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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 11/2/2016

File Folder JL 003-01 270566 (1)

FOIA

S7600

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1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
182683	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN ON BACK OF 4/1/81 MEMO FROM EDWARD V. HICKEY TO RICHARD DARMAN R 11/2/2016	1	ND	B7(D)
182691	MEMO	JOSE MURATTI TO HICKEY RE ACTIONS ON 3/30/81 PAR 6/12/2000 NLSF97-098 #1	4	4/1/1981	B1
182692	MEMO	JOHN P. KLINE TO HICKEY RE ACTIONS ON 3/30/81 PAR 6/12/2000 NLSF97-098 #2	2	4/1/1981	B1
182694	REPORT	RE ACTIVITIES OF THE WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE	33	4/1/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: WHORM Subject File

Archivist: kdb

File Folder: JL003-01 270566 [1 of 2]

Date: 6/29/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. notes	handwritten, on back of 4/1/81 memo from Edward V. Hickey to Richard Darman, 1p	n.d.	F7 B7
2. memo	Jose Muratti to Hickey, re actions on 3/30/81, 4p	4/1/81	P1 B1
3. memo	John P. Kline to Hickey, re actions on 3/30/81, 2p	4/1/81	P1 B1
4. report	re activities of the White House Communications Agency on 3/30/81, 33p	4/1/81	P1 B1, B7 F7 M70 12/1/8100

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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Collection: WHORM Subject File

Archivist: kdb

File Folder: JL003-01 270566 [1 of 2]

Date: 6/24/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. notes	handwritten, on back of 4/1/81 memo from Edward V. Hickey to Richard Darman, 1p	n.d.	F7
2. memo	Jose Muratti to Hickey, re actions on 3/30/81, 4p <i>P 6/12/00 NLS #97-098 #1</i>	4/1/81	P1
3. memo	John P. Kline to Hickey, re actions on 3/30/81, 2p <i>P 6/12/00 NLS #97-098 #2</i>	4/1/81	P1
4. report	re activities of the White House Communications Agency on 3/30/81, 33p	4/1/81	P1 F7

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C. F.

27056655

FILE MEMO:
February 4, 1985
BB/dg

JL 003-01
FG 006-01

White House Staff Compilation of Internal Events after
assassination attempt on President, March 30, 1981, sent
to Records Management by Sara Emory (Darman's Office)

TOP SECRET

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

*BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ARE CONTAINED
IN AR 380-5*

THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
IN THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) COULD RESULT IN EXCEPTION-
ALLY GRAVE DANGER TO THE UNITED STATES

RESPONSIBILITY OF PERSONS HANDLING THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S)

1. Enter on DA Form 969 your name and the date you had access to the document(s).
2. Exercise the necessary safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure by never leaving the document(s) unattended except when properly secured in a locked safe.
3. Transfer the document(s) only to persons who need to know and who possess the required security clearance.
4. Obtain a receipt whenever relinquishing control of the document(s).

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DISPOSITION

This cover sheet should be removed when document(s) are filed in a permanent file, declassified, or destroyed.

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TOP SECRET

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
a 11/7/12

~~TOP SECRET~~

For use of this form, see AR 380-5; the proponent agency is ACSI.

THIS IS A COVER SHEET
FOR
INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN
INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION
DOD 5200.1-R AS SUPPLEMENTED BY COMPONENT
REGULATIONS

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LATIONS CITED ABOVE

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100683

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 1, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR

RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM

EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR. *EvH*

SUBJECT

Compilation of Log of Internal Events

I first learned of the President's condition when I received a telephone call while in Senator Laxalt's office from the Military Office at 2:35 p.m. I immediately departed the Senator's office by White House car en route the White House and then immediately proceeded by White House car to the George Washington University Medical Center. I remained in command of the Military Office while using both a radio and mobile telephone, both of which functioned satisfactorily.

When I arrived at George Washington University Medical Center I conferred with the officials of the White House Military Office who were involved in emergency actions and planning for continued support of the President of the United States.

Significant decisions were made by each member of the Military Office staff who followed proper procedures using the telephone and secure voice capabilities. Given the sensitive nature of much of the Department of Defense information involved, a detailed report with the overall classification of Top Secret has been submitted directly to Mr. Baker.

Timberwolf = VP
Ferry master = Don Regan

~~TOP SECRET~~ *OPS 6/29/81*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 1, 1981

~~TOP SECRET~~ (unclassified upon removal of enclosures)

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. BAKER, III
FROM: EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR. *E V H*
Deputy Assistant to the President
SUBJECT: White House Military Officer
After-Action Report

Attached to this memorandum, you will find after-action reports from units and personnel assigned to the White House Military Office, delineating actions taken during the period between 1430 hours and 1900 hours on 30 March 1981 to insure continuity of the Commander-in-Chief responsibilities of the President of the United States. Given the sensitive nature of much of the Department of Defense information involved, the report has an overall classification of TOP SECRET.

Included in the reports are the actions of the Duty Military Aide, Lieutenant Colonel Jose Muratti, Army Aide to the President, who maintained the Emergency Satchel with the President during the entire period;

- the report of Major John P. Kline, Jr., Marine Corps Aide to the President, who established a command post at the direction of Mr. Dennis LeBlanc for coordination of emergency plans;

- the report of Brigadier General Josiah Blasingame, Commander of the White House Communications Agency, who directed the installation of vital communications at George Washington Hospital.

Other Military Office units contributed to the mission of insuring continuity of Commander-in-Chief responsibilities:

- the U.S. Army Transportation Agency (White House Garage), in addition to motorcade assets already in place, provided extra vehicles (4) at George Washington Hospital for emergency hand-delivered communications and facilitation of principal Staff transportation.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

SUBJECT:

White House Military Office After-
Action Report

- The White House Physician's Office, in addition to Dr. Ruge, who was with the President at all times, and who coordinated and supervised all medical attention given him, maintained a White House physician and nurse with the President 24-hours-a-day. Around-the-clock medical support for the Vice President has also been instituted as a temporary measure.

- The Presidential Watch from the White House Staff Mess responded to provide support for the health and comfort of the First Family.

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
182691	MEMO JOSE MURATTI TO HICKEY RE ACTIONS ON 3/30/81	4	4/1/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1981

CLASSIFIED BY
F97-098 #1
MSM 6/12/00

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR.
Deputy Assistant to the President

FROM: LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSE MURATTE *JM*
Army Aide to the President

SUBJECT: Actions on 30 March 1981 from 1430
Hours to 2100 Hours

(U) At approximately 1430 hours on 30 March 1981, I exited the entrance of the Washington Hilton Hotel following the President by approximately 10 meters. During the ensuing assassination attempt on the President, I fell to the ground, remained for approximately 6.5 to 7.5 seconds (according to videotape), and then rapidly proceeded [REDACTED] motorcade as the Presidential limousine pulled away.

(S) Once in the [REDACTED], visual and electronic attempts were made to verify the President's condition. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Electronic and visual attempts indicated the President was not injured. The [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] -- and into the rear window of the limousine where the President was seen sitting up, moving and gesturing.

(S) The motorcade proceeded at high speed to the emergency entrance of the George Washington University Hospital. At no time was the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the President's limousine or the motorcade. The motorcade arrived at George Washington University Hospital at 1444 hours. As the President entered the hospital, I confirmed that he walked in without seeming injured or incapacitated in any way. Once inside the hallway, however, the President faltered and had to be assisted to the Emergency Room. At this time, I dialed the White House Signal Switchboard on an Emergency Room telephone [REDACTED]

1 APR 2001

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- 2 -

SUBJECT:

Actions on 30 March 1981 from 1430
Hours to 2100 Hours

(TS) Approximately five minutes after the President entered the Hospital, I visually verified that he was still conscious, although no word of an injury had been relayed. I then called Mr. Dennis LeBlanc, Assistant to the Director of the White House Military Office, and informed him that the President had been involved in a shooting incident while exiting the Washington Hilton Hotel; that he may be injured although that was not certain; and, I requested that he direct Major John Kline, Marine Corps Aide to the President, to contact the Vice President's Military Aide [REDACTED]

(TS) I immediately attempted to ascertain the condition of the President in the Emergency Room and was told that he had been shot. I relayed this information to Major Kline in the Military Office and requested he pass it on to the Vice President. Additionally, I requested that [REDACTED]

Following this communication, I attempted to observe the President until I could make a determination as to what medical procedure was going to take place, [REDACTED]

At this time, I reported to Major Kline that surgery was imminent and requested he relay this information to the Vice President and his military aide.

(c) At this point, the [REDACTED]

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- 3 -

SUBJECT:

Actions on 30 March 1981 from 1430
Hours to 2100 Hours

(C) At this time, I communicated to Mr. Baker and Mr. Meese the actions that the Military Office had taken with regard to the Vice President [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] with an estimated arrival time of 1830 hours.

(TS) Shortly after this conversation, I was advised by Mr. David Fischer that the President's clothing had been searched [REDACTED]

REDACTED

ACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

ACTED

REDACTED

(TS) At this time, I was apprised by Mr. Meese that Secretary Weinberger was on his way to the White House Situation Room. I immediately called Major Kline [REDACTED]

REDACTED

(TS) The remainder of the crisis period until 1900 hours was dedicated to insuring the establishment of better [REDACTED]

REDACTED

ACTED

REDACTED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4 -

SUBJECT:

Actions on 30 March 1981 from 1430
Hours to 2100 Hours

 although he would then probably sleep through the night (an assumption which later proved to be wrong, since the President remained awake and alert throughout most of the night.)

(U) At approximately 1730 hours, Commander William R. Schmidt, Naval Aide to the President, arrived to relieve me; however, we both remained to assist as necessary. I departed the Hospital at approximately 1830 hours.

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182692	MEMO JOHN P. KLINE TO HICKEY RE ACTIONS ON 3/30/81	2	4/1/1981	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1981

MSM
FBI 7-0984 # 2
6/17/00

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR.
Deputy Assistant to the President

FROM: MAJOR JOHN P. KLINE, JR. **K**
Marine Corps Aide to the President

SUBJECT: Actions on 30 March 1981 from 1430
Hours to 2100 Hours

(S) At approximately 1445, I received a request from the Duty Military Aide, LtCol Jose Muratti (relayed by Mr. Dennis LeBlanc), to verify that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I was advised that the President was slightly injured, but not incapacitated. LtCol Mike Fry advised me that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and apprised him of the situation.

[REDACTED] LtCol Muratti then called me to advise that the President had been shot and would apparently require surgery. I immediately placed a call to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He informed me that he also understood they were returning immediately to Washington.

(TS)

[REDACTED] prior to 0730 the next morning.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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
~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

SUBJECT:

Actions on 30 March 1981 from 1430
Hours to 2100 Hours

(TS) LtCol Muratti later called to say that he understood there
might be a request to take our



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182700	MEMO	MAX FRIEDERSDORF TO DICK DARMAN RE LOG OF INTERNAL EVENTS D 7/24/2006 NLSF97-098 #3	2	4/2/1981	B1
182701	MEMO	KENNETH CRIB TO CRAIG FULLER RE OCA OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION PAR 6/29/1998	2	3/31/1981	B6
182702	MEMO	FRANK HODSOLL TO DICK DARMAN RE MONDAY EVENTS D 7/24/2006 F97-098 #4	2	4/2/1981	B1
182703	MEMO	JOE HOLMES TO MIKE DEEVER RE CONFIDENTIAL CRITIQUES OF MONDAY'S PRESS OPERATIONS R 11/8/2016	2	4/6/1981	B6
182704	ATTACHMENT	FROM KARNA SMALL RE 3/30/81 EVENTS R 11/8/2016	2	ND	P5 B1
182705	NOTES	FROM KARNA SMALL RE 3/30/81 (TYPED WITH HANDWRITTEN NOTATIONS)	11	4/1/1981	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
182706	MEMO	WILLIAM CASEY TO JAMES BAKER RE EVENTS IN THE SITUATION ROOM ON 30 MARCH 1981 (W/NOTATIONS) (P.1 PARTIAL)	2	4/10/1981	B3 B7(E)
182707	STATEMENT	STATEMENT OF DON REGAN (PARTIAL P. 1,3)	5	ND	B3 B7(F) B7(E)

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File Folder: JL003-01 270566 [2 of 2]

Date: 6/29/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Max Friedersdorf to Dick Darman, re log of internal events, 2p	4/2/81	P1 B1
2. memo	Kenneth Cribb to Craig Fuller, re OCA Operations Following Attempted Assassination (partial of p2), 2p	4/1/81	P6 B6
3. memo	Frank Hodsoll to Dick Darman, re Monday Events, 2p	4/2/81	P1 B1
4. memo	Joe Holmes to Mike Deaver re Confidential Critique of Monday's Press Operation 2p	4/6/81	P5 B6
5. attachment	from Karna Small, re 3/30/81 events, 2p	n.d.	P5 B1
6. notes	from Karna Small, re 3/30/81 events (typed w/handwritten notations), 11p	4/1/81	P1 B6, B6 P6
7. memo	William Casey to James Baker, re Events in the Situation Room on 30 March 1981 (w/notations) (p.1, partial), 2p	4/10/81	P3 B6 B3 F3 B7
8. statement	Statement of Donald Regan (partial of p1,3), 5p	n.d.	F7 B7

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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Date: 6/29/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Max Friedersdorf to Dick Darman, re log of internal events, 2p <i>D 7/24/06 F97-098 # 3</i>	4/2/81	P1
2. memo	Kenneth Cribb to Craig Fuller, re OCA Operations Following Attempted Assassination (partial of p 2), 2p	4/1/81	P6
3. memo	Frank Hodson to Dick Darman, re Monday Events, 2p <i>D 7/24/06 F97-098 # 4</i>	4/2/81	P1
4. memo	Joe Holmes to Mike Deaver, re Monday's press operation, 2p	4/6/81	P5
5. attachment	from Karna Small, re 3/30/81 events, 2p	n.d.	P5
6. notes	from Karna Small, re 3/30/81 events (typed w/handwritten notations), 11p	4/1/81	P1 P6
7. memo	William J. Casey to James Baker, re Events in the Situation Room on 30 March 1981 (w/notations), (partial of p 1), 2p	4/10/81	P3 F3
8. statement	Statement of Donald T. Regan (partial of p 1,3), 5p	n.d.	F7

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick Daman

from MCA.

COMPILATION OF LOG OF INTERNAL EVENTS
(See Baker Memo of 3/31/81 attached)

Questions to be Covered in Individual Memos

1. Exactly when did you first know about the President's condition, and how did you learn of it? (If your knowledge changed over time, please respond accordingly.)
Secretary informed me of shooting a few minutes after it occurred and was assigned a radio. Learned that he had been shot while in Situation Room.
2. What did you do first upon learning of the President's being injured? *Checked at press floor and then went to Situation Room - and remained there until early evening.*
3. Who was in command where you were located? (If the command structure or your understanding of it changed over time, please note accordingly.)
4. What means of communications did you (or others near you) rely upon for interaction with key members of the White House staff and Cabinet; did this communications system function satisfactorily? (Please elaborate as appropriate.)
5. What significant decisions (in your judgment) were made where you were? By Whom? And how?
6. Please note any other facts that you judge might be relevant for a log of internal events.

During the first few hours, Haley stated he was the senior officer in control, although Dick Allen seemed to assume de facto direction of much of the proceedings. When Baker arrived - he was looked to for guidance - and essentially took command. When the Vice President arrived - he was clearly in command.

Mark Anderson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 31, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR STAFF

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER III *JAB*

SUBJECT: Compilation of Log of Internal Events

There is a need to compile an accurate log of relevant internal events for the period (approximately) 2:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. on March 30 (yesterday).

This will be required to provide authoritative responses to external questions, and to provide a basis for our own review of internal operating procedures.


I am asking Dick Darman to take overall responsibility for pulling this compilation together. I have asked him also to coordinate the development of a preliminary analysis of this compilation -- with a view toward recommending necessary changes (if any) in operating procedures and support systems. He will work closely with Dick Allen and Fred Fielding on this -- consulting with all of us as necessary.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD DARMAN

FM: Joseph W. Canzeri 

RE: Log of Internal Events for March 30, 1981

On the afternoon of March 30th during the attempted assassination of the President, I was with a group of White House and Department of State staff at the Cabrillo National Monument, Point Loma, San Diego, California.

I learned about the attempt on the President's life from one of the network's pool producers who accompanied the group.

Upon learning of the attempt, we proceeded immediately to the San Diego airport and departed for Washington, D.C.

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182700	MEMO MAX FRIEDERSDORF TO DICK DARMAN RE LOG OF INTERNAL EVENTS	2	4/2/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 1, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK DARMAN

FROM:

CRAIG FULLER *CF*

SUBJECT:

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS/MARCH 30, 1981

2:30 pm

As the meeting concerning the President's auto industry package concluded in the Roosevelt Room, a staff member from the press office entered indicating that something had happened. Several of us went into the press office. Several descriptions of what had happened were being stated at the same time. I read what was coming over the wires which indicated that a shooting had occurred and that some individuals, but not the President, had been shot. I went to Ed Meese's office.

2:33 pm

I entered Ed Meese's office, interrupted a meeting and indicated that a shooting had occurred when the President left the hotel where he had given a speech. The "board" in Ed's office read "1. Enroute to GW Hospital."

Meese joined Baker and a small group went into the Ground Floor security room, but quickly exited and went to Jim Baker's office.

2:40 pm

A group was assembled in Jim Baker's office. Mike Deaver was on the phone from the emergency room of the hospital. Baker and Meese were the only ones on the telephone initially. Don Regan entered Baker's office and began reporting information he was receiving from the secret service. Al Haig arrived followed by the Attorney General. Meese and Baker left for the hospital. An open telephone line was maintained with the hospital. I spoke to Dave Fischer who was maintaining a position inside the emergency room. He gave that position up shortly after 3:00 pm. I went to the Situation Room where others had assembled.

(From Jim Baker's office, Al Haig made contact with the Vice President's aircraft for the first time.)

prior to
3 pm

I asked Ken Cribb to remain in my office for reports from me.

just after

After an initial assessment in the Sit Room of where things stood, I asked Ken Cribb to make contact with all Cabinet members, to determine their location and ask them to stay where they were (we had in the Situation Room the Cabinet members for the time being: Haig, Regan, Weinberger, Smith).

Additionally, each Cabinet member was assured that he would be kept informed by us of any developments. The attached memo from Ken Cribb gives details of exactly who was contacted. Ken Cribb reports that all Cabinet members were located and had a report by 3:30 pm.

Other reports during the afternoon and evening were given to Ken Cribb by me from the Situation Room once we had received authoritative reports from the hospital. All Cabinet members were advised that what they were being briefed on was not for discussion and that all statements would come from the White House.

Ken Cribb's memo details the calls and the information communicated.

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182701	MEMO KENNETH CRIB TO CRAIG FULLER RE OCA OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION	2	3/31/1981	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 31, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR CRAIG FULLER

FROM: Kenneth Cribb

SUBJECT: OCA Operations Following the Attempted Assassination

Missy called Adela on another matter and Adela said "Have you heard that Jim Brady has been shot?" Missy informed me. When I determined that the President was involved, I immediately went to the West Wing to be of help. You asked me to man the fort in the West Wing Office while you remained in the Situation Room. I in turn asked Missy and Patsy to stay in the EOB offices to handle the telephones there. This was about 2:45 p.m.

Adela had begun to call the Cabinet and had reached Secretary Bell. I decided to handle these calls personally to try to give those Cabinet Members not at the White House a sense of participation.

You gave me the first of several periodic reports on the medical condition of the President and Jim Brady a little after 3:00 p.m., and I then made a series of calls to bring the Cabinet Members up to date and to request that they keep me advised of their whereabouts. I talked personally to Secretary Baldrige, Secretary Bell, Secretary Block, Secretary Donovan, Secretary Edwards, Secretary Schweiker, Director Stockman, and Secretary Watt. I also talked to aides of Brock, Pierce, and Kirkpatrick, all of whom were out of town. The other Cabinet Members were already in the Situation Room, except for Drew Lewis (who was en route to the Situation Room) and Ed Meese, who was at the hospital. I later confirmed that Secretary Lewis had indeed arrived. This office was therefore in touch with all Cabinet Members by 3:30 p.m. At about 4:00 p.m. U.S.D.A. called to indicate that Secretary Block had gone to the hospital. I asked that we be given a number to be able to reach him. I later heard that he had gone from the hospital to the Situation Room.

After you again briefed me at 4:15 p.m., I called all Cabinet Members not in the White House to say that the President was in surgery, that his condition was stable, and that the condition

of Jim Brady was very critical. I spoke to the same people as before, except that Secretary Block was not available.

At 4:55 p.m. you left the Situation Room and came to your office. You then briefed me as follows: (1) Contrary to press reports, the President was still in surgery; (2) The bullet had not been found; (3) There was no internal bleeding in the abdominal cavity; (4) The doctors had told Mrs. Reagan that the President's condition was good; (5) Contrary to press reports, Jim Brady had not died, was still in surgery, but had had last rites administered. I communicated this information to each Cabinet Member not at the White House, except for Secretary Pierce and Ambassador Brock, both en route to Washington.

At 5:45 p.m. you called from the Situation Room to advise that the Vice President would arrive shortly and that a Cabinet Meeting had been called for Tuesday morning. We set a tentative time of 9:00 a.m. I so notified all Cabinet Members with whom I was in personal contact; Missy and Patsy gave notice of the meeting to the offices of those Cabinet Members who were out of town or who were in the Situation Room.

~~REDA~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~DACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDA~~

At about 8:00 p.m. I notified the Secretaries with whom I was in personal contact that the President was conscious and in good condition, that he should be fully functioning by later in the night, and that the Administration's schedule would be kept, with the Vice President standing in as necessary. At this time there was also a full Cabinet call-up to confirm the Tuesday Cabinet meeting and to request that any information on the assassination attempt be communicated to Rudy Giuliani of Justice.

We manned the telephones until after 9:00 p.m. and then adjourned for the evening.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 31, 1981

To: Dick Darman

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR STAFF

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER III *JAB*
SUBJECT: Compilation of Log of Internal Events

There is a need to compile an accurate log of relevant internal events for the period (approximately) 2:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. on March 30 (yesterday).

This will be required to provide authoritative responses to external questions, and to provide a basis for our own review of internal operating procedures.

I am asking Dick Darman to take overall responsibility for pulling this compilation together. I have asked him also to coordinate the development of a preliminary analysis of this compilation -- with a view toward recommending necessary changes (if any) in operating procedures and support systems. He will work closely with Dick Allen and Fred Fielding on this -- consulting with all of us as necessary.

3/30 Log for E. G. Harper - None Relevant

1:30 - 2:30

Met w Don Devine + Senior Executive Service Representatives

2:30 - 2:45

watch events on TV in my office

2:45 - 3:15

Met w Italian Finance Minister

3:30 -

- Offered assistance to Bergen

3:30 - 8:30

- worked in my office + watched events on TV.

SA HARPER.

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182702	MEMO FRANK HODSOLL TO DICK DARMAN RE MONDAY EVENTS	2	4/2/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1981

TO: Richard G. Darman

FROM: Robert M. Garrick *rmg*

In response to your request for a compilation of log of internal events:

1. A telephone call from a friend at the Department of Energy advised my secretary as to the incident.
2. I immediately reported to Ed Meese's office and stood by for further instructions. When it was determined that Meese, Baker and Deaver would go to the hospital, I maintained a command post in the Meese office.
3. Ed Meese.
4. There appeared to be no immediate need for interaction with White House staff other than to man the telephones.
5. No significant decisions were made.
6. At the time I was advised of the incident, I was meeting with Vice Admiral J. W. Cox, USN, Surgeon General, and Captain William Narva, USN. Both Naval officers are doctors. I made arrangements for them to immediately contact their duty stations. This completed, both officers departed the White House.

Barrick

COMPILATION OF LOG OF INTERNAL EVENTS
(See Baker Memo of 3/31/81 attached)

Questions to be Covered in Individual Memos

1. Exactly when did you first know about the President's condition, and how did you learn of it? (If your knowledge changed over time, please respond accordingly.)
2. What did you do first upon learning of the President's being injured?
3. Who was in command where you were located? (If the command structure or your understanding of it changed over time, please note accordingly.)
4. What means of communications did you (or others near you) rely upon for interaction with key members of the White House staff and Cabinet; did this communications system function satisfactorily? (Please elaborate as appropriate.)
5. What significant decisions (in your judgment) were made where you were? By Whom? And how?
6. Please note any other facts that you judge might be relevant for a log of internal events.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 1, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES BAKER
FROM PETER McCOY *pet*
SUBJECT Log of Events for Monday, March 30

I first learned that there was an incident almost immediately after the Military Office had been informed--approximately 2:28 pm. My office is directly across the hall from Dennis LeBlanc and he informed me that shots were fired, however, the President was not injured. Upon learning of this, I proceeded toward the second floor of the residence to inform Mrs. Reagan only to see her in the corridor being escorted, by the Secret Service, to her limousine. I followed and boarded the vehicle with her. I did not receive any official notification and feel I should have.

We arrived at the hospital and proceeded to the trauma room where Mike Deaver and Dr. Ruge informed us of the injuries.

I stayed with Mrs. Reagan in an effort to keep her apprised of all the breaking developments. Just prior to the President going into surgery, I began notifying the immediate family--using the Signal Board at the White House--of the extent of the injury. In addition, during the entire hospital episode I screened all of her visitors and phone calls including incoming traffic from the various family members. At all times I apprised Mike Deaver of all our movements and activities.

187703

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 6, 1981

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/81 BY SP4/BJA/STP

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mike Deaver

FROM: Joe Holmes *Joe*

Confidential Critique of Monday's Press Operation

When I learned of the shooting about six minutes after it occurred, I immediately went to Lyn's office. He decided to go immediately to the Hospital and that I should go to the Press Office.

When I arrived at the Press Office I learned that Speakes had already left for the Hospital with Lyn, Meese and Baker and that Frank Ursomarso was in charge. I therefore assisted in whatever way I could but did not attempt to interfere with Ursomarso.

However my observations are:

1. At critical times such as these, the Press Administrative Offices, both levels, should be immediately closed to the Press. Working Press were all over the offices, listening, cajoling, etc. The incident when Prosperi was quoted as stating Brady was dead, would never had happened if the area had been closed.
2. Lines of responsibility should be established. The Press Offices were cluttered with people from media liason, News Summary all over the place. They were trying to help. They got in the way.
3. Staff people from other Departments were in the Press Offices "to get information." They too interferred with the operation.
4. At no time in the period from about 2:45 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. was I aware of presence by Deputy Press Secretary Karna Small. Where inhell was she?
5. There was little or no direction given to the lower Press Staff until Speakes returned from the Hospital. It was apparent that a chain of command had not been set up in the Press Department for any type of crisis.

6. There is very little depth to the Press Department. After Brady and Speakes, the remainder of the personnel have very little experience in dealing with the press other than being a mechanic. Prosperi has about six months experience; Robin Gray, Kim Hoggard a year or so; Mark Weinberg, perhaps six months and the other girls just a few months.

In conclusion, Press lucked out on this crisis - Aided in no small part by Lyn's work at the Hospital.

April 6, 1981

TO: DICK DARMEN

FROM: KARNA SMALL *KS*

You asked me to answer question three on your list for individual memos. I am attaching my comments, although I hesitated at first to bring up problem areas. As I said at the conclusion, everyone worked hard that day...but I do think that we will be able to handle a crisis situation better in the future after a completely evaluation is made of Monday's events.

Good luck!

182704

3. Who was in command where you were located?

This is the one question that, in my mind, caused the most confusion for the press and for the staff in the press office.

As soon as it was decided that Jim Baker, Ed Meese, Lyn Nofziger and Larry Speakes would go to the hospital, it was completely unclear who would deal with the press here at the White House. I naturally assumed that as Deputy Press Secretary, I would be briefing the press from here, and Larry and/or Lyn would be handling the press relations at the hospital. It did not work out that way.

Almost from the first moments of the tragedy, Dave Gergen seemed to be taking control; however, Frank Ursomarso and others also were giving orders. This caused quite a bit of confusion. From the very beginning I was inundated with questions from the press, but when I endeavored to get the facts, it turned out to be an extremely odd and frustrating situation. I was never told, nor was it ever announced, who the spokesman would be, nor was I able to participate in any of the decisions with respect to press relations or the dissemination of information. (It wasn't until last Friday that I finally learned that Jim Baker and Ed Meese had asked Larry to be the spokesman on Monday).

It was a logical and correct decision to have the initial statements about the condition of the President and the others come from the hospital, with confirmation from here. But there were great lapses in time when the press, clamoring for any little bit of information, was stonewalled here. This is what led to the many erroneous reports, speculation etc. on the air and on the wires. With better and quicker handling, we could have prevented that.

I believe we should have done the following:

- (1) Upon establishing open lines with the hospital, the VP's plane and the White House, one spokesman here and one at the hospital should have been named. That spokesman should have gone out to talk to the press about every 15 minutes.
- (2) The spokesman should have announced - quickly - that the medical condition of the President and the others would first come from the hospital, but that other things (like running the government) were being handled well from here.
- (3) The WH spokesman should have told the press - quickly - who was on hand in the Situation Room...that contact had been made with the VP, that Mrs. Reagan had gone to the hospital, that the children or other relatives had been notified etc....ANY bit of information that was relevant (the press found out anyway but often screwed up in the process).
- (4) The Press staff should have been assembled IMMEDIATELY and told how to answer the phones and how to respond (this was done eventually and Dave Gergen gave them their marching orders - but it was too late).
- (5) In the Situation Room, statements should have been drafted based on what we knew at the time and co-ordinated with Lyn at the hospital. All in the Situation Room would have been apprised of what the ONE spokesman was going to say to the press (this could conceivably have prevented the Haig/Weinberger flap)

(6) Medical bulletins should have been issued much more frequently, but employees of the hospital should have been informed that all statements would be handled by White House spokesmen.

In summary, it should be noted that during this extremely difficult time, everyone involved worked quite hard to try and do what was right. No one individual should be singled out for criticism. But since hindsight offers us 20/20 vision, hopefully we can learn from this experience and be much more effective and have some better procedures to utilize in any future crisis.

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182705	NOTES FROM KARNA SMALL RE 3/30/81 (TYPED WITH HANDWRITTEN NOTATIONS)	11	4/1/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN

FM: Frank A. Ursomarso *fu*

RE: Assassination Attempt

At 2:25 p.m., I was in a meeting with David Gergen, Ed Harper, Dick Darman, Craig Fuller, Larry Speakes and Linda Gosden in the Roosevelt Room to discuss the auto package. Someone from the Press Office ran into the room and said, "There's been a shooting." Gergen, Speakes and I immediately got up and ran into the Press Office and looked at the teletypes. Nothing was coming over.

David Gergen said, "Go outside and see if the motorcade is coming." I ran out the door to the South Lawn driveway to the Guard House. The Guard had two phones up to his ears and I asked him if the motorcade was en route to the White House. He said, "No, I think they're going to the hospital."

I went to Jim Baker's office and when I arrived, David Gergen, Jim Baker, Larry Speakes, Lyn Nofziger, Ed Rollins and Secretary Regan, among others, were present. Phone calls were coming in from Michael Deaver and we were in contact with the Vice President. It was decided that Ed Meese, Jim Baker, Lyn Nofziger and Larry Speakes would go to the hospital. At this point we already knew that the President was injured, along with Jim Brady and several other security persons.

At first it was believed that the President's ribs were bruised. As Jim Baker, Ed Meese, Lyn Nofziger and Larry Speakes walked down the hall to go to the hospital, David Gergen told me to tell the Press they were en route to the hospital. I did so. Then I went into Baker's office.

By this time the Secretary of State had arrived. David Gergen said, "The Secretary and I are going to the Situation Room. You go to the Press Office and make sure things are covered there."

I went to the Press Office, which was completely filled -- wall-to-wall -- with screaming reporters. Connie Gerard saw me standing there and told me Larry Speakes was on the phone. I went to Connie's desk, picked up the phone and Larry told me, "Lyn Nofziger has put out a statement that the President has been shot in the left chest and his condition is stable. I want you to put out the same information." I asked him if he wanted me to do it, "Right here, right now." He said yes.

By now the reporters were in a state of hysteria. I thought that I should check this out with David Gergen first. However, since Speakes was at the hospital, and because Nofziger had announced from the hospital that the President had been shot, I put it out. I decided that it would be much calmer to do it off camera in the Press Office, instead of standing in front of the cameras. I stepped up on Connie Gerard's chair and said, "I am confirming what Lyn Nofziger has just said at the hospital. The President has been shot in the left chest. His condition is stable." I was asked to repeat this three times -- and I did so.

At this point, Fred Fielding appeared at the back of the crowd and motioned me toward him. He took me into the Situation Room. From this point on, I moved back and forth between the Situation Room and the Press Office to monitor activities. At this time, I will not go into any great detail as to what happened in the Situation Room. I will give some of the details here and the rest in a separate memo.

While in the Situation Room, David Gergen, Secretary Haig, Secretary Regan, Attorney General Smith, Dick Allen, Martin Anderson, Fred Fielding and myself, among others, were present.

As we were receiving and placing calls, and discussing the matters at hand, Larry Speakes suddenly appeared on TV in the White House Briefing Room. David Gergen said, "What's he doing up there?" I said, "I don't know, I thought he was at the hospital." Gergen said to go up

there and pull him off. I left the Situation Room and ran to the Press Office Briefing Room. I gave Larry Speakes a note that said to please leave the podium. Speakes read the note, concluded his remarks and left the podium. As I turned to leave with Speakes, I saw Secretary Haig, Dick Allen and David Gergen coming down the hall to the Briefing Room. I said to David, "What's Haig doing in there? Should I stop him?" David said, "No- let him go." I stood aside and let him go in.

As the briefing got underway, I said to Gergen, "I'm not sure I like this, should we pull him off?" Gergen said, "No," so we let him stay at the podium. I said, "OK -- it's your call."

When Secretary Haig had finished, he stepped down from the podium and into the hallway where I said to him, "That's not bad for a Lower Merion graduate, but I bet Upper Darby can still beat you at football." He laughed as he left the Briefing Room and walked down the hall to the Situation Room. We continued working there as before.

I continued to monitor the events in the Situation Room, Press Office and Jim Brady's office, during which time I funneled reports into the Situation Room, making sure that the Press Office staff operated properly.

During this time, I noticed Herb Klien in Jim Brady's office. Sometime between 5:00 and 6:00, Larry Speakes and I had a short meeting with the Press Office staff and told them to stay calm and to continue to do their job as they had in the past. David Gergen, Larry Speakes and I had a meeting with the Press Office staff in the Roosevelt Room about thirty minutes later. David Gergen spoke to them. This greatly improved their morale and understanding of the situation. We cautioned the staff not to put out new information, but only to repeat what had been said.

Early in the afternoon, Secretary Regan said that he had just learned of the news about Jim Brady. Later he announced Brady was dead. Dick Allen said we should observe a moment of silence for our fallen colleague. We all bowed our heads and prayed. I remember standing in the corner and praying that no one else would die. Karna Small, who was in the Situation Room, was visibly shaken. I put my arms around her in an attempt to comfort her. Later we got the report Jim Brady was not dead.

I ran upstairs to determine where the erroneous confirmation to the press had originated. I believe that CBS put out the statement that Brady was dead. I learned from Connie Gerard that David Prospero had mistakenly nodded while talking on two phones at the same time, and a reporter interpreted his nod to mean that Brady was dead.

I sent Connie Gerard and Kim Hoggard to find Prospero and bring him down. Prospero appeared. Gergen and I talked with him. He stated the mistake on his part and on the reporters part. David Gergen and I told Prospero to go back to work.

When word was received that the Vice President was en route to the White House, I walked out to the West Executive driveway and met Pete Teeley. Pete and I stood waiting for the motorcade to arrive. I suggested that Ken Khachigian help him with the Vice President's remarks.

The Vice President's car arrived and Ed Meese was also in the car. Before the Vice President arrived, Jim Baker came into the Situation Room. I escorted the Vice President into the Situation Room and he took the position at the head of the table.

It was decided that the Vice President would go to the Briefing Room and give the report to the people. The activity decreased and I stayed in the press area, attempting to help the Press Office and staff and reporters with their stories.

Obviously, I have not given a complete record of all the events that happened during this confusing time. I have attempted to provide you with the highlights. I will give you a more detailed explanation of some significant events which occurred.

Additionally, I have prepared a critique for Dick Allen. I will send you a copy.

cc: David Gergen

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 1, 1981

TO: RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON

RE: RESPONSE TO YOUR MEMO SEEKING A COMPILATION
OF LOGS OF INTERNAL EVENTS (3/31/81)

Responses to questions as outlined:

1. I was walking through the reception area of the West Wing of The White House at approximately 2:40 p.m. Nell Yates asked me if I had heard that someone had taken a shot at the President.
2. Having first heard that someone had taken a shot at the President, I immediately went to the press office in hopes of learning more details.

While there I learned that a policeman, Secret Service agent and Jim Brady, Presidential Press Secretary, had been hit. I also was told that the President had not been hit. I then proceeded to Jim Baker's office.

At that time, Jim Baker, Ed Meese, Dave Gergen, Frank Hodsoll, Lyn Nofziger, Ed Rollins and Secretary Regan and others were in Jim's office.

It was at that time prior to Jim and Ed's departure that I learned that the President had been shot. At this time I did not know the severity of the injury.

3. With the departure of Jim, Ed and Lyn Nofziger from Jim Baker's office for the hospital, Staff Director Dave Gergen was loosely "in charge" of that office. Shortly thereafter, Secretary Al Haig arrived. Secretary Haig placed a call to Vice President Bush. After that call, Secretary Haig, Secretary Regan and Dave Gergen went down to the Situation Room. At approximately 3:30 p.m. I went down to the Situation Room as well.

In the Situation Room there was generally a collegial situation. Dick Allen was serving as the "note taker." With the exception of Secretary Al Haig's comments in the press room, I was not privy to any discussion with respect to who was "in command" in the Situation Room. Deference was given to the Secretary of State as the senior Cabinet official in that room.

4. The communications reliance was on television as well as frequent reports from Dave Gergen, Secretary Haig and others who spoke directly to Jim Baker and others at the hospital. This communication system was not adequate.

At frequent intervals, the phone connection between the Situation Room and the hospital was lost. In late afternoon Frank Hodson volunteered to go to the hospital and keep an open line to the Situation Room in an effort to remedy the situation.

5. At various times in the Situation Room I left to help with the coordination of transportation for the Brady family from Illinois to Washington, arrange for a communications system to alert the Governors of any developments, and other mechanical matters. While I was in the Situation Room, decisions were made with respect to NORAD, a defense succession exercise, and discussion of readiness states. With respect to the NORAD exercise and the succession exercise, the Secretary of Defense stated what he intended to do. All were in agreement. With respect to the state of readiness, again the Secretary of Defense stated what he intended to do and, again, the others agreed.

Also at that meeting there were discussions on the mechanics of paper preparation consistent with the 25th Amendment. Fred Fielding had the point in outlining the law and having such paper prepared. The documents were given to Dick Darman to hold per the direction of Jim Baker over the telephone.

Later in the afternoon there was discussion on what items should be on the Vice President's agenda upon his arrival and the Vice President's schedule for the 31st.

Max Friedersdorf sought and secured clearance from Al Haig for certain briefings to Capitol Hill. Apparently, Secretary Haig placed calls earlier to Senators Baker and Byrd and Speaker O'Neill and Minority Leader Michel. Secretary Haig decided what and when such communications went out to Capitol Hill.

Dan Murphy coordinated the agenda items for the Vice President's arrival with the assistance of Dick Allen. Dan Murphy, in collaboration generally with the Cabinet members present, outlined the proposed agenda for the Vice President for Monday evening and Tuesday.

With the exception of Secretary Haig's press conference, decisions with respect to public statements came from the hospital.



THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230

March 31, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD G. DARMAN
Deputy Assistant to the President

FROM: Malcolm Baldrige

SUBJECT: OCCURRENCES ON MONDAY, MARCH 30, 1981

A message was brought to me at approximately 2:40 p.m., by Helen Robbins, my Executive Assistant, concerning the attempted assassination of the President. At about the same time, Deputy Secretary of Commerce-Designate Joe Wright came in with the same information. Both of these individuals had received from the Commerce Department telex a report that there was a shooting in which the President was involved, and they notified me immediately. I was in the middle of a meeting with the Saudi Arabian Ambassador, Sheik Faisal Alhegelan. He expressed his sorrow and left.

I estimate that within the next half hour Ken Cribb, of the White House, called to inform me that I was in the order of succession and wanted to know my plans for the rest of the day and evening. He also gave me his telephone number, requesting that I inform him at the time I left the building and every time I moved from one place to another throughout the evening.

Inasmuch as I was not on the official Crisis Team, I did not immediately go over to the Situation Room at the White House. I felt that, from what I had seen of the situation at the White House on television and what I heard from Cribb, the situation was being handled in an orderly, proper manner and that one more person without a specific responsibility at a time like that simply would add to the inevitable confusion.

I did go over to the Situation Room about 6:45 p.m., to see if I could be of any help at that time or during the night in case there were any necessity for people to take breaks or any special duties needed to be handled. Matters were under control, so I left the White House for my residence somewhere around 7:30 p.m. I called the residence of the Vice President and left word with Mrs. Bush that when the Vice President came home if there was anything he wanted checked up on at that time or during the night to call me at home.

Malcolm Baldrige



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250

April 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK DARMAN

FROM: JOHN R. BLOCK *JRB*

RE: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ON MARCH 30

In response to the memorandum requesting information on my whereabouts relevant to the internal events for the period of 2:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on Monday, March 30, I have responded to the series of questions as follows:

1. Exactly when did you first know about the President's condition, and how did you hear of it? (If your knowledge changed over time, please respond accordingly.)
 - a. At 2:00 p.m. on March 30, I was meeting with staff in my office. At approximately 2:30 p.m., my secretary announced there had been a shooting where the President had just given a speech. News of the incident came on the radio and several staff members had rushed to my office in the event I had not heard the news. Preliminary reports stated the President had bumped his head getting into the limo and three people had been wounded -- Brady, D.C. police officer and a secret service agent. At 3:00 p.m. while I was meeting with a constituency group, my secretary came to where I was speaking and announced to me that the President had been shot in the chest.
2. What did you do first upon learning of the President's being injured?
 - a. Not wanting to alarm the group to whom I was speaking, I merely announced to them about the incident and that the President had been injured and due to the nature of the incident it was best for me to return to my office. Upon returning, Deputy Secretary Lyng and I turned on the television to get an update on the situation. It was my feeling that the best course of action was to determine what exactly had happened and to remain in my office.
3. Who was in command where you were located? (If the command structure or your understanding of it changed over time, please note accordingly.)
 - a. I was in charge and when I left at 3:30 p.m. for the hospital, Deputy Secretary Lyng took command.

4. What means of communications did you (or others near you) rely upon for interaction with key members of the White House staff and Cabinet; did this communications system function satisfactorily? (Please elaborate as appropriate.)
 - a. The Cabinet office called my office on another matter and at that time an inquiry was made as to the seriousness of Jim Brady. Other than that communication no telephone calls were made.
5. What significant decisions (in your judgment) were made where you were? By whom? And how?
 - a. Assessing the situation, remaining in control and then acting accordingly where the most significant decisions I made.
6. Please note any other facts that you judge might be relevant for a log of internal events.
 - a. Due to the seriousness of the incident, I felt I could have been of more help had I been better informed -- in lieu of waiting for moment to moment developments on the radio or television.

My time schedule for March 30 between 2:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. was as follows:

2:00 In my office
3:00 In conference room down the hall from my office
3:10 In with Deputy Secretary Lyng to seek update on television
3:30 Left for Hospital
4:30 Left Hospital for White House
8:00 Returned Home -- where I stayed the remainder of the evening

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182706	MEMO WILLIAM CASEY TO JAMES BAKER RE EVENTS IN THE SITUATION ROOM ON 30 MARCH 1981 (W/NOTATIONS) (P.1 PARTIAL)	2	4/10/1981	B3 B7(E)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

To Dick Darman
when done

10 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable James A. Baker III
Chief of Staff and Assistant
to the President

FROM: William J. Casey

SUBJECT: Events in the Situation Room on
30 March 1981

1. I was called out of a meeting at 2:40 p.m. on Monday, 30 March, to be informed that the President had been shot at but he had not been hit, and that he had been taken away from the scene of the shooting safely but that three other men had been hurt. Almost immediately, Dick Allen called and asked me to come over to the Situation Room at the White House right away. I left immediately. It took about twenty minutes to get across the river and reach the Situation Room. There I learned that the President had been taken to George Washington Hospital. I learned also that Jim Brady had been hit in the head and that a Secret Service man and a Washington policeman had been hit and were in the hospital.

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~EDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~RE~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~EDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

3. The Secretary of Defense consulted with those gathered in the Situation Room as to what should be done about putting our military forces on alert and took responsibility for any steps that were called for in that respect. Notification of the families of the victims, arranging for their

transportation needs, and housekeeping details were assigned to various staff members at the White House. Fred Fielding joined the Attorney General in advising with respect to the legal questions that could develop. The Vice President had already been notified in Fort Worth where he was making a speech, and arrangements had been made to fly him as soon as possible to Andrews.

4. There was considerable discussion about how best to walk a line between providing information soon enough and fully enough to maintain public calm and confidence and taking the time to get confirmation and avoid disseminating rumors or otherwise confuse the public. Larry Speakes was dealing with the press over in the West Wing of the White House and was sparring questions and answers back and forth--more questions than answers. At one point in the Situation Room there was surprise that Larry Speakes appeared on the television screen to answer questions put to him by reporters in the press room. It was the general feeling that this was a mistake which was intensified when he found himself over his head in dealing with questions related to succession and command. The Secretary of State left the Situation Room to appear alongside Speakes on the television screen. I was sitting next to the Secretary of State and I believe this was a spontaneous, useful and proper response. It was the common conception that Speakes' inability to deal with the questions being put to him was likely to contribute to concern among what had to be a large number of television viewers at that time.

5. Throughout the afternoon there was general agreement our purpose was to see that the government carried on business as usual. During the course of the afternoon, Drew Lewis, John Block, and other Cabinet members joined the group. There was discussion as to the character and range of information the Vice President would want when he arrived and efforts were made to provide this. When the Vice President did arrive, he quickly made it clear that the only role he wanted to play was to support the President and see that business was carried on, see that the President was fully and properly advised, and protocol obligations met for the President.


William J. Casey

cc: Craig Fuller, Deputy Assistant to the President
and Director of Cabinet Administration



The Secretary of Transportation

Washington, D.C. 20590

Note to : Dick Darman
From : Drew Lewis *Drew*
Date : April 8, 1981
Re : Events of Monday, March 30

As per your request, here is a chronological summary of my involvement in the tragedy of last Monday:

- I. I was interrupted in a meeting with Mayor Barry, Washington, by my Executive Assistant Mark Knouse, who informed me that he had heard on the radio there had been a shooting at the Washington Hilton following President Reagan's address, but that apparently, the President was alright.
- II. I turned on the television in my office and got the report that followed, with the tapes of the shooting. I received the information that the President had returned to the White House. When it was announced that President Reagan had not gone to the White House but to George Washington University Hospital, I called Helene von Damm to see if I could do anything to be helpful. She informed me that she did not know, but I could go to the White House to be available. I arrived at the Situation Room in the White House between 3:00 and 3:30 p.m. Present were Messrs. Haig, Weinberger, Smith, Regan, Allen, Casey and Fielding. Intermittently present were Anderson, Speaks, Durgen, Murphy and Helene von Damm.
- III. Following the time of my arrival, discussions that ensued between that time and the Vice President's arrival covered:
 1. Constant bulletins from the hospital, generally transmitted by Don Regan.
 2. Detailed reports on Hinckley, his past, motivations, etc., transmitted by Bill Smith.
 3. Status of the military preparedness by Haig and Weinberger.
 4. Detailed discussions regarding family arrivals to the Washington scene, etc., in which we all participated.
 5. Question was raised as to why Alexander Haig appeared on television. Inasmuch as you have received detailed reports from others regarding this question, there is no need to reiterate.
 6. Admiral Murphy presented a program of matters to be handled by George Bush.

IV. When the Vice President arrived, he reassured everyone that the President was in total command, and he would be a fill-in, not an assistant President. He also indicated his willingness to be available to help any of us where he could be of assistance.

I could provide more detail on the individuals making reports, but inasmuch as you are receiving input directly from them, there is little more that I can provide other than duplication.

My final impression was that at all times, the situation was calm. The Haig-Weinberger story was reported out of proportion in terms of the disagreement. If I could provide constructive criticism, it would be that an emergency plan be established, and the Cabinet informed, so that if conditions arise in the future, our responsibilities and authorities would be clearly delineated.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

April 21, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CRAIG FULLER
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF CABINET ADMINISTRATION
THE WHITE HOUSE

FROM: David L. Chew *DL*
Executive Assistant
to the Secretary

Attached are Secretary Regan's responses to the five questions you submitted regarding the events of March 30. If there is any need for further elaboration of the Secretary's participation, please let us know.

Attachment

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182707	STATEMENT STATEMENT OF DON REGAN (PARTIAL P. 1,3)	5	ND	B3 B7(F) B7(E)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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STATEMENT OF DONALD T. REGAN

1. Exactly when did you first know about the President's condition, and how did you learn of it? (If your knowledge changed over time, please respond accordingly.)

At approximately 2:27 p.m. on Monday, March 30, 1981, I was notified by Secret Service Agent _____ REDA that there had been an attempt on the life of the President at the Washington Hilton. He said the President was on the way to the hospital. I asked if the President had been shot. Agent _____ replied he did not know any details. I asked if he knew who did the shooting. He said he did not know; I also asked if any others were wounded. He said he thought there were.

2. What did you do first upon learning of the President's being injured?

I immediately left my office for the White House, arriving there at approximately 2:32 p.m. On the way there the Secret Service informed me that the President was not hurt. I requested that the Secret Service keep agents with me and open lines of communication so I could know what was going on. At the same time, I instructed my driver to wait outside the West Wing basement entrance in case he was needed. Arriving at the White House I went immediately to Jim Baker's office where several senior White House staff members had gathered. On the way in, I was told by the Secret Service Agent that the President had been shot. In Jim Baker's office I did not attempt to join in the telephone conversation that Baker and Meese were having with Mike Deaver at the hospital. I was informed there that Jim Brady had been shot. The Secret Service agents who were outside Jim Baker's office notified me that two others had also been hit and wounded.

As far as I know, I was the first Cabinet officer to arrive at the White House. Later Secretary Haig arrived, and after a quick conference, it was decided that Messrs. Baker and Meese were going to the hospital and needed fast transportation. I volunteered to get them a Secret Service escort and had them use my car and driver, Mr. Herbert Horner. I believe Richard Allen then suggested that we adjourn to the Situation Room, and this was seconded by Secretary Haig. The initial group in the

Situation Room consisted of senior White House staff, including Richard Darman, David Gergen, Fred Fielding, Craig Fuller, Karna Small and several others from the Press Office.

3. Who was in command where you were located? (If the command structure or your understanding of it changed over time, please note accordingly.)

Obviously upon entering Jim Baker's office I recognized Messrs. Baker and Meese were in charge. Upon adjourning to the Situation Room, I deferred to Secretary Haig out of a sense of protocol, he being number 1 in cabinet rank. Later Secretary Weinberger arrived, as did the Attorney General Bill Smith. While in the Situation Room there was a discussion, particularly among Messrs. Smith, Fielding and Allen, as to the proper sequence of command and line of succession. Various White House staff members were asked to quickly research and clarify this issue. I observed Secretary Haig on the Situation Room TV and heard him say he was in charge.

I am unable to judge the exact time but at about this same time Secretary Weinberger did remind us, including Secretary Haig, during a discussion of the state of alert of the Strategic Forces, that he was in command from a military point of view. Secretary Haig made a rejoinder which indicated he wasn't too sure of Weinberger's statement. This was a momentary thing, and the discussion passed to other matters. For future situations, I think there should be some guidance to Cabinet officers, who do not attend National Security Council meetings, as to who is in charge in the event that the President and Vice President are not present; or in addition, if the State and Defense Secretaries are not available or not present. If the latter two are present, who among them is in charge and under what circumstances? How do their positions relate to the White House Chief of Staff and the Counsellor to the President if they are present, or if they are in another area, but in touch by telephone? Such questions can be sticky or lead to confusion and possible delays in a crisis situation if not resolved in advance.

4. What means of communications did you (or others near you) rely upon for interaction with key members of the White House staff and Cabinet; did this communications system function satisfactorily? (Please elaborate as appropriate.)

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

Secret Service communication was generally good; the only complaint I had was the need to press various personnel to get details on the suspect quickly. I also criticized the Service for giving me an erroneous report, picked up second or third hand, that Jim Brady had died. I relayed this report to those in the Situation Room, and that caused me personal embarrassment because the information later proved to be incorrect. The erroneous report was corrected by a telephone message from Jim Baker at the hospital.

From this observer's point of view there didn't seem to be adequate phones inside the Situation Room for many of us who had to ask questions from outside personnel or who had to receive messages from our own offices. Perhaps this is deliberate, but it made for too much traffic in and out, and too much confusion in the room.

5. What significant decisions (in your judgement) were made where you were? By whom? And how?

Significant decisions in Treasury were made by our Secret Service people in getting the President out of the shooting area quickly. The decision of Agent Jerry Parr to get the President to the hospital was first rate. Decisions by other agents are not known at this time. A review and a report on all Secret Service activities by the Treasury Department will be forthcoming. Our Office of International Monetary Affairs responded quickly upon learning of the incident.

They immediately contacted the Federal Reserve and notified them to begin procedures to protect the dollar which was falling rapidly in the marketplace. Not too much money (approximately \$79 million) was involved in this support operation because domestic trading in the dollar stopped within an hour. Contact was made by the Treasury with security markets but they had closed almost immediately without Treasury intervention.

In the Situation Room there were many decisions, none of which came to a formal vote; most of them were made by a Department head who notified the others and for the most part, the decisions were assented to orally, or by a lack of nay saying by the other people present. For example, the Vice President made the right decision to return to Washington immediately; the Department of Defense stepped up its alert a fraction; and State sent a wire to all American posts abroad on the situation. Treasury informed the others that to the Secret Service it did not look like a conspiracy and advised there was no need to take action in this regard. Justice immediately put a protective shield around the alleged assailant. The National Security Advisor was keeping a running record. At one time he determined that order and quiet should be maintained in the Situation Room and unauthorized personnel kept out of the room. This latter point may need a little more investigation and further study.

I was surprised at the amount of traffic in the room and lack of assigned seating space. This contributed to a higher degree of confusion and noise level than should have prevailed, in my opinion, under these circumstances.

The group around the table in the Situation Room decided there would be no statements coming out of the White House regarding the President's condition or that of any other of the wounded. All such reports were to come from the hospital. Later, however, to our surprise, we did see on TV a spokesman in the White House press room describing the President's condition. There may be a need to have a more complete understanding in the future of how press reports are to be issued and who will have the final authority in releasing them, especially in an ongoing and rapidly developing situation.

As an example of many small "on the spot" decisions, I offer the following example. Max Friedersdorf at one time reported that Speaker O'Neill was insisting upon Secret Service protection as he heard that Howard Baker and Senator Kennedy had such protection. I volunteered to find out the facts and to handle the situation. I contacted Secret Service Director Knight who informed me that there was no Secret Service protection for either Baker or Kennedy. I then called the Speaker, gave him an update on the situation, some of the information that had been furnished to me and that I had already passed on to the Situation Room regarding the suspected assailant. I also gave him the latest update on the President's condition and that of other wounded and also assured him that he did not need additional protection. If he felt otherwise, he should ask either the Capital Police or the Metropolitan Police Department to put protection around his apartment. He said he was completely reassured, appreciated my getting personally involved and asked I keep him informed of any new turn of events.

I stayed in the Situation Room until after the Vice President and Messrs. Baker and Meese had arrived and the next day's activities set.

WJR APR 21 1981

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1987

DATE 84/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

NARA, Date 02/2/98 PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOR:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

LIST OF PEOPLE IN THE SITUATION
ROOM ON MARCH 30, 19811500-1730
(CIRCA)

CABINET MEMBERS AND SENIOR W.H. STAFFERS
CONVENED MEETING IN SITUATION ROOM. HAIG CONFERED
WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA SIDEBAND SEVERAL TIMES
ALSO SPOKE WITH FORMER PRESIDENTS FORD, NIXON, CARTER
KEY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND MEESE/BAKER.

PARTICIPANTS WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING IN THE
CONFERENCE ROOM AT SOME POINT:

VICE PRESIDENT	KIM HOGGARD
SEC REGAN	ADM NANCE
SEC WEINBERGER	JANET COLSON
SEC HAIG	PETER TEELEY
MR. ALLEN	SEC BLOCK
ADM MURPHY	JIM BAKER
DCI CASEY	GRAIG FULLER
MAJ KLINE	DICK DARMAN
WOODY GOLDBERG	WM FRENCH SMITH
DAVE GERGEN	MARTIN ANDERSON
DREW LEWIS	FRANK URSOMARSO
FRED FIELDING	LARRY SPEAKES
RICH WILLIAMSON	MAX FRIEDERSDORF
HELENE VON DAMM	KARNA SMALL
SHUMACHER (PHOTO)	KIGHTLINGER (PHOTO)
CONNIE GERRARD	IRENE DERRUS
KAY ZERWICK	ED MEESE
FRED OLSON	LARRY SIMS

LIST OF ATTENDEES O 9985

DTG:000000Z JUL 77 SSNI 008368
TOR: 198/1359Z

DATE 04/02/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PARTICIPANTS WHO WERE IN THE SIT ROOM AREA BUT
DID NOT ENTER THE CONFERENCE ROOM:

MORT ALLIN
MG SCHWEITZER
JOHN OWENS
SA REILLY
NANCY BEARG DYKE

JIM RENTSCHLER
JOHN MATHENY
SA NEIL BROWN
LOU GERIG
DAVE PROSPERI

LIST OF ATTENDEES 0 9965

DTG: 000000Z JUL 77
TOR: 190/1309Z
ESN: 008368