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MIKE

SOURCE
COPY

(Dolan)
October 3, 1986
11:30 a.m. SS

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: PRE-SUMMIT MEETING WITH
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1986

OCT. 11-
WASH POST
10/2/86

My fellow Americans: I'm sure many of you have heard that a week from now in Reykjavik, Iceland, I will be meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. Though the meeting will be relatively brief, our discussions will be of critical importance: we'll be laying the groundwork for Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the United States and the summit talks that will take place then.

Now as President, I get all sorts of briefings when talks like these are scheduled but I thought today I'd change things around a bit and give a briefing of my own to those I think are equally important participants in the summit process -- you the people.

CONST.
PREAMBLE

Now I know it's true that some here in the capital think the people can't be trusted with such complex matters as foreign policy. But along with our Founding Fathers, I've always believed that the intuitive wisdom of the people is far more dependable over the long run than the temporary insights or parochial pursuits of the Washington experts. That's why I've said right from the start that the first obligation of democratic leaders is to keep the people informed and seek their support on public policy.

So today I want to take a few moments to bring you up to date on the pre-summit conference in Iceland and ask your support for our objectives there. In particular, I want to ask your help

in removing a grave obstacle to our chances for progress at these talks and the others to follow. It's an obstacle created by partisan divisions here at home, so I do think it's a problem you can help me solve.

1985
PRES.
DACS.
P. 1426

Perhaps you remember Mr. Gorbachev and I first met a year ago in Geneva. We spent about 5 hours alone; and more than 15 hours together with the rest of our delegations. Believe me, we learned again the truth of the statement: nations don't mistrust each other because they are armed; they're armed because they mistrust each other. On this point, I was very blunt and candid with Mr. Gorbachev and told him that in our view the source of that mistrust was the Soviet Union's record of seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others.

But I also made it clear that while the United States remains committed to freedom and self-determination for all the nations of the world, we also want to work with the Soviet Union to prevent war and maintain peace. We believe the twin goals of world peace and freedom can be furthered by making progress with the Soviet Union in four thorny but closely-related areas: strategic arms reductions, the resolution of regional conflicts, the improvement of bilateral contacts between our nations, and the recognition of human rights.

And, to achieve progress on such a broad agenda, we believe personal meetings between our leaders can be very useful. First, as I said, to dispel illusions -- to make sure the Soviets avoid miscalculation, that they know where we stand. And second, the

simple fact is that heads of state can frequently resolve matters far more quickly than other negotiators can.

On this point, I like to tell a story about the Geneva summit. Our experts thought the scheduling of any future meetings was a difficult, delicate subject best left to later in the discussions. Yet as we were walking together after one of our meetings, I mentioned to Mr. Gorbachev how much I would like him to visit the United States. So, I invited him; and he said, "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union. So he invited me. And I said: "I accept." And there it was. As simple as that.

So face-to-face talks can be helpful. And when the Soviet Foreign Minister met with me ^{TWO WEEKS} a week ago, he carried a letter from Mr. Gorbachev. Part of the letter was an invitation to meet Mr. Gorbachev in a third country like Iceland -- for preparatory talks on the upcoming summit here in the United States. I accepted.

I want you to know that next week during the talks in Iceland, we will be taking the same balanced approach we took in Geneva. On one hand, we will make it clear we seek negotiations and serious progress with the Soviets on a wide range of issues. On the other, we will make it clear that we will not sacrifice our values, principles, or vital interests for the sake of merely signing agreements. And that's just another way of making it clear to the Soviets we harbor no illusions about them or their geopolitical intentions.

SEPT. 19
WASH. POST
10/1/86
P. A1

This last point is important. You see, in the past, when agreements were reached with the Soviets, this led to much unrealistic talk about the great thaw in Soviet-American relations and even predictions about the end of the cold war. And then when the Soviets reverted to form -- such as the invasion of Afghanistan -- the result was shock and policy paralysis in Washington.

CARTER'S
"OPTION... CHANGED"
TIME 1/14/80
PP. 10-11

USN+WR
9/8/86 P.2

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9/25/86
COVER

This now has changed. Just last month -- after a Soviet spy at the U.N. was arrested -- the Soviets retaliated by taking hostage an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, in Moscow. It was an act of international outrage; but this time we were prepared. Because we understood that the Soviets are relentless adversaries, they could not surprise us, nor could their actions derail our long-term commitments or initiatives. We knew what we had to do. We wanted Daniloff freed, with no deals. We had to make clear to them the consequences of their actions. We had to be direct, candid, and forceful.

WASH.
POST
10/2/86
P. A1 ORLOV

And we were. That's why Nicholas Daniloff is freed and back in the United States. Later, we swapped Zakharov, the spy, for two noted Russian dissidents, Yuri and Irina Orlov. And that's why we can now go forward to Iceland. Believe me, as we proceed along the path of negotiations, there will be other such obstacles. But let me assure you: as each obstacle arises, we will again make clear to the Soviets our lack of illusions about them, and our resolve to hold them accountable for their actions.

That's the bottom line to this briefing: in order to be successful in negotiations, an American President must be

perceived by the Soviets as realistic and firm and, above all, a President speaking for a united people, a united country.

In the past, this has been one of the Nation's noblest traditions. When it came to matters of national security, politics usually stopped at the water's edge, Americans stood together and the fabric of bipartisan cooperation was untearable, the bond of national unity unbreakable.

BIPARTISANSHIP
CF. RANGLAGH,
THE AGENCY

As I mentioned when I returned last year from Geneva, rarely have the expressions of public and congressional support been more gratifying than during our negotiations with the Soviets. And so today, with a new round of negotiations underway, I'm appealing again for that support.

1985
PRES.
NOV 9
P. 1426

And I'm asking the Congress to be especially alert about sending the Soviets a message of national unity.

For example, we believe our 5-1/2 year military buildup has been a principal factor in bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table. So we need continued support for defense appropriations. So too, some legislative restrictions passed by the House of Representatives could well jeopardize the entire summit process by restricting my options and giving the Soviets unilateral concessions, the very victories that they could not win at the conference table.

JOHN
TOWER
OP-ED,
WASH. POST
9/29/86
P. A15

The House, for example, voted to ban tests of anti-satellite systems, even though the Soviets have a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to slash our request for the strategic defense initiatives, a research program that

W. POST
10/2/86
P. A4

WASH. POST
10/21/86
P. A4

underpins our negotiating position in Geneva and our hopes for strategic arms reductions. They voted to deny funds to move beyond the limits of SALT II, a treaty that couldn't be ratified and that would've expired by now if it had been ratified and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House has prohibited essentially all testing of nuclear weapons.

Some of these proposals are now included in the Government-wide appropriations bill that is being sent this way -- believe me, it will be vetoed quickly. But there is an even larger issue. Every single one of these issues is under discussion with the Soviets -- I cannot afford to have my hands tied in our discussions about them.

That is why we need to send to the Soviets a consistent message of clear resolve and national unity. These upcoming negotiations are important to you, your children, to America's future. Today I'm asking your support and that of the congressional leadership. Bipartisan cooperation has been the keystone of American foreign policy and, as I've said, I'm grateful and deeply touched by the support I've received in the past from all of you.

But right now that support is needed more than ever. I hope you'll let the Members of Congress know that as I said at the beginning, the people are the experts in any democracy and you will hold accountable those who for the sake of partisan advantage trifle with our national security and the chances for peace and freedom.

These are hopeful developments; and that is why I think we can view this whole summit process soberly and yet with a reasonable degree of optimism.

Thank you for your support in the past and as we leave for the talks in Iceland I hope I can count on you again. Make your views known in Washington and don't forget to keep us in your prayers as well.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/2/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10:00 a.m. 10/3/86

SUBJECT: RADIO TALK: PRE_SUMMIT MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MILLER - ADMIN.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BARBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>DOLAN</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MASENG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Please provide any comments directly to Tony Dolan by 10:00 Friday morning, October 3rd. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

(Dolan)
October 2, 1986
4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: PRE-SUMMIT MEETING WITH
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

My fellow Americans: I'm sure many of you have heard that a week from now in Reykjavik, Iceland, I will be meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. Though the meeting will be relatively brief, our discussions will be of critical importance: we'll be laying the groundwork for Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the United States and the summit talks that will take place then.

Now as President, I get all sorts of briefings when talks like these are scheduled but I thought today I'd change things around a bit and give a briefing of my own to those I think are equally important participants in the summit process -- you the people.

Now I know it's true that some here in the capital think the people can't be trusted with such complex matters as foreign policy. But along with our Founding Fathers, I've always believed that the intuitive wisdom of the people is far more dependable over the long run than the temporary insights or parochial pursuits of the Washington experts. That's why I've said right from the start that the first obligation of democratic leaders is to keep the people informed and seek their support on public policy.

So today I want to take a few moments to bring you up to date on the pre-summit conference in Iceland and ask your support for our objectives there. In particular, I want to ask

your help in removing a grave obstacle to our chances for progress at these talks and the others to follow. It's an obstacle created by grasping politicians here at home, so I do think it's ^{a problem} ~~something~~, you can help me ^{solve} ~~it~~.

Perhaps you remember Mr. Gorbachev and I first met a year ago in Geneva. We spent about 5 hours alone; and more than 15 hours together with the rest of our delegations. Believe me, we learned again the truth of the statement: nations don't mistrust each other because they are armed; they're armed because they mistrust each other. On this point, I was very blunt and candid with Mr. Gorbachev and told him that in our view the source of that mistrust was the Soviet Union's record of seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others.

But I also made it clear that while the United States remains committed to freedom and self-determination for all the nations of the world, we also want to work with the Soviet Union to prevent war and maintain peace. We believe the twin goals of world peace and freedom can be furthered by making progress with the Soviet Union in four thorny but closely-related areas: strategic arms reductions, the resolution of regional conflicts, the improvement of bilateral contacts between our Nation and the recognition of human rights.

And, to achieve progress on such a broad agenda, we believe summit conferences are very useful. First, as I said, to dispel illusions -- to make sure the Soviets avoid miscalculation, that they know where we stand. And second, the simple fact is that

heads of state can frequently resolve matters far more quickly than other negotiators can.

On this point, I like to tell a story about the Geneva summit. The scheduling of any future conferences was considered by our experts a difficult, delicate subject best left to later in the discussions. Yet as we were walking together after one of our meetings, I mentioned to Mr. Gorbachev how much I would like him to visit the United States. So, I invited him; and he said, "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union. So he invited me. And I said: "I accept." And there it was: an agreement that the next summit would be in the United States and the one after that in the Soviet Union; just as simple as that.

So face-to-face talks can be helpful; which is why when Mr. Gorbachev extended an invitation a few weeks ago to meet him in a neutral country like Iceland -- for preparatory talks on the upcoming summit here in the United States -- I accepted.

I want you to know that next week during the talks in Iceland, we will be taking the same balanced approach we took in Geneva. On one hand, we will make it clear we seek negotiations and serious progress with the Soviets on a wide range of issues. On the other, we will make it clear that we will not sacrifice our values, principles or vital interests for the sake of merely signing agreements. And that's just another way of making it clear to the Soviets we harbor no illusions about them or their geopolitical intentions.

This last point is important. You see, in the past, when agreements were reached with the Soviets, this led to much unrealistic talk about the great thaw in Soviet-American relations and even predictions about the end of the cold war. And then when the Soviets reverted to form -- such as the invasion of Afghanistan -- the result was shock and policy paralysis in Washington.

This now has changed. Earlier this month -- after a Soviet spy at the U.N. was arrested -- the Soviets retaliated by taking hostage an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff in Moscow. It was an act of international outrage; but this time we were prepared. Because we understood that the Soviets are relentless adversaries, they could not surprise us nor derail our policy initiatives. We knew what we had to do. We had to be direct, candid and forceful.

And we were. That's why Nicholas Daniloff is freed and back in the United States. And that's why we can now go forward to Iceland. Believe me, as we proceed along the path of negotiations there will be other such obstacles. But let me assure you: as each obstacle arises, we will again make clear to the Soviets our lack of illusions about them, and our resolve to hold them accountable for their actions.

And that's the bottom line to this briefing: in order to be successful in negotiations, an American President must be perceived by the Soviets as realistic, firm and, above all, a President speaking for a united people, a united country.

In the past, this has rarely been a problem. When it came to matters of national security, politics usually stopped at the water's edge, Americans stood together -- the fabric of bipartisan cooperation was untearable, the bond of national unity unbreakable.

But in recent years the willingness to put aside partisan difference for the sake of national security has been gravely eroded -- eroded by a highly ideological and entirely irresponsible liberal core in the Congress.

In the first place, this liberal coalition has done everything it could to oppose our 5-1/2 year old military buildup, the very buildup that has done so much to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table in the first place.

But they are hardly satisfied with just opposing defense spending. By passing the irresponsible resolutions they have in the House of Representatives -- they have gone on to jeopardize the entire summit process by passing the Soviet negotiating position into American law, by giving the Soviets the very victories that they could not win at the conference table.

The House, for example, voted to ban tests of antisatellite systems, even though the Soviets have a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to slash our request for the strategic defense research, an initiative that helped bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table in Geneva. They voted to deny funds to move beyond the limits of SALT II, a treaty that couldn't be ratified and that would've expired by now

Note

Adopting to Legislate

in Congressional Committee

Chambers

if it had been ratified and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House has prohibited essentially all testing of nuclear weapons.

Many of these preposterous proposals are now included in the budget resolution that is being sent this way -- believe me, it will be vetoed quickly. But there is an even larger issue: the message that is being sent to the Soviets about our lack of unity here at home. Every single one of these issues is under discussion with the Soviets -- so you can see why if you were the Soviet negotiator you would not get down to serious business. You would simply sit back and wait to see how much of your work would be done for you by Congress' left-wing league of would-be Metternichs.

The upcoming negotiations with the Soviets are important. I can't and I won't have my hands tied. Today I'm asking your help in calling on Speaker O'Neill and the rest of the Democratic leadership to return to the spirit of national unity and bipartisan cooperation, to let me carry out the constitutional duty ^{as President} ~~of the Presidency~~. I'm asking you to tell them I need to conduct American foreign policy without the meddlesome cries and partisan obstructionism of the "Blame America Firsters" in the Congress.

It won't be easy to make the diehard liberals listen. Many of them believe that the only way to score political points on this Administration is to manipulate the arms control issue and engage in scare talk about our relationship with the Soviets. But, as I said at the beginning, over the long run the people are

the experts; eventually they will see through such callous disregard of national security for the sake of partisan advantage. So, please help me remind these Members of the Congress who are jeopardizing our negotiations with the Soviets that theirs is a narrow and unworthy course to follow -- one for which they will be held accountable by both history and the American people.

Mike

Document No. _____

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/3/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ASAP

SUBJECT: REVISED RADIO TALK: PRE-SUMMIT MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
(10/3/86 11:30 a.m. draft)

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MILLER - ADMIN.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BARBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>DOLAN</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MASENG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please give your comments directly to Tony Dolan with an info copy to my office ASAP. Thanks.

RESPONSE:

Keel, Regan, Ball

(Dolan)
October 3, 1986
11:30 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: PRE-SUMMIT MEETING WITH
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1986

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in removing a grave obstacle to our chances for progress at these talks and the others to follow. It's an obstacle created by partisan divisions here at home, so I do think it's a problem you can help me solve.

Perhaps you remember Mr. Gorbachev and I first met a year ago in Geneva. We spent about 5 hours alone; and more than 15 hours together with the rest of our delegations. Believe me, we learned again the truth of the statement: nations don't mistrust each other because they are armed; they're armed because they mistrust each other. On this point, I was very blunt and candid with Mr. Gorbachev and told him that in our view the source of that mistrust was the Soviet Union's record of seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others.

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As I mentioned when I returned last year from Geneva, rarely have the expressions of public and congressional support been more gratifying than during our negotiations with the Soviets. And so today, with a new round of negotiations underway, I'm appealing again for that support.

And I'm asking the Congress to be especially alert about sending the Soviets a message of national unity.

For example, we believe our 5-1/2 year military buildup has been a principal factor in bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table. So we need continued support for defense appropriations. So too, some legislative restrictions passed by the House of Representatives could well jeopardize the ^{chances} ~~entire~~ ~~summit process by restricting my options and giving the Soviets~~ ~~unilateral concessions, the very victories that they could not~~ ~~win at the conference table.~~

The House, for example, voted to ban tests of anti-satellite systems, even though the Soviets have a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to ~~slash~~ ^{cut substantially cut} our request for the strategic defense initiatives, a research program that

underpins our negotiating position in Geneva and our hopes for strategic arms reductions. They voted to deny funds to move beyond the limits of SALT II, a treaty that couldn't be ratified and that would've expired by now if it had been ratified and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House has prohibited essentially all testing of nuclear weapons.

National Security

~~Some of~~ These proposals are now included in the ^{as well as some unacceptable domestic policy provisions} ~~Government-wide appropriations bill~~ ^{other} that is being sent this

way -- ^{unless they are changed from the House passed version} believe me, it will be vetoed. ~~quickly~~. But there is an even larger issue. Every single one of these issues ^{is} under

discussion with the Soviets -- I cannot afford to have my hands tied in our discussions about them. ^{Now can we fail to have the gov't's Appropriations finally resolved} The Soviets must not think that delay could work to their advantage by gaining from the ^{for next year.}

That is why we need to send to the Soviets a consistent message of clear resolve and national unity. These upcoming negotiations are important to you, your children, to America's future. Today I'm asking your support and that of the congressional leadership. Bipartisan cooperation has been the keystone of American foreign policy and, as I've said, I'm grateful and deeply touched by the support I've received in the past from all of you. ^{at the negotiating table}

But right now that support is needed more than ever. ^I hope ~~you'll let~~ The Members of Congress ^{should} know that as I said at the beginning, the people are the experts in any democracy and you will hold accountable those who for the sake of partisan advantage trifle with our national security and the chances for peace and freedom.

Page 7

These are hopeful developments; and that is why I think we can view this whole summit process soberly and yet with a reasonable degree of optimism.

Thank you for your support in the past and as we leave for the talks in Iceland I hope I can count on you again. Make your views known in Washington and don't forget to keep us in your prayers as well.

MIKE

NSC 4's

(Dolan)
October 3, 1986
11:30 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: PRE-SUMMIT MEETING WITH
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1986

My fellow Americans: I'm sure many of you have heard that a week from now in Reykjavik, Iceland, I will be meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. Though the meeting will be relatively brief, our discussions will be of critical importance: we'll be laying the groundwork for Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the United States and the summit talks that will take place then.

Now as President, I get all sorts of briefings when talks like these are scheduled but I thought today I'd change things around a bit and give a briefing of my own to those I think are equally important participants in the summit process -- you the people.

Now I know it's true that some here in the capital think the people can't be trusted with such complex matters as foreign policy. But along with our Founding Fathers, I've always believed that the intuitive wisdom of the people is far more dependable over the long run than the temporary insights or parochial pursuits of the Washington experts. That's why I've said right from the start that the first obligation of democratic leaders is to keep the people informed and seek their support on public policy.

So today I want to take a few moments to bring you up to date on the ^{meeting} ~~(pre-summit conference)~~ in Iceland and ask your support for our objectives there. In particular, I want to ask your help

in removing a grave obstacle to our chances for progress at these talks and the others to follow. It's an obstacle created by partisan divisions here at home, so I do think it's a problem you can help me solve.

Perhaps you remember Mr. Gorbachev and I first met a year ago in Geneva. We spent about 5 hours alone; and more than 15 hours together with the rest of our delegations. Believe me, we learned again the truth of the statement: nations don't mistrust each other because they are armed; they're armed because they mistrust each other. On this point, I was very blunt and candid with Mr. Gorbachev and told him that in our view the source of that mistrust was the Soviet Union's record of seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others.

But I also made it clear that while the United States remains committed to freedom and self-determination for all the nations of the world, we also want to work with the Soviet Union to prevent war and maintain peace. We believe the twin goals of world peace and freedom can be furthered by making progress with the Soviet Union in four thorny but closely-related areas:

Not just rhetoric!

~~(strategic)~~ arms reductions, the resolution of regional conflicts, ^{and expanded} ~~the improvement of~~ bilateral contacts between our nations, ~~and~~ ^{respect for} ~~(the recognition of)~~ human rights,

And, to achieve progress on such a broad agenda, we believe personal meetings between our leaders can be very useful. First, as I said, to dispel illusions -- to make sure the Soviets avoid miscalculation, that they know where we stand. And second, the

simple fact is that heads of state can frequently resolve matters far more quickly than other negotiators can.

[On this point, I like to tell a story about the Geneva summit. Our experts thought the scheduling of any future meetings was a difficult, delicate subject best left to later in the discussions. Yet as we were walking together after one of our meetings, I mentioned to Mr. Gorbachev how much I would like him to visit the United States. So, I invited him; and he said, "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union. So he invited me. And I said: "I accept." And there it was. As simple as that.

So face-to-face talks can be helpful.] And when the Soviet Foreign Minister met with me ^{two} ~~a~~ ¹ week ago, he carried a letter from Mr. Gorbachev. Part of the letter was ^{the suggestion that we} ~~an invitation to meet~~ ~~(Gorbachev)~~ in ~~(a~~ third country like ~~)~~ Iceland -- for preparatory talks on the upcoming summit here in the United States. I accepted.

I want you to know that next week during the talks in Iceland, we will be taking the same balanced approach we took in Geneva. On one hand, we will make it clear we seek negotiations and serious progress with the Soviets on a wide range of issues. On the other, we will make it clear that we will not sacrifice our values, principles, or vital interests for the sake of merely signing agreements. And that's just another way of making it clear to the Soviets we harbor no illusions about them or their geopolitical intentions.

Gorbo
can't
"invite" us
to a
NATO
country

✓

This last point is important. You see, in the past, when agreements were reached with the Soviets, this led to much unrealistic talk about the great thaw in Soviet-American relations and even predictions about the end of the cold war. And then when the Soviets reverted to form -- such as the invasion of Afghanistan -- the result was shock and policy paralysis in Washington.

This now has changed. Just last month -- after a Soviet spy at the U.N. was arrested -- the Soviets retaliated by taking hostage an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, in Moscow. It was an act of international outrage; but this time we were prepared. Because we understood that the Soviets are relentless adversaries, ~~[they could not surprise us, nor could their actions derail our long-term commitments or initiatives.]~~ We knew what we had to do. We wanted Daniloff freed, ^{but not in exchange for a spy.} ~~with no deals.~~ We had to make clear to them the consequences of their actions. We had to be direct, candid, and forceful.

And we were. That's why Nicholas Daniloff is freed and back in the United States. Later, we swapped Zakharov, the spy, for two ^{convergents} ~~noted~~ Russian dissidents, Yuri and ^{his wife} Irina ~~Orlov~~. And that's why we can now go forward to Iceland. Believe me, as we proceed along the path of negotiations, there will be other such obstacles. But let me assure you: as each obstacle arises, we will again make clear to the Soviets our lack of illusions about them, and our resolve to hold them accountable for their actions.

That's the bottom line to this briefing: in order to be successful in negotiations, an American President must be

Still breaks linkage. Not really needed

Orlov, a man who has over the past 10 years been subjected to the most brutal treatment because of his determination to see that the Soviet Union lived up to its international commitments,

perceived by the Soviets as realistic and firm and, above all, a President speaking for a united people, a united country.

In the past, this has been one of the Nation's noblest traditions. When it came to matters of national security, politics usually stopped at the water's edge, Americans stood together and the fabric of bipartisan cooperation was untearable, the bond of national unity unbreakable.

As I mentioned when I returned last year from Geneva, rarely have the expressions of public and congressional support been more gratifying than during our negotiations with the Soviets. And so today, with a new round of negotiations underway, I'm appealing again for that support.

And I'm asking the Congress to be especially alert about sending the Soviets a message of national unity.

For example, we believe our 5-1/2 year ^{program to strengthen our defenses} ~~military buildup~~ has been a principal factor in bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table. So we need continued support for defense appropriations. So too, some legislative restrictions passed by the House of Representatives could well jeopardize the entire summit process by restricting my options and giving the Soviets unilateral concessions, the very victories that they could not win at the conference table.

The House, for example, voted to ban tests of anti-satellite systems, even though the Soviets have a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a ^{credible} deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to slash our request for the Strategic Defense Initiatives, a ~~research~~ program that

promises a safer future and also

"buildup" a bad word (e.g., "Soviet military buildup")

SDI not just a question for Geneva

underpins our negotiating position in Geneva and our hopes for strategic arms reductions. They voted to deny funds to move beyond ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{Certain} limits of SALT II, a treaty that couldn't be ratified and that would've expired by now if it had been ratified and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House has prohibited essentially ^{the} ~~the~~ testing of ^{all} nuclear weapons, *which we still need to deter war.*

Some of these proposals are now included in the Government-wide appropriations bill that is being sent this way -- believe me, it will be vetoed quickly. But there is an even larger issue. Every single one of these issues is under discussion with the Soviets -- I cannot afford to have my hands tied in our discussions about them.

That is why we need to send to the Soviets a consistent message of clear resolve and national unity. These upcoming negotiations are important to you, your children, to America's future. Today I'm asking your support and that of the congressional leadership. Bipartisan cooperation has been the keystone of American foreign policy and, as I've said, I'm grateful and deeply touched by the support I've received in the past from all of you.

But right now that support is needed more than ever. I hope you'll let the Members of Congress know that as I said at the beginning, the people are the experts in any democracy and you will hold accountable those who for the sake of partisan advantage trifle with our national security and the chances for peace and freedom.

Not all
SALT II
limits

These are hopeful developments; and that is why I think we can view this whole summit process soberly and yet with a reasonable degree of optimism.

Thank you for your support in the past and as we leave for the talks in Iceland I hope I can count on you again. Make your views known in Washington and don't forget to keep us in your prayers as well.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

October 3, 1986

Mike

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY DOLAN

FROM: Steve Tupper

SUBJECT: Radio Talk: Pre-Summit Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev

Attached are OMB's comments on the subject Presidential radio talk.

Attachment

c: David Chew

Oct 2 5:32 PM '86

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/2/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10:00 a.m. 10/3/86

SUBJECT: RADIO TALK: PRE SUMMIT MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MILLER - ADMIN.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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BUCHANAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>DOLAN</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MASENG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Please provide any comments directly to Tony Dolan by 10:00 Friday morning, October 3rd. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

(Dolan)
October 2, 1986
4:30 p.m.

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your help in removing a grave obstacle to our chances for progress at these talks and the others to follow. It's an obstacle created by grasping politicians here at home, so I do think it's ~~a problem~~ ^{a problem} you can help me ~~solve~~ ^{solve}.

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But I also made it clear that while the United States remains committed to freedom and self-determination for all the nations of the world, we also want to work with the Soviet Union to prevent war and maintain peace. We believe the twin goals of world peace and freedom can be furthered by making progress with the Soviet Union in four thorny but closely-related areas: strategic arms reductions, the resolution of regional conflicts, the improvement of bilateral contacts between our Nation and the recognition of human rights.

And, to achieve progress on such a broad agenda, we believe summit conferences are very useful. First, as I said, to dispel illusions -- to make sure the Soviets avoid miscalculation, that they know where we stand. And second, the simple fact is that

heads of state can frequently resolve matters far more quickly than other negotiators can.

On this point, I like to tell a story about the Geneva summit. The scheduling of any future conferences was considered by our experts a difficult, delicate subject best left to later in the discussions. Yet as we were walking together after one of our meetings, I mentioned to Mr. Gorbachev how much I would like him to visit the United States. So, I invited him; and he said, "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union. So he invited me. And I said: "I accept." And there it was: an agreement that the next summit would be in the United States and the one after that in the Soviet Union; just as simple as that.

So face-to-face talks can be helpful; which is why when Mr. Gorbachev extended an invitation a few weeks ago to meet him in a neutral country like Iceland -- for preparatory talks on the upcoming summit here in the United States -- I accepted.

I want you to know that next week during the talks in Iceland, we will be taking the same balanced approach we took in Geneva. On one hand, we will make it clear we seek negotiations and serious progress with the Soviets on a wide range of issues. On the other, we will make it clear that we will not sacrifice our values, principles or vital interests for the sake of merely signing agreements. And that's just another way of making it clear to the Soviets we harbor no illusions about them or their geopolitical intentions.

This last point is important. You see, in the past, when agreements were reached with the Soviets, this led to much unrealistic talk about the great thaw in Soviet-American relations and even predictions about the end of the cold war. And then when the Soviets reverted to form -- such as the invasion of Afghanistan -- the result was shock and policy paralysis in Washington.

This now has changed. Earlier this month -- after a Soviet spy at the U.N. was arrested -- the Soviets retaliated by taking hostage an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff in Moscow. It was an act of international outrage; but this time we were prepared. Because we understood that the Soviets are relentless adversaries, they could not surprise us nor derail our policy initiatives. We knew what we had to do. We had to be direct, candid and forceful.

And we were. That's why Nicholas Daniloff is freed and back in the United States. And that's why we can now go forward to Iceland. Believe me, as we proceed along the path of negotiations there will be other such obstacles. But let me assure you: as each obstacle arises, we will again make clear to the Soviets our lack of illusions about them, and our resolve to hold them accountable for their actions.

And that's the bottom line to this briefing: in order to be successful in negotiations, an American President must be perceived by the Soviets as realistic, firm and, above all, a President speaking for a united people, a united country.

In the past, this has rarely been a problem. When it came to matters of national security, politics usually stopped at the water's edge, Americans stood together -- the fabric of bipartisan cooperation was untearable, the bond of national unity unbreakable.

But in recent years the willingness to put aside partisan difference for the sake of national security has been gravely eroded -- eroded by a highly ideological and entirely irresponsible liberal core in the Congress.

In the first place, this liberal coalition has done everything it could to oppose our 5-1/2 year old military buildup, the very buildup that has done so much to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table in the first place.

But they are hardly satisfied with just opposing defense spending. By passing the irresponsible resolutions they have in the House of Representatives -- they have gone on to jeopardize the entire summit process by passing the Soviet negotiating position into American law, by giving the Soviets the very victories that they could not win at the conference table.

The House, for example, voted to ban tests of antisatellite systems, even though the Soviets have a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to slash our request for the strategic defense research, an initiative that helped bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table in Geneva. They voted to deny funds to move beyond the limits of SALT II, a treaty that couldn't be ratified and that would've expired by now

if it had been ratified and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House has prohibited essentially all testing of nuclear weapons.

Many of these preposterous proposals are now included in the *House version of the* budget resolution that is being sent this way -- believe me, *if they remain,* it

will be vetoed quickly. But there is an even larger issue: the message that is being sent to the Soviets about our lack of unity here at home. Every single one of these issues is under discussion with the Soviets -- so you can see why if you were the Soviet negotiator you would not get down to serious business. You would simply sit back and wait to see how much of your work would be done for you by Congress' left-wing league of would-be Metternichs.

The upcoming negotiations with the Soviets are important. I can't and I won't have my hands tied. Today I'm asking your help in calling on Speaker O'Neill and the rest of the Democratic leadership to return to the spirit of national unity and bipartisan cooperation, to let me carry out the constitutional duty of the Presidency. I'm asking you to tell them I need to conduct American foreign policy without the meddlesome cries and

partisan obstructionism of the "Blame America Firsters" in the Congress. *And I'm asking the discerning Democrats in Congress to help us deal with the Soviets from a position of strength and resolve, so we may be better able to negotiate in the interests of world peace.*

It won't be easy to make the diehard liberals listen. Many of them believe that the only way to score political points on this Administration is to manipulate the arms control issue and engage in scare talk about our relationship with the Soviets. But, as I said at the beginning, over the long run the people are

the experts; eventually they will see through such callous disregard of national security for the sake of partisan advantage. So, please help me remind these Members of the Congress who are jeopardizing our negotiations with the Soviets that theirs is a narrow and unworthy course to follow -- one for which they will be held accountable by both history and the American people.

Miller

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some suggested changes

RESPONSE:

DK

10-3-86

(Dolan)
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*overambitious -
unthinking -
over zealous -
??*

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remote ?
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Pres wants to say "no deal" can this be included
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*politicized
~
what*

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testing of nuclear weapons, *the number one item on the Soviet's list and given away this extremely important*

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mike

October 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY DOLAN
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF SPEECHWRITER

FROM: PETER J. WALLISON *PJW*
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Radio Talk: Pre-Summit Meeting with
General Secretary Gorbachev

Counsel's office has reviewed the above-referenced radio talk and has no legal objection to the President's proposed remarks. We have, however, marked editorial changes on several pages, to which we call your attention.

cc: David L. Chew

Attachment

(Dolan)

October 2, 1986

4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: PRE-SUMMIT MEETING WITH
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

My fellow Americans: I'm sure many of you have heard that a week from now in Reykjavik, Iceland, I will be meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. Though the meeting will be relatively brief, our discussions will be of critical importance: we'll be laying the groundwork for Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the United States and the summit talks that will take place then.

Now as President, I get all sorts of briefings when talks like these are scheduled but I thought today I'd change things around a bit and give a briefing of my own to those I think are equally important participants in the summit process -- you the people.

Now I know it's true that some here in the capital think the people can't be trusted with such complex matters as foreign policy. But along with our Founding Fathers, I've always believed that the intuitive wisdom of the people is far more dependable over the long run than the temporary insights or parochial pursuits of the Washington experts. That's why I've said right from the start that the first obligation of democratic leaders is to keep the people informed and seek their support on public policy.

So today I want to take a few moments to bring you up to date on the pre-summit conference in Iceland ~~and~~ and ask your support for our objectives there. In particular, I want to ask

your help in removing a grave obstacle to our chances for progress at these talks and the others to follow. It's an obstacle created by grasping politicians here at home, so I do think it's ~~a problem~~ ^{a problem} you can help me ~~solve~~ ^{solve}.

Perhaps you remember Mr. Gorbachev and I first met a year ago in Geneva. We spent about 5 hours alone; and more than 15 hours together with the rest of our delegations. Believe me, we learned again the truth of the statement: nations don't mistrust each other because they are armed; they're armed because they mistrust each other. On this point, I was very blunt and candid with Mr. Gorbachev and told him that in our view the source of that mistrust was the Soviet Union's record of seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others.

But I also made it clear that while the United States remains committed to freedom and self-determination for all the nations of the world, we also want to work with the Soviet Union to prevent war and maintain peace. We believe the twin goals of world peace and freedom can be furthered by making progress with the Soviet Union in four thorny but closely-related areas: strategic arms reductions, the resolution of regional conflicts, the improvement of bilateral contacts between our Nation^S and the recognition of human rights.

And, to achieve progress on such a broad agenda, we believe summit conferences are very useful. First, as I said, to dispel illusions -- to make sure the Soviets avoid miscalculation, that they know where we stand. And second, the simple fact is that

heads of state can frequently resolve matters far more quickly than other negotiators can.

On this point, I like to tell a story about the Geneva summit. The scheduling of any future conferences was considered by our experts a difficult, delicate subject best left to later in the discussions. Yet as we were walking together after one of our meetings, I mentioned to Mr. Gorbachev how much I would like him to visit the United States. So, I invited him; and he said, "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union. So he invited me. And I said: "I accept." And there it was: an agreement that the next summit would be in the United States and the one after that in the Soviet Union; just as simple as that.

So face-to-face talks can be helpful; which is why when Mr. Gorbachev extended an invitation a few weeks ago to meet him in a ~~neutral country like~~ Iceland -- for preparatory talks on the upcoming summit here in the United States -- I accepted.

I want you to know that next week during the talks in Iceland, we will be taking the same balanced approach we took in Geneva. On one hand, we will make it clear we seek negotiations and serious progress with the Soviets on a wide range of issues. On the other, we will make it clear that we will not sacrifice our values, principles or vital interests for the sake of merely signing agreements. And that's just another way of making it clear to the Soviets we harbor no illusions about them or their geopolitical intentions.

This last point is important. You see, in the past, when agreements were reached with the Soviets, this led to much unrealistic talk about the great thaw in Soviet-American relations and even predictions about the end of the cold war. And then when the Soviets reverted to form -- such as the invasion of Afghanistan -- the result was shock and policy paralysis in Washington.

This now has changed. Earlier this month -- after a Soviet spy at the U.N. was arrested -- the Soviets retaliated by taking ✓ hostage an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff¹ in Moscow. It was an act of international outrage; but this time we were prepared. Because we understood that the Soviets are relentless adversaries, they could not surprise us nor derail our policy initiatives. We knew what we had to do. We had to be direct, candid and forceful.

And we were. That's why Nicholas Daniloff is freed and back in the United States. And that's why we can now go forward to Iceland. Believe me, as we proceed along the path of negotiations there will be other such obstacles. But let me assure you: as each obstacle arises, we will again make clear to the Soviets our lack of illusions about them, and our resolve to hold them accountable for their actions.

And that's the bottom line to this briefing: in order to be successful in negotiations, an American President must be perceived by the Soviets as realistic, firm and, above all, a President speaking for a united people, a united country.

In the past, this has rarely been a problem. When it came to matters of national security, politics usually stopped at the water's edge, Americans stood together -- the fabric of bipartisan cooperation was untearable, the bond of national unity unbreakable.

But in recent years the willingness to put aside partisan difference for the sake of national security has been gravely eroded -- eroded by a highly ideological and entirely irresponsible liberal core in the Congress.

In the first place, this liberal coalition has done everything it could to oppose our 5-1/2 year old military buildup, the very buildup that has done so much to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table in the first place.

But they are hardly satisfied with just opposing defense spending. By passing the irresponsible resolutions they have in the House of Representatives -- they have gone on to jeopardize the entire summit process by passing the Soviet negotiating position into American law, by giving the Soviets the very victories that they could not win at the conference table.

The House, for example, voted to ban tests of antisatellite systems, even though the Soviets have a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to slash our request for the strategic defense research, ^{in this} an initiative that helped bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table in Geneva. They voted to deny funds to move beyond the limits of SALT II, a treaty that ^{has never been} ~~couldn't be~~ ratified, ~~and~~ that would've expired by now

if it had been ratified and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House has prohibited essentially all testing of nuclear weapons.

Many of these preposterous proposals are now included in the budget resolution that is being sent this way -- believe me, it will be vetoed quickly. But there is an even larger issue: the message that is being sent to the Soviets about our lack of unity here at home. Every single one of these issues is under discussion with the Soviets -- so you can see why if you were the Soviet negotiator you would not get down to serious business. You would simply sit back and wait to see how much of your work would be done for you by Congress' ~~left wing league of would be~~ *Metternichs.*

for pre-emptive concessions

Liberal

The upcoming negotiations with the Soviets are important. I can't and I won't have my hands tied. Today I'm asking your help in calling on Speaker O'Neill and the rest of the Democratic leadership to return to the spirit of national unity and bipartisan cooperation, to let me carry out the constitutional duty of the Presidency. I'm asking you to tell them I need to conduct American foreign policy without the meddlesome cries and partisan obstructionism of the "Blame America Firsters" in the Congress.

It won't be easy to make the diehard liberals listen. Many of them believe that the only way to score political points on this Administration is to manipulate the arms control issue and engage in scare talk about our relationship with the Soviets. But, as I said at the beginning, over the long run the people are

This is a group that believes in mutual trust is the foundation of disarmament unilateral trust must be half way there.

the experts; eventually they will see through such callous disregard of national security for the sake of partisan advantage. So, please help me remind these Members of the Congress who are jeopardizing our negotiations with the Soviets that theirs is a narrow and unworthy course to follow -- one for which they will be held accountable by both history and the American people.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 3, 1986

Rudke

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY DOLAN

FROM: *MM* MARI MASENG

SUBJECT: Radio Talk: Iceland Meeting

This office has revised the President's radio address for October 4 and recommends the following:

Page 4, Paragraph 2-3: References to the Daniloff case should be deleted. The Administration's handling of the case has received very little applause, and we should not showcase it.

Page 6: Suggest also reference Nicaragua by inserting before the first paragraph the following:

In addition the House liberals are seeking to thwart the will of both the houses of Congress by tying up U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. A second Cuba on the American mainland would be the biggest ace which Mr. Gorbachev could possibly bring to Iceland.

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SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
SPEECHWRITER

FROM: PETER J. WALLISON
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Radio Talk: Pre-Summit Meeting with General
Secretary Gorbachev

Counsel's office has reviewed the above-referenced radio talk and has no legal objection to the President's proposed remarks. We have, however, marked editorial changes on pages 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the attached copy. Finally, we defer to William L. Ball, III, on the effect of the President's remarks in enhancing our chances of removing the Congressional restrictions on antisatellite testing, nuclear weapons testing, chemical weapons production and strategic defense research.

cc: David L. Chew

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