

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Speechwriting, White House Office of:
Research Office, 1981-1989

Folder Title: 12/10/1987 Address to the Nation-
Summit with Gorbachev (Tony/Staff) (2)

Box: 357

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY DOLAN

FROM: FRANK DONATELLI (FD)

RE: SUMMIT SPEECH TO THE NATION

Our strongest supporters and most loyal party members are questioning our resolve in light of the President's statements to network anchors last week and in the interview yesterday. It is important to offer strong reassurance that the President has not abandoned his traditional views of the Soviet system. Welcoming new Soviet initiatives is fine; forgiving or overlooking past misdeeds is perilous. I strongly suggest adding some additional passages which seeks to reassure the public on this key point.

Some specific suggestions are written in the attached copy of the text.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 12/10/87 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 12:00 TODAY

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION: SUMMIT

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FITZWATER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	GRISCOM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DUBERSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	HOBBS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HOOLEY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAUER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RANGE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
██████████ POWELL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RISQUE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CRIBB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CRIPPEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CULVAHOUSE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DAWSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	DOLAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DONATELLI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please provide your comments/recommendations directly to Tony Dolan's office with an infor copy to my office by 12:00 TODAY. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

See Comments

(Griscom/Dolan)
December 10, 1987
10:00 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION: SUMMIT
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1987

Good evening. As I am speaking to you now, General Secretary Gorbachev is leaving American airspace on his return trip to the Soviet Union. His departure marks the end of 3 historic days here in Washington -- in which Secretary Gorbachev and I put in place a foundation for better relations between our governments and our peoples.

During these 3 days we took a step -- only a first step, I should point out, but still a critical one -- towards building a more durable peace; indeed, a step that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms race.

I am referring to the arms treaty that we signed Tuesday afternoon in the East Room of the White House. I believe this treaty represents a landmark in post-war history because it is not just an arms control but an arms reduction agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, this agreement does not simply establish ceilings for new weapons; it actually reduces the number of such weapons. In fact, it altogether abolishes intermediate missiles in Europe and elsewhere. And so, for the first time, we are eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons.

The verification measures in this treaty are also something new. On-site inspections and short-notice inspection will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

That is why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of nuclear war but can also speed along a process that may someday remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty -- and all that we have achieved during this summit -- signals ^(The 1950s) a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work towards the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

Yet as important as the I.N.F. treaty is, there is a further and even more crucial point about the last 3 days: Soviet-American relations are no longer based strictly on arms control issues, they rest now on a far broader basis, one that has -- at its root -- realism and candor.

Let me explain this with a saying I have often repeated: Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other. And just as real peace means the presence of freedom and justice, as well as the absence of war, so too, summits must be discussions not just about arms but about the fundamental differences that cause nations to be armed.

Dealing then with the deeper sources of conflict between nations and systems of government is a practical and moral imperative. That is why it was vital to establish a broader Summit agenda, one that dealt not only with arms control but other issues such as bilateral, people-to-people contacts between

our nations and -- most important -- the issues of human rights and regional conflicts.

This is the summit agenda we have adopted. By doing so, we have dealt not just with arms control issues but more fundamental problems such as Soviet expansionism and human rights violations, as well as our own moral opposition to the ideology that justifies ^{> and supports} such practices. In this way, we have put Soviet-American relations on a far more candid, far more realistic, far sounder footing.

It also means that while there is movement -- indeed, dramatic movement -- in the arms reduction area, much remains to be done in these other critical areas I have mentioned, especially -- and "this goes without saying -- in advancing our goal of a world open to the expansion of human freedom and the growth of democratic government.

But while much work lies ahead, I am pleased to report to you the significant progress we have made in these area in addition to arms control.

-- On the matter of regional conflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. Gorbachev on the burning issue of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and occupation of that sovereign nation, an act condemned overwhelmingly by every session of the United Nations General Assembly, is a matter of utmost concern to the United States. I can tell you that the Soviets must set an exact date to begin withdrawing its troops and an exact period of time when this will be completed. This is essential toward...

-- So too on the issue of human rights, we continued the progress made at earlier summits. (insert)

-- And finally with regard to the last item on our agenda -- bilateral issues -- we signed several important agreements that will increase such contacts between our nations. (example)

As I say the progress we made on this broad front reflects a better basis for understanding between ourselves and the Soviets. But it also reflects something deeper as well. You see, since the summit process began in 1985, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants in our discussions. Though it may surprise Mr. Gorbachev to discover that all this time there has been a third party in the room with us, I do firmly believe the principal credit for the patience and persistence that brought success this year belongs to you, the American people.

Your support over these last 7 years has laid the basis for these negotiations, your support made it possible for us to rebuild our military strength; to liberate Grenada, to move against terrorism in Libya, and more recently, to protect our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Your support made possible our policy of providing aid to freedom fighters like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and other places around the globe. And when last year at Reykjavik, I refused Soviet demands that we trade away S.D.I. -- our Strategic Defense Initiative that would erect a space shield against incoming missiles -- your overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal and will back their

President on matters of national security. In short, your support for our foreign policy goals -- the preservation of peace as we advance the cause of world freedom -- have helped bring the Soviets to the bargaining table and made possible the success of this summit.

You know, the question has often been asked whether democratic leaders who are accountable to their people aren't at a grave disadvantage in negotiating with leaders of totalitarian states who bear no such burden. Believe me, I think I can answer that question, I can speak from personal experience. Over the long run, no leader at the bargaining table can enjoy any greater advantage than the knowledge he has behind him a people who are strong and free -- and alert; and resolved to remain that way.

People like you. *Add a thought something like: I would never put the*

And it is this kind of informed and enlightened support, *American people in harm's way*
this hidden strength of democratic government that enabled us to do what we did this week at the Washington summit.

And that's why tonight I am again asking your support. In a very short time, the treaty I signed with Mr. Gorbachev will go to the United States Senate for ratification. And I am asking you tonight to tell your Senators this treaty has your full support.

To this end, let me explain the background. In the mid and late 1970's, the Soviets began to deploy hundreds of new intermediate missiles, most of them mobile, that were targeted on cities and military installations in Europe. This action gravely upset the balance of power in Europe; they represented a totally

new nuclear threat to Europe and Japan for which the democratic nations had no comparable deterrent.

Despite intense pressure from the Soviets, NATO proceeded with what we called a "two-track policy." First, we would deploy our own intermediate missiles as a deterrent but at the same time, push hard in negotiations to do away with this entirely new and unprecedented nuclear escalation. And we proposed to do this with something I first proposed in 1981 -- it was called the zero-option; it meant the complete elimination of intermediate missiles on both sides.

At first, the Soviets called this a mere propaganda ploy and some even here in this country agreed. But we were persistent and eventually the Soviets returned to the bargaining table. The result is our I.N.F. treaty.

As you see from the map on the screen now, the Soviet missiles which will be removed and eliminated under the treaty have been a major threat to the security of our friends and allies on two continents, Europe and Asia. Under the terms of this treaty, we will be eliminating 400 deployed warheads while the Soviet Union eliminates 1,600 or 4 times more.

Now let me also point out that this does not, however, leave NATO without nuclear deterrent. In fact, we still have thousands of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe.

And with regard to verification, as I have mentioned, we have the breakthroughs of on-site inspections and short-notice inspections not only at potential missile sites but at the factories where the missiles and their components are produced.

- 7 -
Because of our strategic modernization program
began early in my first term and the consistent
support of the American people, we were able to
negotiate from a position of strength. We've been

We have a verification procedure that assures each side that the ^{Spring it} missiles of the other side have been destroyed. ^{all along: peace through strength includes the best interests.}

Here then is a treaty that shows how persistence and consistency eventually can pay off in arms negotiations. And let me assure you too that this treaty has been accomplished with unprecedented consultation with our allies. I have spoken personally with the leaders of the major European democracies as has Secretary Shultz and our NATO and diplomatic personnel. This treaty has their full support.

But if persistence is paying off in our arms reductions efforts let me also say that with your continued support we are making progress in the areas of regional conflicts and human rights.

Now I have already mentioned that Mr. Gorbachev and I have discussed the importance of Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Once again, let me only state that progress on this front is vital to the improvement of Soviet-American relations. In addition to Afghanistan, I can also report to you tonight that I spoke with Mr. Gorbachev about Soviet intervention in other critical regions or strategic chokepoints. In Angola, where Soviet aid and 40,000 of Castro's Cuban mercenaries sustain an unpopular and tottering Communist regime; in Cambodia where armed resistance continues to North Vietnam's brutal rule; and, most of all, here in our own hemisphere, in the Central American nation of Nicaragua.

On this point, I must candidly report to you some disappointing news: our efforts to get the Soviets to remove

*Abandon the efforts to speak
prescribed with the Third World. UNTIA
do we must be prepared to resist to
protect ourselves*

their military personnel from Nicaragua were not successful. were our efforts to stop the flow of Soviet arms and military aid -- now totaling over \$1 billion -- to the Communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. At this critical time in Central America, this lack of movement was discouraging to me and to all who support the cause of democracy for all Central Americans.

So tonight, I must tell you of my firm resolve to stand by those brave Nicaraguans fighting for freedom. I will urge Congress in the strongest terms to continue aid to the freedom fighters -- which expires just before Christmas. If Congress will not support this request and join with me in sending a strong signal both to Managua and Moscow, then our country will be making a serious mistake that could extinguish the flame of freedom in Nicaragua -- not just now but for generations to come.

Now in addition to making the progress, that I have already outlined on our 4-part agenda, Mr. Gorbachev and I did do some important planning for the Moscow summit next year. We agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range nuclear weapons now under discussion in the START negotiations. General Secretary Gorbachev and I reaffirmed this week our commitment -- made at Reykjavik -- to achieve deep, 50 percent cuts in our arsenals of those frightening weapons, We agreed that we should build on our most efforts to achieve agreement on a START treaty at the earliest possible date; and we have instructed our delegations in Geneva accordingly.

*most especially in those categories of weapons which are
distribution and transfer
conflict with
our goal of
a safer world*

Now, I believe deep reductions in these offensive weapons -- along with the development of S.D.I. -- would do much to make the world safe from nuclear war. So while I was pleased the Soviets dropped their insistence that we abandon S.D.I. -- however -- I remain concerned over their efforts to limit our vital research in this area. I reiterated the point that providing a strategic defensive shield is too important to restrict the promise it holds for the future.

As reducing nuclear weapons ~~are reduced~~, ^{is the need to negotiate reductions of} ~~it becomes all the more important to~~ ^{just} ~~address other arms control issues including~~ conventional and chemical weapons, weapons in which the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States. ^{important}

I think then from all of this you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework of our foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1981, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the post-war era: the threat of nuclear war and the threat of totalitarianism. That is why by building S.D.I., which is a defense against offensive missiles and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called policy of Mutual Assured Destruction where nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So too, we are saying that the post-war policy of containment is no longer enough, that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom -- that as a people we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the

human dignity that their creator intended, a dignity best assured on this Earth by free and democratic government.

I have heard some say that this is a philosophy of "rollback" of communism. But this is the wrong description because it concedes the idea that direction of history has been towards totalitarianism. Since my first days in office, I have argued that the future belongs not to repressive or totalitarian ways of life but to the cause of freedom -- freedom of the marketplace, freedom to speak, assemble, and vote. And when we see the progress of democracy in these last years -- from Central America to Asia -- we must be optimistic about the future of our children.

When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a threat. I have said since then that this is no threat at all but only a dream, the American dream.

And it is a dream that has meant so much to so many -- a dream that still shines out to the world. You know a few years ago, Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former New York Times reporter and Greek immigrant, Nicholas Gage. It is the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught in one of the terrible struggles of the post-war era: the Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who was tried and executed because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story Nicholas Gage

finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself. Mr. Gage writes it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother, that part of him most like here. As he tells it: "the final cry of my mother....was not a curse on her killers but an invocation of what she died for, a declaration of love." These simple last words of Mr. Gage's mother, of Eleni, were: "My children."

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for all children of the world, a cry for peace, for a world of love and understanding.

And it is the hope of heeding such words -- the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people on a desert journey to a promised land, the call spoken by the Nazarene carpenter standing at the Sea of Galilee -- it is these words that we remember as the holiday season approaches and we reflect on the events of this week here in Washington.

So, let us remember the children, and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom -- the gift that is ours as Americans -- the gift that we seek to share with the entire world -- depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which it came.

So during this holy season, let us also recall that in the prayers of simple people there is more power and might than that of all the great statesmen or armies of the Earth. Let us then thank God for all his blessings to this Nation and ask him for his help and guidance; so that we might continue the work of


peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1987

Research

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY R. DOLAN
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF SPEECHWRITING

FROM: ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR. 
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Address to the Nation: Summit

Counsel's office has reviewed the above-referenced Presidential address and has no legal objection to its presentation by the President. Specifically, we are of the opinion that notwithstanding the theoretical applicability of the Anti-Lobbying Act, the President has the right to appeal directly to the American people for their support of the INF treaty. We do not, of course, express any opinion on the materials yet to be included (e.g. the insert and example at page 4).

We have also marked on the attached copy several editorial suggestions for your consideration. Finally, we note that the references to regional conflicts, human rights and bilateral issues, both before (pages 3-4) and after (pages 7-8) the discussion of the INF treaty, is somewhat confusing.

Attachment

cc: Rhett B. Dawson

(Griscom/Dolan)
December 10, 1987
10:00 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION: SUMMIT
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1987

Good evening. As I am speaking to you now, General Secretary Gorbachev is leaving American airspace on his return trip to the Soviet Union. His departure marks the end of 3 historic days here in Washington -- ^{days} in which Secretary Gorbachev and I put in place a foundation for better relations between our governments and our peoples.

During these 3 days we took a step -- only a first step, I should point out, but still a critical one -- towards building a more durable peace; indeed, a step that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms race.

I am referring to the arms treaty that we signed Tuesday afternoon in the East Room of the White House. I believe this treaty represents a landmark in post-war history because it is not just an arms control but an arms reduction agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, this agreement does not simply establish ceilings for new weapons; it actually reduces the number of such weapons. In fact, it altogether abolishes intermediate missiles in Europe and elsewhere. And so, for the first time, we are eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons.

The verification measures in this treaty are also something new. On-site inspections and short-notice inspection will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

That is why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of nuclear war but ~~can~~^{will} also speed along a process that may someday remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty -- and all that we have achieved during this summit -- signals a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work towards the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

Yet as important as the I.N.F. treaty is, there is a further and even more crucial point about the last 3 days:

Soviet-American relations are no longer based strictly on arms control issues, they rest now on a far broader basis, one that has -- at its root -- realism and candor.

Let me explain this with a saying I have often repeated: Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other. And just as real peace means the presence of freedom and justice, as well as the absence of war, so too, summits must be discussions not just about arms but about the fundamental differences that cause nations to be armed.

Dealing then with the deeper sources of conflict between our nations and systems of government is a practical and moral imperative. That is why it was vital to establish a broader Summit agenda, one that dealt not only with arms control but other issues such as bilateral, people-to-people contacts between

our nations and -- most important -- the issues of human rights and regional conflicts.

^{That was}
~~This is~~ the summit agenda we ~~have~~ adopted. By doing so, we have dealt not just with arms control issues but more fundamental problems such as Soviet expansionism and human rights violations, as well as our own moral opposition to the ideology that justifies such practices. In this way, we have put Soviet-American relations on a far more candid, far more realistic, far sounder footing.

It also means that while there is movement -- indeed, dramatic movement -- in the arms reduction area, much remains to be done in these other critical areas I have mentioned, especially -- and this goes without saying -- in advancing our goal of a world open to the expansion of human freedom and the growth of democratic government.

But while much work lies ahead, I am pleased to report to you ^(that in addition to arms control) ~~the significant progress~~ ^(significant progress) we have made in these areas ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ addition to arms control.

-- On the matter of regional conflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. Gorbachev on the burning issue of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and occupation of that sovereign nation, an act condemned overwhelmingly by every session of the United Nations General Assembly, is a matter of utmost concern to the United States. I can tell you that the Soviets must set an exact date to begin withdrawing its troops and an exact period of time when this will be completed. This is essential toward...

-- So too on the issue of human rights, we continued the progress made at earlier summits. (insert)

-- And finally with regard to the last item on our agenda -- bilateral issues -- we signed several important agreements that will increase such contacts between our nations. (example)

As I say the progress we made on this broad front reflects a better basis for understanding between ourselves and the Soviets. But it also reflects something deeper as well. You see, since the summit process began in 1985, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants in our discussions. Though it may surprise Mr. Gorbachev to discover that all this time there has been a third party in the room with us, I do firmly believe the principal credit for the patience and persistence that brought success this year belongs to you, the American people.

Your support over these last 7 years has laid the basis for these negotiations, your support made it possible for us to rebuild our military strength; to liberate Grenada, to move against terrorism in Libya, and more recently, to protect our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Your support made possible our policy of providing aid to freedom fighters like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and other places around the globe. And when last year at Reykjavik, I refused Soviet demands that we trade away S.D.I. -- our Strategic Defense Initiative that would erect a space shield against incoming missiles -- your overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal and will back their

President on matters of national security. In short, your support for our foreign policy goals -- the preservation of peace as we advance the cause of world freedom -- have helped bring the Soviets to the bargaining table and made possible the success of this summit.

You know, the question has often been asked whether democratic leaders who are accountable to their people aren't at a grave disadvantage in negotiating with leaders of totalitarian states who bear no such burden. Believe me, I think I can answer that question, I can speak from personal experience. Over the long run, no leader at the bargaining table can enjoy any greater advantage than the knowledge^{that} he has behind him a people who are strong and free -- and alert; and resolved to remain that way. People like you.

And it is this kind of informed and enlightened support, this hidden strength of democratic government that enabled us to do what we did this week at the Washington summit.

And that's why tonight I am again asking your support. In a very short time, the treaty I signed with Mr. Gorbachev will go to the United States Senate for ratification. And I am asking you tonight to tell your Senators this treaty has your full support.

of this treaty.

To this end, let me explain the background. In the mid and late 1970's, the Soviets began to deploy hundreds of new intermediate missiles, most of them mobile, that were targeted on cities and military installations in Europe. This action gravely upset the balance of power in Europe; they represented a totally

new nuclear threat to Europe and Japan. ~~for which~~ the democratic nations had no comparable deterrent.

Despite intense pressure from the Soviets, NATO proceeded with what we called a "two-track policy." First, we would deploy our own intermediate missiles as a deterrent but at the same time, push hard in negotiations to do away with this entirely new and unprecedented nuclear escalation. And we proposed to do this with something I first proposed in 1981 -- it was called the zero-option; it meant the complete elimination of intermediate missiles on both sides.

At first, the Soviets called this a mere propaganda ploy and some ~~even~~ here in this country agreed. But we were persistent and eventually the Soviets returned to the bargaining table. The result is our I.N.F. treaty.

As you see from the map on the screen now, the Soviet missiles which will be removed and eliminated under the treaty have been a major threat to the security of our friends and allies on two continents, Europe and Asia. Under the terms of this treaty, we will be eliminating 400 deployed warheads while the Soviet Union eliminates 1,600 or 4 times more.

Now let me also point out that this does not, ~~however,~~ leave NATO without nuclear deterrent. In fact, we still have thousands of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe.

And with regard to verification, as I have mentioned, we have the breakthroughs of on-site inspections and short-notice inspections not only at potential missile sites but at the factories where the missiles and their components are produced.

We have a verification procedure that assures each side that the missiles of the other side have been destroyed.

Here then is a treaty that shows how persistence and consistency eventually can pay off in arms negotiations. And let me assure you too that this treaty has been accomplished with unprecedented consultation with our allies. I have spoken personally with the leaders of the major European democracies as has Secretary Shultz and our NATO and diplomatic personnel. This treaty has their full support.

But if persistence is paying off in our arms reductions efforts let me also say that with your continued support we are making progress in the areas of regional conflicts and human rights.

Now I have already mentioned that Mr. Gorbachev and I have discussed the importance of Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Once again, let me only state that progress on this front is vital to the improvement of Soviet-American relations. In addition to Afghanistan, I can also report to you tonight that I spoke with Mr. Gorbachev about Soviet intervention in other critical regions or strategic chokepoints. In Angola, where Soviet aid and 40,000 of Castro's Cuban mercenaries sustain an unpopular and tottering Communist regime; in Cambodia where armed resistance continues to North Vietnam's brutal rule; and, most of all, here in our own hemisphere, in the Central American nation of Nicaragua.

On this point, I must candidly report to you some disappointing news: our efforts to get the Soviets to remove

their military personnel from Nicaragua were not successful. Nor were our efforts to stop the flow of Soviet arms and military aid -- now totaling over \$1 billion -- to the Communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. At this critical time in Central America, this lack of movement was discouraging to me and to all who support the cause of democracy for all Central Americans.

So tonight, I must tell you of my firm resolve to stand by those brave Nicaraguans fighting for freedom. I will urge Congress in the strongest terms to continue aid to the freedom fighters -- which expires just before Christmas. If Congress will not support this request and join with me in sending a strong signal both to Managua and Moscow, then our country will be making a serious mistake that could extinguish the flame of freedom in Nicaragua -- not just now but for generations to come.

Now in addition to making the progress, that I have already outlined on our 4-part agenda, Mr. Gorbachev and I did do some important planning for the Moscow summit next year. We agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range nuclear weapons now under discussion in the START negotiations. General Secretary Gorbachev and I reaffirmed this week our commitment -- made at Reykjavik -- to achieve deep, 50 percent cuts in our arsenals of those frightening weapons. We agreed that we should build on our efforts to achieve agreement on a START treaty at the earliest possible date; and we have instructed our delegations in Geneva accordingly.

Now, I believe deep reductions in these offensive weapons -- along with the development of S.D.I. -- would do much to make the world safe from nuclear war. So while I was pleased the Soviets dropped their insistence that we abandon S.D.I., ~~however~~ I remain concerned over their efforts to limit our vital research in this area. I reiterated the point that providing a strategic defensive shield is too important to restrict the promise it holds for the future.

About the future, Mr. Gorbachev and I also agreed that as nuclear weapons are reduced; it becomes all the more important to address other arms control issues including conventional and chemical weapons, weapons in which the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States.

I think then from all of this you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework of our foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1981, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the post-war era: the threat of nuclear war and the threat of totalitarianism. That is why by building S.D.I., which is a defense against offensive missiles and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called policy of Mutual Assured Destruction where nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So too, we are saying that the post-war policy of containment is no longer enough, that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom -- that as a people we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the

human dignity that their creator intended, a dignity best assured on this Earth by free and democratic government.

I have heard some say that this is a philosophy of "rollback" of communism. But this is the wrong description because it concedes the idea that direction of history has been towards totalitarianism. Since my first days in office, I have argued that the future belongs not to repressive or totalitarian ways of life but to the cause of freedom -- freedom of the marketplace, freedom to speak, assemble, and vote. And when we see the progress of democracy in these last years -- from Central America to Asia -- we must be optimistic about the future of our children.

When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a threat. I have said since then that this is no threat at all but only a dream, the American dream.

And it is a dream that has meant so much to so many -- a dream that still shines out to the world. You know a few years ago, Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former New York Times reporter and Greek immigrant, Nicholas Gage. It is the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught in one of the terrible struggles of the post-war era: the Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who was tried and executed because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story Nicholas Gage

finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself. Mr. Gage writes it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother, that part of him most like here. As he tells it: "the final cry of my mother....was not a curse on her killers but an invocation of what she died for, a declaration of love." These simple last words of Mr. Gage's mother, of Eleni, were: "My children."

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for all children of the world, a cry for peace, for a world of love and understanding.

And it is the hope of heeding such words -- the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people on a desert journey to a promised land, the call spoken by the Nazarene carpenter standing at the Sea of Galilee -- it is these words that we remember as the holiday season approaches and we reflect on the events of this week here in Washington.

So, let us remember the children, and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom -- the gift that is ours as Americans -- the gift that we seek to share with the entire world -- depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which it came.

So during this holy season, let us also recall that in the prayers of simple people there is more power and might than that of all the great statesmen or armies of the Earth. Let us then thank God for all his blessings to this Nation and ask him for his help and guidance; so that we might continue the work of

peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.

(Griscom/Dolan)
December 10, 1987
10:00 a.m. *[Signature]*

[Handwritten mark]
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION: SUMMIT
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1987

Good evening. As I am speaking to you now, General Secretary Gorbachev is leaving American airspace on his return trip to the Soviet Union. His departure marks the end of 3 historic days here in Washington -- in which Secretary Gorbachev and I put in place a foundation for better relations between our governments and our peoples.

During these 3 days we took a step -- only a first step, I should point out, but still a critical one -- towards building a more durable peace; indeed, a step that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms race.

I am referring to the arms treaty that we signed Tuesday afternoon in the East Room of the White House. I believe this treaty represents a landmark in post-war history because it is not just an arms control but an arms reduction agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, this agreement does not simply establish ceilings for new weapons; it actually reduces the number of such weapons. In fact, it altogether abolishes intermediate missiles in Europe and elsewhere. And so, for the first time, we are eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons.

The verification measures in this treaty are also something new. On-site inspections and short-notice inspection will be permitted within ^[both countries] the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

That is why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of nuclear war but can also speed along a process that may someday remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty -- and all that we have achieved during this summit -- signals a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work towards the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

Yet as important as the I.N.F. treaty is, there is a further and even more crucial point about the last 3 days: Soviet-American relations are no longer based strictly on arms control issues, they rest now on a far broader basis, one that has -- at its root -- realism and candor.

Let me explain this with a saying I have often repeated: Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other. And just as real peace means the presence of freedom and justice, as well as the absence of war, so too, summits must be discussions not just about arms but about the fundamental differences that cause nations to be armed.

Dealing then with the deeper sources of conflict between nations and systems of government is a practical and moral imperative. That is why it was vital to establish a broader Summit agenda, one that dealt not only with arms control but other issues such as bilateral, people-to-people contacts between

Barbara

our nations and -- most important -- the issues of human rights and regional conflicts.

This is the summit agenda we have adopted. By doing so, we have dealt not just with arms control issues but more fundamental problems such as Soviet expansionism and human rights violations, as well as our own moral opposition to the ideology that justifies such practices. In this way, we have put Soviet-American relations on a far more candid, far more realistic, far sounder footing.

It also means that while there is movement -- indeed, dramatic movement -- in the arms reduction area, much remains to be done in these other critical areas I have mentioned, especially -- and this goes without saying -- in advancing our goal of a world open to the expansion of human freedom and the growth of democratic government.

But while much work lies ahead, I am pleased to report to you the significant progress we have made in these area in addition to arms control no questions

Conrad

Dennis Halpin
647-2184
State

United Nations
212/963-1234
General Assembly
General Assembly Affairs

Cardozo
963-5049
Kuznetsov
963-5073
Shimmera
1685
1686
1687
1688
1689
1690
1691
1692
1693
1694
1695
1696
1697
1698
1699
1700

-- On the matter of regional conflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. Gorbachev on the burning issue of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and occupation of that sovereign nation, an act whose reversal has been called for overwhelmingly by every session of the United Nations General Assembly, is a matter of utmost concern to the United States. I can tell you that the Soviets must set an exact date to begin withdrawing its troops and an exact period of time when this will be completed. This is essential toward...

179 (special session)
180 (General Assembly)

received vote 123 to 19, 12 abstain (11/10/87)

calling for immediate withdrawal
increasing majority
never mentions Soviet Union

Paul ... 2224
... 3110 4 -

-- So too on the issue of human rights, we continued the progress made at earlier summits. (insert)

-- And finally with regard to the last item on our agenda -- bilateral issues -- we signed several important agreements that will increase such contacts between our nations. (example)

As I say the progress we made on this broad front reflects a better basis for understanding between ourselves and the Soviets. But it also reflects something deeper as well. You see, since the summit process began in 1985, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants in our discussions. Though it may surprise Mr. Gorbachev to discover that all this time there has been a third party in the room with us, I do firmly believe the principal credit for the patience and persistence that brought success this year belongs to you, the American people.

RR +
Gorbachev
First meeting
in Geneva
Nov. 1985

Your support over these last 7 years has laid the basis for these negotiations, your support made it possible for us to rebuild our military strength; to liberate Grenada, to move against terrorism in Libya, and more recently, to protect our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Your support made possible our policy of providing aid to freedom fighters like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and other places around the globe. And when last year at Reykjavik, I refused Soviet demands that we trade away S.D.I. -- our Strategic Defense Initiative that would erect a space shield against ^{ballistic} ~~incoming~~ missiles -- your overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal and will back their

overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal and will back their

CB S / New York Times
for release
10/15/86

~~President on matters of national security.~~ In short, your support for our foreign policy goals -- the preservation of peace as we advance the cause of world freedom -- have helped bring the Soviets to the bargaining table and made possible the success of this summit.

You know, the question has often been asked whether democratic leaders who are accountable to their people aren't at a grave disadvantage in negotiating with leaders of totalitarian states who bear no such burden. Believe me, I think I can answer that question, I can speak from personal experience. Over the long run, no leader at the bargaining table can enjoy any greater advantage than the knowledge he has behind him a people who are strong and free -- and alert; and resolved to remain that way. People like you.

And it is this kind of informed and enlightened support, this hidden strength of democratic government that enabled us to do what we did this week at the Washington summit.

And that's why tonight I am again asking your support. In a very short time, the treaty I signed with Mr. Gorbachev will go to the United States Senate for ratification. And I am asking you tonight to tell your Senators this treaty has your full support.

Carol
po To this end, let me explain the background. In the mid and late 1970's, the Soviets began to deploy hundreds of new intermediate missiles, most of them mobile, that were targeted on cities and military installations in Europe. This action gravely upset the balance of power in Europe; they represented a totally

new nuclear threat to Europe and Japan for which the democratic nations had no comparable deterrent.

Despite intense pressure from the Soviets, NATO proceeded with what we called a "two-track policy." First, we would deploy our own intermediate missiles as a deterrent but at the same time, push hard in negotiations to do away with this entirely new and unprecedented nuclear escalation. And we proposed to do this with something I first proposed in 1981 -- it was called the zero-option; it meant the complete elimination of intermediate missiles on both sides.

At first, the Soviets called this a mere propaganda ploy and some even here in this country agreed. But we were persistent and eventually the Soviets returned to the bargaining table. The result is our I.N.F. treaty.

As you see from the map on the screen now, the Soviet missiles which will be removed and eliminated under the treaty have been a major threat to the security of our friends and allies on two continents, Europe and Asia. Under the terms of this treaty, we will be eliminating 400 deployed warheads while the Soviet Union eliminates 1,600 or 4 times more.

Now let me also point out that this does not, however, leave NATO without nuclear deterrent. In fact, we still have thousands of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe.

And with regard to verification, as I have mentioned, we have the breakthroughs of on-site inspections and short-notice inspections not only at potential missile sites but at the factories where the missiles and their components are produced.

We have a verification procedure that assures each side that the missiles of the other side have been destroyed.

Here then is a treaty that shows how persistence and consistency eventually can pay off in arms negotiations. And let me assure you too that this treaty has been accomplished with unprecedented consultation with our allies. I have spoken personally with the leaders of the major European democracies as has Secretary Shultz and our NATO and diplomatic personnel. This treaty has their full support.

But if persistence is paying off in our arms reductions efforts let me also say that with your continued support we are making progress in the areas of regional conflicts and human rights.

Now I have already mentioned that Mr. Gorbachev and I have discussed the importance of Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Once again, let me only state that progress on this front is vital to the improvement of Soviet-American relations. In addition to Afghanistan, I can also report to you tonight that I spoke with Mr. Gorbachev about Soviet intervention in other critical regions or strategic chokepoints. In Angola, where Soviet aid and 40,000 of Castro's Cuban mercenaries sustain an unpopular and tottering Communist regime; in Cambodia where armed resistance continues to North Vietnam's brutal rule; and, most of all, here in our own hemisphere, in the Central American nation of Nicaragua.

On this point, I must candidly report to you some disappointing news: our efforts to get the Soviets to remove

their military personnel from Nicaragua were not successful. Nor were our efforts to stop the flow of Soviet arms and military aid -- now totaling over \$1 billion -- to the Communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. At this critical time in Central America, this lack of movement was discouraging to me and to all who support the cause of democracy for all Central Americans.

So tonight, I must tell you of my firm resolve to stand by those brave Nicaraguans fighting for freedom. I will urge Congress in the strongest terms to continue aid to the freedom fighters -- which expires just before Christmas. If Congress will not support this request and join with me in sending a strong signal both to Managua and Moscow, then our country will be making a serious mistake that could extinguish the flame of freedom in Nicaragua -- not just now but for generations to come.

Now in addition to making the progress, that I have already outlined on our 4-part agenda, Mr. Gorbachev and I did do some important planning for the Moscow summit next year. We agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range nuclear weapons now under discussion in the START negotiations. General Secretary Gorbachev and I reaffirmed this week our commitment -- made at Reykjavik -- to achieve deep, 50 percent cuts in our arsenals of those frightening weapons. We agreed that we should build on our efforts to achieve agreement on a START treaty at the earliest possible date; and we have instructed our delegations in Geneva accordingly.

Now, I believe deep reductions in these offensive weapons -- along with the development of S.D.I. -- would do much to make the world safe from nuclear war. So while I was pleased the Soviets dropped their insistence that we abandon S.D.I. -- however -- I remain concerned over their efforts to limit our vital research in this area. I reiterated the point that providing a strategic defensive shield is too important to restrict the promise it holds for the future.

Do not
About the future, Mr. Gorbachev and I also agreed that as nuclear weapons are reduced; it becomes all the more important to address other arms control issues including conventional and chemical weapons, weapons in which the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States.

I think then from all of this you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework of our foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1981, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the post-war era: the threat of nuclear war and the threat of totalitarianism. That is why by building S.D.I., which is a defense against offensive missiles and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called policy of Mutual Assured Destruction where nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So too, we are saying that the post-war policy of containment is no longer enough, that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom -- that as a people we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the

human dignity that their creator intended, a dignity best assured on this Earth by free and democratic government.

I have heard some say that this is a philosophy of "rollback" of communism. But this is the wrong description because it concedes the idea that direction of history has been towards totalitarianism. Since my first days in office, I have argued that the future belongs not to repressive or totalitarian ways of life but to the cause of freedom -- freedom of the marketplace, freedom to speak, assemble, and vote. And when we see the progress of democracy in these last years -- from Central America to Asia -- we must be optimistic about the future of our children.

When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a threat. I have said since then that this is no threat at all but only a dream, the American dream.

And it is a dream that has meant so much to so many -- a dream that still shines out to the world. You know a few years ago, Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former New York Times reporter and Greek immigrant, Nicholas Gage. It is the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught in one of the terrible struggles of the post-war era: the Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who was tried and executed because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story Nicholas Gage

finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself. Mr. Gage writes it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother, that part of him most like here. As he tells it: "the final cry of my mother....was not a curse on her killers but an invocation of what she died for, a declaration of love." These simple last words of Mr. Gage's mother, of Eleni, were: "My children."

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for all children of the world, a cry for peace, for a world of love and understanding.

And it is the hope of heeding such words -- the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people on a desert journey to a promised land, the call spoken by the Nazarene carpenter standing at the Sea of Galilee -- it is these words that we remember as the holiday season approaches and we reflect on the events of this week here in Washington.

So, let us remember the children, and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom -- the gift that is ours as Americans -- the gift that we seek to share with the entire world -- depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which it came.

So during this holy season, let us also recall that in the prayers of simple people there is more power and might than that of all the great statesmen or armies of the Earth. Let us then thank God for all his blessings to this Nation and ask him for his help and guidance; so that we might continue the work of

peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.

(Griscom/Dolan)
December 10, 1987
10:00 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION: SUMMIT
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1987

Good evening. As I am speaking to you now, General Secretary Gorbachev is leaving American airspace on his return trip to the Soviet Union. His departure marks the end of 3 historic days here in Washington -- in which Secretary Gorbachev and I put in place a foundation for better relations between our governments and our peoples.

During these 3 days we took a step -- only a first step, I should point out, but still a critical one -- towards building a more durable peace; indeed, a step that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms race.

I am referring to the arms treaty that we signed Tuesday afternoon in the East Room of the White House. I believe this treaty represents a landmark in post-war history because it is not just an arms control but an arms reduction agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, this agreement does not simply establish ceilings for new weapons; it actually reduces the number of such weapons. In fact, it altogether abolishes intermediate missiles in Europe and elsewhere. And so, for the first time, we are eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons.

The verification measures in this treaty are also something new. On-site inspections and short-notice inspection will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

That is why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of nuclear war but can also speed along a process that may someday remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty -- and all that we have achieved during this summit -- signals a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work towards the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

Yet as important as the I.N.F. treaty is, there is a further and even more crucial point about the last 3 days:

Soviet-American relations are no longer based strictly on arms control issues, they rest now on a far broader basis, one that has -- at its root -- realism and candor.

Let me explain this with a saying I have often repeated: Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other. And just as real peace means the presence of freedom and justice, as well as the absence of war, so too, summits must be discussions not just about arms but about the fundamental differences that cause nations to be armed.

Dealing then with the deeper sources of conflict between nations and systems of government is a practical and moral imperative. That is why it was vital to establish a broader Summit agenda, one that dealt not only with arms control but other issues such as bilateral, people-to-people contacts between

our nations and -- most important -- the issues of human rights and regional conflicts.

This is the summit agenda we have adopted. By doing so, we have dealt not just with arms control issues but more fundamental problems such as Soviet expansionism and human rights violations, as well as our own moral opposition to the ideology that justifies such practices. In this way, we have put Soviet-American relations on a far more candid, far more realistic, far sounder footing.

It also means that while there is movement -- indeed, dramatic movement -- in the arms reduction area, much remains to be done in these other critical areas I have mentioned, especially -- and this goes without saying -- in advancing our goal of a world open to the expansion of human freedom and the growth of democratic government.

But while much work lies ahead, I am pleased to report to you the significant progress we have made in these area in addition to arms control.

-- On the matter of regional conflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. Gorbachev on the burning issue of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and occupation of that sovereign nation, an act condemned overwhelmingly by every session of the United Nations General Assembly, is a matter of utmost concern to the United States. I can tell you that the Soviets must set an exact date to begin withdrawing its troops and an exact period of time when this will be completed. This is essential toward...

-- So too on the issue of human rights, we continued the progress made at earlier summits. (insert) *See comment on staffing memo*

-- And finally with regard to the last item on our agenda -- bilateral issues -- we signed several important agreements that will increase such contacts between our nations. (example)

As I say the progress we made on this broad front reflects a better basis for understanding between ourselves and the Soviets. But it also reflects something deeper as well. You see, since the summit process began in 1985, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants in our discussions. Though it may surprise Mr. Gorbachev to discover that all this time there has been a third party in the room with us, I do firmly believe the principal credit for the patience and persistence that brought success this year belongs to you, the American people.

Your support over these last 7 years has laid the basis for these negotiations, your support made it possible for us to rebuild our military strength; to liberate Grenada, to move against terrorism in Libya, and more recently, to protect our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Your support made possible our policy of providing aid to freedom fighters like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and other places around the globe. And when last year at Reykjavik, I refused Soviet demands that we trade away S.D.I. -- our Strategic Defense Initiative that would erect a space shield against incoming missiles -- your overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal and will back their

Peace through strength is not a cliché, it is reality - strength that protects freedom also brings peace.

President on matters of national security. In short, your support for our foreign policy goals -- the preservation of peace as we advance the cause of world freedom -- have helped bring the Soviets to the bargaining table and made possible the success of this summit.

You know, the question has often been asked whether democratic leaders who are accountable to their people aren't at a grave disadvantage in negotiating with leaders of totalitarian states who bear no such burden. Believe me, I think I can answer that question, I can speak from personal experience. Over the long run, no leader at the bargaining table can enjoy any greater advantage than the knowledge he has behind him a people who are strong and free -- and alert; and resolved to remain that way. People like you.

And it is this kind of informed and enlightened support, this hidden strength of democratic government that enabled us to do what we did this week at the Washington summit.

And that's why tonight I am again asking your support. In a very short time, the treaty I signed with Mr. Gorbachev will go to the United States Senate for ratification. And I am asking you tonight to tell your Senators this treaty has your full support.

To this end, let me explain the background. In the mid and late 1970's, the Soviets began to deploy hundreds of new intermediate missiles, most of them mobile, that were targeted on cities and military installations in Europe. This action gravely upset the balance of power in Europe; they represented a totally

new nuclear threat to Europe and Japan for which the democratic nations had no comparable deterrent.

Despite intense pressure from the Soviets, NATO proceeded with what we called a "two-track policy." First, we would deploy our own intermediate missiles as a deterrent but at the same time, push hard in negotiations to do away with this entirely new and unprecedented nuclear escalation. And we proposed to do this with something I first proposed in 1981 -- it was called the zero-option; it meant the complete elimination of intermediate missiles on both sides.

At first, the Soviets called this a mere propaganda ploy and some even here in this country agreed. But we were persistent and eventually the Soviets returned to the bargaining table. The result is our I.N.F. treaty.

As you see from the map on the screen now, the Soviet missiles which will be removed and eliminated under the treaty have been a major threat to the security of our friends and allies on two continents, Europe and Asia. Under the terms of this treaty, we will be eliminating 400 deployed warheads while the Soviet Union eliminates 1,600 or 4 times more.

Now let me also point out that this does not, however, leave NATO without nuclear deterrent. In fact, we still have thousands of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe.

And with regard to verification, as I have mentioned, we have the breakthroughs of on-site inspections and short-notice inspections not only at potential missile sites but at the factories where the missiles and their components are produced.

We have a verification procedure that assures each side that the missiles of the other side have been destroyed.

Here then is a treaty that shows how persistence and consistency eventually can pay off in arms negotiations. And let me assure you too that this treaty has been accomplished with unprecedented consultation with our allies. I have spoken personally with the leaders of the major European democracies as has Secretary Shultz and our NATO and diplomatic personnel. This treaty has their full support.

But if persistence is paying off in our arms reductions efforts let me also say that with your continued support we are making progress in the areas of regional conflicts and human rights.

Now I have already mentioned that Mr. Gorbachev and I have discussed the importance of Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Once again, let me only state that progress on this front is vital to the improvement of Soviet-American relations. In addition to Afghanistan, I can also report to you tonight that I spoke with Mr. Gorbachev about Soviet intervention in other critical regions or strategic chokepoints. In Angola, where Soviet aid and 40,000 of Castro's Cuban mercenaries sustain an unpopular and tottering Communist regime; in Cambodia where armed resistance continues to North Vietnam's brutal rule; and, most of all, here in our own hemisphere, in the Central American nation of Nicaragua.

On this point, I must candidly report to you some disappointing news: our efforts to get the Soviets to remove

their military personnel from Nicaragua were not successful. Nor were our efforts to stop the flow of Soviet arms and military aid -- now totaling over \$1 billion -- to the Communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. At this critical time in Central America, this lack of movement was discouraging to me and to all who support the cause of democracy for all Central Americans.

So tonight, I must tell you of my firm resolve to stand by those brave Nicaraguans fighting for freedom. I will urge Congress in the strongest terms to continue aid to the freedom fighters -- which expires just before Christmas. If Congress will not support this request and join with me in sending a strong signal both to Managua and Moscow, then our country will be making a serious mistake that could extinguish the flame of freedom in Nicaragua -- not just now but for generations to come.

Now in addition to making the progress, that I have already outlined on our 4-part agenda, Mr. Gorbachev and I did do some important planning for the Moscow summit next year. We agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range nuclear weapons now under discussion in the START negotiations. General Secretary Gorbachev and I reaffirmed this week our commitment -- made at Reykjavik -- to achieve deep, 50 percent cuts in our arsenals of those frightening weapons. We agreed that we should build on our efforts to achieve agreement on a START treaty at the earliest possible date; and we have instructed our delegations in Geneva accordingly.

Now, I believe deep reductions in these offensive weapons -- along with the development of S.D.I. -- would do much to make the world safe from nuclear war. So while I was pleased the Soviets dropped their insistence that we abandon S.D.I. -- however -- I remain concerned over their efforts to limit our vital research in this area. I reiterated the point that providing a strategic defensive shield is too important to restrict the promise it holds for the future. ~~I will~~ *This I will never do.*

About the future, Mr. Gorbachev and I also agreed that as nuclear weapons are reduced; it becomes all the more important to address other arms control issues including conventional and chemical weapons, weapons in which the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States.

I think then from all of this you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework of our foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1981, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the post-war era: the threat of nuclear war and the threat of totalitarianism. That is why by building S.D.I., which is a defense against offensive missiles and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called policy of Mutual Assured Destruction where nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So too, we are saying that the post-war policy of containment is no longer enough, that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom -- that as a people we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the

human dignity that their creator intended, a dignity best assured on this Earth by free and democratic government.

I have heard some say that this is a philosophy of "rollback" of communism. But this is the wrong description because it concedes the idea that direction of history has been towards totalitarianism. Since my first days in office, I have argued that the future belongs not to repressive or totalitarian ways of life but to the cause of freedom -- freedom of the marketplace, freedom to speak, assemble, and vote. And when we see the progress of democracy in these last years -- from Central America to Asia -- we must be optimistic about the future of our children.

When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a threat. I have said since then that this is no threat at all but only a dream, the American dream.

And it is a dream that has meant so much to so many -- a dream that still shines out to the world. You know a few years ago, Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former New York Times reporter and Greek immigrant, Nicholas Gage. It is the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught in one of the terrible struggles of the post-war era: the Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who was tried and executed because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story Nicholas Gage

finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself. Mr. Gage writes it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother, that part of him most like here. As he tells it: "the final cry of my mother....was not a curse on her killers but an invocation of what she died for, a declaration of love." These simple last words of Mr. Gage's mother, of Eleni, were: "My children."

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for all children of the world, a cry for peace, for a world of love and understanding.

And it is the hope of heeding such words -- the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people on a desert journey to a promised land, the call spoken by the Nazarene carpenter standing at the Sea of Galilee -- it is these words that we remember as the holiday season approaches and we reflect on the events of this week here in Washington.

So, let us remember the children, and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom -- the gift that is ours as Americans -- the gift that we seek to share with the entire world -- depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which it came.

So during this holy season, let us also recall that in the prayers of simple people there is more power and might than that of all the great statesmen or armies of the Earth. Let us then thank God for all his blessings to this Nation and ask him for his help and guidance; so that we might continue the work of

peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.

'Eleni' on Screen: Greece Goes Hollywood

By JULIE SALAMON

Most children have felt gratitude to their parents for the gift of life—and guilt, too, in those moments when that gift feels like a burden. Nicholas Gage experienced the mixing of these emotions more violently than most of us. His mother paid for his life with her own.

Mr. Gage, formerly a reporter with the New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, told the chilling story of his mother's sacrifice in a best-selling book called "Eleni," which now has been made into a movie with the same title.

There is much to recommend in this picture, which has at its core the immediately arresting notion of a mother who actually did what all mothers say they would do. Eleni Gatzoyiannis died for her children. This acute demonstration of mother love took place against the dramatic backdrop of rocky, rural Greece during the scraggly civil war that erupted there after the end of World War II. The story unfolds as the tale of a son who thinks he wants to avenge his mother's death, but who really wants to learn how to move on. And Kate Nelligan, the Canadian actress who plays Eleni, gives a stunning performance.

Powerful as it is, the movie version also feels like a cheat. Almost none of its characters seem human. Nearly all the people in Mr. Gage's past—shown through flashbacks—are set up as larger-than-life icons representing good or evil. On the other hand, Mr. Gage, as played by John Malkovich, seems like a cipher or a ghost. We get only hints of what his obsession with his mother has done to his relationship to his own children.

The film preserves Eleni the way she must have seemed to Mr. Gage when he last saw her, when he was nine years old. He saw her the only way he possibly could have under the circumstances—as a super-human mother who thought of nothing besides her children. The adolescent stereotypes are preserved throughout, although they are not acknowledged as such. So, while Eleni is a saint, the Communist judge who ordered her torture is the devil. Portraits drawn this starkly get the point across, but with more didacticism than artistry.

Steve Tesich, whose screen-writing credits include "Breaking Away," "Four Friends" and "American Flyer," wrote a

script that did little to demystify Eleni. All of Mr. Tesich's work, with the exception of "Breaking Away," runs to sentimental speechiness, and this picture isn't the second exception. Eleni's talk is oratorical; every sentence a variation on one theme: "I will not give up my children." Much of the language given her is so stilted it sounds as though it is being translated directly from Greek.

Mr. Malkovich is a fine actor but I didn't for a minute believe him as a Greek expatriate so stirred by passion he would



be willing to kill someone—even the man who ordered his mother's death. Balding, his eyes slightly crossed, his soft voice barely perceptible, he seems haunted but not possessed. When he points a gun in the worn, unshaven face of the old man who is all that's left of his mother's tormentor, we already know it's an empty gesture. It doesn't help that the child actor who plays Nikolai—Mr. Gage as a boy—doesn't remotely resemble the adult he's supposed to become.

Even if Mr. Malkovich were more convincing, the film makers tip us off early on that vengeance won't be his. When Mr. Gage first arrives in Greece as the New York Times's Athens bureau chief, he tracks down the man who led Eleni and the Communists' other prisoners to their ex-

cution site. "You're too late," the old man sneers. "We're all dead."

Director Peter Yates, whose films have been as diverse as "John and Mary," "The Deep" and "The Dresser," does a convincing job of conveying the fear that hung over the remote mountain town of Lia during the Communist occupation. In one moving scene, the Communist boss gathers the women and children left in town into the local church and urges the mothers to send their hungry children to Eastern-bloc countries. Linda Hunt, an astonishing actress who could bring dignity to a recitation of the Yellow Pages, pushes her way through the crowd of women in black leggings and baggy woolen dresses as though to volunteer her children.

Instead, she glares at her oppressor as though he were mad. "No mother will give up her children," she says calmly. "There are no volunteers here."

Communists haven't been depicted as such unredeemable curs in a mainstream movie since the '50s. Oliver Cotton, who plays Katis, the evil judge, looks like a Works Progress Administration representation of square-shouldered, black-eyed evil. Even a Communist whom Eleni had hidden back when the monarchists were ruling treats her cruelly when he rides back into town with his troops. We have no clue as to what motivated these Greeks to turn so cruelly against their own compatriots. As Mr. Gage was able to reconstruct it, Eleni's only crime was to have a husband who immigrated to the U.S. and sent her packages. "The Americana," she was called.

Ms. Nelligan holds this complex web together by investing this saint with the humanity that isn't written in her part. She looks haggard. Her mouth droops. When she scurries around hiding bread in her apron—or maiming her daughter so she won't have to go fight with the Communists—there's something glinting in her eyes that's the kind of terror and madness that gives rise to courage. She makes us see the desperation in her push for her children's survival, and the joy in her hope that at least something of her will survive the madness around her.

When you leave the theater, the thing that lingers isn't the movie's shortcomings but the stark image of a doomed mother holding her arms in the air and shouting defiantly: "My children."

10/31/85 WST P. 50

the exchange of young students between their countries which will begin in 1982.

The two governments agreed to begin regular meetings to discuss cultural and information matters with the desire to improve cultural programs and in order to examine means of strengthening relations in these fields. The first cultural and informa-

tion talks will be held in Washington in October.

The two sides concluded their talks by welcoming recent decisions to strengthen mutual consultations as an expression of the special and close relationship which Italy and the United States enjoy.

~~Address to Members of the British Parliament~~

My Lord Chancellor, Mr. Speaker:

The journey of which this visit forms a part is a long one. Already it has taken me to two great cities of the West, Rome and Paris, and to the economic summit at Versailles. And there, once again, our sister democracies have proved that even in a time of severe economic strain, free peoples can work together freely and voluntarily to address problems as serious as inflation, unemployment, trade, and economic development in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity.

Other milestones lie ahead. Later this week, in Germany, we and our NATO allies will discuss measures for our joint defense and America's latest initiatives for a more peaceful, secure world through arms reductions.

Each stop of this trip is important, but among them all, this moment occupies a special place in my heart and in the hearts of my countrymen—a moment of kinship and homecoming in these hallowed halls.

Speaking for all Americans, I want to say how very much at home we feel in your house. Every American would, because this is, as we have been so eloquently told, one of democracy's shrines. Here the rights of free people and the processes of representation have been debated and refined.

It has been said that an institution is the lengthening shadow of a man. This institution is the lengthening shadow of all the men and women who have sat here and all those who have voted to send representatives here.

This is my second visit to Great Britain as President of the United States. My first op-

portunity to stand on British soil occurred almost a year and a half ago when your Prime Minister graciously hosted a diplomatic dinner at the British Embassy in Washington. Mrs. Thatcher said then that she hoped I was not distressed to find staring down at me from the grand staircase a portrait of His Royal Majesty King George III. She suggested it was best to let bygones be bygones, and in view of our two countries' remarkable friendship in succeeding years, she added that most Englishmen today would agree with Thomas Jefferson that "a little rebellion now and then is a very good thing." [Laughter]

Well, from here I will go to Bonn and then Berlin, where there stands a grim symbol of power untamed. The Berlin Wall, that dreadful gray gash across the city, is in its third decade. It is the fitting signature of the regime that built it.

And a few hundred kilometers behind the Berlin Wall, there is another symbol. In the center of Warsaw, there is a sign that notes the distances to two capitals. In one direction it points toward Moscow. In the other it points toward Brussels, headquarters of Western Europe's tangible unity. The marker says that the distances from Warsaw to Moscow and Warsaw to Brussels are equal. The sign makes this point: Poland is not East or West. Poland is at the center of European civilization. It has contributed mightily to that civilization. It is doing so today by being magnificently unreconciled to oppression.

Poland's struggle to be Poland and to secure the basic rights we often take for

granted demonstrates why we dare not take those rights for granted. Gladstone, defending the Reform Bill of 1866, declared, "You cannot fight against the future. Time is on our side." It was easier to believe in the march of democracy in Gladstone's day—in that high noon of Victorian optimism.

We're approaching the end of a bloody century plagued by a terrible political invention—totalitarianism. Optimism comes less easily today, not because democracy is less vigorous, but because democracy's enemies have refined their instruments of repression. Yet optimism is in order, because day by day democracy is proving itself to be a not-at-all-fragile flower. From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than 30 years to establish their legitimacy. But none—not one regime—has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted by bayonets do not take root.

The strength of the Solidarity movement in Poland demonstrates the truth told in an underground joke in the Soviet Union. It is that the Soviet Union would remain a one-party nation even if an opposition party were permitted, because everyone would join the opposition party. [Laughter]

America's time as a player on the stage of world history has been brief. I think understanding this fact has always made you patient with your younger cousins—well, not always patient. I do recall that on one occasion, Sir Winston Churchill said in exasperation about one of our most distinguished diplomats: "He is the only case I know of a bull who carries his china shop with him." [Laughter]

But witty as Sir Winston was, he also had that special attribute of great statesmen—the gift of vision, the willingness to see the future based on the experience of the past. It is this sense of history, this understanding of the past that I want to talk with you about today, for it is in remembering what we share of the past that our two nations can make common cause for the future.

We have not inherited an easy world. If developments like the Industrial Revolution, which began here in England, and the gifts of science and technology have made life much easier for us, they have also made it more dangerous. ~~There is a threat~~

~~to our freedom, indeed to our very existence, that other generations could never even have imagined.~~

~~There is first the threat of global war. No President, no Congress, no Prime Minister, no Parliament can spend a day entirely free of this threat. And I don't have to tell you that in today's world the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it. That's why negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces now underway in Europe and the START talks—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks—which will begin later this month, are not just critical to American or Western policy; they are critical to mankind. Our commitment to early success in these negotiations is firm and unshakable, and our purpose is clear: reducing the risk of war by reducing the means of waging war on both sides.~~

At the same time there is a threat posed to human freedom by the enormous power of the modern state. History teaches the dangers of government that overreaches—political control taking precedence over free economic growth, secret police, mindless bureaucracy, all combining to stifle individual excellence and personal freedom.

Now, I'm aware that among us here and throughout Europe there is legitimate disagreement over the extent to which the public sector should play a role in a nation's economy and life. But on one point all of us are united—our abhorrence of dictatorship in all its forms, but most particularly totalitarianism and the terrible inhumanities it has caused in our time—the great purge, Auschwitz and Dachau, the Gulag, and Cambodia.

Historians looking back at our time will note the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions of the West. They will note that it was the democracies who refused to use the threat of their nuclear monopoly in the forties and early fifties for territorial or imperial gain. Had that nuclear monopoly been in the hands of the Communist world, the map of Europe—indeed, the world—would look very different today. And certainly they will note it was not the democracies that invaded Afghanistan or su-

pressed Polish Solidarity or used chemical and toxin warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.

If history teaches anything it teaches self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is folly. We see around us today the marks of our terrible dilemma—predictions of doomsday, antinuclear demonstrations, an arms race in which the West must, for its own protection, be an unwilling participant. At the same time we see totalitarian forces in the world who seek subversion and conflict around the globe to further their barbarous assault on the human spirit. What, then, is our course? Must civilization perish in a hail of fiery atoms? Must freedom wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil?

Sir Winston Churchill refused to accept the inevitability of war or even that it was imminent. He said, "I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today while time remains is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries."

Well, this is precisely our mission today: to preserve freedom as well as peace. It may not be easy to see; but I believe we live now at a turning point.

In an ironic sense Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis, a crisis where the demands of the economic order are conflicting directly with those of the political order. But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, but in the home of Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It is the Soviet Union that runs against the tide of history by denying human freedom and human dignity to its citizens. It also is in deep economic difficulty. The rate of growth in the national product has been steadily declining since the fifties and is less than half of what it was then.

The dimensions of this failure are astounding: A country which employs one-fifth of its population in agriculture is unable to feed its own people. Were it not for the private sector, the tiny private sector tolerated in Soviet agriculture, the

country might be on the brink of famine. These private plots occupy a bare 3 percent of the arable land but account for nearly one-quarter of Soviet farm output and nearly one-third of meat products and vegetables. Overcentralized, with little or no incentives, year after year the Soviet system pours its best resource into the making of instruments of destruction. The constant shrinkage of economic growth combined with the growth of military production is putting a heavy strain on the Soviet people. What we see here is a political structure that no longer corresponds to its economic base, a society where productive forces are hampered by political ones.

The decay of the Soviet experiment should come as no surprise to us. Wherever the comparisons have been made between free and closed societies—West Germany and East Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, Malaysia and Vietnam—it is the democratic countries that are prosperous and responsive to the needs of their people. And one of the simple but overwhelming facts of our time is this: Of all the millions of refugees we've seen in the modern world, their flight is always away from, not toward the Communist world. Today on the NATO line, our military forces face east to prevent a possible invasion. On the other side of the line, the Soviet forces also face east to prevent their people from leaving.

The hard evidence of totalitarian rule has caused in mankind an uprising of the intellect and will. Whether it is the growth of the new schools of economics in America or England or the appearance of the so-called new philosophers in France, there is one unifying thread running through the intellectual work of these groups—rejection of the arbitrary power of the state, the refusal to subordinate the rights of the individual to the superstate, the realization that collectivism stifles all the best human impulses.

Since the exodus from Egypt, historians have written of those who sacrificed and struggled for freedom—the stand at Thermopylae, the revolt of Spartacus, the storming of the Bastille, the Warsaw uprising in World War II. More recently we've seen evidence of this same human impulse in one of the developing nations in Central

America. For months and months the world news media covered the fighting in El Salvador. Day after day we were treated to stories and film slanted toward the brave freedom-fighters battling oppressive government forces in behalf of the silent, suffering people of that tortured country.

And then one day those silent, suffering people were offered a chance to vote, to choose the kind of government they wanted. Suddenly the freedom-fighters in the hills were exposed for what they really are—Cuban-backed guerrillas who want power for themselves, and their backers, not democracy for the people. They threatened death to any who voted, and destroyed hundreds of buses and trucks to keep the people from getting to the polling places. But on election day, the people of El Salvador, an unprecedented 1.4 million of them, braved ambush and gunfire, and trudged for miles to vote for freedom.

They stood for hours in the hot sun waiting for their turn to vote. Members of our Congress who went there as observers told me of a woman who was wounded by rifle fire on the way to the polls, who refused to leave the line to have her wound treated until after she had voted. A grandmother, who had been told by the guerrillas she would be killed when she returned from the polls, and she told the guerrillas, "You can kill me, you can kill my family, kill my neighbors, but you can't kill us all." The real freedom-fighters of El Salvador turned out to be the people of that country—the young, the old, the in-between.

Strange, but in my own country there's been little if any news coverage of that war since the election. Now, perhaps they'll say it's—well, because there are newer struggles now.

On distant islands in the South Atlantic young men are fighting for Britain. And, yes, voices have been raised protesting their sacrifice for lumps of rock and earth so far away. But those young men aren't fighting for mere real estate. They fight for a cause—for the belief that armed aggression must not be allowed to succeed, and the people must participate in the decisions of government—[*applause*]*—the decisions of government under the rule of law. If there had been firmer support for that principle*

some 45 years ago, perhaps our generation wouldn't have suffered the bloodletting of World War II.

In the Middle East now the guns sound once more, this time in Lebanon, a country that for too long has had to endure the tragedy of civil war, terrorism, and foreign intervention and occupation. The fighting in Lebanon on the part of all parties must stop, and Israel should bring its forces home. But this is not enough. We must all work to stamp out the scourge of terrorism that in the Middle East makes war an ever-present threat.

But beyond the troublespots lies a deeper, more positive pattern. Around the world today, the democratic revolution is gathering new strength. In India a critical test has been passed with the peaceful change of governing political parties. In Africa, Nigeria is moving into remarkable and unmistakable ways to build and strengthen its democratic institutions. In the Caribbean and Central America, 16 of 24 countries have freely elected governments. And in the United Nations, 8 of the 10 developing nations which have joined that body in the past 5 years are democracies.

In the Communist world as well, man's instinctive desire for freedom and self-determination surfaces again and again. To be sure, there are grim reminders of how brutally the police state attempts to snuff out this quest for self-rule—1953 in East Germany, 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, 1981 in Poland. But the struggle continues in Poland. And we know that there are even those who strive and suffer for freedom within the confines of the Soviet Union itself. How we conduct ourselves here in the Western democracies will determine whether this trend continues.

No, democracy is not a fragile flower. Still it needs cultivating. If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy.

Some argue that we should encourage democratic change in right-wing dictatorships, but not in Communist regimes. Well, to accept this preposterous notion—as some

well-meaning people have—is to invite the argument that once countries achieve a nuclear capability, they should be allowed an undisturbed reign of terror over their own citizens. We reject this course.

As for the Soviet view, Chairman Brezhnev repeatedly has stressed that the competition of ideas and systems must continue and that this is entirely consistent with relaxation of tensions and peace.

Well, we ask only that these systems begin by living up to their own constitutions, abiding by their own laws, and complying with the international obligations they have undertaken. We ask only for a process, a direction, a basic code of decency, not for an instant transformation.

We cannot ignore the fact that even without our encouragement there has been and will continue to be repeated explosions against repression and dictatorships. The Soviet Union itself is not immune to this reality. Any system is inherently unstable that has no peaceful means to legitimize its leaders. In such cases, the very repressiveness of the state ultimately drives people to resist it, if necessary, by force.

While we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, we must not hesitate to declare our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move toward them. We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings. So states the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, among other things, guarantees free elections.

The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.

This is not cultural imperialism, it is providing the means for genuine self-determination and protection for diversity. Democracy already flourishes in countries with very different cultures and historical experiences. It would be cultural condescension, or worse, to say that any people prefer dictatorship to democracy. Who would voluntarily choose not to have the right to vote,

decide to purchase government propaganda handouts instead of independent newspapers, prefer government to worker-controlled unions, opt for land to be owned by the state instead of those who till it, want government repression of religious liberty, a single political party instead of a free choice, a rigid cultural orthodoxy instead of democratic tolerance and diversity?

Since 1917 the Soviet Union has given covert political training and assistance to Marxist-Leninists in many countries. Of course, it also has promoted the use of violence and subversion by these same forces. Over the past several decades, West European and other Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and leaders have offered open assistance to fraternal, political, and social institutions to bring about peaceful and democratic progress. Appropriately, for a vigorous new democracy, the Federal Republic of Germany's political foundations have become a major force in this effort.

We in America now intend to take additional steps, as many of our allies have already done, toward realizing this same goal. The chairmen and other leaders of the national Republican and Democratic Party organizations are initiating a study with the bipartisan American political foundation to determine how the United States can best contribute as a nation to the global campaign for democracy now gathering force. They will have the cooperation of congressional leaders of both parties, along with representatives of business, labor, and other major institutions in our society. I look forward to receiving their recommendations and to working with these institutions and the Congress in the common task of strengthening democracy throughout the world.

It is time that we committed ourselves as a nation—in both the public and private sectors—to assisting democratic development.

We plan to consult with leaders of other nations as well. There is a proposal before the Council of Europe to invite parliamentarians from democratic countries to a meeting next year in Strasbourg. That prestigious gathering could consider ways to help democratic political movements.

This November in Washington there will

take place an international meeting on free elections. And next spring there will be a conference of world authorities on constitutionalism and self-government hosted by the Chief Justice of the United States. Authorities from a number of developing and developed countries—judges, philosophers, and politicians with practical experience—have agreed to explore how to turn principle into practice and further the rule of law.

At the same time, we invite the Soviet Union to consider with us how the competition of ideas and values—which it is committed to support—can be conducted on a peaceful and reciprocal basis. For example, I am prepared to offer President Brezhnev an opportunity to speak to the American people on our television if he will allow me the same opportunity with the Soviet people. We also suggest that panels of our newsmen periodically appear on each other's television to discuss major events.

Now, I don't wish to sound overly optimistic, yet the Soviet Union is not immune from the reality of what is going on in the world. It has happened in the past—a small ruling elite either mistakenly attempts to ease domestic unrest through greater repression and foreign adventure, or it chooses a wiser course. It begins to allow its people a voice in their own destiny. Even if this latter process is not realized soon, I believe the renewed strength of the democratic movement, complemented by a global campaign for freedom, will strengthen the prospects for arms control and a world at peace.

I have discussed on other occasions, including my address on May 9th, the elements of Western policies toward the Soviet Union to safeguard our interests and protect the peace. What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long term—the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people. And that's why we must continue our efforts to strengthen NATO even as we move forward with our Zero-Option initiative in the negotiations on intermediate-range forces and our proposal for a one-third reduction

in strategic ballistic missile warheads.

Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope it will never be used, for the ultimate determinant in the struggle that's now going on in the world will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve, the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish, the ideals to which we are dedicated.

The British people know that, given strong leadership, time and a little bit of hope, the forces of good ultimately rally and triumph over evil. Here among you is the cradle of self-government, the Mother of Parliaments. Here is the enduring greatness of the British contribution to mankind, the great civilized ideas: individual liberty, representative government, and the rule of law under God.

I've often wondered about the shyness of some of us in the West about standing for these ideals that have done so much to ease the plight of man and the hardships of our imperfect world. This reluctance to use those vast resources at our command reminds me of the elderly lady whose home was bombed in the Blitz. As the rescuers moved about, they found a bottle of brandy she'd stored behind the staircase, which was all that was left standing. And since she was barely conscious, one of the workers pulled the cork to give her a taste of it. She came around immediately and said, "Here now—there now, put it back. That's for emergencies." [Laughter]

Well, the emergency is upon us. Let us be shy no longer. Let us go to our strength. Let us offer hope. Let us tell the world that a new age is not only possible but probable.

During the dark days of the Second World War, when this island was incandescent with courage, Winston Churchill exclaimed about Britain's adversaries, "What kind of a people do they think we are?" Well, Britain's adversaries found out what extraordinary people the British are. But all the democracies paid a terrible price for allowing the dictators to underestimate us. We dare not make that mistake again. So, let us ask ourselves, "What kind of people do we think we are?" And let us answer, "Free people, worthy of freedom and deter-

mined not only to remain so but to help others gain their freedom as well."

Sir Winston led his people to great victory in war and then lost an election just as the fruits of victory were about to be enjoyed. But he left office honorably, and, as it turned out, temporarily, knowing that the liberty of his people was more important than the fate of any single leader. History recalls his greatness in ways no dictator will ever know. And he left us a message of hope for the future, as timely now as when he first uttered it, as opposition leader in the Commons nearly 27 years ago, when he said, "When we look back on all the perils through which we have passed and at the mighty foes that we have laid low and all the dark and deadly designs that we have frustrated, why should we fear for our future? We have," he said, "come safely through the worst."

Well, the task I've set forth will long out-

live our own generation. But together, we too have come through the worst. Let us now begin a major effort to secure the best—a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation. For the sake of peace and justice, let us move toward a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny.

Thank you.

Note: The President spoke at 12:14 p.m. in the Royal Gallery at the Palace of Westminster in London.

On the previous evening, the President was greeted by Queen Elizabeth II in an arrival ceremony at Windsor Castle, near Windsor, England. Later, the Queen hosted a private dinner for the President.

On the morning of June 8, the President and the Queen spent part of the morning horseback riding on the Windsor Castle grounds.

Toasts of the President and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at a Luncheon Honoring the President in London June 8, 1982

The Prime Minister. We are here today to welcome and to honor our great ally, the United States of America. Mr. President, Mrs. Reagan, it's a privilege and a pleasure to have you both here with us. It's rare enough to have an American President as a guest at Number 10, but my researchers have been unable to find out when we last had the honor of the First Lady at Number 10 as well.

President and Mrs. Reagan, your presence gives me and, indeed, many of our guests a chance to repay as best we can the hospitality you bestowed on us when we were your first official guests from abroad at the beginning of your Presidential term of office. I realize, of course, that you've both become accustomed recently to taking your meals in rather grander places—*[laughter]*—the Palace of Versailles and Windsor Castle. As you can see, this is a very simple house, one which has witnessed

the shaping of our shared history since it first became the abode of Prime Ministers in 1732.

Mr. President, some of us were present this morning to hear your magnificent speech to members of both Houses of Parliament in the historic setting of the Royal Gallery. It was, if I may say so, respectfully, a triumph. We are so grateful to you for putting freedom on the offensive, which is where it should be. You wrote a new chapter in our history—no longer on the defensive but on the offensive. It was, if I might say so, an exceedingly hard act to follow. *[Laughter]* But I will try to be brief.

Much has been said and written over the years, Mr. President, about the relations between our two countries. And there's no need for me to add to the generalities on the subject today, because we've had before our eyes in recent weeks the most concrete expression of what, in practice, our friend-

INF

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES CHRONOLOGY

1977 - 1987

1977

Early 1977

Soviet Union begins deployment of the SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missile in the European U.S.S.R.

The SS-20 is a modern, mobile ballistic missile with three independently targetable warheads and a range covering all of Western Europe from bases well inside the U.S.S.R.

October 28, 1977

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt brings the Soviet SS-20 threat to the forefront of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) attention in a speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He warns that strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. means "magnification of the significance of the disparities between East and West as regards tactical and conventional weapons," and cites deployment of the SS-20 as increasing such disparity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Late 1977

NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) directs that a High Level Group (HLG) be established to study Alliance long-term INF modernization needs, consistent with its doctrine of flexible response.

There are two categories of INF missiles: longer-range (LRINF) and shorter-range (SRINF).

1979

Spring 1979

A NATO Special Group on Arms Control and Related Matters (SG) is established to formulate guiding principles for future arms control efforts involving INF. (The SG was renamed the Special Consultative Group, or SCG, following the NATO decision of December 1979.)

Summer 1979

The work of NATO's High Level Group and Special Group converge in the Integrated Decision Document, which sets forth the basic aims of Alliance INF policy as "deterrence and stability based upon a triad of forces, the coupling between these forces, and the important political principle of the strategic unity of the Alliance." The Document calls for complementary supporting programs of force modernization and arms control.

October 6, 1979

Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev proposes a freeze on Soviet SS-20 deployments if NATO deploys no counterpart systems because "a balance now exists."

One hundred thirty SS-20s, with 390 warheads, are now deployed.

No U.S. INF missiles are deployed.

December 12, 1979

NATO unanimously adopts a "dual track" strategy to counter Soviet deployments of SS-20 missiles.

One track calls for arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R. to restore the balance in INF at the lowest possible level.

In the absence of an arms control agreement, NATO's second track is to modernize its INF with the deployment in Western Europe of 464 single-warhead U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and 108 single-warhead U.S. Pershing II ballistic missiles, beginning in December 1983.

1980

Early 1980

The U.S. offers—but the Soviets refuse—to negotiate on INF.

July 1980

During Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow, the Soviets announce agreement in principle to participate in INF negotiations with the U.S.

October 1980

The Soviet Union claims "a balance now exists" in INF missiles.

Approximately 200 Soviet SS-20s, with 600 warheads, are now deployed.

No U.S. INF missiles are deployed.

October-November 1980

No agreement is reached in preliminary discussions on what the focus should be in INF talks between U.S. and Soviet negotiators.

1981

January 1981

The Reagan Administration takes office, and begins a review of U.S. arms control policy.

Spring 1981

At a meeting of NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC), foreign ministers reaffirm the 1979 "dual track" decision, and allied consultations proceed in preparation for negotiations later in the year.

November 18, 1981

In a major policy address calling for a framework of negotiations on reductions in all types of arms, President Reagan proposes the "zero option," agreeing to the cancellation of planned U.S. INF missile deployments, if the Soviet Union agrees to eliminate all its SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles.

November 31, 1981

Formal negotiations on INF begin in Geneva. The U.S. seeks global elimination of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles and collateral constraints on SRINF missiles.

December 11, 1981

The U.S. formally presents the "zero option" proposal to the Soviets in Geneva.

December 1981

The Soviets propose an agreement that would establish an eventual ceiling of 300 "medium-range" missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe for each side, and that would include

British and French independent nuclear forces in the U.S. count.

1982

March 1982

The Soviets announce a "moratorium" on their SS-20 deployments in the European U.S.S.R. Soviet deployments, however, continue as missile sites under construction in the European U.S.S.R. are finished and activated, and new sites are begun in the Asian U.S.S.R. from which missiles can reach NATO targets.

June 1982

U.S. and Soviet negotiators develop an informal package of elements to be included in a possible INF agreement.

This so-called "Walk in the Woods" proposal would:

1. Set equal levels of INF missile launchers in Europe.
2. Preclude deployment of U.S. Pershing IIs.
3. Freeze Soviet SS-20 deployments in the Asian part of the U.S.S.R.

Moscow subsequently rejects the package.

August 1982

Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov states: "Approximate parity of forces...continues to exist today."

Over 300 Soviet SS-20s, with more than 900 warheads, are now deployed.

No U.S. INF missiles are deployed.

December 1982

The U.S.S.R. publicly proposes an INF missile sub-ceiling in Europe, tied explicitly to the level of British and French missiles and designed to preclude U.S. INF missile deployment in Europe.

The Soviet demand to include the independent nuclear deterrent forces of the United Kingdom and France would grant the U.S.S.R. a legally sanctioned "right" to have nuclear force equal to those of all other nuclear powers combined. This is tantamount to a Soviet demand for global military superiority and political hegemony.

The U.S.S.R. also mounts a propaganda campaign centered on an alleged "moratorium" on its SS-20 deployments in the European region of the Soviet Union. The Soviet proposal would permit unlimited SS-20 deployments in the Asian U.S.S.R.

1983

January 31, 1983

Vice President George Bush, in Berlin, reads an "open letter to Europe from President Reagan proposing to Soviet leader Yuri Andropov that they meet and sign an agreement banning U.S. and Soviet land-based INF missiles from the face of the earth.

February 1983

The U.S. reiterates criteria, set forth in November 1981 after consultation with and approval by the allies, for reaching agreement with the Soviets in INF negotiations:

1. Equality of rights and limits between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
2. Exclusion of independent third country, i.e. British and French, nuclear deterrent forces from any agreement.
3. Agreed-upon limits must be applied on a global basis: no s

of Soviet longer-range INF missiles from the European U.S.S.R. to the Asian U.S.S.R.

4. No weakening of NATO's conventional deterrent forces.
5. Effective verification measures.

March 29, 1983

The U.S. formally presents an interim agreement proposal at the INF talks in Geneva.

March 30, 1983

President Reagan announces publicly that the U.S. and the allies are prepared to accept an interim agreement on INF missiles that would establish equal global levels of U.S. and Soviet warheads on INF missile launchers at the lowest possible number, with zero still the ultimate goal.

April 1983

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko terms the U.S. "interim solution" unacceptable. He reiterates the Soviet position that there must be no U.S. deployments, and that Soviet deployments be tied to the number of British and French strategic systems.

May 3, 1983

General Secretary Andropov indicates willingness to count INF warheads as well as missiles at INF talks. He reiterates that the number of Soviet SS-20s in the European U.S.S.R. would be keyed to a Soviet count of British and French strategic systems. He refuses to address Soviet deployments in the Asian U.S.S.R., where Soviet missiles withdrawn from the European U.S.S.R. could be moved, threatening U.S. friends and allies in Asia and Europe. Mobile SS-20s in the Asian U.S.S.R. would also have the potential for a quick return to the European U.S.S.R.

May 19, 1983

The U.S. tables a draft treaty embodying the interim agreement proposal of March 29.

August 1983

General Secretary Andropov proposes to reduce INF missiles and launchers to the Soviet count of British and French levels, provided the U.S. cancels deployment of its Pershing II and cruise missiles.

September 22, 1983

At the Geneva negotiations, the U.S. offers three new elements to its proposed interim agreement:

1. The U.S. would entertain the idea of not offsetting all Soviet global INF deployments by U.S. deployments in Europe. The U.S. would keep the right, however, to deploy elsewhere to reach an equal global ceiling.
2. The U.S. is prepared to apportion its reductions of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in an appropriate manner.
3. The U.S. is prepared to consider proposals involving land-based aircraft.

September 26, 1983

President Reagan reiterates the three new elements of his proposed interim agreement in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly.

October 1983

General Secretary Andropov proposes a modified version of his December 1982 proposal, by announcing that the "U.S.S.R. is willing to reduce the number of its SS-20s in the European U.S.S.R. to 140, with 420 warheads, to match the Soviet count of British and French warheads."

General Secretary Andropov offers to freeze the number of Soviet SS-20s deployed in the Asian U.S.S.R., once an INF agreement limiting European-based systems is implemented—as long as the U.S. deploys no similar weapons in that region. Andropov also announces "additional flexibility" on the issue of counting intermediate-range nuclear aircraft, although details are not provided.

Andropov announces that the start of deployment of U.S. INF missiles "will make it impossible to continue the INF talks."

The Soviet Defense Ministry states that the U.S.S.R. is preparing to deploy "operational-tactical" missiles in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia as part of "planned countermeasures" to U.S. deployments.

The U.S. states that the Andropov proposal contains shortcomings because it still insists that the U.S.S.R. be compensated for British and French strategic forces through its INF deployments and that there be no U.S. deployments.

The Soviet proposal to freeze INF deployments in the Asian U.S.S.R. appears to recognize the U.S. view that INF missiles must be treated on a global basis. The U.S. seeks details of the Soviet proposal on aircraft.

The U.S. notes that the Soviet threat to end negotiations if the U.S. deploys missiles in Europe is unjustified because the U.S. has negotiated for two years while Soviet SS-20 levels rose dramatically.

October 27, 1983

At Montebello, Canada, the U.S. and the allies agree to maintain NATO's nuclear capability at the lowest level consistent with security and deterrence. This would include withdrawing 1,400 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe over a period of several years. This is in addition to the 1,000 warheads withdrawn following NATO's December 1979 "dual track" decision.

November 15, 1983

While reaffirming its preference for the "zero option," the U.S. proposes that both sides agree to an equal global ceiling of 420 warheads on INF missiles.

November 23, 1983

Deliveries of the first U.S. ground-launched cruise missile components begin in Great Britain and West Germany. This begins implementation of INF deployment in accordance with the second track of NATO's 1979 decision.

The Soviet delegation walks out of the INF negotiations.

The U.S. offers to resume the talks whenever the Soviets are willing to return.

November 31, 1983

Three hundred sixty Soviet SS-20s, with 1,080 warheads, are now deployed.

November 1983 - January 1985

Formal INF negotiations remain suspended in the absence of the Soviet delegation.

1984

November 24, 1984

President Reagan announces on Thanksgiving Day that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have agreed to enter into new negotiations, known as the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), concerning nuclear offensive arms and defense and space issues.

1985

January 7-8, 1985

Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko meet in Geneva to set an agenda for new comprehensive arms control negotiations, covering strategic nuclear arms (START), INF, and Defense and Space.

March 12, 1985

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. begin the NST Talks in Geneva. The U.S. seeks the elimination or reduction of INF to the lowest possible number, with equal global limits.

March-April 1985

At the beginning of the new INF talks, the U.S. reaffirms its approach and its draft treaties of 1982 on the global elimination of INF missiles, and of 1983 for an interim agreement on equal INF limits at the lowest possible number.

In the new NST talks, the U.S.S.R. maintains its 1983 position, opposing U.S. INF deployment, and insisting on linkage of Soviet SS-20s with British and French strategic forces.

The Soviet delegation tables a proposal for a bilateral moratorium on INF deployments and a proposal for subsequent "reductions" that would result in zero U.S. INF missiles, but allow Soviet INF missiles at levels equivalent to British and French strategic forces.

General Secretary Gorbachev also announces a unilateral Soviet moratorium on INF missile deployments in the U.S.S.R. Soviet deployments nonetheless continue at sites already under construction.

May-July 1985

The U.S. continues its effort to engage the Soviet Union substantively and constructively, indicating flexibility on any outcome that achieves equal U.S.-Soviet global INF limits.

The U.S.S.R. continues to demand a halt to, and withdrawal of, U.S. INF deployments, and insists that INF limits on Soviet forces take into account British and French strategic forces.

October 3, 1985

During a visit to Paris, General Secretary Gorbachev announces elements of a counterproposal to the U.S. proposals of March 1985 in the NST. He calls for a freeze in U.S. and Soviet INF missile deployments, followed by the "deepest possible" reductions, and he announces that Soviet SS-4's are being phased out and some SS-20's are being removed from combat status.

October 31, 1985

President Reagan announces that the U.S. is presenting a new arms control proposal at the Geneva talks. This proposal includes INF and builds on "positive elements" of the Soviet counterproposal of October 3, 1985, e.g., the possibility of a separate INF agreement independent of strategic or defense and space issues.

November 1, 1985

The U.S. response to the Soviet counterproposal contains the following points on INF:

1. While preferring the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF, the U.S. proposes—as an interim step—limiting U.S. INF missile launcher deployments in Europe to 140 Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles. (Each GLCM launcher has four missiles.) This is the number to be deployed by December 31, 1985. This proposal also calls for reductions in the Soviet force of SS-20 missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to 140. (Each SS-20 missile has three warheads.)
2. Within that launcher limit, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could have an agreed equal number of between 420 and 450 warheads in Europe.
3. To achieve equal global U.S. and Soviet INF warhead limits, the Soviets must reduce SS-20 launchers in Asia (that are outside the range of NATO Europe) by the same proportion as the reduction of launchers within the range of NATO Europe.
4. Appropriate constraints on shorter-range INF (SRINF) should be agreed, so that the Soviets cannot circumvent an agreement on longer-range INF (LRINF) with a buildup of their SRINF.

November 21, 1985

At the Geneva Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agree to focus on several issues in arms control, including the "idea of an interim INF agreement."

1986

January 15, 1986

General Secretary Gorbachev sends a letter to President Reagan containing an arms control proposal which, in the context of completely eliminating nuclear weapons over a 15-year period, includes the call to eliminate U.S. and Soviet LRINF in Europe over the next 5-to-8 years.

The Gorbachev letter proposes that British and French nuclear forces not be counted against U.S. LRINF in Europe, but that they be frozen at present levels, and that U.S. transfers of nuclear systems to third parties be barred. The Soviet proposal to dismantle its SS-20s deployed in Europe does not address Soviet LRINF missiles stationed east of the Ural Mountains nor constraints on Soviet SRINF.

February 24, 1986

President Reagan issues a statement making it known that certain aspects of the Soviet January 1986 arms control

proposal are not appropriate at this time. One area in which he hopes "immediate progress" will be made is in the INF negotiations. The President notes that the U.S. already has on the table in Geneva a concrete plan calling for the elimination of U.S. Pershing IIs and GLCMs, as well as Soviet SS-20 missiles, not only in Europe but also in Asia.

March 2, 1986

U.S. Arms Control Adviser Paul Nitze publicly criticizes and rejects Soviet proposals to include limits on British and French independent nuclear forces in a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. He reiterates the main elements of the U.S. proposal for equal global limits on LRINF and collateral constraints on SRINF.

September 30, 1986

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. announce that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will meet at Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12.

October 11-12, 1986

At Reykjavik, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agree to equal global ceilings of 100 LRINF missile warheads for each side, with none in Europe.

The Soviets also offer to freeze their SRINF missile systems, pending negotiation of reductions, but they would require U.S. SRINF missile systems to be "frozen" at the current level of zero. They also agree in principle to some key verification elements. However, the Soviets link an INF agreement to U.S. acceptance of constraints on its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). These constraints go beyond those of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

October 23, 1986

The U.S. tables a proposal reflecting the areas of agreement reached at Reykjavik.

November 7, 1986

The U.S.S.R. presents a new INF proposal which backtracks from the 1985 Geneva Summit commitment to conclude a separate interim agreement on INF. It also refuses to accept the Reykjavik understandings on INF as separate from those on strategic arms control issues. The Soviets also maintain linkage between an INF agreement and constraints on SDI.

November 15-16, 1986

President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain agree at Camp David that priority should be given, with effective verification, to an INF agreement with constraints on SRINF.

1987

January 15, 1987

The U.S. proposes at the INF talks in Geneva:

1. Phased reduction of LRINF warheads to a global ceiling of 100 LRINF warheads for each side by the end of 1991, with remaining Soviet LRINF warheads permitted in Soviet Asia, and U.S. LRINF warheads permitted in U.S. territory, including Alaska.
2. Reduction of U.S. and Soviet LRINF warheads in Europe to zero by the end of 1991.
3. Agreement on INF reductions not contingent on the resolution of other issues outside of the INF negotiations, as agreed at the November 1985 Geneva Summit.

4. Global constraints limiting U.S. and Soviet SRINF within the range band of the Soviet SS-23 to SS-12 (Scaleboard) missiles to the current Soviet global level.

5. Ban on development and deployment of SRINF missiles in the range between the U.S. Pershing II (the shortest-range LRINF missile) and the Soviet Scaleboard (the longest-range SRINF missile).

6. Subsequent negotiations on additional SRINF constraints or reductions would begin within six months after an initial INF agreement is reached.

7. Exchange of data before and after reductions take place.

8. On-site observation of elimination of weapons and an effective monitoring arrangement for facilities, including on-site inspection, following elimination of weapons.

9. Negotiations on the details of verification to take place in parallel with negotiations on reduction of weapons.

February 28, 1987

General Secretary Gorbachev announces Soviet willingness to sign a separate agreement to eliminate Soviet and U.S. INF missiles in Europe within five years, dropping once again Soviet insistence that these missiles be considered part of a comprehensive arms control package.

These Soviet terms appear nearly identical to those agreed to at Reykjavik. Each side would be permitted to keep only 100 warheads outside of Europe—the Soviet Union in Soviet Asia and the United States within its territory.

March 3, 1987

President Reagan says that Gorbachev's February 28th statement indicating Soviet willingness to conclude an agreement on INF missile reductions separately from agreements in the two other areas of NST negotiations "removes a serious obstacle to progress toward INF reductions."

He adds that: "To seize this new opportunity, I have instructed our negotiators to begin the presentation of our draft INF treaty text in Geneva tomorrow. I hope that the Soviet Union will then proceed with us to serious discussion of the details which are essential to translate areas of agreement in principle into a concrete agreement. And I want to stress that of the important issues which remain to be resolved, none is more important than verification. Because we are committed to genuine and lasting arms reductions and to ensuring full compliance, we will continue to insist that any agreement must be effectively verifiable."

March 4, 1987

The United States presents its draft U.S.-Soviet INF treaty, which provides for the reduction of LRINF missile warheads on each side to 100 globally, with zero in Europe, as agreed to by U.S. and Soviet leaders at Reykjavik. The U.S. makes clear, however, that global elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles remains its preference.

March 12, 1987

At the INF negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. presents a treaty article providing for a comprehensive approach to verification of an INF agreement. The basic elements of the U.S. approach to verification are:

1. Provision for the use of and non-interference with National Technical Means (NTM), a requirement for the broadcast of engineering measurements on missile flights, a ban on encryption and a ban on concealment measures that impede verification.

2. Specification of areas and facilities where treaty-limited systems must be located and prohibition against having them elsewhere.
3. Reciprocal exchange of a specified comprehensive set of data on related treaty-limited systems and their support facilities and equipment.
4. Reciprocal updating of this data.
5. Specialized procedures for destruction, dismantlement and conversion of LRINF systems, including on-site inspection.
6. On-site inspection and monitoring initially when the treaty goes into effect, and subsequently to ensure compliance with the treaty limitations.

March 26, 1987

The extended session of the U.S.-Soviet NST negotiations concludes. The U.S. objects to a Soviet proposal to separate the negotiations on SRINF from an initial INF agreement, saying it is a step backward from agreements reached in principle during the U.S.-Soviet INF negotiations of 1981-1983 and reaffirmed at Reykjavik. The Soviet proposal would allow the U.S.S.R. a virtual monopoly of these systems and leave the Soviets free to increase their existing SRINF missile force, thereby circumventing any agreement on LRINF.

April 15, 1987

Secretary of State George Shultz concludes three days of meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow.

Shultz says that, with hard negotiations, the prospect of reaching an agreement on INF is close at hand: "The basic structure of that agreement would be, first, the Reykjavik formula of 100 LRINF warheads on each side to be deployed on the Soviet side in Asia and on the U.S. side in the United States."

The two sides agree that the INF missile reductions should be accomplished in approximately four-to-five years and that an agreement "must contain provisions for very strict and intrusive verification."

On SRINF missiles, Shultz says the two sides agree that there should be global limits, and that the U.S. believes any constraints must be set up on "the principle of equality."

Shultz notes that the Soviets say they intend, upon signing an INF agreement, to withdraw and destroy the SRINF they now have stationed in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, and that, in negotiations over remaining missiles, the U.S.S.R. will propose that SRINF be reduced to zero within one year.

April 23, 1987

President Reagan calls on the Soviet Union to speed progress in the INF negotiations by responding to U.S. verification proposals. The President says that Soviet agreement to eliminate INF systems altogether would facilitate verification of compliance with the proposed pact.

The two sides currently agree to reduce land-based LRINF systems to 100 warheads on each side with none in Europe. Reagan says "a zero LRINF outcome—the elimination of this entire class of missiles—" remains the preferred solution for the United States and its allies.

April 27, 1987

The Soviet Union presents a draft INF treaty, which reflects basic agreements on land-based LRINF missiles reached at Reykjavik.

The Soviet proposal would reduce each side's LRINF in Europe to zero by the end of five years, and would limit Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Soviet Asia to 100 warheads deployed beyond a striking distance of the United States. It also would limit U.S. LRINF missile warheads in U.S. territory to 100 missile warheads deployed beyond a striking distance of the Soviet Union, thus precluding deployments in Alaska.

June 12, 1987

In a communique issued following a meeting in Reykjavik of NATO's North Atlantic Council, the foreign ministers express support for global and effectively verifiable elimination of all U.S. and Soviet land-based SRINF missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 km as an integral part of an INF agreement.

The communique calls on the Soviet Union to drop its demand to retain a portion of its SS-20 capability and reiterates the wish to see all U.S. and Soviet longer-range, land-based INF missiles eliminated in accordance with NATO's long-standing objective.

The ministers say an INF agreement would be an important element in a coherent and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament which, while consistent with NATO's doctrine of flexible response, would include:

1. A 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union, to be achieved during current Geneva negotiations.
2. The global elimination of chemical weapons.
3. The establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces by eliminating disparities in the whole of Europe.
4. In conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of U.S. and Soviet land-based, short-range nuclear missile systems, leading to equal ceilings.

June 16, 1987

The United States formally presents its position on SRINF missile systems at the INF talks in Geneva. The position calls for the global elimination of all U.S. and Soviet SRINF missile systems.

July 23, 1987

Secretary General Gorbachev announces a change in the Soviet position on INF. The Soviets essentially accept the "double global zero" proposal, indicating:

1. Readiness, as part of an agreement with the U.S., to eliminate all "medium-range missiles" in Soviet Asia, including the 100 LRINF warheads on such missiles, provided the U.S. also gives up all such missiles and warheads.
2. Readiness to eliminate "operational and tactical missiles" (SRINF), if the U.S. does the same.

July 28, 1987

In response to the Soviet announcement that the U.S.S.R. is willing to accept the global zero proposal for INF missiles, originally tabled by the U.S., President Reagan says: "The proposal put forward today by our negotiators in Geneva

would make provision for strict and effective verification measures and reject the transfer of existing U.S. and Soviet INF missiles and launchers to a third country. Two vital new elements are also included: the destruction of missiles and launchers covered by the treaty and no conversion of these systems and launchers to other types of weapons."

August 3, 1987

Soviet arms negotiator Aleksei A. Obukhov says the U.S.S.R. will consider a compromise to resolve U.S.-Soviet differences over West Germany's Pershing 1A missiles. The Soviets had called the missiles "the main barrier" to an INF agreement and had demanded elimination of these missiles.

U.S. arms negotiator Max Kampelman says: "We will not, in a bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, have a provision in that agreement which affects our allies."

August 7, 1987

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, in a speech to the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament, accuses the U.S. and West Germany of blocking an INF agreement by using a "legal sham" to justify excluding 72 Pershing 1A nuclear warheads from such an agreement.

August 26, 1987

With Soviet acceptance of the U.S. proposal that both countries eliminate all their ground-based LRINF and SRINF missiles, U.S. negotiators in Geneva offer a revised proposal for verification of an INF agreement.

The new American plan differs from the older plan:

1. It drops a provision that inspectors be based outside missile production and assembly sites to count the missiles that leave the factory. This provision is no longer needed because production, flight testing and modernization would be banned under "double global zero."
2. The new plan also limits challenge inspections to facilities where medium- and shorter-range missiles are kept to make sure that they are being eliminated, as required.
3. There could also be suspect-site inspections at facilities in the United States and Soviet Union that are used for long-range, ground-based ballistic missiles to ensure that no medium-range or shorter-range missiles are hidden there.

August 26, 1987

* Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany announces that West Germany will dismantle its 72 shorter-range INF Pershing 1A missiles, and will not replace them with more modern weapons, if the United States and the Soviet Union:

1. Eliminate all of their own LRINF and SRINF missiles as foreseen under the proposed INF treaty.
2. Adhere to whatever schedule is agreed to for eliminating their missiles.
3. Comply with the terms of the treaty.

August 27, 1987

The Soviet Union welcomes Chancellor Kohl's statement. A spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry says the possibility of concluding a new superpower arms agreement is now "realistic," and he welcomes the latest American proposal on verifying such a treaty. He adds that the Soviet Union now sees "no problems" in assuring that both sides comply.

September 14, 1987

At the INF negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. presents an Inspection Protocol detailing the procedures it considers necessary to effectively verify compliance with an INF treaty that provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles.

The new U.S. proposals call for the most stringent verification regime in arms control history. Key elements of the proposal include:

1. The requirement that all INF missiles and launchers be geographically fixed in agreed areas or in announced transit between such areas during the reductions period.
2. A detailed exchange of data, updated as necessary, on the location of missile support facilities and missile operating bases, the number of missiles and launchers at those facilities and bases, and technical parameters of those missile systems.
3. Notification of movement of missiles and launchers between declared facilities.
4. A baseline on-site inspection to verify the number of missiles and launchers at declared missile support facilities and missile operating bases prior to elimination.
5. On-site inspection to verify the destruction of missiles and launchers.
6. Follow-on, short-notice inspection of declared facilities during the reductions period to verify residual levels until all missiles are eliminated.
7. Short-notice, mandatory challenge inspection of certain facilities in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at which banned missile activity could be carried out.
8. A requirement for a separate "close out" inspection to ensure that when a site is deactivated and removed from the list of declared facilities, it has indeed ended INF-associated activity.

September 18, 1987

Following a meeting in Washington, Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announce that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have reached agreement in principle to conclude an INF treaty.

The U.S. and Soviet Geneva delegations are instructed to work intensively to resolve remaining technical issues and to complete promptly a draft INF treaty text.

It is announced that—in order to sign a treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and to cover the full range of issues in the relationship between the two countries—a summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will be held in the fall of 1987. Exact dates are to be determined during talks in October.

October 22-24, 1987

At a meeting in Moscow between senior U.S. and Soviet officials, progress is made on concluding an INF treaty. General Secretary Gorbachev refuses to set a date for a U.S.-Soviet summit.

October 29, 1987

Reversing its position, the Soviet Union announces that it has agreed with the U.S. on the terms of a summit meeting to take place before the end of the year.

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze arrives in Washington for talks with President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz.

October 30, 1987

During meetings between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the United States and the Soviet Union agree that General Secretary Gorbachev will visit Washington beginning December 7, 1987, and that he and President Reagan will sign a treaty which would eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles.

Shultz and Shevardnadze also agree to keep in close touch with their respective delegations in Geneva to ensure rapid progress toward completion of the INF treaty.