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(Reagan/Dolan)  
October 13, 1986  
5:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION  
ICELAND MEETING  
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

The implications of these talks are enormous and only just beginning to be understood. While we parted company with an American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.

But first, let me tell you that from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. And it is for these aims I went the extra mile to Iceland.

Before I report on our talks though, allow me to set the stage by explaining two things that were very much a part of our talks, one a treaty and the other a defense against nuclear missiles which we are trying to develop. You've heard their titles a thousand times -- the A.B.M. treaty and S.D.I. Those

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letters stand for anti-ballistic missile and strategic defense initiative.

Some years ago, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to limit any defense against nuclear missile attacks to the emplacement in one location in each country of a small number of anti-aircraft type missiles capable of intercepting and shooting down incoming nuclear missiles. Thus leaving our real defense a policy called Mutual Assured Destruction, meaning if one side launched a nuclear attack, the other side could retaliate. This mutual threat of destruction was believed to be a deterrent against either side striking first.

So here we sit with thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on each other and capable of wiping out both our countries. The Soviets deployed the few non-nuclear anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow as the treaty permitted. Our country didn't bother deploying because the threat of nationwide annihilation made such limited defense seem useless.

For some years now we have been aware that the Soviets have been researching a nationwide defense. They have installed a great radar system at Krasnoyarsk (?) which we believe is designed to provide radar guidance for non-nuclear anti-ballistic missiles protecting the entire nation. This is a violation of the A.B.M. treaty.

Believing that a policy of mutual destruction and slaughter of their citizens and ours was uncivilized, I asked our military a few years ago to study and see if there was a practical way to destroy nuclear missiles as they left their silos rather than to

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just destroy people. This is what we call S.D.I. and our scientists researching such a system are convinced it is practical and that several years down the road we can have such a system ready to deploy. Incidentally we are not violating the A.B.M. treaty which permits such research. If and when we deploy the treaty also allows withdrawal from the treaty upon 6 month's notice. S.D.I., let me make it clear, is not a nuclear weapon.

So here we are at Iceland for our second such meeting. In the first and in the months in between, we have discussed ways to reduce and in fact eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. We and the Soviets have had teams of negotiators in Geneva trying to work out a mutual agreement on how we could reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. So far, no success.

On Saturday and Sunday, General Secretary Gorbachev and his foreign minister Shevernadze and Secretary of State George Shultz and I met for more than 10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to just arms reductions. We discussed what we call violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets, refusal to let people emigrate from Russia so they can practice their religion without being persecuted, letting people go to rejoin their families, husbands and wives separated by national borders should be allowed to reunite. In much of this the Soviet Union is violating another treaty -- the Helsinki pact they had signed in 1975. Yuro Orlov whose freedom we just obtained was imprisoned for pointing out to his government its violations of the pact, its refusal to let citizens leave their country or return.



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We also discussed regional matters such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia.

But by their choice the main subject was arms control. We discussed the emplacement of intermediate range missiles in Europe and Asia and seemed to be in agreement they could be reduced and possibly eliminated. Both sides seemed willing to find a way to reduce even to zero the strategic missiles we have aimed at each other. This then brought up the subject of S.D.I. and whether deployment of such a system would violate A.B.M. I offered a proposal that we continue our present research and if and when we reached the stage of testing we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests. And if the program was practical we would both eliminate our offensive missiles and then we would make available the S.D.I. system to the Soviets and others. I explained that even though we would have done away with our offensive weapons, having the defense would protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles. After all, the world now knows how to make them. I likened it to our keeping our gas masks even though the nations of the world had outlawed poison gas after World War I.

We seemed to be making progress on reducing weaponry although the General Secretary was registering opposition to S.D.I. and proposing a pledge to observe A.B.M. for a number of years as the day was ending.

Secretary Shultz suggested we turn over the notes our note-takers had been making of everything we'd said to our respective teams and let them work through the night to put them together and find just where we were in agreement and what differences separated us. With respect and gratitude I can inform you they worked until 2 a.m.

Yesterday (Sunday morning) our four came together again and took up the report of our two teams. It was most promising. They proposed a 10-year period in which we began with the reduction of all nuclear explosive devices, bombs, cruise missiles, intermediate range, short range, and strategic missiles. They would be reduced 50 percent in the first 5 years and totally eliminated in the next 5. During that time we would proceed with research, development and testing of S.D.I. All done in conformity with A.B.M. provisions. At the 10-year point we would invoke the clause permitting 6 months notice, at which time we would proceed to deploy at the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.

Here the debate began. The General Secretary wanted wording that in effect would have kept us from developing the S.D.I. for the entire 10 years. In effect, he was killing S.D.I. and unless I agreed all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons went down the drain -- cancelled.

I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away S.D.I. -- there was no way I could tell our people their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things, our freedom and our future.

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I am still optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.

So you can see, we made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. From the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions. We were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We declared the principal objective of American foreign policy to be not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world. That is why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, and ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. For the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the

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area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues that are fundamental.

As I mentioned, one such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "And, is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights...?"

I made it plain that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. Summit meetings cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure

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that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item. This area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our 4-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

So, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or any future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to Reykjavik. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States.

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.



But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past 5-1/2 years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might; your support has restored our military strength. Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

So, if there is one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs.

Our ideas are out there on the table. They won't go away. We are ready to pick up where we left off. Our negotiators are heading back to Geneva, and we are prepared to go forward whenever and wherever the Soviets are ready. So, there is reason -- good reason -- for hope.



I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation at Keflavik [KEF-la-VICK] -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been... unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers," John Quincy Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a Nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

Another President, Harry Truman, noted that our century had seen two of the most frightful wars in history. And that "The supreme need of our time is for man to learn to live together in peace and harmony."

It is in pursuit of that ideal I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week. And it is in pursuit of that ideal that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our

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journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is  
enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

add WTRK's

(Dolan)

October 13, 1986

4:30 p.m.

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ICELAND MEETING  
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Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

The implications of these talks are enormous and only just beginning to be understood. While we parted company with an American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.

But first, let me tell you that from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. And it is for these aims I went the extra mile to Iceland.

So, let me report to you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than 11 hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. During long discussions on both Saturday and Sunday, he and I made considerable headway. We moved toward agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate range nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia. We approached

agreement on sharply reduced strategic arsenals for both our countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing.

So, at what was intended to be merely a preparatory meeting for a future summit conference, we had with the Soviets the most intense and far-reaching discussions to date, and we almost made an historic breakthrough. But there remained toward the end of our talks one area of disagreement. While both sides sought reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States. This we would not and could not do.

That was the deadlock at Hofdi House late Sunday afternoon. Then, the American delegation recessed and caucused, and we returned to the table with the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history.

We offered the Soviets a 10-year program for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the Earth by 1996, plus at least a 10-year delay in American deployment of a strategic defense against nuclear weapons, during which time we would observe the terms of the current A.B.M. treaty. Astonishingly, Mr. Gorbachev rejected it.

Instead, he made a non-negotiable demand that the United States end at once all development of a strategic defense for the free world -- and insisted that we confine our program strictly to laboratory research. Unless we signed such a commitment, he

said, all the agreements of the previous 11-1/2 hours of negotiation were null and void, including our last proposal.

To give in to his demands would have meant giving up America's defensive program. That would have forfeited our children's opportunity to live in a world free of the fear of nuclear attack. That would have sacrificed the future security interests of the American people, in exchange for a Soviet promise. And this we could not do.

Again and again, we hit the same obstacle. The Soviets told us their demand was a single package. They said there would be no deals on any aspect of arms reduction unless we also agreed to their unacceptable terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues hostage while trying to kill our strategic defense.

So we ask -- and the world must ask: Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer? Why are the Soviets afraid of a strategic defense against nuclear missiles?

Not a single Soviet citizen has anything to fear from such an American defensive system. We have even offered to share the benefits of such a system with the Soviets. That defensive system -- even if developed and deployed -- would harm not people, but only ballistic missiles, after they had been fired. It threatens no one and would harm nobody.

In refusing our offer and making his non-negotiable demand on the United States, Mr. Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war. Nevertheless, we have come too far to turn back now. So tonight

(Reagan)

ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON ICELAND

Good evening. I'm sure, most, if not all, of you know I'm just back from Iceland where at the invitation of General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, I met with him to discuss the grave problems facing our two countries. I'm reporting to you on the outcome of those meetings because in a very real sense you are full participants in such meetings. They have to do with the kind of world we'll all live in, whether we'll continue to be free and at peace.

— Before I report on our talks though, allow me to set the stage by explaining two things that were very much a part of our talks, one a treaty and the other a defense against nuclear missiles which we are trying to develop. You've heard their titles a thousand times -- the A.B.M. treaty and S.D.I. Those letters stand for anti-ballistic missile and strategic defense initiative.

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On Saturday and Sunday, General Secretary Gorbachev and his foreign minister Shevernadze and Secretary of State George Shultz and I met for more than 10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to just arms reductions. We discussed what we call violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets, refusal to let people emigrate from Russia so they can practice their religion without being persecuted, letting people go to rejoin their families, husbands and wives separated by national borders should be allowed to reunite. In much of this the Soviet Union is violating another treaty -- the Helsinki pact they had signed in 1975. Yuro Orlov whose freedom we just obtained was imprisoned for pointing out to his government its violations of the pact, its refusal to let citizens leave their country or return.

We also discussed regional matters such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia.

But by their choice the main subject was arms control. We discussed the emplacement of intermediate range missiles in Europe and Asia and seemed to be in agreement they could be reduced and possibly eliminated. Both sides seemed willing to find a way to reduce even to zero the strategic missiles we have aimed at each other. This then brought up the subject of S.D.I. and whether deployment of such a system would violate A.B.M. I offered a proposal that we continue our present research and if and when we reached the stage of testing we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests. And

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Secretary Shultz suggested we turn over the notes our note-takers had been making of everything we'd said to our respective teams and let them work through the night to put them together and find just where we were in agreement and what differences separated us. With respect and gratitude I can inform you they worked until 2 a.m.

Yesterday (Sunday morning) our four came together again and took up the report of our two teams. It was most promising. They proposed a 10-year period in which we began with the reduction of all nuclear explosive devices, bombs, cruise missiles, intermediate range, short range, and strategic missiles. They would be reduced 50 percent in the first 5 years and totally eliminated in the next 5. During that time we would proceed with research, development and testing of S.D.I. All

done in conformity with A.B.M. provisions. At the 10-year point we would invoke the clause permitting 6 months notice, at which time we would proceed to deploy at the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.

Here the debate began. The General Secretary wanted wording that in effect would have kept us from developing the S.D.I. for the entire 10 years. In effect, he was killing S.D.I. and unless I agreed all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons went down the drain -- cancelled.

I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away S.D.I. -- there was no way I could tell our people their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things, our freedom and our future.

I am still optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.



I call on the Soviet Union to build on the agreements we reached, and not to tear down the nearly-complete structure we erected in Iceland because of our differences over the single issue of S.D.I.

*So you can see, we made*  
~~We~~ made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. From the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions. We were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We declared the principal objective of American foreign policy to be not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world. That is why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, and ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. For the

first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues that are fundamental.

<sup>As I mentioned</sup>  
One such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "And, is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights...?" ~~Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a heroic champion of human rights, Yuri Orlov, described to me the persecution he suffered for leading an effort simply to get the Soviet government to live up to the solemn commitment on human rights it had signed at Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like that of far too many other individuals in all walks of life inside the Soviet Union -- including those who wish to emigrate.~~

~~In Iceland, human rights was a critical part of our agenda.~~  
I made it plain that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at



meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. Summit meetings cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item. This area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our 4-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

~~And I realize some Americans may be asking tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand? Why not give up S.D.I. for this agreement?~~

~~The answer, my friends, is simple. S.D.I. is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments~~

made at Reykjavik. S.D.I. is America's security guarantee -- if the Soviets should -- as they have done too often in the past -- fail to comply with their solemn commitments. S.D.I. is what brought the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland. S.D.I. is the key to a world without nuclear weapons.

The Soviets understand this. They have devoted far more resources for a lot longer time than we, to their own S.D.I. The world's only operational missile defense today surrounds Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union. What Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a new version of a 14-year-old A.B.M. treaty that the Soviet Union has already violated. I told him we don't make those kinds of deals in the United States.

And the American people should reflect on these critical questions.

How does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against Soviet missiles -- fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so -- forever?

So, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or any future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to Reykjavik. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States.

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past 5-1/2 years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might; your support has restored our military strength. Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

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"Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been... unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers," John Quincy Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a Nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest

dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

Another President, Harry Truman, noted that our century had seen two of the most frightful wars in history. And that "The supreme need of our time is for man to learn to live together in peace and harmony."

It is in pursuit of that ideal I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week. And it is in pursuit of that ideal that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

(Reagan)

ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON ICELAND

Good evening. I'm sure most, if not all, of you know I'm just back from Iceland where at the invitation of General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, I met with him to discuss the grave problems facing our two countries. I'm reporting to you on the outcome of those meetings because in a very real sense you are full participants in such meetings. They have to do with the kind of world we'll all live in, whether we'll continue to be free and at peace.

Before I report on our talks though, allow me to set the stage by explaining two things that were very much a part of our talks, one a treaty and the other a defense against nuclear missiles which we are trying to develop. You've heard their titles a thousand times -- the A.B.M. treaty and S.D.I. Those letters stand for anti-ballistic missile and strategic defense initiative.

Some years ago, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to limit any defense against nuclear missile attacks to the emplacement in one location in each country of a small number of anti-aircraft type missiles capable of intercepting and shooting down incoming nuclear missiles. Thus leaving our real defense a policy called Mutual Assured Destruction, meaning if one side launched a nuclear attack, the other side could retaliate. This mutual threat of destruction was believed to be a deterrent against either side striking first.



So here we sit with thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on each other and capable of wiping out both our countries. The Soviets deployed the few non-nuclear anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow as the treaty permitted. Our country didn't bother deploying because the threat of nationwide annihilation made such limited defense seem useless.

For some years now we have been aware that the Soviets have been researching a nationwide defense. They have installed a great radar system at Krasnoyarsk (?) which we believe is designed to provide radar guidance for non-nuclear anti-ballistic missiles protecting the entire nation. This is a violation of the A.B.M. treaty.

Believing that a policy of mutual destruction and slaughter of their citizens and ours was uncivilized, I asked our military a few years ago to study and see if there was a practical way to destroy nuclear missiles as they left their silos rather than to just destroy people. This is what we call S.D.I. and our scientists researching such a system are convinced it is practical and that several years down the road we can have such a system ready to deploy. Incidentally we are not violating the A.B.M. treaty which permits such research. If and when we deploy the treaty also allows withdrawal from the treaty upon 6 month's notice. S.D.I., let me make it clear, is not a nuclear weapon.

So here we are at Iceland for our second such meeting. In the first and in the months in between, we have discussed ways to reduce and in fact eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. We and the Soviets have had teams of negotiators in Geneva trying to

work out a mutual agreement on how we could reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. So far, no success.

On Saturday and Sunday, General Secretary Gorbachev and his foreign minister Shevernadze and Secretary of State George Shultz and I met for more than 10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to just arms reductions. We discussed what we call violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets, refusal to let people emigrate from Russia so they can practice their religion without being persecuted, letting people go to rejoin their families, husbands and wives separated by national borders should be allowed to reunite. In much of this the Soviet Union is violating another treaty -- the Helsinki pact they had signed in 1975. Yuro Orlov whose freedom we just obtained was imprisoned for pointing out to his government its violations of the pact, its refusal to let citizens leave their country or return.

We also discussed regional matters such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia.

But by their choice the main subject was arms control. We discussed the emplacement of intermediate range missiles in Europe and Asia and seemed to be in agreement they could be reduced and possibly eliminated. Both sides seemed willing to find a way to reduce even to zero the strategic missiles we have aimed at each other. This then brought up the subject of S.D.I. and whether deployment of such a system would violate A.B.M. I offered a proposal that we continue our present research and if and when we reached the stage of testing we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests. And

if the program was practical we would both eliminate our offensive missiles and then we would make available the S.D.I. system to the Soviets and others. I explained that even though we would have done away with our offensive weapons, having the defense would protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles. After all, the world now knows how to make them. I likened it to our keeping our gas masks even though the nations of the world had outlawed poison gas after World War I.

We seemed to be making progress on reducing weaponry although the General Secretary was registering opposition to S.D.I. and proposing a pledge to observe A.B.M. for a number of years as the day was ending.

Secretary Shultz suggested we turn over the notes our note-takers had been making of everything we'd said to our respective teams and let them work through the night to put them together and find just where we were in agreement and what differences separated us. With respect and gratitude I can inform you they worked until 2 a.m.

Yesterday (Sunday morning) our four came together again and took up the report of our two teams. It was most promising. They proposed a 10-year period in which we began with the reduction of all nuclear explosive devices, bombs, cruise missiles, intermediate range, short range, and strategic missiles. They would be reduced 50 percent in the first 5 years and totally eliminated in the next 5. During that time we would proceed with research, development and testing of S.D.I. All

done in conformity with A.B.M. provisions. At the 10-year point we would invoke the clause permitting 6 months notice, at which time we would proceed to deploy at the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.

Here the debate began. The General Secretary wanted wording that in effect would have kept us from developing the S.D.I. for the entire 10 years. In effect, he was killing S.D.I. and unless I agreed all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons went down the drain -- cancelled.

I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away S.D.I. -- there was no way I could tell our people their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things, our freedom and our future.

I am still optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.

(Dolan)  
October 13, 1986  
4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION  
ICELAND MEETING  
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

The implications of these talks are enormous and only just beginning to be understood. While we parted company with an American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.

But first, let me tell you that from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. And it is for these aims I went the extra mile to Iceland.

So, let me report to you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than 11 hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. During long discussions on both Saturday and Sunday, he and I made considerable headway. We moved toward agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate range nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia. We approached

agreement on sharply reduced strategic arsenals for both our countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing.

So, at what was intended to be merely a preparatory meeting for a future summit conference, we had with the Soviets the most intense and far-reaching discussions to date, and we almost made an historic breakthrough. But there remained toward the end of our talks one area of disagreement. While both sides sought reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States. This we would not and could not do.

That was the deadlock at Hofdi House late Sunday afternoon. Then, the American delegation recessed and caucused, and we returned to the table with the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history.

We offered the Soviets a 10-year program for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the Earth by 1996, plus at least a 10-year delay in American deployment of a strategic defense against nuclear weapons, during which time we would observe the terms of the current A.B.M. treaty. Astonishingly, Mr. Gorbachev rejected it.

Instead, he made a non-negotiable demand that the United States end at once all development of a strategic defense for the free world -- and insisted that we confine our program strictly to laboratory research. Unless we signed such a commitment, he



said, all the agreements of the previous 11-1/2 hours of negotiation were null and void, including our last proposal.

To give in to his demands would have meant giving up America's defensive program. That would have forfeited our children's opportunity to live in a world free of the fear of nuclear attack. That would have sacrificed the future security interests of the American people, in exchange for a Soviet promise. And this we could not do.

Again and again, we hit the same obstacle. The Soviets told us their demand was a single package. They said there would be no deals on any aspect of arms reduction unless we also agreed to their unacceptable terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues hostage while trying to kill our strategic defense.

So we ask -- and the world must ask: Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer? Why are the Soviets afraid of a strategic defense against nuclear missiles?

Not a single Soviet citizen has anything to fear from such an American defensive system. We have even offered to share the benefits of such a system with the Soviets. That defensive system -- even if developed and deployed -- would harm not people, but only ballistic missiles, after they had been fired. It threatens no one and would harm nobody.

In refusing our offer and making his non-negotiable demand on the United States, Mr. Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war. Nevertheless, we have come too far to turn back now. So tonight

I call on the Soviet Union to build on the agreements we reached, and not to tear down the nearly-complete structure we erected in Iceland because of our differences over the single issue of S.D.I.

We made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. From the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions. We were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We declared the principal objective of American foreign policy to be not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world. That is why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, and ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. For the

first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues that are fundamental.

One such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "And, is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights...?" Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a heroic champion of human rights, Yuri Orlov, described to me the persecution he suffered for leading an effort simply to get the Soviet government to live up to the solemn commitment on human rights it had signed at Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like that of far too many other individuals in all walks of life inside the Soviet Union -- including those who wish to emigrate.

In Iceland, human rights was a critical part of our agenda. I made it plain that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at

meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. Summit meetings cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item. This area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our 4-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

And I realize some Americans may be asking tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand? Why not give up S.D.I. for this agreement?

The answer, my friends, is simple. S.D.I. is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments

made at Reykjavik. S.D.I. is America's security guarantee -- if the Soviets should -- as they have done too often in the past -- fail to comply with their solemn commitments. S.D.I. is what brought the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland. S.D.I. is the key to a world without nuclear weapons.

The Soviets understand this. They have devoted far more resources for a lot longer time than we, to their own S.D.I. The world's only operational missile defense today surrounds Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union. What Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a new version of a 14-year-old A.B.M. treaty that the Soviet Union has already violated. I told him we don't make those kinds of deals in the United States.

And the American people should reflect on these critical questions.

How does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against Soviet missiles -- fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so -- forever?

So, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or any future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to Reykjavik. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States.

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past 5-1/2 years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might; your support has restored our military strength. Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.



So, if there is one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs.

Our ideas are out there on the table. They won't go away. We are ready to pick up where we left off. Our negotiators are heading back to Geneva, and we are prepared to go forward whenever and wherever the Soviets are ready. So, there is reason -- good reason -- for hope.

I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation at Keflavik [KEF-la-VICK] -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been... unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers," John Quincy Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a Nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest

dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

Another President, Harry Truman, noted that our century had seen two of the most frightful wars in history. And that "The supreme need of our time is for man to learn to live together in peace and harmony."

It is in pursuit of that ideal I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week. And it is in pursuit of that ideal that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

(Reagan)

ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON ICELAND

Good evening. I'm sure most, if not all, of you know I'm just back from Iceland where at the invitation of General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, I met with him to discuss the grave problems facing our two countries. I'm reporting to you on the outcome of those meetings because in a very real sense you are full participants in such meetings. They have to do with the kind of world we'll all live in, whether we'll continue to be free and at peace.

Before I report on our talks though, allow me to set the stage by explaining two things that were very much a part of our talks, one a treaty and the other a defense against nuclear missiles which we are trying to develop. You've heard their titles a thousand times -- the A.B.M. treaty and S.D.I. Those letters stand for anti-ballistic missile and strategic defense initiative.

Some years ago, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to limit any defense against nuclear missile attacks to the emplacement in one location in each country of a small number of anti-aircraft type missiles capable of intercepting and shooting down incoming nuclear missiles. Thus leaving our real defense a policy called Mutual Assured Destruction, meaning if one side launched a nuclear attack, the other side could retaliate. This mutual threat of destruction was believed to be a deterrent against either side striking first.

So here we sit with thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on each other and capable of wiping out both our countries. The Soviets deployed the few non-nuclear anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow as the treaty permitted. Our country didn't bother deploying because the threat of nationwide annihilation made such limited defense seem useless.

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Believing that a policy of mutual destruction and slaughter of their citizens and ours was uncivilized, I asked our military a few years ago to study and see if there was a practical way to destroy nuclear missiles as they left their silos rather than to just destroy people. This is what we call S.D.I. and our scientists researching such a system are convinced it is practical and that several years down the road we can have such a system ready to deploy. Incidentally we are not violating the A.B.M. treaty which permits such research. If and when we deploy the treaty also allows withdrawal from the treaty upon 6 month's notice. S.D.I., let me make it clear, is not a nuclear weapon.

So here we are at Iceland for our second such meeting. In the first and in the months in between, we have discussed ways to reduce and in fact eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. We and the Soviets have had teams of negotiators in Geneva trying to

work out a mutual agreement on how we could reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. So far, no success.

On Saturday and Sunday, General Secretary Gorbachev and his foreign minister Shevernadze and Secretary of State George Shultz and I met for more than 10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to just arms reductions. We discussed what we call violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets, refusal to let people emigrate from Russia so they can practice their religion without being persecuted, letting people go to rejoin their families, husbands and wives separated by national borders should be allowed to reunite. In much of this the Soviet Union is violating another treaty -- the Helsinki pact they had signed in 1975. Yuro Orlov whose freedom we just obtained was imprisoned for pointing out to his government its violations of the pact, its refusal to let citizens leave their country or return.

We also discussed regional matters such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia.

But by their choice the main subject was arms control. We discussed the emplacement of intermediate range missiles in Europe and Asia and seemed to be in agreement they could be reduced and possibly eliminated. Both sides seemed willing to find a way to reduce even to zero the strategic missiles we have aimed at each other. This then brought up the subject of S.D.I. and whether deployment of such a system would violate A.B.M. I offered a proposal that we continue our present research and if and when we reached the stage of testing we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests. And

if the program was practical we would both eliminate our offensive missiles and then we would make available the S.D.I. system to the Soviets and others. I explained that even though we would have done away with our offensive weapons, having the defense would protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles. After all, the world now knows how to make them. I likened it to our keeping our gas masks even though the nations of the world had outlawed poison gas after World War I.

We seemed to be making progress on reducing weaponry although the General Secretary was registering opposition to S.D.I. and proposing a pledge to observe A.B.M. for a number of years as the day was ending.

Secretary Shultz suggested we turn over the notes our note-takers had been making of everything we'd said to our respective teams and let them work through the night to put them together and find just where we were in agreement and what differences separated us. With respect and gratitude I can inform you they worked until 2 a.m.

Yesterday (Sunday morning) our four came together again and took up the report of our two teams. It was most promising. They proposed a 10-year period in which we began with the reduction of all nuclear explosive devices, bombs, cruise missiles, intermediate range, short range, and strategic missiles. They would be reduced 50 percent in the first 5 years and totally eliminated in the next 5. During that time we would proceed with research, development and testing of S.D.I. All



done in conformity with A.B.M. provisions. At the 10-year point we would invoke the clause permitting 6 months notice, at which time we would proceed to deploy at the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.

Here the debate began. The General Secretary wanted wording that in effect would have kept us from developing the S.D.I. for the entire 10 years. In effect, he was killing S.D.I. and unless I agreed all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons went down the drain -- cancelled.

I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away S.D.I. -- there was no way I could tell our people their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things, our freedom and our future.

I am still optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.

(Dolan)  
October 13, 1986  
1:30 p.m.

Master

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION  
ICELAND MEETING  
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Q Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

Q But first, let me tell you that from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. And it is for these aims I went the extra mile to Iceland.

So, let me report to you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than 10 hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. During long discussions on both Saturday and Sunday, he and I made considerable headway. We moved toward agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate range nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia. We approached agreement on sharply reduced strategic arsenals for both our countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing.

Q But there remained toward the end of our talks one area of disagreement. While both sides sought reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets

While we parted company with the American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreement that could lead to a safer world without modern weapons.

only just being to he understood

So at what was intended to be a preparatory meeting we had a discussion with the Soviets for a discussion and we made a historic breakthrough

insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States. This we would not and could not do.

That was the deadlock at Hofdi House late Sunday afternoon. Then, the American delegation recessed and caucused, and ~~they~~<sup>we</sup> returned to the table with the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in American history.

We offered the Soviets a ~~10-year delay in American deployment of S.D.I., and~~ a 10-year program for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- ~~and a 10-year delay in American deployment of S.D.I.~~ We took that proposal downstairs to Mr. Gorbachev, and Mr. Gorbachev rejected it.

**AL** Instead, he made a non-negotiable demand that the United States end at once all development of a strategic defense for the free world -- and insisted that we confine our program strictly to laboratory research. Unless we signed such a commitment, he said, all the agreements of the previous 12 hours of negotiation were null and void.

~~That would have killed America's defensive program in its cradle.~~ ~~That would have forfeited our children's opportunity to live in a world free of the fear of nuclear attack. That would have sacrificed the future security interest of the American people, in exchange for a Soviet promise. And this we could not do.~~

My fellow Americans, my most solemn duty as President is the security of these United States and the safety of the American

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people. <sup>at Iceland</sup> The ~~only~~ issue in my mind was my duty to my country and those I had sworn to protect.

So, ~~again and again, we kept offering and the Soviets kept accepting.~~ <sup>And,</sup> again and again, we hit the same obstacle. The Soviets told us their <sup>demand was</sup> proposals ~~were~~ a single package. They said there would be no deals on any aspect of arms reduction unless we also agreed to their unacceptable terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues hostage while trying to kill our strategic defense.

So we ask -- and the world must ask: Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer?

Why are the Soviets afraid of S.D.I.? <sup>Not a single Soviet citizen has anything to fear from an American S.D.I.</sup> That <sup>defensive system, we have even</sup> ~~Such~~ <sup>upheld to</sup> ~~That~~ <sup>show the</sup> ~~defensive system -- even if developed and deployed -- would harm~~ <sup>benefits</sup> ~~not people, but only ballistic missiles, after they had been~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~fired. It threatens~~ <sup>such a</sup> ~~nothing~~ <sup>system</sup> ~~and would harm~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~no one. nobody.~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~no one. nobody.~~ <sup>Soviet</sup>

In refusing our offer and making his non-negotiable demand on the United States, Mr. Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war. Nevertheless, we have come too far to turn back now. So tonight I call on the Soviet Union to build on the agreements we reached, and not to tear down the nearly-complete structure we erected in Iceland because of our differences over the single issue of S.D.I.

We made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. ~~Let me remind you that,~~

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From the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions; we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We <sup>declared</sup> ~~said~~ that the principal objective of American foreign policy <sup>is to be</sup> ~~is~~ not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world; <sup>I</sup> ~~that~~ is why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the strategic defense initiative.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, <sup>and</sup> ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. For the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues that are fundamental.

One such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "Is not peace, <sup>and</sup> in the <sup>last</sup> ~~final~~ analysis, <sup>basically</sup> a matter of human rights...?" Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a heroic champion of human rights, Yuri Orlov, described to me the persecution he suffered for leading an effort simply to get the Soviet government to live up to the solemn commitment on human rights it had signed at Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like that of far too many other individuals in all walks of life inside the Soviet Union -- including those who wish to emigrate.

In Iceland, human rights was a critical part of our agenda. I made it plain that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. ~~If the best and brightest inside the Soviet Union -- like Mr. Orlov -- cannot trust the Soviet Government, how then can the rest of the world?~~ So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that



follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. ~~I told Mr. Gorbachev that the summit~~ <sup>meeting</sup> cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item. This area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed the signing of several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our 4-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

And I realize some Americans may be asking tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand? Why not give up S.D.I. for this agreement?

The Soviets understand this. That is why they have  
devoted far more resources <sup>for a longer time</sup> than we, to their own ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ SDI.  
The world's only operational missile defense today surrounds  
Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union. So, what Mr. Gorbachev  
was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States sign a <sup>U.S. to a</sup> ~~new~~  
<sup>42-2-84</sup> ten-year extension of ~~XXXX~~ a fourteen-year-old ABM treaty that  
the Soviet Union ~~is~~ has already violated. I told him we don't make  
those kindsof deals in the United States.

J.D.I. "man brought the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland."

The answer, my friends, is simple. S.D.I. is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik. S.D.I. is America's security guarantee -- if the Soviets should -- as they have done too often in the past -- fail to comply with their solemn commitments. S.D.I. is ~~a~~ <sup>THE</sup> key to a world without nuclear weapons.

Point A

And the American people should reflect themselves on these critical questions.

How does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, we <sup>are</sup> ~~as~~ a free <sup>s</sup> Nation are utterly defenseless against Soviet nuclear missiles -- fired either by accident or by design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so -- forever?

<sup>so,</sup> Now, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or <sup>any</sup> ~~our~~ future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to Reykjavik. We would prefer to have no agreement rather than <sup>to</sup> bring <sup>home</sup> a bad agreement home to the United States.

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we

X  
X

the immediate prospects

continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

sketch

But whatever ~~the immediate prospects~~ <sup>decision is taken</sup>, I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past 5-1/2 years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might; your support has restored our military strength. Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

center  
A

So, if there is one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs. *NSC insert*

So, I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation at Keflavik [KEF-la-VICK] -- a critically

Our ideas are out there

important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

<sup>standard of freedom and independence has been... unfurled there will</sup>  
"Wherever the ~~banner of liberty is unfurled~~, there shall be ~~be~~  
America's heart, her <sup>benedictions</sup> ~~prayers~~ and her <sup>prayers</sup> ~~benedictions~~," John Adams <sup>Quincy</sup>  
once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a Nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

Another President, Harry Truman, noted that our century had seen two of the most frightful wars in history. <sup>and that</sup> ~~He said~~, "The supreme need of our time is for man to learn to live together in peace and harmony."

It is in pursuit of that <sup>ideal</sup> dream I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week; ~~it is in pursuit of that dream I have~~ invited Mr. Gorbachev to visit us here for further discussions. And it is in pursuit of that <sup>ideal</sup> ~~dream~~ that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.



