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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. draft report	"Post Geneva Themes: Themes and Perceptions for Public Presentation"	n.d.	P1
2. report	"Wrap-up Statement: Wednesday, November 20, 1985"	n.d.	P1
3. draft report	same as item #1	n.d.	P1
4. report	same of item #2	n.d.	P1
COLLECTION:			
SPEECHWRITING, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF: Research Office Records			kdb
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Joint Session of Congress: 11/21/85 Timmons/Noonan [1 of 2] OA 17929			8/16/95

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- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(B)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

SOURCED COPY
#1

KIM TIMMONS

(Noonan/BE)

November 18, 1985

4:00 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS
REPORT ON GENEVA
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

Thank you ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress,
distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's good to be home. Nancy and I thank you for this
wonderful homecoming. This great chamber has always greeted us
with kindness but after the bracing winds of Lake Geneva your
warmth is especially appreciated.

I have just come from Geneva; I am here to report to you and
to the American people on the summit and on my discussions with
General Secretary Gorbachev. I want to speak of what we
discussed -- what we agreed on -- what we were not able to agree
on -- whether it was worthwhile to make such a journey -- and
where we go from here.

To begin with, I am glad we made the journey. It was good
to talk with Mr. Gorbachev. I can say of our meetings that there
was "...no discourtesy, no loss of tempers, no threats or
ultimatums by either side; no advantage or concession gained or
given; no major decision...planned or taken; no spectacular
progress achieved or pretended." You may find those words
vaguely familiar. They're the words John Kennedy used to
describe his meetings with ~~Kruschev~~ ^{Khrushchev} in Vienna. So not too much
has changed.

TITLE -OK
GEN. SEC.
D.O.S.
BACKGROUND

TV
ADDRESS
TO
AMERICAN
PEOPLE
A THOUSAND
DAYS
SCHLESINGER
P. 377

JFK
PRES. DOC.
6/6/61
RADIO +
TV
REPORT
P. 442
DOC. 231

I found Mr. Gorbachev to be able, aggressive, assertive, and assured. He was quite a talker. I hope he was quite a listener too.

Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century. For 40 years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union have complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know these facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that our differences must remain peaceful. With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We have a responsibility to be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.

Five years ago, when I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. One aspect of the new realism was to continue the tradition observed by Thomas Jefferson: to "...confide in our strength without boasting of it; (and) respect (the strength of) others without fearing it."

I believe that, with your support, the policies this Nation has developed and followed the past 5 years have given us new strength to thwart aggression and subversion. America can say today: We are strong -- and our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost.

1/29/81
PRES. DOC.
P. 1

THE
JEFFER-
SON
ENCYCLOP-
EDIA
MICHAEL
& SHORT
IV, 17,
FORD ED.
VI, 338
(Pa. 1793)

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X

OK

OK

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, that is the context of the drama. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings might give a push to important talks already under way on nuclear weapons. This is an area of such great importance that it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles.

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because one side found it too uncomfortable or inconvenient to face.

In recent years, the American people have questioned not only Soviet nuclear policies but their compliance with past agreements. We have had questions about expansionism by force in the Third World -- and failures to live up to human rights obligations -- and the obstacles to free and open communication between our peoples.

I brought those questions to the summit and I put them before Mr. Gorbachev.

We discussed nuclear arms and how to control them. I explained our proposals for real, equitable, and verifiable reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer but that really is safer. I explained our research on the Strategic Defense Initiative. I told Mr. Gorbachev that S.D.I. is a defensive weapon that offers the hope of eventually freeing both our countries from the death-grip of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. I offered the possibility of eventual cooperation

4,200
STATUTE
MILES:
GENEVA
TO
WASH.
OK
TRAVEL
OFFICE
+
A.F.
PILOTS
ON
PRE-
ADVANCE

with the Soviets on S.D.I. if such a breakthrough does, indeed, prove possible.

We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of the world. I explained my proposals for a three-level peace process to stop the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia, where democratic insurgencies are pitted against communist-controlled or communist-backed governments. I tried to be very clear about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. I believe Mr. Gorbachev no longer doubts, if he ever did, our commitment to freedom.

We discussed human rights -- a sensitive issue for the Soviets. I explained that we Americans not only believe that freedom is essential to a meaningful life -- we believe that human rights are inseparable from the issue of peace.

History teaches no clearer lesson than this: those countries which respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect the rights of their neighbors; and those countries which abuse the human rights of their people prey on their neighbors and upset the peace of the world. Human rights is not an abstract moral issue -- it is a peace issue. And human rights is not a matter of "interference in internal matters" any more than a bridge support "interferes" with a bridge -- it's a part of the bridge, not just something that's standing in the way!

We discussed the barriers to communication between our societies, and I elaborated on our proposals for real people-to-people contacts on a wide scale. Such contacts really

(OK)

can enhance understanding. Franklin Roosevelt once said he learned more in 5 minutes with a man than from any number of briefing books and letters. That was a very American thing to say.

FDR
ADDRESS
TO THE
CONGRESS
#138
P. 570
3/1/45

I told Mr. Gorbachev there is no justification for keeping our people estranged. Americans have a right to know the people of Russia -- their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of the Soviet Union have a right to know of America's deep desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.

And so, you see, our talks were wide ranging. Let me at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn't.

We remain far apart on many issues, as had to be expected. We reached agreement on certain matters, however, and, most significant, we agreed to meet again. This is good: as a former union leader I can tell you there's always room for movement, action, and progress when people are talking.

SCREEN
ACTOR'S
GUILD
LABOR
UNION
ENCY 1533
OF
ASSOC
1984
VOL. 1
1947-52
1959-60
P. 344
CURRENT
BIO
1982

On arms control, the Soviets still have not met us half way. This is disappointing. But the pace of our arms negotiations has picked up and we've made some small progress. What's more, we've agreed to keep trying.

As for Soviet activities in the Third World -- I am afraid Mr. Gorbachev is content to allow these dangerous wars to fester and continue. He insists, as his predecessors have, that it is the historic duty of the Soviet Union to encourage wars of, quote, national liberation. He did not agree that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not a matter of liberation but of

conquest. Let me be frank: we cannot hope for an immediate or dramatic end to the Soviet occupation. But we can enlist our support for the true cause of freedom in Afghanistan -- and this we shall do. We have also agreed to continue our meetings with the Soviets on these regional issues.

On the issue of people-to-people contacts, there is progress to report. Mr. Gorbachev and I were able to come to agreement on (FILL IN THE FACTS). We look forward to implementing agreements on (AS APPROPRIATE.)

In addition, our discussions on civil aviation and air safety (ARE MAKING PROGRESS)/(HAVE PRODUCED AGREEMENTS) that will serve the interests of both our countries.

And finally, as you know, Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed to meet again next year in (AS APPROPRIATE).

We know the limits as well as the promise of summit meetings. And we believe the continued involvement of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union may well help move us forward over the years.

The fact is, every new day begins with possibilities; each new day is empty of history; it's up to us to fill it with the things that move us toward progress and peace. Hope, therefore, is a realistic attitude -- and despair an uninteresting little vice.

And so: was our journey worthwhile?

Thirty years ago, when he too had just returned from a summit in Geneva, President Eisenhower said, "...the wide gulf that separates East and West... (is) as wide and deep as the

OK

so far

RADIO & TV ADDRESS TO AMERICANS ON THE GENEVA CONFERENCE JULY 25, 1955 P.D. #175 n. 727

X

X

difference between individual liberty and ~~repression~~. Today, three decades later, that is still true.

regimentation -- as wide as the deep as the gulf that lies

And yet I truly believe that this meeting was worthwhile for both sides. A new realism spawned the summit; the summit itself was good; and now our byword must be: Steady as we go.

between the concept of man made in the image of his God and the concept of man as a mere instrument of the state."

I am, as you are, impatient for results. But in spite of our goodwill and our good hopes we cannot always control events. We can, however, do all in our power to be persuasive for peace. And I have made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that there will be no Soviet gains from delay.

Just as we must avoid illusions on our side, so we must dispel them on the Soviet side. Meetings like ours help to dispel Soviet illusions about the resolve of the West. And that too is good.

We face a new Soviet leadership. Its members face many big decisions at home and abroad. We cannot know whether this Soviet government will continue to resist their people's desire and their nation's need for change. We cannot know -- but because the choices they make will affect us, I thought it absolutely essential to tell the Soviet government personally where the United States stands. I think we gave the other side a lot to think about.

Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing

truly worth pursuing. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of make-believe detente or era of new accords. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace, and we want it to last.

As I flew back this evening, I had many thoughts. In just a few days families across America will gather to celebrate Thanksgiving. It is 350 years since the first Thanksgiving, when Pilgrims and Indians held to each other on the edge of an unknown continent. And now we are moderns huddled on the edge of a future -- but, like our forefathers, really not so much afraid, and full of hope, and trusting in God, as ever.

Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening. And God bless you all.

FIRST NATIONAL T-DAY NOV. 26 1790 ENCYC. OF AM. HIST. EAGLE BOOKS; BY KULL 1965

1621 autumn Encyc. Am. p. 598 Vol. 26

(NSC/BE)
November 20, 1985
5:00 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

It is a special pleasure to be in Brussels today -- to discuss with you my meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev and the way ahead, as I see it, for East-West relations.

You and your governments have been key in helping prepare for these meetings. You can rightfully claim part of the credit for their success. And I do consider them successful, an important step forward in our efforts to build the basis for more stable and constructive East-West relations.

We have consulted intensively during the past few months leading up to Geneva; this is as it should be in an Alliance of equals and partners such as ours.

I have valued your advice and counsel; they have contributed significantly to my approach in discussions with Mr. Gorbachev.

Your support and the unity of the entire Alliance have provided that foundation of strength so essential to dealing effectively with the Soviet leadership.

Because of this shared effort, I felt a particular obligation to come to Brussels in order to share my thoughts with you and hear your own perspectives and suggestions.

I am grateful that all of you have taken the time to come here today to join with me in this endeavor, and I want in particular to thank Peter Carrington for making this meeting happen.

My discussions with Mr. Gorbachev confirmed to me once again that our general approach to East-West relations -- a policy based on realism, strength, and dialogue -- is on the mark.

We have shown that we can be realistic in our approach to the Soviet Union, recognizing the profound differences that will continue to divide us as well as the possible areas of common ground and potential cooperation.

We have worked to rebuild our common strength. The repair of Western military defenses over the past 5 years, the equally important restoration of our economic vitality, and the reaffirmation of the diplomatic cohesion and solidarity of the Western Alliance have all helped convince the Soviet leaders that propaganda, intimidation, and lack of restraint in their actions will not serve their ends vis-a-vis the West.

We have also shown that, on this basis, we are not afraid of dialogue and negotiation with the Soviets. We seek serious negotiation -- not for its own sake -- but for the achievement of solid and tangible measures that might strengthen the peace, protect our interests, and lead to genuine progress toward a more secure East-West relationship. We recognize that neither East nor West can be secure when the other is insecure.

We have all realized that a dialogue grounded on this realism and strength must be a gradual one. So I approached my discussions with Mr. Gorbachev this past week not as an end, but a beginning, important step in that long-term process.

I emphasized to Mr. Gorbachev our desire for a more stable, constructive, and peaceful relationship; I underscored that the

people of the United States and of the Western democracies as whole bear no aggressive intention towards the Soviet people.

At the same time, I also made clear our determination to protect our interests and those of our allies and to resist unacceptable Soviet activity. I conveyed to him clearly the depth of our concerns about Soviet conduct and its negative impact on our ability to build such a relationship.

I then indicated my personal hopes that our two nations could now make a fresh start in our relations, and my readiness to explore with him those areas where such a start might best begin.

In turn, Mr. Gorbachev voiced his own views of East-West relations. There was, of course, much that would be familiar to you in his assertions that it is up to the West to take responsibility for any improvement in relations.

I found him to be a tough and aggressive negotiator, but one who is also willing to listen and who appears to see areas of possible compromise on issues which divide us. This was evident in a number of areas.

(BILATERAL ISSUES)

(SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL)

(HUMAN RIGHTS)

(REGIONAL ISSUES)

In sum, I believe my exchanges with Mr. Gorbachev have left us just about where I expected to be.

We have achieved progress in some areas, progress that we hope will serve as stepping stones to further advances in our relationship.

We have also "agreed to disagree" in a number of other areas where our differences are more profound but we now understand each other's position better.

I have always seen this first meeting not as a watershed event in and of itself but as an important part of a vital, long-term process. In my view, it has served that purpose admirably.

As a demonstration of that fact, we have agreed to meet again in ().

Again, I want to thank all of you -- including those leaders who were not able to come today -- for helping to make this possible. I believe we are heading in the right direction and that, with your help, we will remain so.

I would not be glad to answer any questions and look forward to hearing your own views on the issues I have just discussed.

9285

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 19, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID CHEW

FROM: WILLIAM MARTIN *WJM*
SUBJECT: Speech to Congress

The attached mark up reflects the NSC staff's preliminary comments on yesterday's draft of the President's speech to Congress on Thursday.

Bud McFarlane has not yet had a chance to go over the draft in detail.

We are turning copies over to the speechwriters.

Attached:
Speech Draft

cc: Ben Elliott
Peggy Noonan

(Noonan/BE)
November 18, 1985
4:00 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS.
REPORT ON GENEVA
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

Thank you ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress,
distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's good to be home. Nancy and I thank you for this wonderful homecoming. This great chamber has always greeted us with kindness but after the bracing winds of Lake Geneva your warmth is especially appreciated.

I have just come from Geneva; I am here to report to you and to the American people on the summit and on my discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev. I want to speak of what we discussed -- what we agreed on -- what we were not able to agree on -- whether it was worthwhile to make such a journey -- and where we go from here.

To begin with, I am glad we made the journey. It was good to talk with Mr. Gorbachev. I can say of our meetings that there was "...no discourtesy, no loss of tempers, no threats or ultimatums by either side; no advantage or concession gained or given; no major decision...planned or taken; no spectacular progress achieved or pretended." You may find those words vaguely familiar. They're the words John Kennedy used to describe his meetings with ^hK^hruschev in Vienna. So not too much has changed.

Probably have to drag — remembered
as a bad summit

I found Mr. Gorbachev to be able, aggressive, assertive, and assured. He was quite a talker. I hope he was quite a listener too.

Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century. For 40 years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union have complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know these facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that our differences must remain peaceful. ~~With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We have a responsibility to be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.~~

Five years ago, when I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. One aspect of the new realism was to continue the tradition observed by Thomas Jefferson: to "...confide in our strength without boasting of it; (and) respect (the strength of) others without fearing it."

I believe that, with your support, the policies this Nation has developed and followed the past 5 years have given us new strength to thwart aggression and subversion. America can say today: We are strong -- and our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost.

We have shown under pressure that we don't yield our principles or sacrifice our interests.

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, that is the context of the drama. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings ~~might~~ give a push to important talks already under way on nuclear weapons. ~~This is an area of such great importance that~~ ^{On this ~~subject~~ subject} it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles.

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because one side found it ~~too~~ uncomfortable ~~to discuss~~.

In recent years, the American people have questioned not only Soviet nuclear policies but their compliance with past agreements. We have had questions about ~~expansionism~~ ^{expansionism} by force in the Third World -- ^{about} ~~and~~ failures to live up to human rights obligations -- ^{about} ~~and~~ the obstacles to free and open communication between our peoples. ^{deep} ~~concerns~~

I brought those ^e ~~questions~~ ^{concerns} to the summit and I put them before Mr. Gorbachev.

We discussed nuclear arms and how to control them. I explained our proposals for ~~real~~ equitable, ~~and~~ verifiable ^{and deep} reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer but that really is safer. I explained our ~~research on the~~ Strategic Defense Initiative. ^{and} I told Mr. Gorbachev that ~~SDI~~ ^{it} ~~is~~ ^{research programs into} a defensive systems ~~weapons~~ that ^{might} ~~offer~~ the hope of eventually freeing both our countries from the ^{threat of nuclear} ~~death grip of the destruction of mutually assured~~ destruction. ~~It offered the possibility of eventual cooperation~~

I observed that the Soviets' own ^{long-standing,} vigorous programs in this field suggests they too believe in strategic defense.

that would threaten no one and that

expressed a very American view when he

can enhance understanding. Franklin Roosevelt once said he learned more ~~in~~ ^{from} 5 minutes with a man than from any number of briefing books and letters. ~~That was a very American thing to~~

I told Mr. Gorbachev there is no justification for keeping our people ~~estranged~~. Americans ^{need to} ~~have a right to~~ know the people ^{of the Soviet Union} ~~of~~ -- their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of the Soviet Union ^{need} ~~have a right to~~ know of America's deep desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.

And so, you see, our talks were wide ranging. Let me at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn't.

We remain far apart on many issues, ~~as had to be expected~~. We reached agreement on certain matters, however, and, most significant, we agreed to meet again. This is good: as a former union leader I can tell you there's always room for movement, action, and progress when people are talking.

On arms ^{reductions} ~~control~~, the Soviets still have not met us half way. This is disappointing. But the pace of our arms negotiations has picked up and we've made some small progress. What's more, we've agreed to keep trying ^{on strategic nuclear issues as well as}

As for Soviet activities in the Third World -- I am afraid Mr. Gorbachev is content to ^{let} ~~allow~~ these dangerous wars ~~to~~ fester and continue. He insists, as his predecessors have, that it is the historic duty of the Soviet Union to encourage wars of, quote, national liberation. He did not agree that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not a matter of liberation but of

[ADD REFERENCE TO OTHER ARMS ISSUES]

conquest. Let me be frank: we cannot hope for an immediate or dramatic end to the Soviet occupation. But we can ^{VC?} enlist our support for the true cause of freedom in Afghanistan -- and this we shall do. ^{But} ~~we~~ ^{we} also agreed to continue ~~our meetings~~ ^{-- and if possible to intensify our} with ^{discussions} the Soviets ~~on~~ ^{of} these regional issues.

On the issue of people-to-people contacts, there is progress to report. Mr. Gorbachev and I were able to come to agreement on (FILL IN THE FACTS). We look forward to implementing agreements on (AS APPROPRIATE.)

In addition, our discussions on civil aviation and air safety ~~(ARE MAKING PROGRESS)~~ ^(HAVE PRODUCED AGREEMENTS) that will serve the interests of both our countries. [CONSULTATES HERE.]

And finally, as you know, Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed to meet again next year in (AS APPROPRIATE).

We know the limits as well as the promise of summit meetings. And we believe the continued ^{face-to-face} involvement of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union ^{could} ~~may~~ help move us forward over the years.

The fact is, every new day begins with possibilities; each new day is empty of history; it's up to us to fill it with the things that move us toward progress and peace. Hope ~~is a~~ ^{fully} realistic attitude -- and despair ^{is unworthy of those who speak} ~~is a~~ ^{for freedom.} ~~is a~~ ^{is a}

And so: was our journey worthwhile?

Thirty years ago, when he too had just returned from a summit in Geneva, President Eisenhower said, "...the wide gulf that separates East and West... (is) as wide and deep as the

difference between individual liberty and repression." Today, three decades later, that is still true.

And yet I truly believe that this meeting was worthwhile for both sides. A new realism spawned the summit; the summit itself was good; and now our byword must be: Steady as we go.

I am, as you are, impatient for results. But in spite of our goodwill and our good hopes we cannot always control events. We ~~must~~^{must}, however, do all ~~in our power~~^{we can} to be ~~persuasive~~^{persuasive} ~~for~~^{with proposals that} peace. ~~And~~ I have made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that there will be no Soviet gains from delay. ^{strengthen the}

Just as we ~~must~~ avoid illusions on our side, so we must dispel them on the Soviet side. Meetings like ours help to dispel Soviet illusions about the resolve of the West. And that too is good.

We face a new Soviet leadership. Its members face many big decisions at home and abroad. We cannot know whether this Soviet government will continue to resist their people's desire and their nation's need for change. We cannot know -- but because the choices they make will affect us, I thought it absolutely essential to tell the Soviet government personally where the United States stands. I think we gave ~~Mr. Gorbachev~~^{Mr. Gorbachev} a lot to think about.

Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing

truly worth pursuing. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of make-believe ~~detente~~ ^{friendship} or era of new accords. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want ^{-- safe, stable, free --} real peace and we want it to last.

As I flew back this evening, I had many thoughts. In just a few days families across America will gather to celebrate Thanksgiving. It is 350 years since the first Thanksgiving, when Pilgrims and Indians held to each other on the edge of an unknown continent. And now we are moderns huddled on the edge of a future -- but, like our forefathers, really not so much afraid, and full of hope, and trusting in God, as ever.

Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening. And God bless you all.

KT
(NSC/BE)
November 21, 1985
2:00 a.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: SUMMARY STATEMENT
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

President Furgler, General Secretary Gorbachev:

May I express Nancy's and my deep personal appreciation, and that of all Americans, to the people of Switzerland for welcoming us so warmly and preparing the foundations for productive discussions.

Yours is a long and honorable tradition of promoting international peace and understanding. You should take pride in being the capital for international discussions. So again, to the government of Switzerland, and to the citizens of Geneva -- many, many thanks.

I feel good about the past 2 days. I came here to Geneva to make a fresh start in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we have done this.

General Secretary Gorbachev and I have held extensive discussions, covering all elements of our relationship.

I am pleased with the course and the content of our talks. I am convinced we're heading in the right direction.

We have reached some useful interim results, which are described in the joint statement that is being issued this morning.

But more importantly we have addressed our common responsibility to strengthen peace. In the nuclear age the leaders of the two most powerful states must do all that they can to avoid misunderstandings.

In our discussions, we established a process of more intensive contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union. These 2 days of talks should give extra impetus to our work on all the issues between us.

Before coming to Geneva, I spoke often of the need to build confidence in our dealings with each other. Frank and forthright conversations at the summit are part of this process. But I am certain General Secretary Gorbachev would agree that real confidence in each other must be built on deeds, not simply on words.

This is the thought that ties together all the proposals that the United States has put on the table in the past. And this is the criteria by which our meetings will be judged in the future.

The real report card on Geneva will not come in for months, or even years. But we know the questions that must be answered:

Will we join together in sharply reducing offensive nuclear arms and moving to defensive systems to make ours a safer world?

Will we join together to help bring about a peaceful resolution of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Central America -- so that the peoples there can freely determine their own destiny, without outside interference?

Will the cause of liberty be advanced?

And will the treaties and agreements signed, past and future, be honored?

The people in America, the Soviet Union, and throughout the world are ready to answer yes.

I leave Geneva today determined to pursue every opportunity to build a safer world of peace and freedom. There is hard work ahead. We are ready for it. General Secretary Gorbachev, we ask you to join us in getting the job done.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

11/8/85

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE (Coordinate with James Hooley
and M. B. Oglesby, Jr.)

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FR*

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: Report to Joint Session of Congress on Geneva
Trip

DATE: November 21, 1985

TIME: Approximately 9:00 pm

DURATION: Approximately 30 minutes

LOCATION: U. S. Capitol

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

MEDIA COVERAGE: Coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: Yes

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc: K. Barun
P. Buchanan
D. Chew
E. Crispen
M. Daniels
T. Dawson
B. Elliott
J. Erkenbeck
L. Faulkner
C. Fuller
W. Henkel
C. Hicks
J. Hooley

A. Kingon
J. Kuhn
C. McCain
B. Oglesby
R. Riley
J. Rosebush
R. Scouten
R. Shaddick
B. Shaddix
L. Speakes
WHCA Audio/Visual
WHCA Operations
N. Yates

(NSC)
November 20, 1985
Midnight (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: SUMMARY STATEMENT
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

President Furgler, General Secretary Gorbachev:

May I express Nancy's and my deep personal appreciation, and that of all Americans, to the people of Switzerland for welcoming us so warmly and preparing the foundations for productive discussions.

Your efforts carry forward a long and honorable tradition of promoting international peace and understanding. So again, to the government of Switzerland, and to the citizens of Geneva -- many, many thanks.

Over the past 2 days, General Secretary Gorbachev and I have held extensive discussions, covering all elements of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I am very pleased with the course and the content of our talks. I came here to Geneva to make a fresh start in our relationship, and we have done this. I am convinced we're heading in the right direction.

We have secured some useful interim results, which are described in the joint statement that is being issued this morning.

But more importantly we have addressed our common responsibility to strengthen peace. In the nuclear age the leaders of the two most powerful states must do all that they can to avoid misunderstandings.

Our _____ hours of discussions have been an essential contribution to this goal. We have established a process of more intensive contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union. These 2 days of talks should give extra impetus to our work on all the issues between us.

Before coming to Geneva, I spoke often of the need to build confidence in our dealings with each other. Frank and forthright conversations at the summit are part of this process. But I am certain General Secretary Gorbachev would agree that real confidence in each other must be built on deeds, not simply on words. This is the thought that ties together all the proposals that the United States has put on the table in the

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The value of the meetings we have held here will ultimately be judged by what follows. I leave today determined to pursue every opportunity to build a safer world of peace and freedom. There is hard work ahead. We are ready for it.

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER / LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Ben: Consider for all
speeches. This is Reagan's
summing up for Gorbachev. -TJ

The President wished to make

A FEW POINTS ~~TO MAKE~~ AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SEEING IF
GORBACHEV COULD AGREE.

THERE HAD BEEN TWO DAYS OF CANDID CONVERSATION ON A WIDE
RANGE OF ISSUES. THERE WERE CLEAR DIFFERENCES ON SUCH
QUESTIONS AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ON THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
THE TWO COUNTRIES. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BE REALISTIC AND TO
HAVE NO ILLUSIONS REGARDING OUR DIFFERENCES.

BUT THERE WERE SOME COMMON CONCERNS AS WELL. BOTH SIDES
HAD EXPRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO DEEP REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR
ARMAMENTS AND THEIR HOPE TO ELIMINATE SUCH WEAPONS ENTIRELY
SOME DAY. BOTH WOULD LIKE TO INTENSIFY DISCUSSIONS ON HOW TO
INCREASE STRATEGIC STABILITY AND REDUCE THE DANGERS TO EITHER
SIDE.

THE PRESIDENT REPEATED HIS CONVICTION OF A NEED FOR A SHIFT
FROM DETERRENCE BASED ON STRATEGIC ARMS TO A GREATER RELIANCE
ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. IF OUR RESEARCH WAS BORNE OUT IT WOULD
BE NECESSARY TO DISCUSS HOW TO INTRODUCE DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.
THERE WAS ALSO A NEED FOR GREATER MUTUAL TRUST THROUGH
COMPLIANCE WITH AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ON BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS FROM ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS TO THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

IN ADDITION TO CREATING A SAFER STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, IT WAS NECESSARY TO END TRAGIC REGIONAL CONFLICTS. THE TWO SIDES DIFFERED ON THE CAUSES OF REGIONAL TENSIONS, BUT THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED BOTH SAW THE NEED TO SOLVE THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS ON LOCAL CONFLICTS. AS HE HAD SAID IN HIS OCTOBER UNGA SPEECH THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH BOLD INITIATIVES TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS WHICH HAD DAMAGED U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND AGGRAVATED INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. THIS WAS BEHIND OUR PROPOSALS FOR MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT AND TO END OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT IN REGIONAL STRUGGLES. THE PEOPLE OF THE VARIOUS REGIONS MUST BE ABLE TO SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS.

THERE WERE A NUMBER OF BILATERAL QUESTIONS WHICH COULD BE RESOLVED IF THE NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL WAS THERE. THE TWO SIDES SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE TO A FUNDAMENTAL EXPANSION OF EXCHANGES IN THE AREAS OF CULTURE, SCIENCE, AND ATHLETICS AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING GREATER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

CONCLUDING, THE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV AS RICH AND CONSTRUCTIVE. HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE TWO LEADERS WOULD CONTINUE THE PROCESS BY VISITING EACH OTHERS' COUNTRIES. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE PLEASURE OF GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO THE U.S. IN °986, AND TO HIS OWN VISIT TO MOSCOW IN °987. THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA MEETINGS WOULD BE CLEAR ONLY IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD.

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER _____ LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

(NSC/BE)
November 20, 1985
6:00 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DEPARTURE STATEMENT
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

President Furgler, General Secretary Gorbachev: May I
^{Wang's and I} express my deep personal appreciation, and that of all
Americans, to the people of Switzerland for welcoming us so
warmly and preparing the foundations for productive discussions.

Your efforts carry forward a long and honorable tradition of
promoting international peace and understanding. So again, to
the government of Switzerland, and to the citizens of Geneva --
many, many thanks.

Over the past (2 / 3) days, General Secretary Gorbachev and
I have held extensive discussions, covering all elements of the
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Our differences remain deep and abiding. They are rooted in
fundamental disagreements about the nature of man and the
legitimate power of states. The issues that divide us are far
too serious to resolve in these meetings.

At the same time, our meetings were candid and
comprehensive. General Secretary Gorbachev and I are both
realistic, unbound by illusions. We share a common concern and a
common responsibility -- first and foremost to prevent nuclear
conflict and to establish a more stable relationship.

I believe that we have secured useful, interim results;
we've agreed to seek improvement in other areas, and I'm
convinced that we are heading in the right direction.

Page 2

I will report fully on my meetings to the Congress. For now, let me touch briefly on their highlights of the discussions and the most significant results.

Annex

(NSC)

November 20, 1985

Midnight (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: SUMMARY STATEMENT
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

President Furgler, General Secretary Gorbachev:

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The value of the meetings we have held here will ultimately be judged by what follows. I leave today determined to pursue every opportunity to build a safer world of peace and freedom. There is hard work ahead. We are ready for it.

Jim Kuon

Tues: | hr 49 min.

Wed: 2 hrs 41 min

(1 hr (am)
10²¹ to 11²¹)

(49 min pm
3⁵⁵ to 4⁴⁴)

Group: plenary

Group: 2 hrs 29 min

2 hrs 22 min.

dinner: 2 1/2 hours

dinner: 2 hrs 40 min.

Thurs

guess?
1/2 hour or less

TETE-A-TETE: 4 1/2 HOURS

PLENARY: 4 HOURS 51 MINUTES

DINNER: 5 HOURS 10 MINUTES

~~4 1/2~~
4

4:30

4:51

5:10

(14:31)

13.91