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(Dolan)
October 13, 1986
1:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

QL Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

QL But first, let me tell you that from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. And it is for these aims I went the extra mile to Iceland.

So, let me report to you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than ~~10~~ hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. During long discussions on both Saturday and Sunday, he and I made considerable headway. We moved toward agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate range nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia. We approached agreement on sharply reduced strategic arsenals for both our countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing.

QL But there remained toward the end of our talks one area of disagreement. While both sides sought reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets

While we parted company with the understanding that we are closer than ever before and the lead us to a world without nuclear weapons.

what was intended to be a preparatory meeting

arms reduction issues

What the entire world made a historic breakthrough

insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States. This we would not and could not do.

That was the deadlock at Hofdi House late Sunday afternoon. Then, the American delegation recessed and caucused, and ~~we~~ returned to the table with the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in American history.

We offered the Soviets a ~~10-year delay in American deployment of S.D.T., and~~ a 10-year program for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- ~~and a 10-year delay in American deployment of S.D.T.~~ from the face of the Earth. We took that proposal downstairs to Mr. Gorbachev, and Mr. Gorbachev rejected it.

Q/ Instead, he made a non-negotiable demand that the United States end at once all development of a strategic defense for the free world -- that we confine our program strictly to laboratory research. Unless we signed such a commitment, he said, all the agreements of the previous ^{11 1/2} 12 hours of negotiation were null and void.

That would have killed America's defensive program in its cradle. That would have forfeited our children's opportunity to live in a world free of the fear of nuclear attack. That would have sacrificed the future security interest^s of the American people, in exchange for a Soviet promise. And this we could not do.

My fellow Americans, my most solemn duty as President is the security of these United States and the safety of the American

people. The ~~only~~ ^{only} issue in my mind ^{at Iceland} was my duty to my country and those I had sworn to protect.

So, again and again, we kept offering and the Soviets kept accepting. ~~And, again and again, we hit the same obstacle.~~ The Soviets told us their proposals were a single package. They said there would be no deals on any aspect of arms reduction unless we also agreed to their unacceptable terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues hostage while trying to kill our strategic defense.

So we ask -- and the world must ask: Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer?

Why are the Soviets afraid of S.D.I.? [Not a single Soviet citizen has anything to fear from an American S.D.I. That defensive system -- even if developed and deployed -- would harm not people, but only ballistic missiles, after they had been fired. It threatens nothing and would harm no one.

[In refusing our offer and making his non-negotiable demand on the United States, Mr. Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war. Nevertheless, we have come too far to turn back now. So tonight I call on the Soviet Union to build on the agreements we reached, and not to tear down the nearly-complete structure we erected in Iceland because of our differences over the single issue of S.D.I.

[We made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. ~~Let me remind you that,~~

any deal
accepted
was
rejected

X²
X₁
X

From the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions; we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We ^{declassified} ~~said~~ that the principal objective of American foreign policy ^{to be} ~~is~~ not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world. ^I ~~is~~ that is why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the strategic defense initiative.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, ^{and} ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends — one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. For the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues that are fundamental.

One such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "Is not peace, in the final analysis, a matter of human rights...?" Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a heroic champion of human rights, Yuri Orlov, described to me the persecution he suffered for leading an effort simply to get the Soviet government to live up to the solemn commitment on human rights it had signed at Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like that of far too many other individuals in all walks of life inside the Soviet Union -- including those who wish to emigrate.

In Iceland, human rights was a critical part of our agenda. I made it plain that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. If the best and brightest inside the Soviet Union -- like Mr. Orlov -- cannot trust the Soviet Government, how then can the rest of the world? So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that

follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. I told Mr. Gorbachev that the summit cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item. This area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed the signing of several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our 4-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

And I realize some Americans may be asking tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand? Why not give up S.D.I. for this agreement?

The Soviets understand this. [REDACTED] they have
devoted far more resources than we, to their own [REDACTED] SDI,
The world's only operational missile defense today surrounds
Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union. [REDACTED] what Mr. Gorbachev
was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States sign a
ten-year extension of [REDACTED] a fourteen-year-old ABM treaty that
the Soviet Union [REDACTED] has already violated. I told him we don't make
those kinds of deals in the United States.

brought the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland.

The answer, my friends, is simple. S.D.I. is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik. S.D.I. is America's security guarantee -- if the Soviets should -- as they have done too often in the past -- fail to comply with their solemn commitments. S.D.I. is ~~the~~ key to a world without nuclear weapons.

Point A

And the American people should reflect ~~themselves~~ on these critical questions.

How does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack. As of today, we ~~are~~ a free ~~Nation~~ ^{s/} are utterly defenseless against Soviet ~~nuclear~~ missiles -- fired either by accident or ~~by~~ design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so -- forever?

^{so,} Now, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or ~~our~~ ^{any} future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to Reykjavik. We ~~would~~ prefer to ~~have~~ no agreement rather than to bring ~~a~~ ^{home} bad agreement ~~home~~ to the United States.

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we

X
X

the immediate prospects

continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

Sketch
[But whatever ~~the immediate prospects~~ ^{decision}, I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past 5-1/2 years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might; your support has restored our military strength. Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

So, if there is one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs.

I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation at Keflavik [KEF-la-VICK] -- a critically

important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Wherever the banner of liberty is unfurled, there shall be America's heart, her prayers and her benedictions," John Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a Nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

Another President, Harry Truman, noted that our century had seen two of the most frightful wars in history. ~~We said~~ ^{and that} "The supreme need of our time is for man to learn to live together in peace and harmony."

It is in pursuit of that dream I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week; it is in pursuit of that dream I have invited Mr. Gorbachev to visit us here for further discussions. And it is in pursuit of that dream that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

CLOSE HOLD

Document No. _____

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/13/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ----SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: ICELAND MEETING

| | ACTION FYI | | | ACTION FYI | |
|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| VICE PRESIDENT | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | MILLER - ADMIN. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| REGAN | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | POINDEXTER | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| MILLER - OMB | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | RYAN | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| BALL | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | SPEAKES | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| BARBOUR | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | SPRINKEL | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
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| CHEW | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | THOMAS | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| DANIELS | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | TUTTLE | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
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| MASENG | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

REMARKS: The attached has been forwarded to the President.

CLOSE HOLD

RESPONSE:

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

(Dolan)
October 13, 1986
1:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION
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MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

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countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing. *We also discussed various aspects and regional issues making some progress.*
But there remained toward the end of our talks ^{an} ~~one~~ area of ^{these} ~~one~~ disagreement. While both sides sought reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets

insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States. This we would not and could not do.

That was the deadlock at Hofdi House ^{12:14} late Sunday afternoon. Then, ~~the American delegation~~ ^{so we} recessed, ~~and caucused,~~ ^{the Soviet delegates} and they

w returned to the table with the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in American ~~history~~.

We offered the Soviets a 10-year delay in American deployment of S.D.I., and a 10-year program for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the Earth. We took that proposal downstairs to Mr. Gorbachev, and Mr. Gorbachev rejected it.

Instead, he made a non-negotiable demand that the United States end at once all development of a strategic defense for the free world -- that we confine our program strictly to laboratory research. Unless we signed such a commitment, he said, all the agreements of the previous 12 hours of negotiation were null and void.

That would have killed America's defensive program in its cradle. That would have forfeited our children's opportunity to live in a world free of the fear of nuclear attack. That would have sacrificed the future security interest of the American people, in exchange for a Soviet promise. And this we could not do.

My fellow Americans, my most solemn duty as President is the security of these United States and the safety of the American

people. The only issue in my mind was my duty to my country and those I had sworn to protect.

So, again and again, we kept offering and the Soviets kept accepting. And, again and again, we hit the same obstacle. The Soviets told us their proposals were a single package. They said there would be no deals on any aspect of arms reduction unless we also agreed to their unacceptable terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues hostage while trying to kill our strategic defense.

So we ask -- and the world must ask: Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer?

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In refusing our offer and making his non-negotiable demand on the United States, Mr. Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war. Nevertheless, we have come too far to turn back now. So tonight I call on the Soviet Union to build on the agreements we reached and not to tear down the nearly-complete structure we erected in Iceland because of our differences over the single issue of S.D.I.

We made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. Let me remind you that,

from the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions; we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We said that the principal objective of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world; that is why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the strategic defense initiative.

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The answer, my friends, is simple. S.D.I. is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik. S.D.I. is America's security guarantee -- if the Soviets should -- as they have done too often in the past -- fail to comply with their solemn commitments. S.D.I. is a key to a world without nuclear weapons.

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We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to Reykjavik. We would prefer to have no agreement rather than bring a bad agreement home to the United States.

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we

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So, let me report to you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than 10 hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. During long discussions on both Saturday and Sunday, he and I made considerable headway.

We moved toward agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate range nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia. We approached agreement on sharply reduced strategic arsenals for both our countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing.

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But there remained toward the end of our talks one area of disagreement. While both sides ^{so - mt} ~~seek~~ reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States. This we would not and could not do.

That was the deadlock at Hofdi House late Sunday afternoon. Then, the American delegation recessed and caucused, and ^{they} returned to the table with the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in American history.

We offered the Soviets a 10-year delay in American deployment of S.D.I., and a 10-year program for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the Earth. We took that proposal downstairs to Mr. Gorbachev, and Mr. Gorbachev rejected it.

Ⓚ Instead, he made a non-negotiable demand that the United States end at once all development of a strategic defense for the free world -- that we confine our program strictly to laboratory research. Unless we signed such a commitment, he said, all the agreements of the previous 12 hours of negotiation were null and void.

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MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

But first, let me tell you that from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. ~~This faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are the founding principles of our Republic.~~ And it is for these ^{principles}, I went the extra mile to Iceland.

So, let me ^{refer to} assure you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than 10 hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. During long discussions on both Saturday and Sunday, Mr. ^{he} Gorbachev and I made considerable headway ~~on a number of arms reduction issues.~~

Summary [We moved toward agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate range nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia. We approached agreement on sharply reduced strategic arsenals for

both our countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing.

But ~~there remained toward the end of our talks one area of disagreement.~~ While both sides ^{so-ght} ~~seek~~ reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States. This we would not and could not do.

~~That was the deadlock at Hofdi House late Sunday afternoon.~~ ~~Then,~~ ~~the American delegation~~ ~~recessed and caucused,~~ and returned to the table with the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in American history.

We offered the Soviets a 10-year delay in American deployment of S.D.I., and a 10-year program for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the Earth. ^{and a 10-year delay in the deployment of} ~~We took that proposal downstairs to~~ Mr. Gorbachev, and Mr. Gorbachev rejected it.

Instead, he made a non-negotiable demand that the United States end at once all development of a strategic defense for the free world -- that we confine our program strictly to laboratory research. Unless we signed such a commitment, he said, all the agreements of the previous 12 hours of negotiation were null and void.

That would have killed America's defensive program in its cradle. That would have forfeited our children's opportunity to live in a world free of the fear of nuclear attack. That would

strategic defense against ballistic missiles
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have sacrificed the future security interest of the American people, in exchange for a Soviet promise. And this we could not do.

My fellow Americans, my most solemn duty as President is the security of these United States and the safety of the American people. ~~So, a one-day headline or a glowing cover story was never an issue.~~ The only issue in my mind was my duty to my country and those I had sworn to protect. ^P So again and again we kept offering and the Soviets kept accepting.

And again and again, we hit the same obstacle. The Soviets told us their proposals were a single package. They said there would be no deals ^{on any aspect of arms reduction} unless we also agreed to their terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues ^{unacceptable} hostage while trying to kill ^{our} ~~the possibility of research progress on~~ strategic defense.

~~So we ask -- and the world must ask:~~
Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer?

Why are the Soviets afraid of S.D.I.? Not a single Soviet citizen has anything to fear from an American S.D.I. That defensive system -- even if developed and deployed -- would harm not people, but only ballistic missiles, after they had been fired. It threatens nothing and would harm no one.

~~So~~ In refusing our offer and making his non-negotiable demand on the United States, Mr. Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war.

~~Nevertheless, we remain dedicated to continuing the peace process.~~ We have come too far to turn back now. So tonight I call on the Soviet Union to build on the agreements we reached

and not to tear down the nearly-complete structure we erected in Iceland because of our differences over the single issue of S.D.I.

We made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. Let me remind you that, from the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions; we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We said that the principal objective of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world; that is why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the strategic defense initiative.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. ~~I cannot~~

~~predict the nature or dates of future agreements. I can only~~
repeat that, ^F for the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues ~~under discussion~~ on the table in Iceland, issues that are ~~even more~~ fundamental. ^{For} some time before our talks began, I had been saying that arms control negotiations alone could not bear the full weight of Soviet-American relations; that, as I said, the real cause of the arms competition was political tensions growing out of our deeper differences. In short, doing more about arms control meant talking about more than arms control. So I proposed "umbrella talks" with the Soviets -- to expand the agenda, to go to the real source of the conflict and competition between the Soviets and the West.

One such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "Is not peace, in the final analysis, a matter of human rights...?" Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a heroic champion of human rights, Yuri Orlov, described to me the persecution he suffered for leading an effort simply to get the Soviet government to live up to the solemn commitment on human rights it had signed at Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like that of far too many other individuals in all walks of life inside the Soviet Union -- including those who wish to emigrate.

In Iceland, human rights was a critical part of our agenda. ~~I can report to you that~~ I made it plain ~~to Mr. Gorbachev~~ that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. If the best and brightest inside the Soviet Union -- like Mr. Orlov -- cannot trust the Soviet Government, how then can the rest of the world? So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. I told Mr. Gorbachev that the summit cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item, ~~besides arms reduction,~~ ~~human rights,~~ and the resolution of regional conflicts. This

Eliminate the arms race

And the

There were were proposals on both sides. In late after, the final, most sweeping proposal came from the United States. We offered the Soviets a ten-year moratorium on deployment of SDI-- on both sides. WE offered to proceed with the ten-year destruction of all ballistic missiles on both sides. It was the most sweeping and generous Americans arm control proposal in hidtory---and the soviet ~~XXXXX~~ Union turned it down.

Instead, of accepting this proosal, they demanded that the United States kill the SDI program outright, that we confine all our We had agreed not to deploy SDI. ~~XXXXXXXX~~ SDI to what they called "laboratory research," that we do test the program, tha we not develop the program.

This was a non-negotiable edemand that Isurrender to the Soviet Union, in perpetuity, America's right to defend herself from strategivc ~~XXXXXX~~ ballistic missiles. This ~~XX~~ is something I couldnot do.

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~~I think the American people should reflect uon this question.~~

How does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else? What are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever naked to Soviet rocket naked. Today, the United States is utterly defenseless agisnt Soviet nulcaar ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ missiles-- fired either by accident, by whim, or by design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so----forever? And I would ask our American critics: Why do you agree with this Soviet position?

SDI Program

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~~Again~~

And I realize some Americans may be asking tonight:

~~As to whether we can do it~~

Mr. Gorbachev?

People ask: Why not give up SDI. Why not accept the demand?

Why not give up SDI, for this Agreement.

The answer, my friends, is simple. SDI is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep its commitments at Reykjavik. SDI is the fall-back position---if the Soviets

should ~~has~~ they have done too often in the past, failed to comply with their solemn commitments. SDI is a key to a world without nuclear weapons.

And the American people should reflect themselves on a critical question.

~~SDI is one of the~~

SDI is one ~~of the~~ perhaps the primary reasons why the Soviets have, at long last, begun to bargain seriously about reductions in ~~ballistic~~ ballistic missiles. ~~we can~~

SDI is what helped bring the Soviets to the negotiating table in the first place.

area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed the signing of several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our 4-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

Now, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or our future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

~~We still believe that no agreement is better than a bad agreement.~~ ~~And we must bear in mind the nature of the Soviet regime itself will put many obstacles in our path as we go along. When that happens, we must be prepared, not surprised. We must not permit such developments to disorient our policy or derail our initiatives. We must be deliberate and candid and make it clear that the Soviet Union will be held responsible for its actions. And we must persevere.~~

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in

inserts

the
United States

But we will not abandon the guiding principle we take to Pres. Reagan

we would prefer to have no agreement rather than bring no agreement home to the United States

Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past 5-1/2 years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might, your support has restored our military strength, ~~and~~ your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

So, if there is one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs.

I know such optimism in a century that has seen so much war and suffering seems unwarranted to some. Yet this confidence is based on more than an easy optimism; it springs from a quiet

appreciation for what British author Paul Johnson calls the "enormous reserves" of democratic societies, societies where national unity springs from popular consent.

The resiliency of a free society is one of the comforting lessons of history. And because of you, the American people, those enormous reserves are now making their presence and power felt throughout the world.

I saw evidence of ~~this in the~~ progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation at Keflavik [KEF-la-VICK] -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Wherever the banner of liberty is unfurled, there shall be America's heart, her prayers and her benedictions," John Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a Nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

It is in pursuit of that dream I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week; it is in pursuit of that dream I have invited Mr. Gorbachev to visit us here for further discussions.

Handwritten note: How the president, Ray Truman, noted that our century had

Handwritten note: seen two terrible wars of the

Handwritten note: most faithful class in history. The

And it is in pursuit of that dream that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.