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MANAGEMENT REVIEW

on the Performance
of the

U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY

in connection with the
March 30, 1981 Assassination Attempt
on President Ronald Reagan



Department of the Treasury
Office of the General Counsel
August, 1981

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August, 1981

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Shortly after the attempted assassination of the President on March 30, 1981, Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan directed the General Counsel of the Treasury to prepare a report on the performance of Treasury Department agencies in connection with this incident, including "the adequacy of procedures, facilities, and personnel for (i) ascertaining the existence and assessing the seriousness of threats to the President, (ii) protecting the President in his public activities, and (iii) responding promptly and effectively to this and similar incidents. On March 30, 1981, this nation narrowly avoided a tragedy; your report should focus not only on the event itself, but also on its lessons for the future."

The report principally addresses the performance of the Secret Service, but extends also to the activities of other agencies which played a role in the aftermath of the incident, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Customs Service, the groups within the Office of the Secretary concerned with domestic finance and the foreign exchange markets, and the Office of the Secretary itself.

In general, the report concludes that all of these agencies performed well under the circumstances, but that the circumstances themselves were highly favorable. The President was shot by a single alleged assailant who was quickly apprehended; he was attacked in mid-afternoon on a weekday, with a small caliber weapon, in Washington, D.C., at the door of his limousine, close to a fully equipped and staffed metropolitan hospital; most important, the wound was not mortal.

Less favorable circumstances can be easily imagined, and the report attempts to measure the adequacy of existing procedures to meet a more difficult test than that presented on March 30. In this light, the report finds that in certain respects the procedures in effect on March 30 could be improved, that in some cases procedures should be established where none existed on March 30, and that the important work of the Secret Service and other agencies could be made more effective by changes in certain laws and regulations.

Among the principal conclusions and recommendations of the report are the following:

1. The protective responsibilities of the Secret Service have been expanding in recent years while budgetary restraints have reduced the number of Special Agents available for protective duty. Congress should consider an increase in the authorized number of Special Agents and a commensurate increase in the appropriations to the Service for the salaries and expenses of these agents.

II

2. As an agency headed by a career official, the Secret Service should be subject to increased outside supervision. This supervisory role, recommended by the Warren Commission, should remain with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations but should be enhanced to include periodic review of the Service's policies, priorities and organizational structure.

3. In the event of an attack on the President, Service procedures rely on the head of the President's security detail to request a build-up of security personnel around the President. This was the procedure followed at George Washington University Hospital on March 30, 1981. Since the full dimensions of a threat may not be known to the principal agent on the scene, the report suggests that the prudent course would be to adopt procedures which require an immediate increase in security around the President in the aftermath of a threat; the number of agents can then be reduced later as the extent of the threat is more fully assessed.

4. The Service relies on other governmental agencies, including agencies at the State and local levels, to furnish information on individuals and groups which may be of assistance in protecting the President and others. This informal process has inherent limitations and, for the following reasons, is not working as well as it might:

-- legislation on privacy and information access has made sources reluctant to furnish information they had voluntarily provided in the past;

-- a recent decline in information furnished by the FBI, probably attributable to the impact of the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines on the FBI's domestic intelligence activities, has also reduced the amount of useful information available to the Service;

-- the Service has not effectively used its Liaison Division to develop sources of intelligence or to monitor the effectiveness of existing sources; and

-- the Service has not developed an in-house capability to use modern statistical analysis and automated data processing facilities to derive maximum utility from the information it has in its possession.

The report recommends that the Service be given an executive mandate, perhaps in the form of an Executive Order, to require greater assistance from Federal agencies; that consideration be given to narrowing the scope of privacy and information access laws as they apply to information furnished to the Service; that consideration be given to permitting the FBI to expand its domestic security investigations; and that the Service's Liaison Division be reconstituted as a branch of the Intelligence Division.

5. The details of procedures for protecting the President are frequently negotiated between the White House staff advance team, which wants to give the President maximum exposure to press and public, and the Secret Service advance group, which is principally concerned with security. These discussions, always ad hoc, produce uneven protective arrangements. The report recommends that the Service and the White House staff advance group agree on a detailed set of protective procedures for the President, including such matters as whether prior notice of Presidential trips will be provided, the extent to which unscreened members of the public will be able to get close enough to the President to threaten his security, and the circumstances under which the President will make himself available for questions from the press.

6. The Special Agents in the President's protective detail on March 30 -- most notably Special Agents Jerry Parr, Tim McCarthy, D.V. McCarthy, and Ray Shaddick -- reacted in precisely the manner required by their training and the applicable procedures of the Secret Service to cover and evacuate the President. The report recommends that these four agents receive special awards and recognition for their exemplary performance.

7. The President's chances of surviving any future attempt on his life would be enhanced by the presence of a paramedic team in his entourage, by a more complete security survey of the hospital designated for emergencies, and by the presence of his medical records at the hospital or in his limousine.

8. The Service's procedures for increasing security for the Vice President in the event of an attempt on the life of the President should be reviewed and made more specific, and the security of communications with the Vice President's travelling party should be enhanced.

9. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms was able promptly to trace the weapon used in the attack on the President -- a capability which would assume even more importance if a suspect had not been immediately apprehended at the scene. However, the Bureau's tracing ability is largely limited to periods when manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers of firearms are open for business. The report recommends that consideration be given to methods or mechanisms, acceptable to Congress, which would enable the Bureau to effect gun sales traces during non-business hours.

10. Current law may permit the Secretary of the Treasury, through the Customs Service and for limited periods, to control arrivals and departures of conveyances from airports and other United States ports of entry. The report recommends that an existing Executive Order be amended to permit the Secretary, in coordination with the Departments of State and Justice, to develop procedures which could prevent the escape of assailants from the United States in the immediate aftermath of an attempt

on the life of the President.

11. Procedures should be put in place for the prompt notification of successors to the Presidency and other Cabinet level officials in the event of an attempt on the life of the President. These procedures should be implemented by the White House Communications Agency.

Report on the Performance of Certain Agencies of the
United States Treasury Department

In Connection With the
March 30, 1981, Assassination Attempt
On President Ronald Reagan

Peter J. Wallison
The General Counsel
of the Treasury

August, 1981

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I. INTRODUCTION

On March 30, 1981, the President of the United States was fired upon and wounded while leaving a meeting of the Building and Construction Trades Union at the Washington Hilton Hotel. This was the first apparent attempt on the life of a President since 1975, and the first time that a President had been injured in such an attempt since the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, nearly eighteen years ago.

Perhaps more troubling than the incident were its implications. As one more act of violence in a continuing pattern of physical attacks on Presidents and other prominent figures, it raised again the question of how free institutions can defend themselves and still remain free.

Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan, who oversees the Presidential protection activities of the United States Secret Service, responded to the incident by directing the General Counsel of the Department to investigate "all aspects of the incident, including the adequacy of procedures, facilities and personnel for (i) ascertaining the existence and assessing the seriousness of threats to the President, (ii) protecting the President in his public activities, and (iii) responding promptly and effectively to this and similar incidents." He observed that "[o]n March 30, 1981, this nation narrowly avoided a tragedy; your report should focus not only on the event itself, but also on its lessons for the future."

In response to this instruction, the General Counsel of the Treasury established a working group of attorneys, drawn primarily from the law enforcement area, but with support in international affairs and domestic finance. Those attorneys were given full access to the personnel and papers of the Department and its bureaus, including the U.S. Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the U.S. Customs Service. In addition, Secretary Regan requested, and the working group received, the cooperation of the Attorney General, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Finally, on a less formal level, the working group was assisted by personnel in the White House, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Federal Reserve System.

As Secretary Regan suggested, the inquiry went beyond the

question of whether Treasury agencies responded well to the incident of March 30. In many ways, that transfixing encounter with fate was an easy case: the gunman acted alone; on a weekday; with a low-caliber weapon; in Washington, D.C.; while the President was at the door of his limousine; within a mile or two of a fully equipped and staffed metropolitan hospital; above all, the President's wound was not mortal. Anyone can imagine less favorable circumstances, and it is for these that Treasury and other agencies must be prepared.

For this reason, the report focused on the procedures or plans which each Treasury agency involved had in place on March 30 for dealing with an assassination attempt or similar crisis, and compared the agency's performance with the standard established by its plans. Where plans or procedures did not exist, the agency's performance was assessed in light of what professional judgment or common sense would suggest. The report's conclusions evaluate performance in relation to procedures, evaluate procedures for their efficacy, and, in some cases, recommend the establishment of procedures or plans where none existed on March 30.

But the report also had significant limits:

* First, the report does not attempt to suggest an appropriate level of protection for the President. This is fundamentally a political and policy question, suitable ultimately for resolution by the President alone. The means exist fully to protect the President; unfortunately, he must decide whether in availing himself of these means he will reduce his ability to lead and his effectiveness in the office.

* Second, the inquiry was made necessary by a criminal act for which an accused person has not yet come to trial. Accordingly, the inquiry was conducted and the report drafted in such a way as to minimize any possible threat to the procedural rights of the accused. To this end, no interviews of persons who had been at the Washington Hilton on March 30 were conducted without the approval of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, and no such person was interviewed about his observations of the crime itself.

* Third, in conformity with the Secretary's direction, the report is about the Treasury Department and its constituent agencies. The inquiry did not attempt to review or evaluate security plans or procedures of the White House or of the intelligence agencies, or indeed to determine whether such plans exist or were implemented on March 30.

* Fourth, the inquiry was concerned solely with institutional preparedness for, and response to, an attempted assassination of the President. The performance of individuals in conditions of crisis was not relevant to these purposes. Although questions arose concerning the performance of a few individuals during the inquiry, the details of these matters are known to officials who can act appropriately upon them and do not appear in the report.

* Finally, certain agencies may already have evaluated their performance on March 30, 1981, and plan to implement changes based on that evaluation. The inquiry did not attempt to review, and the report does not assess the efficacy, of these changes.

Even with these limitations, however, the report was compelled in some cases to deal with major issues of national policy, issues which require the balancing of competing values or objectives. The report does not presume to strike this balance, but seeks only to make somewhat more clear the implicit choices which underlie current policies. What is already clear is that a democratic system which values an orderly transfer of authority through free elections cannot allow the results of these processes to be redirected or reversed by violence.

II. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS OF MARCH 30, 1981,
PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO HILTON HOTEL

President Ronald Reagan was scheduled to visit the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981, to speak to representatives of the Building and Construction Trades Union, AFL-CIO. The President was to arrive by motorcade from the White House, reaching the hotel at approximately 1:50 p.m. After entering the hotel, the President would have his picture taken with fifteen union leaders, and then go into the main ballroom to speak briefly to approximately 4,000 members of the union. Following the speech, the President would return to his motorcade, parked on the "T" Street side of the hotel, and depart for the White House, where he was to arrive at about 2:30 p.m. The visit was expected to be routine.

Since the President had been making similar trips to the Hilton approximately once every other week, the White House staff and the Secret Service had developed a standard drill for Hilton visits. In accordance with that procedure, the White House designated a staff advance man, in this case Rick Ahearn, and provided him with the President's itinerary. The staff then informed the Secret Service's Presidential Protective Division (the "PPD") of the scheduled visit. On Wednesday, March 25, the PPD notified Special Agent William Green that he would be the lead advance Special Agent for the March 30 visit. Ahearn was responsible for arranging the President's schedule during the Hilton visit, while Green was responsible for coordinating all security preparations.

On the morning of Friday, March 27, Ahearn, Green, and members of their respective advance teams met with Hilton representatives and with union officials to make arrangements for the visit scheduled for the following Monday. By Friday evening, the entire Secret Service advance team had been notified of their assignments. Over the weekend, Green and Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon, who was in charge of transportation, arranged for the participation of other Secret Service Special Agents and police officers in providing security for the President for the entire time he would be outside the White House.

On Monday, the day of the visit, Gordon drove through the routes to be taken to and from the Hilton with a representative of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. Later that morning, Green and an agent from the Service's Washington field

office went through the hotel looking for security problems. The Special Agents assigned to guard particular posts in the hotel, a counter-sniper team, and an intelligence team were then briefed and placed at their stations. Personnel from the Service's Technical Security Division conducted searches inside the hotel and around the arrival area, looking for explosive devices or any similar threat to the security of the President. Remaining security preparations for the President's arrival were completed.

The President's motorcade left the White House at 1:45 p.m., and arrived at the Hilton at 1:50 p.m., as scheduled. The limousine pulled into a driveway parallel to "T" Street and stopped directly outside the VIP entrance; the President waited for his Secret Service escort to surround the limousine, and then got out of the car and went inside the hotel. There were no unusual incidents during the trip from the White House to the Hilton.

Rick Ahearn met the President at the entrance to the hotel and conducted him inside. President Reagan had his picture taken with several union leaders in a "holding room," and then was escorted to the main ballroom for his speech. The speech began at approximately 2:00 p.m.

In accordance with usual procedure, the motorcade cars were backed up, after the President had gone into the hotel, so that the Presidential limousine was parked at an angle to the curb, with the front of the limousine facing onto "T" Street. A follow-up car was parked a few feet behind the limousine; the rest of the motorcade was parked either behind that follow-up car, or out on "T" Street itself.

At approximately 2:20 p.m., Green informed the agents that the President was concluding his speech and would be out momentarily. The motorcade drivers returned to their vehicles, and the Metropolitan Police Department officers resumed their assigned posts. The President concluded his speech shortly thereafter, and left the main ballroom. He was accompanied to the holding room, and from there to the VIP entrance, by Secret Service Special Agents and members of his staff.

When the Presidential party came through the VIP entrance, there were more than 200 people on hand. Most of these spectators were across "T" Street, blocked off by police; others were behind a rope barricade, which stretched across the sidewalk alongside the driveway leading to the VIP entrance. The area behind the rope was not a designated "press area," restricted

to those with press credentials; the area had normally been open to the public during prior Presidential visits to the Hilton.

The Secret Service protective detail came out of the hotel through the VIP door, and went to take up positions around the limousine. The President exited, accompanied by Special Agents Parr and Shaddick, Press Secretary James Brady, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, Military Aide Jose Muratti, and advance Special Agent Green. Special Agent Tim McCarthy opened the right rear door of the limousine. The President responded to calls of "Mr. President" from the crowd, and waved first with one hand, then the other.

At that moment, John Warnock Hinckley is alleged to have stepped from the second row of the crowd behind the rope barrier, held a .22 caliber handgun in front of him with both hands, and fired six shots at the President.

At the sound of the shots, Special Agent Parr immediately pushed the President toward the back seat of the limousine. As he fell toward the seat of the limousine with Parr on top of him, the President was apparently struck beneath the left arm by one bullet which ricocheted off the side of the limousine and passed through the small space between the door and the limousine's body. Shaddick pushed Parr and the President into the limousine, and closed the door behind them. The limousine moved off in less than ten seconds, dodged a stalled Metropolitan Police Department car, drove up "T" Street and turned left onto Connecticut Avenue.

The six shots had been fired by the assailant in a period of less than two seconds. One shot struck Press Secretary Brady in the head, and he fell to the ground immediately. Another struck Officer Delahanty in the neck; a third struck Special Agent Tim McCarthy in the upper torso as he turned, screening the President with raised arms, toward the sound of the shots. Two more shots ricocheted off the armored limousine, one of which struck the President. A sixth shot traveled across the street and passed through a window.

The first individual to reach the assailant was Alfred Antenucci, a civilian who jumped on him from behind as the last shot was fired. Reacting to the shots, Special Agent D.V. McCarthy moved along the rope line in front of the crowd and was the first law enforcement officer to reach Hinckley, diving on him as he continued to pull the trigger on an empty gun. McCarthy was followed immediately by Sergeant Granger and

Officer Swain of the Metropolitan Police Department. The assailant had his weapon quickly shaken from him; this weapon was eventually retrieved by Special Agent Thomas Lightsey. After some seconds, D.V. McCarthy was able to handcuff Hinckley, as other Secret Service Special Agents and police officers moved to surround them. Although several Secret Service Special Agents drew their weapons, no shots were fired, and only the persons struck by the assailant's bullets were injured. As the Secret Service and the police began to clear the scene of bystanders, the rest of the motorcade was able to leave, several seconds behind the limousine.

One of the U.S. Park Police motorcycle officers left his motorcycle and ran to assist the agents struggling with Hinckley. As he arrived at the crowd of Special Agents, he lost his .38 caliber revolver, which fell alongside the prostrate Brady. For some minutes, this revolver was mistaken for the weapon used by the assailant, causing considerable confusion. The officer subsequently retrieved his revolver, and assisted in moving Hinckley toward the Metropolitan Police Department cruiser brought to the scene by Sergeant Granger. When the rear door of Granger's vehicle would not open, the crowd of Special Agents and policemen moved to a second Metropolitan Police Department cruiser. Hinckley was pushed into this vehicle, and was taken to the Metropolitan Police Department Central Cell Block.

The wounded were given some limited medical assistance at the hotel by two paramedics who identified themselves to Secret Service agents on the scene. McCarthy, Brady, and Delahanty were removed, in that order, by ambulances. McCarthy and Brady were taken to George Washington University Hospital, while Delahanty was taken to the Washington Hospital Center.

This activity was taking place as the Presidential motorcade traveled along Connecticut Avenue. Once the Presidential limousine had cleared the area of the Hilton, the President asked Parr to get off him, and complained of pain in his ribs. Parr radioed, "[The President] is OK," and instructed the motorcade to proceed to the White House. Parr continued to examine the President and found no evidence of external injury, but noticed that the President was bleeding from his mouth. The President suggested that he might have broken a rib; Parr was unsure of the precise nature of the President's injury, but he decided nonetheless to divert the motorcade to George Washington University Hospital (the hospital designated for emergency use on the Hilton trip).

Special Agent Unrue, driving the President's limousine, informed the motorcade by radio and Secret Service agents monitoring the broadcast notified the hospital of the change in plan. Hospital personnel were not told that the President was injured, however, since no one in the motorcade had said that the President had been hurt (Parr radioed a request for a stretcher, but not until after the hospital had been notified). When the President reached the hospital, the emergency trauma staff inside was assembling, but no stretcher was brought outside for his use.

Special Agents Parr and Shaddick escorted the President through the doors of the emergency entrance. After the President got inside, his knees buckled; Parr and Shaddick assisted him inside the emergency room, where he was placed on a cart and moved to the trauma area. A team of seven or eight emergency personnel, headed by Dr. Joseph Giordano, removed the President's clothing. It was only after the President's shirt had been removed that the medical personnel attending the President realized that he had been shot.

The President spent approximately forty minutes in the trauma area being prepared for surgery. He remained conscious throughout this preliminary treatment, and was able to speak with Mrs. Reagan and emergency personnel. The President was moved to an operating room at some time between 3:15 p.m. and 3:30 p.m.

Dr. Benjamin Aaron assumed command of the President's operating team and commenced the surgery for removal of the bullet. He encountered a great deal of bleeding from the President's chest; later estimates indicated that the President lost almost one-half of the volume of blood in his body before going into surgery. Initially, Dr. Aaron was unable to trace the path of the bullet; although he reportedly decided at least once to terminate the surgery without locating the bullet, he continued and was able to locate the bullet shortly before 6:00 p.m. The bullet had been flattened, and upon removal appeared to be roughly the shape of a dime. Following surgery, the President was moved to a recovery room after 6:30 p.m.

Chief of Staff James Baker and Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese were informed of the shooting within minutes of its occurrence. Baker and Meese went to the hospital, while Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, National Security Adviser Richard Allen, CIA Director William Casey, and Attorney General William French Smith met in the White House Situation

Room.

Vice President Bush was notified of the incident as his Air Force plane left Fort Worth, Texas, destined for Austin. The Vice President decided to allow the plane to be refueled in Austin, and then to return to Washington. His return to the White House occurred without incident. Landing at Andrews Air Force Base at approximately 6:30 p.m., he was taken by helicopter to his official residence at the Naval Observatory, and then by motorcade to the White House. The Vice President went directly to the Situation Room, and, except for a brief statement to the press at approximately 8:00 p.m., remained there until 9:45 p.m.

While the President was being treated for his injuries and senior government officials were taking steps in response to the shooting, law enforcement agencies, headed by the FBI, initiated an investigation of the incident. The man apprehended at the Hilton was interviewed by representatives of the FBI, the Metropolitan Police Department, and the Secret Service; his wallet and personal belongings were searched for investigative leads. Shortly after 3:00 p.m. he was identified as Hinckley, and Federal agencies began cross-checking records for any information on the suspect. When his identity was announced by the national news services, field offices in geographic areas Hinckley had been known to frequent did the same. By 4:30 p.m., the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had successfully traced the handgun used in the assault to a pawnshop in Dallas, and had learned that Hinckley had purchased other weapons and ammunition at that shop and at other locations.

The Washington field office of the FBI took custody of Hinckley shortly before 5:00 p.m.; at 11:00 p.m., criminal complaints were sworn against Hinckley for attempting to kill the President and assaulting Federal officers. After a preliminary hearing, Hinckley was moved to a Marine Corps brig at Quantico, Virginia.

III. TREASURY DEPARTMENT PERFORMANCE:
PROCEDURES AND EXECUTION

Two Treasury agencies -- the Secret Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms -- played important roles in the events of March 30, 1981. The Customs Service, another Treasury law enforcement agency, had no direct involvement in the protection of the President or the apprehension of his assailant that day, but Customs has authority to take actions at ports of entry and departure from the United States which, under different circumstances, could contribute significantly to the President's safety. Finally, various units within the Office of the Secretary of the Treasury took actions on March 30, 1981, which reflect the degree to which the Department as a whole is prepared to deal with crises such as an attempted assassination of the President.

The remaining sections of this report will deal in turn with each of these Treasury agencies or units, evaluating the emergency procedures which were in effect on March 30, 1981, and assessing the degree to which these procedures actually guided agency action or were effective in achieving their purposes.

The conclusions suggested by this review, together with appropriate recommendations, appear at the end of each principal section.

A. United States Secret Service

BASIC AUTHORITY

The United States Secret Service is an agency of approximately 3,500 employees, organized into a Washington, D.C., headquarters and 61 domestic (and two foreign) field offices. While the Service is charged with protection of the President and a number of other protective responsibilities ^{1/}, it must also investigate violations of laws against counterfeiting and forgery, and fraudulent negotiation of Government checks, bonds and other securities.

The performance of the Secret Service on March 30, 1981, must be reviewed against a background of budget constraints. Secret Service officials point out that over the past four years their force of Special Agents has declined by 72 (to 1,544) and the force of Uniformed Division officers has declined by 97 (to 800), which the Service's protective responsibilities have increased. All government agencies claim to be understaffed, but the Service's vital protective mission suggests that its statements of concern in this respect should receive special attention from Congress.

1/ The responsibilities include protection of: the President's immediate family; the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the Office of the President; the President- and Vice President-elect; the members of their immediate families, unless the members decline such protection; the visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad; persons who are classified as major Presidential or Vice Presidential candidates unless such protection is declined; former Presidents and their spouses; the Executive Residence and grounds and any building in which the White House offices are located; the temporary official residence of the Vice President and grounds in the District of Columbia; foreign diplomatic missions in the Washington metropolitan area and such areas in the United States, its territories and possessions, as the President may direct on a case-by-case basis; protection of foreign diplomatic missions located in metropolitan areas in the United States where there are located twenty or more such missions headed by full-time officers (only under certain enumerated circumstances); and the Main Treasury Building and its Annex in Washington, D.C.

ORGANIZATION

An understanding of the methods used by the Secret Service to provide protection for the President requires some working knowledge of its organizational structure and the ways in which it divides responsibility.

Functioning under a Director, H. Stuart Knight, and a Deputy Director, Myron J. Weinstein, the Secret Service has five Assistant Directors whose responsibilities generally reflect the structure of the organization: Investigations, Protective Operations, Protective Research, Administration, and Inspection. The last two are support functions, with no direct management role in a crisis situation. Only the roles of the first three, and their subordinate offices and units, will be covered in this report.

* The Office of Investigations, under Acting Assistant Director Robert R. Burke, has line authority over the 63 field offices of the Secret Service located throughout the United States and abroad. Those offices are staffed with most of the 1,544 Special Agents of the Secret Service, who investigate incidents of counterfeiting and forgery when they are not performing intelligence investigations or direct protective duties. Of these 63 field offices, the one with the largest protective mission by far, and the one on which this report will focus, is the Washington, D.C., field office.

* The Office of Protective Operations, under Assistant Director John R. Simpson, supervises the Uniformed Division and the protective details -- those units of Special Agents assigned full-time to the protection of specific persons, traveling with them and drawing on the field offices for support and supplementation as necessary. The Uniformed Division, composed of 800 officers, is trained as a police force and assigned to guard the White House and foreign missions within the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia.

* The Office of Protective Research, under Acting Assistant Director Robert R. Snow, is responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of protective intelligence information for the entire Secret Service; it provides policies and procedures relating to data systems and communications, and it develops and conducts scientific and technical programs in support of the Service's protective and investigative responsibilities. Located only at the Service's Washington, D.C., headquarters, the Office of Protective Research consists of six divisions, and is staffed with approxi-

mately 66 Special Agents and a number of technicians and specialists.

In addition, the Director has Assistants for Public Affairs and Training, and a Legal Counsel, who provides legal advice to the Director but reports directly to Treasury's General Counsel. Of these, only the Public Affairs Assistant has a role in a crisis involving the President of the United States. Therefore, although Public Affairs is not a part of the Service's protective staff, it will also be covered in this report.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

This report's analysis of the performance of the Secret Service follows, as closely as possible within the constraints of the Service's structure, the sequence in which the Service's various constituent organizations had their most intense involvement in the process of protecting the President on March 30 --

- * The Office of Protective Intelligence, which has its greatest impact on the President's safety in the work that it does long before any particular trip;

- * The "advance" group -- the Special Agents and specialists drawn from a cross section of the Service's protective organizations who prepared the way for the President at the Washington Hilton;

- * The "protective detail" of specially trained Special Agents who accompanied the President throughout the day, covered him with their bodies, and evacuated him to George Washington University Hospital;

- * The Special Agents who went to George Washington University Hospital to aid in establishing security for the President after the evacuation from the Hilton;

- * The Special Agents who remained at the Hilton Hotel to coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and gather intelligence for the prosecution of the suspect and for evaluation in connection with the Service's protective functions; and

- * The protection that the Service maintained for the Vice President as the possibility arose that he might have to assume

the Presidency.

Initially, however, the report will review the procedures for crisis management which were in place at the Service on March 30, 1981.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Within the Secret Service crisis management scheme there are three principal assigned areas of responsibility, roughly corresponding to the three line Assistant Directors. As is set forth below in more detail, within the Intelligence Division of the Office of Protective Research, an intelligence Command/Control Center is established for coordination of all intelligence and alert notifications. Within the Office of Investigations, the Assistant Director, operating primarily through his subordinate field office in the geographical locale of the crisis, is responsible for preserving the security of the crime or incident scene until the arrival of the FBI, and for working with the FBI on the subsequent criminal investigation. Within the Office of Protective Operations, the head of the protective detail involved in the crisis is responsible for continuing emergency coordination of protection. On March 30, 1981, all three of these emergency procedures went into operation.

Intelligence Division's Command/Control Center

Procedures

In a May 20, 1980, memorandum, titled "Headquarters Emergency Situation Response", Deputy Director Weinstein set out procedures for the establishment of a "top level command and/or control facility where emergency situations can be coordinated" at headquarters and in the Service's Washington field office. Within the Secret Service this procedure is understood to cover emergency "incoming and outgoing information/communications" together with initial emergency personnel notification. Actual command responsibility for the discharge of the protective and criminal missions of the Service is covered in another memorandum, discussed below.

Under the procedures set out in the Headquarters Emergency Situation Response memorandum, the Operations Desk Supervisor of the Intelligence Division is responsible for notifying all affected offices, working from a published list contained in the memorandum. Personnel in each office are in turn responsible for ensuring that the head of the office and all others with a need to know are promptly notified.

Any Assistant Director may activate the headquarters Command/Control Center. If more than one Assistant Director is directly involved, the Director or Deputy Director is required to designate which Assistant Director will be in charge at the Center. That Assistant Director is then responsible for insuring that all incoming and outgoing information and communications concerning the emergency situation are channeled through the Center. A representative from the office of each Assistant Director which has a role in the emergency and a representative of the Office of Public Affairs (depending on the nature of the emergency) are expected to report to the Center and to serve as contact points for communication of information in either direction.

Beyond the establishment of the Center and the requirement for accomplishing appropriate notifications, the May 20, 1980, memorandum does not contain procedures to govern the conduct of the Center. The personnel available to staff the Center, however, are experienced Special Agents who staff the duty desk as a routine matter. There is a substantial similarity between their daily responsibilities and the intelligence and communications functions that they are likely to be required to perform during a crisis.

Execution of Center Procedures

With written instructions in place for establishing a headquarters Command/Control Center, the Secret Service responded quickly in setting up a Center on March 30. Acting Deputy Assistant Director Richard E. Keiser took charge of the Center, but left the principal command to the Intelligence Division's Special Agent in Charge, Edward Walsh.

Walsh assumed overall supervision of the Command Center within a minute or two of the receipt of the initial radio reports that there had been an attack on the President. Personnel from the Office of Protective Operations, the Office of Investigations, and the Public Affairs Office quickly assembled at peripheral desks around the duty desk operation and Walsh installed senior Special Agents in the key positions at the desk. Communications were immediately established with the Hilton Hotel Security Room and with the Intelligence Squad at the Washington field office. In addition, telephone arrangements were established between the duty desk and the Protective Operations and Investigations Offices.

The Command/Control Center was not intended to handle the deployment of physical protection. Its demands on field offices are for the development of intelligence -- and to the extent this requires additional manpower the Office of Investigations transfers personnel among field offices as needed.

Operational Crisis-Management

Operational Crisis-Management Procedures

The Secret Service also has written procedures governing crisis response by operational personnel. These are set out in an April 23, 1979, memorandum issued by Deputy Director Weinstein. Among other things, that memorandum directs that the first Intelligence Team present at the attack site is to establish an "interim federal presence" and maintain that presence until relieved by the FBI or the Special Agent in Charge of the local field office.

The Assistant Director (Office of Protective Research) is assigned responsibility for determining the nature of the attack and the potential for additional threats to protected persons; the protective detail leader "[h]as the ultimate responsibility to evacuate and provide necessary security for the protectee"; and the Special Agent in Charge of the field office (which was the Washington, D.C., field office in the March 30 crisis) is responsible for assisting the protective detail leader in insuring the safety and evacuation of the protected person. The memorandum contains no provisions requiring an automatic increase in the level of protection around the President.

Except for Special Agents assigned to the protective details for specific protected persons, in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area there are approximately 280 Special Agents (of whom 110 are assigned to the Washington Field Office) and 800 Officers of the Uniformed Division. As a practical matter, on any given day these Agents and Officers handle regular protective and other assignments, or may be in leave status, effectively reducing the number available to protect the President.

Execution of Operational Crisis-Management Procedures

No Secret Service Special Agent or Uniformed Division Officer had been posted at George Washington Hospital on March 30, 1981. Immediately upon learning that the President had been taken to this hospital, Acting Special Agent in Charge Andrew Berger of the Washington field office sent one supervisor (Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Pat Miller) and a small group of Special Agents to the hospital. When it arrived at the hospital, the Presidential motorcade radioed a request for more manpower; within a few minutes, Berger sent another Special Agent followed at approximately 3:00 p.m. by a small group of additional Special Agents.

Information prepared later by the Washington field office suggests that some other agents may have gone on their own or been sent over during this period, but between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., no additional agents were requested by Pat Miller, and none were sent spontaneously by Berger. Throughout these hours, Berger recalls receiving no communications from the Presidential detail concerning the situation at the hospital, and recalls no significant communications from headquarters concerning manpower needs. A reserve of Special Agents was gathered in the Washington field office conference room, and was parcelled out on other assignments during the course of the afternoon.

Most of the attention of supervisory Washington field office personnel was directed to the arrangements concerning the custody of Hinckley; the transmittal of information derived from Hinckley's personal effects (the first significant intelligence accumulated to help determine the nature and extent of the crisis) to the Command/Control Center at headquarters and to the appropriate field offices; and coordination with other protective details in the Washington, D.C., area.

In the meantime, Gerald Bechtle, acting as Assistant Director of Protective Operations, sent instructions to the Washington Hilton to hold the original security contingent at the hotel in order to execute his understanding of the "interim federal presence" requirements of the April 23, 1979 memorandum. That memorandum actually assigned the responsibility for maintaining that presence to the first intelligence team on the scene and did not, at least in its express terms, require that the intelligence team keep other Special Agents there.

Just after 4:00 p.m., Bechtle directed the Uniformed Division to send as many officers as possible to the hospital.

Then, a little after 5:00 p.m., Bechtle received a call from Miller at the hospital asking for a substantial number of Special Agents. This call had been diverted from the Washington field office because Miller could not get through on the telephone lines. Miller was anticipating the President's removal from surgery, and he expected to need additional manpower to station in a couple of additional areas of the hospital. In response, Bechtle had the Office of Training at headquarters queried to see if Special Agents could be located in the in-service training classes that were being conducted in downtown Washington.

During the first hour and a half the Office of Investigations received no requests for help from the Presidential detail at the hospital, or from Bechtle in Protective Operations, from whom they would have expected any requests to come. Assistant Director Burke recalls calling Berger at the Washington field office around 6:00 p.m. to ask whether Inspection should provide manpower to the hospital, and that Berger said no.

While additional small numbers of Special Agents were sent to the hospital site during the afternoon, it does not appear that supervisory Secret Service agents away from the hospital had any specific information concerning the number of Secret Service personnel actually there or, except as noted above, attempted to increase manpower on the site during the first two hours or so.

In effect, headquarters crisis managers followed the implications of existing procedures and assumed that the Presidential detail personnel on site, and the Washington field office personnel sent there shortly afterward, would request whatever assistance was necessary. The requests they received from the hospital site were few, and took some period of time to fulfill; as a consequence, the number of Service personnel at the hospital did not reach a level substantially greater than the security that had been established at the Hilton prior to the shooting until late in the afternoon of March 30.

Office of Public Affairs: Crisis Response

Procedures

The Office of Public Affairs at Secret Service has no written procedures which prescribe how office functions are to

be performed under either routine or emergency conditions. However, the Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs), Jack Warner, has held that position for a number of years and has developed a set of unwritten procedures for office operations when an event occurs which attracts substantial media interest.

Under these procedures, personnel assigned to the Office are instructed that only Warner will handle wire service calls and audiotaping for radio and television. Determinations of what information will be released are also made by Warner. Information released through the Service's Public Affairs Office is only that which relates to actions of the Service itself, as long as such release does not interfere with the Service's mission.

Action of Public Affairs Personnel on March 30

The Office received notification of the assassination attempt from the Command/Control Center in the Intelligence Division almost immediately. The Center remained the primary source of information for the Public Affairs Office throughout the afternoon.

The Office immediately took steps to inform the Director and Deputy Director, and assigned staff to the Command/Control Center. It was assumed that the Center would not be able to reach the Public Affairs Office by telephone, and a messenger system was arranged to transmit information.

The Office's major activity during the afternoon of March 30 was responding to an overwhelming number of inquiries from the press. Wire service calls and taping for radio and television were handled personally by Warner. There was an initial effort to have him respond to all the network inquiries as well, but there were too many.

There was little, if any, contact between the Public Affairs Office and similar offices of the Treasury Department or its other bureaus. There was some communication with the White House press office, primarily to coordinate information with Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes. Although the hospital and the White House had established a press room in a hospital auditorium, the Secret Service's Public Affairs Office had no contact with it.

During the afternoon, a large number of reporters congregated in the eighth floor lobby area at Secret Service headquarters. Warner briefed them as information became available.

Although Warner was routinely asked questions which did not relate specifically to activities of the Service, he did not respond to them.

Conclusions

1. The Secret Service system for establishing a Command/Control Center at the duty desk of the Intelligence Division is a sound and effective method of ensuring that emergency notification is provided to the appropriate personnel, and that intelligence is collected and disseminated throughout the Service. This system was implemented in an effective and timely manner on March 30, 1981.

2. While the Secret Service has regular procedures for maintaining security around the President, in a crisis situation such as the aftermath of an attempted assassination the procedures do not contemplate an increase in security unless the head of the President's protective detail makes a decision to request additional assistance. This may not be the most reasonable allocation of responsibility. The principal agent on the scene may not know the dimensions of the threat that produced the attempt; his attention is likely to be focused on the immediate physical welfare of the President, and he may hesitate to call for increased security simply because he is not aware that the threat which places the President in jeopardy extends beyond a single assassin.

The key question appears to be whether the Service should act first and risk over-manning or await a more comprehensive view of the circumstances before increasing security around the President. On the facts of March 30, viewed with hindsight, there was no need for special precautions. But in the first hour at the hospital the Service could not have known this.

The prudent course would appear to be the establishment of procedures which will rapidly increase security in the immediate aftermath of an assassination attempt. These procedures should contain special provisions to accommodate the special situations that arise in the Washington, D.C., area.

3. Despite the absence of written procedures on March 30, the Office of Public Affairs at Secret Service functioned satisfactorily.

The Office has followed a policy of attempting to confine its press contacts to matters peculiarly within the knowledge

of, and related specifically to, the Secret Service. Based on a review of press clippings and an interview with the Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs), there is no indication that the office went beyond its mandate in providing information to the public.

Recommendation

The Secret Service should consider whether to establish procedures for substantially and rapidly increasing security around the President in any crisis situation -- such as that at the hospital on March 30, 1981 -- in which the degree of continuing danger to the President is largely unknown. These procedures should take account of variations in the level of manpower available to the Secret Service due to such factors as the time of day and the location of the President.

PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

Procedures

The Secret Service responsibility for developing intelligence for protective purposes is assigned to the Office of Protective Research. Within that office are six divisions. The primary intelligence collection and analysis functions are assigned to the Intelligence Division and the Liaison Division. In the Washington, D.C. area, these two divisions are substantially augmented by personnel of the Washington field office intelligence squad.

Intelligence Received Via The White House

White House personnel turn over to the Secret Service letters and telephone calls that appear threatening to the President or another official. If the matter requires further investigation a field investigation is authorized. Individuals who come to the White House complex and appear threatening to the President or others are interviewed and, if further investigation is warranted, referred to the protective intelligence squad of the Washington field office.

Intelligence Received From the Field

Intelligence in the field is collected through field office investigations, from state and local agencies, and from the field offices of other Federal agencies. Intelligence from state and local agencies will include information elicited from or volunteered by law enforcement groups, local mental hospitals, and state and local government offices.

The degree to which the field is successful in generating intelligence is solely attributable to informal field liaison efforts aimed at either requesting information and assistance or educating local agencies to the Service's intelligence needs. These efforts are informally monitored and encouraged by the Intelligence Division at headquarters.

Secret Service Director Stuart Knight has stated on several occasions that the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act have contributed to a decrease over the last several years in intelligence information received from various sources, including other law enforcement agencies and foreign countries. For example, in testimony before committees of both

the House and Senate following the March 30 assassination attempt, Knight testified that foreign law enforcement organizations, as well as state and local police, are reluctant to share information with the Secret Service and other Federal agencies. This reluctance, he believes, is largely the result of the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act, which have led foreign and other information sources to believe that the United States government agencies cannot maintain the confidentiality of the information they receive.

The Secret Service's view is almost universally shared by other law enforcement officials. In a report entitled "Impact of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts on Law Enforcement Agencies," dated November 15, 1978, the Comptroller General noted that "law enforcement officials at all levels of government have stated in congressional testimony that the proliferation of access and privacy laws has been instrumental in creating a restrictive climate which affects their ability to obtain information from the public and institutions, to recruit and maintain informants, and to exchange information with other law enforcement agencies."

Law enforcement officials reported, according to the GAO Report, that the Privacy Act has had some of its most severe effects on their ability to obtain information from institutions such as hospitals, banks and telephone companies. While law enforcement agencies could previously obtain records from these institutions on an informal basis, an increasing number require the agencies to obtain a subpoena before providing the information. Secret Service officials told the GAO that since most of the threats against the President come from mentally unstable individuals, timely access to records maintained by mental institutions is critical when the President or other dignitaries travel around the country.

Intelligence Received from other Federal Agencies

The Service has entered into memoranda of understanding or agreements with other Federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. These agreements describe in broad, general terms the intelligence sought by the Service, and an examination of various editions of these agreements used over the past ten years shows little substantive evolution in the description of information the agencies are to furnish.^{2/}

^{2/} [Footnote on next page]

Neither the Liaison Division nor the Intelligence Division has any procedures for monitoring whether Federal agencies have internal guidelines implementing the agreements and educating their personnel as to Service intelligence needs, although the Intelligence Division itself tries to use its limited staff to perform these functions informally with respect to some -----

2/ [Footnote from previous page] Agreements commonly specify seven "types" of information to be referred to the Service:

1. Information concerning attempts, threats, or conspiracies to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by the USSS or other U.S. or foreign officials in the U.S. or abroad.
2. Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means, or attempts personally to contact such officials for that purpose.
3. Information concerning threatening, irrational, or abusive written or oral statements about U.S. Government or foreign officials.
4. Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U.S. demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic establishments.
5. Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-making; concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or other implements of war; or other terrorist activity.
6. Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a desire to defect from the United States and who demonstrate one or more of the following characteristics:
 - a. irrational or suicidal behavior or other emotional instability.
 - b. strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiment.
 - c. a propensity toward violence.
7. Information concerning persons who may be considered potentially dangerous to individuals protected by the USSS because of their background or activities, including evidence of emotional instability or participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the United States.

agencies. Infrequently, Liaison arranges meetings with representatives of other Federal agencies in which Intelligence Division personnel can describe their intelligence requirements.

Liaison Division agents maintain informal relations with the rest of the Federal community, and will serve as a conduit for Intelligence Division requests to these agencies for specific information. Some agencies provide formal liaison contacts while others do not, forcing Liaison Division agents to establish their own contacts on an informal basis. Liaison Division agents also distribute to their Federal agency contacts boilerplate descriptions, similar to those in the formal agreements, of Service intelligence needs. How these handouts are utilized by the Federal agencies is not monitored.

In some instances Federal agencies provide the Service with intelligence in response to a direct request for specific information from the Intelligence Division, or in response to a request from the Liaison Division. At other times, these agencies, especially the FBI and the CIA, unilaterally provide intelligence they judge to be of interest to the Service. Intelligence suppliers have not been assessed or evaluated with a view to improving their performance.

Information collected and disseminated by the FBI is the most important source of Secret Service intelligence on potential domestic threats to the President, and has a significant impact on the ability of the Service to fulfill its mission. As a general matter, intelligence received from the FBI will be of two types: information about the intentions and objectives of individuals and groups, and information about what individuals and groups have actually done.

Since the Service is interested in predictive information -- that is, intelligence which will enable it to assess possible threats to the President -- information about intentions is a good deal more valuable to the Service than information about completed acts, from which future intentions may only be inferred.

This distinction has led the Service to become increasingly concerned in recent years about a decline in the FBI's domestic intelligence activities, and the almost exclusive emphasis which the FBI has begun to place on its role as an agency engaged in investigation for purposes of assisting prosecutorial authorities. Generally speaking, much domestic

intelligence investigation may be usefully characterized as the process of discovering, through informants or otherwise, the intentions and objectives of groups. On the other hand, investigations in aid of prosecution focus principally on actions already taken -- information which at best is only of marginal utility to the Service.

An example of the limited usefulness of law enforcement information to the Service is the arrest of John W. Hinckley at the Nashville Airport on October 9, 1980. The facts of that incident are not in dispute. Hinckley had attempted to board a commercial airliner with three pistols. Although he could have transported them lawfully in baggage checked through to his destination, he instead tried to carry them into the passenger compartment and was arrested by airport police. The fact that Hinckley has been accused of the shooting on March 30, 1981, has raised questions about whether the Service should have been on notice of the threat he posed to the President.

The arrest coincided with substantial Presidential campaign activity in Tennessee. Then-candidate Ronald Reagan had just cancelled a trip scheduled for October 8 to Memphis; President Carter was conducting a town meeting in Nashville's Grand Old Opry; and the wife of Vice President Mondale had left Nashville a day earlier. Local police officials considered the arrest routine and unrelated to President Carter's visit -- a reasonable conclusion in light of the fact that the President was still speaking when Hinckley was arrested.

Nevertheless, the arrest was reported to the FBI because the attempted boarding with the pistols violated Federal as well as local law. The FBI treated the case as one that the local U.S. Attorney would automatically decline to prosecute, and did not refer it. Neither did the FBI pass the information along to the Secret Service -- also not an unreasonable decision in light of the fact that there are thousands of such arrests annually in the United States and nothing in the circumstances of Hinckley's arrest to suggest that he was or would become a danger to the President. In the absence of evidence of a threat, the agreement between the Service and the FBI did not require the FBI to report Hinckley's arrest to the Service.

Even assuming, however, that the information had been passed on to the Service by the FBI, one cannot conclude that the consequences would have been different. The Service does not have the manpower to interview every person who was arrested -- for example, on a weapons charge -- in each city visited by the President in the course of a political campaign.

Absent a stronger suggestion on the face of the data that an investigation should be undertaken, the most the Service could reasonably do with raw arrest information would be store it for later correlation with other facts. If, for example, the same person were arrested in another city the President is visiting, the coincidence might suggest that he is "stalking" the President and justify a more thorough investigation. Today, the Service's resources do not permit such data correlation.

The data processing and intelligence resources required for a system which could achieve such correlations would be massive, and even then there could be no assurance that the linking of circumstantial data to support an inference of danger would be more than mere chance. Normally, follow-up investigation would still be needed.

Limitations on resources -- and indeed effective use of resources by the Service -- compel the Service to concentrate its efforts on collecting, analyzing and investigating information which more directly indicates a threat to the President. This is information about the overtly or covertly expressed intentions of individuals or groups.

From the protection-oriented perspective of the Service, therefore, the decline in FBI domestic intelligence activities has caused a critical overall decline in the useful information the Service receives from the FBI. In November 1979, Secret Service Director Stuart Knight testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the Service was, at that time, receiving only about 40 percent of what it had previously received from the FBI, and that this reduced intelligence product had deteriorated in quality. Explaining what he meant by quality, he referred to the loss of information concerning motives and plans.

Knight repeated these statements in the aftermath of the March 30 assassination attempt, in testimony before other committees of the House and Senate, specifically attributing this loss of useful intelligence to the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines. These are discussed below.

On March 10, 1976, then Attorney General Edward Levi issued Domestic Security Guidelines which, in effect, prevented the FBI from engaging in domestic intelligence gathering unless it was in possession of "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or a group is or may be engaged in activities which (1) involve the use of force or violence and which (2) involve or will involve the violation of

federal law for one or more of [certain] purposes [related to the overthrow of the government or abridgement of civil rights]." 3/

The Domestic Security Guidelines define three stages of investigation: preliminary, limited and full. Preliminary and limited investigations are confined to determining whether a full investigation is warranted. They may be undertaken only on the reasonable belief that a violation of federal law, by way of force or violence, is involved, and they may only be carried on for short periods of time. A limited investigation allows a somewhat greater range of investigative techniques than is available in a preliminary investigation, but it must be authorized in writing by a Special Agent in Charge or FBI Headquarters. Full investigations must be authorized by FBI Headquarters based on specific and articulable facts concerning the use of force or violence in committing certain crimes.

The Guidelines limit the period during which a full investigation may be conducted to one year, extendable only if the Department of Justice gives written authority. 4/

3/ Attorney General's Guidelines for domestic security investigations, issued by Attorney General Edward Levi, published April 5, 1976, Subparagraph II.I.

4/ [Id., II.E. Preliminary investigations are limited to:]

- (1) examination of FBI indices and files;
- (2) examination of public records and other public sources of information;
- (3) examination of federal, state, and local records;
- (4) inquiry of existing sources of information and use of previously established informants; and
- (5) physical surveillance and interviews or [sic] persons not mentioned in E(1)-E(4) for the limited purpose of identifying the subject of an investigation.

[II.F. Investigative techniques for limited investigations may also include:]

- (1) physical surveillance for purposes other than identifying the subject of the investigation;
- (2) interviews of persons not mentioned in E(1)-E(4) for purposes other than identifying the subject of the investigation, but only when authorized by the Special Agent in Charge

[Footnote continued on next page]

The Service's criticism of these Guidelines raises serious questions which cannot be ignored in any study of the Service's performance. As the March 30 incident reveals, physically surrounding the President is not sufficient protection. The President's ultimate shield must be the ability of the Secret Service to keep him out of dangerous environments. This the Service cannot do without adequate intelligence resources -- information about the intentions and plans of potentially dangerous people.

Despite its importance to the Service's mission, the Service has done little to document or analyze the decline in FBI intelligence dissemination which it attributes to the Domestic Security Guidelines. Circumstantial data, however, appears to confirm the Service's view that the decline has been very substantial.

In interviews conducted for this report, FBI officials have estimated that more than 20,000 so-called domestic security cases were open shortly prior to the promulgation of the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines. While some of those cases were converted into standard criminal investigations when the necessary information was developed, very few of the remainder produced criminal prosecutions. Some officials at the Bureau state that all but about 7,000 of those cases were terminated by the FBI for reasons other than the restrictions imposed by the Domestic Security Guidelines, but they nonetheless appear to accept the estimates of the number of domestic security cases which the FBI was handling before 1976.

Whatever the reason for termination of these cases, the decline in their number since publication of the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines has been precipitous. According to a 1976 report by the General Accounting Office, the ten FBI field offices studied by the Comptroller General during 1974 actively investigated 19,659 domestic intelligence cases, which the report asserted to represent 35 percent of a total of 55,500 cases on "subversives and extremists" opened or reopened by the FBI during 1974.

[Footnote con't from previous page]

[II.I. Investigative techniques for full investigations may also include:]

- (1) use of informants . . . subject to review [after] 180 days;
- (2) 'mail covers' . . . ;
- (3) electronic surveillance"

In a 1977 follow-up investigation, the GAO again counted cases and reported:

[W]e believe that the FBI's domestic intelligence effort has declined substantially. Although it is impossible to attribute the decline to any one reason, a major factor, particularly since April 1976, would be the interpretation given to the Attorney General's domestic security guidelines.

As of June 30, 1977, a total of 642 domestic intelligence investigative matters were pending, compared to 9,814 at the same date in 1975. Similarly, the number of domestic intelligence matters initiated declined from 1,454 in June 1975 to 95 in June 1977.

As of early October 1977, 17 organizations and approximately 130 individuals were under domestic intelligence investigation. 5/

Interviews for this report with FBI and Secret Service personnel indicated that the total number of preliminary, intermediate, and full domestic security investigations involving both individuals and groups which were open at the time of our inquiry was far less than at any time covered by the GAO report. Ultimately, the question is whether the Secret Service can adequately perform its mission without a regular flow of information about the intentions of individuals or groups who may be a threat to the President. An answer to this question is beyond the scope of this report, but one of the lessons of March 30 is that the President is exposed to danger whenever he is outside the White House, and the best efforts of alert agents on the scene cannot substitute for adequate warning.

Intelligence Storage

All nonclassified intelligence kept by the Intelligence Division is accessed by computer; the computer contains only case file abstracts and serves as an index to more detailed information located elsewhere in paper files.

5/ FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations: An Uncertain Future (November 9, 1977), at 15.

Although reworked to fit a new computer acquired in 1978, the Service's current computer software does not make full use of the new computer's capacity. Both the Data Systems Division and the Intelligence Division Programming and Planning Branch agree that the software should undergo major upgrading in order to be able to make optimal utilization of the data bank, but cost and personnel limitations have constrained their efforts.

The system incorporates data files on about 20,000 persons investigated in the past by the Service, on events, incidents, organizations and groups, and a name index. These data are accessed through two limited data retrieval search systems.

One system searches through all information coded into each of about 100 fields in the data bank; the other searches every word in each case abstract looking for key words suggested by the operator. The coded search requires about 45 minutes and 20 such searches can be run simultaneously. The time taken by the key word search is negligible, but the key-word indexing system is expensive to set up and maintain.

Intelligence Analysis

Intelligence analysis is primarily directed toward identifying dangerous individuals. As already noted, the field agent, along with his supervisor and the field Special Agent in Charge, evaluate the information on a subject provided by the Intelligence Division and generated by the field investigation. No "dangerous person" indicia have been generated from the Intelligence Division data pool, and no statistical analysis is used to identify patterns or correlations in the data. Consequently, the entire dangerousness determination is based wholly on agent judgment. Consistency is sought through Intelligence Division review of each determination.

An individual who has been determined to be dangerous to a protected person is interviewed at regular intervals, and his whereabouts are periodically monitored. This periodic review status continues until the field office determines, and the Intelligence Division agrees, that the subject no longer presents a danger. Approximately 400 persons are listed in this category, and most of them are incarcerated in either mental or penal institutions.

Intelligence data is also utilized to identify dangerous groups. The Analysis and Control Branch has a desk devoted to

domestic groups, while the Foreign Intelligence Branch deals almost exclusively with international terrorist groups that may present a threat to a protected person. Files are kept only on those groups which, in the view of the Service, may pose a threat to a protected person at some future time. Certain groups considered the most dangerous are constantly monitored; others are only occasionally reviewed. As with individuals, there are no "dangerous group" indicia; all assessments are based on agent judgment and some analysis done by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

A third major use of intelligence data is to identify dangerous environments. For any trip by a protected person, the Intelligence Division advance agent will attempt to obtain all available information in the computer with which to assess the general "dangerousness" of the environment into which the protected person is going. The advance agent's assessment and conclusions are communicated to Protective Operations.

While the files described above have not been analyzed in order to identify indicia of "dangerousness", the Service has made a number of efforts to develop a model that might support such analysis. During the 1960's and 1970's, a number of outside studies were commissioned to develop a "profile" of the type of individual likely to be dangerous to a protected person. These efforts produced little useful information. The Service now seems interested in pursuing broader concepts of statistical significance. Perhaps most promising to date is a symposium that the Service conducted under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences in March 1981. The results of that symposium are expected in July.

Efforts to develop statistical tools for using the information now contained in the protective intelligence files have suffered from the Service's failure to follow advice, provided as early as 1969 in a study by the Bioengineering Corporation, to bring the effort in-house. Studies made in the past under contract with outside groups have not been based upon a complete or accurate understanding of how proposals would actually be used by agents in the field, nor has there been sufficient follow-up to permit evaluation and assessment of proposals actually put into use.

Conclusions

Intelligence Division

1. Since the Secret Service has no formal authority to direct other agencies as to the gathering or dissemination of intelligence to the Service, its intelligence collection activities have relied on the voluntary furnishing of information by Federal and state agencies, police departments, and mental hospitals. This voluntary process has been affected by recent legislation on privacy and information access, such as the Right to Financial Privacy Act, amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, and state medical privacy laws. Information required by the Service is no longer volunteered by sources now concerned about transgressing privacy protections or about being revealed as a source.

2. The Secret Service's protective capabilities have been impaired by the decline in the quantity and quality of intelligence collected by the FBI, which is the primary source of the Service's domestic intelligence. This decline is attributable primarily to the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines and their effect in cutting off non-criminal domestic intelligence investigations.

3. The Intelligence Division has a fairly efficient system for storing, retrieving, and disseminating to Secret Service users the intelligence information it receives. The Division is failing, however, to make use of advances in statistical methods and data processing to improve its analytic abilities. In view of the fact that a similar criticism was made of the Intelligence Division in a 1969 outside study prepared by the Bioengineering Corporation, this failure may reflect an institutional problem within the Office of Protective Research.

There appears to be an improved receptivity to such an enterprise in the Intelligence Division under current management. The results of the Service's most recent outside study, a symposium conducted under the auspices of the National Academy of Science, may provide the theoretical base on which to begin in-house efforts at testing and verifying hypotheses.

Such an effort would require at a minimum additional personnel with data-processing-related skills, and additional personnel with professional training in statistical methods and

behavioral psychology or psychiatry. The Service has no professionals in the latter two areas at this time, other than outside consultants, who are available for very limited amounts of time.

Liaison Division

1. The Liaison Division was formed pursuant to a Warren Commission recommendation, ostensibly to generate intelligence and intelligence sources. However, the Division spends most of its resources on protective operations assignments or activities other than intelligence support. This resource allocation does not carry out the Warren Commission recommendation and was criticized earlier in the 1969 Bioengineering Corporation Criteria Study.

2. Insofar as the Liaison Division is involved in intelligence support, the process is largely ad hoc. Liaison agents operate in an informal manner and, by and large, take their intelligence support roles to be passive ones, responding to Intelligence Division requests rather than generating more and better intelligence and sources.

3. The Service's agreements with other agencies as to the furnishing of intelligence were proposed by the Warren Commission as an aid to the Service's intelligence collection. The agreements are very general and appear to have become largely pro-forma documents.

4. While the Secret Service conscientiously attempts to encourage other agencies to provide it with intelligence, neither the Liaison Division nor the Intelligence Division has a formal procedure that adequately monitors the quality and quantity of intelligence received from other Federal agencies, and the current informal monitoring is not a sufficient substitute.

Recommendations

1. Because of the apparent effect of privacy and government information disclosure laws on the ability of the Secret Service to collect useful intelligence on a voluntary basis, consideration should be given to narrowing the scope of these laws as they relate to the release of information furnished to the Secret Service, and to protecting the right of the Secret Service to have access to information in the hands of private organizations and state and local governmental authorities.

2. The Secret Service should be given an executive mandate, perhaps in the form of an Executive Order or proclamation, to require greater assistance from other Federal agencies in the collection of intelligence.

3. Consideration should be given to permitting the FBI to pursue domestic security investigations where no criminal predicate is available; this may be done through appropriate modifications of the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines for the FBI.

4. The Secret Service has not developed indicators to help identify "dangerous" individuals and groups, either by associating and correlating intelligence that might reveal the intentions of individuals and groups from their prior activities or by using so-called "profiles". Using data in the files of its Intelligence Division, the Service should attempt to develop useful indicators to assist it in identifying "dangerous" individuals, groups, and personality types. The Service should create within the Intelligence Division a more sophisticated planning and research operation, including five to ten non-agent employees with professional training in statistical methods and behavioral sciences. This group should be responsible, on an ongoing basis, for analyzing the intelligence data base in order to identify what types of information the Intelligence Division should be looking for, and what it should be doing with it.

5. The problems with maintaining Liaison Division as an intelligence-gathering group are compounded by its location outside the Intelligence Division. Liaison Division should be restructured and placed within the Intelligence Division. The resulting Liaison Branch should become aggressively involved in soliciting intelligence from other agencies and monitoring the amount and quality of intelligence generated. This Liaison Branch should take the lead in redrafting the agreements with other agencies so that they are more useful guides to the Service's intelligence needs that draw on the information developed by the recommended planning and research operation. If a liaison unit is needed to conduct work that facilitates advances and trips, it should be staffed through a separate liaison unit that does not compete for resources directly with the intelligence liaison function.

6. The Intelligence Division planning and research operation should also work closely with Data Systems Division to better define the data systems needs of the Intelligence Division, to insure that adequate computer programming and data

processing support is provided to this enterprise, and to insure that the computer is being optimally applied to routine Intelligence Division needs.

ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR MARCH 30, 1981

Procedures for Trip Advances

Overview

Procedures for the conduct of security advances are first presented to prospective Special Agents in training courses, and are then restated and supplemented in procedures manuals prepared by each of the primary protective divisions. For the most part, these procedures are presented in checklist form, even though all of the items listed will not be applicable to every advance. The Service emphasizes to trainees that even those items applicable to a particular advance are to be interpreted with some flexibility, leaving room for the judgment of Special Agents on the scene who must respond to widely varying circumstances.

Thus, the procedures do not include such matters as how far from the President crowds should be kept, under what circumstances doors should or should not be locked or guarded, or even how many Special Agents should be assigned to a particular visit. The standards which Special Agents apply in individual cases seem to be the product of their experience in similar circumstances, modified by two other factors: the level of manpower available to the Service; and the need to reach a practical accommodation -- there being no written agreements -- with the occasionally conflicting demands of the White House advance staff for greater exposure of the President to the press and public.

Because of the unique character of each trip, and the fact that procedures are not specified in other than general terms, it is not possible to compare the execution of the Hilton trip in detail with a given and accepted set of standards.

Moreover, the circumstances of the President's trip to the Washington Hilton on March 30 did much to shape the way the Service adapted its procedures that day. The Hilton trip was uncomplicated; it was to begin and end in the White House, a highly secure facility; pass along routes with which the Service's Special Agents were well familiar; and involve a stop at a location which Presidents and other protected persons had visited many times.

In addition, the Metropolitan Police Department and the United States Park Police, which assist the Service on Presidential trips within the capital city, are familiar with the Service's procedures and are able to provide drivers, motorcycle escorts and crowd control with relatively little briefing or advance preparation.

Trips within the District of Columbia are also unusual in another respect: intelligence responsibilities are handled by the Washington field office rather than the Service's Intelligence Division. As discussed below, the procedures followed by the Washington field office for gathering intelligence information are different from those of the Intelligence Division.

Despite these exceptions, however, the broad outlines of Service procedures, applicable to all advances, are relatively clear.

The Advance Team

The advance is headed by a lead advance agent, who is ordinarily selected from the detail assigned to the protected person. Depending on the nature of the trip, the lead advance agent may be assisted by Service advance agents responsible for transportation, intelligence, technical security, and/or communications. The lead advance agent also coordinates preparations with Service Special Agents from field offices responsible for the districts to be visited by the protected person, with local law enforcement agencies, and with the protected person's staff.

On a Presidential trip, one or more Special Agents from PPD may be assigned to conduct the advance, depending upon the magnitude of the itinerary. One of the agents will be designated lead advance agent, and will coordinate all Service arrangements, as well as the support efforts of local police and security personnel. Where appropriate, a transportation agent may be designated from the Transportation Section of PPD.

Since the Hilton movement was to take place within the jurisdiction of the Washington field office, intelligence advance activities were to be performed by Special Agents from the Washington field office, rather than from the Intelligence Division. In such an instance, the lead advance agent is responsible for notifying the Intelligence Division, the operations desk of the Washington field office intelligence squad,

which then assigns a Protective Intelligence team (or teams) in support of the movement; and the Technical Security Division, which designates a team coordinator, responsible for all phases of the Technical Security Division mission.

When the lead advance agent contacts the Washington field office, he should, in addition to requesting Protective Intelligence assistance, also request the name of his Washington field office counterpart, and should ask that the Washington field office make initial contacts with the local police and fire departments that will be involved in the movement. The purpose of designating a Washington field office counterpart is to coordinate Washington field office participation in the advance, and to improve liaison and communications with local authorities.

The lead advance agent must also contact and work with other elements of government that have roles in any Presidential trip: the White House Communications Agency, the White House Physician's office, and the White House staff, particularly its advance personnel.

Execution of Procedures for Trip Advances
in Connection with March 30, 1981 Trip
to the Washington Hilton

Wednesday, March 25, and Thursday, March 26

Special Agent Ray Shaddick, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge of PPD, notified Special Agent William Green on Wednesday, March 25, that Green would be the lead advance agent for the President's March 30 visit to the Washington Hilton. The White House staff had already designated Rick Ahearn to conduct the staff advance, and had arranged a security meeting at the hotel for Friday morning. On either Wednesday or Thursday, Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon of the Transportation Section of PPD was notified by Special Agent Bob Teter of her assignment as transportation agent for the March 30 visit.

Friday, March 27

Early Friday morning, Security Specialist Eugene Troutman was informed that he would function as Technical Security Division Coordinator for the visit; Special Agent Thomas Lightsey was assigned to assist Troutman in conducting the advance for training purposes. Both Troutman and Lightsey were

instructed to attend the 10:30 a.m. security meeting at the Hilton.

The meeting at the Hilton was attended by Troutman, Lightsey, and Green of Secret Service; Rick Ahearn and Rocky Kounan from the White House staff; John Norton, Hilton Convention Sales Director, and Al Fury, Hilton Security Director; Victor Kamber, from the host committee sponsoring the event; and John Bixler, representing the White House Communications Agency. The participants at the meeting reviewed the itinerary proposed for the President. Green asked that the host committee provide a list of names of the union officials who would meet the President prior to his speech, and that the hotel update its employee list kept at the Washington field office. Following the meeting, those present conducted a "walk-through" of the President's itinerary.

Little or no consideration was given to the establishment of a designated press area outside the Hilton. Ahearn and Green agreed that a rope line would be placed in the vicinity of the follow-up car, as usual, but Green stated later that this was put in place primarily to control pedestrian traffic. Establishment of a designated press area would have required posting both a Secret Service Special Agent and a White House representative at the press area to control access; in addition, such a restricted press area would effectively shut down the main terrace entrance, which both Green and Ahearn felt was impractical.

Saturday, March 28

Early Saturday morning, Green prepared a list of names, to be checked by the Intelligence Division, composed of union members and those hotel employees who would be in the vicinity of the President. This function is ordinarily performed by the intelligence agents assigned to the visit. Since Green had not yet been given the names of the Washington field office agents assigned to the advance, he decided to submit the names himself, so that the results would be available as early as possible. He submitted the list that afternoon to the Intelligence Division.

Later, Green twice called the Washington field office to determine who had been assigned as his Washington field office advance counterpart. Green requested that the Special Agent on duty contact the Metropolitan Police Department, to inform them of the Hilton visit and to notify them that a security briefing

would be conducted at the hotel on Monday. The Special Agent was not successful in contacting the Metropolitan Police Department immediately; he decided not to take further action on Green's request, assuming that the Metropolitan Police Department would be notified of the visit by agents conducting the advance.

Gordon contacted the Washington field office to request that they provide one of the cars for the motorcade.

Sunday, March 29

On Sunday, Green spent the morning working on his preliminary survey report, and completed it except for the names of the Washington field office coordinator and the intelligence advance agent.

Gordon made two calls to Green during the course of the day; she obtained from Green the exact arrival and departure time for the Hilton trip, and the entrance to be used from the motorcade. Following the first of these calls, Gordon called the U.S. Park Police and the Special Operations Division of the Metropolitan Police Department to request their assistance in providing support for the motorcade. In addition, Gordon informed both departments that there would be a "run-through" of the motorcade routes the following morning.

During the afternoon, both Gordon and Green spoke with the Special Agent on duty at the Washington field office. Gordon called to ask that the Washington field office car be sent to the White House between 1:00 p.m. and 1:15 p.m. on Monday. Green called once again to obtain the name of his Washington field office counterpart, and given the name of Special Agent Paul Mobley. Green called Mobley that afternoon, and told him (1) that the Metropolitan Police Department had been contacted, (2) that name checks had been performed through the Intelligence Division, (3) which official vehicles would make up the emergency motorcade, and (4) that Mobley was to meet with Green the following morning at the Hilton.

Monday, March 30

Gordon called the U.S. Park Police that morning to determine whether any representatives of the Park Police would participate in the run-through of the motorcade routes, but was told that all available Park Police officers were needed to

assist with morning rush-hour traffic. The supervising Park Police officer stated later that it was unnecessary for his officers to run the routes with Gordon, since his officers were familiar with the designated routes and could be briefed regarding additional responsibilities at the White House. Gordon ran the routes as scheduled with a Metropolitan Police Department sergeant; after this, she called the D.C. Highways and Traffic Department, and determined that there would be no construction along the motorcade route.

Green completed the preliminary survey report between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. and turned it over to the Presidential Detail. He then called the Washington field office and was advised by Special Agent D.V. McCarthy, the intelligence coordinator, that there was no intelligence information of significance to report in connection with this trip. McCarthy also provided Green with the composition of the intelligence teams. Shortly after Green spoke to McCarthy, however, illness caused the Washington field office to make reassignments which reduced the number of agents available for the intelligence teams. Green did not learn of this cancellation until the remaining intelligence team agents arrived at the Hilton for the noon security briefing.

A Special Agent from PPD gave Green the names of the Special Agents who would serve as the main security contingent at the Hilton, and promised that an additional Special Agent would be assigned later in the morning. Green determined that the name checks conducted by the Intelligence Division had revealed that none of the individuals who would obtain access to the President were "of record" with Secret Service. Before leaving for the Hilton, Green briefed shift leader Ray Shaddick on the Hilton visit.

Shortly before 11:00 a.m., Green met with Mobley at the Hilton; both men conducted a walk-through of the hotel. The security briefing began a few minutes after noon in the Adams Room of the hotel. Green met with McCarthy prior to the briefing, and was informed of the reassignment of some of the intelligence team agents. No representatives of the police or fire departments attended the briefing, contrary to usual procedure.

At the briefing, McCarthy reported that telephone calls to the Intelligence Division and the Metropolitan Police Department had revealed no adverse intelligence information. Green gave a standard security briefing, which covered the itinerary for the visit, the frequencies to be used for radio com-

munications, the location of the security room, the call signs to be used in connection with the visit, and the system of identification badges and pins to be used. At the conclusion of the briefing, the security contingent agents were stationed individually at their posts.

That morning, the ballroom was cleared and the Technical Security Division sweep of the ballroom began. The arrival area was swept by a canine unit, and nothing unusual was encountered. The Metropolitan Police Department detail arrived, headed by Sergeant Granger; Granger posted his own men around the VIP entrance and informed Green of the postings.

When the sweep of the ballroom was completed, Green returned inside and authorized the opening of the ballroom doors. The crowd entered through two checkpoints, manned by Special Agents Huggins and Norton. Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel were posted at each checkpoint to inspect briefcases and handbags; also assigned to each checkpoint was a representative of the host committee. Press personnel used a separate entrance to the ballroom; an Explosive Ordnance Disposal team was assigned to check cameras and other equipment. Green noticed some of the press people straying outside of the designated press area; he spoke to Ahearn, who had the situation corrected. Green then returned to the VIP entrance to await the arrival of the President.

At the White House, Gordon had supervised the coordination of the Presidential motorcade. A Park Police officer had been instructed to bring a portable Park Police radio for use in one of the leading motorcade cars, but had forgotten it; therefore, the motorcade had no radio communication with the U.S. Park Police motorcycle officers. Gordon briefed the motorcade participants, and distributed copies of the Transportation Survey.

The motorcade left the White House at 1:45 p.m.; the Metropolitan Police Department maintained intersection control along the route. On the way to the Hilton, Shaddick called Green for a situation report. Green noted about seven press people and about ten spectators at the rope line. He was aware of no difficulties, and advised the motorcade that the arrival area was clear.

A rope line blocking pedestrian traffic had been positioned approximately 35-40 feet from the VIP entrance. The spectators located behind it were not screened by Secret Service, since the area had not been designated a "press area".

Metropolitan Police Department officers controlled traffic on "T" Street. When the motorcade arrived at the Hilton, the Metropolitan Police Department detail assigned to the arrival were at their designated posts at the rope line and along the concrete island separating the driveway from "T" Street. The limousine moved to a point directly outside the VIP entrance; the President remained in the limousine until his Secret Service detail was in position; he then left the limousine, met Ahearn at the door, and was escorted inside the hotel. The arrival was uneventful.

After the President had entered the Hilton, Gordon instructed the motorcade drivers to reposition the limousine and the follow-up car, so that the limousine was parked at an angle to the curb, with the front pointed through the gap on the concrete island and facing directly onto the street. Placing the limousine in this position required the President to walk 25-30 feet from the VIP entrance, bringing him to within 15-20 feet of the assembled spectators. This repositioning was standard procedure for a Hilton visit. The follow-up car was parked a few feet behind the limousine, under the canopy that served the main Terrace entrance to the hotel. Four motorcade vehicles were parked behind the follow-up car, and the other cars and motorcycles were parked on "T" Street, ahead of the path to be taken by the limousine during its scheduled departure.

While the President spoke, Special Agents Unrue and Fabel sat in the follow-up car, while the military personnel driving the other motorcade vehicles gathered in another of the follow-up vehicles. Two Metropolitan Police Department officers moved the restraining rope a few feet farther away from the VIP entrance at the order of Sergeant Granger. While they were parked, some of the motorcade drivers noted the erratic behavior of one individual in the crowd. The Secret Service Special Agents were familiar with him, had interviewed him on several occasions, and had determined that he was not dangerous to the President. News accounts later suggested, incorrectly, that this individual was John W. Hinckley, the man later accused of the shooting. Special Agent Dennis McCarthy spoke with the individual and concluded that he was not a danger to the President.

At 2:20 p.m., Green radioed from inside the hotel that the President was finishing his speech and would be departing shortly. Following that transmission, the motorcade drivers returned to their vehicles. Special Agent Mobley left the ballroom and surveyed the departure area; he saw nothing out of

the ordinary. One security car prepared to leave, since its assignment was to precede the rest of the motorcade by a few minutes. The military drivers checked their assignments with each other and returned to their vehicles. The Metropolitan Police Department officers were stationed at their posts; Officers Swain and Delahanty were stationed along the rope line, and Sergeant Granger was between the two officers and the path to be taken by the President. The motorcade vehicles started their engines to prepare for departure; the advance security car moved away from the Hilton as the vanguard of the Presidential party began to exit through the VIP entrance. The counter-snipers were on duty, although perhaps not exactly in their usual positions. Gordon had moved to another of the advance vehicles and was preparing to get inside as the Presidential party began its departure. Up to this point, the visit had been almost entirely routine.

Conclusions

1. The Secret Service has established procedures to govern the conduct of advance preparations for the travel of protected persons. Special alterations in those procedures, which do not appear in the PPD Manual, govern advance preparations for trips in the Washington, D.C. area. Those procedures assign a heavier share of the responsibility to the Washington field office. In addition, there is some evidence that the routine nature of advances and heavy protective work load in the Washington area has resulted in agents devoting less attention to detail than is commonly the case in other locations.

2. While the agents conducting the advance for the President's March 30 visit to the Hilton handled their responsibilities capably, their preparations did not address certain details which are included in the standard procedures for an advance. This may be understandable, since the procedures were developed for environments outside Washington, D.C., and do not take account of the fact that trips in the capital have become routine. The problem for the Service appears to be to develop procedures for Presidential trips in Washington, D.C., which take realistic account of their routine nature and of the fact that auxiliary agencies such as the local police have established their own views of what the Secret Service should require of them.

3. The political mission of the White House staff conflicts at times with the security mission of the Secret

Service; security measures taken to protect the President are often determined by give-and-take between the two groups. Without some agreement between these two groups with regard to substantive security guidelines, the level of protection provided the President will inevitably be inconsistent.

The visit to the Hilton illustrated the anomalous outcomes resulting from the absence of a substantive agreement. Inside the Hilton, elaborate security precautions were taken to safeguard the President from a pre-screened group that would be kept at a substantial distance; outside the Hilton, members of the general public, without any Secret Service pre-screening whatever, could walk to a rope barricade and stand within 15 feet of the President.

Recommendations

1. The advance staff of the White House and the senior managers of the Secret Service should commit whatever time and resources are required to develop a single document, on which both groups can agree, in which they detail the balance that is to be struck among the security, scheduling, and public exposure requirements of the President. The document should be updated, at least annually, and should include specific information concerning such items as:

- a. The distances between the public and the President during his entrance and exit from areas with controlled access;
- b. The advisability of permitting unscreened members of the public to have advance notice of an opportunity for gaining proximity to the President;
- c. The circumstances in which the President will make himself available for questions from the press;
- d. The amount of information regarding Presidential visits to be released to the public;
- e. The advisability of locating the press in the area of motorcade vehicles;
- f. Procedures for screening, electronically or otherwise, members of the public who can get close enough to the President to threaten his security;
- g. The structure and placement of PPD formations around the President and arrangements with the White House staff to avoid interference with those formations.

2. The Washington field office and the protective divisions of the Secret Service should commit whatever time and resources are required to develop detailed procedures for the conduct of advances in the Washington, D.C. area. The number of advances conducted in the Washington area, the routine and repetitive quality of these advances, and other distinguishing characteristics of Secret Service operations in the Washington, D.C., area should be taken into account in developing these procedures. These procedures should provide for

the earliest possible notification to the Washington field office of proposed trips, preferably simultaneously with the notification given to the lead advance agent by the protective divisions, and a statement of the responsibilities of each member of the Washington field office advance team. In addition, the Washington field office should conduct a review of intelligence advance procedures in the Washington, D.C. area, assisted by the Intelligence Division; this review should address the categories of advance intelligence data to be collected by the Washington field office, as well as the procedures by which it is to be collected.

PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTIVE DETAIL

Procedures

Presidential Protective Division Structure

The Presidential Protective Division is headed by a Special Agent in Charge, Jerry Parr, and a Deputy Special Agent in Charge, Robert DeProspero. The Division is organized into three major subdivisions, each headed by an Assistant Special Agent in Charge: (1) Support and Logistics; (2) Operations; and (3) Training and Special Projects. The Operations subdivision is further broken down into three separate details for protecting the President, the First Lady and immediate family members, and a transportation section.

The Presidential Detail is responsible for protecting the President at all times. The detail is composed of three shifts, each headed by a Shift Leader commonly known as an Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge. Normally when the President leaves the White House, he is accompanied by a working shift consisting of Special Agents assigned to his protective detail, an Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge of the Presidential Protective Division, and either the Special Agent in Charge or the Deputy Special Agent in Charge.

The Special Agents on the Presidential detail tend to be the more experienced, better qualified Special Agents. Typically, these Special Agents have had three to five years experience in the field, where each has had experience on various protective assignments (e.g., intelligence, post standing, and advance). The Special Agents usually remain in the Presidential Protective Division for three to four years.

Training

All Special Agents, when first employed, receive seven to eight weeks of basic law enforcement training at Treasury's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. After completing this basic training, each Special Agent completes specialized classroom training conducted by Secret Service's Office of Training in Washington, D.C.

In this basic classroom instruction the Special Agents are taught the Secret Service theory of perimeter protection, which has remained basically unchanged since the Kennedy assassination. The working shift moves with the President, entering and leaving a secure area established by Secret Service advance agents and local law enforcement officers. The Special Agents learn that during an entrance/exit situation between secure locations (e.g., the armored limousine to the holding room), the working shift Special Agents must leave their vehicle, move to predesignated positions around the President's limousine and quickly assess whether there is a danger to the President if he leaves the limousine. This, of course, is in addition to other security measures and observation being carried out by the Secret Service and local police.

If no danger is detected, the President leaves the car and the working shift Special Agents fall into protective formation around him. Circumstances such as crowd proximity and density dictate the formation that the working shift employs. Each formation has its own peculiar strengths and weaknesses. During this movement, other protective coverage is provided by Special Agents and law enforcement officers, who are not members of the working shift.

If shots are fired, Special Agents in the immediate area of the President are taught that they should remain in an upright position, each Special Agent making himself as large a target as possible.

Supplementing classroom instruction are training exercises conducted at the Secret Service's facility at Beltsville, Maryland. These exercises are designed to condition a Special Agent's response to an attack on the President. The Special Agents are also drilled on their reactions to medical emergencies such as a heart attack. The Special Agents' reactions are videotaped and later reviewed with instructors in a classroom setting.

Special Agents are taught in the classroom, in practical training, and on the job, that the safety of the protected person is the primary concern of any protective operation. Whenever shots are fired in the vicinity of a protected person, Special Agents are to interpose themselves between the protected person and the source of the shots, and are to see to his safety and evacuation before attempting to interdict the assailant or prevent the assailant's escape.

Execution on March 31, 1980, of Procedures
Established for Presidential Protective Detail

Trip to the Hilton

At 1:45 p.m. on March 30, 1981, President Reagan left the White House and went to the South Grounds where the Presidential limousine was waiting to take him to the Washington Hilton Hotel. Accompanying the President in his limousine were Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan and Special Agent in Charge Jerry Parr.

The Presidential motorcade departed the White House, proceeded north on 17th Street, veered left onto Connecticut Avenue, and proceeded directly to the Hilton where it arrived without incident at approximately 1:50 p.m. During the approximately four-minute ride, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Shaddick radioed lead advance agent Green at the hotel for a situation report. Green indicated that there appeared to be no problem. On arriving at the Hilton, the working shift Special Agents left their vehicles, and proceeded to their preassigned positions around the Presidential limousine, surveying the surrounding crowd for any signs of trouble. Parr moved to the right rear door where he awaited the President. They saw no sign of danger.

The President then got out of the limousine, which was parked directly opposite the VIP entrance -- a distance of ten to fifteen feet. He was accompanied on his short walk into the hotel by the working shift Special Agents. Inside the hotel, the President was accompanied to the holding room where he met briefly with ranking members of the Building and Construction Trades Union. After leaving the holding room, the President delivered a twenty-minute speech to the 4,000 members of the Union in the main ballroom. During the speech, the Special Agents of the Presidential detail were positioned in the ballroom, scanning the crowd for possible trouble.

Shooting Incident

At the conclusion of his speech, the President retraced his steps of half an hour earlier and headed outside to the motorcade for the return trip to the White House. Parr and Shaddick remained just behind the President as he stepped through the doors to leave the hotel. In front of the President were members of his staff and several Secret Service

Special Agents -- the lead advance agent, the transportation advance agent, the intelligence advance agents, and the Special Agents of the working shift.

Because there were a number of members of the press congregated between the Presidential limousine and the follow-up car, one Special Agent walked directly to this area and attempted to clear these persons from between the parked cars before moving to his preassigned position at the limousine. Other working shift agents moved to their preassigned positions around the limousine and scanned the crowds across "T" Street and at the hotel for possible trouble.

Special Agent Tim McCarthy opened the right rear door of the limousine for the President. Having been repositioned for the departure, the limousine was now parked approximately 25 feet from the hotel entrance, facing the opening onto "T" Street at an angle toward Connecticut Avenue.

Parr and Shaddick stayed close to the President, although at one point Shaddick was forced to move around a White House staff member to maintain his position. The President, with Parr behind him and slightly to his right and Shaddick directly to the President's right and slightly in front of Parr, moved directly toward the waiting limousine. They were closely accompanied by Presidential aides Fischer and Deaver, Press Secretary Brady, and Military Aide Muratti.

Special Agent Green and Metropolitan Police Department Officers Delahanty, Swain and Sergeant Granger, all of whom were standing at the line, turned to see whether the President had gotten into the limousine.

At approximately 2:27 p.m., as someone in the crowd was shouting "Mr. President," six shots were fired in the direction of the President by an assailant in the crowd behind the rope line. All six shots took less than two seconds.

At the sound of the first shot, Parr pushed the President the remaining three feet into the limousine, dove in on top of him and ordered the driver, Special Agent Thomas Drew Unrue, to leave the scene. The President was hit by one of the six shots, the bullet apparently ricocheting off the side of the limousine, passing through the space between the door and the car body, and hitting him at a point under his left arm.

Special Agent Tim McCarthy turned in the direction of the shots, spread his arms and legs to protect the President and

was hit in the abdomen. Of the other four shots, one hit Officer Delahanty in the back of the neck, one struck Press Secretary Brady in the head, another hit the limousine, and another struck a building across the street.

Shaddick helped push the President and Parr into the limousine and slammed the door. He then jumped into the follow-up car and radioed the Presidential Protective Division's command post in the White House, advising that:
" . . . we've had shots fired, shots fired, there are some injuries"

No Secret Service Special Agent on the scene saw the assailant draw or otherwise display his weapon prior to the actual shots. Once the shots were fired, a number of Special Agents immediately drew their weapons, but seeing the subject surrounded, withheld fire. The films of the shooting show that as the President was being pushed into the limousine by Parr, the first law enforcement officer to reach the location of the shots was Special Agent D.V. McCarthy, who ran from his position near the curb behind the President's limousine and leaped onto the suspected assailant, grabbing him by the head and wrist.

McCarthy, with the assistance of other Secret Service Special Agents and Metropolitan Police Department officers, quickly subdued and handcuffed the suspect. A second Secret Service Special Agent raised his weapon, was unable to shoot safely, and ran to the scene from across the sidewalk; a third Special Agent ran to the suspect from a position near the left front fender of the follow-up car; a fourth Special Agent got to the suspect from a point near the rope line just behind D.V. McCarthy; and a fifth Special Agent moved to the suspect from the other side of the Presidential limousine.

Special Agent Wanko of the working shift looked in the direction of the gunfire, did not see the gun or the assailant, and started for the crowd behind the ropeline. He covered the limousine from the rear with an Uzi submachine gun as it departed. He then moved to the wall between the entrance and the rope line where he assumed a position facing the crowd. He tried to ascertain whether any other assailants were involved.

Other Special Agents helped safeguard the limousine's departure, neutralize the assailant, secure the incident scene, and get medical assistance. Although several weapons were drawn, no shots were fired by agents or police.

The Transportation agent, Mary Ann Gordon, retreated from her assigned car toward the President's limousine but got into another motorcade car when she saw that the President was already in the limousine. That car waited momentarily for the President's physician and then departed, pulling in behind the President's limousine.

Transportation of the President to
George Washington University Hospital

Within approximately ten seconds of the first shot the President's limousine pulled away from the curb and turned onto "T" Street. It passed another motorcade car (which had stalled going up the hill) and some of the motorcycles parked on "T" Street and turned left onto Connecticut Avenue. The follow-up car left the scene approximately thirteen seconds after the President's limousine. The remainder of the motorcade, delayed because of the crowd among the vehicles, followed.

Meanwhile, in the back seat of the President's limousine the President noticed a sharp pain in his chest and thought that he had broken a rib. Parr assisted the President to a seated position in the right rear seat. Parr asked the President whether he was all right, and the President replied that he was. Parr then quickly examined the President by running his hands inside the President's coat and found no sign of injury. He then examined the back of the President's coat and once again found no sign of injury. At this point, Parr ordered Unrue back to the White House. Parr advised the detail: "[The President] is o.k., follow-up. [The President] is o.k." Shaddick replied: "You want to go to the hospital or back to the White House?" Parr responded "We're going right, we're going to [the White House]." Shaddick acknowledged this transmission.

Approximately thirty seconds after Parr's initial examination, the President said that he was having trouble breathing. The President thought that he might have broken a rib. Parr then noticed that the President had blood in his mouth, and ordered driver Unrue to go to George Washington University Hospital (the motorcade was then proceeding down Connecticut Avenue).

Unrue radioed Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon and told her: "We want to go to the emergency room of George Washington." After Gordon acknowledged this transmission, Unrue added: "Go to George Washington FAST." Parr followed this with a trans-

mission to Shaddick asking if Shaddick knew that they were going to George Washington. After Shaddick acknowledged this, Parr added: "Get an ambulance - I mean get - ah - stretcher out there." Parr indicated that he did not broadcast that the President was hurt because he did not want everyone who monitors that frequency to know of the President's injury.

Shaddick then asked the Service's White House Command Post if it had copied Parr's last transmission that the motorcade was going to George Washington University Hospital. The Command Post replied that it had and that the call to the hospital had already been made. The Command Post told the hospital that the President was enroute and that there were injuries, but did not say that the President was injured or that a stretcher should be available.

Special Agent Gordon attempted to notify the police vehicles that the motorcade was going to the hospital, but was unable to do so because of heavy radio traffic on the police frequency. Therefore, in order to keep a car in front of the President's limousine, Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon ordered the car in which she was riding to pass the President's limousine. When the motorcade turned onto Pennsylvania Avenue, the leading car and the four motorcycles failed to make the turn; the other advance cars then led the motorcade to the hospital.

Arrival at the Hospital

After the Command Post notification, the hospital emergency room announced over its loudspeaker that the President was enroute to the hospital. On hearing this announcement, various hospital medical, administrative and security personnel reported to the emergency room.

The President's limousine reached the hospital at approximately 2:30 p.m., about three minutes after the shots were fired. When the President's limousine pulled up at the hospital emergency room entrance, there were no stretchers or medical personnel present.

Secret Service Assistant Director for Administration, Fred White, who was in the emergency room on a personal matter, heard the announcement, went outside, directed that the emergency room doors be locked open and, when the motorcade arrived, directed where the limousine should park. The President got out of the car and started to walk into the emergency room. He was closely preceded by Special Agent

McIntosh with Parr to the President's right and Shaddick to his left. Inside the emergency room, the President's knees began to buckle, and he was carried by Parr, Shaddick, and two paramedics the remainder of the distance to Trauma Bay Number 5. At this point, the President appeared to be in the initial stages of shock.

In the trauma bay, medical personnel immediately started to administer standard emergency treatment. They removed the President's clothes, placed him on oxygen, started him on an intravenous solution, and took blood to determine the type. One of the medical staff asked Parr, who had remained with the President, what was the President's blood type. Parr responded correctly that it was O-positive.

It was after the President's clothes had been removed that the medical staff first realized that the President had been shot. Dr. Giordano, with the assistance of other medical personnel, inserted a tube into the President's chest and drained 1300 cc of blood. Within ten minutes of arrival the President was started on a transfusion of universal donor (O negative) blood. The President remained conscious during this time.

Dr. Giordano later stated that there was no medical history file on President Reagan (with blood types, etc.) available in the emergency room. While he did not deem this absence to be critical to the treatment of the President, he nevertheless believes that the President's medical file should be available in the emergency room, and that the emergency room staff should be familiar with it. Dr. Giordano further stated that because the President received prompt medical treatment in a fully equipped trauma center the chances that the President's injuries were life threatening were substantially minimized. Even so, the President's condition was much more serious than initially reported.

The President's personal physician, as well as Dr. Giordano and various Secret Service officials, believe that the chances of the President surviving a medical emergency can be enhanced by the presence of a highly skilled, paramedic team that moves with the protective motorcade. The doctors supported the paramedic team concept even though they believe that, in the March 30 shooting incident, paramedics would probably not have found time to contribute to the President's survival. His quick evacuation to a fully equipped and staffed trauma unit was the key element.

At some time after 3:00 p.m., the President was moved from

the emergency room to the operating room where Dr. Giordano initially performed a "peritoneal lavage" to determine whether there was any internal bleeding in the abdomen. The results were negative.

Dr. Benjamin Aaron headed the surgical team which treated the President's chest wound and, after considerable exploration, removed a bullet lodged in the President's left lung. The bullet was removed at approximately 5:45 p.m. Surgery was completed and the President moved to the recovery room at approximately 6:45 p.m.

At approximately 7:00 p.m., after the President was out of surgery, Secret Service Special Agents at the hospital received information that Hinckley had purchased explosive .22 caliber ammunition, with the brand-name "Devastator", at the same time he had purchased the weapon allegedly used in the assault on the President. This information was not given to the physicians treating the President, Special Agent McCarthy or Press Secretary Brady, who was still in surgery, or to the physicians treating Officer Delahanty at Washington Hospital Center.

The President remained in the recovery room the rest of the night. He was moved from there to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) early the next morning.

Conclusions

1. The Secret Service procedures in place on March 30, 1981, for the movement of the President from the hotel to the Presidential limousine by the Presidential Protective Detail were followed by the Detail's Special Agents.
2. Once shots were fired, the Special Agents on the scene reacted, as trained, to cover and evacuate the President, neutralize the assailant, and determine whether multiple assailants were involved. Four of the Special Agents performed in an exemplary manner: Special Agent in Charge Jerry Parr in reacting precisely as trained to cover and evacuate the President by pushing him into the limousine; Assistant to the Special Agent Charge Ray Shaddick in pushing both Parr and the President into the limousine; Special Agent Timothy McCarthy in placing himself between the assailant and the President; and Special Agent D.V. McCarthy in quickly jumping onto the assailant and, with the help of others, subduing him.
3. During the evacuation of the President to the hospital

there were a number of minor incidents such as the initial confusion with motorcade vehicles leaving the hotel, and the failure to notify the hospital emergency room that the President was injured. These incidents did not affect the evacuation of the President in this case but could have presented serious problems in less fortuitous circumstances.

4. The chances of the President surviving a medical emergency would be enhanced by the presence of a highly skilled, paramedic team that moves with the protective motorcade.

Recommendations

1. Based on their exemplary performance immediately following the shots at the hotel, Special Agents Jerry Parr, Ray Shaddick, Tim McCarthy and D.V. McCarthy should receive special recognition and an appropriate monetary award.

2. A fully trained paramedic team should be regularly included in the Presidential motorcade.

SECURITY AT GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL

Procedures

The Secret Service Manual provides that the detail leader is responsible for the protection of the President during an emergency. It is the practice of the Secret Service, however, that in the event of an emergency the senior member of the working shift remains with the President, and the responsibility for establishing contingency plans is delegated to the next most senior member of the shift on the scene. This Special Agent must assess the situation, establish security perimeters, request extra Special Agents (if needed), plan for any movement of the President, and establish lines of communication.

There were no contingency plans for security at George Washington University Hospital. In July 1980 the Secret Service's Washington field office had surveyed George Washington University Hospital's emergency room and surgical capabilities, but security arrangements, such as the number of Special Agents needed to provide security in the event of an emergency, the placement of post standers, or the location of a command post, were not covered because Secret Service hospital survey procedures do not call for such information. Basic security arrangements for the President at the hospital commenced with his arrival. The hospital did maintain its own "hospital disaster plan" which was activated by the Hospital Administrator; the plan provided for increased hospital security through limiting access.

Execution of Procedures

Manpower

When the President arrived at the hospital, he was being protected by the Special Agents who had accompanied him from the Hilton. The senior agent, Special Agent in Charge Parr, followed the President into the trauma bay of the emergency room. Under Secret Service procedures, authority for establishing security for the President was transferred without formal delegation at this point from Parr to Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Shaddick. The remaining agents attempted to secure the emergency room. On arrival at the hos-

pital, Shaddick had instructed the follow-up driver, Special Agent Dennis Fabel, to radio the White House Command Post for more manpower. Fabel had radioed and asked: "Would you contact Washington field office or some other division and get some additional people sent to this location [hospital]?"

With the assistance of members of the hospital administration, the Special Agents present then began to establish check points at the entrance to the emergency room, excluding all persons except those identified as necessary medical personnel.

Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon had arrived with the motorcade and remained outside the emergency room entrance attempting to set up security around the hospital. As the press and public began to gather, she asked for the assistance of the Metropolitan Police Department and Park Police officers on the scene to establish crowd control and keep people clear of the area.

Shortly after the President entered the emergency room, Special Agents from the Presidential Detail's 4:00 p.m.-to-midnight working shift arrived at the hospital. They had been driving to work at the time of the shooting and were ordered to report to the hospital by the White House Command Post. They arrived approximately five to ten minutes after the President and were assigned by Shaddick to assist in securing the emergency room, locating a command post, establishing communications, and preparing for the President's expected move to the operating room and his later move to the Intensive Care Unit.

Within half an hour after the shooting a Special Agent from the Technical Security Division arrived at the hospital and conducted a technical security check of the operating room. He remained throughout the evening and conducted other checks of the recovery room and Intensive Care Unit. There were no technical security checks of the emergency room.

While Shaddick was coordinating the security in the immediate proximity of the President, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Pat Miller arrived from the Washington field office. Without being assigned the task, Miller assumed responsibility for coordinating the security arrangements in the emergency room and the operating room. At about 5:00 p.m., Miller concluded that considerably more Special Agents would be needed to stand post during the President's movements after he left surgery. Miller attempted to telephone the Washington field office but was unable to get through. He then called

Secret Service headquarters instead and asked for additional Special Agents, who reported to the hospital between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m..

Two officers from the Service's Uniformed Division, who arrived at the hospital at approximately 3:00 p.m., were the first people from that Division on the scene. After evaluating the situation, they requested additional personnel, and by about 3:30 p.m., several other officers had arrived at the hospital. In the following hour, Uniformed Division strength was increased and the officers who arrived relieved Metropolitan Police Department officers at posts inside the hospital; the Metropolitan Police Department officers then moved to points outside the hospital. Later that evening, canine and counter-sniper teams also reported to the hospital. The Uniformed Division continued to maintain a sizeable contingent of officers at the hospital throughout the remainder of the President's stay.

When Deputy Special Agent in Charge DeProspero and Assistant Director (Protective Operations) Simpson arrived around 3:30 p.m., there were Special Agents posted at the door to the operating room, Special Agents guarding the hall to the operating room and Special Agents in the operating room with the President. In addition, checkpoints had been established at the entrances into the hospital, and at the entrances into the operating room area. Simpson and DeProspero spoke with Miller and concluded that security arrangements at the hospital were sufficient.

After surgery on the President was completed, he was moved to the recovery room. At this point there were security posts both inside and outside the President's room, and the requisite security perimeters were in place at the hospital. A technical search of the recovery room had been conducted and preparations initiated for the President's anticipated move to the Intensive Care Unit. This level of security was continued throughout the President's stay at the hospital.

Communications

George Washington University Hospital, even though it was the primary emergency hospital for trips by the President in the downtown Washington area, was not considered by the White House Communications Agency to be the primary hospital for medical treatment of the President in the Washington area. A military hospital in the area served this role, and as a

result there were only limited communication capabilities in place at George Washington for immediate use by the White House Communications Agency and the Secret Service.

Within five minutes of the President's arrival the White House Communications Agency began to set up communications. Shortly thereafter, White House Communications Agency portable communications equipment arrived. The room in which the equipment was installed, Room 2500, became the Secret Service Command Post, from which drop lines were installed and open lines were established with the Intelligence Squad duty desk at the Washington field office. Within an hour to an hour and one-half after the President's arrival, the Command Post was fully operational. It served as a communications and security coordination center at the hospital for the duration of the President's stay.

Conclusions

1. The Secret Service has procedures in place for conducting surveys of the adequacy and accessibility of medical care for the President at local hospitals in the event of an emergency. Those procedures appear to have been properly followed, and a Hospital Protective Survey Check List had been prepared for George Washington University Hospital.

2. The Special Agents arriving at the hospital with the President had no overall assessment of the protective manpower needs at the hospital. Such an assessment was not included in the hospital survey, which in any event did not arrive at the hospital until after the initial crisis had passed.

3. While with the benefit of hindsight it is clear that security at the hospital was adequate, there is some question whether the Service should have procedures to assure that an adequate level of personnel is available to protect the President in the immediate aftermath of an attempted assassination -- at least until it is known whether that attempt was part of a larger threat.

4. Hospital personnel have concluded that, although it was not critical to the treatment of the President in this case, it would be helpful in the future if the President's medical file were to be available in the hospital emergency room.

Recommendations

1. Hospital protective surveys should include a segment assessing the security needs at any hospital for which emergency use is contemplated, including manpower, posts, a room designated as a command post and all access routes to the emergency room, operating room, recovery room and intensive care unit; this survey should be placed in the President's limousine.

2. A copy of the President's medical history (including blood type) should be carried with the hospital survey in the President's limousine, so that it can be made promptly available to hospital emergency room staffs.

HILTON HOTEL AFTERMATH

Procedures

Secret Service Special Agents are instructed that they should not assist individuals injured during an assault on a protected person until the protected person has been evacuated from the scene or the scene has been secured. In addition, they learn that the scene of the assault should be secured as soon as possible by agents not directly involved in the physical safeguarding of the protected person.

The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over assassination attempts (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1751). The Secret Service and the FBI have entered into an agreement delineating the responsibilities of each agency in the event of an assassination of, or an assassination attempt on, a protected person, including the President. The agreement provides that it is the responsibility of the Secret Service to assume and maintain control of the situation (exercise an "interim federal presence") until the Director of the Secret Service and the Director of the FBI or their respective designees have arranged a logical and coordinated transition of control of an investigation. The agreement further provides that the FBI should be given immediate access to all parts of the investigation by the Secret Service. Responsibility for working with the FBI, to determine when to transfer control of an investigation to the FBI, is assigned to the Assistant Director, Office of Investigations.

In addition to the agreement with the FBI, each Secret Service Special Agent has received basic law-enforcement training and has normally had on-the-job experience with the procedures for preserving a crime scene and evidence and for establishing the chain of custody of the evidence.

Execution of Procedures

From the shooting, the evacuation of the President took less than ten seconds. Thereafter, attention turned to crowd control and dealing with the assailant.

As the suspect was being subdued by Special Agent D.V. McCarthy, Special Agent Wanko, a member of the Presidential detail who had remained on the scene, readied his submachine

gun and surveyed the crowd for other possible assailants. He ultimately moved to a position against the wall of the hotel where he continued to survey the area. He also directed the crowd to move back.

At this point, members of the public trained in emergency medical treatment and other Special Agents in the vicinity moved to render assistance to Press Secretary Brady, Special Agent Tim McCarthy and Metropolitan Police Department Officer Thomas Delahanty.

Special Agent William Green, the lead advance agent, was near Officer Delahanty at the rope line when he heard the shots. He moved away from the rope line and toward the departing Presidential limousine, radioing that there had been an attack on the President. After the limousine left, he attempted to radio the emergency ambulance which was pre-positioned on Connecticut Avenue above the hotel. The ambulance did not respond, so Green moved up the hill and motioned for the ambulance to come to the area of the shooting.

The Special Agents and police officers in the area of the wounded effectively kept the crowd back. Within a few minutes of the shooting, Special Agent Tim McCarthy and Press Secretary Brady were loaded into the first two ambulances on the scene and Officer Delahanty was loaded into the third. Secret Service Special Agents got into the ambulances with Special Agent McCarthy and Press Secretary Brady. They accompanied them to the George Washington University Hospital and there assisted with hospital security.

A number of Special Agents and police officers tried to control the crowd and preserve the crime scene until the FBI arrived. Special Agent Tom Lightsey picked up with his handcuffs the .22 caliber weapon used by the assailant, was later advised of the FBI's assumption of jurisdiction by the Assistant Director for Investigations, and turned the weapon over to the FBI. Eight officers from the Uniformed Division, responding to a radio transmission requesting assistance, arrived within seven minutes of the request and assisted in preserving the integrity of the crime scene.

In the Security Room monitoring the radios was Special Agent Steve Ramsey. After hearing that the crime scene was under control, Ramsey ordered the post standers to report to the Hilton briefing room for interviews with the FBI. Ramsey also called the Washington field office and asked for case agents, required whenever there is a shooting incident, to

report to the scene. Shortly after 2:30 p.m., two Special Agents from the Washington field office were dispatched to the hotel to work with the FBI.

By 5:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., the FBI had interviewed most of the post standers, who were then told that they could return to their respective offices. Most returned to the Washington field office and remained there working the telephones or were ordered home with instructions to rest and return with a later shift.

Movement of the Suspect

Procedures

Secret Service Special Agents are instructed that steps should be taken to protect those in custody from physical harm and from overexposure to news reporters and photographers. Any suspects taken into custody are to be informed immediately of their rights as outlined in the Miranda decision of the Supreme Court.

Execution

After being subdued by Special Agent D.V. McCarthy, the suspect, later identified as John Warnock Hinckley, Jr., was transported to the Metropolitan Police Department Central Cell Block. After the ride, Hinckley was searched for weapons. On arrival, McCarthy covered the subject as he entered the cell block; another Special Agent, Carlton Spriggs, searched Hinckley, and McCarthy informed him of his rights. Hinckley was placed in a cell, and McCarthy stayed at the entrance.

Spriggs took Hinckley's belongings and called the Washington field office to inform the Secret Service of their contents. The Washington field office then assigned a response team of two Special Agents from the Protective Intelligence Squad and they, plus a Special Agent from the Command Post, went to the Central Cell Block. Secret Service Special Agents who were present during questioning of the subject by Metropolitan Police Department homicide detectives reported pertinent information (name, date of birth, etc.) back to the Washington field office.

Hinckley was transferred to the FBI Washington field

office at Buzzard's Point by Secret Service armored car. On arrival at the FBI Washington field office, Hinckley was interviewed by FBI agents with Secret Service Special Agents present. Information from the interview was forwarded to the Secret Service Washington field office and from there to the Intelligence Division.

Intelligence information was also coming from a variety of other sources. The State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency and Office of Special Investigations (Department of Defense), the CIA and the Capitol Police, all reported that they had no record of Hinckley. ATF called to offer its services and provided information on the weapon used within one-half hour after receiving the correct serial numbers, as is further explained below.

At about 5:00 p.m., Special Agent Huse, the Secret Service liaison to the FBI, advised the Intelligence Division's Command/Control Center that the FBI had a record of Hinckley's arrest at the Nashville Airport on October 9, 1980. Later, at about 9:00 p.m., the FBI confirmed this information.

Secret Service personnel transported Hinckley during the evening of March 30 from the FBI Washington field office to the Federal Courthouse using an armored car. Later that night he was again moved with the aid of Secret Service personnel to the Quantico Marine base.

Search of the Park Central Hotel

Special Agent Spriggs determined from Hinckley's belongings that he was registered in Room 312 at the Park Central Hotel. Spriggs relayed this information to the Washington field office, and two Special Agents were assigned there. At about 5:45 p.m., a search warrant was requested by FBI agents, and was signed by a Magistrate at 9:45 p.m. Approximately ten minutes thereafter, the search of Room 312 began. The luggage was screened for explosives, and the room was dusted for fingerprints. Among the items of interest in the room was the newspaper listing of the President's schedule (time and location) for Monday, March 30, 1981. At approximately 4:15 a.m. the next morning the search was completed.

Conclusions

1. The Service's agreement with the FBI for the preservation of an "interim federal presence" at the Hilton Hotel did not require that the post standers remain at the hotel for interviews with FBI agents. What the agreement did require was the presence of a Secret Service intelligence team, who were in turn authorized to use available personnel. The decision to keep the post standers at the hotel was questionable under circumstances in which the dimensions of the danger to the President -- who was then in the hospital -- were still largely unknown. A determination should have been made at headquarters to transfer these Special Agents to the hospital.

2. The control, protection and transportation of the suspected assailant to the Metropolitan Police Department proceeded in accordance with Secret Service procedures.

3. Available information suggests that the accused in this case was materially aided in his attempt on the life of the President by a newspaper publication of the daily itinerary of the President.

Recommendations

1. The agent coordinating communications at the scene of any assassination attempt should be responsible for obtaining instructions from Secret Service headquarters as to the subsequent assignment of the agents remaining at the site. These agents should be made available to protect the President at another location, if advisable, before they are assigned to any other duties.

2. Consideration should be given to withholding from publication information concerning the times and locations of the President's public activities outside the White House.

PROTECTION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Procedures for Protection of the Vice President

There were apparently no written procedures in place for automatically increasing the protection of the Vice President in the event of an assassination attempt on the President.

Secret Service Protection of the Vice President on March 30, 1981

The Vice President was enroute to Austin, Texas, by airplane when he learned that the President had been shot. Although it is unclear whether other landing sites were considered, the Vice President decided to land in Austin for refueling, and did so at 2:25 p.m., C.S.T. It is unclear whether the Service made a special check to determine whether trouble might be anticipated at this stop, which had been scheduled well in advance. In any event, there is some question as to the security of the communications facilities on the Vice President's plane; any transmission of the decision to land in Austin could have been overheard by members of the public.

In Austin, the Vice President did not leave the plane. Special Agents remained on the aircraft with the Vice President, guarding the door with automatic weapons. Other Special Agents were posted outside the plane. The plane departed Austin at 3:10 p.m., C.S.T.

The Washington field office ordered protective intelligence agents who were at Andrews Air Force Base for the arrival of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands to remain there pending the arrival of the Vice President. In addition, several other Special Agents were assigned by the Washington field office to assist in security arrangements at Andrews Air Force Base.

The Vice President landed at Andrews at 6:25 p.m., E.S.T., and the plane taxied directly into a hangar adjacent to that housing Air Force One. The Vice President was then flown by helicopter to the Naval Observatory grounds where he landed at 6:41 p.m. At the Naval Observatory, he was transferred to an armored limousine and escorted by an augmented motorcade to the White House (after the attempt on President Reagan's life, the

Vice President received additional Secret Service protection).

Upon arrival at the White House, the Vice President went directly to the Situation Room. He later went to the Press Room and made a short statement. About 9:50 p.m., the Vice President returned from the White House to his residence at the Naval Observatory grounds.

Conclusion

The protective detail with the Vice President at the time of the shooting responded with good judgment to his protective needs. Nevertheless, the written procedures for responding to an assassination attempt on the President do not provide a very specific system for upgrading protection for the Vice President or other successors to the Presidency. Although the President already has the authority to order such protection, given the circumstances in which a decision may be required, statutory authority for the Secretary of the Treasury may be appropriate.

Recommendations

1. The Secret Service should review and formalize its unwritten procedures for an immediate increase in protection for the Vice President and other successors to the Presidency in the event of an attempted assassination of the President.
2. The security of communications with the Vice President's traveling party should be enhanced.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCERNING THE SECRET SERVICE

General Conclusions

1. As a whole, the United States Secret Service performs its protection role with great effectiveness and professionalism. Moreover, from the Director down through each of the agents interviewed, the Service was entirely cooperative and forthcoming with what was in effect the most searching management review it has undergone since the Warren Commission.

2. Over the last few years there has been an increase in the number of individuals the Secret Service is charged by law with protecting, and a decrease in the number of Special Agent and Uniformed Division personnel the Service has to discharge those responsibilities. Even after offsetting the decreases against an increase in support personnel, the Secret Service still puts its effective loss in strength since 1977 at 280 positions, with about a 15 percent overall decline in the Special Agent and Uniformed Division categories.

General Recommendations

1. In its 1964 report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the Warren Commission recommended improvements in the Treasury Department's daily supervision of the operations of the Secret Service, and that "the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant with the responsibility of supervising the Service." Continuous outside management supervision can improve the responsiveness and flexibility of government agencies, especially those -- such as the Service -- which are headed by career officials. Consideration should be given to increasing the reporting responsibilities of the Secret Service to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations, and the supervisory authority which this officer can exercise over the Service's activities. The choice of methods for protecting the President should, of course, remain with the Service, but the Service should be required periodically to review with the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Operations such matters as its priorities, its policies and its organizational structure.

2. If the Secret Service is to continue to provide the level of protection equivalent to that which it has historically achieved, the manpower and financial resources available to the Service for the performance of this function must be significantly increased.

B. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

LEGAL AUTHORITY

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) is responsible for enforcing and administering the firearms and explosives laws of the United States. Much of ATF's authority derives from the Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 921, et seq.), which imposes a number of record-keeping requirements on importers, manufacturers, and dealers who are licensed to engage in the firearms business by the Act.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 923(g), licensees must maintain records of importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or other disposition of firearms and ammunition "at such place, for such period, and in such form as the Secretary [of the Treasury] may by regulations prescribe."

In addition, licensees must make their records available for inspection at all reasonable times and must submit to the Secretary such reports and information with respect to the records as the Secretary may by regulations require. And finally, licensees must allow the inspection, during business hours and on their premises, of any records required by regulation to be kept as well as the inspection of any firearms or ammunition stored on the premises.

When a firearm is sold or otherwise disposed of by a licensee to an unlicensed person, the transaction must be recorded on a firearms transaction record (Form 4473). Each licensee must retain as a part of his permanent files each Form 4473 and must file the forms in one of three ways: alphabetically (by name of purchaser), chronologically (by date of disposition), or numerically (by transaction serial number).

In an over-the-counter sale of a firearm to a non-licensee who is a resident of the state in which the licensee maintains his business, the Form 4473 will contain the purchaser's name, address, date and place of birth, height, weight and race, as well as a certification by the purchaser that he is not prohibited by law from receiving a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce. It will also contain the name of the manufacturer of the firearm, the name of the importer (if any), the type, model, caliber or gauge, and the serial number.

Forms 4473 are not forwarded to ATF, but are maintained by the licensees. However, if two or more pistols or revolvers are sold to a single person within a five-day period, the licensee must file with ATF a Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Pistols and Revolvers.

In the Federal Register of March 21, 1978, ATF published a notice containing several proposals concerning recordkeeping and reporting requirements under the firearms regulations. Specifically, the notice proposed that (1) licensed manufacturers and licensed importers put a unique serial number on each firearm imported into or manufactured in the United States; (2) each Federal firearms licensee report to ATF any theft, loss, or recovery of a firearm; (3) each licensed manufacturer submit to ATF a quarterly report of firearms manufactured; and (4) each licensed manufacturer, licensed importer, and licensed dealer submit to ATF a quarterly report of firearm dispositions.

Congress halted any action on the proposals by providing, in the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-74), that no funds appropriated for the salaries and expenses of ATF:

"shall be available for administrative expenses in connection with consolidating or centralizing within the Department of the Treasury the records of receipt and disposition of firearms maintained by Federal firearms licensees or for issuing or carrying out any provisions of the proposed rules of the Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, on Firearms Regulations, as published in the Federal Register, volume 43, number 55, of March 21, 1978."

COOPERATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

The National Firearms Tracing Center at ATF Headquarters traces firearms for federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, conducting approximately 3,000 to 4,000 traces per month. Law enforcement agencies may call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and request a gun trace. The trace request call is recorded and the trace is done when the personnel of the Center are at work -- usually from around 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

When the Center receives a request for a trace, the name

of the requester, a description of the firearm (including the serial number, manufacturer, etc.) and other available information are recorded. Center personnel call the manufacturer and obtain the first disposition of the weapon; the manufacturers usually sell to wholesalers. The wholesaler receiving the weapon is then called, and the next disposition of the weapon is identified. The entire transfer history of the weapon is obtained in this manner and provided to the requester.

EMERGENCY PERFORMANCE

Procedures

While ATF has no written plans or procedures to be put into effect in case of an assassination or attempted assassination of the President, such an event would be treated in a fashion similar to other more common emergency situations (bombings, bomb threats, etc.).

Because information on firearms ownership is maintained by manufacturers, wholesalers and dealers, and not by ATF, there is only limited tracing capability after business hours. If an emergency gun trace is requested after the National Firearms Tracing Center has closed for the day, the ATF Communications Center (which is open 24 hours a day) will call the Chief of the National Firearms Tracing Center at his residence. He has the names and the home telephone numbers of all the major manufacturers' representatives who could be called and asked to initiate a trace. If the firearm was not manufactured by one of the major firms, it is likely that no trace can be effected after business hours. Moreover, reaching the ultimate dealer (who actually sold the firearm and has the Form 4473 indicating the name of the individual purchaser) after business hours is likely to be difficult in any case.

Execution on March 30, 1981

At approximately 2:40 p.m. on March 30, 1981, the ATF Liaison Branch, upon the instruction of the Acting Assistant Director (Criminal Enforcement), contacted the U.S. Secret Service Liaison Office and offered to provide assistance, including the ATF gun tracing capability. At about the same time, the National Firearms Tracing Center was ordered to stand by for an urgent trace. At approximately 3:20 p.m., a liaison agent from the Secret Service contacted the ATF Liaison Branch

and provided a description and the serial number of the firearm recovered from the scene of the attempted assassination.

The ATF Liaison Branch immediately passed the information along to the Chief of the National Firearms Tracing Center for an urgent gun trace. The Chief of the Tracing Center called the ATF Liaison Branch a few minutes later and advised that the serial number given was missing one digit (the number of digits in a serial number varies according to the manufacturer so it would not be immediately apparent that a digit had been dropped). Contact was again initiated with the Secret Service and at about 4:00 p.m. the correct serial number was furnished and the trace was begun.

The Chief of the National Firearms Tracing Center telephoned the manufacturer, RG Industries, in Miami, Florida, and gave them a description of the weapon and the serial number. In a few minutes RG Industries advised that the weapon had been shipped on July 27, 1979, to Scott Wholesale, Indian Trail, North Carolina. The Chief then called Scott Wholesale and they advised him that the weapon had been shipped to Rocky's Pawn Shop, 2018 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas, on October 11, 1979.

Finally, the Chief called Rocky's Pawn Shop, and was told that the weapon had been purchased on October 13, 1980, by an individual identifying himself as John Warnock Hinckley, Jr. Hinckley provided the dealer with his Texas driver's license number, his date of birth, and his Lubbock, Texas address. Rocky's Pawn Shop also advised that Hinckley had purchased a second identical firearm on the same day.

At about 4:30 p.m., the Acting Assistant Director of ATF's Office of Criminal Enforcement telephoned the Office of the Director of the Secret Service and spoke with the Deputy Director. The trace information was passed along to the Deputy Director, including the information that Hinckley had purchased a second identical firearm. The Deputy Director of the Secret Service asked that ATF notify the ATF Dallas office that the weapon had been traced to Rocky's and that the ATF Dallas office inform the Secret Service Dallas office of the trace information. This was done and at about 4:55 p.m. agents from ATF, the FBI and the Secret Service went to Rocky's and obtained the original Forms 4473 that Hinckley had signed when purchasing the two RG Industries .22 caliber revolvers.

While ATF headquarters was conducting the gun trace on the weapon recovered from the scene of the attempted assassination, the Lubbock field office, after learning from television re-

ports that the suspect John Hinckley was from the Lubbock area, began calling dealers in Lubbock and asking them to review their records for purchases by Hinckley.

The office also began checking its files of multiple sale forms (described above), and found one indicating that the two handguns described above had been purchased by Hinckley at Rocky's Pawn Shop in Dallas. The Lubbock office passed this information along to the ATF Dallas District Office shortly before Dallas was advised by ATF Headquarters of the successful trace of the weapon by the National Firearms Tracing Center.

Subsequently, the Lubbock investigation revealed that Hinckley had made several other purchases of firearms and ammunition in the Lubbock area. The ammunition purchased included one box of "Devastator" ammunition. In explosive bullets, such as the "Devastator" brand, an explosive is inserted into each bullet in order that the bullet will fragment upon impact with a target. The Lubbock information, which included the purchase of the Devastator ammunition, was passed to the Dallas District Office and on to ATF headquarters at about 5:30 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. The information concerning the Devastator ammunition was given to the Chief of ATF's Firearms Technology Branch and he began a search of his files for information concerning the Devastator ammunition.

Shortly thereafter, at about 6:30 p.m., the FBI requested (through the ATF Nashville field office) a gun trace on three firearms which had been seized from Hinckley when he was arrested at the Nashville Airport on October 9, 1980. ATF had not previously been notified of this arrest and seizure. The three seized weapons turned out to be the revolvers purchased in Lubbock, and ATF Headquarters was able immediately to advise the FBI of the purchase information on the weapons.

The fact that Hinckley had purchased Devastator ammunition, the full significance of which was not then apparent, was provided to Main Treasury and to the Liaison Office of the Secret Service by ATF Headquarters at about 7:00 p.m. on the evening of March 30. Later, at approximately 9:00 p.m., after the Chief of the Firearms Technology Branch had found a descriptive advertisement for Devastator ammunition in his files, ATF Headquarters again called the Liaison Office of the Secret Service and provided further information on the nature of the ammunition.

Conclusions

1. ATF was able to conduct the gun trace on the weapon recovered from the scene of the assassination attempt in less than half an hour. Such a rapid trace could, of course, be of crucial importance in identifying a suspect in circumstances where the weapon is recovered, but the suspect escapes or a second person is involved. ATF also swiftly gathered information on other weapons and ammunition purchased by Hinckley and provided that information to the appropriate authorities. Through its own investigation, and prior to a request from the FBI, ATF obtained the purchase information on the three weapons seized from Hinckley in Nashville.

2. It is noteworthy that the gun trace of the suspect's weapon and the other investigative activities carried out by ATF were initiated during the normal working day. It would be difficult to conduct such an emergency gun trace if the weapon were not made by one of the major manufacturers, and it is likely to be difficult in any case to reach the ultimate dealer (who actually sold the weapon and has the name of the retail purchaser) during non-business hours.

Recommendation

Consideration should be given to methods or mechanisms, acceptable to the Congress, by which ATF would be enabled to effect gun sales traces during non-business hours.

C. United States Customs Service

LEGAL AUTHORITY

The United States Customs Service assesses, collects, and protects the levying of, import duties and taxes; collects import and export statistics; enforces customs and related laws against contraband smuggling; controls carriers, persons, and articles entering or departing the United States by enforcing the Tariff Act of 1930 and other statutes and regulations governing international traffic and trade; and enforces the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act by investigating financially motivated crime involving currency reporting violations.

COOPERATION WITH SECRET SERVICE

Customs does not have any written agreement with the U.S. Secret Service concerning cooperation or the exchange of information. The Office of Border Operations has a Liaison Group which works with the Secret Service and other law enforcement agencies. For example, Customs has in the past established "look-outs" for certain suspects at the request of the Secret Service. This involves placing the individual's name in the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) ^{6/} and requesting that Customs personnel notify the appropriate authorities if that person passes through Customs.

Customs agents also, at the request of the Secret Service and pursuant to Public Law 90-331, as amended, augment Secret Service protective details. For example, approximately 400 Customs agents were actively involved in the protection of the Presidential candidates during the 1980 campaign.

^{6/} The Treasury Enforcement Communications Systems (TECS) is a system of telecommunications terminals located in various law enforcement facilities and connected to a computer in San Diego, California. Participants within the Department of the Treasury are the Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Internal Revenue Service.

EMERGENCY PERFORMANCE

Procedures

The Customs Service does not have any formalized plans or procedures in place in case of an assassination or attempted assassination of the President, although it does have contingency plans set up for events such as nuclear war or terrorist attack. If an emergency situation were to arise, Customs has duty officers in its headquarters Office of Investigations until about 8:00 p.m. In addition, the Sector Communications Center maintains a 24 hour, 7 day a week, communications operation; in the event of a late night or early morning emergency, the Center would contact the Assistant Commissioner who is then "on-call."

In some emergency situations, Customs may have authority for limited periods of time to seal the country's borders or close ports of entry or egress. Although there are no constitutional or statutory provisions which specifically authorize such action, there are several statutes and executive orders, such as Executive Order 11490, as amended, which give the Secretary of the Treasury (and by delegation, Customs) varying degrees of control over border movements of conveyances, persons and goods. When these statutes are read in conjunction with the various laws and executive orders granting the Attorney General and the Secretary of State authority to control the movement of persons across the borders, it seems clear that the three Departments can coordinate efforts at least to order the sealing of borders for limited times.

The ability physically to seal a border would depend on the scope of the action (geographic and time factors) and on the availability of personnel not only from Customs but also from other Federal, state and local agencies.

Execution on March 30, 1981

The only involvement of the Customs Service in the investigation of the attempted assassination of the President arose out of requests by the FBI and the Secret Service for searches of the "Archive System," a part of TECS which is used primarily by Customs Special Agents to verify that a particular vehicle or person has entered the United States.

Archive records are created when a person (or vehicle) passes through Customs and the Customs Inspector, as part of the routine inspection, queries TECS. All primary queries are logged and stored showing the date, time, and place that the query was made.

Normally, the Customs Inspector will query TECS for each incoming person by entering the person's date of birth and name. Often, however, Customs Inspectors are rushed (Customs cleared more than 297 million persons entering the United States in fiscal 1980) and do not follow this procedure. Particularly in some of the larger ports, queries for many of the passengers will not be entered, or, if the name is entered, will not include the passenger's date of birth.

When an archives search was run on John Hinckley and two aliases, there were several "hits" showing that a person with that name had passed through Customs coming into the United States. Unfortunately, no date of birth was entered for any of the names so it was not immediately apparent whether any of the hits might be the John W. Hinckley, Jr., who was the suspect in the attempted assassination of the President.

In certain instances, Customs is able to go to the ports of entry indicated on the hits and pull the written baggage declarations for those hits for which no date of birth is given. However, the hits for Hinckley were at preclearance facilities in Canada where the declarations would have been oral. None of these hits were for dates in proximity to President Reagan's trip to Canada on March 10 and 11, 1981.

Conclusions

1. Because of the nature of the assassination attempt on March 30, there was relatively little that Customs could do, either to warn the Secret Service in advance or to participate in the follow-up investigation. While the Archive System might be useful in establishing the international travel patterns of a suspect or suspects, it does not appear to have been of much assistance in the current investigation.

2. Current law may permit the Secretary of the Treasury to coordinate efforts with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to order the sealing of the country's borders for limited times. No current procedures exist for implementing such a program following an assassination or attempted assassination.

Recommendation

Executive Order 11490, as amended, should be further amended specifically to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to develop plans and procedures, in coordination with the Department of State and the Department of Justice, for controlling conveyances arriving at or departing from ports of entry, airports having international arrivals and departures, and the land and sea borders during emergencies. Such plans should be updated and attention given to developing procedures to deal with the particular problems arising out of attempted assassinations of the President.

D. Office of the Secretary

EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Departmental Notification Procedures

The attempt on the President's life on March 30, 1981, occurred during regular business hours in the presence of the news media. As a consequence, notification of the Treasury Secretary and other members of the Department was accomplished in large part through the normal dissemination of news. In this respect, as in others, the events of March 30 did not test the adequacy of existing procedures.

The Secret Service Intelligence Division duty desk, which functions as the Secret Service Headquarters Command/Control Center in the event of an assassination attempt, has written procedures for notifying the protective detail assigned to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Special Agent assigned to the Assistant Secretary (Enforcement and Operations) if an attempt on the President's life should occur.

There is also a notification system available for alerting some cabinet agencies. That system is the Central Locator System which is established by the White House and operated by the White House Communications Agency through the White House Signal Switchboard. The Central Locator System, which is maintained by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), provides information to the White House on the location of legal successors to the Presidency -- the Vice President, Speaker of the House, President pro tempore of the Senate, and cabinet officers in order of the establishment of their departments.

Under emergency conditions, the White House Communications Agency may instruct FEMA to ask the successors to keep the White House Communications Agency informed of their whereabouts at all times.

Execution of Departmental Notification Procedures

The Secretary's Secret Service detail was notified by the Intelligence Division duty desk that the assassination attempt had occurred and immediately alerted the Secretary, who went to

the White House. The Secretary's immediate office notified the Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs, the Secretary's Executive Assistant and his Special Assistant.

The White House did not tell FEMA to amplify the routine use of the Central Locator System in order to require notification to the White House in the event of any change in location by the successors. It is not entirely clear what happened at FEMA on the afternoon of March 30 because different people have different recollections of events. However, it appears that between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., FEMA, acting on its own, contacted the office of each successor to determine whether the staff there knew where the successor was, and whether he would notify his office of any change in location. Each office answered both questions in the affirmative. This was not an attempt to find out where the successors were, but merely an effort to determine how much effort would be required if the White House were to order emergency use of the Central Locator System.

Office of the Secretary
Notification Procedures

Within the Treasury Department, the Office of the Secretary consists of the Department's top officials, including the Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries, and the General Counsel; the term "Office of the Secretary" should be taken to refer to all these officials as a group, together with their supporting staff of 1,500, unless the context otherwise requires.

Despite a lack of formal rules, notification within the Office of the Secretary is handled by the Treasury switchboard, located within the Telecommunications Center, and the Watch Office, a part of the Executive Secretariat. The switchboard operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Generally, the switchboard gives notice of emergency situations to the Watch Office and individuals in the Office of Administration. The Watch Office then determines which top officials should be notified; the switchboard locates those officials upon request.

The Watch Office screens all incoming traffic, including State Department cables, press, Defense, CIA and NSA reports, and alerts Treasury officials who have a need to know about unusual events or emergency conditions. There are no written procedures describing how these functions are carried out. Generally, the duty officer determines what events are signi-

ficant enough to warrant notification, and which officials should be notified, based on his or her individual judgment and experience. When in doubt, the duty officer can consult with the senior briefing officer or counterparts at the White House, CIA, State Department, or the Pentagon.

In the event of an assassination attempt, notification would go to the Secretary (either directly or through his immediate staff), to the Assistant Secretary (Enforcement and Operations), and to the Office of Intelligence Support. Depending on the circumstances, other officials would also be notified, but there is no written list which is required to be followed.

When both the switchboard and the Watch Office function around the clock, emergencies developing after hours present no particular difficulty. The Watch Office has recently limited its coverage on weekends, however; this will create blind spots during the periods when the Watch Office is closed.

Implementation of Notification Procedures
by the Office of the Secretary

On March 30, a Treasury operator in the Telecommunications Center learned of the assassination attempt from a friend and, on her own initiative, immediately notified the individuals named on the list contained in the Facility Self-Protection Plan (this Plan is primarily concerned with situations posing threats to the Treasury Building). The Assistant Secretary for Administration was notified by the Director of the Office of Administrative Programs, whose name appears on the list and who had been notified by the switchboard. The Assistant Secretary for Administration immediately called the Secretary and both Under Secretaries, and found that all three had already been informed.

The officer on duty in the Watch Office, who learned of the attempted assassination when the news appeared on the Watch Office wire, immediately notified the Office of Enforcement and Operations, and had copies of the wire stories delivered to the Secretary's Executive Assistant and the Office of Intelligence Support. The Executive Secretariat was also notified. The Watch Office continued to monitor the situation so that any changes in the President's condition could be relayed to the same offices; of course, extensive television coverage obviated the need for this activity.

Bureau Notification Procedures
and Execution

There are no existing procedures pursuant to which Main Treasury notifies the various Treasury bureaus of emergency situations.

There is no indication that any Treasury bureau received notification of the March 30 incident through formal Treasury channels.

Office of the Secretary
Crisis Management Procedures

The only emergency plan in place for the Treasury Department, short of one requiring evacuation of principal officials from the immediate Washington, D. C. area, is the Facility Self-Protection Plan. This plan is not designed to deal with crises other than physical threats to the security of Treasury facilities. It does not contain procedures which should be followed in the event of an attempt on the life of the President. In addition, the Plan is not well-known outside the Office of Administration, which was responsible for its preparation.

Office of the Secretary
Crisis Management Execution

The Secretary was informed of the incident within two or three minutes by one of the Secret Service Special Agents assigned to his protective detail. Despite the absence of formal procedures, attempts to notify the Secretary were also undertaken by several other offices, including the Acting Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Operations, the Assistant Secretary for Administration, the Watch Office, and the Treasury Security Force.

Within five minutes of his notification, the Secretary was en route to the White House, where he remained until about 8:00 p.m. He maintained telephone contact with his immediate staff from the Situation Room. The Deputy Secretary and the Assistant Secretary-Designate for Enforcement and Operations, both of whom were in California, were informed promptly and were contacted again after the President's injuries were known (at about 3:15 p.m.) in order to make arrangements for their respective returns to Washington that evening.

Conclusions

1. There are no adequate procedures for insuring that top officials of the Treasury Department are promptly notified in the event of a crisis such as an assassination attempt. Although media coverage during a normal working day obviated this problem on March 30, the unstructured way in which the notification process occurred within Treasury raises concerns about the ability to insure prompt notification under less favorable conditions.

2. There are no procedures in place for the notification of necessary officials throughout the government in the event of an attempted assassination or similar crisis. This should prompt concern about the ability of top Federal officials to be able to respond quickly when a crisis occurs under less favorable conditions than prevailed on March 30.

3. There was no focal point for crisis management activities at the Treasury Department on March 30. There were no established channels of communication to direct the flow of information into, out of, and within the Treasury Department. Because of the favorable outcome and fortuitous circumstance of this crisis, no harm was done, but there is a question whether the Treasury's procedures are equal to a more sustained crisis.

4. These deficiencies could have been reduced or eliminated if an adequate crisis management plan, including the establishment of a central point for communications and direction, had been in place.

Recommendations

1. (a) The Office of the Secretary should establish an orderly procedure for providing top policy officials with prompt notification whenever a crisis such as an assassination attempt occurs. This procedure should include a regularly updated list of individuals to be contacted. The decision on which officers to notify should not be left to the discretion of the switchboard or the Watch Office, although these offices should be assigned the task of notification. The procedures should also provide for notice to be given to top officials within the various Treasury bureaus.

The responsibility for developing these procedures should be assigned to the Office of Enforcement and Operations, in coordination with the Office of Administration and the Office

of the Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs.

(b) Consideration should be given to the creation of procedures to ensure notification of all Federal cabinet level agencies in the event of a crisis with the potential significance of an attempted assassination of the President. The development and administration of this system should be under the direct control of the White House; there is no apparent need for the introduction of the cumbersome additional layer of activity associated with White House use of the Central Locator System through the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

2. The Office of the Secretary should develop a crisis management plan which can be implemented in the event of a crisis such as an attempted assassination of the President. The plan should provide for the establishment of a crisis management center in the Office of the Deputy Secretary, to maintain contact with the Secretary and coordinate all Treasury Department activities. The Office of Enforcement and Operations should be responsible for developing this plan.

RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO
CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL MARKETS

Domestic Financial and Securities Markets

Procedures

The Treasury Department has no direct regulatory or supervisory authority over the operations of domestic financial, securities, or commodities markets, but its lead role in the formulation and execution of economic policy requires it to concern itself, at least in crisis situations, with the smooth and orderly functioning of these markets. Moreover, the government financing and debt management responsibilities of the Treasury Department require it maintain a direct interest in the smooth and orderly functioning of the Government securities markets.

Treasury Department Order 103-1 (April 30, 1981), places the prime staff responsibility for reflecting these market-based concerns with the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Domestic Finance). Pursuant to this authority, the Domestic Finance office monitors conditions in the financial markets each business day and prepares regular market reports and updates for senior Treasury officials. There are no procedures for actions to be taken with respect to domestic financial or securities markets in an emergency.

The Treasury Department has no legal authority to deal directly with disorderliness in the domestic financial or securities markets. Most officials believe that in the event of an emergency such as an attempted assassination of the President trading will stop in the government securities market (which is an over-the-counter market) and will be halted by the exchanges on which corporate securities are traded.

If this does not occur, regulatory intervention to close securities exchanges is authorized by section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Such a mandatory closing by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires approval by the President and has never been exercised.

Events on March 30

At the time of the attack on the President, the key Treasury domestic finance officials, Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs-Designate Dr. Beryl Sprinkel, Assistant Secretary-Designate Roger W. Mehle and Acting Assistant Secretary John E. Schmidt, were all attending a meeting in Dr. Sprinkel's office. The Secretary's office called Dr. Sprinkel with the news at approximately 2:40 p.m., and the meeting was immediately adjourned. Mehle and Schmidt went to the Treasury market room outside Schmidt's office to observe the reaction of financial markets and to follow news reports coming across the wire. The conclusion of initial news reports was that the President had not been shot, and while the stock market moved downward (the Dow-Jones average of industrials fell from 998 at 2:30 p.m. to 992 at 3:00 p.m.), the market reaction was not particularly sharp.

Shortly thereafter word came that the President had in fact been injured. Schmidt returned to the market room. Within minutes he was called by Douglas Scarff, Director of Market Regulation at the SEC, who said that the various stock exchanges had decided to close voluntarily. All of the exchanges closed between 3:17 and 3:23 p.m. EST.

Press accounts and subsequent interviews make it clear that upon the first reports of the incident the governors of the various stock exchanges had prepared themselves for a rapid shutdown. NYSE officials had been observing the build-up in selling pressure (the Dow-Jones fell an additional two points after 3:00 p.m.) and when the wire services reported the wounding of the President at 3:16 p.m., immediately decided to close the exchange. This action avoided a sharp reaction such as those which followed the Kennedy assassination (a fall in the Dow-Jones from 732 to 711 in less than thirty minutes with an estimated paper loss of \$11 billion) and the Eisenhower heart attack in 1955 (a fall in the New York Times index of 24 points, to 309.3, with an estimated paper loss of \$14 billion).

At the time of the shooting, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was in the process of executing an order for \$500 million in Treasury bills for a foreign customer. Since initial reports were that the President was unharmed, the New York Fed, after consulting with some of the dealers, decided to execute the order routinely -- in part to signal stability and

calm. Although word that the President had been hit came before completion of this transaction, it was executed without any noticeable anomaly in yields; otherwise, trading came to a halt.

Later in the afternoon, after the closings, Schmidt further discussed the market situation with officials from the SEC and the New York Fed. It was agreed that in light of the favorable preliminary reports on the President's condition, there appeared to be no reason to postpone the Treasury auction of seven year notes scheduled for the next day, or to close the stock markets.

Commodity futures markets were not significantly affected. Commodity futures exchanges had closed, on their usual schedules, prior to news that the President had been hit.

After word that the President was out of surgery with a favorable prognosis, Secretary Regan asked Mehle to advise the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission that he hoped that the markets under their jurisdiction would open at the usual time the following day. On Tuesday, March 31, Secretary Regan appeared on morning television to report on the President's condition. The markets opened that day with an improved tone, relieved at the outcome, and no further actions were taken.

International Financial Markets

Procedures

Section 10 of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, as amended, 31 U.S.C. Sec. 822a, establishes the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) and authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to utilize the fund to deal in gold and foreign exchange, and such other instruments of credit and securities as he may deem necessary "consistent with the United States['] obligations in the International Monetary Fund regarding orderly exchange arrangements and a stable system of exchange rates". On April 27, 1978, the United States notified the IMF, in accordance with Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, that as part of the exchange arrangements of the United States, "the authorities [will] intervene when necessary to counter disorderly conditions in the exchange markets." 7/

7/ Letter of April 27, 1978 from Under Secretary (Monetary Affairs) Anthony M. Solomon to J. Witteveen, Managing Director, IMF.

Exchange market operations of the ESF are conducted, at the instruction of the Treasury, by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as fiscal agent.

Authority over operations of the ESF is specifically delegated by the Secretary to the Under Secretary (Monetary Affairs), Dr. Beryl Sprinkel. The Assistant Secretary (International Affairs), Marc Leland, is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary on international monetary matters, including use of the ESF. Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary (International Affairs), it is the Deputy Assistant Secretary (International Monetary Affairs), Thomas B.C. Leddy, and specifically Director of the Office of Foreign Exchange Operations, Frederick L. Springborn, who has principal responsibility for policy formulation and implementation regarding U.S. exchange market intervention.

There are no written procedures governing exchange market operations for the account of the ESF. Guidelines on particular exchange market intervention are set by the responsible Treasury officials as frequently as necessary, conveyed to subordinate officials (who are within close physical proximity), and telephoned to the New York Fed for execution.

Similarly, there are no written or otherwise articulated standards within the Treasury Department on currency stabilization actions to be taken in an emergency, or procedures for reacting to an emergency that occurs outside the normal business hours of the Treasury.

Federal Reserve System Authority
To Buy and Sell Foreign Exchange

The Treasury Department is not the only instrumentality of the United States that engages in foreign exchange market intervention. The Federal Reserve System purchases and sells foreign exchange on the authority of Sec. 14 of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 355. This authority has been implemented, as a technical matter, by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which is created by 12 U.S.C. Section 263.

The FOMC has issued a Foreign Currency Directive requiring that Federal Reserve System operations in foreign currencies shall generally be directed at countering disorderly market conditions, provided that market exchange rates for the U.S. dollar reflect actions and behavior consistent with Article IV

of the IMF's Articles of Agreement. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York conducts the authorized foreign exchange operations through the Manager of the System Open Market Account.

Thus, both the Treasury (through the ESF) and the Federal Reserve System intervene in foreign exchange markets in furtherance of the U.S. policy to counter disorderly foreign exchange markets. Both entities conduct their operations through instructions to the same individual, the New York Fed's Manager of Operations, System Open Market Account, and his operational arm, the Foreign Trading Desk.

Operational Arrangements Between the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve System

Historically, there has been a pattern of cooperation between the Federal Reserve System and the Treasury Department in U.S. exchange market intervention policy and implementation. By March of 1981, operational personnel of the Federal Reserve Board, the New York Fed, and the Treasury Department were in the habit of coordinating their activities closely. They would consult frequently throughout the day on any U.S. intervention that seemed appropriate, and hold a wrap-up conference call each day. Since the Treasury Department's decision in late March 1981 to take a less active role in currency stabilization, there has necessarily been less coordination between Treasury and the Federal Reserve on such matters, but on March 30, 1981, both organizations had procedures in place to act jointly.

Execution on March 30, 1981

By coincidence, the attempt on President Reagan occurred within three minutes of the scheduled daily 2:30 p.m. conference call among Mr. Springborn, Ted Truman (Federal Reserve Board, Director, International Division), and the New York Federal Reserve Bank personnel operating the Foreign Trading Desk. Word of the attempt was passed from the New York Fed's domestic trading desk during the call.

Measured against the German mark, the dollar had opened at DM 2.1243 in New York, and had declined to DM 2.0755 prior to 2:30. The dollar quickly dropped on virtually no trading to around DM 2.0650 shortly after broadcast reports of the incident. By around 2:43 p.m. Reuters carried a story on the

attempt in which it -- like all other news sources at the time -- stated that the President had not been hit. Shortly thereafter, some commercial banks indicated quotes for the dollar around DM 2.0675.

Between 2:45 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., the news reports remained unclear, but pressure began to build in the exchange markets as belief grew that the President had been shot. Trading was not active and the dollar remained around DM 2.0650, but the Treasury officials watching the market decided that official intervention would be helpful to steady market conditions and prevent speculative selling of dollars. After conferring with Springborn, Leddy went to then Undersecretary-Designate Sprinkel who concurred that intervention should be authorized.

In the meantime, the Federal Reserve Board had been active. The Manager of the Foreign Department, New York Federal Reserve Bank, happened to be visiting at the Federal Reserve Board in Washington at the time of the attempt. In the course of this visit, he facilitated the Federal Reserve Board's authorization to provide to the New York Fed for intervention comparable to that provided by Treasury. It was assumed throughout this process that intervention would be undertaken equally for the System Open Market Account and the Exchange Stabilization Fund.

The wire services reported the wounding of the President at 3:16 p.m.; the New York and American stock exchanges had closed within a minute of that announcement. At 3:30 p.m., the New York Fed commenced foreign exchange operations, undertaking them primarily through New York brokers. This approach was intended to circulate word, through the activity of the brokers, that the Fed was buying dollars without providing any exact information on the extent of the intervention. Intervention continued until 5:00 p.m., when the market effectively stopped trading for the day. A total of \$74.4 million equivalent of German marks had been sold by the Fed by that time, and the dollar had been supported at around DM 2.0650.

By prior agreement, the New York Fed trading desk remained operational throughout the night, ready to intervene in the Hong Kong and Singapore markets. No further activity was necessary, however, as the dollar rose from DM 2.0735 in early Hong Kong trading to DM 2.0973 at the opening in Frankfurt. Treasury officials attribute this trend to the combination of the favorable medical news about the President that developed during the evening of March 30 and the knowledge that the United States had operated in support of the dollar.

Banking Regulation:
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

Procedures

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is charged with regulating and supervising approximately 4,500 national banks. It has no formal procedures for dealing with emergencies similar to an attempted Presidential assassination. In any such emergency the Office regards its responsibilities as including the monitoring of the money markets for signs of activity which might threaten the stability of the banking system, and, in extreme conditions, taking action under 12 U.S.C. Sec. 95(b)(1), which permits the Comptroller of the Currency to close national banks by declaring legal banking holidays.

Actions on March 30

On March 30, although there was some turbulence in financial markets following the first reports of the attempted assassination of the President, market disorder did not approach a level which would warrant action by the Comptroller of the Currency, and no action was taken.

Conclusions

1. There were no procedures in place to guide Treasury Department activities with respect to monitoring domestic financial, securities, and commodities markets and in consulting with officials of the New York Fed, the SEC, and the CFTC. Officials in Treasury's Office of Domestic Finance nonetheless acted appropriately in discharging their consultative responsibilities on March 30.

2. There were no procedures in place to guide Treasury Department intervention in the foreign exchange markets on March 30. Without pre-arrangement, Treasury officials acted in concert with the Federal Reserve System to intervene in support of the dollar; that intervention appeared to be effective. Because the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have no standing arrangements as to intervention, it is not possible to conclude that a similar joint intervention in the future will be handled the same way.

Recommendations

1a. In light of the nature of Treasury's role at times of emergency with respect to domestic financial securities and commodities markets, we see no need to establish specific procedures covering that role.

b. After obtaining the permission of the individuals involved, Treasury's Office of Domestic Finance should compile a telephone list (office and home) of senior officials and senior staff at the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Securities Exchange Commission, and Commodities Futures Trade Commission, who would be concerned at times of emergency with domestic financial, securities, and commodities markets. Treasury should take responsibility for distributing this list and updating it at least semi-annually (more frequently at times of transition).

2. Treasury should seek to have the Presidential approval authority for the mandatory closing of stock exchanges (and suspension of all other trading), under Section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act, delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury. In light of the possible circumstances in which this power might be exercised, it seems prudent to provide for an officer of the United States other than the President to exercise what is, in effect, a veto authority over Securities and Exchange Commission action. Given Treasury's role in financial and economic matters, the Secretary of the Treasury seems the appropriate official for this purpose.

3. Without a greater indication that the existence of procedures for intervening in the currency markets would materially improve Treasury's actions in a crisis arising out of an attempt to assassinate the President, we do not recommend the establishment of such procedures at this time.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
BUILDING AND PERSONNEL SECURITY

Procedures

Primary responsibility for the physical protection and security of the Main Treasury and Annex buildings and grounds resides with the Treasury Security Force, which is part of the Secret Service. In exercising this responsibility, the Security Force has the authority to prevent or limit access to these buildings, to search packages and otherwise act to protect Treasury personnel when the circumstances warrant such action. In other buildings occupied by Treasury agencies, these functions are under the control of the primary occupant of the building and are completely independent of the Treasury Security Force and Secret Service.

The Security Force reports to and takes direction from the Special Investigations and Security Division within the Office of Investigations at Secret Service. The Security Force has no written or other specific procedures to be implemented in the event of an attempted assassination of the President, and which Treasury officials would have the authority to direct the Security Force in such a situation is unclear.

Regulations which currently govern conduct in the Main Treasury and Annex buildings provide that these buildings may be closed to the public "when, in the opinion of the Assistant Secretary for Administration, or his delegate, an emergency situation exists." (31 CFR 407.3). Secret Service officials agree that there are circumstances -- such as a bomb threat requiring evacuation, or a fire -- in which it would be appropriate for the Assistant Secretary for Administration to act to close the building. They are concerned, however, that an attempted assassination of the President is of a different character. In such a case, the directions and priorities of the Secret Service, and of the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Operations to whom the Service reports, should be paramount. If procedures are developed to deal with future assassination attempts, the question of which agency or officer has the authority to direct the Security Force under those circumstances must be resolved.

Actions on March 30

On March 30, the Treasury Security Force initially learned of the attempted assassination through routine monitoring of Secret Service radio frequencies, followed by broadcast news reports. The Security Force did not receive any special instructions from Secret Service or from the Assistant Secretary for Administration, and carried out its duties in a routine manner.

Conclusion

The provisions of 31 CFR 407.3 require further clarification, since it is unclear whether the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Operations (through the Secret Service) or the Assistant Secretary for Administration has the authority to direct the Treasury Security Force in the event of an emergency such as an attempted assassination of the President.

Recommendation

The Treasury Security Force should have a clear line of authority from which it receives directions in crisis situations. A crisis such as an assassination attempt would appear to require that the reporting responsibilities of the Treasury Security Force should be to the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Operations, an authority with supervisory responsibility over the Secret Service. For this purpose, the definition of "emergency" as used at 31 CFR 407.3 should be appropriately refined.