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(Griscom/Dolan)
December 9, 1987
9:00 p.m. SS

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION: SUMMIT
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1987

Good evening. As I am speaking to you now, General Secretary Gorbachev is leaving American airspace on his return trip to the Soviet Union. His departure marks the end of 3 historic days here in Washington, 3 days in which Secretary Gorbachev and I put in place a foundation for better relations between our governments and our peoples.

During these 3 days we took a step -- only a first step, I should point out, but still a critical one -- towards building a more durable peace; indeed, a step that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms race.

I am referring to the arms treaty that we signed Tuesday afternoon in the East Room of the White House. I believe this treaty represents a landmark in post-war history because it is not just an arms control but an arms reduction agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, this agreement does not simply establish ceilings for new weapons; it actually reduces the number of such weapons. In fact, it altogether abolishes intermediate missiles in Europe and elsewhere. And so, for the first time, we are eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons.

The verification measures in this treaty are also something new. On-site inspections and short-notice inspection will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

That is why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of nuclear war but can also speed along a process that may someday remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty -- and all that we have achieved in the past 3 days -- signals a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work towards the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

Yet as important as the I.N.F. treaty is, there is a further and even more crucial point about the last 3 days: Soviet-American relations are no longer based strictly on arms control issues, they rest now on a far broader basis, one that has -- at its root -- realism and candor.

Let me explain this with a saying I have often repeated: Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other. And just as real peace means the presence of freedom and justice, as well as the absence of war, so too, summits must be discussions not just about arms but about the fundamental differences that cause nations to be armed.

Dealing then with the deeper sources of conflict between nations and systems of government is a practical and moral imperative. That is why it was vital to establish a broader Summit agenda, one that dealt not only with arms control but other issues such as bilateral, people-to-people contacts between


our nations and -- most important -- the issues of human rights and regional conflicts.

This is the summit agenda we have adopted. By doing so, we have dealt not just with arms control issues but more fundamental problems such as Soviet expansionism and human rights violations, as well as our own moral opposition to the ideology that justifies such practices. In this way, we have put Soviet-American relations on a far more candid, far more realistic, far sounder footing.

It also means that while there is movement -- indeed, dramatic movement -- in the arms reduction area, much remains to be done in these other critical areas I have mentioned, especially -- and this goes without saying -- in advancing our goal of a world open to the expansion of human freedom and the growth of democratic government.

But while much work lies ahead, I am pleased to report to you the significant progress we have made in these area in addition to arms control.

-- On the matter of regional conflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. Gorbachev on the burning issue of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and occupation of that sovereign nation, an act condemned overwhelmingly by every session of the United Nations General Assembly, is a matter of utmost concern to the United States. I can tell you that Mr. Gorbachev confirmed to me that Soviet forces will leave Afghanistan and.....

-- So too on the issue of human rights, we continued the progress made at earlier summits. (insert) 

-- And finally with regard to the last item on our agenda -- bilateral or people-to-people exchanges -- we signed several important agreements that will increase such contacts between our nations.

As I say the progress we made on this broad front reflects a better basis for understanding between ourselves and the Soviets. But it also reflects something deeper as well. You see, since the summit process began in 1985, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants in our discussions. Though it may surprise Mr. Gorbachev to discover that all this time there has been a third party in the room with us, I do firmly believe the principal credit for the patience and persistence that brought success this year belongs to you, the American people.

Your support over these last 7 years has laid the basis for these negotiations, your support made it possible for us to rebuild our military strength; to liberate Grenada, to move against terrorism in Libya, and more recently, to protect our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Your support made possible our policy of providing aid to freedom fighters like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and other places around the globe. And when last year at Reykjavik, I refused Soviet demands that we trade away S.D.I. -- our Strategic Defense Initiative that would erect a space shield against incoming missiles -- your overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal and will back their President on matters of national security. In short, your

support for our foreign policy goals -- peace through strength as we advance the cause of world freedom -- have helped bring the Soviets to the bargaining table and made possible the success of this summit.

You know, the question has often been asked whether democratic leaders who are accountable to their people aren't at a grave disadvantage in negotiating with leaders of totalitarian states who bear no such burden. Believe me, I think I can answer that question, I can speak from personal experience. Over the long run, no leader at the bargaining table can enjoy any greater advantage than the knowledge he has behind him a people who are strong and free -- and alert; and resolved to remain that way. People like you.

And it is this kind of informed and enlightened support, this hidden strength of democratic government that enabled us to do what we did this week at the Washington summit.

And that's why tonight I am again asking your support. In a very short time, the treaty I signed with Mr. Gorbachev will go to the United States Senate for ratification. And I am asking you tonight to tell your Senators this treaty has your full support.

To this end, let me explain the background. In the mid and late 1970's, the Soviets began to deploy hundreds of new intermediate missiles, most of them mobile, that were targeted on cities and military installations in Europe. This action gravely upset the balance of power in Europe; they represented a totally

new nuclear threat to Europe and Japan for which the democratic nations had no comparable deterrent.

Despite intense pressure from the Soviets, NATO proceeded with what we called a "two-track policy." First, we would deploy our own intermediate missiles as a deterrent but at the same time, push hard in negotiations to do away with this entirely new and unprecedented nuclear escalation. And we proposed to do this with something I first proposed in 1981 -- it was called the zero-option; it meant the complete elimination of intermediate missiles on both sides.

At first, the Soviets called this a mere propaganda ploy and some even here in this country agreed. But we were persistent and eventually the Soviets returned to the bargaining table. The result is our I.N.F. treaty.

As you see from the map on the screen now, the Soviet missiles which will be removed and eliminated under the treaty have been a major threat to the security of our friends and allies on two continents, Europe and Asia. Under the terms of this treaty, we will be eliminating 400 deployed warheads while the Soviet Union eliminates 1,600 or 4 times more.

Now let me also point out that this does not, however, leave NATO without nuclear deterrent. In fact, we still have thousands of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe.

And with regard to verification, as I have mentioned, we have the breakthroughs of on-site inspections and short-notice inspections not only at potential missile sites but at the factories where the missiles and their components are produced.

And finally we have a verification procedure that assures each side that the missiles of the other side have been destroyed. And here the world will witness a remarkable sight. After we have removed the warheads, the United States will start firing off our intermediate missiles from the West Coast of Europe into the Atlantic Ocean. Simultaneously, the Soviets will begin launching their missiles eastward, where they will burn out and fall harmlessly into the wastes of Siberia.

Here then will be one missile launch for peace, one that shows how persistence and consistency eventually can pay off in arms negotiations. And let me assure you too that this treaty has been accomplished with unprecedented consultation with our allies. I have spoken personally with the leaders of the major European democracies as has Secretary Shultz and our NATO and diplomatic personnel. This treaty has their full support.

But if persistence is paying off in our arms reductions efforts let me also say that with your continued support we are making progress in the areas of regional conflicts and human rights.

Now I have already mentioned that Mr. Gorbachev and I have discussed the importance of Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Once again, let me only state that progress on this front is vital to the improvement of Soviet-American relations. In addition to Afghanistan, I can also report to you tonight that I spoke with Mr. Gorbachev about Soviet intervention in other critical regions or strategic chokepoints. In Angola, where Soviet aid and 40,000 of Castro's Cuban mercenaries sustain an

unpopular and tottering Communist regime; in Cambodia where armed resistance continues to North Vietnam's brutal rule; and, most of all, here in our own hemisphere, in the Central American nation of Nicaragua.

On this point, many of you may not be aware that the Soviet Union has poured in more than \$1 billion of military aid to prop up the Communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. With this aid and with the help of Soviet bloc advisers, the Sandinista Communists have built a gigantic military machine that oppresses its own people and wages aggression against the neighboring democratic nations of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.

Now I have often said that the establishment of a Soviet base-camp for subversion on the mainland of North America -- only a 2-day drive from our own border -- is intolerable. Only a few years ago, that seemed the bleak prospect we would have to deal with. But then the Nicaraguan people -- angry at how the Communists had betrayed their democratic revolution of 1978 and taken control of the government -- organized resistance to the Sandinistas. Known as the contras, these freedom fighters now comprise the largest peasant armies in history of this hemisphere. With our assistance they have waged a heroic fight against the Communists and forced them not only to come to the bargaining table but, under the terms of a peace plan worked out last September in Guatemala, to enact limited democratic reforms. Thanks to these freedom fighters and the democratic leaders of the Central American nations involved in the Guatemalan peace

process, there is now a chance for democratic and peaceful change in Nicaragua. But tonight I want to ask you to remember that the Sandinista Communists did not come to the conference table willingly -- only the presence of the freedom fighters and our support for them has given peace a chance in Central America. Until a full and free democratic government is installed in Nicaragua we must continue to support the democratic resistance. Some in Congress seem to be taking at face value the promises of the Communist Sandinistas and are threatening to stop our funding of the contras -- here I need your help and your support.

Ask your Representatives and Senators to back continued support for the contras; it is the right thing; it is important to the cause of freedom. But it is also important to the matters we are discussing tonight: the work of this summit. Believe me, if we suddenly show a lack of resolve and commitment in Central America, it will jeopardize the progress we have made in the other areas of regional conflicts and arms reductions.

To sum up on regional conflicts then: I reaffirmed to the General Secretary Gorbachev our support for political solutions among the warring parties in such conflicts as Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia. The U.S. stands ready to assist these negotiations as appropriate, and to join actively in the important work of economic reconstruction following settlement of these needless and costly conflicts. At the same time, I emphasized the American commitment to the cause of freedom around the world. We will continue to support freedom-fighters in their struggle for genuine national

self-determination for their countries, particularly where foreign troops have intervened to install or prop up regimes lacking popular support.

Now let me talk on the third issue on the summit agenda, that of human rights. As I say, since our first discussion in 1985, progress has been made and in recent months, our human rights dialogue with the Soviets has become much broader. Without in any way dismissing the important and welcome steps taken recently by the Soviet Union to improve policy and performance in this area, I made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that much more must be done in this area to open the way for a more normal relationship between our countries. Here, political, artistic, and especially religious freedom are key: And we will continue to urge the Soviets to allow all those who wish to leave the country to do so freely. On all of this, we will not be satisfied with sporadic gestures or half measures; the human rights issue will not be put to rest until our present concerns are resolved, and new ones cease to emerge.

And finally let me briefly address the fourth item on the summit agenda: that of bilateral, people-to-people contacts between our two nations. On bilateral issues, Mr. Gorbachev and I expressed our satisfaction at the growing number of private exchanges which are affording our citizens unprecedented opportunities to learn about each other. This is a worthwhile investment in future relations; and we signed a number of bilateral agreements on ____ and ____ . Also, Nancy and I are looking forward to seeing the Soviet Union next spring where

Mr. Gorbachev and I will take up the unfinished work of this summit.

Now in addition to making the progress, that I have already outlined on our 4-part agenda, Mr. Gorbachev and I did do some important planning for the upcoming Moscow summit. We agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range nuclear weapons now under discussion in the START negotiations. General Secretary Gorbachev and I reaffirmed this week our commitment -- made at Reykjavik -- to achieve deep, 50-percent cuts in our arsenals of those frightening weapons. We agreed that we should accelerate our efforts to achieve agreement on a START treaty by the time of the Moscow summit; and we have instructed our delegations in Geneva accordingly.

Now, I believe deep reductions in these offensive weapons -- along with the development of S.D.I. -- would do much to make the world safe from nuclear war. Which is why I am also glad to report to you the the Soviets have now dropped their insistence that we abandon S.D.I. Indeed, Mr. Gorbachev has admitted that the Soviets are building their own.

About the future, Mr. Gorbachev and I also agreed that as nuclear weapons are reduced; it becomes all the more important to address other arms control issues including conventional and chemical weapons, weapons in which the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States.

I think then from all of this you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework

of our foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1981, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the post-war era: the threat of nuclear war and the threat of totalitarianism. That is why by building S.D.I., which is a defense against offensive missiles and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called M.A.D. policy, the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction where nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So too, we are saying that the post-war policy of containment is no longer enough, that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom -- that as a people we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the human dignity that their creator intended, a dignity best assured on this Earth by free and democratic government.

I have heard some say that this is a philosophy of "rollback" of communism. But this is the wrong description because it concedes the idea that direction of history has been towards totalitarianism. Since my first days in office, I have argued that the future belongs not to repressive or totalitarian ways of life but to the cause of freedom -- freedom of the marketplace, freedom to speak, assemble, and vote. And when we see the progress of democracy in these last years -- from Central America to Asia -- we must be optimistic about the future of our children.

When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a

threat. I have said since then that this is no threat at all but only a dream, the American dream.

And it is a dream that has meant so much to so many -- a dream that still shines out to the world. You know a few years ago, Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former New York Times reporter and Greek immigrant, Nicholas Gage. It is the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught in one of the terrible struggles of the post-war era: the Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who was tried and executed because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story Nicholas Gage finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself. Mr. Gage writes it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother, that part of him most like here. As he tells it: "the final cry of my mother....was not a curse on her killers but an invocation of what she died for, a declaration of love." These simple last words of Mr. Gage's mother, of Eleni, were: "My children."

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for all children of the world, a cry for peace, for a world of love and understanding.

And it is the hope of heeding such words -- the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people on a desert journey to a promised land, the call spoken by the Nazarene carpenter

standing at the Sea of Galilee -- it is these words that we remember as the holiday season approaches and we reflect on the events of this week here in Washington.

So, let us remember the children, and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom -- the gift that is ours as Americans -- the gift that we seek to share with the entire world -- depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which it came.

So during this holy season, let us also recall that in the prayers of simple people there is more power and might than that of all the great statesmen or armies of the Earth. Let us then thank God for all his blessings to this Nation and ask him for his help and guidance; so that we might continue the work of peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.

The Harris Survey

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For release: Monday AM, October 20th, 1986

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DEMOCRATS GAIN GROUND AFTER SUMMIT DESPITE RALLYING BEHIND REAGAN

By Louis Harris

In the post-summit environment in which the election is taking place, there is now firm and hard evidence that the Democrats are gaining ground. Before the summit meeting, the Democrats held a 49-43 percent lead in the House races nationwide. Now the Democratic lead has gone to 51-42 percent. What was a 6 point Democratic lead has now gone up to 9 points.

These results are based on telephone polling by the Harris Survey during September and October, among 2,695 voters nationwide.

In analyzing what is going on, it is important to separate two distinct processes. One is the reaction of the American people to President Reagan personally. Overall, the number who give him high marks on "inspiring confidence in the White House" has risen from 60-37 percent just before the summit to 62-33 percent afterward.

To a large extent, this has been the result of a closing of ranks behind a President who obviously has been through a difficult experience in not achieving any agreement on arms control at the summit meetings. The pattern of the groups rallying to the support of the President is unusual. This is evident on a key question where people were asked to rate the job President Reagan is doing on "handling nuclear arms reduction negotiations with the Russians." Overall, among adults the President comes up with a 50-46 percent positive rating on this key dimension. By age, he is rated 49-48 percent negative by the under 30 group, only 50-49 percent positive by the 30-49 age group, but a much higher 54-41 percent positive by those 50 to 64 and 47-40 percent positive among those 65 and over. Yuppies are most critical of Reagan, giving him negative marks of 53-45 percent on his efforts to come to arms control agreements. Obviously, older people have rallied behind the President, while younger people have not.

Basically, in the reaction of the people to the summit, older people who have been accustomed most of their lives to rallying behind a president in a crisis are doing just that, while younger people are not. Yet another group which is not closing ranks are the highest educated group, those with a postgraduate degree, who are 66-33 percent negative on the President's handling of nuclear arms reduction negotiations with the Soviets.

This reaction to the President appears to have little relationship to the voting that will take place on November 4th, when a new House of Representatives and one third of the U.S. Senate will be elected. The proof of this is to compare the vote of key age segments. The 50-64 age group, most rallying behind the President in the post-summit period, is voting Democratic in the House races by 52-42 percent. The 65 and over group, next most behind the President on the arms reduction negotiation issue, is voting 51-37 percent Democratic. By contrast, the under 30 group, obviously most critical of the President following the collapse of the summit without agreement, nonetheless is the only major age group voting Republican -- by 50-45 percent. Yuppies intend to vote Republican for Congress by a 47-46 percent margin.

Obviously, there is not a correlation between rallying behind President Reagan and how people intend to vote in November. This is immediately reminiscent of the 1958 off year elections, when President Eisenhower was embarrassed by the U-2 spy episode and there was a closing of ranks behind him. Nonetheless, in the voting of 1958, the Democrats made major gains. In the off year, it is difficult for a popular president to transfer his popularity to members of his own party running for the House and the Senate.

In the case of two groups, both pivotal in the electorate, there is a relationship between the reaction to the summit and their intended vote. Political moderates, who

(over)

largely make up the balance of power, give the President only a modest 49-48 percent positive rating on arms control, but are voting Democratic by a big 53-38 percent. Those with a postgraduate degree, who make up 10 percent of the electorate and who are highly critical of the outcome of the summit, are voting 46-44 percent Democratic.

As a result of the events in Iceland, both the President and the Republicans have been thrown on the defensive and the Democrats appear to be moving successfully into the vacuum that has been created. When coupled with hard times in the energy, sunbelt, and agricultural sectors of the economy, 1986 is beginning to look far more in these latter stages like the 1982 off year elections than the year of realignment toward the Republicans that the GOP had so fondly looked forward to.

T A B L E S

During September and October, the Harris Survey asked a nationwide cross section of 2,695 adults by telephone:

"Now let me ask you some questions about this November's election. In the race for U.S. Congress here in your district, if you had to choose right now, would you vote for the Republican or the Democratic candidate for Congress?"

U.S. CONGRESS VOTE INTENTIONS

	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
	%	%	%	%
September-October 1986	42	51	1	6
September 1986	43	49	1	7
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1986 DEMOGRAPHICS				
TOTAL	42	51	1	6
Age 18-29	50	45	1	4
30-49	42	50	2	6
50-64	42	52	1	5
65 & over	37	51	2	10
Less than high school	29	62	1	8
High school graduate	45	48	2	5
Some college	48	46	1	5
College graduate	51	43	1	5
Postgraduate	44	46	3	7
*Yuppies	47	46	1	6
Conservative	56	38	1	5
Middle-of-the-road	38	53	2	7
Liberal	22	72	1	5

*Yuppies = at least some college and age 18-39

"Now let me ask you about some things President Reagan has done. How would you rate him on (READ EACH ITEM) -- excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?"

REAGAN SPECIFICS

	<u>Positive</u>	<u>Negative</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
	%	%	%
Inspiring confidence in the White House			
October 1986	62	33	5
August 1986	60	37	3
His handling of nuclear arms reduction negotiations with the Russians			
Total	50	46	4
Age 18-29	48	49	3
30-49	50	49	1
50-64	54	41	5
65 and over	47	40	13

(continued)

REAGAN SPECIFICS (CONT'D)

	<u>Positive</u>	<u>Negative</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
	%	%	%
Less than High school	45	48	7
High school graduate	55	41	4
Some college	49	48	3
College graduate	55	42	3
Postgraduate	33	66	1
*Yuppies	45	53	2
Conservative	61	35	4
Middle-of-the-road	49	48	3
Liberal	32	64	4

*Yuppies = at least some college and age 18-39
 Positive = excellent and pretty good
 Negative = only fair and poor

M E T H O D O L O G Y

This Harris Survey was conducted by telephone within the United States during September and October, among a cross section of 2,695 voters nationwide. Figures for age, sex, race and education were weighted where necessary to bring them into line with their actual proportions in the population.

In a sample of this size, one can say with 95 percent certainty that the results have a statistical precision of plus or minus three percentage points of what they would be if the entire adult population had been polled.

This statement conforms to the principles of disclosure of the National Council on Public Polls.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

12/9/87

MEMORANDUM

TO: TOM GRISCOM
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*
SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: Address to the Nation

DATE: December 10, 1987

TIME: 9:00 pm

DURATION: Approximately 20 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

BACKUP LOCATION:

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

MEDIA COVERAGE: Coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: No


NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

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CBS NEWS POLL

The New York Times



FOR RELEASE: 10/15/86
6:30 p.m. EDT

CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES POLL POST-ICELAND SUMMIT October 14-15, 1986

Ronald Reagan's actions at the Iceland summit receive stunning support from the American people. Like Reagan, the public believes the U.S. should not give up Star Wars technology for the arms control agreement proposed at Reykjavik. Approval of Reagan's handling of the Russians has improved, and for the first time in two years, Americans are hopeful the summit meetings will lead to real arms control agreements.

According to the public, the breakdown in the talks was the fault of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, not Ronald Reagan. Just as before the Iceland summit, only a third of the public believe Gorbachev is interested enough in an arms control agreement to make real concessions in order to get one.

While Reagan's standing with the public may have risen as a result of the summit, there is no indication that arms control and the summit has had much effect on the Congressional elections -- at least not yet. Only one in ten voters say the summit will make a difference in their vote. Overall, those reinterviewed after the summit were divided in their preferences for House and Senate outcomes in the same proportions as those in the original sample, interviewed before the summit.

This poll was conducted by telephone October 14-15, 1986 among a nation-wide random sample of 767 adults first interviewed September 28-October 1. The error due to sampling could be plus or minus 4 percentage points.

This poll conforms to the standards of disclosure of the National Council for Public Polls.

SUMMIT '86
October 14-15, 1986

1. Who is more to blame for not reaching an arms control agreement at the Iceland summit meeting-- Ronald Reagan or Mikhail Gorbachev?

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>REP</u>	<u>DEM</u>	<u>IND</u>
REAGAN	17%	9%	20%	19%
GORBACHEV	44	54	39	40
BOTH (VOL)	11	11	10	11
NEITHER (VOL)	4	3	2	7
NO OPINION	24	23	29	23

2. Do you think Reagan should have given up the Strategic Defense Initiative -- Star Wars -- in order to get Gorbachev to agree to a big reduction in Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons?

YES	20	9	29	20
NO	68	83	56	67
NO OPINION	12	8	15	13

3. The Strategic Defense Initiative -- Star Wars -- is a defense system in space that would destroy incoming missiles before they would reach the United States. Do you think the system is likely to work, or not?

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>NOV85</u>
WILL WORK	60%	58%
WILL NOT WORK	22	27
NO OPINION	18	15

4. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling relations with the Soviet Union?

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>SEPT86</u>
APPROVE	72%	61%
DISAPPROVE	20	26
NO OPINION	8	13

5. Do you think Gorbachev wants an arms control agreement enough to make real concessions to the United States in order to get it, or not?

YES	34	33
NO	53	46
NO OPINION	13	21

6. Do you think Reagan wants an arms control agreement enough to make real concessions to the Soviet Union in order to get it, or not?

YES	53	49
NO	37	34
NO OPINION	10	17

7. Which of the two do you think is more interested in negotiating an arms control agreement -- Reagan or Gorbachev, or are both about equally interested?

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>SEPT85</u>
REAGAN	35%	33%
GORBACHEV	9	7
BOTH (VOL)	51	51
NEITHER (VOL)	1	2
NO OPINION	4	7

8. Even though no agreement was reached at the Iceland summit, do you think that meeting will eventually lead to real arms control agreements, or not?

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>NOV85</u>	<u>SEPT85</u>	<u>JAN85</u>
WILL LEAD	57%	32%	33%	38%
WILL NOT	31	55	55	47
NO OPINION	12	13	12	15

VARIED WORDINGS:

(NOVEMBER 1985) Do you think this meeting will lead to real arms control agreements or not?

(SEPTEMBER 1985) This November, Reagan and Gorbachev will meet in Geneva to discuss arms control. Do you think the Geneva meeting will eventually lead to real arms control agreements, or not?

(JANUARY 1985) Do you think the meeting in Geneva, held earlier this month, will or will not, lead to real nuclear arms agreements?

9. Will what happened at the summit meeting make a difference in how you vote this fall for Congress?

	<u>PROBABLE ELECTORATE</u>
YES	12%
NO	81
WON'T VOTE (VOL)	-
NO OPINION	7

10. If the 1986 elections for the House of Representatives were being held today, would you vote for the Republican candidate or the Democratic candidate in your district? IF OTHER OR NO OPINION, ASK: As of today, do you lean more toward the Republican candidate or more towards the Democratic candidate in your district?

	<u>PROBABLE ELECTORATE</u>	<u>SEPT86*</u>
REPUBLICAN	47%	44%
DEMOCRAT	48	45
WON'T VOTE (VOL)	-	-
OTHER (VOL)	-	1
NO OPINION	5	10

*Probable electorate in total opposed districts

11. After the 1986 elections, which party would you like to have the most seats in the United States Senate -- the Republicans or the Democrats?

	<u>PROBABLE ELECTORATE</u>	<u>SEPT86**</u>
REPUBLICANS	42%	42%
DEMOCRATS	47	43
DON'T CARE (VOL)	4	9
NO OPINION	7	6

**Probable electorate

SIZE OF TOTAL SAMPLE	767	
Probable Electorate	553	
Size of Subgroups	<u>Weighted</u>	<u>Unweighted</u>
Republican	224	237
Democrat	246	260
Independent	264	270

file USSR

P6-7

Soviet propaganda campaign against NATO

Проглотить всех стран, соединяйтесь!

Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза

ПРАВДА

Газета основана 5 мая 1912 года В И ЛЕНИНЫМ

№ 78 (12337)

Среда, 17 марта 1982 года

Цена 8 коп

Вчера в Москве начал работу XVII съезд профессиональных союзов СССР. С большой речью на съезде выступил Генеральный секретарь ЦК КПСС, Председатель Президиума Верховного Совета СССР товарищ Л. И. Брежнев.

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НАРОДАМ — ПРОЧНЫЙ МИР

Встреча Л. И. Брежнева с К. Фомвиханом

Прекратить гонку вооружений! Предотвратить угрозу ядерной войны!

Обращение XVII съезда профессиональных союзов СССР к трудящимся и профессионалам

Soviet Propaganda Theme:

The United States is not interested in arms control

"At all talks directly, or indirectly, linked with curbing the arms race the U.S. Administration pursues an unconstructive, obstructionist line. This applies to the U.S. conduct at the talks in Geneva, Vienna, Madrid, and other international forums".

Soviet Government Statement, *Pravda*, May 27, 1983.

Comment:

This frequent Soviet characterization cannot be sustained as a judgment of the past or the present. Khrushchev also used the propaganda theme that the United States and its NATO allies were an obstacle to disarmament measures persistently sought by the Soviets.¹²

Since World War II, the United States has consistently taken the initiative to shape realistic negotiations in the key areas of arms control. The United States attempted, through the Baruch Plan of 1946, to have nuclear technology placed under international control, only to have this proposal rejected by the Soviet Union. Since that time, the United States, in coordination with its allies, has taken the lead in framing and pursuing all of the major bilateral and multilateral arms control accords. These include:

- 1959 Antarctic Treaty
- 1963 Hot-Line Agreement (updated in 1971)
- 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
- 1967 Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
- 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty
- 1970 Seabed Arms Control Treaty
- 1971 Nuclear Accidents Agreement

- 1972 SALT I ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty
- 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons
- 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
- 1977 Environmental Modification Convention
- 1979 SALT II (unratified, but each side has declared a policy of complying with it as long as the other side does)

President Reagan has explained the principles on which the U.S. arms control effort is based. These principles are essential to agreements that will advance peace and security:

- The United States seeks to reduce weapons and forces substantially, not just freeze them at high levels or even legitimize additional buildups, as has been the case in some earlier agreements.
- The goal of the United States is mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces. An unequal agreement that establishes or prolongs an unequal balance of forces can only result in instability.
- The United States seeks to achieve agreements that will enhance security while reducing the risks of war. Thus, arms control is not an end in itself, but is a vital means to ensure a secure peace and international stability.

• The provisions of arms control agreements must be designed carefully so that effective measures are included to ensure full compliance with their terms.

On the basis of these principles, the United States, together with its allies, is pursuing an arms control agenda of unprecedented breadth. Today's efforts build on more than three decades of experience in international arms control, on the agreements that have been achieved, and on the lessons that have been learned from the successes and failures of the past.

This leading role by the United States and the West in shaping the arms control process is not accidental. In the first place, given the rapid growth of Soviet military power, the United States and its allies have had a direct security interest in removing dangerous imbalances in both conventional and nuclear forces. At the same time, as democratic societies, they have a basic responsibility to maintain defense expenditures at the lowest level consistent with continued national and Alliance security.

Faced with these requirements, Western governments have of necessity developed and analyzed potential arms control agreements in terms of concrete national

and Alliance security implications. They have engaged in extensive and detailed preparatory work, public debate, and intra-Alliance coordination, to ensure that eventual agreements preserve and enhance security and stability and enjoy public and political support.

The results of this work are evident in today's negotiating agenda. Indeed, it is significant that the Soviet Union and its allies, despite strong support for rhetorical declarations, have rarely advanced any concrete ideas for practical negotiations on central issues. Instead, they have usually preferred to react tactically to specific Western efforts to establish an arms control framework. In so doing, they have delayed agreeing to join talks as long as politically possible, while maintaining their original positions on the central substantive issues.* The Soviets have attempted to use the arms control process to divide the United States from its allies. The propaganda theme that the United States is not interested in, and the obstacle to, INF arms control is an example.

*Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain recently observed, in her address to a joint session of the Canadian Houses of Parliament on September 26, 1983: "Every few weeks there is a further statement from Moscow designed to give an appearance of flexibility. But so far when these public statements are checked at the negotiating table—the real test of the truth—flexibility disappears."

(Griscom/Dolan)
December 10, 1987
5:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION: SUMMIT
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1987

Good evening. As I am speaking to you now, General Secretary Gorbachev is leaving American airspace on his return trip to the Soviet Union. His departure marks the end of 3 historic days here in Washington in which ^{Secretary} Gorbachev and I continued to build a foundation for better relations between our governments and our peoples. X

During these 3 days we took a step -- only a first step, but still a critical one -- towards building a more durable peace; indeed, a step that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms build-up:

I am referring to the treaty that we signed Tuesday afternoon in the East Room of the White House. I believe this treaty represents a landmark in post-war history because it is not just an arms control but an arms reduction agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, this agreement does not simply establish ceilings for new weapons; it actually reduces the number of such weapons. In fact, it altogether abolishes an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles.

The verification measures in this treaty are also something new, with far-reaching implications. On-site inspections and short-notice inspections will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

That is why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of war but can also speed along a process that may someday

remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty -- and all that we have achieved during this summit -- signals a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work towards the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

Yet as important as the I.N.F. treaty is, there is a further and even more crucial point about the last 3 days and the entire summit process: Soviet-American relations are no longer focused only on arms control issues; they now cover a far broader agenda, one that has -- at its root -- realism and candor.

Let me explain this with a saying I have often repeated: Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other. And just as real peace means the presence of freedom and justice, as well as the absence of war, so too, summits must be discussions not just about arms but about the fundamental differences that cause nations to be armed.

Dealing then with the deeper sources of conflict between nations and systems of government is a practical and moral imperative. That is why it was vital to establish a broader Summit agenda, one that dealt not only with arms reductions but also people-to-people contacts between our nations and -- most important -- the issues of human rights and regional conflicts.

This is the summit agenda we have adopted. By doing so, we have dealt not just with arms control issues but also candidly

with fundamental problems such as Soviet expansionism and human rights violations, as well as our own moral opposition to the ideology that justifies such practices. In this way, we have put Soviet-American relations on a far more candid, and far more realistic, footing.

It also means that while there is movement -- indeed, dramatic movement -- in the arms reduction area, much remains to be done in that area as well as in these other critical areas I have mentioned, especially -- and this goes without saying -- in advancing our goal of a world open to the expansion of human freedom and the growth of democratic government.

So, much work lies ahead. Let me explain:

-- On the matter of regional conflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. Gorbachev on the burning issue of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and occupation of that sovereign nation, an act whose reversal has been overwhelmingly called for by every session of the United Nations General Assembly, is a matter of utmost concern to the United States. While Mr. Gorbachev assured me of his desire to withdraw his troops, he did not state when that withdrawal would begin or end. On the Iran-Iraq war, the Soviets refused to commit themselves, even to start work on an enforcement resolution in the U.N. Security Council that might pressure Iran to end that war. Although I am disappointed that what the General Secretary told me was not more forthcoming, I continue to have high hopes -- and he assured me, he did too -- that we can have real cooperation in resolving regional conflicts

on terms that promote peace and freedom. This is essential to a lasting improvement in our relations.

-- So too, on human rights, there was some very limited movement -- resolution of a number of individual cases, in which prisoners will be released or exit visas granted. There were assurances of future, more substantial movement, which we hope to see become a reality.

-- And finally with regard to the last item on our agenda -- scientific, educational, cultural, and economic exchanges -- we agreed to expand cooperation in ways that will break down some of the artificial barriers between our nations. For example, agreement was reached to expand and improve civil air service between our two countries.

But let me point out here that while much work is ahead of us, the progress we have made reflect a better understanding between ourselves and the Soviets.

It also reflects something deeper. You see, since my first meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in 1985, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants in our discussions. Though it may surprise Mr. Gorbachev to discover that all this time there has been a third party in the room with us, I do firmly believe the principal credit for the patience and persistence that brought success this year belongs to you, the American people.

Your support over these last 7 years has laid the basis for these negotiations; your support made it possible for us to rebuild our military strength, to liberate Grenada, to strike

hard against terrorism in Libya, and more recently, to protect our strategic interests and bolster our friends in the Persian Gulf. Your support made possible our policy of helping freedom fighters like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and other places around the globe. And when last year at Reykjavik, I refused Soviet demands that we trade away S.D.I. -- our Strategic Defense Initiative that could erect a Space Shield against ballistic missiles -- your overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal, and will back their President on matters of national security. In short, your support for our foreign policy goals -- building a safer peace as we advance the cause of world freedom -- has helped bring the Soviets to the bargaining table. It makes it possible now to hope for a real, fundamental improvement in our relations.

You know, the question has often been asked whether democratic leaders who are accountable to their people aren't at a grave disadvantage in negotiating with leaders of totalitarian states who bear no such burden. Believe me, I think I can answer that question, I can speak from personal experience. Over the long run, no leader at the bargaining table can enjoy any greater advantage than the knowledge that he has behind him a people who are strong and free -- and alert; and resolved to remain that way. People like you.

And it is this kind of informed and enlightened support, this hidden strength of democratic government that enabled us to do what we did this week at the Washington summit.

Now that the treaty has been signed, it will be submitted to the Senate for the next step, the ratification process. I will meet with the leadership of Congress here tomorrow morning, and I am confident that the Senate will now act in an expeditious way to fulfill its duty under our Constitution.

To this end, let me explain the background. In the mid and late 1970's, the Soviets began to deploy hundreds of new, mobile intermediate-range missiles, capable of destroying major cities and military installations in Europe and Asia. This action was an unprovoked, new dimension of the threat against our friends and allies on both continents, a new threat to which the democratic nations had no comparable counter.

Despite intense pressure from the Soviets, NATO proceeded with what we called a "two-track policy." First, we would deploy a limited number of our own I.N.F. missiles as a deterrent but at the same time, push hard in negotiations to do away with this entirely new nuclear threat. And we set out to do this with a formula I first put forward in 1981 -- it was called the zero-option; it meant the complete elimination of these missiles on both sides.

At first, many called this a mere propaganda ploy, some even here in this country. But we were persistent, our allies steadfast, and eventually the Soviets returned to the bargaining table. The result is our I.N.F. treaty.

As you see from the map on the screen now, the Soviet missiles, which will be removed and eliminated under the treaty, have been a major threat to the security of our friends and

allies on two continents, Europe and Asia. Under the terms of this treaty, we will be eliminating about 400 deployed warheads while the Soviet Union eliminates some 1,600, or four times more.

Now let me also point out that this does not, however, leave NATO unprotected. In fact, we will maintain a substantial deterrent force on the ground, on aircraft, and at sea. Our commitment to NATO's strategy of being able to respond as necessary to any form of aggression remains steadfast.

And with regard to verification, as I have mentioned, we have the breakthroughs of on-site inspections and short-notice inspections not only at potential missile deployment sites but at the facility where the Soviet SS-20 missiles and their components have been assembled. We have a verification procedure that assures each side that the missiles of the other side have been destroyed and that new ones aren't built.

Here, then, is a treaty that shows how persistence and consistency eventually can pay off in arms negotiations. And let me assure you too that this treaty has been accomplished with unprecedented consultation with our allies and friends. I have spoken personally with the leaders of the major democracies, as has Secretary Shultz and our diplomats. This treaty has full allied support.

But if persistence is paying off in our arms reductions efforts, wars and conflicts in many parts of the world, and the question of human rights, are still problems in our relations. Real improvement in those areas would give an enormous boost to the overall relationship.

Now, I have already mentioned that Mr. Gorbachev and I have discussed the importance of Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Once again, let me only state that progress on this front is vital to the improvement of Soviet-American relations. In addition to Afghanistan, I can also report to you tonight that I spoke with him about Soviet policy in other critical regions. In Angola, where Soviet combat advisors and 37,000 of Castro's Cuban mercenaries sustain an unpopular Communist regime; in Cambodia where there continues to be armed resistance to Hanoi's occupation and control; and, most of all, here in our own hemisphere, in the Central American nation of Nicaragua.

On this point, I must candidly report to you that I pressed the General Secretary to stop massive arms shipments to the Communist Sandinista regime -- arms the Communists in Nicaragua are using against the Nicaraguan people and to threaten their neighbors. The General Secretary was not forthcoming. At this critical time in Central America, this lack of movement was discouraging to me and to all who support the cause of democracy for all Central Americans.

So tonight, I must tell you of my firm resolve to stand by those brave Nicaraguans fighting for freedom. I will urge Congress in the strongest terms to continue aid to the freedom fighters -- which expires just before Christmas. If Congress will not support this request and join with me in sending a strong signal both to Managua and Moscow, then our country will be making a serious mistake that could extinguish the flame of freedom in Nicaragua -- not just now but for generations to come.

Now in addition to these candid exchanges on our 4-part agenda, Mr. Gorbachev and I did do some important planning for a Moscow summit next year. We agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range or strategic nuclear arms as I have proposed in the START negotiations. He and I reaffirmed this week our commitment -- made first at Geneva -- to achieve deep, 50-percent cuts in our arsenals of those powerful weapons. We agreed that we should build on our efforts to achieve agreement on a START treaty at the earliest possible date; and we have instructed our delegations in Geneva accordingly.

Now, I believe deep reduction in these offensive weapons -- along with the development of S.D.I., -- would do much to make the world safer. For that reason, I made it clear that our S.D.I. program will continue, and that when we have a defense ready to deploy -- we will do so.

About the future, Mr. Gorbachev and I also agreed that, as nuclear weapons are reduced, it becomes all the more important to redress the disparities in conventional and chemical weapons, where the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States and our allies.

I think then from all of this you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework of American foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1982, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the post-war era: the threat of nuclear war and the threat of totalitarianism. That is why, by pursuing S.D.I., which is a

defense against offensive missiles, and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called policy of Mutual Assured Destruction by which nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So too, we are saying that the post-war policy of containment is no longer enough, that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom -- that as a people we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the human dignity that their creator intended, a dignity best assured on this Earth by free and democratic government.

I have heard some say that this is a philosophy of "rollback" of communism. But this is the wrong description because it concedes the idea that the direction of history has been towards totalitarianism. Since my first days in office, I have argued that the future belongs not to repressive or totalitarian ways of life but to the cause of freedom -- freedom of the marketplace, freedom to speak, assemble, and vote. And when we see the progress of democracy in these last years -- from Latin America to Asia -- we must be optimistic about the future of our children.

When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a threat. I have said since then that this is no threat at all but only a dream, the American dream.

And it is a dream that has meant so much to so many -- a dream that still shines out to the world. You know a couple

years ago, Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former New York Times reporter and Greek immigrant, Nicholas Gage. It is the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught in one of the terrible struggles of the post-war era: the Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who was tried and executed because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story Nicholas Gage finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself. Mr. Gage writes it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother, that part of him most like her. As he tells it: "and her final cry....was not a curse on her killers but an invocation of what she died for, a declaration of love." These simple last words of Mr. Gage's mother, of Eleni, were: "My children."

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for all children of the world, a cry for peace, for a world of love and understanding.

And it is the hope of heeding such words -- the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people in a promised land, the call spoken by the Nazarene carpenter standing at the Sea of Galilee that carpenter whose birth into the poverty of a stable we celebrate -- it is these words that we remember as the holiday

season approaches and we reflect on the events of this week here in Washington.

So, let us remember the children, and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom -- the gift that is ours as Americans -- the gift that we seek to share with all the world -- depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which it comes.

So during this holy season, let us also reflect that in the prayers of simple people there is more power and might than that possessed by all the great statesmen or armies of the Earth. Let us then thank God for all his blessings to this Nation and ask Him for His help and guidance; so that we might continue the work of peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.

(Griscom/Dolan)
December 10, 1987
5:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION: SUMMIT
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1987

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The verification measures in this treaty are also something new, with far-reaching implications. On-site inspections and short-notice inspections will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

That is why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of war but can also speed along a process that may someday

remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty -- and all that we have achieved during this summit -- signals a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work towards the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

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It also means that while there is movement -- indeed, dramatic movement -- in the arms reduction area, much remains to be done in that area as well as in these other critical areas I have mentioned, especially -- and this goes without saying -- in advancing our goal of a world open to the expansion of human freedom and the growth of democratic government.

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But if persistence is paying off in our arms reductions efforts, wars and conflicts in many parts of the world, and the question of human rights, are still problems in our relations. Real improvement in those areas would give an enormous boost to the overall relationship.

Now, I have already mentioned that Mr. Gorbachev and I have discussed the importance of Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Once again, let me only state that progress on this front is vital to the improvement of Soviet-American relations. In addition to Afghanistan, I can also report to you tonight that I spoke with him about Soviet policy in other critical regions. In Angola, where Soviet combat advisors and 37,000 of Castro's Cuban mercenaries sustain an unpopular Communist regime; in Cambodia where there continues to be armed resistance to Hanoi's occupation and control; and, most of all, here in our own hemisphere, in the Central American nation of Nicaragua.

On this point, I must candidly report to you that I pressed the General Secretary to stop massive arms shipments to the Communist Sandinista regime -- arms the Communists in Nicaragua are using against the Nicaraguan people and to threaten their neighbors. The General Secretary was not forthcoming. At this critical time in Central America, this lack of movement was discouraging to me and to all who support the cause of democracy for all Central Americans.

So tonight, I must tell you of my firm resolve to stand by those brave Nicaraguans fighting for freedom. I will urge Congress in the strongest terms to continue aid to the freedom fighters -- which expires just before Christmas. If Congress will not support this request and join with me in sending a strong signal both to Managua and Moscow, then our country will be making a serious mistake that could extinguish the flame of freedom in Nicaragua -- not just now but for generations to come.

Now in addition to these candid exchanges on our 4-part agenda, Mr. Gorbachev and I did do some important planning for a Moscow summit next year. We agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range or strategic nuclear arms as I have proposed in the START negotiations. He and I reaffirmed this week our commitment -- made first at Geneva -- to achieve deep, 50-percent cuts in our arsenals of those powerful weapons. We agreed that we should build on our efforts to achieve agreement on a START treaty at the earliest possible date; and we have instructed our delegations in Geneva accordingly.

Now, I believe deep reduction in these offensive weapons -- along with the development of S.D.I., -- would do much to make the world safer. For that reason, I made it clear that our S.D.I. program will continue, and that when we have a defense ready to deploy -- we will do so.

About the future, Mr. Gorbachev and I also agreed that, as nuclear weapons are reduced, it becomes all the more important to redress the disparities in conventional and chemical weapons, where the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States and our allies.

I think then from all of this you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework of American foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1982, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the post-war era: the threat of nuclear war and the threat of totalitarianism. That is why, by pursuing S.D.I., which is a

defense against offensive missiles, and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called policy of Mutual Assured Destruction by which nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So too, we are saying that the post-war policy of containment is no longer enough, that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom -- that as a people we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the human dignity that their creator intended, a dignity best assured on this Earth by free and democratic government.

I have heard some say that this is a philosophy of "rollback" of communism. But this is the wrong description because it concedes the idea that the direction of history has been towards totalitarianism. Since my first days in office, I have argued that the future belongs not to repressive or totalitarian ways of life but to the cause of freedom -- freedom of the marketplace, freedom to speak, assemble, and vote. And when we see the progress of democracy in these last years -- from Latin America to Asia -- we must be optimistic about the future of our children.

When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a threat. I have said since then that this is no threat at all but only a dream, the American dream.

And it is a dream that has meant so much to so many -- a dream that still shines out to the world. You know a couple

years ago, Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former New York Times reporter and Greek immigrant, Nicholas Gage. It is the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught in one of the terrible struggles of the post-war era: the Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who was tried and executed because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story Nicholas Gage finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself. Mr. Gage writes it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother, that part of him most like her. As he tells it: "and her final cry....was not a curse on her killers but an invocation of what she died for, a declaration of love." These simple last words of Mr. Gage's mother, of Eleni, were: "My children."

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for all children of the world, a cry for peace, for a world of love and understanding.

And it is the hope of heeding such words -- the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people in a promised land, the call spoken by the Nazarene carpenter standing at the Sea of Galilee that carpenter whose birth into the poverty of a stable we celebrate -- it is these words that we remember as the holiday

season approaches and we reflect on the events of this week here in Washington.

So, let us remember the children, and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom -- the gift that is ours as Americans -- the gift that we seek to share with all the world -- depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which it comes.

So during this holy season, let us also reflect that in the prayers of simple people there is more power and might than that possessed by all the great statesmen or armies of the Earth. Let us then thank God for all his blessings to this Nation and ask Him for His help and guidance; so that we might continue the work of peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.

(Griscom/Dolan)
December 10, 1987
3:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION: SUMMIT
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1987

Good evening. As I am speaking to you now, General Secretary Gorbachev is leaving American airspace on his return trip to the Soviet Union. His departure marks the end of 3 historic days here in Washington -- in which Secretary Gorbachev and I put in place a foundation for better relations between our governments and our peoples.

During these 3 days we took a step -- only a first step, I should point out, but still a critical one -- towards building a more durable peace; indeed, a step that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms race.

I am referring to the arms treaty that we signed Tuesday afternoon in the East Room of the White House. I believe this treaty represents a landmark in post-war history because it is not just an arms control but an arms reduction agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, this agreement does not simply establish ceilings for new weapons; it actually reduces the number of such weapons. In fact, it altogether abolishes intermediate missiles in Europe and elsewhere. And so, for the first time, we are eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons.

The verification measures in this treaty are also something new. On-site inspections and short-notice inspections will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

That is why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of nuclear war but can also speed along a process that may someday remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty -- and all that we have achieved during this summit -- signals a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work towards the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

Yet as important as the I.N.F. treaty is, there is a further and even more crucial point about the last 3 days: Soviet-American relations are no longer based strictly on arms control issues; they rest now on a far broader basis, one that has -- at its root -- realism and candor.

Let me explain this with a saying I have often repeated: Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other. And just as real peace means the presence of freedom and justice, as well as the absence of war, so too, summits must be discussions not just about arms but about the fundamental differences that cause nations to be armed.

Dealing then with the deeper sources of conflict between nations and systems of government is a practical and moral imperative. That is why it was vital to establish a broader Summit agenda, one that dealt not only with arms control but other issues such as bilateral, people-to-people contacts between

our nations and -- most important -- the issues of human rights and regional conflicts.

This is the summit agenda we have adopted. By doing so, we have dealt not just with arms control issues but more fundamental problems such as Soviet expansionism and human rights violations, as well as our own moral opposition to the ideology that justifies such practices. In this way, we have put Soviet-American relations on a far more candid, far more realistic, far sounder footing.

It also means that while there is movement -- indeed, dramatic movement -- in the arms reduction area, much remains to be done in these other critical areas I have mentioned, especially -- and this goes without saying -- in advancing our goal of a world open to the expansion of human freedom and the growth of democratic government.

But while much work lies ahead, I am pleased to report to you the significant progress we have made in these areas in addition to arms control.

-- On the matter of regional conflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. Gorbachev on the burning issue of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and occupation of that sovereign nation, an act whose reversal has been overwhelmingly called for by every session of the United Nations General Assembly, is a matter of utmost concern to the United States. I can tell you that the Soviets must set an exact date to begin withdrawing its troops and an exact period of time when this will be completed. This is essential.

-- So too on the issue of human rights, we continued the progress made at earlier summits. (insert)

-- And finally with regard to the last item on our agenda -- bilateral issues -- we signed several important agreements that will increase such contacts between our nations. (example)

As I say the progress we made on this broad front reflects a better basis for understanding between ourselves and the Soviets. But it also reflects something deeper as well. You see, since the summit process began in 1985, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants in our discussions. Though it may surprise Mr. Gorbachev to discover that all this time there has been a third party in the room with us, I do firmly believe the principal credit for the patience and persistence that brought success this year belongs to you, the American people.

Your support over these last 7 years has laid the basis for these negotiations; your support made it possible for us to rebuild our military strength, to liberate Grenada, to move against terrorism in Libya, and more recently, to protect our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Your support made possible our policy of providing aid to freedom fighters like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and other places around the globe. And when last year at Reykjavik, I refused Soviet demands that we trade away S.D.I. -- our Strategic Defense Initiative that would erect a space shield against incoming missiles -- your overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal and will back their

President on matters of national security. In short, your support for our foreign policy goals -- the preservation of peace as we advance the cause of world freedom -- has helped bring the Soviets to the bargaining table and made possible the success of this summit.

You know, the question has often been asked whether democratic leaders who are accountable to their people aren't at a grave disadvantage in negotiating with leaders of totalitarian states who bear no such burden. Believe me, I think I can answer that question, I can speak from personal experience. Over the long run, no leader at the bargaining table can enjoy any greater advantage than the knowledge that he has behind him a people who are strong and free -- and alert; and resolved to remain that way. People like you.

And it is this kind of informed and enlightened support, this hidden strength of democratic government that enabled us to do what we did this week at the Washington summit.

Now that the treaty has been signed, it will be submitted to the Senate for the next step, the ratification process. I will meet with the leadership of Congress here tomorrow morning, and I am confident that the Senate will now act in an expeditious way to fulfill its duty under our Constitution.

To this end, let me explain the background. In the mid and late 1970's, the Soviets began to deploy hundreds of new intermediate missiles, most of them mobile, that were targeted on cities and military installations in Europe. This action gravely upset the balance of power in Europe; they represented a totally

new nuclear threat to Europe and Japan for which the democratic nations had no comparable deterrent.

Despite intense pressure from the Soviets, NATO proceeded with what we called a "two-track policy." First, we would deploy our own intermediate missiles as a deterrent but at the same time, push hard in negotiations to do away with this entirely new and unprecedented nuclear escalation. And we proposed to do this with something I first put forward in 1981 -- it was called the zero-option; it meant the complete elimination of intermediate missiles on both sides.

At first, the Soviets called this a mere propaganda ploy and some even here in this country agreed. But we were persistent and eventually the Soviets returned to the bargaining table. The result is our I.N.F. treaty.

As you see from the map on the screen now, the Soviet missiles, which will be removed and eliminated under the treaty, have been a major threat to the security of our friends and allies on two continents, Europe and Asia. Under the terms of this treaty, we will be eliminating 400 deployed warheads while the Soviet Union eliminates 1,600, or four times more.

Now let me also point out that this does not, however, leave NATO without nuclear deterrent. In fact, we still have thousands of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe.

And with regard to verification, as I have mentioned, we have the breakthroughs of on-site inspections and short-notice inspections not only at potential missile sites but at the factories where the missiles and their components are produced.

We have a verification procedure that assures each side that the missiles of the other side have been destroyed.

Here then is a treaty that shows how persistence and consistency eventually can pay off in arms negotiations. And let me assure you too that this treaty has been accomplished with unprecedented consultation with our allies. I have spoken personally with the leaders of the major European democracies as has Secretary Shultz and our NATO and diplomatic personnel. This treaty has their full support.

But if persistence is paying off in our arms reductions efforts, let me also say that with your continued support we are making progress in the areas of regional conflicts and human rights.

Now I have already mentioned that Mr. Gorbachev and I have discussed the importance of Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Once again, let me only state that progress on this front is vital to the improvement of Soviet-American relations. In addition to Afghanistan, I can also report to you tonight that I spoke with Mr. Gorbachev about Soviet intervention in other critical regions or strategic chokepoints. In Angola, where Soviet aid and 40,000 of Castro's Cuban mercenaries sustain an unpopular and tottering Communist regime; in Cambodia where armed resistance continues to North Vietnam's brutal rule; and, most of all, here in our own hemisphere, in the Central American nation of Nicaragua.

On this point, I must candidly report to you some disappointing news: our efforts to get the Soviets to remove

their military personnel from Nicaragua were not successful. Nor were our efforts to stop the flow of Soviet arms and military aid -- now totaling over \$1 billion -- to the Communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. At this critical time in Central America, this lack of movement was discouraging to me and to all who support the cause of democracy for all Central Americans.

So tonight, I must tell you of my firm resolve to stand by those brave Nicaraguans fighting for freedom. I will urge Congress in the strongest terms to continue aid to the freedom fighters -- which expires just before Christmas. If Congress will not support this request and join with me in sending a strong signal both to Managua and Moscow, then our country will be making a serious mistake that could extinguish the flame of freedom in Nicaragua -- not just now but for generations to come.

Now in addition to the items I have outlined on our 4-part agenda, Mr. Gorbachev and I did do some important planning for the Moscow summit next year. We agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range nuclear weapons now under discussion in the START negotiations. General Secretary Gorbachev and I reaffirmed this week our commitment -- made at Reykjavik -- to achieve deep, 50-percent cuts in our arsenals of those frightening weapons. We agreed that we should build on our efforts to achieve agreement on a START treaty at the earliest possible date; and we have instructed our delegations in Geneva accordingly.

Now, I believe deep reductions in these offensive weapons -- along with the development of S.D.I. -- would do much to make the

world safe from the threat of nuclear war. So, I was pleased the Soviets dropped their insistence that we abandon S.D.I.; however, I remain concerned over their efforts to limit our vital testing in this area. I reiterated the point that providing a strategic defensive shield is too important to restrict the promise it holds for the future. This I will never do.

About the future, Mr. Gorbachev and I also agreed that, as nuclear weapons are reduced, it becomes all the more important to address other arms control issues including conventional and chemical weapons, weapons in which the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States.

I think then from all of this you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework of our foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1982, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the post-war era: the threat of nuclear war and the threat of totalitarianism. That is why, by building S.D.I., which is a defense against offensive missiles, and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called policy of Mutual Assured Destruction where nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So too, we are saying that the post-war policy of containment is no longer enough, that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom -- that as a people we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the human dignity that their creator intended, a dignity best assured on this Earth by free and democratic government.

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When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a threat. I have said since then that this is no threat at all but only a dream, the American dream.

And it is a dream that has meant so much to so many -- a dream that still shines out to the world. You know a couple years ago, Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former New York Times reporter and Greek immigrant, Nicholas Gage. It is the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught in one of the terrible struggles of the post-war era: the Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who was tried and executed because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story Nicholas Gage finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself.

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So, let us remember the children, and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom -- the gift that is ours as Americans -- the gift that we seek to share with all the world -- depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which it comes.

So during this holy season, let us also reflect that in the prayers of simple people there is more power and might than that possessed by all the great statesmen or armies of the Earth. Let us then thank God for all his blessings to this Nation and ask Him for His help and guidance; so that we might continue the work

of peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.

John

(Griscom/Dolan)
December 10, 1987
1:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION: SUMMIT
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1987

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The verification measures in this treaty are also something new. On-site inspections and short-notice inspections will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

That is why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of nuclear war but can also speed along a process that may someday remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty -- and all that we have achieved during this summit -- signals a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work towards the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

Yet as important as the I.N.F. treaty is, there is a further and even more crucial point about the last 3 days: Soviet-American relations are no longer based strictly on arms control issues; they rest now on a far broader basis, one that has -- at its root -- realism and candor.

Let me explain this with a saying I have often repeated: Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other. And just as real peace means the presence of freedom and justice, as well as the absence of war, so too, summits must be discussions not just about arms but about the fundamental differences that cause nations to be armed.

Dealing then with the deeper sources of conflict between nations and systems of government is a practical and moral imperative. That is why it was vital to establish a broader Summit agenda, one that dealt not only with arms control but other issues such as bilateral, people-to-people contacts between

our nations and -- most important -- the issues of human rights and regional conflicts.

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-- On the matter of regional conflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. Gorbachev on the burning issue of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and occupation of that sovereign nation, an act whose reversal has been overwhelmingly called for by every session of the United Nations General Assembly, is a matter of utmost concern to the United States. I can tell you that the Soviets must set an exact date to begin withdrawing its troops and an exact period of time when this will be completed. This is essential.

-- So too on the issue of human rights, we continued the progress made at earlier summits. (insert)

-- And finally with regard to the last item on our agenda -- bilateral issues -- we signed several important agreements that will increase such contacts between our nations. (example)

As I say the progress we made on this broad front reflects a better basis for understanding between ourselves and the Soviets. But it also reflects something deeper as well. You see, since the summit process began in 1985, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants in our discussions. Though it may surprise Mr. Gorbachev to discover that all this time there has been a third party in the room with us, I do firmly believe the principal credit for the patience and persistence that brought success this year belongs to you, the American people.

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About the future, Mr. Gorbachev and I also agreed that as nuclear weapons are reduced; it becomes all the more important to *reduce* ~~address other arms control issues including~~ conventional and chemical weapons, weapons in which the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States *and our Allies* ☹

We don't want to control conventional force Soviets to even them.

I think then from all of this you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework of our foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1982, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the post-war era: the threat of nuclear war and the threat of totalitarianism. That is why by ~~building~~ *working on* S.D.I., which is a defense against offensive missiles and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called policy of Mutual Assured Destruction where nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So too, we are saying that the post-war policy of containment is no longer enough, that the goal of American foreign policy is both *a safer* ~~world~~ peace and world freedom -- that as a people we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the

human dignity that their creator intended, a dignity best assured on this Earth by free and democratic government.

I have heard some say that this is a philosophy of "rollback" of communism. But this is the wrong description because it concedes the idea that the direction of history has been towards totalitarianism. Since my first days in office, I have argued that the future belongs not to repressive or totalitarian ways of life but to the cause of freedom -- freedom of the marketplace, freedom to speak, assemble, and vote. And when we see the progress of democracy in these last years -- from ^{Latin} ~~Central~~ America to Asia -- we must be optimistic about the future of our children.

When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a threat. I have said since then that this is no threat at all but only a dream, the American dream.

And it is a dream that has meant so much to so many -- a dream that still shines out to the world. You know a couple ^{of} years ago, Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former New York Times reporter and Greek immigrant, Nicholas Gage. It is the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught in one of the terrible struggles of the post-war era: the Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who was tried and executed ^{by Communists} because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his

mother to her death. But at the end of the story Nicholas Gage finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself. Mr. Gage writes it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother, that part of him most like her. As he tells it: "and her final cry....was not a curse on her killers but an invocation of what she died for, a declaration of love." These simple last words of Mr. Gage's mother, of Eleni, were: "My children."

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for all children of the world, a cry for peace, for a world of love and understanding.

And it is the hope of heeding such words -- the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people on a desert journey to a promised land, the call spoken by the Nazarene carpenter standing at the Sea of Galilee that carpenter whose birth into the poverty of a stable we celebrate -- it is these words that we remember as the holiday season approaches and we reflect on the events of this week here in Washington.

So, let us remember the children, and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom -- the gift that is ours as Americans -- the gift that we seek to share with all the world -- depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which it comes.

So during this holy season, let us also reflect that in the prayers of simple people there is more power and might than that possessed by all the great statesmen or armies of the Earth. Let

us then thank God for all his blessings to this Nation and ask Him for His help and guidance; so that we might continue the work of peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.