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
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ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS



by

Mary H. Cooper

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ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

AFTER a 13-month hiatus, the United States and the Soviet Union are about to return to the bargaining table in Geneva, Switzerland, to resume arms control negotiations. The talks, scheduled to begin March 12, will for the first time encompass three separate categories of arms: strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons and — a category never before given special consideration — space weapons.

But no sooner was the agreement to resume negotiations announced than the prospects for their successful outcome were clouded by conflicting interpretations of the ambiguously worded announcement itself. The document to which both delegations agreed Jan. 8 specified that all three areas be "considered and resolved in their interrelationship." Subsequent statements by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko made clear the Soviet position that no agreement can be reached in any one area unless agreement is also reached in the other two. "If no progress were made in space," he said Jan. 13 in a television interview with Soviet journalists, "then none could be made in the question of strategic weapons." American spokesmen denied such iron-clad "linkage" was intended. "Interrelationships, yes," explained White House spokesman Larry Speakes, "but as far as linkage where one doesn't proceed without the other, no, that's not our position."

Another potential conflict that became immediately apparent centered around President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as SDI or, to its critics, "Star Wars." Now in the research stage, SDI envisions a new type of non-nuclear, space-based defense against nuclear attack that its supporters say would remove the enemy's incentive to use nuclear weapons. Advocates say the research program does not violate the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which forbids the deployment of weapons in space, and say it should not be used as a "bargaining chip" in Geneva. Only if the program passes from the research stage to the development and deployment of weapons, they say, should SDI be a subject of negotiation. President Reagan reiterated this position in a recent interview. Asked if he would halt SDI research in return for Soviet concessions on offensive weapons, he replied: "No, I would want to proceed with what we're doing. . . ."¹

¹ Interview with *The New York Times*, Feb. 13, 1985.

The Soviet Union is adamantly opposed to SDI and clearly intends to place the program at the top of its agenda in March. Far from being a benign defensive system, they say, SDI would guarantee the success of an American first strike against the Soviet Union. As such, it can only be interpreted as a destabilizing offensive weapons system and must be banned before it ever gets off the ground.

The selection of the negotiating teams is also an indication of each side's opening positions. On the U.S. side, the delegation will be headed by a newcomer to nuclear arms talks, ~~Mr. M. K. [redacted]~~ ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ record as a hard-liner toward the Soviet Union and supporter of SDI, he will also lead the American team dealing with space weapons. ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ a former senator (R-Texas, 1961-85) and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee who supports Reagan's military buildup, will be the chief negotiator on strategic, or long-range, weapons (*see glossary, p. 157*). The only delegation head with negotiating experience in the area to which he has been assigned is ~~Maynard W. Glitman~~, a career diplomat who was deputy head of the delegation in previous talks on the intermediate-range nuclear force (INF).² He will lead the delegation on INF talks in Geneva.

Veteran arms negotiator Paul H. Nitze will play an important behind-the-scenes role. By far the most experienced arms control expert connected with the new talks, Nitze will be a "special adviser" to the proceedings. Hard-liners were encouraged by the selection of Kampelman and Tower. At the same time, however, supporters of arms control were encouraged by the surprise replacement of Edward L. Rowny, chief negotiator in the stalemated strategic arms reductions talks (START), and his relegation to a less visible advisory position.³ Rowny, a retired general with strong conservative backing, has criticized past arms control efforts.

The Soviet delegation has greater experience in arms control negotiations. Delegation head and chief negotiator on strategic arms will be Viktor Karpov, who also led his party to the START talks. The space weapons team will be led by Yuli Kvitsinsky, former INF negotiator and co-author, with Nitze, of the ill-fated "walk-in-the-woods" proposal before those talks collapsed (*see p. 162*). His place as chief negotiator for the INF

² The United States and the Soviet Union opened talks in Geneva in November 1981 aimed at limiting INF missiles based in Europe. Moscow broke off these talks two years later when the first American-made Pershing II and cruise missiles were deployed in Western Europe in accordance with a 1979 NATO decision (*see p. 160*).

³ The Reagan administration, critical of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) begun in 1969, proposed instead reducing the levels of these long-range nuclear weapons. START talks began in June 1982 but were suspended in December 1983 when Moscow refused to set a date for their resumption (*see p. 163*).

Chernenko's Health

While official Soviet statements offer conflicting accounts of Konstantin U. Chernenko's state of health, the 73-year-old Soviet leader was last seen in public Dec. 27 and is reportedly suffering from emphysema and heart disease. Speculation on the eventual succession of a younger Kremlin leader has focused on 53-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev, the youngest member of the ruling Politburo. Gorbachev would be the first Soviet leader whose political formation was not directly shaped by World War II and the rule of Josef Stalin.

Whoever Chernenko's successor may be, however, the transition's impact on the Geneva talks may be minimal. Continuity in the Soviet position on arms control appears to be assured not only by the Politburo's final say in the matter but also by the active role that veteran negotiator Andrei A. Gromyko continues to play in the arms control process.

Should Chernenko die, his successor would be the fourth Soviet leader since Ronald Reagan was first elected to the White House. Leonid I. Breznev died in 1982 and was succeeded by Yuri V. Andropov, who died in February 1984. He was succeeded by Chernenko.

talks will be taken by Aleksei Obukhov, another experienced arms control negotiator.

President Reagan's Call for a 'New Dialogue'

In contrast to the skepticism with which he regarded arms control during his first term, Reagan welcomed the Geneva talks, saying he had "no more important goal" in his second term than to "achieve a good agreement — an agreement which meets the interests of both countries, which increases the security of our allies and which enhances international stability."⁴

At the same time, Reagan sought significant increases in defense spending for fiscal 1986, reinforcing his position that the United States should only enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union from a position of strength (*see p. 150*). In addition, the administration has stepped up its campaign calling into question Soviet compliance with the terms of past arms control agreements. In a report to Congress, the administration cited 13 areas of "concern," but focused its attention on one "clear violation" of the 1972 ABM Treaty, a phased-array, early warning radar system now under construction near the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk.⁵ Calling the provision controlling deployment of phased-array radar "the linchpin of the ABM Treaty,"

⁴ Statement issued Jan. 22, 1985.

⁵ The unclassified version of the non-compliance report, required by the fiscal 1985 Defense Authorization Act, was released Feb. 1.

a senior administration official, who briefed reporters on condition he not be identified, termed Soviet non-compliance "a dagger pointed at the whole arms control process in the future."

With public opinion apparently solidly behind him and such misgivings about Soviet trustworthiness, why is Reagan embarking on new arms control negotiations? Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, gave three reasons: "New arms control agreements, if soundly formulated, can serve U.S. security interests; entering into new negotiations does not in any way condone past Soviet behavior; and arms control gives us leverage and another way to get the Soviets to abide by existing agreements."⁶

Such an agreement would have to take account of changed expectations, as reflected in the administration's new "strategic concept," which couples the traditional aims of arms control negotiations in the short term with a longer-term vision of strategic defense. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam first presented the strategy, which other officials have since restated verbatim: "For the next 10 years, we should seek a radical reduction in the number and power of existing and planned offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether land-based, space-based or otherwise. We should even now be looking forward to a period of transition, beginning possibly 10 years from now, to effective non-nuclear defensive forces, including defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition should lead to the eventual elimination of nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A nuclear-free world is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union and all other nations can agree."⁷

Continuing Push to Build Up U.S. Defenses

Even as the administration was elaborating its negotiating position for the coming talks, it was trying to build support in the United States and Europe for its defense modernization program, including SDI. This program, it argues, is necessary to persuade the Soviet Union to bargain in good faith. The administration requested that Congress approve a \$2 trillion military budget over the next five years, beginning with \$313.7 billion for fiscal 1986, which starts Oct. 1, 1985. Part of the money would be used to reinforce the arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons: the budget includes \$3.2 billion for 48 land-based MX missiles,

⁶ Adelman spoke at a State Department briefing Feb. 1. The arms control agency was set up in 1960 to advise the president and secretary of state on arms control.

⁷ Dam spoke Jan. 14 before the Foreign Policy Association in New York. The new strategic concept was reportedly drafted by Paul Nitze and presented to Gromyko by Secretary of State Shultz at a meeting of the two in Geneva, Jan. 7-8. Nitze later reiterated the concept in a meeting Jan. 25 with reporters. See *The Washington Post*, Jan. 26, 1985.



President Reagan and Vice President Bush with the U.S. negotiating team; from left, chief Max M. Kampelman, John Tower and Maynard W. Glitman

\$5.6 billion for 48 B1 bombers and \$5 billion for a Trident submarine and Trident missiles.

Administration spokesmen, led by Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, maintain that Reagan's four-year-old program to "rearm America" is what led the Soviet Union back to the bargaining table and that efforts to reduce the Pentagon's budget will only undermine the American position in Geneva. Because of widespread bipartisan concern over the \$200 billion federal budget deficit, however, the administration's defense budget request will undoubtedly be pared.⁸ Reflecting this sentiment, Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., told Weinberger during hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee: "It's not a question of whether it will be cut, it's a question of how much it will be reduced."

Another subject of concern to the administration is the ongoing debate over the controversial MX missile. Dubbed the "peacekeeper" by Reagan because of its purported contribution to nuclear deterrence, the MX is a new, more accurate intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) armed with 10 nuclear warheads whose production has been delayed by congressional opposition.⁹ The administration is trying to increase support for the program in Congress before it comes to a vote, possibly in March, just as the Geneva talks are to open: "I must tell you, frankly," Weinberger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jan. 31, "that cancellation of key programs, such as MX, will prolong negotiations, not facilitate them, and will reduce our ability to achieve arms reductions."

⁸ For background, see "Federal Budget Deficit," *E.R.R.*, 1984 Vol. 1, pp. 45-64; "Reagan's Defense Buildup," *E.R.R.*, 1984 Vol. 1, pp. 309-328.

⁹ Of the 100 missiles called for in the MX program, 21 are already under production. Under a complex formula agreed to in 1984, \$1.5 billion earmarked for the production of 21 more MX missiles cannot be released until after March 1. Even then, the money cannot be spent until both the House of Representatives and the Senate vote their approval.

Further complicating the administration's effort to boost defense spending on Capitol Hill is the recent change in leadership on several key congressional committees. In particular, Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., newly elected chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has suggested he may drop his support for the MX, a weapon he said may be unnecessary if Reagan's strategic defense initiative proves feasible.¹⁰

"Star Wars" itself has now overtaken the MX as the most controversial element of the administration's defense modernization program. In its preliminary research phase alone, SDI is expected to cost \$26 billion, while some estimates of its final figure reach \$1 trillion.¹¹ But budget concerns are only a small element of the growing criticism over SDI. While supporting the current research effort, former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance said he was "strongly opposed" to pursuing strategic defense beyond the research stage. "Once we cross the line from basic research to deployment," he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Feb. 4, "we have very radically changed the basic strategic doctrine."¹² He voiced the concern of many arms control advocates in Congress that the deployment of a strategic defense system in space would set off a new arms race. They fear that the Soviet Union would try to penetrate the defense with new offensive weapons and the United States would then be compelled to build even more elaborate defenses.

Up to now, the debate over SDI has been largely confined to the scientific community, where technical considerations are called into play either to boost or to debunk the program. Some of its supporters are physicists working in arms research facilities.¹³ Others, however, oppose SDI as technically unfeasible. Some say that even if it were possible to extend a nuclear umbrella over the United States, SDI would pose grave dangers. According to a study conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists: "If the president's vision is pursued, outer space could become a battlefield. An effective defense against a missile attack must employ weapons operating in space. This now peaceful sanctuary, so long a symbol of cooperation, would be violated. And the arduous process of arms control, which has scored so few genuine successes in the nuclear era, would also be imperiled — perhaps terminated — by the deployment of weapons in space."¹⁴

¹⁰ Aspin has long supported the renegotiation of the ABM Treaty. See Les Aspin, "Missiles Become Protected," *The New Republic*, February 1981.

¹¹ The fiscal 1985 budget includes \$1.4 billion for SDI; the administration has asked for \$3.7 billion in fiscal 1986.

¹² Vance served under President Carter from 1977 to 1980.

¹³ See, for example, letters to the editor in support of SDI published in *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 17, 1985.

¹⁴ Union of Concerned Scientists, *The Fallacy of Star Wars* (1984), pp. 5-6. UCS is a non-profit organization of 100,000 scientists and citizens concerned about the impact of advanced technology on society.

NATO, Soviet Concerns

THE DEBATE over SDI may be reawakening anti-nuclear sentiment in other countries, a worrisome prospect to administration supporters. The opposition Liberal Party in Canada in early February challenged the Conservative government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney over its current negotiations with the U.S. government to modernize an early warning system in northern Canada. The Liberals said that the modernization would draw Canada into participation in SDI. Defense Minister Robert Coates denied that the new \$1 billion North Warning System would be a part of SDI.¹⁵

Far more troubling to the administration is the effect an anti-SDI campaign among NATO's European members might have on the American position in Geneva.¹⁶ So far the initiative has elicited no official opposition from the allied governments. Lord Carrington, NATO's secretary general, went so far as to say that it would be "the height of imprudence" for the United States to interrupt research on SDI.¹⁷

But SDI alarms many European observers who fear that the creation of an anti-ballistic defense over North America would encourage the United States to withdraw into a "Fortress America," abandoning Western Europe to its own defenses. With the United States safely protected behind its space-based shield, they say, Europe would become an attractive battlefield for a nuclear exchange. The governments of allied nations — West Germany, Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands — that supported a 1979 NATO decision to deploy 572 new intermediate-range nuclear weapons on their soil may have special cause for alarm.¹⁸ The deployment began on schedule in December 1983, but it fueled a widespread anti-nuclear movement that undermined the ruling governments' political strength. The

¹⁵ The United States and Canada are now negotiating an agreement to modernize the distant Early Warning system — or DEW line — originally built to detect low-flying strategic bombers that the Earth's curvature prevented U.S.-based radar from picking up from far away. It was allowed to deteriorate as the Soviet Union based its strategic arsenal ever more heavily on land-based ICBMs.

¹⁶ NATO was formed in April 1949 as a military alliance against Soviet aggression in Europe in the wake of the Berlin blockade. It is made up of 16 countries: Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United States.

¹⁷ Lord Carrington, who served as foreign minister in the conservative government of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, spoke Jan. 22 while visiting Ottawa.

¹⁸ NATO's December 1979 "dual-track" decision called for U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces. If negotiations were not successful, the decision called for the deployment in Europe of 464 ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles — each with a single nuclear warhead — beginning in December 1983. All 108 Pershings are to be deployed in West Germany, and 54 are reportedly in place now. Deployment of the cruise missiles has already begun in Britain, West Germany and Italy, and is scheduled to begin this year in Belgium and the Netherlands.

conservative government of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl is particularly vulnerable. Already weakened by economic stagnation, the government faces elections in two years and can expect strong opposition from the country's peace movement.¹⁹

Only days after it was announced that U.S.-Soviet arms talks would resume, Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens dismayed the Reagan administration by refusing to permit the cruise missile deployment scheduled in March. He said his government would decide by the end of that month when to begin deployment, but observers predicted that Martens, who is under pressure from anti-nuclear forces, would delay such a decision until after national elections are held in December. The Netherlands is exhibiting similar sensitivity to domestic anti-nuclear sentiment. The government there has delayed deployment of 48 cruise missiles until November.

As if NATO's jitters were not enough to jeopardize Reagan's plan to arrive in Geneva with a strong hand, U.S. allies in the southern Pacific dealt the administration an unexpected blow. First, New Zealand's Prime Minister David Lange, following up on a campaign promise to prohibit nuclear weapons in the country, announced his government would deny port access to a U.S. warship scheduled to arrive for joint naval exercises within the ANZUS alliance (Australia, New Zealand and the United States).²⁰ The United States, which for security reasons does not reveal whether or not Navy vessels at sea are carrying nuclear weapons, responded by canceling the exercises altogether. Days later, Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke told the administration U.S. aircraft could not use Australian bases to monitor a test of the MX missile scheduled for this summer.

Pressure for Arms Control in Soviet Bloc

While pursuing arms modernization, the Reagan administration has consistently maintained that it was willing to resume arms control negotiations at any time the Soviet Union wished. It was, after all, the Soviet side that abandoned both the START and the INF talks in 1983, spokesmen maintain. First, Moscow broke off the INF negotiations in November to protest the initial NATO deployment of new Pershing and cruise missiles. The following month it failed to agree to a date for the next round of START talks. Soviet leader Konstantin U. Chernenko insisted as recently as last October that Moscow would not resume INF talks until the NATO weapons were

¹⁹ For background, see "West Germany's 'Missile' Election," *E.R.R.*, 1983 Vol. 1, pp. 149-168.

²⁰ The ANZUS defense treaty was signed in September 1951. Less structured than NATO, the treaty calls primarily for strategic consultation and periodic joint military exercises.

removed from Europe. In agreeing to return to Geneva, Moscow reversed its position. It also appears to have dropped its prior insistence on a moratorium on testing anti-satellite weapons as a condition for negotiations on space weaponry.

Since the agreement to resume negotiations, the Soviet Union has focused its attention on SDI, repeatedly asserting that no progress can be made on INF and strategic weapons unless some agreement can be worked out to prevent the "militarization of space." Some Western observers have deduced from such statements that Moscow is desperately trying to head off a new and highly expensive round of the arms race that it can ill afford. The Soviet economy has for the past several years suffered from repeated crop failures as well as depressed world prices for its oil exports.²¹

Secretary of State George P. Shultz expressed this view during recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In contrast to the growing military and economic might of the West, he said, "the Soviets face ... profound structural economic difficulties, a continuing succession problem and restless allies; its diplomacy and its clients are on the defensive in many parts of the world." But this picture is not shared by all administration officials. Defense Secretary Weinberger told the same hearing Jan. 31 that the Soviet Union boasts a numerically stronger nuclear arsenal and is "dramatically improving" its quality, while "expanding the geographical reach" of its conventional forces.

History of Arms Control

THE GENEVA negotiations are but the most recent chapter in the turbulent history of arms control. Ever since the nuclear genie was let out of the bottle nearly 40 years ago, negotiators have tried in vain to halt the development of nuclear weapons.

The United States was the first country to explode nuclear devices and is the only country to have used them, destroying the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Only by bringing Japan quickly to its knees, it was reasoned, could the Pacific war be ended without the additional loss of thousands of U.S. servicemen. Ten months later, on June 14, 1946, the United States presented a plan to the newly created

²¹ For background on economic issues within the Soviet bloc, see "Communist Economics," *E.R.R.*, 1984 Vol. II, pp. 957-976.

United Nations to ban the production of nuclear weapons and to place all peaceful applications of nuclear technology under international control. The Baruch plan — named for its co-author, financier Bernard Baruch — called for the creation of an agency to oversee nuclear development and inspect member nations' facilities. The United States, which alone possessed the technology to produce nuclear weapons at that time, pledged to destroy its bombs as soon as the agency was established. The Soviet Union, however, insisted that the American arsenal be dismantled before it would agree to the agency's creation, and the Baruch plan became the first of many arms control proposals to fall victim to disagreements between the postwar superpowers.

The next two decades witnessed a steady worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations. It was during this so-called Cold War period of frosty diplomatic exchanges that the Soviet Union developed a nuclear capability of its own and rapidly built an arsenal of atomic weaponry to counter that of the United States. Both sides began modernizing their weapons, and the arms race was on. The first breakthrough in nuclear arms technology came as a result of reducing warhead size and weight. The bombs dropped over Japan were so heavy that they had to be transported by large bombers. By making them smaller and lighter, arms designers on both sides were able to load them instead onto rockets, which were a faster, and thus less vulnerable, means of delivering the bomb to its target. In time, both the United States and the Soviet Union developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), large rockets that could be shot up into the atmosphere to release their payload — the nuclear bomb — which would then follow a path determined by the physical law of "ballistic trajectory" toward its ultimate target halfway around the Earth.

The unprecedented danger and expense entailed in the spiraling arms race prompted both sides to propose several arms control initiatives during the 1950s and 1960s. This period saw considerable progress in areas not directly concerned with the armaments themselves. The bilateral Hot Line Agreement (1963) set up a direct link between the White House and the Kremlin to facilitate emergency communications and reduce the risk of war. Four multilateral agreements of the same period also were aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. The Antarctic Treaty (1959) banned "any measures of a military nature" on that continent; the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) banned weapons tests under water, in the atmosphere and in outer space, including "the moon and other celestial bodies"; the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Treaty (1966) went a step further and banned all nuclear weapons from

Arms Control: A Glossary

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM): A defensive system to intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles or their elements during flight, consisting of interceptor missiles, launchers and radars.

Cruise Missile: a small (18-ft.), jet-powered guided missile that can fly at very low altitudes to minimize radar detection.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM): A land-based, rocket-propelled missile with an intercontinental range (defined as over 5,500 kilometers under SALT). Usually launched from an underground silo, it is vulnerable to attack but is also the most destructive strategic weapon.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF): Land-based missiles and aircraft with ranges of up to 5,500 kilometers that are capable of striking targets beyond the general region of the battlefield but not capable of intercontinental range.

Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV): The portion of a strategic missile that carries a number of nuclear warheads, each of which can be directed to a separate target.

Mutual Assured Destruction: The ability of opposing sides to inflict an "unacceptable" degree of damage upon an aggressor after absorbing any first strike, or first offensive move of a nuclear war.

MX (Missile Experimental): A new, 10-warhead U.S. ICBM developed to replace the increasingly vulnerable Minuteman ICBM force and to counter the SS-18 and SS-19, Soviet ICBMs.

Short-Range Nuclear Forces: Land-based missiles, rockets and artillery capable of striking only targets in the general region of the battlefield.

Strategic Nuclear Forces: Ballistic missiles and bomber aircraft that have intercontinental range. U.S. strategic nuclear forces directly threaten Soviet territory and vice versa.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile: Ballistic missiles carried in and launched from a submarine. These are harder to detect than land-based or air-launched missiles.



MX missile

space, and signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons to nations that do not possess them. These agreed in turn not to embark on nuclear weapons programs of their own.²²

Agreement to negotiate the far more difficult issue of existing weapons was longer in coming. After its humiliation in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 — under U.S. pressure Russia withdrew its missiles from the island — the Soviet Union rapidly increased its nuclear arsenal. By the time agreement was finally reached to begin arms negotiations in 1968, each side already possessed nuclear arsenals capable of destroying the other. Deterrence was based on the mutual realization that a nuclear first strike could not destroy all the enemy's warheads and would merely provoke a retaliatory response. The concept, known as mutual assured destruction — or MAD — was to dominate the strategic thinking of both sides. President Johnson's defense secretary, Robert S. McNamara, gave top priority to the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs). He believed they would be ineffective against an all-out attack and were destabilizing, in that each side was rushing ahead to develop newer offensive weapons to counter ABMs.

Delayed first by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and then by the election of a new president, Richard M. Nixon, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks — SALT — finally began in Vienna April 16, 1970. After two years of hard bargaining, President Nixon went to Moscow and joined Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev on May 26, 1972, in signing the two accords that made up the first strategic arms limitation agreement — SALT I. The first accord, the ABM Treaty, reflected the shared belief that ABM systems are destabilizing and ineffective. The treaty — which is of unlimited duration but subject to review every five years — allowed each side only two ABM deployment sites — later amended to one — and strictly limited the technological development of ABM weaponry, including radar and interceptor missiles.²³

SALT I's second component, an interim agreement on offensive strategic arms, was less sweeping in its effect. It froze the numbers of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on each side for five years. The Soviet Union was left

²² In addition to the United States and Soviet Union, the only country with acknowledged nuclear weapons are Britain, France and China. Several other countries possess the technical ability to produce nuclear weapons. See Joseph P. Yager, ed., *Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy*, The Brookings Institution, 1980. See also "Controlling Nuclear Proliferation," *E.R.R.*, 1981 Vol. 1, pp. 509-532.

²³ By 1975 the United States had deactivated its ABM installation at Grand Forks, N.D., because it was considered to be of little military value by itself. The Soviet "Galosh" ABM system is deployed around Moscow.

with more missile launchers and land-based ICBMs than the United States, while the United States retained its technological superiority and numerical advantage in long-range strategic bombers.

It was this discrepancy in the nuclear balance, which allowed both sides to perceive themselves at a disadvantage, that was to spell eventual failure for the SALT process. The agreement also left unaddressed an important technological advance already under development. This was the multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle, or MIRV. A single missile could now be armed with several warheads, each aimed at different targets. MIRVs made simple missile counts obsolete at a single stroke and vastly complicated the already sticky problem of counting nuclear warheads. Although the Senate ratified SALT I by an 88-to-2 margin in September 1972, U.S. misgivings over the interim agreement were expressed in an amendment sponsored by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., that directed the president in future negotiations to accept arms levels equal or superior to those of the Soviet Union.

Technological improvements not restricted under SALT's numerical limits proceeded apace on both sides. Soviet advances included a new intermediate-range ballistic missile called the SS-20, the Tu-22M Backfire bomber, submarine-launched missiles and more accurate ICBMs with a higher throw-weight, or payload capacity. For its part, the United States deployed MIRVs to maintain its advantage in the number of nuclear warheads, expanded its Trident submarine-launched missile and B-1 strategic bomber forces, and began developing new weapons such as the MX missile and the long-range cruise missile, a small, guided aircraft similar to the buzz-bombs Nazi Germany used against England in World War II. Able to fly at low altitudes, the cruise missile can be launched from land, sea or air and is particularly difficult to classify under arms control agreements because it can be armed with either conventional or nuclear warheads.

Both sides continued to modernize their nuclear weapons while observing the numerical limits imposed by SALT I. On Nov. 24, 1974, Brezhnev and President Gerald R. Ford agreed to the framework for its successor, SALT II. The Vladivostok accord, named for the Soviet Pacific port city where the two leaders met, set an overall ceiling on the number of delivery vehicles, including strategic bombers, permitted each side. Of the 2,400 total, 1,320 missile launchers could be fitted with MIRVs. Both sides were allowed leeway to allocate their forces as they saw fit. The Soviet Union would continue to concentrate its nuclear warheads on ICBMs, while the United States distrib-

uted its arsenal more evenly among the strategic "triad" of land-based missiles, submarines and strategic bombers.

Once again, however, weapons designers in the military-industrial complex of both nations worked faster than the arms control negotiators. The Vladivostok agreement did not cover the American cruise missile or the Soviet Backfire bomber, presented as a medium-range bomber but considered capable of intercontinental missions as well. The impasse over these weapons was sidestepped under a compromise negotiating framework of September 1977, in which both sides agreed to observe the SALT I Interim Agreement until they could produce its successor.

The three-part SALT II accord that Brezhnev and President Jimmy Carter signed in Vienna on June 18, 1979, featured a Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. It set a limit of 2,400 on the total number of nuclear delivery vehicles and the following individual limits: 1,320 MIRV launchers (missiles and bombers carrying cruise missiles); 1,200 MIRVed ballistic missiles; 820 MIRVed land-based ICBMs; and 308 "heavy" ICBMs. No additional fixed launchers were permitted. It also banned any increase in the maximum number of warheads on existing types of ICBMs and limited the number of warheads allowed for each new type of ICBM to 10. Each SLBM was allowed to carry 14 warheads while an average of 28 long-range cruise missiles was permitted for each bomber. SALT II also banned the flight-testing and deployment of several missiles and the construction of new fixed ICBM launchers.

SALT II immediately came under fire from critics who said it enabled the Soviets to maintain nuclear superiority over the United States. For the next two years, as U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated, the agreement was subjected to mounting criticism. In protest over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter himself stopped the ratification process by asking the Senate in January 1980 to "delay consideration" of SALT II. It was never ratified.

Arms Control Under Reagan Administration

Elected in the fall of 1980, Ronald Reagan came to office vowing to "rearm America." The SALT process was denounced as a failure and arms control figured hardly at all during the first 18 months of his administration. The Soviet Union, he and his officials repeatedly suggested, had deftly used the negotiations to slow U.S. weapons modernization while boldly forging ahead themselves to a position of military superiority over the United States.

While the strategic arms negotiations were placed on hold and

Other Arms Control Talks in Progress

In addition to the bilateral negotiations dealing with nuclear armaments, the United States and the Soviet Union have held negotiations to limit conventional forces and chemical weapons, as well as talks aimed at reducing tensions and averting the risk of war in times of crisis.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR): Talks opened in Vienna in 1973 among 12 NATO and seven Warsaw Pact nations. Their aim is to enhance East-West security and reduce the likelihood of war in Europe by reducing each side's military manpower in Central Europe to a maximum level of 700,000 ground forces, or 900,000 air and ground force personnel combined. NATO claims the Warsaw Pact has a 170,000-man superiority over the West (960,000 compared with 790,000) in the area under consideration. Referred to as the "zone of reductions," the area includes West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in the West, and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia in the East. Issues blocking agreement involve on-site verification, a timetable for the reduction and the troop levels now deployed. Talks resumed Jan. 31.

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE): The goal of these 35-nation talks, which first opened Jan. 17, 1984, in Stockholm, is to reduce the possibility of an accidental nuclear confrontation resulting from miscalculation or a failure of communications. Its participants comprise the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and all European countries except Albania. One recent product of these talks was the addition to the Washington-Moscow "hotline" of a high-speed facsimile capability that will allow the rapid transmission of photos and charts. The CDE talks are an outgrowth of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which produced the Helsinki accords of 1975, under which both sides agreed to provide advance notification of large military maneuvers. Max Kampelman, who will lead the U.S. delegation in Geneva, headed the U.S. delegation to follow-up talks, held in Madrid and concluded in September 1983. NATO delegates to the Stockholm CDE talks have proposed additional measures for exchanging military information. This year's session opened Jan. 29.

Conference on Disarmament (CD): The 40-member Committee on Disarmament was established in 1979 to achieve a complete and verifiable ban on the production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons. Although a prior agreement — the Geneva Protocol of 1925 — prohibits their use, it does not restrict the production or stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and contains no provisions for verification. The United States has accused the Soviet Union of using such weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. On April 18, 1984, the United States introduced a draft treaty calling for a comprehensive and verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. The latest round opened Feb. 5.

the Pentagon was given the green light for increased military spending, the administration had to deal with the issue of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. NATO in 1979 had announced its decision to pursue a "dual track" path to counter the Soviet Union's growing arsenal of intermediate-range missiles, the SS-4, SS-5 and the new SS-20, pointed toward Western Europe. NATO announced it would seek to draw the Soviet Union into negotiations and to begin deploying American-made Pershing II and cruise missiles on allied territory if agreement had not been reached by December 1983.

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko pledged in September 1981 "to spare no effort" to conclude an agreement before the NATO deadline. Talks opened in Geneva on Nov. 30 of that year. Only days earlier, Reagan had offered his own solution to the INF dilemma with his "zero-zero option": NATO would cancel deployment of the American missiles if the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle all its SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles.

But the Soviet position on INF proved irreconcilable with the U.S. contention that the SS-20s constituted a new and destabilizing class of weapons. Moscow rejected U.S. insistence on global limits of the SS-20 which, with a range of 5,000 kilometers, could threaten not only Western Europe but also American allies in Asia, including Japan. The Soviet Union insisted that British and French nuclear missiles be counted as part of NATO's arsenal; the United States refused, saying that these forces were purely national in scope and did not contribute to allied defense.

The two chief negotiators at Geneva attempted to resolve the impasse on their own during a private conversation in July 1982 later known as the "walk in the woods." U.S. chief negotiator Paul Nitze — founder of the Committee on the Present Danger and leader of the fight against SALT II — and his Soviet counterpart Yuli Kvitsinsky drove to a secluded mountaintop in the Jura range near the French border, ordered the driver to meet them at the bottom and started to walk down. According to one account: "Once they got down to business, Nitze and Kvitsinsky were sitting on a log. It was starting to rain. Nitze had brought along a typed outline of an agreement, from which he began to read aloud. Kvitsinsky listened for a while, then suggested some modifications. Incorporating these changes would make it a joint paper. Nitze asked Kvitsinsky if he realized that. 'Yes,' replied the Soviet. 'Let's go through with the rest of it.'"²⁴

²⁴ Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits* (1984), p. 127.

By the time they had reached their car, Nitze and Kvitsinsky reportedly had defined a compromise agreement that prohibited the Soviet Union from developing a long-range ground-launched cruise missile and froze SS-20s deployed in the Asian U.S.S.R. at current levels. In exchange, the United States would cancel deployment of the Pershing. Their efforts were to prove fruitless. Both governments disavowed the proposal and the stalemate persisted. On Nov. 23, 1983, Kvitsinsky announced the Soviet decision to "discontinue" the talks in protest against NATO's resolve to deploy the Pershing and cruise missiles on schedule the following month.

Meanwhile, after 16 months in office, Reagan outlined his first strategic arms control proposal. In an effort to distinguish it from the "failed" SALT process, Reagan named his proposal START, for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. START's basic aim, as described by chief negotiator Edward L. Rowny, was "to break the mold of past negotiations which concentrated on limiting strategic offensive arms at high levels" and "to improve strategic stability through substantial reductions in the more destabilizing strategic offensive arms."²⁵ The initial proposal, which Reagan presented May 9, 1982, called for both sides to reduce the number of land- and sea-based missile warheads by about one-third to 5,000 and to reduce the number of deployed ballistic missiles to no more than 850, a cut of one-half for the United States, somewhat more for the Soviet Union.



Paul H. Nitze

Reagan subsequently modified his START proposal to accommodate the recommendations of the Commission on Strategic Forces — known as the Scowcroft commission after its head, former National Security Council member Brent Scowcroft. While reaffirming the goal of reducing each side's ballistic-missile warheads to 5,000, the president in June 1983 relaxed the overall limit of 850 deployed ballistic missiles. These changes were included in a draft treaty that the United States offered July 7.

Under pressure from congressional arms control advocates, Reagan in October incorporated into the U.S. bargaining position the "build-down" concept, which called for retiring older weapons as a corollary to modernization with the aim of reducing the total number of warheads over time. The Soviet Union, which had linked INF and START talks all along, rejected the

²⁵ Rowny spoke June 21, 1984, before the Royal United Services Institute of London.

modified proposal and, at the end of the negotiating round on Dec. 8, refused to agree to a resumption date for START.

Focus on 'Star Wars'

AS THE DATE for the Geneva talks approaches, the United States and Soviet Union have not altered their basic positions on either strategic or intermediate-range missiles. Officially, these remain as irreconcilable as they were when the two sets of talks were interrupted at the end of 1983.

Some observers speculate that the format to be followed in Geneva, establishing an "interrelationship" among the two categories of offensive weapons as well as strategic defense, may offer a means of breaking the stalemate. By merging the negotiations on INF and strategic forces, it is said, the two sides might satisfy Moscow's insistence on including the British and French INF arsenals — totaling some 140 missiles armed with 420 warheads — in NATO's overall weapons count.²⁶ These would seem less significant if the entire Euromissile issue were to be considered in the context of the 10,000 or so strategic weapons possessed by both sides.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko seemed to indicate that a merger might be acceptable. "Earlier we conducted talks, separately on strategic arms and on intermediate-range arms — and the two sides then agreed to try to conduct them this way because it might be easier this way to find accords — while it has now become absolutely clear that it is impossible to hold talks and to try to reach agreement on strategic armaments without solving also the question of intermediate-range weapons," he said during his Jan. 13 interview on Soviet television.

Whether or not this statement reflects Soviet interest in the merger idea, Reagan administration officials are reportedly opposed. The inclusion of INF with strategic weapons may give the NATO allies, who are closely involved in the INF talks, too great a say in the formulation of the U.S. position on strategic weapons. Given the West Europeans' strong desire for an arms control agreement between the superpowers, it is said, the United States would come under pressure to make concessions on strategic weapons.

The administration appears determined to continue its build-up of these weapons and to be wavering on its promise to abide

²⁶ *The New York Times*, Feb. 1, 1985.

by the terms of the unratified SALT II treaty. Reagan said in 1981 that the United States would not exceed the limits the treaty imposed on strategic weapons so long as the Soviet Union did likewise. But the administration's recent report on Soviet non-compliance charged Moscow with several treaty violations, and Reagan on Jan. 26 for the first time indicated the United States may decide to ignore SALT II when a new, 24-missile-bearing Trident submarine — the USS *Alaska* — puts to sea next October. Under the treaty's terms, the administration would have to retire an older, 16-missile Poseidon submarine or dismantle eight land-based Minuteman II ICBMs when the Trident is completed. Adelman of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has said recommendations will be made to the White House in October on whether to continue to abide by SALT II.

Meanwhile, weapons systems in all three areas of the American nuclear "triad" are being modernized. In addition to the Trident, which is quieter and thus more difficult to detect than older submarines, the sea leg of the triad will soon be reinforced by the long-range, highly accurate D-5 (also called the Trident II) submarine-launched missile. The Tomahawk cruise missile is also slated for deployment on board some 100 surface ships and submarines by the end of the decade. The stealth bomber, designed to evade detection by enemy radar, and air-launched cruise missiles incorporating stealth technology are also due for completion by the early 1990s. The MX, whose fate may be decided as the talks get under way, is only one of several new developments strengthening the land-based missile force.

Negotiating 'Star Wars,' the Non-Agreement

Judging from the barrage of Soviet criticism, the Soviet Union can be expected to concentrate its negotiating stance on preventing the Strategic Defense Initiative from proceeding beyond the research stage now in progress. Announcing the program on March 23, 1983, Reagan hailed the SDI concept as nothing less than visionary: "What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?" The purpose of SDI, he said, was to strengthen deterrence. The feasibility of such a non-nuclear defense system was expected to be determined by the early 1990s.

According to official descriptions, SDI would constitute a "layered defense" using different technologies to destroy attacking missiles during each phase of the ballistic trajectory. An ICBM could be destroyed during its "boost phase" shortly

after launch; during the "post-boost phase" before the warheads are released; in the "mid-course phase" while the released warheads are soaring through space; or during the "terminal phase" as they re-enter the atmosphere (see graphic, p. 167). A panoply of exotic-sounding weapons utilizing lasers and mirrors and based both on the ground and in space — hence the "Star Wars" connection — are envisioned.

SDI supporters, including Kampelman, insist that it must not be used as a "bargaining chip," to be dispensed with in return for Soviet concessions. "Strategic defense would compensate for the inevitable difficulties of verification and for the absence of genuine trust by permitting some risk-taking in [arms control] agreements," Kampelman and two co-authors wrote in a controversial article published shortly after his appointment to the Geneva talks. "This is another reason why strategic defense should not be traded in the forthcoming negotiations in return for promises that can be broken at any time."²⁶


Repeating the concerns expressed by some American scientists, Soviet officials and academics condemn SDI out of hand. "... [I]ts creation will certainly increase the danger of the first (pre-emptive) strike and the probability of making wrong decisions in a crisis situation," a group of Soviet scientists wrote in a study issued last year. "That is why strategic stability will be diminished, although the two sides will retain a rough parity in their strategic armaments."²⁷ Another Soviet commentator predicted that SDI will further escalate the arms race. "The other side cannot shut its eyes to these war preparations, of course," arms control analyst Alexei Fedorov wrote. "It will do everything to make the Pentagon realize that [Soviet] ballistic missiles have not become 'a heap of junk' while the U.S. offensive strategic potential hangs over it like the sword of Damocles."²⁸

Some observers believe the Soviet Union plans to resume testing and deployment of its anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. Like SDI, ASAT involves space weaponry. But while SDI would use space- and ground-based weapons to destroy attacking missiles, ASAT would destroy only satellites, including SDI satellites and existing communications and spy satellites. The Soviet Union has had an ASAT program since the early 1970s. But

²⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Jastrow and Max M. Kampelman, "Defense in Space Is Not 'Star Wars'," *The New York Times Magazine*, Jan. 27, 1985, p. 47. Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Carter. Jastrow, a physicist at Dartmouth College, founded the Goddard Institute for Space Studies. Following his appointment as chief U.S. negotiator, Kampelman reportedly tried to have his name removed as the article's co-author but was turned down by the newspaper.

²⁷ Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace against Nuclear Threat, "A Space-Based Anti-Missile System with Directed Energy Weapons: Strategic, Legal and Political Implications," Institute of Cosmic Research, All-Union Academy of Sciences, 1984.

²⁸ Alexei Fedorov, "Is the 'Star Wars' Program a Defense Plan?" undated, Novosti Press Agency.



after the United States began developing its own ASAT system, Russia in 1983 proposed a ban on further ASAT development.²⁹ No mention of such a ban has been made by the Soviets since October, leading some observers to believe they want to develop their system to counter SDI.

Because the eventual testing and deployment of the space-based components of SDI are prohibited by the terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty, negotiators involved in the space weapons category of talks in Geneva will discuss this as well as the alleged Soviet violations of that treaty. Meanwhile, some administration officials are openly discussing an approach to arms control that makes it hard to see why the negotiators should bother to meet in Geneva at all. In an article published just as the agenda for next month's talks was announced, ACDA Director Adelman wrote in support of "arms control without agreements."³⁰ According to this approach, each side would develop a strategic defense system, such as SDI, with the expectation that the other would do the same. President Reagan envisioned such a development when he offered to share SDI technology with the Soviet Union: if both sides constructed a viable strategic defense, he said, perhaps both would then dismantle their nuclear arsenals once and for all.

²⁹ The U.S. ASAT missile is designed to be launched in flight from an F-15 fighter aircraft. A congressionally imposed moratorium on space testing of the ASAT expires March 1, and the first test reportedly is set for June.

³⁰ Kenneth L. Adelman, "Arms Control With and Without Agreements," *Foreign Affairs*, winter 1984-85.

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October 16, 1987

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THE IMPORTANCE OF SDI

-- The Reagan Administration has had a well defined strategy for countering the threat posed by the Soviet offensive nuclear buildup. Our goal is to build a safer peace and to ensure a stable strategic balance over the long term.

-- This strategy has three key elements:

- Modernization of our strategic deterrent because, to keep the peace, we still rely on the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons;

- Pursuit of deep, equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in US and Soviet nuclear arms; and

- The search, through the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), for a safer and morally preferable means to deter war, by increasing reliance on defenses to enhance our security.

-- SDI is a research and technology development program to demonstrate by the early 1990s the feasibility of effective defenses against ballistic missiles for the U.S. and our allies. The most promising concepts involve layered defenses for intercepting an attacker's missiles in all phases of their flight--boost, mid-course, and terminal.

-- SDI serves a number of vital purposes:

- Through SDI we seek a defensive means of deterring aggression, based on systems protecting the U.S. and our Allies against ballistic missile attack.

- SDI helped to bring the Soviets back to the nuclear arms negotiating table in early 1985, after their late 1983 walkout.

- SDI is not a bargaining chip, but provides a strong incentive to the Soviets to agree to our proposal to reduce offensive strategic arms by 50%.

- Even if 50% strategic arms cuts are achieved, SDI will remain essential in persuading the Soviets to reduce further.

- SDI also underwrites the integrity of any new arms agreements by diminishing Soviet incentives to cheat. The record of Soviet violations of past arms control agreements makes this especially important.

- Finally, SDI is insurance against an accidental missile launch or possible future ballistic missile threats--nuclear, conventional or chemical--from outlaw countries.

-- The importance of SDI is underscored by the Soviets' long-standing and extensive strategic defense programs. These include:

- o the world's only anti-ballistic missile defenses, surrounding Moscow, which they are steadily improving;
- o construction of a large phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and
- o research, development and testing, including for example a \$1 billion annual program on lasers alone, employing some 10,000 scientists and engineers.

-- We cannot let the Soviets have a monopoly on strategic defenses. Possessed by both sides, such defenses can be stabilizing. Possessed by the Soviet Union alone, effective strategic defenses would threaten the peace by undermining the credibility of our deterrent. This would be devastating to Western security.

October 8, 1987

Defense and Space Themes

-- U.S. seeks a more secure and stable world--one with reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based on the increasing contribution of effective strategic defenses against offensive ballistic missiles.

-- In our ongoing research into strategic defense (Strategic Defense Initiative--SDI), the U.S. is seeking to establish the feasibility of comprehensive defenses protecting the U.S. and our allies against ballistic missile attack.

-- At the D&S Talks we have endeavored to discuss with the Soviets the relationship between strategic offense and defense. We are also seeking to discuss how, if we establish the feasibility of effective defenses, the U.S. and USSR could jointly manage a stable transition to a deterrence based increasingly on defenses rather than on the threat of retaliation by offensive nuclear weapons. We are also expressing our concerns about Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty.

-- In an effort to reach agreement with the Soviets in D&S, the U.S. has made a number of constructive proposals. Our most recent proposal in the D&S Talks includes the following elements:

- o A mutual U.S./Soviet commitment, through 1994, not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying strategic defenses.

- o During this period the U.S. and USSR would observe strictly all ABM Treaty provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

- o This commitment would be contingent upon implementation of 50 percent reductions to equal levels in strategic offensive arms over seven years from entry into force of a START agreement.

- o Either side shall be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1994 if it so chooses, unless the parties agree otherwise.

-- In response to expressed Soviet concerns, the U.S. has also offered proposals to enhance confidence and predictability regarding each side's exploration of advanced strategic defense technologies.

-- Our proposals in this regard include annual exchange of programmatic data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on our respective strategic defense programs and reciprocal visits to laboratories conducting SDI research, as well as reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.

-- On the other hand, the objective of Soviet proposals in D&S Talks has been to kill or cripple the U.S. SDI program. The U.S.

cannot--and will not--accept any measures which would cripple the SDI program, which is being conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty and which is so important to the future security of the U.S. and our allies, as well as to ensuring a safe strategic balance over the long term. The US has made it clear that it will not accept any restrictions on SDI beyond those actually agreed in the ABM Treaty.

-- Despite their rhetoric, the Soviets have been deeply involved for years in extensive programs in strategic defense, investigating many of the same technologies as SDI. In addition, the Soviets have deployed--and are currently upgrading--ABM defenses around Moscow. These are the world's only ABM deployments. Moreover, the Soviets are violating the ABM Treaty by construction of a large, phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk in Central Siberia. The West simply cannot afford to leave the Soviet Union with a monopoly in strategic defense, as this would undercut the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, which keeps the peace.

-- The Soviets have proposed changes to the ABM Treaty which they claim would "strengthen" it. This is clearly an effort to amend the ABM Treaty, making it more restrictive than the provisions to which the Soviets agreed in 1972. Changing the Treaty won't strengthen it; Soviet compliance with it will.

-- The Soviet argument that it is necessary to "strengthen the ABM Treaty" to achieve reductions of offensive arms is groundless. In 1972 when we signed the Treaty, we agreed that the restrictions it placed on defense were premised on the necessity of achieving significant reductions in offensive strategic nuclear arsenals. Fifteen years have now passed, and the Soviets still have not agreed to offensive reductions. It is time to get on with those reductions without additional conditions.

-- During their Foreign Minister's visit to Washington, the Soviets proposed that the US and USSR agree on a list of space-based devices which would not be allowed to be put into space if they exceeded certain performance parameters; the U.S. believes the list provided by the Soviets would impose limitations beyond those actually agreed in the ABM Treaty. Alternatively, they proposed agreeing to strict compliance with the ABM Treaty as "signed and ratified in 1972." Although the Soviets have not explained this proposal, previous Soviet statements reflect a view that the ABM Treaty imposes limits on SDI which are far more restrictive than what the parties actually agreed to in the Treaty in 1972. Thus, we believe the Soviets are continuing their efforts to cripple SDI.

-- The basic outline for a treaty to reduce strategic offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent to equal U.S./Soviet levels has already been agreed to by the U.S. and the USSR. We believe that a treaty could be concluded in short order if the Soviets dropped their artificial linkage of strategic arms reductions to SDI and were willing to negotiate seriously on the remaining issues, such as the need for sublimits on the most dangerous weapons--fast-flying intercontinental ballistic missiles.

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journalist Juan Pablo Cardenas for "slandering the president." Cardenas is also editor of one of a half dozen vocal newsweeklies that are allowed to publish despite the state of emergency. And after three years of petitions and applications, a group of persistent journalists and investors recently received government permission to publish *La Epoca*, the first opposition daily in fourteen years. Finally, the political parties law allows for access, if limited, to television; this represents another opportunity for the democratic opposition, including the newly formed movement of Chilean personalities for free elections.

At this point there can be no guarantees in Chile's tangled, political force field. Unexpected events are destined to play a role. And while the democratic opposition seems to be caught between a rock and a hard place, in need of some unifying force to prevent an overheated, potentially

explosive scenario, the Catholic church continues to offer support.

The church has been the primary defender of human rights under the dictatorship, and the bishops understand that a return to pluralist democracy is the best guarantee that those rights will be respected. The bishops were an integral factor in forging the National Accord, and continue to provide a channel for communication between the democratic opposition and senior officers in the armed forces. It is therefore not surprising that the church is the target of criticism from both Pinochet and the Communists. Because its authority and influence in Chilean society may be unmatched, and were clearly reinforced by the recent visit of Pope John Paul II, the church may emerge as the determining factor in the search for a democratic transition, especially given the nature of transition politics so far. ■

Toward An Open Soviet Union

Michael Novak

There is now much speculation about glasnost, openness, in the Soviet Union. The term and what it implies have caught much of the world by surprise. What it might mean, at least in part, is suggested by the following address, which Ambassador Michael Novak, as the U.S. representative, delivered to a plenary session of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, meeting in Bern. It is worth noting that the meeting took place on 1 May 1986, before the policy of glasnost was announced by Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Soviet Union is a great nation among the world's nations. Its 270 million citizens occupy nearly a sixth of the world's surface. Its navy operates on virtually all seas. It is a great military power. The talents of its people have been long praised. Yet---and here is the puzzle, Mr. Chairman---why does such a great nation whose activities are international in scope remain so outspokenly insecure, hesitant and fearful about human contacts?

The citizens of the United States have, cumulatively, millions upon millions of contacts with all the peoples of Europe every year (and with all the peoples of the world, for that matter). But in no other nation are the human contacts of our own citizens so often interrupted, prohibited, limited, restrained, controlled, steered and obstructed as they are, alas, with the citizens of the USSR. Mail is not delivered. Telephone service is interrupted. Soviet authorities discourage Soviet citizens from talking with tourists, or offering them hospitality, etc.

The irony of this situation is that the people of the United States typically *like* Russians, Ukrainians,

Georgians, Armenians, Uzbeks and all the other citizens of the Soviet Union, when they are allowed to meet them. The various peoples of the Soviet Union are warm-hearted, passionate, often excited about ideas, deeply moved by high art, full of sentiment. People to people, our peoples get along splendidly. And why not? So many Americans spring from similar stock; so many profoundly cherish the great novels, plays, poetry and music of Russian and the other cultures of the Soviet Union. When the great maestro Vladimir Horowitz played recently in Moscow, television showed tears streaming down many faces in the audience---and would have shown similar emotion upon the faces of many Americans, too.

So it is ironic. Our peoples have genuine affection for one another. In moments of joy, such as the Horowitz recital, and in moments of tragedy mutually shared, as in the heart-stopping tragedy and painful suffering of the last few days, our peoples are as one.

And yet communications from the Soviet side are so thoroughly controlled, steered and (often) distorted either by total silence or by horribly falsified propaganda about other peoples and other nations, that no one can help noting an unmistakable fearfulness about human contacts exhibited by the Soviet state. Why is the regime of such a great nation so afraid of human contacts? Why? That is the question behind every intervention during these last three weeks. Why?

The reason cannot be ideology. (1) Marxist thought does not require the total control exercised until now by the

Soviet regime. (2) Other Marxist nations do differently. (3) Many Marxist thinkers propose much more open methods.

If the reason for the closed society cannot be ideology alone, neither can it be due to the fact that the Soviet social system is "different" from all others. For to assert that is to beg the question, *why* is it different? What is the *reason* for such systematic control over human contacts as the Soviet Union practices, and concerning which every delegation in this room has considerable experience?

A great world power, one of the greatest military powers the world has ever known, has the right to be secure, unafraid, relaxed and open. According to the Helsinki Final Act, it even has the duty to be so. And in the world of fact and ordinary realism, it has the full capacity of being so.

The Soviet state could remain a Marxist state, and still be far more open than it is---open in its postal service, open in its telephone and telegraphic service, open in radio and television and every form of reading material, open in permitting visitors to travel as freely as they do in Switzerland and other nations, open in allowing its own citizens to travel, to visit, and to emigrate, as they like, when they like.

Invitation to a new path

The Soviet Union is powerful enough to be an open society. Why, then, is it not so? The peoples of the Soviet Union are attractive. The nation has to its credit immense accomplishments. All the world would like to know its citizens better, and to have its citizens know better all the great, buzzing and vital world around them. Why not? Why not an open, large-hearted, free and amicable Soviet Union?

Nothing in the ideology of Marxism prevents this. Nothing in the vast power of the Soviet Union requires otherwise. Logic, reason, experience, sentiment, the ideas of civilized peoples everywhere, the basic founding ideas of European culture---and the Helsinki Final Act, Madrid, and this very good dialogue we have been having in Bern---all these invite the governing bodies of the USSR to try a new path. All the world would applaud new decisions taken in this new direction.

These are the reasons *for* greater openness to human contacts. But there are also arguments *against* the closed society. (1) The closed society deprives its people of the stimulation of diversity, opposition and unconventional ways of looking at reality. (2) Any one culture is only one culture, but human creativity is fertilized by inputs from many cultures---and especially by the most contrary and opposite. The human mind works by the clash of opposites. (3) The closed society leads to a decline of standards, from want of true intellectual challenge. (4) In a closed society the roots of genuine culture---a true sensitivity to differences and to nuance---are slowly covered over by bureaucratic sludge. (5) Even the mode of controversy declines, since true argument is not permitted, and true differences not freely faced.

In sum, the closed society deprives its thinking citizens of intellectual air. They miss, they truly miss, the necessary contact of the human spirit with contrary ideas and oppos-

ing images, and unaccustomed controversies. Surprise is the law of life. Surprise is the stimulus of mind. The question for Soviet society, then, comes down to this: Can it compete in a world open to surprise, to choice, to individual will? My own answer is, its people are worthy of the highest confidence, and they would benefit enormously therefrom.

Indeed, nothing would do more to build a new spirit of worldwide confidence, a new humanitarian outlook, a new sense of a common humanity, than new policies of openness by the Soviet regime. Allow the peoples of the USSR to be seen and known and conversed with, as they are---an attractive and talented people. Allow them to know all the rest of us, as we are, in our strengths, and in our weaknesses. All of us are only human beings. Only that. But nothing less. This is the cry of Europe, this is the heritage of Europe: out of many; one. In diversity, a common humanity.

Europe has two branches from one same set of roots. East and West are not antithetical. The two branches belong together. They should be open to each other. They should strengthen each other. They should enrich each other. Being closed, one to the other, violates our profoundest vocation, and wounds our duty to each other. The task of the younger generation of Europeans everywhere (including those who are children of Europe, in Canada and the U.S.) is to make Europe one---an open Europe. A Europe of respect and affection, one for the other, each for all, all for each.

Human contacts

The key to human contacts is the freedom of human beings to *choose* which human contacts they desire. In this planetary age, of swift and cheap transportation, the whole world is open to such choice. The nub of human contacts, their living kernel, is the right of every human individual to travel and to set up a small universe of human contacts wherever such an individual wills. One's own human contacts are a crucial realm of choice. To an unprecedented degree, modern men and women choose the company we keep.

Thus, the central characteristic of human contacts in our time is free movement from place to place, whether temporary or permanent, or, indeed, circular and changing. Free movement no doubt has costs. Everything does. It introduces risk. That is precisely what is most human about it. As the ancients said, "Nothing ventured, nothing gained." Free movement makes burdens for bureaucrats, for social welfare agencies, for keepers of records. It also means the temporary shifting of human resources from one part of the world to another. When openness to movement obtains in all directions, however, human flows tend to change, double-back, and circulate---to the universal enrichment of the entire human family.

The first step in such openness is free emigration. Emigrating individuals, and emigrating families, tie bonds of memory and understanding, of knowledge and instinct and love, between the peoples to whom they emigrate and from whom they emigrate.

That is why the world was encouraging during the 1970s, when several hundred thousand from among three of the Soviet peoples, in particular, began to forge new links between the peoples of the USSR and the peoples of Western nations. I mean the rather massive migrations during those brief years—years too brief—of ethnic Germans, Armenians and Jews from the Soviet Union.

Almost two centuries ago, Catherine the Great and Alexander I invited German settlers to Russia, where two million ethnic Germans still live. Dispossessed during World War II, incarcerated and confined for ten long years after the war, these German citizens of the USSR were finally allowed to settle in western Siberia and central Asiatic Russia. Their diligent labor in agriculture and industry has won them new respect and acclaim. They suffer, however, from great pressures upon their historic culture, religions and language. When emigration became possible to them during the 1970s, 105,000 of these ethnic Germans returned to West Germany.

Something similar happened among the four million Soviet Armenians, who have with great effort built up one of the most prosperous of the Soviet republics. After World War II, Soviet authorities invited Armenians abroad to return to their homeland—and some 250,000 gratefully did, to build a new Armenia. During the 1970s, Soviet authorities also allowed emigration from ancestral Armenia, and some 52,000 Armenians chose to leave. All this despite the prosperity they helped to build.

The third major people of the Soviet Union permitted somewhat free emigration during the 1970s was the community of Jews, up to three million strong, dispersed mainly in the three great Slavic republics—Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Russian—and, for the most part, in the great cities of Kiev, Minsk, Leningrad and Moscow. This is the third largest Jewish community in the world.

Among all the cultures of the world, few perhaps place as much emphasis upon the life of the mind and the life of the arts as Jewish culture does, from early family life through adulthood. This is as true in the Soviet Union as elsewhere. Figures from 1973 indicate that, while Jews in the USSR constitute only .7 percent of the Soviet people, they accounted for 6.1 percent of all scientific workers, 8.6 percent of all scientists and 14 percent of all scientists with the rank of doctor (a post-Ph.D. degree, equivalent). In the past thirteen years, alas, these proportions have been shrunken by discriminatory factors, quotas, obstructions, and steadily growing campaigns of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. During the 1970s, Soviet authorities allowed Soviet Jews—especially those from rural areas—to emigrate. Some 250,000 did so. Nonetheless, in 1981, the curtain dropped on emigration for all three peoples: ethnic Germans, Armenians and Jews. Today, from all those groups, only a trickle of emigration continues. For example, in 1979, at the high point, 51,000 Jews emigrated. By 1984, only 896 were allowed to leave; in 1985, 1,140—just under 100 per month. So far in 1986, the numbers have dropped even lower.

The numbers are equally sad for the Armenians and the

Germans. Only 109 Armenians were allowed to leave during all of 1985 and only 406 Germans.

Soviet authorities occasionally explain away the closing of these spigots of free choice, a human right guaranteed in many international instruments and written in the human heart. They sometimes assert that Soviet law permits emigration, but few now want to apply for it. This explanation defies probabilities. Worse, it defies facts.

The German Red Cross has testified that as many as 150,000 ethnic Germans still want to emigrate; scholars estimate far higher numbers. Scholars of Soviet Armenia hold that 200,000 Armenians want to emigrate now. And it is a simple, cold fact that 370,000 Soviet Jews have already requested papers of invitation from abroad, as required by Soviet law for the first step in emigration proceedings. The cold fact is that 3,100 Jewish families—some 11,000 persons—are known to have applied for, and been refused, permission to emigrate. Yet, during the month just before we assembled in Bern, March 1986, there was registered one of the lowest totals of Jewish emigration ever. Only 47 persons were allowed to leave. I regret to say that the horror the refuseniks suffer is barely suggested in that cold number: 11,000 persons.

Nothing would do more to build a new spirit of worldwide confidence, a new humanitarian outlook, a new sense of a common humanity, than new policies of openness by the Soviet regime.

Many of the refuseniks have been fired from their jobs, and forced to take menial work. University professors and physicians now labor as janitors and street sweepers. Some, unable to find employment are now, ironically, subject to charges of "parasitism." Children are barred from good schools and universities. Many refuseniks are vilified, often by name, in the Soviet media. During the past two years, years (many of us thought) of hope, numerous newspaper articles and several television programs have singled out refuseniks as "Zionist subversives."

The more active refuseniks, who teach Hebrew or speak out openly against the refusal of authorities to let them leave, are subject to particularly harsh sanctions. At least sixteen of them have been convicted since autumn 1984, several on crudely trumped-up criminal charges designed to discredit them. Many others have been threatened, their apartments searched, their phones disconnected. I am very sad to say, there have also been cruel physical beatings: Vladimir Lifshits, Josef Berenshtein and Yuli Edelstein, for example. So heavy was his beating Berenshtein was almost blinded.

The life of the refuseniks requires immense courage. Simply to exercise a fundamental human right is, for them, an act of heroism. This courage has not been lacking. Its beauty is breathtaking.

Many refuseniks, 311 families to be precise, have been

waiting to leave for more than ten years. They have been given the usual reasons: fully one-third of them, a hundred families, have been refused on security grounds. General Secretary Gorbachev has said publicly that such reasons now hold for at most ten years. The evidence that would support such welcome words has not yet appeared.

Still today 11,000 refuseniks have been made pariahs in the country of their birth. They should be allowed to follow their choice, in order to honor the good name of their country, in order to become human links between the Soviet Union and their new lands of choice, helping to unite this broken world. That was the hope of Helsinki's Final Act.

And what of the 370,000 Jews who have received the necessary invitations to emigrate, but are afraid of becoming refuseniks? For external consumption, Soviet officials deny their very existence. They say that all who want to leave have already left, so no more problem. For internal consumption, though, a different story is told, closer to the truth. At a recent Znaniye Society lecture in Moscow, for example, an official Soviet expert on Soviet nationality policy estimated that between 10 and 15 percent of Soviet Jews now wish to emigrate. At his base, he used the 1979 Soviet census figure (showing a total Soviet Jewish population of 1.8 million). The Soviet Jews who wish to leave number---in his view---between 180 and 270 thousand. This falls short of the 370,000 known to have taken the first legal step. That percentage is closer to 20 percent. But this Soviet scholar's internal estimate is far larger than what his government claims externally....

An open Europe

Mr. Chairman, the obstruction to Soviet emigration is not a hurdle faced only by Armenians, Germans and Jews. It is a universal problem in the Soviet Union, extending to every man, woman and child in the country. We have focused on Armenians, Germans and Jews only because they alone of the many people of the Soviet Union have been allowed to leave in significant numbers. Many Russians,

Ukrainians, Balts and others would leave if they could. We know the names of some who have tried and who have failed. But Russians, Ukrainians, Balts and others know that members of their nationalities simply are not allowed to leave. For them there is no similar precedent; there is no similar hope. For many of them, the only method left is described by authorities as illegal: clandestinely, they simply flee. Many, on trips abroad, must leave "hostages" behind---a child, a spouse, a parent.

Consider the young Estonian official and his beautiful wife, a singer, who recently asked asylum in Sweden. The only way they could leave Estonia, sadly, was to leave behind their infant daughter. That infant, Kaissa Randpere, is now only two years old. Her grandmother, her guardian now, has been deprived of employment and threatened with confinement in an asylum for the insane. A great power could soften the crying of a two-year-old, allowing her now to join her parents, without any damage to its security, gaining honor for its open ways. A Europe without openness would be a hell, that is why Europeans so honor openness.

In the course of our delegation's plenary statements, we have tried our best to give credit and to stress hope. We have tried hard not to be confrontational, but to speak the truth as we see it fairly and clearly, in the context of much hope for better things to come. The Soviet Union has promised new directions. Here in Bern we strongly welcome every sign of spring.

In candor, we have suggested the enormity of the work remaining to be done, the boldness of promises yet to be fulfilled. As these promises become realities in fact---when the great nation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics opens itself to the world---a great new age of human confidence will have begun. That was the hope generated by the Helsinki Final Act. May it soon become fact.

Never more than now, Europe desires openness. The European vocation is openness. The European imperative is openness. ■

In Italy "Private is Beautiful"

Leo J. Wollemborg

P rivate is beautiful": the slogan sums up not only a psychological climate but a concrete trend which in recent years has taken hold in Italy.

Similar developments have emerged in other Western European countries, notably in Great Britain and France. But the "Italian case" shows several significant peculiarities of its own.

This is a nation where the state's role in the economy, and government regulation of private pursuits had reached

levels rarely equalled in countries not ruled by totalitarian regimes. A strong tradition of governmental intervention and authority in the economic and social fields was given broader scope and new twists under Fascism. A major step was the creation of IRI (*Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale*) in 1933. The original purpose was to rescue the

Leo J. Wollemborg writes from Rome as a special correspondent for Freedom at Issue.

Steine

October 8, 1987

START: Key Themes

-- Despite the attention currently focused on the INF negotiations, we place our highest priority on our efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviet Union for deep reductions in strategic nuclear arms. We place particular emphasis on the most dangerous arms--fast-flying ballistic missiles, especially large, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads.

-- As a concrete step toward this end, the U.S. presented a draft treaty at the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in Geneva on May 8, 1987. This draft treaty reflects the basic areas of agreement reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev last October at Reykjavik and provides for roughly 50 percent reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear arms.

-- The U.S. draft treaty provides a solid basis for the creation of a fair and durable START agreement. Among other things, it provides for:

- o U.S. and Soviet reductions to a maximum of 1,600 deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with no more than 6,000 warheads over a period of seven years after the treaty enters into force;

- o Sublimits on warheads carried by fast-flying ballistic missiles, and particularly those on ICBMs, the most destabilizing and dangerous nuclear systems of all;

- o A 50 percent cut in the current Soviet level of ballistic missile throw-weight to a limit which would apply to both sides;

- o A ban on mobile ICBMs because of the verification and stability concerns they raise; and

- o An extensive verification regime designed to ensure with the highest possible confidence that each side is complying with the agreement.

-- The U.S. has made every effort to facilitate a START agreement, including making important compromises on sublimits shortly after Reykjavik in order to meet Soviet concerns.

-- The Soviet draft treaty text presented on July 31 is a welcome departure from the previous Soviet practice of proposing only highly generalized documents containing basic principles. It is similar in structure to the U.S. draft text and contains some common language. This has facilitated preparation of a joint, bracketed draft treaty text.

-- However, the Soviet draft offered no movement on the major outstanding issues, including sublimits on the most dangerous missile systems. In addition, it continued to hold hostage strategic offensive arms reductions to restrictions on strategic

defense that would go beyond those limitations already in the ABM Treaty and which appear to us to be a continuation of Soviet efforts to cripple the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

-- The President has made clear that he cannot and will not accept measures which would kill or cripple SDI--a research and technology development program that holds great promise for enhancing the future security of the U.S. and its Allies and for ensuring a stable strategic balance over the long term.

-- During their September meetings in Washington, Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed to intensify efforts at the Geneva talks to achieve an agreement on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms.

-- At the ministerial, the two sides had a good discussion on START issues. Some progress was made on outstanding issues, specifically:

- o the Soviets reinstated and updated their earlier proposal to limit warheads on any one leg of the strategic triad to 60 percent of the 6000 warhead total. We believe, however, that this limit should apply only to ICBMs, the most destabilizing systems, and be slightly lower (3300);

- o the Soviets said that a 50 percent reduction from their current level of heavy ICBM launchers would mean a limit of 1540 warheads on heavy ICBMs;

- o the Soviets have stated that a 50 percent reduction in strategic arms would result in a 50 percent reduction in their throw-weight and that this throw-weight would not subsequently increase (although they are as yet unwilling to codify this commitment in a treaty); and

- o the Soviets agreed to consider the seven year reduction period we proposed.

-- Since the ministerial, the Soviets have tabled in Geneva proposals reflecting the 60% limit on any one leg of the strategic triad and a limit of 1540 warheads on heavy ICBMs.

-- Nevertheless, fundamental issues remain, including the need for ballistic missile warhead sublimits, the need for codified throw-weight limits, the need for a ban on mobile ICBMs, and continuing Soviet insistence that START reductions be linked to U.S. acceptance of further limits on defense.

-- The U.S. believes that a treaty to reduce strategic arms could be completed in short order, if the Soviets were willing to apply themselves with the same seriousness as the U.S. Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed that START would be the focus of their arms control discussions during their October meeting in Moscow.

October 6, 1987

INF Negotiations: Key Themes

WE'VE COME A LONG WAY . . .

-- During the September meetings of Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Washington, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in principle to conclude a treaty on ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) which would eliminate the entire class of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles. Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will meet in Moscow October 22-23 to review progress toward an INF treaty as well as other elements of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the September ministerial noted that an INF agreement could be signed during a summit this fall.

-- The prospective INF agreement is consistent with the longheld U.S. position in key areas of the negotiations. This success is a direct consequence of the President's steadfast commitment to real arms reductions and Allied solidarity in support of these objectives:

o Longer-range INF missiles (LRINF): Since formal talks with the Soviet Union began in November 1981, the U.S. has sought to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile systems. This was the President's original "zero option" proposal. In July 1987 the Soviets finally agreed to eliminate these systems.

o Shorter-range INF missiles (SRINF): Since the negotiations began, the U.S. has insisted that an INF agreement must constrain shorter-range INF missiles to prevent circumvention of an accord on LRINF missiles by a Soviet buildup of the shorter-range systems. The agreement to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet SRINF missiles as an integral part of an INF accord satisfies this U.S. requirement.

o Reductions on a global basis: The U.S. has long insisted that any limitations on INF missiles must be global to prevent the transfer of the threat from one region to another. The Soviets have accepted this in the context of global elimination of both categories of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles, known as "global double zero".

-- The U.S. and the Soviet Union have also agreed on procedures for the elimination of INF missile reentry vehicles. Specifically, the sides have agreed that before U.S. and Soviet INF missiles are eliminated, nuclear explosive devices and guidance systems will be removed from the reentry vehicles and returned to national authorities. The remaining reentry vehicle structures will then be eliminated under agreed procedures.

-- The U.S. reentry vehicles associated with FRG Pershing IAs would be subject to the above elimination procedures once the conditions established by the FRG Government for dismantling the missiles have been met and the U.S.-FRG program of cooperation has ended. The U.S. made clear that bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the USSR cannot constrain third country forces nor affect existing programs of cooperation with our allies.

. . . BUT WE ARE NOT QUITE THERE YET.

-- Although the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed in principle to conclude an INF agreement, important issues remain to be resolved, including the details of verification procedures and a schedule for reductions. The Geneva delegations of both sides have been instructed to work intensively to resolve these remaining issues and to complete a draft treaty text promptly.

-- The sides have agreed in principle on the need for an effective verification regime to ensure compliance with the treaty. On September 14, the U.S. presented in Geneva a comprehensive proposal calling for the most stringent verification regime in arms control history. The negotiators are now working to achieve agreement on the all-important issue of verification.

-- The sides are also working to resolve differences on a schedule for reductions of INF missiles. The U.S. has proposed that longer-range INF missiles (1000-5500 km range) be eliminated through phased reductions within a three-year period from treaty entry into force and that shorter-range INF missiles (500-1000 km range) be eliminated within one year of treaty entry into force. The Soviets have proposed elimination of these missiles during five years and two years, respectively. During the September Ministerial, the Soviets expressed willingness to accept the U.S.-proposed schedule if it were shown possible, given technical and environmental considerations. To resolve this issue, the sides agreed to have technical experts meet in Geneva.

-- INF is only a part of the arms reduction agenda. The President has long been seeking deep cuts in strategic offensive arms in the START negotiations at Geneva as our first priority. General Secretary Gorbachev has agreed that START reductions are the "core" arms control issue. During their meetings in Washington, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed to intensify efforts to push forward on a START agreement. We believe that a START agreement could be achieved in short order if the Soviets are willing to negotiate constructively to resolve remaining issues, such as warheads sublimits on the most dangerous systems -- fast flying ballistic missiles.


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September 17, 1987

The Editor,
The Washington Post,
1150 15th St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20071

Dear Sir:

Your editorial on the Krasnoyarsk radar (September 11, 1987) raises the question, "Now what?". A better question might be, "What does the U.S. government propose to do about it?", since a bipartisan consensus now exists, reflected in yesterday's unanimous Senate vote, that this radar is a major Soviet violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The answer will have important implications for existing and future arms control agreements, including one on INF. (The House of Representatives had voted 418-0 in May for a similar resolution.)

The U.S. presently has no explicit policy for dealing with Soviet treaty violations. Yet each American failure to address a case of Soviet non-compliance can only encourage further violations. Without the development of a clear U.S. policy to handle treaty violations, U.S. verification capabilities become irrelevant. Verification by itself--even on-site inspection--cannot compel Soviet compliance.

A "positive compliance regime" is needed to impose explicit penalties for failing to observe the terms of arms control agreements. Such penalties might include proportional U.S. responses that offset any Soviet gains brought by treaty violations. If the Soviet's fail to dismantle their Krasnoyarsk radar, the U.S. should seriously consider either the development of those ABM capabilities permitted by the 1972 treaty, or formal withdrawal from the treaty. A positive compliance regime for the proposed INF agreement might have the U.S. halt and, if necessary, reverse the process of reductions should the Soviets fail to comply with its terms.

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Sincerely,

Robin Ranger

Robin Ranger
Bradley Resident Scholar
(Home tel:301-951-7082.)

MONDAY
AUG 24 1987

638

FH

Lance the boil

EDITORIAL

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According to Robin Ranger, a former UCLA professor and now a consultant to the Heritage Foundation, Soviet proposals at the disarmament conference will blame SDI "and what Moscow calls the U.S. 'militarization of space' as the chief roadblocks to disarmament and hence to Third World development."

Such Kremlin propaganda can be easily rebutted. First, many Third World countries are no longer poor. Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and others have pulled themselves out of poverty by rejecting Soviet-style socialism, while embracing free market policies. If U.S. military spending affects these countries at all, it does so by protecting them against foreign attack by Soviet client states like North Korea.

In contrast, Third World countries following Muskovite socialism, such as Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and Cuba, remain immersed in poverty. Some even use Soviet-inspired mass starvation to advance state power.

Second, American SDI spending amounts to only \$3 billion this year, or 0.3 percent of the U.S. federal budget; and less than \$10 billion has been spent since the program began in 1983. In contrast, the Soviets' own unpublicized strategic defense, Red Star Wars, has cost an estimated \$200 billion over the past 10 years — 20 times the American amount; 10,000 Soviet scientists are reportedly working on it. If the Soviets are so concerned about space defenses hurting the Third World, they first should scrap Red Star Wars.

Third, if the United Nations really were concerned about Third World poverty, it would dissolve itself, and refund to contributing nations the \$4.5 billion spent each year by itself and associated agencies — that's more money than the American SDI program costs. By returning this money to taxpayers throughout the world, the United Nations would thus increase the world capital pool, which in turn would help Third World economic development.

But of course the United Nations would never do that. It deliriously thinks giving bags of other people's money to Third World dictators and grafters somehow helps relieve poverty. But as the past 40 years' experience has shown, the reality is different. Countries' economies develop, not when local politicians get fattened on foreign money, but when politicians promote liberty. Free economies attract foreign development capital, while socialist economies attract only graft.

The United States has wisely refused to participate in this week's U.N.-Soviet propaganda display in New York. But the question then arises: Why is the United States still involved with any of the other U.N. charades? Why are we still paying 25 percent of its exorbitant, wasteful budget?

It's time to end this farce — this obscene totalitarian sore rising on free American soil by the East River. We would be better off joining such free, prosperous nations as Switzerland and Taiwan outside the U.N. walls, while leaving the United Nations to the 80 percent of its members, including the Soviet Union, Libya, and Albania, that are dictatorships.

We should further insist that the United Nations move its offices to more appropriate surroundings in, say, Novosibirsk.

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AUG 26 1987

BURRELLE'S

Wrong Question, Wrong Answer

EDITORIAL

Many elderly Americans are impoverished by the out-of-pocket cost of health care. Many others live in fear of such an assault on their life savings. That is a tragedy in this rich land of ours.

But Congress, as usual, is approaching the issue from the wrong angle, proposing to spend \$34 billion over the next five years on a program that does not even address the main problem.

Among the elderly who are forced to spend more than \$2,000 a year on health care, more than 80 percent spend it for nursing home care.

Congress, though, did not address the question of how to ease the burden of paying for long-term care; that very real problem was too expensive for even the free-spending Democrats.

Instead, it answered the question of what Congress can do to protect older Americans against catastrophic costs for acute care, even though most elderly people already are better protected against such costs than millions of young people.

The expansion of the Medicare program approved July 22 by the House of Representatives gives the 31 million Medicare beneficiaries greater coverage of their hospital, outpatient and prescription drug costs. It sets a ceiling on their out-of-pocket costs for such care, with the government picking up the rest of the tab.

To a large extent, though, this new government program would simply replace the "Medigap" insurance policies that about 75 percent of the elderly already are buying from private insurers.

So, having asked the wrong question, Congress is pushing forward with the wrong answer—government intervention where the private sector can do the job more efficiently.

The income tax surtax that will be imposed on the elderly to pay for this Medicare expansion will range up to \$580 a year for an elderly person with an adjusted gross income of more than \$14,166. Basic Medigap policies, according to Heritage Foundation analyst Edmund F. Haislmaier, cost about \$160 a year.

The congressional plan is an outgrowth of President Reagan's proposal in his 1986 State of the Union address for a limited catastrophic health care plan to protect the elderly. In Congress, it has outgrown our ability to pay and has been turned into a massive new tax on the elderly.

We need to continue to look for ways to protect the elderly against catastrophic health care costs. But the House bill is not the answer.



The Heritage Foundation

A tax-exempt public policy research institute

September 17, 1987

The Editor,
The Washington Post,
1150 15th St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20071

Dear Sir:

Your editorial on the Krasnoyarsk radar (September 11, 1987) raises the question, "Now what?". A better question might be, "What does the U.S. government propose to do about it?", since a bipartisan consensus now exists, reflected in yesterday's unanimous Senate vote, that this radar is a major Soviet violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The answer will have important implications for existing and future arms control agreements, including one on INF. (The House of Representatives had voted 418-0 in May for a similar resolution.)

The U.S. presently has no explicit policy for dealing with Soviet treaty violations. Yet each American failure to address a case of Soviet non-compliance can only encourage further violations. Without the development of a clear U.S. policy to handle treaty violations, U.S. verification capabilities become irrelevant. Verification by itself--even on-site inspection--cannot compel Soviet compliance.

A "positive compliance regime" is needed to impose explicit penalties for failing to observe the terms of arms control agreements. Such penalties might include proportional U.S. responses that offset any Soviet gains brought by treaty violations. If the Soviet's fail to dismantle their Krasnoyarsk radar, the U.S. should seriously consider either the development of those ABM capabilities permitted by the 1972 treaty, or formal withdrawal from the treaty. A positive compliance regime for the proposed INF agreement might have the U.S. halt and, if necessary, reverse the process of reductions should the Soviets fail to comply with its terms.

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We should further insist that the United Nations move its offices to more appropriate surroundings in, say, Novosibirsk.

To Rowena,
USC profs and graduates who
come to D.C. end up in the
most interesting places, don't they?
Cheers
Robin.

Learning From the Naval Arms Control Experience

Robin Ranger

THE RECENT HARVARD study by Albert Carnesale, Richard Haass, and their colleagues, *Learning from Experience with Arms Control*,¹ is a much needed assessment. But its historical purview is quite narrow, drawing only on the superpower experience since 1963. Another experience from which much of contemporary relevance can be learned is the effort of the interwar years to control naval arms—the “strategic” weapons of that era.

With the recent declassification of some important British sources and the appearance of comprehensive technical studies on warship design, it is now possible to reconstruct the interwar arms control experience in its entirety. The lessons of this experience are surprisingly relevant to the current arms control debate, especially the discovery that President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) pioneered a U.S. proportionate response policy in the 1930s. Above all, the interwar naval arms control experience is, as one analyst has written of that with chemical weapons, one that

conveys an image of a policy environment not unlike our own today; an imperfect though politically significant arms control regime . . . the military grappling with a technological revolution [and] extensive public attention being given to highly emotional policy issues. . . . it is rich in insights relevant to contemporary policy considerations.²

To develop the insights from the naval arms control experience, a summary of the treaty regime is offered, followed by an analysis of the four most relevant aspects of this experience: the dispute between the United States and the United Kingdom over ambiguous treaty provisions; the problems of both countries with the lulling effects of the treaties; FDR's proportional response policy and, finally, the United Kingdom's failure to respond to compelling evidence of German and Italian violations. An earlier naval arms control agreement will also be revisited, the 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement, which was intended to demilitarize the Great Lakes. Lessons for U.S. policymakers from these experiences will then be suggested.

The Arms Control Regime

The interwar naval arms control regime was based on the 1922 Washington Treaty and the limits it established.³ The core of the treaty was

Robin Ranger is a Washington-based consultant who has taught international security issues at universities in Canada and the United States. This article draws on his unclassified study for the office of the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy (START), *The Naval Arms Control Record 1919-1939: Axis Violations vs. Democratic Compliance Policy Failures* (Fairfax, Va.: National Security Research, 1987).

a three-power U.S.-British-Japanese agreement to freeze their strategic naval forces in their existing ratios of roughly 5:5:3 and to divide the Pacific into spheres of influence via the accompanying Four and Nine Power Pacts. All three powers canceled their large naval building programs. Warships were divided into five categories: capital units (battleships and battlecruisers, faster but less well protected units); aircraft carriers; cruisers; destroyers; and submarines. Two main units of account for measuring and limiting a warship's military effectiveness were established. The first was displacement, the most accurate single indication of a warship's military capabilities (comparable to missile throw-weight today). The weight of a ship was equal to the weight of the water it displaced, expressed in English tons (1,016 kilograms), and the treaty established the Washington standard displacement of a ship fully equipped for war, without fuel or reserve feed water, but with normal ammunition and stores.

The second unit of account was the main gun battery caliber, measured in inches: the diameter of the gun's bore and its shell. Shell weight and destructive power rose sharply with increases in caliber.

The combination of these two measures of military effectiveness produced a Washington naval force structure based on maximum limits, for capital units, of 35,000 tons and 16-inch main batteries and, for cruisers, of 10,000 tons and 8-inch main batteries. Ships built to these limits became known as treaty battleships and cruisers. The main limits on aircraft carriers were that the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan each could convert two capital units under construction to large carriers, displacing up to 33,000 tons with 8-inch

main batteries (to deal with treaty cruisers). Further carrier construction would be limited to 27,000 tons. The total tonnage of capital units and carriers was also limited.

Collateral constraints consisted of limits on capital units' modernization (displacement could be increased by no more than 3,000 tons) and limits on the fortification of naval bases in the Pacific. Basically, no additions could be made to existing fortifications and no new bases could be constructed in a clearly defined region of the Central Pacific. Finally, verification was left up to the naval (and other) intelligence services of the three powers.

To make the treaty regime comprehensive, the three powers also persuaded a reluctant France and Italy to accept its limits. So the Washington Treaty limited the main classes of warships in the five powers' navies in the ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75.

Taken together, the effect of the Washington Treaty's limits, if they were observed, would be to establish a defense-dominated strategic environment in the Pacific. Japan could not attack U.S. and British possessions and allies, and these two powers could not attack Japan.

Three follow-on treaties built on and extended the 1922 treaty's limits. The 1930 First London Treaty imposed sublimits on mainly heavy (8-inch) and light (6-inch) carriers; lowered aircraft carrier displacement to 23,000 tons; and limited destroyers and submarines, individually and in total. But France and Italy rejected this treaty and its extension until 1936 of the 1922 treaty's moratorium on new battleship construction. The 1936 Second London Treaty abolished the limits on total naval forces but retained those on individual units. The treaty was initially accepted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and

France, and later by Germany, Italy, and the USSR. The 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement (AGNA) extended the 1922 and 1930 treaties' limits to individual German units and limited German forces to 35 percent of the United Kingdom's total in each of the main classes of warships.

For a first strategic naval arms control treaty, that of 1922 was remarkably comprehensive. It set qualitative limits on individual units and quantitative total limits on the most militarily significant classes of warships, limited their modernization, and banned increased defense in the Central Pacific. Subsequent treaties built on this basic structure, apparently demonstrating its soundness. Indeed, the Washington Treaty's limits were so far-reaching that it could be seen, to paraphrase Gilbert and Sullivan, as the very model of a modern arms control agreement.

Yet this treaty and its successors quickly ran into a series of equally modern problems, including a clash between a broad U.S. interpretation of its modernization provisions and a narrow British interpretation of them.

Broad Versus Narrow Interpretations

Given the current U.S. controversy over the broad versus the narrow interpretations of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, it is quite remarkable to find an almost exact parallel in the U.S.-British controversy over the 1922 Washington Treaty.

The 1922 treaty's modernization limits allowed increases in capital units' defenses provided that these did not increase standard displacement by more than 3,000 tons and complied with the so-called "reconstruction clause." This clause stated that "no alterations in side armor, in caliber,

number or general type of main armaments shall be permitted."⁴

But the U.S. Navy, conscious that its battle fleet was "outranged by their British counterparts, and . . . that in a Jutland-type battle . . . the Americans would be defeated,"⁵ proposed to increase the elevation, and hence the range, of its battleships' main batteries to 30 degrees.

The British ambassador to Washington responded in 1924, with "an official protest declaring that increasing the elevation of capital ships' guns would be a violation in spirit, if not in letter, of the 'reconstruction clause' of the treaty."⁶ The British prime minister further argued that the proposed substitution of oil for coal fuel in the six older U.S. battleships was also a violation of this clause. These British arguments for a narrow interpretation of the reconstruction clause were meant to preserve their existing military advantage and avoid the costs of a major modernization program.

The U.S. Navy's arguments for a broad interpretation of the reconstruction clauses were the reverse of the United Kingdom's arguments: the United States did not want the treaty to freeze its inferiority in place, and the United States could afford modernization. The navy had also insisted, even before the British protest, that the reconstruction clause permitted increased main battery elevation. The U.S. secretary of state at the Washington Conference, Charles E. Hughes, and his successor, Frank B. Kellogg, agreed with this broad interpretation. Finally in 1927, Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur wrote the British ambassador insisting that the U.S. delegates to the Washington Conference had always assumed that the broad interpretation was valid and asked for a withdrawal of the United Kingdom's protest. No more was heard of the pro-

test, and the United States went ahead with increases in main battery elevation as the rest of its battleline was modernized. The United Kingdom followed suit from 1935 onward, but it modernized only four units.

Meanwhile, the Japanese, who had begun to increase their battleline's main battery elevation in the mid-1920s, went further than the United States or the United Kingdom. Japan eventually increased this elevation to 43 degrees versus 30 degrees in the U.S. and British modernization in all 10 capital units.⁷

These U.S.-British differences over the interpretation of ambiguous treaty provisions suggest that these kinds of differences are difficult to avoid. This conclusion is reinforced by another U.S. broad interpretation of the treaty's modernization provisions. The two large U.S. carriers converted from incomplete battlecruisers were limited to 33,000 ton displacement but would, it became clear, displace 36,000 tons. The U.S. Navy therefore decided that "as the ships were more than half finished as *capital ships* at the time of the conference, the clause about extra protection applied to them."⁸

In both these cases, the U.S. Navy was insisting, in current terms, on a broad interpretation of ambiguous treaty provisions and exploiting ambiguities to modernize its forces.

Lulling Effects

One of the hypotheses examined in the Harvard study was that "the arms control process and . . . agreements (a) lull the United States into spending less than it should on defense [or] (b) stimulate the United States to spend more than it should on defense."⁹ This is a particularly important, politically sensitive issue because it is dif-

ficult to prove or disprove a lulling effect. The weaknesses of the Harvard study's attempt to disprove this effect by the use of data on U.S. defense budgets and public opinion underlines this difficulty.¹⁰

But the naval experience shows fairly clearly that both the United States and the United Kingdom found that the interwar arms control process and agreements exerted a lulling effect on their defense budgets and forces. As Norman Friedman noted,

for the United States, the most important effect of the treaty regime was an imbalance between the U.S. and Japanese navies. It is interesting as an *indirect* effect of the treaty and as a parallel to similar effects under SALT. That is, in 1922 the treaty left the United States in a commanding position. . . . All that the United States had to do was to build up its carrier and cruiser forces to match [its battlefleet]. What happened was that the public and Congress saw the treaty *itself* as proof that the underlying tensions in the Pacific had been eliminated, and naval construction was seriously restricted. . . . Japan, with a much more autocratic political system, embarked on an interwar building program, the consequences of which were obvious in 1941.¹¹

The imbalance between the U.S. and Japanese navies was particularly acute until FDR's proportional response policy (discussed below) began to take effect in the late 1930s. By the mid-1930s, Japan had built up its naval forces to treaty limits in terms of numbers of individual units—and many of these exceeded the treaty limits on displacement by 10–20 percent or more. The United States had failed to

build up to treaty limits in terms of the numbers of individual units and many of these were below treaty limits by up to 10 percent. For example, Japan's early Washington Treaty cruisers initially displaced about 11,000 tons (in violation of treaty limits) while the early U.S. treaty cruisers displaced about 9,000 tons. Japan's treaty violations were such that its cruisers displaced some 22 percent more than U.S. cruisers, a militarily significant advantage.¹² This advantage became apparent in the opening battles of the Pacific War, including the bitter night cruiser actions around Guadalcanal Island in 1942.

The result of this lulling effect was that instead of the 10:7 treaty ratio of U.S. to Japanese naval forces (in favor of the United States), Japan enjoyed at least equality, if not superiority. This advantage enabled Japan to invade China in 1931 knowing that the United States would be unable to implement its 1922 treaty commitments to preserve China's independence.

The British experienced a similar lulling effect. For example, in 1936 the British admiralty produced SALT-style tables grossly overstating (by 300 percent for capital ships) how much larger the German naval threat would be without the 1935 AGNA. British rearmament could thus proceed without disrupting normal business routines, as desired by the politically powerful Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain. The admiralty had been lulled into making two incorrect assumptions:

One . . . was . . . that . . . the German Navy was capable of far greater expansion than that allowed for under . . . the agreement and was, therefore, exercising a politically inspired restraint. The second was that the Germans

were loyally abiding by [its] terms.¹³

In these U.S. and British cases, the lulling effect extended beyond defense budgets to include overcompliance with arms control treaty limits, individually and in total. The United States' willingness to push a broad interpretation of the treaty noted above thus was exceptional, as shown by a small but significant episode. To protect the Philippines, the U.S. Navy wanted to lay defensive minefields. But "the Judge Advocate ruled eventually against such deployments as a violation of the letter and spirit of the nonfortification status of the Five Power Treaty."¹⁴

FDR's Proportional Response

The Reagan administration has been widely criticized for arguing the need for a U.S. proportional response policy to Soviet violations of arms control agreements. But the first U.S. administration to develop a proportional response policy was the Democratic one of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. FDR developed his policy in close collaboration with the influential chairman of the House naval affairs committee, Representative Carl H. Vinson (D-Ga.), the political mentor of the current, equally influential chairman of the Senate armed services committee, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.). So, surprising as it may seem, Republican President Ronald Reagan's proportional response policy follows a Democratic precedent.

As a keen navy man and a former assistant secretary of the navy, President Roosevelt was well aware of how far below treaty strength the navy was. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) also suspected Japan of violat-

ing the prohibition on fortifications and bases in their Mandated Territories, a violation that they may or may not have been guilty of because of treaty ambiguities. Curiously, ONI seems to have been unaware of Japan's militarily more significant violations of treaty limits on displacement. The beginning of Japan's war against China also meant that, as the Japanese government confirmed in 1934, they would reject any follow-on naval treaty when the 1922 and 1930 treaties expired in 1936.

To deal with Japan's suspected treaty violations and its breakout from treaty limits after they expired, President Roosevelt, Representative Vinson, and the U.S. Navy crafted what would now be called a proportional response policy. The two key elements of this policy were enabling legislation and treaty escalator clauses, both elements of potential use in future U.S. arms control agreements.

The enabling legislation authorized the buildup of the U.S. Navy to its maximum permitted treaty strength in terms of total forces, while these were still limited, and then beyond these limits after they expired in 1936, although staying within the new limits on individual units. This legislation was contained in the First and Second Vinson Naval Acts (1934 and 1938). Funding for the necessary programs was then sought by the executive branch and approved, albeit slowly, by the legislature. To support this funding, President Roosevelt frequently argued that there could be no objection to building a U.S. *treaty* navy. But groups opposed to U.S. defense increases, very similar to current opponents of the increases, opposed the U.S. Navy's buildup as unnecessary and provocative to the peaceloving Japanese, prompting, in turn, an exasperated FDR to note that it is "far

better not to answer the professional pacifist."¹⁵

The specific escalator clauses were inserted by the United States into the 1936 London Treaty, negotiations for which began in 1934. Technical studies by the U.S. Navy showed that to counter new Japanese construction new U.S. battleships needed to carry 16-inch main batteries and displace at least 35,000 tons, preferably more. But the United Kingdom was pushing strongly for a 14-inch main battery limit in the futile hope that this unilateral self-restraint would be reciprocated by Japan. Domestic U.S. opinion also favored the lowest possible limits on the size and armament of new U.S. battleships.

To balance these pressures for arms control against the need to provide for U.S. national security, the Roosevelt administration devised two escalator clauses that would come into effect unless Japan accepted the treaty terms. The first escalator clause was adversary triggered, automatic and specific. Unless Japan accepted the Second London Naval Treaty by April 1, 1937, the proposed reduction in the maximum permitted main battery caliber from 16 to 14 inches would not take place. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy designed its first treaty battleships with both 14- and 16-inch main batteries, and they were finally ordered in 1937 with 16-inch main batteries.

The second escalator clause allowed the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to increase their battleship's maximum displacement to 45,000 tons if any other nation built outside the 35,000 ton limit. Because Japan refused to give assurances that it would not do so, this escalator clause was invoked in 1938.

These escalator clauses, plus the administration's willingness to use them, were instrumental in giving the U.S.

Navy an adequate battleship force in World War II and today. Because main batteries took longer to build than the ships carrying them, the navy's ability to begin design of its 16-inch batteries in 1935 enabled its battleships to be completed in time for the Pacific war. The United States' use of the second escalator clause permitted the building of four Iowa class battleships of 45,000 ton displacement.

The need for these escalator clauses was underlined by the U.S. Navy's postwar discovery that while they were building their first six treaty-limited battleships of 35,000 tons with 16-inch main batteries, Japan was building the largest battleships in history, the Yamato class. These behemoths displaced 64,000 tons, some 84 percent more than the U.S. battleships, and carried 18-inch main batteries. More recently, a further benefit from these clauses was secured when the four Iowa-class battleships built as part of FDR's proportional response policy were modernized and returned to service as part of former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's 600-ship navy.

Failing to React to Violation

The British failure to react to compelling evidence of German and Italian violations of naval arms control agreements supports the hypothesis that, when faced with such evidence of arms control violations, a democratic society may choose to do nothing. This hypothesis has been confirmed, of course, by the recent U.S. failure to react to Soviet violations until late last year. But this seemed a novel concept when first formulated by Fred C. Iklé, now undersecretary of defense for policy. He suggested in 1961 that

a potential violator of an arms-control agreement will not be de-

tered simply by the risk that his action may be discovered. What will deter him will be the fear that what he gains from the violation will be outweighed by the loss he may suffer from the victim's reaction to it. [But]. . . democratic governments might experience serious political difficulties in reacting effectively to a detected evasion.¹⁶

Britain's failure to react to German naval arms control violations is particularly striking when placed in historical context. Germany's naval challenges to Britain had been a major factor in the British decision to oppose German hegemony in World War I. During the war the German navy had demonstrated a significant technical edge over the Royal Navy, so that on a given displacement a German warship was qualitatively superior to its British counterpart. When the war ended, Britain had incurred unprecedented casualties, including nearly 1 million killed.

The 1919 Versailles Treaty then demilitarized Germany, on paper, and set up a Control Commission that supervised this demilitarization, including via intrusive on-site inspection, until it was disbanded in 1926. The commission found, as one of its members put it, that

Germany never was disarmed, never intended to disarm, and for seven years did everything in her power to obstruct, deceive and "counter-control" the Commission whose duty it was to disarm her.¹⁷

British civil and military policymakers in the 1930s thus knew that the German military threat could become a major one if Germany rearmed. They further knew that the Weimar Republic had clearly violated, on a

large scale, the arms control provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Yet when Hitler announced the establishment of the German Air Force and the reintroduction of conscription in 1935, the British government of Stanley Baldwin rushed to conclude the AGNA.

The British admiralty strongly supported the AGNA, even though the admiralty had recently discovered that the last two German pocket battleships being built were actually battlecruisers displacing 26,000 tons instead of the 10,000 tons allowed, according to the *Reichsmarine*. Winston Churchill recorded his amazement that

in the face of this brazen and fraudulent violation of the Peace Treaty, carefully planned and begun at least two years earlier (1933), the Admiralty actually thought it was worthwhile making an Anglo-German naval agreement.¹⁸

Even more amazingly, the admiralty then became advocates of Hitler's compliance with the arms control agreement that they had helped negotiate, rejecting evidence of German violations. In 1936 Germany laid down the famous battleship *Bismark* and provided the British with technical data claiming to prove that it was within treaty limits. The German section of the admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division (NID) questioned this claim, particularly the shallow draft relative to *Bismark's* length and breadth. But the director of plans, who had been heavily involved in the negotiations for the AGNA, insisted that the *Bismark* complied with the limits he had negotiated. He took the same view of German pocket battleships and battlecruisers. The director of naval intelligence agreed, having earlier noted that Admiral Raeder, head of

the *Reichsmarine*, had "categorically denied that Germany is violating" the AGNA.¹⁹

Unfortunately, difficult though the admiralty would have found to believe it, Admiral Raeder and Hitler were not telling the truth. The 10,000 ton pocket battleships displaced about 12,000 tons; the 26,000 ton battlecruisers displaced 32,000 tons; and the 35,000 ton *Bismark* and its sister ship *Tirpitz* displaced 42,000 tons. These were violations of the displacement limits by 20, 23, and 20 percent respectively.

Because the admiralty and its political masters believed in Hitler's compliance with arms control agreements, both wanted the new British battleships to comply with the initial 1936 treaty limits, which Japan was expected to accept: 35,000 ton displacement and 14-inch main batteries. This British compliance produced the King George V class battleships, which proved markedly inferior to the *Bismark* class in combat. Before World War I, the idea of the Royal Navy building inferior battleships to comply with an arms control agreement Germany was violating and Japan rejected would have seemed ludicrous. But that is exactly what the admiralty's belief in Hitler's compliance led them to do.

The British failure to react to German violations of the AGNA, except by denying that they existed, is truly remarkable. As an experienced U.S. Department of Defense arms control negotiator put it privately, the British knew that the Weimar Republic had grossly violated arms control agreements, so they were assuming that the Nazis would be more scrupulous in their observance of such agreements than the Republic's Social Democratic governments.

In addition, the British also knew

by late 1936 that Italy's treaty cruisers were more than 10 percent over treaty limits because Britain had repaired and weighed one of them at Gibraltar. The admiralty was further assuming that Hitler was more honest than Mussolini. Having established this clear Italian violation, the British government deliberated and decided to do nothing about it.

Symbolism Versus Substance

An earlier naval arms control agreement, the Rush-Bagot Agreement, shows the same pattern of violations as the interwar naval agreements. Despite its substantive failure, the agreement has successfully symbolized the emergence of an essentially cooperative political relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom (succeeded by Canada in North America).

Following the War of 1812, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to demilitarize the Great Lakes to avoid a naval arms race that would, as John Quincy Adams wrote, "operate as a continual stimulus of suspicion and ill will."²⁰ The subsequent history of the agreement was summarized by the distinguished Canadian historian James Eayrs as being

not the example of successful arms control it is popularly supposed to be [it has] an unknown history of almost continuous violations, and a succession of negotiations designed to reconcile violations with the spirit of the agreement.²¹

Both the United Kingdom and the United States deployed ships on the Great Lakes exceeding the token level allowed. In the case of the United States, many more ships had been de-

ployed than were allowed and each exceeded, by very wide margins, the limits on the displacement and armament of individual ships. By 1922, Canadian Prime Minister MacKenzie King complained that "our American friends have been steadily evading the . . . Agreement which . . . has become more or less of a mockery" and, in turn, proposed a replacement treaty.²² Yet Rush-Bagot is still in force and frequently referred to as evidence of the harmonious state of U.S.-Canadian relations (despite differences on acid rain). How is this possible?

Because the underlying U.S.-Canadian political relationship was, and is, so cooperative, the technical violations of the agreement were, and are, irrelevant, politically. They had also become, after the U.S. Civil War, militarily irrelevant because the United States had become the dominant military power on the North American continent.

So the United States could observe or violate the agreement as it chose, and its choice would not alter its strategic dominance. Indeed, what is interesting is that the U.S. violations were so small, compared to what they could have been, although they were large compared to the agreement's near-zero limits.

The Rush-Bagot Agreement thus offers a paradoxical lesson for arms control. On the one hand, the agreement proves to have been an almost complete technical failure. On the other hand, it was an almost complete political success. The implications of this and other lessons of naval arms control can now be considered.

Naval Lessons for Arms Control

The naval arms control experience is clearly a rich one from which much

can be learned. If there is a single lesson that emerges from this experience, it is that it is difficult, perhaps almost impossible, to get major military powers to agree on arms control regimes that can function as desired by all the parties to them.

More specifically, the naval arms control regime encountered five major problems. First, there was the ambiguity problem. Even in an era of relatively much simpler weapons technology, it was difficult for the negotiators to draft unambiguous limits on some important weapons systems. Both the United States and the United Kingdom had "differing but plausible interpretations"—broad versus narrow—of the battleship modernization limits.²³

The ambiguity problems were further illustrated by the large U.S. aircraft carriers, Japan's battleship modernization program, and Japan's activities of potential military value in the Mandated Territories. Many of the more important treaty limitations that looked clear and unambiguous proved to be the opposite, rivaling the ABM Treaty ambiguities.

Second, there was the asymmetry problem. The asymmetry between open, democratic societies and less open or totalitarian societies exerted a pervasive effect on the way the naval arms control regimes functioned. The democratic United States and United Kingdom usually complied, or over-complied, with the spirit and letter of these regimes. (The U.S. Navy's two exploitations of ambiguities in its favor were departures from the prevalent U.S. and UK pattern of compliance.) The less democratic German government in the 1920s, its totalitarian successor, and the Japanese and Italian governments violated the letter and spirit of the arms control regimes.

These violations were militarily most significant in the 1930s.

Such violations reflected the situation Iklé noted in 1961: the asymmetry between democratic and totalitarian societies creates incentives for violations by the latter that are likely to prove irresistible. The potential violators can calculate that their violations may well go undetected or, if detected, will fail to incur any meaningful penalties. British failure to react to German and Italian violations emphasized this point.

Third, there was the problem of proportional response. It is difficult for states complying with arms control agreements to devise responses to violations that will reverse these or offset their effects. Only the United States, under President Roosevelt's leadership, was able to devise a proportional response policy to deal, mainly, with Japan's breakout from treaty limits when they expired. But this response was domestically difficult and took several years to become effective.

Fourth, there was the linkage problem. Arms control regimes cannot be insulated from the broader political and military relationships between the parties to them. The naval regimes never functioned as expected and collapsed as the conflicts between the United States and Japan and the United Kingdom and Germany, plus Italy, intensified.

Fifth, unrealistic expectations caused problems. Arms control regimes were often asked to do more than it was reasonable to expect from them, especially as international tensions increased. The paradox that arms control regimes may be asked to do more, precisely when they are able to do less, was illustrated by the Baldwin government's expectation that the

AGNA would restrain Hitler when the Versailles Treaty failed to restrain the Weimar Republic.

Future Prospects

This past naval experience helps put current U.S. and allied arms control expectations in historical perspective. Such a perspective is particularly useful as the 1988 presidential election campaign begins, and outbreaks of arms control fever occur on the Potomac. The basic lessons of the naval arms control experience for U.S. policymakers are the following:

- do not expect arms control agreements to do too much, if anything;
- do not expect arms control regimes to function as advertised;
- expect violations, noncompliance, and exploitation of ambiguities in agreements by non-democratic parties to them;
- anticipate a U.S. need to build its forces up to treaty levels, as the nondemocratic parties build beyond them;
- and prepare a U.S. proportionate response policy in advance to deter nondemocratic parties' violations or offset them if they occur.

In concrete terms, these lessons suggest that hopes for a comprehensive agreement along the lines sought at Reykjavik are illusory. So, too, are hopes for some grand compromise on strategic defensive and offensive forces, or, currently, for a zero-option, intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement with Soviet acceptance of intrusive on-site inspection. How then can the prevalent desire for an arms control agreement to cap the Reagan presidency and to calm domestic U.S. and allied public anxieties be met?

The answer may be a Rush-Bagot style agreement, full of political symbolism and ability to survive, politically, the most egregious violations of any technical limitations it contains. To avoid any problems with such violations, an agreement could take the form of a Declaration of Principles Governing Future Negotiations for Arms Reductions. Symbolic arms control is, after all, always feasible, even if substantial arms control has proved historically largely impossible.

Notes

1. Albert Carnesale, ed., et. al., *Learning from Experience with Arms Control* (for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, September 1986). The principal conclusions and lines of analysis of this study are summarized elsewhere in this issue of *The Washington Quarterly*.
2. Brad Roberts, "The World of Books," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 1987), p. 188.
3. The data on the Washington Treaty draws on my *The Naval Arms Control Record*, but two basic sources are Merze Tate, *The United States and Armaments* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), and Roger Dingman, *Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation 1914-1922* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
4. Captain Stephen Roskill, RN (Ret.), *Naval Policy Between the Wars: Vol. I, The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1968), p. 335, his italics.
5. Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars: Vol. I*, p. 335.
6. Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars: Vol. I*, p. 335.
7. See Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars: Vol. I*, p. 336, and Peter Hodges, *The Big Gun: Battleship Main Armament 1860-1945* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981), pp. 61-126.
8. Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars: Vol. I*, pp. 334-335, and Norman Freedman,

- U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), pp. 31–47. Friedman notes (p. 43) that the two carriers were “carried in official lists at 33,000 tons with a footnote stating that this figure ‘does not include weight allowance under Ch. 11, pt. 3, Sec. 1, art. (d) of Washington Treaty for providing means against air and submarine attack’—3,000 tons of ‘means.’” He adds that “in 1925 a more legalistic Secretary of the Navy [asked] whether the two ships could be completed within the treaty limit . . . only to discover that rather . . . radical changes would be required. He demurred.” So the U.S. Navy *had* to exploit this treaty ambiguity.
9. Carnesale, et al., p. 10–31.
 10. Carnesale, et al., Chapter 7, “The Lulling Effect.”
 11. Norman Friedman, *U.S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1985), p. 183.
 12. See Norman Friedman, *U.S. Carriers: An Illustrated Design History* and Ernest Lacroix, “The Development of the ‘A Class’ Cruisers in the Imperial Japanese Navy,” *Warship International* (Toledo, Ohio: International Naval Research Organization, 1977–1984), Parts I–VII.
 13. Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 140.
 14. Robert A. Hoover, *Arms Control: The Inter-war Naval Limitation Agreements*, University of Denver, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 13, Book 3 (1980), p. 117, footnote 26.
 15. Quoted in Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. II, The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930–1939* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 178.
 16. Fred C. Iklé, “After Detection—What?,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (January 1961), pp. 208–220, quoting p. 208 and p. 211.
 17. General J.H. Morgan quoted in Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. II*, p. 440.
 18. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Vol. I, The Gathering Storm* (London: Cassel and Co., 1948), p. 108.
 19. Adm 116/3377, quoted in Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. II*, p. 309.
 20. James Eayrs, “Arms Control on the Great Lakes,” *Disarmament and Arms Control*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Autumn 1964), pp. 372–404, quoting p. 373.
 21. Eayrs, Abstract, p. 405.
 22. Eayrs, p. 391.
 23. W. Bruce Weinrod, “Strategic Defense and the ABM Treaty,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1986), p. 75.

A United Nations Assessment Project Study

August 17, 1987

THE HIDDEN AGENDA FOR THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Once again the United Nations is convening to discuss disarmament. Yet when the delegates from some 80 member nations gather at U.N. headquarters in Manhattan this August 24 to September 11, the U.N. once again will avoid the most serious arms questions. Instead, the U.N. effort will be dominated by a hidden agenda pushed through by the Soviet Union and endorsed by the Third World bloc that dominates the U.N.

Despite the formal U.N. announcements, this year's real agenda almost surely will be an all-out assault on U.S. efforts to develop and deploy a defense against nuclear attack. The undeclared but true aim of the U.N. Conference on Disarmament and Development (UNCDD) will be to discredit Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or, as it popularly is known, Star Wars.

U.S. Warning. Reinforcing this assault will be a distortion of the way the U.N. decided to hold the UNCDD, a decision so dubious that the U.S. warned before it was finally taken that American delegates could not attend a conference falsely linking two separate issues--disarmament and development.¹ This U.S. warning, given as long ago as last year, is now being obscured by the U.N. Undersecretary of Disarmament's office decision to stress "consensus" as the key word behind the UNCDD. The U.N. claims that the decision to hold it was taken

1. The current U.S. position is given in U.S. Department of State, International Organizations Bureau, "I.O. Contingency Press Guidance, U.N. Conference on Disarmament and Development," p. 1. "We are not participating because we believe disarmament and development are not issues which should be considered inter-related."

by "consensus" and that UNCDD will arrive at "consensus" decisions. The U.N., apparently, is willing to redefine "consensus" in a way that pretends that Washington raises no objections to the conference.

The State Department should be forcefully and publicly refuting the U.N.'s anti-U.S. rhetoric and be preparing to deal with attacks on the U.S. at the UNCDD. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) should be preparing an active diplomatic campaign against these attacks.

Ignoring Third World Arsenals. What is almost certain to happen at this month's U.N. conference is that SDI will be branded as the world's major arms problem and threat to peace. Ignored will be the massive buildup of conventional arms arsenals in Third World countries, the crucial Soviet role in support of regional aggression and the enormous resource drain that this represents. Ignored too will be the fact that every one of the more than 100 wars since the U.N.'s founding in 1945 has been fought with conventional arms. And ignored will be the threat posed by the two-decade buildup of Moscow's nuclear arsenal.

Instead, the UNCDD will accept the longstanding Soviet assertion that there exists a "disarmament dividend" that could fund Third World economic development if only the U.S. and its allies would accept the latest Soviet disarmament proposals. The Soviets first enunciated this line with their 1959 proposal for General and Complete Disarmament. Their 1987 variant will be proposals to halt the U.S. SDI program, a binding U.S. commitment to abide by a "narrow" interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and a ban on U.S. development of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) systems. Similar, but much larger Soviet programs would, of course, be left free to continue their intensive buildup.

Soviet proposals to the U.N. Conference will identify SDI and what Moscow calls the U.S. "militarization of space" as the chief roadblocks to disarmament and hence to Third World development. These Soviet arguments will appeal, as they are designed to do, to three groups: Western leftists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) supporting arms control and disarmament, and Third World governments.

American Counteroffensive. To counter this Soviet propaganda offensive, the Reagan Administration and State Department should develop a counteroffensive built around three main themes:

1) **That the main arms buildup draining resources away from Third World development is the Third World's conventional arms buildup and the wars fought with them.** Since 1945, this buildup has cost many hundreds of billions of dollars and these wars have killed some 13.5 million Third World citizens.² These costs in economic resources and human lives have been sharply increased by huge Soviet arms sales and transfers to Third World nations.

2. For casualty estimates, see Gerard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, *Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers*, second rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), p. 47.

2) **That it is Soviet militarism** in general, and Soviet militarization in particular, that is the real threat to world peace and to Third World development.

3) **That the Soviet propaganda argument** about an alleged "disarmament dividend" is not supported by--indeed is refuted by--the analytical evidence. So advocates of this argument are simply scoring cheap political debating points against the U.S. To drive home this point, the U.S. should identify those nongovernmental organizations or NGOs functioning as Soviet front organizations plus other NGOs and individuals with a track record of supporting Soviet disarmament positions.

THE THIRD WORLD CONVENTIONAL ARMS BUILDUP

The massive buildup and use of conventional arms in the Third World has been largely ignored in the U.N. debates about arms and disarmament. These debates instead have focused almost exclusively on the dangers of the continued buildup of nuclear weapons by the two superpowers. In the debates, the U.S. is always blamed, wrongly, for this buildup. Here, as elsewhere, what former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick called the blame-America approach has served Third World and Soviet interests well. Third World nations do not mention, much less criticize, China's or India's nuclear arsenals, and only rarely are the British or French nuclear arsenals plus the reason for them noted--the need to counter the Soviet threat.

Avoiding Awkward Questions. For Third World governments, focusing U.N. debates on the nuclear arms buildup avoids awkward questions about their conventional arms buildup, their neglect and oppression of their citizenry, and the wars they have fought with these arms. This focus also diverts attention away from the Soviet military buildup, the most massive and sustained in world history. Ignored too are Moscow's arms transfers to the Third World to further Soviet military and political objectives.

This U.N. linkage, making American spending on nuclear weapons responsible for the Third World's poor pace of economic development, is not only false but the reverse of the truth. To the extent that slow Third World development can be blamed on an arms buildup, it can be blamed on the Third World conventional arms spending. This becomes clear by looking at the numbers. Third World arms outlays in 1986 amounted to an estimated \$150 billion.³ By contrast, U.S. spending for nuclear arms in that year was a much smaller \$38 billion.⁴ The fact of the matter is that for all their potential devastating power, nuclear weapons are much cheaper and consume much fewer resources than do conventional arms. If anything, the West's reliance on nuclear arsenals has freed resources for economic development.

3. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1986* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

4. The costs of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are difficult to calculate precisely, partly because of the accounting problems posed by dual-capable nuclear and conventional systems. But an average of under 20 percent, or less, of the U.S. defense budget is a reasonable estimate of the costs of the nuclear forces.

More than 100 Wars. The Soviet bloc, moreover, has consumed many more resources for weapons in absolute terms and as a proportion of the economy than have the U.S. and its allies. Pentagon spending for this year, for example, will be about 6.5 percent of U.S. gross national product. In contrast, Soviet defense spending is now estimated, conservatively, by both the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency at 15 to 17 percent of Soviet GNP.⁵ The real burden may be much higher.

Third World countries not only have spent huge sums on massive conventional arms buildups but have suffered the even larger costs, human and economic, of conventional wars. The causes of wars in the Third World are the classic ones: conflicts over economic and territorial assets and over ideological, national, religious, and tribal differences, and they are reinforced by the expansionist impulses of communism and Muslim fundamentalism. A French study concluded that between 1945 and 1983, the Third World fought 100 significant conflicts, including 13 major interstate and 17 secondary conflicts, 16 conflicts over secession, and 37 civil wars to change regimes. Just ten of these wars accounted for over 10 million victims: "...the two Indochina wars (1946-1975), the Indo-Pakistan wars (1947-1949 and 1971 Bangladesh), the Korean War, the Algerian war, the civil war in Sudan, the massacres in Indonesia (1965), and the Biafran war."⁶

The two largest and longest running Third World conflicts currently are the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (since 1979) and the Iran-Iraq war (since 1980). The Soviet-Afghanistan war has killed some 1 million Afghanistans and displaced over 4 million more, while Soviet casualties now exceed 35,000 killed. The Soviets now spend over \$15 million per day on the war.⁷ The Iran-Iraq war has lasted as long as World War I and inflicted proportionately comparable casualties on both societies, including a combined total of 1 million killed.

India's Huge Defense Spending. In such a conflict-ridden environment, it is not surprising that such non-elected and quasi-military Third World governments give priority to spending on defense over spending on economic and social development. The costs of the Third World conventional arms buildup and wars, plus their drain on development, are so large that they can be illustrated only by some representative figures. The Iran-Iraq War has been costing Iraq over half its entire GNP.⁸ India, a leader of the Third World at the U.N. and a vocal critic of U.S. arms expenditures (though nearly silent on Soviet outlays) spends about 20 percent

5. See *Soviet Military Power 1987* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 108, plus the sources cited in *The Military Balance 1986-1987* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986).

6. See "Conflicts in the World Since 1945," Chaliand and Rageau, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-5., quoting p. 47.

7. See Chaliand and Rageau, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137; *Strategic Survey 1986-87* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), p. 134.

8. Table 4, "Comparisons of Defense Expenditure and Military Manpower 1981-86," *The Military Balance 1986-87*, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

of its government's budget on defense forces, which include the third largest army in the world.⁹ Economically anemic Vietnam fields the world's fourth largest army. Cuban forces, meanwhile, have been dispatched far from home, to distant Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia in a modern version of the Afrika Korps. It is near certain that the U.N. Conference on Disarmament will be silent about these Third World arms costs.

The Soviet contribution to the Third World conventional arms buildup is so huge that estimates of its total value are nearly impossible. Harvard Professor of Political Science Samuel P. Huntington calculates that "...Soviet arms deliveries to non-communist developing countries amounted to...over \$8 billion" by 1979.¹⁰ It is Moscow's more than \$5 billion per annum aid to Havana, moreover, that allows Fidel Castro to keep his troops in Africa. Soviet subsidies of \$4 billion per annum also have enabled Nicaragua to create Central America's largest armed force. Other Soviet subsidies have included \$5 billion to Angola (1975-1987), \$1 billion to Mozambique (1975-1983), and \$3.5 billion to Ethiopia (1975-1986).¹¹

Another Moscow Forum. In a familiar phrase used in U.N. debates, if only a small fraction of the resources spent by the Third World and the Soviets on conventional arms and on conventional wars were devoted to economic development, the world would be much better off. Why, then, does the U.N. choose to ignore the link between this conventional Third World arms buildup and development? The answer is that the true agenda of these U.N. conferences is not to probe the relationship between economic development and global arms spending. The true agenda is to create yet one more forum at which Moscow, its allies, and willing Third World nations can attack the U.S.

UNCDD: INSTITUTIONALIZING THE SOVIET LINE

In 1959, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev addressed the U.N. and unveiled his plan for "General and Complete Disarmament." In this, he implicitly recognized the new propaganda possibilities at the U.N. opened up by the emerging Third World, composed of newly independent countries. Because most were former Western colonies, their governments often were inherently anti-Western. They were interested primarily in securing as much development aid as possible from their former colonial masters and from the U.S.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

10. Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Intervention: America and the Soviets in the Third World," *The National Interest*, No. 7 (1987), p. 43.

11. See *Soviet Military Power 1987, op. cit.*, pp. 128, 141-142 and Table, "Major Soviet Equipment Delivered to the Third World 1981-86," p. 134. Soviet economic aid to Cuba has recently averaged \$4 billion per annum plus \$1 billion per annum for military aid; Soviet aid to Nicaragua includes economic and military aid. See Timothy Ashby, *The Bear in the Back Yard: Moscow's Caribbean Strategy* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1987); additional information provided by the author. For Soviet aid to Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986*, pp. 106, 116, 128, 143-146.

To appeal to the Third World's anti-Western, pro-aid biases, the Soviets introduced the idea of the disarmament dividend: huge sums available for economic development in the Third World if only the West would accept the sweeping Soviet proposals for "General and Complete Disarmament." The propaganda success of this first Soviet use of the disarmament dividend led them to refine the concept and lobby for its acceptance as valid by the U.N. bureaucracy.

Controlling the Bureaucracy. This was easy because the Soviets then and now control much of the U.N. bureaucracy. In addition, through inducements or coercion, Moscow has the support of many Third World nationals working for the U.N.¹² A number of West European nationals, moreover, were sympathetic to the disarmament dividend concept. Thus in 1978, at the First U.N. Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I), the concept was accepted. Said Alfonso Garcia Robles, Mexico's Permanent Representative to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament: "the U.N. philosophy on disarmament [asserted]

that there is a close relationship between disarmament and development and that any resources that may be released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures must urgently be used to reduce the economic imbalance between developed and developing countries....¹³

UNSSOD I accomplished nothing and, of course, avoided any scrutiny of Third World and Soviet arms outlays. At the Special Session, predictably, the U.S. was denounced repeatedly. UNSSOD I was followed, in 1982, by UNSSOD II, which even Ambassador Robles described as a hopeless failure. At this Special Session, however, the Reagan Administration was much more forceful than the Carter Administration in defending legitimate U.S. interests and identifying Soviet and Third World propaganda arguments for what they really were.

Stacked Against the U.S. This more forceful U.S. approach to disarmament diplomacy served to blunt the impact of the Soviet and Third World propaganda in American public opinion. So the Soviets and the Third World sought an alternative U.N. forum for advancing the disarmament dividend idea. They devised an International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (shortened to UNCDD). It was authorized by the U.N. General Assembly in 1984 and originally scheduled for 1986. It was then delayed for one year. Named Secretary-General of the UNCDD, was Undersecretary-General for Disarmament, Jan Martenson of Sweden, a longtime critic of the U.S. and of the Reagan Administration. He has since been replaced as Under-Secretary and Secretary-General of the UNCDD by Yasushi Akashi of Japan.

12. This Soviet penetration of the U.N. has been extensively analyzed and documented in The Heritage Foundation's United Nations Assessment Project studies and by the former Soviet U.N. Under-Secretary General who defected to the U.S., Arkady Shevchenko. See *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1985), especially p. 225. As former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick recently noted "...Soviet bloc nationals working in the U.N. Secretariat remain employees of their own government." "Will the U.N. Knuckle Under Again?" *The Washington Post*, June 1, 1987, p. A11.

13. Alfonso Garcia Robles, Introduction to Homer A. Jack, *Disarm--or Die: The Second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament* (New York: World Conference on Religion and Peace, 1983), p. 11. Dr. Jack is Secretary-General of the WCRP and head of the New York-based NGO Committee on Disarmament.

Preparatory work for the UNCDD reveals that the conference will be stacked against the U.S. Example: the impressively entitled glossy pamphlet *Disarmament and Development: Declaration by the Panel of Eminent Personalities* contains not one "eminent personality" from the U.S. Its theme is the alleged interrelationship between the Triad of Peace: Disarmament, Development, and Security.¹⁴

"Not Borne Out by the Facts." An earlier U.N. report is entitled *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development*. This study was conducted under the chairmanship of one of the "eminent personalities," Sweden's longtime Ambassador to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament, Inga Thorsson, with the assistance of Undersecretary-General Martenson. The report, endorsing the Soviet theme that Third World development depends on disarmament, has been widely circulated through the U.N.'s global information network. Ignored have been the many protests that the report is seriously flawed and biased. The Western experts participating in the study, for instance, attached numerous reservations, noting repeatedly that "Statements are made which do not appear to be borne out by the facts..."¹⁵ The U.S. expert, Daniel Gallik, added that many important findings were "...adopted under the majority rule procedure...adopted after the growing number of reservations by experts..."¹⁶ Soviet bloc and Third World countries ignored facts that conflicted with the disarmament dividend idea and then used their voting majority to make this U.N. report endorse the idea.

NGOs: DISTINGUISHING SOVIET FRONTS FROM INDEPENDENT GROUPS

Many nongovernmental organizations, widely known as NGOs, long have been involved with arms control and disarmament issues. These NGOs fall into three distinct, although overlapping, categories:

1) **Soviet front NGOs** which clearly can be documented as such. The most transparent of these is the World Peace Council (WPC). Others include the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), which is associated with the U.N. Department of Public Information. In addition, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) although not a direct Soviet front organization, collaborates actively with the WPC.¹⁷

14. *Disarmament and Development: Declaration by the Panel of Eminent Personalities* (New York: United Nations, 1986), pp. 1-2. Not surprisingly, one of the personalities was Ambassador Robles.

15. *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development*, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, U.N. Center for Disarmament, Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 1982), Appendix III *Reservations...*, pp. 181-189.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

17. Juliana Geran Pilon, "At the U.N., Soviet Fronts Pose as Nongovernmental Organizations," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 549, December 1, 1986, pp. 15-17.

2) **Genuine groups of non-experts led by leftists.** One of the most prominent of these groups is Homer Jack's World Conference on Religion and Peace.¹⁸ Others include the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, the U.K. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), and Physicians for Social Responsibility.

3) **Groups of experts that draw upon qualified analysts' aid to make serious arguments.** The most influential NGO in this category is the Washington-based Arms Control Association. Others include the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Pugwash Conference on Science and International Affairs, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

In dealing with these NGOs at such U.N. conferences as the UNCDD, the U.S. faces a series of problems. If U.S. delegates identify Soviet front organizations for what they are, these delegates are accused of McCarthyism. The second group of NGOs, by and large, is immune to rational arguments and ignores data that undermine its preconceptions. These are emotionally committed advocates of disarmament who will embrace nearly any movement or proposal that invokes the correct buzzwords. In dealing with NGOs in the third category, the U.S. is dealing with groups that at least listen to facts and understand how difficult, perhaps impossible, general and complete disarmament is. But this third group is very reluctant to break ranks with the groups the other two categories.

A U.S. STRATEGY FOR UNCDD

At other United Nations conferences and gatherings, the Reagan Administration has pursued an effective strategy: explain the real problems of international peace and security clearly and refute Soviet propaganda claims very forcibly.

Stress Real Problems

At the UNCDD this approach will require the U.S. to stress that the real arms impediments to economic and social development result from the Third World conventional arms buildup and the wars which Third World countries have been fighting. The U.S. must stress repeatedly that Third World development problems are increased by Soviet arms transfers to the Third World and Soviet interventions, including those via surrogates, in Third World conflicts. Similarly, the U.S. forcefully must refute Soviet, Third World, and NGO attacks on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. No logical or plausible link can be made between U.S. spending on SDI and Third World economic problems. The U.S. should warn that it is inappropriate for SDI to be discussed at UNCDD.

18. There is, it should be added, nothing amateurish about these non-expert NGOs' ability to conduct effective public relations. Homer Jack's position is typical of the genuine idealists in these NGOs, blaming the U.S. for escalating the arms race and willing to work with NGOs supporting Soviet positions, yet prepared to recognize the WPC as a Soviet front. See John Buckman, "The U.N. and Disarmament: The Second Special Session," Heritage Foundation *Background* No. 186, May 26, 1982, pp. 9-10.

Remember Real Audience

The U.S. must remember the real audience to which its arguments are to be addressed. It is not the Soviet government, nor Third World governments, nor those NGOs committed to the disarmament dividend-for-development idea. They are not going to change their minds because of rational U.S. arguments.

The real audience for U.S. arguments are those few Third World governments seriously interested in development and the citizens of the U.S. and its democratic allies. The citizens of industrial democracies are decent and well-meaning and want to assist Third World development in affordable, effective ways; they will want to be reassured that the U.S. is not blocking development by its refusal to accept Soviet and Third World disarmament proposals. For this audience, the reasons why the U.S. rejects the Soviet-inspired disarmament dividend will have to be spelled out, yet again. Similarly, this democratic audience will want to be reassured that the U.S. SDI program is not blocking Third World development, is not militarizing space, and will create a more stable balance of deterrence.

CONCLUSION

Even though the U.S. quite rightly has declined to participate in so futile a discussion as the UNCDD, it will be important for the U.S. to refute the Soviet and Third World propaganda arguments that will be made at the conference. In particular, the U.S. will have to refute the false, but superficially appealing, idea that there is a disarmament dividend that is available from general and complete disarmament for use for Third World development.

The U.S. further should stress that Third World governments are poorly serving their populations and themselves by blaming their lack of development on a false problem instead of facing the real problems, particularly the Third World conventional arms buildup.

The basic U.S. means of dealing with the anti-U.S. propaganda offensive to be conducted at the UNCDD thus should be a public diplomacy campaign stressing seven themes:

- 1) **The UNCDD is going to unfold according to a hidden Soviet agenda.**
- 2) **This agenda aims to blame the West, and mainly the U.S., for the economic problems of the Third World.**
- 3) **The key culprit will be identified by the Soviets as U.S. spending on nuclear arms and U.S. plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative.**
- 4) **Ignored will be massive Soviet military spending and even more massive Third World conventional arms outlays.**
- 5) **The U.S. is not prepared to accommodate what is certain to be the strong anti-U.S. mood at UNCDD.**

6) **If the conference really is concerned about disarmament**, then it will look at how to reduce Third World and Soviet arsenals.

7) **And if UNCDD is really concerned about economic and social development**, then it will look hard at and repudiate those policies pursued by Third World nations which have impeded growth for a quarter century.

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