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As the host country, the United States believes in the United Nations and in what it symbolizes. We have criticized it sometimes in the past when we felt that it was not all it could be and should be. And we have on occasion been frustrated, but we have never stopped believing in its possibilities, and we've never stopped taking the United Nations seriously. That is why we are determined to see to it that the United Nations lives up to its noble potential to further the cause of freedom, defend individual rights, increase economic growth and well-being, and strengthen the rule of law.

And so, today, 40 years after the birth of the United Nations and 15 years before the end of the century whose tribulations inspired it, let us, together, seize the moment. Let us recapture the vision of the charter and recall the principles upon which the U.N. was founded. Let us resolve to make this organization and the world it represents a better, safer place. And let us renew our commitment, individually and together, to peace and justice and the rights of man.

And may I presume to suggest a toast to the Secretary-General and what he has accomplished and what he is doing for all of us.

Note: The President spoke at 2:45 p.m. in the North Delegate's Lounge at the United Nations in response to a toast by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar de la Guerra.

United Nations

Address Before the 40th Session of the General Assembly. October 24, 1985

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, honored guests, and distinguished delegates, thank you for the honor of permitting me to speak on this anniversary for the United Nations.

Forty years ago, the world awoke daring to believe hatred's unyielding grip had finally been broken, daring to believe the torch of peace would be protected in liberty's firm grasp. Forty years ago, the world yearned to dream again innocent dreams,

to believe in ideals with innocent trust. Dreams of trust are worthy, but in these 40 years too many dreams have been shattered, too many promises have been broken, too many lives have been lost. The painful truth is that the use of violence to take, to exercise, and to preserve power remains a persistent reality in much of the world.

The vision of the U.N. Charter—to spare succeeding generations this scourge of war—remains real. It still stirs our soul and warms our hearts, but it also demands of us a realism that is rockhard, clear-eyed, steady, and sure, a realism that understands the nations of the United Nations are not united.

I come before you this morning preoccupied with peace, with ensuring that the differences between some of us not be permitted to degenerate into open conflict, and I come offering for my own country a new commitment, a fresh start.

On this U.N. anniversary, we acknowledge its successes: the decisive action during the Korean war, negotiation of the nonproliferation treaty, strong support for decolonization, and the laudable achievements by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Nor must we close our eyes to this organization's disappointments: its failure to deal with real security issues, the total inversion of morality in the infamous Zionism-is-racism resolution, the politicization of too many agencies, the misuse of too many resources.

The U.N. is a political institution, and politics requires compromise. We recognize that, but let us remember from those first days, one guiding star was supposed to light our path toward the U.N. vision of peace and progress—a star of freedom.

What kind of people will we be 40 years from today? May we answer: free people, worthy of freedom and firm in the conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a chosen few, but the universal right of all God's children.

This is the universal declaration of human rights set forth in 1948, and this is the affirming flame the United States has held high to a watching world. We champion freedom not only because it is practical and beneficial but because it is morally right and just.

Free people whose governments rest upon the consent of the governed do not wage war on their neighbors. Free people blessed by economic opportunity and protected by laws that respect the dignity of the individual are not driven toward the domination of others.

We readily acknowledge that the United States is far from perfect. Yet we have endeavored earnestly to carry out our responsibilities to the charter these past 40 years, and we take national pride in our contributions to peace. We take pride in 40 years of helping avert a new world war and pride in our alliances that protect and preserve us and our friends from aggression. We take pride in the Camp David agreements and our efforts for peace in the Middle East, rooted in resolutions 242 and 338; in supporting Pakistan, target of outside intimidation; in assisting El Salvador's struggle to carry forward its democratic revolution; in answering the appeal of our Caribbean friends in Grenada; in seeing Grenada's Representative here today voting the will of its own people; and we take pride in our proposals to reduce the weapons of war.

We submit this history as evidence of our sincerity of purpose. But today it is more important to speak to you about what my country proposes to do in these closing years of the 20th century to bring about a safer, a more peaceful, a more civilized world.

Let us begin with candor, with words that rest on plain and simple facts. The differences between America and the Soviet Union are deep and abiding.

The United States is a democratic nation. Here the people rule. We build no walls to keep them in, nor organize any system of police to keep them mute. We occupy no country. The only land abroad we occupy is beneath the graves where our heroes rest. What is called the West is a voluntary association of free nations, all of whom fiercely value their independence and their sovereignty. And as deeply as we cherish our beliefs, we do not seek to compel others to share them.

When we enjoy these vast freedoms as we do, it's difficult for us to understand the restrictions of dictatorships which seek to control each institution and every facet of people's lives—the expression of their be-

liefs, their movements, and their contacts with the outside world. It's difficult for us to understand the ideological premise that force is an acceptable way to expand a political system.

We Americans do not accept that any government has the right to command and order the lives of its people, that any nation has an historic right to use force to export its ideology. This belief, regarding the nature of man and the limitations of government, is at the core of our deep and abiding differences with the Soviet Union, differences that put us into natural conflict and competition with one another.

Now, we would welcome enthusiastically a true competition of ideas; welcome a competition of economic strength and scientific and artistic creativity; and, yes, welcome a competition for the good will of the world's people. But we cannot accommodate ourselves to the use of force and subversion to consolidate and expand the reach of totalitarianism.

When Mr. Gorbachev and I meet in Geneva next month, I look to a fresh start in the relationship of our two nations. We can and should meet in the spirit that we can deal with our differences peacefully. And that is what we expect.

The only way to resolve differences is to understand them. We must have candid and complete discussions of where dangers exist and where peace is being disrupted. Make no mistake, our policy of open and vigorous competition rests on a realistic view of the world. And therefore, at Geneva we must review the reasons for the current level of mistrust.

For example, in 1972 the international community negotiated in good faith a ban on biological and toxin weapons; in 1975 we negotiated the Helsinki accords on human rights and freedoms; and during the decade just past, the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated several agreements on strategic weapons. And yet we feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet Union what we believe are violations of a number of the provisions in all of these agreements. Indeed, this is why it is important that we have this opportunity to air our differences through face-to-face meet-

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The United States has never sought treaties merely to paper over differences. We continue to believe that a nuclear war is one that cannot be won and must never be fought. And that is why we have sought for nearly 10 years, still seek, and will discuss in Geneva, radical, equitable, verifiable reductions in these vast arsenals of offensive nuclear weapons.

At the beginning of the latest round of the ongoing negotiations in Geneva, the Soviet Union presented a specific proposal involving numerical values. We are studying the Soviet counterproposal carefully. I believe that within their proposal there are seeds which we should nurture, and in the coming weeks we will seek to establish a genuine process of give-and-take.

The United States is also seeking to discuss with the Soviet Union in Geneva the vital relationship between offensive and defensive systems, including the possibility of moving toward a more stable and secure world in which defenses play a growing role.

The ballistic missile is the most awesome, threatening, and destructive weapon in the history of man. Thus, I welcome the interest of the new Soviet leadership in the reduction of offensive strategic forces. Ultimately, we must remove this menace, once and for all, from the face of the Earth.

Until that day, the United States seeks to escape the prison of mutual terror by research and testing that could, in time, enable us to neutralize the threat of these ballistic missiles and, ultimately, render them obsolete.

How is Moscow threatened if the capitals of other nations are protected? We do not ask that the Soviet leaders, whose country has suffered so much from war, to leave their people defenseless against foreign attack. Why then do they insist that we remain undefended? Who is threatened if Western research and Soviet research, that is itself well-advanced, should develop a nonnuclear system which would threaten not human beings but only ballistic missiles?

Surely, the world will sleep more secure when these missiles have been rendered useless, militarily and politically; when the sword of Damocles that has hung over our

planet for too many decades is lifted by Western and Russian scientists working to shield their citizens and one day shut down space as an avenue of weapons of mass destruction.

If we're destined by history to compete, militarily, to keep the peace, then let us compete in systems that defend our societies rather than weapons which can destroy us both and much of God's creation along with us.

Some 18 years ago, then Premier Aleksei Kosygin was asked about a moratorium on the development of an antimissile defense system. The official news agency, TASS, reported that he replied with these words: "I believe the defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people. Maybe an antimissile system is more expensive than an offensive system, but it is designed not to kill people, but to preserve human lives."

Preserving lives—no peace is more fundamental than that. Great obstacles lie ahead, but they should not deter us. Peace is God's commandment. Peace is the holy shadow cast by men treading on the path of virtue.

But just as we all know what peace is, we certainly know what peace is not. Peace based on repression cannot be true peace and is secure only when individuals are free to direct their own governments.

Peace based on partition cannot be true peace. Put simply: Nothing can justify the continuing and permanent division of the European Continent. Walls of partition and distrust must give way to greater communication for an open world. Before leaving for Geneva, I shall make new proposals to achieve this goal.

Peace based on mutual fear cannot be true peace, because staking our future on a precarious balance of terror is not good enough. The world needs a balance of safety.

And finally, a peace based on averting our eyes from trouble cannot be true peace. The consequences of conflict are every bit as tragic when the destruction is contained within one country.

Real peace is what we seek, and that is why today the United States is presenting an initiative that addresses what will be a

central issue in Geneva—the issue of regional conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Central America.

Our own position is clear: As the oldest nation of the New World, as the first anticolonial power, the United States rejoiced when decolonization gave birth to so many new nations after World War II. We have always supported the right of the people of each nation to define their own destiny. We have given \$300 billion since 1945 to help people of other countries, and we've tried to help friendly governments defend against aggression, subversion, and terror.

We have noted with great interest similar expressions of peaceful intent by leaders of the Soviet Union. I am not here to challenge the good faith of what they say. But isn't it important for us to weigh the record as well? In Afghanistan, there are 118,000 Soviet troops prosecuting war against the Afghan people. In Cambodia, 140,000 Soviet-backed Vietnamese soldiers wage a war of occupation. In Ethiopia, 1,700 Soviet advisers are involved in military planning and support operations along with 2,500 Cuban combat troops. In Angola, 1,200 Soviet military advisers involved in planning and supervising combat operations along with 35,000 Cuban troops. In Nicaragua, some 8,000 Soviet-bloc and Cuban personnel, including about 3,500 military and secret police personnel.

All of these conflicts—some of them underway for a decade—originate in local disputes, but they share a common characteristic: They are the consequence of an ideology imposed from without, dividing nations and creating regimes that are, almost from the day they take power, at war with their own people. And in each case, Marxism-Leninism's war with the people becomes war with their neighbors.

These wars are exacting a staggering human toll and threaten to spill across national boundaries and trigger dangerous confrontations. Where is it more appropriate than right here at the United Nations to call attention to article II of our charter, which instructs members to refrain "from the use or threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . . .?"

During the past decade, these wars played a large role in building suspicions

and tensions in my country over the purpose of Soviet policy. This gives us an extra reason to address them seriously today.

Last year, I proposed from this podium that the United States and Soviet Union hold discussions on some of these issues, and we have done so. But I believe these problems need more than talk. For that reason, we are proposing and are fully committed to support a regional peace process that seeks progress on three levels.

First, we believe the starting point must be a process of negotiation among the warring parties in each country I've mentioned, which in the case of Afghanistan includes the Soviet Union. The form of these talks may and should vary, but negotiations and an improvement of internal political conditions are essential to achieving an end to violence, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and national reconciliation.

There is a second level. Once negotiations take hold and the parties directly involved are making real progress, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union should sit down together. It is not for us to impose any solutions in this separate set of talks; such solutions would not last. But the issue we should address is how best to support the ongoing talks among the warring parties. In some cases, it might well be appropriate to consider guarantees for any agreements already reached. But in every case, the primary task is to promote this goal: verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms.

And finally, if these first two steps are successful, we could move on to the third: welcoming each country back into the world economy so its citizens can share in the dynamic growth that other developing countries, countries that are at peace, enjoy. Despite past differences with these regimes, the United States would respond generously to their democratic reconciliation with their own people, their respect for human rights, and their return to the family of free nations.

Of course, until such time as these negotiations result in definitive progress, America's support for struggling democratic resistance forces must not and shall not cease.

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This plan is bold: it is realistic. It is not a substitute for existing peacemaking efforts: it complements them. We're not trying to solve every conflict in every region of the globe, and we recognize that each conflict has its own character. Naturally, other regional problems will require different approaches. But we believe that the recurrent pattern of conflict that we see in these five cases ought to be broken as soon as possible.

We must begin somewhere, so let us begin where there is great need and great hope. This will be a clear step forward to help people choose their future more freely. Moreover, this is an extraordinary opportunity for the Soviet side to make a contribution to regional peace which, in turn, can promote future dialog and negotiations on other critical issues.

With hard work and imagination, there is no limit to what, working together, our nations can achieve. Gaining a peaceful resolution of these conflicts will open whole new vistas of peace and progress—the discovery that the promise of the future lies not in measures of military defense or the control of weapons, but in the expansion of individual freedom and human rights.

Only when the human spirit can worship, create, and build; only when people are given a personal stake in determining their own destiny and benefiting from their own risks, do societies become prosperous, progressive, dynamic, and free.

We need only open our eyes to the economic evidence all around us. Nations that deny their people opportunity—in Eastern Europe, Indochina, southern Africa, and Latin America—without exception, are dropping further behind in the race for the future. But where we see enlightened leaders who understand that economic freedom and personal incentive are key to development, we see economies striding forward. Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, India, Botswana, and China—these are among the current and emerging success stories because they have the courage to give economic incentives a chance.

Let us all heed the simple eloquence in Andrei Sakharov's Nobel Peace Prize message: "International trust, mutual understanding, disarmament and international security are inconceivable without an open society with freedom of information, free-

dom of conscience, the right to publish and the right to travel and choose the country in which one wishes to live."

At the core, this is an eternal truth; freedom works. That is the promise of the open world and awaits only our collective grasp. Forty years ago, hope came alive again for a world that hungered for hope. I believe fervently that hope is still alive.

The United States has spoken with candor and conviction today, but that does not lessen these strong feelings held by every American. It's in the nature of Americans to hate war and its destructiveness. We would rather wage our struggle to rebuild and renew, not to tear down. We would rather fight against hunger, disease, and catastrophe. We would rather engage our adversaries in the battle of ideals and ideas for the future.

These principles emerge from the innate openness and good character of our people and from our long struggle and sacrifice for our liberties and the liberties of others. Americans always yearn for peace. They have a passion for life. They carry in their hearts a deep capacity for reconciliation.

Last year at this General Assembly, I indicated there was every reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to shorten the distance between us. In Geneva, the first meeting between our heads of government in more than 6 years, Mr. Gorbachev and I will have that opportunity.

So, yes, let us go to Geneva with both sides committed to dialog. Let both sides go committed to a world with fewer nuclear weapons, and some day with none. Let both sides go committed to walk together on a safer path into the 21st century and to lay the foundation for enduring peace.

It is time, indeed, to do more than just talk of a better world. It is time to act. And we will act when nations cease to try to impose their ways upon others. And we will act when they realize that we, for whom the achievement of freedom has come dear, will do what we must to preserve it from assault.

America is committed to the world because so much of the world is inside America. After all, only a few miles from this very room is our Statue of Liberty, past which life began anew for millions, where

the peoples from nearly every country in this hall joined to build these United States. The blood of each nation courses through the American vein and feeds the spirit that compels us to involve ourselves in the fate of this good Earth. It is the same spirit that warms our heart in concern to help ease the desperate hunger that grips proud people on the African Continent.

It is the internationalist spirit that came together last month when our neighbor Mexico was struck suddenly by an earthquake. Even as the Mexican nation moved vigorously into action, there were heart-warming offers by other nations offering to help and glimpses of people working together, without concern for national self-interest or gain.

And if there was any meaning to salvage out of that tragedy, it was found one day in a huge mound of rubble that was once the Juarez Hospital in Mexico City. A week after that terrible event, and as another day of despair unfolded, a team of workers heard a faint sound coming from somewhere in the heart of the crushed concrete. Hoping beyond hope, they quickly burrowed toward it. And as the late afternoon light faded, and racing against time, they found what they had heard, and the first of three baby girls, newborn infants, emerged to the safety of the rescue team. And let me tell you the scene through the eyes of one who was there. "Everyone was so quiet when they lowered that little baby down in a basket covered with blankets. The baby didn't make a sound either. But the minute they put her in the Red Cross ambulance, everybody just got up and cheered." Well, amidst all that hopelessness and debris came a timely and timeless lesson for us all. We witnessed the miracle of life.

It is on this that I believe our nations can make a renewed commitment. The miracle of life is given by One greater than ourselves, but once given, each life is ours to nurture and preserve, to foster, not only for today's world but for a better one to come.

There is no purpose more noble than for us to sustain and celebrate life in a turbulent world, and that is what we must do now. We have no higher duty, no greater cause as humans. Life and the preservation of freedom to live it in dignity is what we are on this Earth to do. Everything we

work to achieve must seek that end so that some day our prime ministers, our premiers, our presidents and our general secretaries will talk not of war and peace, but only of peace.

We've had 40 years to begin. Let us not waste one more moment to give back to the world all that we can in return for this miracle of life.

Thank you all. God bless you all.

Note: The President spoke at 10:08 a.m. in the General Assembly Hall at the United Nations. Upon arriving at the United Nations, the President was greeted by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar de la Guerra.

United Nations

Informal Exchange With Reporters. October 24, 1985

Q. Mr. President, why were you so tough in outlining Soviet misdeeds today?

The President. You haven't been around for previous photo ops, but I've made it a rule today not to take any questions.

Q. Mr. Shevardnadze, what did you think of the President's speech, sir?

The Foreign Minister. Well, I've outlined it in my speech today.

Q. It sounded like you didn't like it.

Q. Are you going to talk to Mr. Shevardnadze about your plan for settling regional conflicts in this meeting?

The President. No answers, Sam [Sam Donaldson, ABC News].

Q. Mr. President, Ortega says that your speech flew in the face of peace.

The President. Never have I regretted so much that I'm not giving an answer as on that one.

Q. Is there any questions you will answer?

Q. Mr. Shevardnadze, what, sir, do you think of the President's plan for settling regional conflicts?

The Foreign Minister. That's what we shall be discussing.

Q. In this meeting here?

Q. Does it make arms control—

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But the hope too of seeking to work with the Soviet Union to reduce and eventually eliminate the danger of nuclear destruction, to relax those regional tensions that can lead to wider conflict, to enhance respect for human rights in every nation and to expand the peace process itself by involving more directly the citizens of both our nations. And on this latter point I want to mention in a few moments the specific new proposals I have in mind.

This series of people-to-people exchanges can I believe do much to bring the people of both our nations together. In this area we are going to suggest for example the exchange of at least 5,000 undergraduates each year for two semesters of study as well a youth exchange involving at least 5,000 secondary school age youngsters who would live with a host family and attend schools or summer camps. We also look to increase scholarship programs, to improve language studies, to develop and expand sister city relationships, to establish cultural centers and libraries and to increase bi-national athletic exchanges and sporting competitions.

In the areas of science, space and technology we would also seek to inaugurate more joint space flights and establish joint medical research projects and institutes in each of our countries. In the communications area, in particular, we would like to see a far more extensive contact including more appearances by representatives of both our countries in the other's mass media. I've noted that Mr. Gorbachev has shown a

lively appreciation for America's free press tradition; I can assure you I will be preaching the virtues of some Soviet movements in this direction as well and will ask again, as I did several years ago in a speech to the British Parliament, for an opportunity to address the Soviet people.

Now I do not think these proposals will by themselves solve the world's problems or end our differences; but I do believe more people-to-people contact between our nations can help build constituencies for peace and freedom in both our nations. *Read*

*When the people are involved, the less interested
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*For when the people grow more involved
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President's Television Address
Pre-Geneva November 1985
Thematic Outline

Looking Ahead to Geneva

-- In a few days, will be meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. I see meeting as a stepping stone to the kind of future both our peoples want:

- o to reduce and eventually eliminate the danger of nuclear destruction;
- o to relax regional tensions which can spread and engulf both our countries in conflict;
- o to respect the dignity of each human being;
- o to remove the barriers between our people.

Build bridges —

-- Historic opportunity to set a course for the future, address the fundamental differences between us in a frank, open way.

-- We have prepared carefully and extensively for this moment: want to share my thoughts and vision of the future that I will present to Gorbachev.

A Historic Opportunity

-- Americans have reason to be satisfied: economy flourishing, alliances strong, military might second to none, and we enjoy individual freedoms about which much of the world can only dream.

-- But what about the future?

-- US-Soviet relationship holds key to world's future: ~~whether there is peace or war~~, progress in solving mankind's problems depends on what we do in coming months and years.

-- Differences between us are profound -- our history, economic systems, and the amount of freedom our citizens enjoy.

-- But we have a common interest -- and mankind has a common interest -- in dealing with these differences peacefully, and finding ways to cooperate wherever possible.

-- The most important task for General Secretary Gorbachev and me is to chart a course for the future that will ensure a safer and better world for all our citizens and for mankind.

- Our goals:
- not just to avoid war, but to strengthen peace;
 - not just to prevent confrontation, but to remove the sources of tension;
 - not just to paper over differences but to address them;
 - not just to talk about what our citizens

*Are deterring
- Haven't given
up one square
inch*

*Why I am
going to
Geneva*

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/29/85 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: C.O.B. 10/30/85

SUBJECT: THEMATIC OUTLINE OF PRE-GENEVA TELEVISION ADDRESS

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	LACY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	McFARLANE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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REMARKS:

Please review by close of business Wednesday, 10/30, with any comments to Bill Martin. Send information copies to my office.

RESPONSE:

This incorporates Pat Buchanan's and speechwriting office's comments—

David L. Chew
10/30

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

President's Television Address
Pre-Geneva November 1985
Thematic Outline

Why I Am Going to Geneva

-- In a few days, will be meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva.

-- My purpose is to ^{engage} ~~renew a dialogue~~ with the Soviet leader on the most important question of our time: what we must do to build a better, safer world for both our peoples and mankind as a whole.

-- It is my fervent hope that the two of us can begin a new effort ^{an effort} ~~process~~ which our successors and our peoples can continue: ^{to} ~~process~~ ^{process} of facing our differences frankly and openly so that we can begin to narrow and resolve them; a ^{process} ~~process~~ of communicating effectively so that our actions and intentions are not misunderstood; a ^{effort} ~~process~~ of ^{building bridges} ~~building bridges~~ between us and cooperating wherever possible for the greater good of all.

-- I see our meeting as a stepping stone to the kind of future both our peoples want:

- o to reduce and eventually eliminate the danger of nuclear destruction;
- o to relax regional tensions which can spread and engulf both our countries in conflict;
- o to respect the dignity of each human being;
- o to build bridges between our peoples.

-- Historic opportunity to set a steady course through the 21st century.

-- We have prepared carefully and extensively for this moment: want to share my thoughts and vision of the future that I will present to Gorbachev.

A Historic Opportunity

-- Americans have reason to be satisfied: ^{feel confident about the future} ~~being satisfied~~ economy flourishing, alliances strong, military might ~~second to none~~, and we enjoy individual freedoms about which much of the world can only dream.

o Our strategy of deterrence ^{is} ~~has~~ worked: ⁱⁿ ~~since~~ I have ^{in last 5 years,} ~~been President~~ not one inch of free territory has fallen to communist subjugation. Indeed, the number of free countries calling themselves democracies has grown by (4?).

-- But what about the future?

-- US-Soviet relationship ^{is} ~~holds~~ key to world ^{peace} ~~future~~: ~~progress in solving mankind's problems depends on what we do in coming months and years.~~ ^(This snarls of Big-power hegemony + would create antagonisms among allies + third world countries)

-- Differences between us are profound -- our history, economic systems, ~~and~~ the amount of freedom our citizens enjoy,

*and how significant
the clash of different
philosophies*

o But we ~~also have a history of cooperation~~ World War II alliance to defeat fascism. ~~In the two major wars of this century we have been on the same side. (Czarist Russia was our ally, not Lenin's.)~~

-- We have a common interest ~~in dealing with our differences~~ and mankind has an interest -- ~~in dealing with our differences~~ peacefully and finding ways to cooperate wherever possible. *(from coupling in open conflict; and we have an*

-- The most important task for General Secretary Gorbachev and me is to chart a course for the future:

- o not just to avoid war, but to strengthen peace;
- o not just to prevent confrontation, but to remove the sources of tension;
- o not just to paper over differences but to address them;
- o not just to talk about what our citizens want, but to let them talk to each other.

Peace is Indivisible

-- History has shown that peace is indivisible. Ensuring a safe future requires addressing the complex of problems we see, not just focusing on one or two issues, important as they may be. Thus our agenda for Geneva includes:

Putting the Nuclear Genie Back...

-- Since the dawn of the nuclear age, every American President has sought to limit and end the dangerous competition in nuclear arms. I have no higher priority than to finally realize that dream of a world free of nuclear weapons, a world where free people can live and work in peace.

-- We have gone the extra mile in arms control:

(Recap US arms control proposals for deep reductions, greater strategic stability, effective verification of agreements.)

-- Wouldn't it be better for both our countries and for the world for us to concentrate on reducing the weapons that exist today?

-- And wouldn't the world benefit if we could mutually find a way to render nuclear ballistic missiles obsolete and useless?

Develop survival shields that would protect the earth's people and

-- Wouldn't it be better if Mr. Gorbachev and I could discuss this, without artificial preconceptions and pretense?

-- Our discussions will be an opportunity to inject new momentum into the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks, and will have consequences long beyond our November meeting.

Sources of Tension

-- Reducing the levels of nuclear arms is not the whole answer: since World War II, about twenty million people have died in regional wars, not one involving nuclear weapons.

-- Soviet Union's use of force or threat of force to intervene directly or through proxies in in Afganistan, Poland, Angola, Nicaragua has made world more dangerous.

-- We cannot isolate these activities from other aspects of our relationship. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan killed any hope of SALT II ratification.

-- That is why I proposed a plan for resolving regional conflicts that have taken such a heavy toll on the people involved, which threaten to engulf their neighbors and draw in outside powers which includes:

(Recap regional initiative)

Peace Depends on People

-- Freedom and democracy are the best guarantors of peace: people who enjoy freedom and human rights will not encourage their governments to commit aggression against others. History has shown that democractic nations do not start wars.

-- Respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. A government which does not respect its citizens' rights and its international commitments to protect those rights is not likely to respect its other international undertakings.

-- We hold these beliefs deeply, ^{we do not seek} but ~~are not trying~~ to impose our values on others. We do ask, however, that countries live up to their freely undertaken international commitments. ⁶ -- ^{that people} can determine their own destiny.

Building Bridges

-- Finally, enduring peace requires openness, honest communications and oportunitites for our peoples to get to know one another directly.

-- This applies to all aspects of our relationship, whether it be negotiating arms control agreements, reducing regional tensions and in the day to day business between our two governments.

o Imagine if Joe Smith in Poughkeepsie could meet and visit Sergei Ivanov in Sverdlovsk, if Sergei's son or daughter could spend a year, or even three months living with the Smith family, going to summer camp or classes at Poughkeepsie High, while Smith's son or daughter went to school in Sverdlovsk? Soviet young people could learn first hand what spirit of freedom rules our land, and that we do not wish the peoples of the Soviet Union any harm. Our young people would get first hand knowledge of life in the USSR.

o Imagine if people in Minneapolis could see the Kirov ballet live, while citizens in Mkhatchkala could see an American play or hear Duke Ellington's band? And how about Soviet children watching Sesame Street?

-- We have had educational and cultural exchanges for 25 years, and are now close to completing a new agreement. But I feel the time is ripe for us to take bold new steps to open the way for our peoples to participate in an unprecedented way in the building of peace. That is why I have proposed to the Soviet government:

1) To encourage our young people to get to know one another - reciprocal exchange of thousands of undergraduate students, and thousands of high school students; Soviet-American scholarship program.

2) To use the resources of technology for better communications - elimination of jamming, mutual satellite transmissions, exchanges in computer educational materials. We welcome the free competition of ideas and respect the right to hold different views.

3) To pool scientific talent - cooperative research and space programs where there is something to be learned on both sides. Important past accomplishments include Apollo-Soyuz, mechanical heart. How much more could be done by working together?

4) To bring cultural achievements closer - establishment of cultural centers, increased publication and distribution of books, possibly a book store in each country, increased language study. We have much to learn from one another.

5) To channel competition into healthy athletic outlets - increased sports exchanges, joint events. If we must compete, let it be in the athletic arena, rather than arms factories, in sweatsuits rather than military uniforms.

-- Our open society is our greatest strength, believe the only way to break down barriers of mistrust is through more information, communication and contact between our people. That is part of my vision of the future, and what I want to discuss further with Soviet leader Gorbachev in Geneva.

-- Differences between our two countries are substantial, but now is time to get programs like these underway. They will not solve our problems overnight, but can move us in the right direction.

Not An Impossible Dream

-- It is not an impossible dream that we can begin to reduce nuclear arsenals, reduce the risk of war and build a solid foundation for peace. It is not an impossible dream that our children and grandchildren can some day travel freely back and forth between America and the Soviet Union, visit each other's homes, work and study together, enjoy and discuss plays, music, television, and even root for each other's soccer teams.

-- The American people are ready for this. I have confidence in their ability to sift fact from fiction, propaqanda from honest proposals. The people of the Soviet Union should have the same opportunity.

-- But governments can only do so much; once they get the ball rolling, they should step out of the way and let people get together to share, enjoy, help, listen and learn from each other, especially young people.

-- Peace involves everyone. It is built on the daily actions of citizens, especially in a democracy.

-- History has shown us that peace is indivisible. Addressing all the problems we face together is the only way to develop a healthy, sound relationship based on equality, mutual trust and fairness:

- o no matter how good an arms control agreement may be, its chances of being approved are diminished if Soviet behavior in other areas is unacceptable;

- o similarly, the prospects for more trade and other bilateral exchanges are improved when governments treat their people with respect;

- o and the chances for reaching an arms control agreement are improved if the barriers between people are lowered, and regional tensions not exploited.

-- That is the dream I am taking to Geneva. It is not an impossible dream. Our relationship will continue to be competitive in many ways, but, just as we have cooperated in the past to defeat a common enemy, we can do so again to defeat today's enemies: hunger, disease, poverty, illiteracy.

-- Our peoples want nothing so much as peace, a better life for themselves and their children. We can have a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union only if the Soviet leaders also want it.

-- As the poet Robert Frost said ".... and many miles to go before we sleep."

-- But our meeting in Geneva need not be an end: it could be the beginning of a renewed commitment to working together to shape a safer future for both our countries and the world. History will not forgive us if we do not make a start.

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-- Our peoples want nothing so much as peace, a better life for themselves and their children. We can have a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union only if the Soviet leaders also want it.

-- Real problems are hunger, disease, poverty. Soviets have made important contributions to music, literature, science, as have Americans.... If we pool our resources, what could we not achieve?

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-- As the poet Robert Frost said ".... and many miles to go) before we sleep."

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*Why I am
going to
Geneva 7/72*

o Imagine if Joe Smith in Poughkeepsie could meet and visit Sergei Ivanov in Sverdlovsk, if Sergei's son or daughter could spend a year, or even three months living with the Smith family, going to summer camp or classes at Poughkeepsie High, while Smith's son or daughter went to school in Sverdlovsk? Soviet young people could learn first hand what spirit of freedom rules our land, and that we do not wish the peoples of the Soviet Union any harm. Our young people would get first hand knowledge of life in the USSR, learn about their culture and suffering in World War II?

o Imagine if people in Minneapolis could see the Kirov ballet live, while citizens in Mkhatchkala could see an American play or hear Duke Ellington's band? And how about Soviet children watching Sesame Street?

o Great things achieved in joint scientific research -- Apollo-Soyuz, development of mechanical heart -- imagine how much more we could do if we worked together?

*Spill out
People to
People Projects
Program!*

Our open society is our greatest strength, believe the only way to break down barriers of mistrust is through more information, communication and contact between our people. That is part of my vision of the future, and what I want to discuss further with Soviet leader Gorbachev in Geneva.

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-- We cannot isolate these activities from other aspects of our relationship. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan killed any hope of ratification of SALT II.

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(Recap regional initiative)

Peace Depends on People

-- Respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. A government which does not respect its citizens' rights and its international commitments to protect those rights is not likely to respect its other international undertakings.

-- Freedom and democracy are the best guarantors of peace: democratic nations do not start wars. Where citizens rule, there is a no need or desire to take up arms for conquest or political gain.

-- We hold these beliefs deeply, but are not trying to impose them on others. We do ask, however, that countries live up to their freely undertaken international commitments.

Removing the Barriers

-- Finally, enduring peace requires openness, contacts and honest communications in all areas:

o to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation, freedom of travel and inspection essential to arms control process;

~~o to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation, freedom of travel and inspection essential to arms control process;~~

o citizens listening to all sides of the case, making up their own minds.

-- The US has always stood for openness: in 1955, President Eisenhower, preparing for his first meeting with the then Soviet leader, made his Open Skies proposal (quote...). His dream of educational cultural exchanges.

-- Today, thirty years later, we have not even begun to realize the vast potential which science and technology offer to facilitate communications, contacts that could dispel stereotypes, and enable our people to better understand and learn from each other:

People who
copy documents
has info and
encourage govts
to come
together
often

*Cautious
Optimism
Vittimay*

want, but to let them talk to each other.

Peace is Indivisible

-- History has shown that peace is indivisible. Ensuring a safe future requires addressing the complex of problems we see, not just focusing on one or two issues, important as they may be. Thus our agenda for Geneva includes:

Putting the Nuclear Genie Back...

-- Since the dawn of the nuclear age, every American President has sought to limit and end the dangerous competition in nuclear arms. I have no higher priority than to finally realize that dream.

-- We have gone the extra mile in arms control:
(Recap US arms control proposals)

-- Last month's Soviet counteroffer still very one-sided, but we are willing to hear them out, to work with them.

-- Soviet Union has so far not given our proposals the same attention, unwilling to explore our offer unless we agree in advance to give up our research and testing program on defenses.

-- Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has for many years been intensively pursuing its own research and more on defenses: has the world's only anti-ballistic missile defense system in place around Moscow, only proven anti-satellite weapon.

-- Wouldn't it be better for both our countries and for the world for us to concentrate on reducing the weapons that exist today?

-- And wouldn't the world benefit if we could mutually find a way to render nuclear ballistic missiles obsolete and useless?

-- Wouldn't it be better if Mr. Gorbachev and I could discuss this, without artificial preconceptions and pretense?

Sources of Tension

-- Reducing the levels of nuclear arms is not the whole answer:

since World War II, about twenty million people have died in regional wars, not one involving nuclear weapons.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO : DANA ROHRBACHER

FROM : AMY JOHNSON - WHITE HOUSE RESEARCH

RE : INFORMATION ON CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM DOCUMENTATION
ON WORLD WAR 1 AND WORLD WAR 2

Corporation for Entertainment & Learning

A Walk Through The 20th Century With Bill Moyers

Show #103 "The Arming Of The Earth"

"By World War 1 we had 8 million military but 1.3 million civilians died, in World War 1. Now by World War 2 we had approximately 16.9 million military casualties but we had 34 million civilians who were killed. For the first time in the history of modern warfare we had almost twice as many civilians killed as military casualties. The projection for World War 3 if it were ever fought; we're talking approximately 253 million people in a nuclear type scenario, and that would mean over 90% of the casualties would be civilians."

C5H1
Kitty Ed 10/85
x:ccc

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT--November 1, 1985

	Nov 1982	Dec 1984	Aug 1985	Sep 1985	Oct 1985	11/82 to Total	10/85 Per mo	12/84 to Total	10/85 Per mo	9/85 to 10/85
Total employment*	100.758	107.971	108.898	109.276	109.567	8.809	0.252	1.596	0.160	0.291
Civilian employment*	99.098	106.273	107.172	107.544	107.867	8.769	0.251	1.594	0.159	0.323
Payroll employment**	88.666	96.092	97.977	98.115	98.529	9.863	0.282	2.437	0.244	0.414
Total unemployment rate	10.6	7.1	6.9	7.0	7.0	-3.6	-0.1	-0.1	.0	0.0
Civilian unemployment rate	10.7	7.2	7.0	7.1	7.1	-3.6	-0.1	-0.1	.0	0.0
Unemployment	11.899	8.191	8.127	8.274	8.291	-3.608	-0.103	0.100	0.010	0.017
Resident Armed Forces	1.660	1.698	1.726	1.732	1.700	0.040	0.001	0.002	.000	-0.032
Labor force incl RAF	112.657	116.162	117.025	117.550	117.859	5.202	0.149	1.697	0.170	0.309
Civilian labor force	110.997	114.464	115.299	115.818	116.159	5.162	0.147	1.695	0.170	0.341

*Household survey.

**Nonfarm.

Note: Data are millions of persons, except that unemployment rates are percent of labor force and changes are percentage points.

October 1985 is the 35th month since the cyclical trough of November 1982.

Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements

February 1, 1985



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following are the texts of President Reagan's message to the Congress and his unclassified report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS. FEB. 1, 1985

During 1984, at the request of the Congress, I forwarded two reports to the Congress on arms control compliance. The first, forwarded last January, was an in-depth analysis of seven specific issues of violations or probable violations by the Soviet Union of arms control obligations and commitments. The second report, forwarded in October, was an advisory study prepared independently by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. These reports indicate that there is cause for serious concern regarding the Soviet Union's conduct with respect to observance of arms control agreements.

In the FY-1985 Defense Authorization Act and the Conference Report on that Act, the Congress called for additional classified and unclassified reports regarding a wide range of questions concerning the Soviet Union's compliance with arms control commitments. The Administration is responding to these requests by providing both classified and unclassified reports which update the seven issues initially analyzed in the January 1984 report, and analyze a number of additional issues.

In this unclassified report the United States Government reaffirms the conclusions of its January 1984 report that the USSR has violated the Helsinki Final Act, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and two pro-

visions of SALT II [strategic arms limitation talks]: telemetry encryption and ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] modernization. The United States Government also reaffirms its previous conclusions that the USSR has probably violated the SS-16 deployment prohibition of SALT II and is likely to have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In addition, the United States Government has determined that the USSR has violated the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty (through the siting, orientation, and capability of the Krasnoyarsk Radar), violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and violated the SALT II provision prohibiting more than one new type of ICBM, and probably violated the ABM Treaty restriction on concurrent testing of SAM [surface-to-air missiles] and ABM components. Evidence regarding the USSR's compliance with the ABM Treaty provision on component mobility was determined to be ambiguous. In addition, the United States Government is concerned about Soviet preparations for a prohibited territorial ABM defense. Further, the USSR was determined to be currently in compliance with those provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures that deal with reuse of dismantled ICBM sites and with the reconfiguration of dismantled ballistic missile launching submarines.

Beyond the issues that are treated in the unclassified report released today, there are other compliance issues that will not be publicly disclosed at this time but which remain under review. As we continue to work on these issues, we will brief and consult with the Congress in detail and will, to the maximum extent possible, keep the public informed on our findings.

In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is

essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less. To do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

As I stated last January, Soviet non-compliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. With regard to the issues analyzed in the January 1984 report, the Soviet Union has thus far not provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate our concerns. The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.

Our approach in pursuing these issues with the Soviet Union is to ensure that both the letter and intent of treaty obligations and commitments will be fulfilled. To this end the Administration is: analyzing further issues of possible non-compliance; as noted above, seeking from the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels explanations, clarifications, and, where necessary, corrective actions; reporting on such issues to the Congress; and taking into account in our defense modernization plans the security implications of arms control violations. At the same time, the United States is continuing to carry out its own obligations and commitments under relevant agreements. Our objectives in the new negotiations which begin in March are to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty and to seek equitable, effectively verifiable arms control agreements which will result in real reductions and enhanced stability. While all of these steps can help, however, it is fundamentally important that the Soviet Union take a constructive attitude toward full compliance with all arms control obligations and commitments.

The Administration and the Congress have a shared interest in supporting the arms control process. For this reason, increased understanding of Soviet violations or probable violations, and a strong Congressional consensus on the importance of compliance to achieving effective arms control, will strengthen our efforts both in the new negotiations and in seeking corrective actions from the Soviet Union.

I look forward to continued close consultation with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT, FEB. 1, 1985

SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

In January 1984, the President, in response to Congressional requests, reported to the Congress on several issues involving violations or probable violations by the Soviet Union of existing arms control agreements, including: the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Helsinki Final Act, the ABM Treaty, SALT II, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

In that report the President stated:

If the concept of arms control is to have meaning and credibility as a contribution to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements comply with them. Because I seek genuine arms control, I am committed to ensuring that existing agreements are observed.

The President further noted that:

Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. It increases doubts about the reliability of the USSR as a negotiating partner, and thus damages the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The current unclassified report provides updated information on the seven issues previously reported and additionally reviews six other compliance issues that have been intensively studied since the January 1984 report was completed, for a total of thirteen issues. The six new cases involve questions of Soviet compliance with provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

- With regard to the SALT I Interim Agreement, this report examines the evidence on two issues: (1) whether the USSR has made prohibited use of remaining facilities at dismantled former ICBM sites; (2) whether the USSR has reconfigured dismantled ballistic missile submarines in a manner prohibited by Treaty or Protocol provisions.

- With regard to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), this report examines whether the USSR vented nuclear debris from underground nuclear tests beyond its territorial limits in contravention of the LTBT.

- With regard to the ABM Treaty, this report examines whether the USSR has: concurrently tested SAM and ABM components; developed, tested, or deployed mobile ABM components; and/or has provided a base for territorial defense.

In this report the United States Government reaffirms the conclusions of its January 1984 report that the USSR has violated the Helsinki Final Act, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and two provisions of SALT II: telemetry encryption and ICBM modernization. The United States Government also reaffirms its previous conclusions that the USSR has probably violated the SS-16 deployment prohibition of SALT II and is likely to have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In addition, the United States Government has determined that the USSR has violated the ABM Treaty through the siting, orientation, and capability of the Krasnoyarsk Radar and the Limited Test Ban Treaty; by testing the SS-X-25 ICBM in addition to the SS-X-24 ICBM, violated the SALT II "new types" provision limiting each party to one new type ICBM; and probably violated the prohibition against concurrent testing of SAM and ABM components. Moreover, the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Evidence regarding the USSR's compliance with the ABM Treaty provision on component mobility was determined to be ambiguous, and the USSR was determined to be currently in compliance with provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures that deal with re-use of dismantled ICBM sites and the reconfiguration of dismantled ballistic missile launching submarines.

In addition to the issues regarding Soviet compliance with arms control agreements which are addressed in this unclassified report, there are other compliance matters currently under review which cannot be publicly disclosed at this time and which we intend to brief to the Congress on a classified basis in the near future.

In examining the issues in this unclassified report, as well as in the classified report to follow, we have focused on questions of Soviet noncompliance. Questions of Soviet noncompliance have not arisen with regard to several other provisions of these agreements, nor with certain other treaties, such as the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Non-Proliferation

Treaty, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the Environmental Modification Convention, and others

The issues we have analyzed raise very serious concerns. The United States Government firmly believes that in order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global and regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and the United States Government will not accept anything less: to do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

THE FINDINGS

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol

1. Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

• **Treaty Status:** The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (the BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are parties. Soviet actions not in accord with these treaties and customary international law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.

• **Obligations:** The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, or possession, and transfer of: microbial or other biological agents or toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment, and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the first use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices; and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

• **Issues:** The January 1984 compliance report addressed whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession, and use of biological and toxin weapons. Soviet compliance was reexamined for this report.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that evidence during 1984 confirm and strengthen the conclusion of the January 1984 report that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under

the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Although there have been no confirmed chemical and toxin attacks in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1984, there is no basis for amending the January 1984 conclusion that the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

2. Underground Nuclear Test Venting

• **Treaty Status:** The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)) is a multilateral treaty that entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet actions not in accord with this treaty are violations of a legal obligation.

• **Obligations:** The LTBT specifically prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment "if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."

• **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether the USSR's underground nuclear tests have caused radioactive debris to be present outside of its territorial limits.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices have resulted in the venting of radioactive matter and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violations of its legal obligation to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union has failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite U.S. request for corrective action.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

3. Nuclear Testing and the 150 Kiloton Limit

• **Treaty Status:** The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974. The Treaty has not been ratified but neither party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Therefore, both parties are subject to the obligation under

customary international law to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. Soviet actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT are therefore violations of their legal obligation. The United States is seeking to negotiate improved verification measures for the Treaty. Both Parties have separately stated they would observe the 150 kiloton threshold of the TTBT.

• **Obligation:** The Treaty prohibits any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under the jurisdiction or control of the Parties, beginning March 31, 1976. In view of the technical uncertainties associated with estimating the precise yield of nuclear weapons tests, the sides agreed that one or two slight unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation.

• **Issue:** The January 1984 report examined whether the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons. This issue was reexamined for this report.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that, while ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and verification uncertainties continued in 1984, evidence available through the year confirms the January 1984 finding that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which banned underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. These Soviet actions continue despite U.S. requests for corrective measures.

Helsinki Final Act

4. Helsinki Final Act Notification of Military Exercises

• **Legal Status:** The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This document represents a political commitment and was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, along with many other States. Soviet actions not in accord with that document are violations of their political commitment.

• **Obligation:** All signatory States of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to give prior notification of, and other details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 ground troops.

• **Issues:** The January 1984 compliance report examined whether notification of the Soviet military exercise Zapad-81 was inadequate and therefore a violation of the Soviet

over

(Over)

Union's political commitment under the Helsinki Final Act. The USSR's compliance with its notification commitment was reexamined for this report.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government previously judged that the Soviet Union violated its political commitment to observe the prior-notification provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act, which requires notification and other information concerning exercises exceeding 25,000 ground troops. A major Warsaw Pact maneuver (Zapad-81), exceeding the 25,000 troop limit, was conducted in 1981 at a time great pressure was being put on Poland, and the Soviet Union did not provide the pre-notification or other information required. The judgment that the Soviet Union did not observe the prior notification provisions of the Helsinki Final Act is confirmed.

While the USSR and Warsaw Pact states have generally taken an approach to the confidence-building measures of the Final Act which minimizes the information they provide, Soviet compliance with the exercise-notification provisions was much improved in 1983. However, during 1984, the USSR returned to a minimalist stance, providing only the bare minimum required under the Final Act.

SALT I Interim Agreement

• **Treaty Status:** The SALT I Interim Agreement entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. Dismantling procedures implementing the Interim Agreement were concluded in 1974. The Interim Agreement, by its own terms, was of limited duration and expired as a legally binding document in 1977. The applicability of the Interim Agreement to the actions of both parties has, however, been extended by the parties by a series of mutual political commitments, including the President's May 31, 1982 statement that the United States would refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint. The Soviets have told us they would abide by the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II. Any actions by the USSR inconsistent with this commitment are violations of its political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

Two issues were analyzed for this report: Soviet activities at dismantled ICBM sites, and reconfiguration of a Yankee-Class ballistic missile submarine.

5. Mobile Missile Base Construction at Dismantled SS-7 ICBM Sites

• **Obligation:** The SALT I Interim Agreement and its procedures prohibit the parties from using facilities remaining at dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs. Any Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of a political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

• **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether the USSR has used former ICBM sites in a manner inconsistent with its political commitment under the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that Soviet activity apparently related to SS-X-25 ICBM deployments at two former SS-7 bases does not at present violate the agreed implementing procedures of the SALT I Interim Agreement. However, ongoing activities raise concerns about compliance for the future, since use of "remaining facilities" to support ICBMs at deactivated SS-7 sites would be in violation of Soviet commitments. The U.S. will continue to monitor developments closely.

6. Reconfiguration of Yankee-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines

• **Obligations:** The SALT I Interim Agreement and its procedures require that submarines limited by the Agreement be dismantled or be reconfigured into submarines without ballistic missile capabilities. Any Soviet actions inconsistent with this obligation are violations of a political commitment.

• **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether the USSR's reconfiguration of a submarine to increase its length, and for use as a platform for modern long-range cruise missiles, is consistent with its political commitments under the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union's conversion of a dismantled SSBN into a submarine longer than the original, and carrying modern, long-range cruise missiles is not a violation of its political commitment under the SALT I Interim Agreement, but constitutes a threat to U.S. and Allied security similar to the original Yankee-Class submarine.

SALT II Treaty

• **Treaty Status:** SALT II was signed in June 1979 and has not been ratified. In 1981 the United States made

clear to the Soviet Union its intention not to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Prior to this clarification of our position in 1981, both nations were obligated under customary international law not to take actions which would defeat the object and purpose of the signed, but unratified, Treaty. Such Soviet actions prior to 1981 are violations of legal obligations. Since 1981, the United States has observed a political commitment to refrain from actions that undercut the SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviet Union does likewise. The Soviets have told us they also would abide by these provisions. Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of their political commitment with respect to the SALT II Treaty.

Three SALT II issues are included in this unclassified report: encryption of telemetry, SS-X-25 ICBM, and SS-16 ICBM deployment.

7. Encryption of Ballistic Missile Telemetry

• **Obligation:** The provisions of SALT II ban deliberate concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means. The Treaty permits each party to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including encryption, but bans deliberate denial of telemetry, such as through encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification.

• **Issue:** The January 1984 compliance report examined whether the Soviet Union has engaged in encryption of missile test telemetry (radio signals) so as to impede verification. This issue was reexamined for this report.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the January 1984 report that Soviet encryption practices constitute a violation of a legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 and a violation of their political commitment since 1982. The nature and extent of such encryption of telemetry on new ballistic missiles, despite U.S. request for corrective action, continues to be an example of deliberately impeding verification of compliance in violation of this Soviet political commitment.

8. The SS-X-25 ICBM

• **Obligation:** In an attempt to constrain the modernization and the proliferation of new, more capable types of ICBMs, the provisions of SALT II permit each side to "flight test and deploy" just one new type of "light" ICBM. A new type is defined as one that differs from an existing type by more than 5 percent in length, largest diameter,

launch-weight, and throw-weight or differs in number of stages or propellant type. In addition, it was agreed that no single re-entry vehicle ICBM of an existing type with a post-boost vehicle would be flight-tested or deployed whose reentry vehicle weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM. This latter provision was intended to prohibit the possibility that single warhead ICBMs could quickly be converted to MIRVed (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) systems.

• **Issues:** The Soviets declared the SS-X-24 to be their allowed one new type ICBM. The January 1984 report examined the issues: whether the Soviets have tested a second new type of ICBM (the SS-X-25) which is prohibited; whether the reentry vehicle (RV) on that missile, if it is not a new type, is in compliance with the provision that for existing types of single RV missiles, the weight of the RV be equal to at least 50 percent of total throw-weight; and whether encryption of SS-X-25 flight test telemetry impedes verification. The U.S. reexamined these issues for this report.

• **Finding:**

a. **Second New Type:** The U.S. Government judges that the SS-X-25 is a prohibited second "new" type of ICBM and that its testing, in addition to the SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new" type provision of the SALT II Treaty. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken.

b. **RV-to-Throw-Weight Ratio:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion of the January 1984 report regarding the SS-X-25 RV-to-throw-weight ratio. That is, if we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SS-X-25 is not a prohibited new type of ICBM, it would be a violation of their political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibits the testing of such an existing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of the ICBM.

c. **Encryption:** The U.S. Government reaffirms its judgment made in the January 1984 report regarding telemetry encryption during tests of the SS-X-25. Encryption during tests of this missile is illustrative of the deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of a legal obligation prior to 1981, and of the USSR's political commitment subsequent to 1981.

9. SS-16 Deployment

• **Obligation:** The Soviet Union agreed in SALT II not to produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, in particular, not to produce the SS-16 third stage or the reentry vehicle of that missile.

• **Issue:** The January 1984 report examined the evidence regarding whether the Soviets have deployed the SS-16 ICBM in spite of the ban on its deployment. The U.S. reexamined this issue for this report.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the January 1984 report. While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, the available evidence indicates that the activities at Plesetsk are a probable violation of the USSR's legal obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of SALT II prior to 1981 when the Treaty was pending ratification, and a probable violation of a political commitment subsequent to 1981.

ABM Treaty

• **Treaty Status:** The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around the national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are, therefore, violations of a legal obligation.

Four ABM issues are included in this unclassified report: the Krasnoyarsk Radar, mobile land-based ABM systems or components, concurrent testing of ABM and SAM components, and ABM territorial defense.

10. The Krasnoyarsk Radar

• **Obligation:** In an effort to preclude creation of a base for territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty limits the deployment of ballistic missile early warning radars, including large phased-array radars used for that purpose, to locations along the periphery of the national territory of each party and requires that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

• **Issue:** The January 1984 report examined the evidence regarding the construction of a large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. It was concluded that this radar was almost certainly a violation of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. reexamined this issue for this report.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges, on the basis of evidence which continued to be available through 1984, that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction, and the absence of credible alternative explanations, have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken.

11. Mobility of New ABM System

• **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

• **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility are ambiguous, but the USSR's development of components of a new ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively little or no preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

12. Concurrent Testing of ABM and SAM Components

• **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty and its Protocol limit the parties to one ABM deployment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at that one deployment area, the parties may have ABM systems and components for development and testing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The Treaty also prohibits giving components, other than ABM system components, the capability "to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and prohibits the parties from testing them in "an ABM mode." The parties agreed

that the concurrent testing of SAM and ABM system components is prohibited.

- **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether the Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM and ABM system components in contravention of this legal obligation.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient to assess fully compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty, although the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The number of incidents of concurrent operation of SAM and ABM components indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In

several cases this may be highly probable. This and other such Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

13. ABM Territorial Defense

- **Obligation:** The Treaty allows each party a single operational site, explicitly permits modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components, and explicitly recognizes the existence of ABM test ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the parties and prohibits the parties from providing a base for such a defense.

- **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether Soviet ABM and related activities provide a base for a territorial defense.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the aggregates of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. ■

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man Harris during the hearings on this legislation that the Board would take up its responsibilities to keep the system financially sound.

I also indicated to the Congress my hope that we might soon have some recommendations designed to remedy the financial situation of these systems. Accordingly I would like you to undertake immediately a review of the situation and to develop recommenda-

tions which I can consider for presentation to the Congress.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

[Honorable Howard W. Habermeyer, Chairman, Railroad Retirement Board, 44 Rush Street, Chicago 11, Illinois]

NOTE: For the President's statement upon signing S. 2395, see Item 384.

In his letter the President referred to U.S. Representative Oren Harris from Arkansas, Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.

386 Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Relating to the Office of Emergency Planning. *September 22, 1961*

I HAVE TODAY approved H.R. 8406, a bill "To Change the Name of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization to Office of Emergency Planning."

Effective August 1, I assigned to the Secretary of Defense major Federal responsibilities for civil defense. The remaining responsibilities can more accurately be described as emergency planning functions, for they deal with responsibilities for investigation, advice, coordination, and policy

formulation in connection with our preparedness effort.

These functions of the Office of Emergency Planning may be of critical importance to our very survival. The national security requires that there be soundly conceived and well-tested plans for every emergency.

NOTE: As enacted, H.R. 8406 is Public Law 87-296 (75 Stat. 630). See also Item 295.

The statement was released at Hyannis, Mass.

387 Address in New York City Before the General Assembly of the United Nations. *September 25, 1961*

Mr. President, honored delegates, ladies and gentlemen:

We meet in an hour of grief and challenge. Dag Hammarskjold is dead. But the United Nations lives. His tragedy is deep in our hearts, but the task for which he died is at the top of our agenda. A noble servant of peace is gone. But the quest for peace lies before us.

The problem is not the death of one man—the problem is the life of this organization. It will either grow to meet the

challenges of our age, or it will be gone with the wind, without influence, without force, without respect. Were we to let it die, to enfeeble its vigor, to cripple its powers, we would condemn our future.

For in the development of this organization rests the only true alternative to war—and war appeals no longer as a rational alternative. Unconditional war can no longer lead to unconditional victory. It can no longer serve to settle disputes. It can no longer concern the great powers

alone. For a nuclear disaster, spread by wind and water and fear, could well engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and the uncommitted alike. Mankind must put an end to war—or war will put an end to mankind.

So let us here resolve that Dag Hammarskjöld did not live, or die, in vain. Let us call a truce to terror. Let us invoke the blessings of peace. And, as we build an international capacity to keep peace, let us join in dismantling the national capacity to wage war.

II.

This will require new strength and new roles for the United Nations. For disarmament without checks is but a shadow—and a community without law is but a shell. Already the United Nations has become both the measure and the vehicle of man's most generous impulses. Already it has provided—in the Middle East, in Asia, in Africa this year in the Congo—a means of holding man's violence within bounds.

But the great question which confronted this body in 1945 is still before us: whether man's cherished hopes for progress and peace are to be destroyed by terror and disruption, whether the "foul winds of war" can be tamed in time to free the cooling winds of reason, and whether the pledges of our Charter are to be fulfilled or defied—pledges to secure peace, progress, human rights and world law.

In this Hall, there are not three forces, but two. One is composed of those who are trying to build the kind of world described in Articles I and II of the Charter. The other, seeking a far different world, would undermine this organization in the process.

Today of all days our dedication to the Charter must be maintained. It must be

strengthened first of all by the selection of an outstanding civil servant to carry forward the responsibilities of the Secretary General—a man endowed with both the wisdom and the power to make meaningful the moral force of the world community. The late Secretary General nurtured and sharpened the United Nations' obligation to act. But he did not invent it. It was there in the Charter. It is still there in the Charter.

However difficult it may be to fill Mr. Hammarskjöld's place, it can better be filled by one man rather than by three. Even the three horses of the Troika did not have three drivers, all going in different directions. They had only one—and so must the United Nations executive. To install a triumvirate, or any panel, or any rotating authority, in the United Nations administrative offices would replace order with anarchy, action with paralysis, confidence with confusion.

The Secretary General, in a very real sense, is the servant of the General Assembly. Diminish his authority and you diminish the authority of the only body where all nations, regardless of power, are equal and sovereign. Until all the powerful are just, the weak will be secure only in the strength of this Assembly.

Effective and independent executive action is not the same question as balanced representation. In view of the enormous change in membership in this body since its founding, the American delegation will join in any effort for the prompt review and revision of the composition of United Nations bodies.

But to give this organization three drivers—to permit each great power to decide its own case, would entrench the Cold War in the headquarters of peace. Whatever advantages such a plan may hold out to my own country, as one of the great powers, we

reject it. For we far prefer world law, in the age of self-determination, to world war, in the age of mass extermination.

III.

Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

Men no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or a cause of tension. The mere existence of modern weapons—ten million times more powerful than any that the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth—is a source of horror, and discord and distrust. Men no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of all disputes—for disarmament must be a part of any permanent settlement. And men may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness—for in a spiraling arms race, a nation's security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase.

For 15 years this organization has sought the reduction and destruction of arms. Now that goal is no longer a dream—it is a practical matter of life or death. The risks inherent in disarmament pale in comparison to the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race.

It is in this spirit that the recent Belgrade Conference—recognizing that this is no longer a Soviet problem or an American problem, but a human problem—endorsed a program of “general, complete and strictly an internationally controlled disarmament.”

It is in this same spirit that we in the United States have labored this year, with a new urgency, and with a new, now statutory agency fully endorsed by the Congress, to find an approach to disarmament which would be so far-reaching yet realistic, so mutually balanced and beneficial, that it could be accepted by every nation. And it is in this spirit that we have presented with the agreement of the Soviet Union—under the label both nations now accept of “general and complete disarmament”—a new statement of newly-agreed principles for negotiation.

But we are well aware that all issues of principle are not settled, and that principles alone are not enough. It is therefore our intention to challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race, but to a peace race—to advance together step by step, stage by stage, until general and complete disarmament has been achieved. We invite them now to go beyond agreement in principle to reach agreement on actual plans.

The program to be presented to this assembly—for general and complete disarmament under effective international control—moves to bridge the gap between those who insist on a gradual approach and those who talk only of the final and total achievement. It would create machinery to keep the peace as it destroys the machinery of war. It would proceed through balanced and safeguarded stages designed to give no state a military advantage over another. It would place the final responsibility for verification and control where it belongs, not with the big powers alone, not with one's adversary or one's self, but in an international organization within the framework of the United Nations. It would assure that indispensable condition of disarmament—true inspection—and apply it in

stages proportionate to the stage of disarmament. It would cover delivery systems as well as weapons. It would ultimately halt their production as well as their testing, their transfer as well as their possession. It would achieve, under the eyes of an international disarmament organization, a steady reduction in force, both nuclear and conventional, until it has abolished all armies and all weapons except those needed for internal order and a new United Nations Peace Force. And it starts that process now, today, even as the talks begin.

In short, general and complete disarmament must no longer be a slogan, used to resist the first steps. It is no longer to be a goal without means of achieving it, without means of verifying its progress, without means of keeping the peace. It is now a realistic plan, and a test—a test of those only willing to talk and a test of those willing to act.

Such a plan would not bring a world free from conflict and greed—but it would bring a world free from the terrors of mass destruction. It would not usher in the era of the super state—but it would usher in an era in which no state could annihilate or be annihilated by another.

In 1945, this Nation proposed the Baruch Plan to internationalize the atom before other nations even possessed the bomb or demilitarized their troops. We proposed with our allies the Disarmament Plan of 1951 while still at war in Korea. And we make our proposals today, while building up our defenses over Berlin, not because we are inconsistent or insincere or intimidated, but because we know the rights of free men will prevail—because while we are compelled against our will to rearm, we look confidently beyond Berlin to the kind of disarmed world we all prefer.

I therefore propose, on the basis of this Plan, that disarmament negotiations resume promptly, and continue without interruption until an entire program for general and complete disarmament has not only been agreed but has been actually achieved.

IV.

The logical place to begin is a treaty assuring the end of nuclear tests of all kinds, in every environment, under workable controls. The United States and the United Kingdom have proposed such a treaty that is both reasonable, effective and ready for signature. We are still prepared to sign that treaty today.

We also proposed a mutual ban on atmospheric testing, without inspection or controls, in order to save the human race from the poison of radioactive fallout. We regret that that offer has not been accepted.

For 15 years we have sought to make the atom an instrument of peaceful growth rather than of war. But for 15 years our concessions have been matched by obstruction, our patience by intransigence. And the pleas of mankind for peace have met with disregard.

Finally, as the explosions of others beclouded the skies, my country was left with no alternative but to act in the interests of its own and the free world's security. We cannot endanger that security by refraining from testing while others improve their arsenals. Nor can we endanger it by another long, uninspected ban on testing. For three years we accepted those risks in our open society while seeking agreement on inspection. But this year, while we were negotiating in good faith in Geneva, others were secretly preparing new experiments in destruction.

Our tests are not polluting the atmosphere. Our deterrent weapons are guarded against accidental explosion or use. Our doctors and scientists stand ready to help any nation measure and meet the hazards to health which inevitably result from the tests in the atmosphere.

But to halt the spread of these terrible weapons, to halt the contamination of the air, to halt the spiralling nuclear arms race, we remain ready to seek new avenues of agreement, our new Disarmament Program thus includes the following proposals:

—First, signing the test-ban treaty by all nations. This can be done now. Test ban negotiations need not and should not await general disarmament.

—Second, stopping the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, and preventing their transfer to any nation now lacking in nuclear weapons.

—Third, prohibiting the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to states that do not own them.

—Fourth, keeping nuclear weapons from seeding new battlegrounds in outer space.

—Fifth, gradually destroying existing nuclear weapons and converting their materials to peaceful uses; and

—Finally, halting the unlimited testing and production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and gradually destroying them as well.

v.

To destroy arms, however, is not enough. We must create even as we destroy—creating worldwide law and law enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and weapons. In the world we seek, the United Nations Emergency Forces which have been hastily assembled, uncertainly supplied, and inadequately financed, will never be enough.

Therefore, the United States recommends

that all member nations earmark special peace-keeping units in their armed forces—to be on call of the United Nations, to be specially trained and quickly available, and with advance provision for financial and logistic support.

In addition, the American delegation will suggest a series of steps to improve the United Nations' machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes—for on-the-spot fact-finding, mediation and adjudication—for extending the rule of international law. For peace is not solely a matter of military or technical problems—it is primarily a problem of politics and people. And unless man can match his strides in weaponry and technology with equal strides in social and political development, our great strength, like that of the dinosaur, will become incapable of proper control—and like the dinosaur vanish from the earth.

vi.

As we extend the rule of law on earth, so must we also extend it to man's new domain—outer space.

All of us salute the brave cosmonauts of the Soviet Union. The new horizons of outer space must not be driven by the old bitter concepts of imperialism and sovereign claims. The cold reaches of the universe must not become the new arena of an even colder war.

To this end, we shall urge proposals extending the United Nations Charter to the limits of man's exploration in the universe, reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies, and opening the mysteries and benefits of space to every nation. We shall propose further cooperative efforts between all nations in weather prediction and eventually in weather control.

We shall propose, finally, a global system of communications satellites linking the whole world in telegraph and telephone and radio and television. The day need not be far away when such a system will televise the proceedings of this body to every corner of the world for the benefit of peace.

VII.

But the mysteries of outer space must not divert our eyes or our energies from the harsh realities that face our fellow men. Political sovereignty is but a mockery without the means of meeting poverty and illiteracy and disease. Self-determination is but a slogan if the future holds no hope.

That is why my Nation, which has freely shared its capital and its technology to help others help themselves, now proposes officially designating this decade of the 1960's as the United Nations Decade of Development. Under the framework of that Resolution, the United Nations' existing efforts in promoting economic growth can be expanded and coordinated. Regional surveys and training institutes can now pool the talents of many. New research, technical assistance and pilot projects can unlock the wealth of less developed lands and untapped waters. And development can become a cooperative and not a competitive enterprise—to enable all nations, however diverse in their systems and beliefs, to become in fact as well as in law free and equal nations.

VIII.

My Country favors a world of free and equal states. We agree with those who say that colonialism is a key issue in this Assembly. But let the full facts of that issue be discussed in full.

On the one hand is the fact that, since the close of World War II, a worldwide declaration of independence has transformed nearly 1 billion people and 9 million square miles into 42 free and independent states. Less than 2 percent of the world's population now lives in "dependent" territories.

I do not ignore the remaining problems of traditional colonialism which still confront this body. Those problems will be solved, with patience, good will, and determination. Within the limits of our responsibility in such matters, my Country intends to be a participant and not merely an observer, in the peaceful, expeditious movement of nations from the status of colonies to the partnership of equals. That continuing tide of self-determination, which runs so strong, has our sympathy and our support.

But colonialism in its harshest forms is not only the exploitation of new nations by old, of dark skins by light, or the subjugation of the poor by the rich. My Nation was once a colony, and we know what colonialism means; the exploitation and subjugation of the weak by the powerful, of the many by the few, of the governed who have given no consent to be governed, whatever their continent, their class, or their color.

And that is why there is no ignoring the fact that the tide of self-determination has not reached the Communist empire where a population far larger than that officially termed "dependent" lives under governments installed by foreign troops instead of free institutions—under a system which knows only one party and one belief—which suppresses free debate, and free elections, and free newspapers, and free books and free trade unions—and which builds a wall to keep truth a stranger and its own citizens prisoners. Let us debate colonialism in full—and apply the principle of free choice

and the practice of free plebiscites in every corner of the globe.

IX.

Finally, as President of the United States, I consider it my duty to report to this Assembly on two threats to the peace which are not on your crowded agenda, but which causes us, and most of you, the deepest concern.

The first threat on which I wish to report is widely misunderstood: the smoldering coals of war in Southeast Asia. South Viet-Nam is already under attack—sometimes by a single assassin, sometimes by a band of guerrillas, recently by full battalions. The peaceful borders of Burma, Cambodia, and India have been repeatedly violated. And the peaceful people of Laos are in danger of losing the independence they gained not so long ago.

No one can call these "wars of liberation." For these are free countries living under their own governments. Nor are these aggressions any less real because men are knifed in their homes and not shot in the fields of battle.

The very simple question confronting the world community is whether measures can be devised to protect the small and the weak from such tactics. For if they are successful in Laos and South Viet-Nam, the gates will be opened wide.

The United States seeks for itself no base, no territory, no special position in this area of any kind. We support a truly neutral and independent Laos, its people free from outside interference, living at peace with themselves and with their neighbors, assured that their territory will not be used for attacks on others, and under a government comparable (as Mr. Khrushchev and I agreed at Vienna) to Cambodia and Burma.

But now the negotiations over Laos are reaching a crucial stage. The cease-fire is at best precarious. The rainy season is coming to an end. Laotian territory is being used to infiltrate South Viet-Nam. The world community must recognize—and all those who are involved—that this potent threat to Laotian peace and freedom is indivisible from all other threats to their own.

Secondly, I wish to report to you on the crisis over Germany and Berlin. This is not the time or the place for immoderate tones, but the world community is entitled to know the very simple issues as we see them. If there is a crisis it is because an existing peace is under threat, because an existing island of free people is under pressure, because solemn agreements are being treated with indifference. Established international rights are being threatened with unilateral usurpation. Peaceful circulation has been interrupted by barbed wire and concrete blocks.

One recalls the order of the Czar in Pushkin's "Boris Godunov": "Take steps at this very hour that our frontiers be fenced in by barriers. . . . That not a single soul pass o'er the border, that not a hare be able to run or a crow to fly."

It is absurd to allege that we are threatening a war merely to prevent the Soviet Union and East Germany from signing a so-called "treaty" of peace. The Western Allies are not concerned with any paper arrangement the Soviets may wish to make with a regime of their own creation, on territory occupied by their own troops and governed by their own agents. No such action can affect either our rights or our responsibilities.

If there is a dangerous crisis in Berlin—and there is—it is because of threats against the vital interests and the deep commitments of the Western Powers, and the free-

dom of West Berlin. We cannot yield these interests. We cannot fail these commitments. We cannot surrender the freedom of these people for whom we are responsible. A "peace treaty" which carried with it the provisions which destroy the peace would be a fraud. A "free city" which was not genuinely free would suffocate freedom and would be an infamy.

For a city or a people to be truly free, they must have the secure right, without economic, political or police pressure, to make their own choice and to live their own lives. And as I have said before, if anyone doubts the extent to which our presence is desired by the people of West Berlin, we are ready to have that question submitted to a free vote in all Berlin and, if possible, among all the German people.

The elementary fact about this crisis is that it is unnecessary. The elementary tools for a peaceful settlement are to be found in the charter. Under its law, agreements are to be kept, unless changed by all those who made them. Established rights are to be respected. The political disposition of peoples should rest upon their own wishes, freely expressed in plebiscites or free elections. If there are legal problems, they can be solved by legal means. If there is a threat of force, it must be rejected. If there is desire for change, it must be a subject for negotiation and if there is negotiation, it must be rooted in mutual respect and concern for the rights of others.

The Western Powers have calmly resolved to defend, by whatever means are forced upon them, their obligations and their access to the free citizens of West Berlin and the self-determination of those citizens. This generation learned from bitter experience that either brandishing or yielding to threats can only lead to war. But firmness and reason can lead to the kind of peaceful

solution in which my country profoundly believes.

We are committed to no rigid formula. We see no perfect solution. We recognize that troops and tanks can, for a time, keep a nation divided against its will, however unwise that policy may seem to us. But we believe a peaceful agreement is possible which protects the freedom of West Berlin and allied presence and access, while recognizing the historic and legitimate interests of others in assuring European security.

The possibilities of negotiation are now being explored; it is too early to report what the prospects may be. For our part, we would be glad to report at the appropriate time that a solution has been found. For there is no need for a crisis over Berlin, threatening the peace—and if those who created this crisis desire peace, there will be peace and freedom in Berlin.

x.

The events and decisions of the next ten months may well decide the fate of man for the next ten thousand years. There will be no avoiding those events. There will be no appeal from these decisions. And we in this hall shall be remembered either as part of the generation that turned this planet into a flaming funeral pyre or the generation that met its vow. "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

In the endeavor to meet that vow, I pledge you every effort this Nation possesses. I pledge you that we shall neither commit nor provoke aggression, that we shall neither flee nor invoke the threat of force, that we shall never negotiate out of fear, we shall never fear to negotiate.

Terror is not a new weapon. Throughout history it has been used by those who could not prevail, either by persuasion or

example. But inevitably they fail, either because men are not afraid to die for a life worth living, or because the terrorists themselves came to realize that free men cannot be frightened by threats, and that aggression would meet its own response. And it is in the light of that history that every nation today should know, be he friend or foe, that the United States has both the will and the weapons to join free men in standing up to their responsibilities.

But I come here today to look across this world of threats to a world of peace. In that search we cannot expect any final triumph—for new problems will always arise. We cannot expect that all nations will adopt like systems—for conformity is the jailor of freedom, and the enemy of growth. Nor can we expect to reach our goal by contrivance, by fiat or even by the wishes of all.

But however close we sometimes seem

to that dark and final abyss, let no man of peace and freedom despair. For he does not stand alone. If we all can persevere, if we can in every land and office look beyond our own shores and ambitions, then surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.

Ladies and gentlemen of this Assembly, the decision is ours. Never have the nations of the world had so much to lose, or so much to gain. Together we shall save our planet, or together we shall perish in its flames. Save it we can—and save it we must—and then shall we earn the eternal thanks of mankind and, as peacemakers, the eternal blessing of God.

NOTE: The President spoke at 11:30 a.m. His opening words "Mr. President" referred to Mongi Slim, President of the General Assembly and U.N. Representative from Tunisia.

388 Remarks in New York City Upon Signing the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

September 26, 1961

WITH THE SIGNING of H.R. 9118, there is created the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This act symbolizes the importance the United States places on arms control and disarmament in its foreign policy.

The creation for the first time by act of Congress of a special organization to deal with arms control and disarmament matters emphasizes the high priority that attaches to our efforts in this direction.

Our ultimate goal, as the act points out, is a world free from war and free from the dangers and burdens of armaments in which the use of force is subordinated to the rule of law and in which international adjust-

ments to a changing world are achieved peacefully. It is a complex and difficult task to reconcile through negotiation the many security interests of all nations to achieve disarmament, but the establishment of this agency will provide new and better tools for this effort.

I am pleased and heartened by the bipartisan support this bill enjoyed in the Congress. The leaders of both political parties gave encouragement and assistance. The new agency brings renewed hope for agreement and progress in the critical battle for the survival of mankind.

I want to express my thanks to the Members of the Congress, particularly who are

(Dolan)
November 4, 1985
4:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: TO THE NATION -- GENEVA SUMMIT

In 48 hours, I will be leaving for Geneva to meet with Mr. Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union. Very few events attract as much attention as summit conferences and I felt it was my duty to report directly to you tonight on this meeting and its significance.

Now, I don't think it's any mystery why most of us regard summit conferences as a good idea. The danger of thermonuclear warfare and the havoc it would wreak are, as President Kennedy put it, a modern sword of Damocles dangling over the head of each of us. The awful reality of these weapons is actually a kind of terrible crescendo to the steady, dehumanizing progress of modern warfare in this century. To a few people here in this office recently, I recalled a hotly debated issue in my own college years -- which by the way also took place in this century -- when some of us strenuously argued that in the advent of another world war no civilized person and certainly no American would ever obey an order to attack purely civilian targets. Humanity, we were certain, would never come to that. Well, World War II and 34 million civilian casualties later we were all sadly, tragically wiser. At least today we can say we have fewer illusions: we know if a World War III breaks out the destruction will be vast and devastating with perhaps 90 percent civilian casualties.

Believe me, the office I now occupy leads to serious reflection on all this. Whenever I travel, for example, I am followed by a military aide who carries with him a small black attache case -- "the football" is its nickname. It is a grim reminder of the narrow line our world walks every day because it contains the codes necessary for retaliation to a nuclear attack on the United States.


And this office provides another sobering, even sadder perspective on our world, one I will talk about to Mr. Gorbachev in a few days, one I want to mention to you now. The 23 million lives lost since the end of World War II in conventional and regional conflicts are stark evidence that a strictly nuclear conflict is far from the only danger we face. In recent years, America has had her share of fallen sons; Korea, Vietnam, other military engagements including terrorist attacks have been part of this terrible cost. And many times at this desk I have had to discharge the most difficult duty I have as President: to try and find words of comfort for grieving mothers and fathers. I don't have to tell you how regularly I fail at that; because there are no such words. It's one reason why earlier this year when I visited those places in Europe that had seen so much suffering during World War II, I said a voice could be heard there, a voice from our century and from every century, the same voice I have heard in such sorrow here in this room, the voice of humanity crying out in anguish but in hope for peace -- and for an end to war.

This is why I go to Geneva. For peace. And in hope -- the hope of never having to face that awful option of nuclear retaliation; the hope of never again having to speak from this office to grief-stricken loved ones, the hope that someday our Nation and the Soviet Union and all the people of the world will learn to heed the age-old cry of mankind for peace among all nations.

There is another reason I go to Geneva. It has to do, like the threat of nuclear war, with a danger unique to this century. Part of our heritage as Americans is our Founding Fathers' warning about history's most terrible but, somehow, most easily forgotten lesson; that the abuse of government power has always posed the most serious and enduring threat to the freedom of man.

In the twentieth century, with the development of science and technology and the rise of modern ideology, we have seen a quantum leap in the nature of this danger and the birth of the gravest threat to freedom ever known -- the police state, the totalitarian society.

Now I don't think I have to elaborate on the human suffering and the loss of life totalitarian government has caused in our time. Hitler's concentration camps or Stalin's purges, the Third Reich or the Gulag Archipelago, the advent of totalitarian ideology -- an ideology which justifies any crime or affront to the individual done in the name of the state -- has sparked the worse assaults in history on the human spirit. On this point, my own views have been plainly stated many times in the past; only as recently as a few weeks ago, I spoke of some specific



instances of unacceptable Soviet conduct: the invasion of Afghanistan, one that has cost between 750,000 and one million lives not to mention nearly six million refugees, Soviet intervention in the African nations of Angola and Ethiopia, Soviet attempts to establish a totalitarian regime in Nicaragua and undermine democracy in this hemisphere -- this tragic, unhappy list goes on.

I need not elaborate on this now except to say that in forthrightly opposing such action we Americans have a grave responsibility and bear a special burden. A belief in the dignity of the individual and in his or her worth in the sight of God gave birth to this country; it is central to our being. "Our whole experiment is based on the capacity of the people for self-government," said James Madison. And Thomas Jefferson said more directly: "The mass of men were not born to wear saddles on their backs," and again: "The God who gave us life, gave us liberty as well." This is our past, it is a part of us, we must never deny nor forsake it. If the day ever comes when the leaders of this Nation remain silent in the face of foreign aggression or stop speaking out about the repression of human rights then truly the cause of America -- the cause of freedom -- has been lost, and the great heart of this country has been broken. We Americans know we can never rest as a people nor say our work as a Nation is done until each man, woman and child on earth knows the blessings of liberty.

And this is the second reason I go to Geneva. For freedom. To speak for the right of every people and every nation to choose

their future. I go to Geneva for the right of human beings everywhere to determine their own destiny, to live in the dignity God intended for each of his children.

But let me stress here that not only do I believe this candor and realism on behalf of freedom is our responsibility as Americans, I also think it is essential for success in Geneva. Because if history has shown there is any key to dealing successfully with the Soviets it is this: the Soviets must realize that their counterparts take them seriously and that, above all, we harbor no illusions about their ultimate goals and intentions. The Soviet mind is not the mirror image of the American or the Western mind and it is both wrong and arrogant to assume that it is. The Soviets have a very different view of the world than we do; they believe a great struggle is already underway in the world and true peace can only be attained with the triumph of communist power. The Soviets sincerely believe then that the march of history is embodied in the Soviet state, and so, to them, the mere existence of the democracies is seen as an obstacle to the ultimate triumph of history and that state. So, from the Soviet perspective, even if the democracies do nothing overt against their interests, just our survival, our mere existence, is considered by them an act of aggression.

And that is why the Soviets tend to misinterpret well-intentioned public statements obscuring the nature of this struggle or minimizing the crucial moral distinction between totalitarianism and democracy. And that is why any sudden shifts in our realistic and long-held views about the Soviets tends to

disrupt the negotiating process. In the past, when such shifts or such statements have been made, the Soviets have either regarded them as a ruse and reacted with distrust or looked on them as hopelessly naive and attempted to exploit the pathetic illusions of their counterparts. In both cases, the peace process and the business of serious negotiations suffered serious setbacks.

So I must be blunt with you tonight; while I go to Geneva for peace and for freedom, I also go to Geneva without illusions. Let us be clear: the fact of this summit conference does not mean the Soviets have forsaken their long-term goals and objectives. Let us never forget, as President Eisenhower put it in his farewell address to the American people; "we face a hostile ideology -- global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose and insidious in method."

I do not mention this, however, to sound unduly pessimistic or to paint a heedlessly discouraging picture. (Far) to the contrary, my mood about this meeting is one of cautious optimism; and while it would be foolhardy to think one summit conference can establish a permanent peace, this conference can, I believe, help begin a permanent process towards peace.

But that is why realism is so essential. For only by leaving our illusions behind and dealing realistically with the Soviets do we have any chance at all for meaningful progress in Geneva. The Soviets understand firmness of mind and will; and I can assure you that the American delegation will lack neither next week in Geneva.

This is the way to progress; as Winston Churchill said after a long experience of negotiating with the Soviets, "The Soviets will try every door in the home, enter all rooms which are not locked and when they come to a house that is barred, if they are unsuccessful in breaking through it, they will withdraw and invite you to dine genially that same evening."

So, because we can neither permit civilization to perish in a nuclear holocaust nor freedom to wither under the steady and relentless assault of totalitarianism, our goals next week in Geneva must be both peace and freedom as well as an end to illusion.

But if nuclear war is an impossible option and so too is a world under totalitarian rule, how then are we to steer between them? How do we confront this dilemma in Geneva and elsewhere? What course are we to chart and what cause is their for hope?

My fellow Americans, I believe there is great cause for hope -- hope that peace and freedom will not only survive but triumph, and perhaps even sooner than any of us had even dared to imagine only a few years ago. I also think it possible that history will record a great paradox about our century: that while it gave birth to the awful menaces of nuclear weapons and totalitarian government and saw so much bloodshed and heartache it was also the century that in its closing decades fostered the greatest movement in human memory towards free institutions and democratic self-rule, the greatest flowering of mankind's age old aspiration for freedom and human dignity.

Consider, for a moment, that at the start of the twentieth century there were only a handful of democracies in the entire world while today there are more than 50 with one-third of the world's population living in freedom. Here in our own hemisphere there is dramatic evidence of this change: more than 90 percent of the people in Latin America are now living under governments that are either democratic or headed in that direction, a dramatic reversal from only a few years ago.

Even the communist world is far from immune to this worldwide movement. In an astonishing turnaround from only a few years ago, China, for example, has adopted sweeping economic reforms. And Eastern European nations are seeking higher standards of living through some free-market techniques; and although for the moment Polish Solidarity has been suppressed we know the hunger of the Polish people for freedom can never be completely stilled.

So we see even in the communist world, the great longing for personal freedom and democratic self-rule, the realization that economic progress is directly tied to the operation of a free market, surfacing again and again. That's because Karl Marx was in one sense right: the demand for economic well-being in this century has brought the masses into conflict with the old political order; only he was wrong about where this conflict would occur. It is the democracies that are vibrant and growing -- bringing to their people higher and higher standards of living even as freedom grows and deepens while the communist

world has economies that stagnate, technology that lags and people who are restless and unhappy with their lives.

In the Soviet Union too, economic difficulties have led to reappraisal and reexamination. Mr. Gorbachev himself has spoken to this issue and I intend to engage him further on this matter when we meet. Without being overly optimistic we should recognize that it has happened before in history: a small ruling elite -- when it meets firm resistance to foreign adventurism -- begins to ponder how to lend more legitimacy to its government by allowing the people more of voice in their own destiny.

And think what this would mean for the prospects of arms control and peace; consider what a process of democratization within the Soviet Union might contribute. Public involvement in the peace initiatives would grow as it has in the West and the enormous Soviet military budget -- nearly 15 percent of the gross national product -- would suddenly be subjected to public scrutiny as it is here in the West. And one of the central difficulties in negotiating arms control agreements -- the problem of verification -- could be dramatically eased. Above all, the suspicion and distrust which is endemic to closed political systems, and which so poisons the mutual pursuit of peace by the Soviet Union and the United States, would be greatly alleviated.

Now, don't get me wrong; I hardly think we've reached this situation, not by a long shot. But, my fellow Americans, I do believe that there is a historic trend towards more openness and democracy in the world and that even in communist countries the

momentum is building in this direction. But because, unlike the Soviets, we believe that history has no unalterable laws, we must do all in our power to accelerate this trend. Let us start by understanding the important factors that have contributed to this movement.

To begin with, the health and vigor of the American economy -- with ~~2~~⁹ million new jobs -- has been restored; and this in turn had led to a reinvigoration of the world economy, a lessening of international tension and a new appreciation by many nations for the pragmatics of freedom. Many more people and governments understand today that freedom is fruitful, that freedom works. And that is why it is especially important to keep our economy vigorous and expanding by moving here at home on initiatives like deficit reduction and tax reform.

Second, our efforts to restore America's military might has brought with it a new appreciation by the rest of the world for American power, resolve and confidence. But this job is not yet completed. Since the postwar period the American people have sacrificed enormously to provide for the defense of the free world; let us not at the very moment when that willingness to sacrifice is beginning to pay dividends relax our vigilance or vigor.

Third, this item I am about to discuss is actually related to our defense buildup but because I believe it is so vital to the peace process I wanted to treat it separately. As most of you know, the United States and the Soviet Union have for many years used massive nuclear arsenals to hold each other hostage in



a kind of mutual nuclear terror -- one side threatening massive retaliation against the other. This has been known as mutual assured destruction; M-A-D or M.A.D. as the arms control experts call it. I think you will agree there has never been a more apt acronym. As perhaps most of you also know, the United States is now embarked on research and development of new strategic defense system -- an intricate but very workable series of defenses that could provide a shield in outer space against incoming nuclear missiles. We believe this system could be partly deployed at the end of this decade or the early part of the 1990's.

Now we have embarked on this program for a single reason: to end the madness of MAD, the insanity of mutual nuclear terror. Think what the advent of this new space shield -- a defensive system that would kill weapons not people -- could mean to our lives and the lives of our children. For the first time much of the dread of the postwar period would be lifted because we would have some means as a people to protect ourselves from a nuclear attack launched either by design or by mistake.

Now I must tell you when I made the decision to go ahead with this program several years ago, I heard much well-intended advice urging me to either delay or not to take this course at all. But some decisions in any Presidency must be made alone; and it was so in this case. But I think we are already seeing evidence this was the correct course to choose; at first, many derided this proposal as unworkable calling it "star wars"; but as research efforts have continued the system has become increasingly feasible and this negative mood has altered.

The Soviets of course have been working on their own defensive system; much less capable than ours but nonetheless one in which they have moved from the research stage to the deployment stage. They have already, for example, installed a huge new radar system and computer network that would be the brains of any such system, a clear violation of the terms of the A.B.M. Treaty signed by our two countries in 1972. But because they are aware of our technological advantage, the Soviets are deeply frightened by our resolve to move ahead with our space shield; they have launched a massive propaganda offensive designed to convince the world our defensive system is "destabilizing" even as they move vigorously ahead with their own.

So that is why I believe moving forward with our strategic defense initiative and making sure this system is not given up or negotiated away in Geneva is a third important step towards peace and freedom.

Fourth, we must continue with a foreign policy that offers a wide range of peace initiatives even as it speaks out vigorously for freedom. Yes, we have been candid about the difference between the Soviets and ourselves and we have been willing to use our military power when our vital interests were threatened. And I think we can be pleased with the results: for the first time in many years not a single square inch of real estate has been lost to communist aggression, in fact, Grenada has been rescued from such a fate and in at least four other countries freedom fighters are now opposing the rule of totalitarian leaders. But

in addition to these firm foreign policy steps, we have also set in motion a wide series of diplomatic initiatives, perhaps the greatest number of such proposals in our history. They cover a range of areas: strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, mutual troop reductions in Europe, and the list goes on.

And it is in this last area, the business of negotiation between the Soviet Union and the United States that this Geneva meeting takes on a special importance. Too often in the past, the whole burden of Soviet and American relations has rested on one or two arms talks or even arms proposals. And while arms control is absolutely essential it can not be the only area of discussion between the United States and the Soviet Union. That is why I believe this summit conference can move the peace process substantially forward. After careful consultation with our allies, Secretary Shultz flew to Moscow last week and established with the Soviets a four-fold agenda for discussion. So, we will be discussing in Geneva arms control but also human rights; we will be talking with them about bilateral matters such as trade, scientific and cultural exchanges but also regional disputes such as those in Afghanistan, Angola and the other places I have mentioned.

I think this represents a breakthrough. And I am determined to continue in this direction in Geneva by offering the Soviets a series of proposals that while not new when taken individually do make up in their entirety a unique and even revolutionary approach. With this series of "Open World" proposals, I want to

invite the Soviet Union to participate more fully in the effort to reduce secrecy and distrust between nations and construct a more open and constructive relationship.

First, in my United Nations speech of last year I mentioned a proposal for a series of "Umbrella talks" between the Soviets and ourselves on a wide-ranging number of issues. I will once again offer this proposal, suggesting not only regular meetings of the two heads of state but meetings at the cabinet and ministerial level as well.

Second, in the area of arms control we will be discussing a wide series of proposals. In addition to these, I want to formally take up the issue of our strategic defense initiative. But rather than bargaining away this essential system or spending our time in Geneva bickering over who is building what and which side is destabilizing the most; I am going to extend to the Soviets an invitation to share in the fruits of our research and deployment of this space shield.

Third, I will be proposing a wide series of people-to-people exchanges. Unlike the exchanges of the past, however, which were limited to a tiny few on both sides, I will be suggesting to Mr. Gorbachev that we exchange on a yearly basis thousands of our citizens from different community, fraternal and cultural groups; students, religious organizations and so forth.

And fourth and finally, I've noted that Mr. Gorbachev has shown a lively appreciation for America's free press tradition; I can assure you I will be preaching the virtues of some Soviet movement in this direction as well and will ask again, as I did

several years ago in a speech to the British Parliament, for an opportunity to address the Soviet people.

Now I do not think progress on any of these proposals will necessarily be immediate. But I do believe the very fact that such proposals are on the table and under discussion is an event of considerable significance.

To summarize then; I will be going to Geneva for peace and for freedom; without illusions; to put forward a whole series of "Open World" proposals that can help lead to a more open and less distrustful international climate.

I also think the conversations Mr. Gorbachev and I will here together can help alleviate whatever suspicions and misunderstandings now exist between our two sides. You can be sure the Soviet Union knows the United States is not an aggressor and will never strike first against a foreign adversary. As Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada put it recently when he was told the United States was an imperialist Nation -- and I'm using the Prime Minister's words -- "What the hell do you mean 'imperialist nation?'. We have a 5,000 mile border with them and for 172 years there hasn't been a shot fired in anger."

But the great danger in the past has been the failure by our adversaries to remember that while the American people love peace they also love freedom and are always ready to sacrifice for it. That is why I will be stressing to Mr. Gorbachev that the only way war can ever break out between our two countries is through such a grave miscalculation on the part of the Soviets. My first meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, by the way, will be taking place on

the anniversary of the Gettysburg address; so you can be certain I will remind him that the American people are as determined as ever that "government by the people for the people and of the people shall not perish from the earth."

In conclusion, my fellow Americans, while this summit conference marks the culmination of much of our effort in the foreign policy area it is also, in another way, a milestone in a long personal journey. That quotation from James Madison I mentioned earlier was from a speech that marked my first entry into political life, a speech given more than two decades ago. It was a time when many of us anticipated the troubles and difficulties of the years ahead and wondered if America would meet that challenge. She has, of course, and, as I said during the campaign last year, this is not the work of any one man or party the accomplishment is yours; the credit belong to the American people.

Both Nancy and I are proud and grateful for the chance you have given us to serve this Nation and the trust you have placed in us. And I think you can understand why on the eve of our departure for Geneva my thoughts turn not only to you but her as well: not just for all the support and love she has given me over the years but also because I know how deep the hope of peace is in her heart as it is in the heart of every American mother.

You know recently Nancy and I saw together a moving new film, the story of Eleni, a woman caught in the Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who because she smuggled her

children out to safety in America was tried, tortured and shot by the Greek communists.

It is also the story of her son, Nicholas Gage, who grew up to become an investigative reporter with the New York Times and who secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story Nick Gage finds he cannot extract the vengeance he has promised himself. Mr Gage writes it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother and the part of him most like her. As he tells it: "her final cry, before the bullets of the firing squad tore into her, was not a curse on her killers but an invocation of what she died for, a declaration of love: 'my children.'"

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for the children of the world, for peace, for love of a fellowman.

Here then is what Geneva is really about; the hope of heeding such words, spoken so often in so many different places -- in a desert journey to promised land or by a carpenter at the Sea of Galilee -- words calling all men to be brothers and all nations to be one.

Here is the central truth of our time, of any time; a truth to which I have tried to bear witness in this office. When I first accepted the nomination of my party for the presidency I asked the American people to join with me in prayer for our Nation and for the world. I want to remind you again that in the simple prayers of people like ourselves there is far more power

than in the hands of all the great statesmen or armies of the world.

And so, as Thanksgiving approaches, I want to ask each of you to join me again in thanking God for all his blessings to this Nation and ask him to help and guide us so that next week in Geneva the cause of peace and freedom will be served and all of human life ennobled.

God bless you and good night.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

Monday, November 4, 1985

INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT
BY SOVIET NEWS ORGANIZATIONS

October 31, 1985

The Oval Office

2:05 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: May I welcome you all -- it's a pleasure here. And I appreciate very much the opportunity to be able to speak, in a sense, to the people of your country. I've always believed that a lot of the ills of the world would disappear if people talked more to each other instead of about each other. So I look forward to this meeting and welcome your questions.

Q Mr. President, we appreciate greatly this opportunity to ask to you personally questions after you kindly answered our written questions. We hope that they will be instructive and -- well, facilitate success for your forthcoming meeting with our leader.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm looking forward to that meeting. I'm hopeful and optimistic that maybe we can make some concrete achievements there.

Q We are planning to ask our questions in Russian. I don't think -- I think you don't mind.

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q Mr. President, we have become acquainted with the answers which you furnished to our written questions. They basically reflect the old U.S. proposals. They have been evaluated -- which have been evaluated by the Soviet side as being unbalanced and one-sided in favor of the U.S. side. And you have not answered concerning the new Soviet proposal. And this reply to the new Soviet proposal is what is of greatest interest before the meeting in Geneva.

THE PRESIDENT: When this interview is over, later this afternoon at 3:00 p.m., I will be making a statement to our own press -- well, to all the press -- to the effect that we have been studying the Soviet proposal and tomorrow in Geneva, our team at the disarmament conference will be presenting our reply which will be a proposal that reflects the thinking of the original proposal that we had, but also of this latest. Indeed, it will show that we are accepting some of the figures that were in this counter-proposal by the Secretary General.

There are some points in which we have offered compromises between some figures of theirs and some of ours. But that will all be -- all those figures will be available tomorrow, and I will simply be stating today that we have -- that that is going to take place tomorrow in Geneva. But it is a detailed counter-proposal that -- to a counter-proposal, as is proper in negotiations, that will reflect, as I say, the acceptance on our part of some of this latest proposal as well as compromises with earlier figures that we'd proposed.

MORE

Q I would like to have another question for you, Mr. President. According to a survey taken by The Washington Post and ABC on Tuesday it was found that 74 percent of the American people as compared to 20 percent said that they would like the U.S. and the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear arsenals and not to have the U.S. develop space weapons. This seems to be the choice which the American people have made. It seems clear that without stopping the development of weapons in space there can be no reduction of nuclear weapons. This is the position of the Soviet side. So how then will you react, Mr. President, to this opinion expressed by the American public?

THE PRESIDENT: For one thing, it is based on a misconception. The use of the term "Star Wars" came about when one political figure in America used that to describe what it is we are researching and studying, and then our press picked it up and it has been world-wide. We're not talking about Star Wars at all. We are talking about seeing if there isn't a defensive weapon that does not kill people, but that simply makes it impossible for nuclear missiles, once fired out of their silos, to reach their objective -- to intercept those weapons.

Now it is also true that, to show that this is a misconception on the part of the people when you use the wrong terms, not too long ago there was a survey taken, a poll of our people, and they asked them about Star Wars. And similar to the reaction in this poll, only about 30 percent of the people in our country favored it, and the rest didn't. But in the same poll they then described, as I have tried to describe, what it is we are researching -- a strategic defensive shield that doesn't kill people, but would allow us one day -- all of us -- to reduce -- get rid of nuclear weapons. And over 90 percent of the American people favored our going forward with such a program.

Now this is one of the things that we will discuss. We are for, and have for several years now, been advocating a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. It is uncivilized on the part of all of us to be sitting here with the only deterrent to war -- offensive nuclear weapons that in such numbers that both of us could threaten the other with the death and the annihilation of millions and millions of each other's people.

And so that is the deterrent that is supposed to keep us from firing these missiles at each other. Wouldn't it make a lot more sense if we could find -- that as there has been in history for every weapon a defensive weapon. Weapon isn't the term to use for what we are researching. We are researching for something that could make it, as I say, virtually impossible for these missiles to reach their targets. And if we find such a thing, my proposal is that we make it available to all the world. We don't just keep it for our own advantage.

Q Mr. President, with the situation as it stands today in the international arena, attempts to create such a space shield will inevitably lead to suspicion on the other side that the country creating such a space shield will be in a position to make a first strike. This is a type of statement whose truth is agreed to by many people. Now, it's apparent that the American people have indicated their choice, that if it comes down to a choice between the creation of such a space system and the decrease in nuclear arms, they prefer a decrease in nuclear arms. So, it seems to be a realistic evaluation on the part of the American people. And I would like to ask how the American government would react to the feelings of the American people in this regard.

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THE PRESIDENT: In the first place, yes, if someone was developing such a defensive system and going to couple it with their own nuclear weapons -- offensive weapons -- yes, that could put them in a position where they might be more likely to dare a first strike. But your country, your government has been working on this same kind of a plan beginning years before we ever started working on it, which, I think, would indicate that maybe we should be a little suspicious that they want it for themselves.

But I have said, and am prepared to say at the summit, that if such a weapon is possible, and our research reveals that, then, our move would be to say to all the world, "Here, it is available." We won't put this weapon -- or this system in place, this defensive system, until we do away with our nuclear missiles, our offensive missiles. But we will make it available to other countries, including the Soviet Union, to do the same thing.

Now, just what -- whichever one of us comes up first with that defensive system, the Soviet Union or us or anyone else -- what a picture if we say no one will claim a monopoly on it. And we make that offer now. It will be available for the Soviet Union, as well as ourselves.

And if the Soviet Union and the United States both say we will eliminate our offensive weapons, we will put in this defensive thing in case some place in the world a madman some day tries to create these weapons again -- nuclear weapons -- because, remember, we all know how to make them now. So, you can't do away with that information. But we would all be safe knowing that if such a madman project is ever attempted there isn't any of us that couldn't defend ourselves against it.

So, I can assure you now we are not going to try and monopolize this, if such a weapon is developed, for a first-strike capability.

Q Mr. President, I would like to ask you about some of the matters which concern mutual suspicion and distrust. And you indicated at your speech at the United Nations that the U.S. does not extend -- does not have troops in other countries -- but there are -- has not occupied other countries. But there are 550,000 troops -- military personnel outside of the United States. In 32 countries, there are 1,500 military bases. So, one can see in this way which country it is that has become surrounded. And you have agreed that the Soviet Union has the right to look-out for the interest of its security. And it is inevitable that the Soviet Union must worry about these bases which have -- which are around it.

The Soviet Union, in turn, has not done the same. So, how do you in this respect anticipate to create this balance of security which you have spoken about?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I can't respond to your exact numbers there that you've given. I don't have them right at my fingertips as to what they are. But we're talking about two different things -- we're talking about occupying a country with foreign troops, such as we see the Soviet Union doing in Afghanistan, and there are other places, too -- Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia.

Yes, we have troops in bases. The bulk of those would be in the NATO forces -- the alliance in Europe along the NATO line -- there in response to even superior numbers of Warsaw pact troops that are aligned against them. And the United States, as one of the members of the alliance, contributes troops to that NATO force.

The same is true in Korea in which, at the invitation of the South Korean government, we have troops to help them there because of the demilitarized zone and the threatening nature of North Korea, which attacked them without warning. And that was not an American war, even though we provided the most of the men. That war was fought under the flag of the United Nations. The United Nations found North Korea guilty of aggression in violation of the Charter of the U.N. And, finally, South Korea was defended and the North Koreans were defeated. But they still have maintained a sizeable, threatening offensive force.

Other places -- we have bases in the far Pacific; we've had them for many years in the Philippines. We lease those -- those are bases we rent. In fact, we even have a base that is leased on Cuba that was there long before there was a Castro in Cuba -- a naval base. But this, I think, is a far cry from occupying other countries, including the nations in the Warsaw pact. They never were allowed the self-determination that was agreed to in the Yalta Treaty -- the end of World War II.

So, I think my statement still goes -- that there is a difference in occupation and a difference in having bases where they are there in a noncombat situation, and many where they are requested by the parent country.

Q If there's a referendum and the Cuban people decide that the base at Guantanamo should be evacuated, would it be evacuated?

THE PRESIDENT: No, because the lease for that was made many years ago and it still has many years to run, and we're perfectly legal in our right to be there. It is fenced off. There is no contact with the people or the main island of Cuba at all.

Q Mr. President, you have mentioned Afghanistan. I would like to say that in Afghanistan Soviet troops are there at the invitation of the Afghan government to defend the Afghan revolution against the incursions of forces from abroad that are funded and supported by the United States.

In the United Nations, and in your written replies to our questions, you have indicated that the United States has not attempted to use force, but has fostered the process of democracy by peaceful means. How does this reply fit in with the use of force by the United States in many countries abroad, beginning with Vietnam, where seven million tons of weapons were dropped -- seven million tons more than were in the Second World War, and, also, Grenada? I ask this not to dwell on the past, but simply to clarify this issue.

THE PRESIDENT: And it can be clarified, yes.

First, of all, with regard to Afghanistan, the government which invited the Soviet troops in didn't have any choice because the government was put there by the Soviet Union and put there with the force of arms to guarantee. And, in fact, the man who was the head of that government is the second choice. The first one wasn't satisfactory to the Soviet Union and they came in with armed forces and threw him out and installed their second choice, who continues to be the governor.

Now, there are no outside forces fighting in there. But, as a matter of fact, I think there are some things that, if they were more widely known, would shock everyone worldwide. For example, one of the weapons being used against the people of Afghanistan consists of toys -- dolls, little toy trucks, things that are appealing to children. They're scattered in the air. But when the children pick them up, their hands are blown off. They are what we call booby-traps. They're like land mines. This is hardly consistent with the kind of armed warfare that has occurred between nations.

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Vietnam? Yes, when Vietnam -- or let's say, French Indochina -- was given up as a colony, an international forum in Geneva, meeting in Geneva, established a North Vietnam and a South Vietnam. The North Vietnam was already governed by a communist group and had a government in place during the Japanese occupation of French Indochina. South Vietnam had to start and create a government.

We were invited into -- with instructors, to help them establish something they had never had before, which was a military. And our instructors went in in civilian clothes. Their families went with them. And they started with a country that didn't have any military schools or things of this kind to create an armed force for the government of South Vietnam.

They were harrassed by terrorists from the very beginning. Finally, it was necessary to send the families home. Schools were being bombed. There was even a practice of rolling bombs down the aisles of movie theaters and killing countless people that were simply enjoying a movie. And finally, changes were made that our people were allowed to arm themselves for their own protection.

And then, it is true, that President Kennedy sent in a unit of troops to provide protection. This grew into the war of Vietnam. At no time did the allied force -- and it was allied. There were more in there than just American troops. -- At no time did we try for victory. Maybe that's what was wrong. We simply tried to maintain a demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. And we know the result that has occurred now.

And it is all one state of Vietnam. It was conquered in violation of a treaty that was signed in Paris between North and South Vietnam. We left South Vietnam, and North Vietnam swept down, conquered the country, as I say, in violation of a treaty.

But this is true of almost any of the other places that you mentioned. We -- I've talked so long I've forgotten some of the other examples that you used.

Q Grenada.

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q Grenada.

THE PRESIDENT: Grenada. Ah. We had some several hundred young American medical students there. Our intelligence revealed that they were threatened as potential hostages and the government of Grenada requested help, military help, not only from the United States, but from the other Commonwealth nations -- island nations in the Caribbean -- from Jamaica, from Dominica, a number of these others. They in turn relayed the request to us because they did not have armed forces in sufficient strength.

And, yes, we landed. And we found warehouses filled with weapons, and they were of Soviet manufacture. We found hundreds of Cubans there. There was a brief engagement. We freed the island. And in a very short time, our troops came home, after rescuing our students, rescuing the island. There are no American troops there now. Grenada has set up a democracy and is ruling itself by virtue of an election that was held shortly thereafter among the people, and of which we played no part.

And there is the contrast: The Soviet troops have been in Afghanistan for six years now, fighting all that time. We did what we were asked to do -- the request of the government of Grenada -- and came home.

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Q Mr. President, with relation to the ABM Treaty, which was signed in 1972, Article V of that treaty indicates, and I quote, "that each side will not develop a test or deploy anti-ballistic missile components or systems which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based. Now, some administration representatives say that the Treaty is such that it permits all of these things -- the development, the testing, and deployment of ABM systems. Such an interpretation of that treaty certainly cannot help achieve agreement.

What is the true position of the American administration with regard to the interpretation of this treaty? Will the U.S. abide by the Treaty or not? And certainly the results of your meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev will depend a great deal on that fact.

THE PRESIDENT: There are two varying interpretations of the treaty. There is an additional clause in the treaty that would seem to be more liberal than that paragraph 5 -- or clause 5. The other hand, we have made it plain that we are going to stay within a strict definition of the treaty. And what we are doing with regard to research -- and that would include testing -- is within the treaty.

Now, with regard to deployment, as I said earlier, no, we are doing what is within the treaty and which the Soviet Union has already been doing for quite some time, same kind of research and development. But, when it comes to deployment, I don't know what the Soviet Union was going to do when and if their research developed such a weapon, or still if it does. But I do know what we're going to do and I have stated it already. We would not deploy -- my -- it is not my purpose for deployment -- until we sit down with the other nations of the world, and those that have nuclear arsenals, and see if we cannot come to an agreement on which there will be deployment only if there is elimination of the nuclear weapons.

Now, you might say if we're going to eliminate the nuclear weapons, then why do we need the defense? Well, I repeat what I said earlier. We all know how to make them -- the weapons, so it is possible that some day a madman could arise in the world -- we were both allies in a war that came about because of such a madman -- and therefore, it would be like, in Geneva after World War I when the nations all got together and said no more poison gas, but we all kept our gasmasks. Well, this weapon, if such can be developed, would be today's gasmask. But we would want it for everyone and the terms for getting it, and the terms for our own deployment would be the elimination of the offensive weapons -- a switch to maintain trust and peace between us of having defense systems that gave us security, not the threat of annihilation -- that one or the other of us would annihilate the other with nuclear weapons.

So, we will not be violating this treaty at any time, because, as I say, it is not our purpose to go forward with deployment if and when such a weapon proved practical.

Q Mr. President, we've about run out of time unless you had something in conclusion you wanted to state.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I -- we haven't covered -- I guess I've filibustered on too many of these questions here with lengthy answers. I know you have more questions there. I'm sorry that we haven't time for them.

But I would just like to say that the Soviet Union and the United States -- well, not the Soviet Union, let us say Russia and the United States have been allies in two wars. The Soviet Union and the United States, allies in one, the last and greatest war, World War II. Americans and Russians died side by side, fighting the same enemy.

There are Americans buried on Soviet soil. And it just seems to me -- and what I look forward to in this meeting with the General Secretary -- is that people don't start wars, governments do. And I have a little thing here that I copied out of an article the other day and the author of the article uttered a very great truth. "Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed. They arm themselves because they distrust each other." Well, I hope that in the summit maybe we can find ways that we can prove by deed -- not just words, but by deeds -- that there is no need for distrust between us. And then we can stop punishing our people by using our wherewithal to build these arsenals of weapons instead of doing more things for the comfort of the people.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. President, and --

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

(end of formal interview)

(start of informal comments)

Q -- it's a pity, sir, too, that there can't be enough time to have your answers for all our questions --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, all right. Okay.

Q Thank you, Mr. President.

Q Unfortunately, Mr. President, we cannot discuss with you the history of questions which we just asked already because we have sometimes a very different attitude of that. But no time.

Q As you know, the world is sort of different.

THE PRESIDENT: I was waiting for a question that would allow me to point out that, under the detente that we had for a few years, during which we signed the SALT I and the SALT II Treaties, the Soviet Union added over 7,000 warheads to its arsenal. And we have fewer than we had in 1969. And 3,800 of those were added to the arsenal after the signing of SALT II. So --

Q But --

Q But still you have more warheads --

THE PRESIDENT: No, we don't.

Q -- Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, no we don't.

Q Yes, you have -- well, to 12,000 --

Q You know, it's an interesting phenomenon because in '79, after seven years of very severe -- I would say the -- researching in -- SALT II, the -- President Carter and other specialists told that there was a parity in strategic and military. And then you came to the power and they said -- you said it sounded that the Soviet Union is much ahead. Then, recently, in September, you said almost the same, though the Joint Chiefs of Staffs told this year that there is a parity. What is the contradiction?

THE PRESIDENT: No, there really isn't. Somebody might say that with the sense of that we have sufficient for a deterrent, that, in other words, we would have enough to make it uncomfortable if someone attacked us. But, no, your arsenal does out-count ours by a great number.

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Q People say that -- (inaudible.) (Laughter.) The generals -- your generals say that they wouldn't --

Q Okay.

Q -- switch, you know, with our generals, your arsenal.

Q I would like to tell you also that those stories about dolls in Afghanistan. I was in Afghanistan there a little bit --

MR. SPEAKES: He's -- maybe we'll have another opportunity --

Q Yes, we hope so.

MR. SPEAKES: And he's got to go down and tell the General Secretary, through our press, what he's going to do.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. President, and we wish you certainly success and good achievements in your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. We hope for this.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

END

2:47 P.M. EST

RESPONSES TO PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED
WRITTEN QUESTIONS

QUESTION ONE

Q: The forthcoming meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and you, Mr. President, is for obvious reasons looked upon as an event of special importance. Both sides have stated their intention to make an effort to improve relations between our two countries, to better the overall international situation. The Soviet Union has, over a period of time, put forward a whole set of concrete proposals and has unilaterally taken steps in various areas directly aimed at achieving this goal. What is the U.S. for its part going to do?

THE PRESIDENT: I fully agree that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev has special significance, and I am personally looking forward to it very much. I sincerely hope that we will be able to put relations between our two countries on a safer and more secure course. I, for my part, will certainly do all I can to make that possible.

We of course study every Soviet proposal carefully and when we find them promising we are happy to say so. If, on the other hand, we find them one-sided in their effect, we explain why we feel as we do. At the same time we, too, have made concrete proposals -- dozens of them -- which also cover every sphere of our relationship, from the elimination of chemical weapons and resolution of regional conflicts to the expansion of contacts and exchanges, and we hope these receive the same careful attention that we give to Soviet proposals.

Let me give you a few examples. One thing that has created enormous tension in U.S.-Soviet relations over the last few years has been attempts to settle problems around the world by using military force. The resort to arms, whether it be in Afghanistan, Cambodia, or in Africa, has contributed nothing to the prospects for peace or the resolution of indigenous problems, and has only brought additional suffering to the peoples of these regions. This is also dangerous, and we need to find a way to stop attempts to solve problems by force. So I have proposed that both our countries encourage parties to these conflicts to lay down their arms and negotiate solutions -- and if they are willing to do that our countries should find a way to agree to support a peaceful solution and refrain from providing military support to the warring parties. And if peace can be achieved, the United States will contribute generously to an international effort to restore war-ravaged economies -- just as we did after the second world war, contributing to the recovery of friends and erstwhile foes alike, and as we have done on countless other occasions.

Both of our governments agree that our nuclear arsenals are much too large. We are both committed to radical arms reductions. So the United States has made concrete proposals for such reductions: to bring ballistic missile warheads down to 5,000 on each side, and to eliminate a whole category of intermediate-range missiles from our arsenals altogether. These have not been "take-it-or-leave-it" proposals. We are prepared to negotiate, since we know that negotiation is necessary if we are to reach a solution under which neither side feels threatened. We are willing to eliminate our advantages if you will agree to eliminate yours. The important thing is to begin reducing these terrible weapons in a way that both sides will feel secure, and to continue that process until we have eliminated them altogether.

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Events of the past ten to fifteen years have greatly increased mistrust between our countries. If we are to solve the key problems in our relationship, we have to do something to restore confidence in dealing with each other. This requires better communication, more contact, and close attention to make sure that both parties fulfill agreements reached. That is why we have made literally 40 to 50 proposals to improve our working relationship, expand communication and build confidence. For example, we have proposed an agreement to cooperate on the peaceful use of space. The Apollo-Soyuz joint mission was a great success in 1975, and we should try to renew that sort of cooperation. We have also made several proposals for more direct contact by our military people. If they talked to each other more, they might find that at least some of their fears are unfounded. But most of all, ordinary people in both countries should have more contact, particularly our young people. The future, after all, belongs to them. I'd like to see us sending thousands of students to each other's country every year, to get to know each other, to learn from each other and -- most of all -- to come to understand that, even with our different philosophies, we can and must live in peace.

Obviously we are not going to solve all the differences between us at one meeting, but we would like to take some concrete steps forward. Above all, I hope that our meeting will give momentum to a genuine process of problem solving, and that we can agree on a course to take us toward a safer world for all - and growing cooperation between our countries.

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QUESTION TWO

Q: The Soviet Union stands for peaceful coexistence with countries which have different social systems, including the U.S. In some of your statements, the point has been made that in spite of differences between our countries, it is necessary to avoid a military confrontation. In other words, we must learn how to live in peace. Thus, both sides recognize the fact that the issue of arms limitation and reduction is and will be determining in these relations. The special responsibility of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. for the fate of the world is an objective fact. What in your opinion can be achieved in the area of security in your meeting with Gorbachev?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, I would say that we think all countries should live together in peace, whether they have the same or different social systems. Even if social systems are similar, this shouldn't give a country the right to use force against another.

But you are absolutely right when you say that we must learn to live in peace. As I have said many times, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. And this means that our countries must not fight any type of war.

You are also right when you say that our countries bear a special responsibility before the world. This is the case not only because we possess enormous nuclear arsenals, but because as great powers, whether we like it or not, our example and actions affect all those around us.

Our relations involve not only negotiating new agreements, but abiding by past agreements as well. Often we are accused by your country of interfering in your "internal" affairs on such questions as human rights, but this is a case in point. Ten years ago we both became participants in the Helsinki Accords and committed ourselves to certain standards of conduct. We are living up to those commitments and expect others to do so also. Soviet-American relations affect as well regional conflicts, political relations among our friends and allies, and many other areas.

The fact that our countries have the largest and most destructive nuclear arsenals obliges us not only to make sure they are never used, but to lead the world toward the elimination of these awesome weapons.

I think that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev can start us on the road toward the goal our countries have set: the radical reduction of nuclear weapons and steps to achieve their complete elimination. We can do this by finding concrete ways to overcome roadblocks in the negotiating process and thus give a real impetus to our negotiators. Of course, we will also have to deal with other problems, because it will be very hard to make great progress in arms control unless we can also act to lower tensions, reduce the use and threat of force, and build confidence in our ability to deal constructively with each other.

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QUESTION THREE

Q: As is well known, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reached an understanding last January in Geneva that the top priority of the new negotiations must be the prevention of the arms race in space. But now, the American delegation in Geneva is trying to limit the discussion to consideration of the question of nuclear arms and is refusing to talk about the prevention of the arms race in space. How should we interpret this American position?

THE PRESIDENT: You have misstated the January agreement. Actually, our Foreign Ministers agreed to "work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability." Further, they agreed that the "subject of negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms--both strategic and medium range--with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

Since your question reflects a misunderstanding of the United States position, let me review it for you:

First, we believe that the most threatening weapons facing mankind today are nuclear weapons of mass destruction. These are offensive weapons, and they exist today--in numbers that are much too high. Our most urgent task therefore is to begin to reduce them radically and to create conditions so that they can eventually be eliminated. Since most of these weapons pass through space to reach their targets, reducing them is as important to prevent an arms race in space as it is to terminate an arms race on earth.

As I noted earlier, we have made concrete, specific proposals to achieve this. Recently, your government finally made some counterproposals, and we will be responding in a genuine spirit of give-and-take in an effort to move toward practical solutions both countries can agree on.

Second, we believe that offensive and defensive systems are closely interrelated, and that these issues should be treated, as our Foreign Ministers agreed, as interrelated. Our proposals are fully consistent with this understanding. We are seeking right now with Soviet negotiators in Geneva a thorough discussion of how a balance of offensive and defensive systems could be achieved, and how -- if scientists are able to develop effective defenses in the future -- we might both use them to protect our countries and allies without threatening the other. And if we ever succeed in eliminating nuclear weapons, countries are going to require a defense against them, in case some madman gets his hands on some and tries to blackmail other countries.

Specifically, we have proposed:

--On strategic nuclear arms, a reduction of each side's nuclear forces down to 5,000 warheads on ballistic missiles. That would be a very dramatic lowering of force levels, in a way that would greatly enhance strategic stability. We have also offered to negotiate strict limits on other kinds of weapons. Because our force structures are different, and because the Soviet Union has complained about having to reconfigure its forces, we have offered to seek agreements which would balance these differing areas of American and Soviet strength.

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--On intermediate-range nuclear forces, we believe the best course is to eliminate that entire category of forces, which includes the 441 SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union has deployed, and our Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. If this is not immediately acceptable, we have also offered an interim agreement which would establish an equal number of warheads on U.S. and Soviet missiles in this category, at the lowest possible level.

--In the area of space and defense, we are seeking to discuss with Soviet negotiators the possibility that new technology might allow both sides to carry out a transition to greater reliance on defensive weapons, rather than basing security on offensive nuclear forces.

So that there would be no misunderstandings about our research program on new defensive systems which is being carried out in full compliance with the ABM Treaty, I sent the director of our Strategic Defense research program to Geneva to brief Soviet negotiators. Unfortunately, we have not had a comparable description of your research in this area, which we know is long-standing and quite extensive.

Frankly, I have difficulty understanding why some people have misunderstood and misinterpreted our position. The research we are conducting in the United States regarding strategic defense is in precisely the same areas as the research being conducted in the Soviet Union. There are only two differences: first the Soviet Union has been conducting research in many of these areas longer than we have, and is ahead in some. Second, we are openly discussing our program, because our political system requires open debate before such decisions are made. But these differences in approaches to policy decisions should not lead to erroneous conclusions. Both sides are involved in similar research, and there is nothing wrong in that.

However, this does make it rather hard for us to understand why we should be accused of all sorts of aggressive intentions when we are doing nothing more than you are. The important thing is for us to discuss these issues candidly.

In sum, what we are seeking is a balanced, fair, verifiable agreement -- or series of agreements -- that will permit us to do what was agreed in Geneva in January: to terminate the arms race on earth and prevent it in space. The United States has no "tricks" up its sleeve, and we have no desire to threaten the Soviet Union in any way. Frankly, if the Soviet Union would take a comparable attitude, we would be able to make very rapid progress toward an agreement.

QUESTION FOUR

Q: Mr. President, officials of your Administration claim that the U.S., in its international relations, stands for the forces of democracy. How can one reconcile statements of this kind with the actual deeds of the U.S.? If you take any current example, it seems that when a particular country wants to exercise its right to independent development -- whether it be in the Middle East, in Southern Africa, in Central America in Asia -- it is the U.S. in particular, which supports those who stand against the majority of the people, against legitimate governments.

THE PRESIDENT: Your assertion about U.S. actions is totally unfounded. From your question, one might think that the United States was engaged in a war in some other country and in so doing had set itself against the majority of the people who want self determination. I can assure you that this is not the case. I am proud, as are all Americans, that not a single American soldier is in combat anywhere in the world. If every country could say the same, we would truly live in a world of less tension and danger.

Yes, we are very supportive of democracy. It is the basis of our political system and our whole philosophy. Our nation was not founded on the basis of one ethnic group or culture, as are many other countries, but on the basis of the democratic ideal. For example we believe that governments are legitimate only if they are created by the people, and that they are subordinate to the people, who select in free elections those who govern them. But democracy is more than elections in which all who wish can compete. In our view there are many things that even properly elected governments have no right to do. No American government can restrict freedom of speech, or of religion, and no American government can tell its people where they must live or whether they can leave the country or not. These and the other individual freedoms enshrined in our Constitution are the most precious gift our forefathers bequeathed us and we will defend them so long as we exist as a nation.

Now this doesn't mean that we think we are perfect. Of course we are not. We have spent over 200 years trying to live up to our ideals and correct faults in our society, and we're still at it. It also doesn't mean that we think we have a right to impose our system on others. We don't, because we believe that every nation should have the right to determine its own way of life. But when we see other nations threatened from the outside by forces which would destroy their liberties and impose the rule of a minority by force of arms, we will help them resist that whenever we can. We would not be true to our democratic ideals if we did not.

We respond with force only as a last resort, and only when we or our Allies are the victims of aggression. For example, in World War II, we took a full and vigorous part in the successful fight against Hitlerism, even though our country was not invaded by the Nazis. We still remember our wartime alliance and the heroism the peoples of the Soviet Union displayed in that struggle. And we also remember that we never used our position as one of the victors to add territory or to attempt to dominate others. Rather we helped rebuild the devastated countries, friends and erstwhile foes alike, and helped foster democracy where there was once totalitarianism. Have we not all benefitted from the fact that Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany are today flourishing democracies, and strong pillars of a stable and humane world order? Well, the German and Japanese people deserve the most credit for this, but we believe we helped along the way.

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In the areas you mention, we are heartened by trends we see, although there are still many troubling areas. In the southern part of Africa, Angola is torn by civil war, yet we have determined not to supply arms to either side, and to urge a peaceful settlement. In South Africa, the system of apartheid is repugnant to all Americans, but here as well we seek a peaceful solution and for many years we have refused to supply arms or police equipment to the South African Government. In Latin America, great progress in the transition from authoritarian to democratic societies has been made, and now on that continent there exist only four countries that do not have democratically elected governments. Since 1979 seven Latin American countries have made major strides from authoritarian to democratic systems. Over the years, we have been a leading voice for decolonization and have used our influence with our closest friends and allies to hasten this process. We are gratified by the nearly completed process of decolonization, and take pride in our role.

I should emphasize that our aim has been to encourage the process of democratization through peaceful means. And not just the American government, but the American people as a whole have supported this process with actions and deeds.

American society has long been characterized by its spirit of volunteerism and by its compassion for the less fortunate. At home, we are proud of our record of support for those who cannot manage for themselves. It is not simply that the government, but the American people, through a host of voluntary organizations, who bring help to the needy--the victims of floods and fires, the old, the infirm and the handicapped. Americans have been no less generous in giving to other peoples. I remember the efforts of Herbert Hoover in organizing the American Relief effort to feed Soviet victims of famine in the 1920's, and these efforts continue to this day, whether it be food for the victims of famine in Ethiopia, or of earthquakes in Mexico.

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QUESTION FIVE

Q: The Soviet Union has unilaterally taken a series of major steps. It has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has undertaken a moratorium on any kind of nuclear tests. It has stopped deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the European part of its territory and has even reduced their number. Why hasn't the U.S. done anything comparable?

THE PRESIDENT: Actually, we have frequently taken steps intended to lower tension and to show our good will, though these were rarely reciprocated. Immediately after World War II, when we were the only country with nuclear weapons, we proposed giving them up altogether to an international authority, so that no country would have such destructive power at its disposal. What a pity that this idea was not accepted!

Not only did we not use our nuclear monopoly against others, we signalled our peaceful intent by demobilizing our armed forces in an extraordinarily rapid way. At the end of the war in 1945, we had 12 million men under arms, but by the beginning of 1948 we had reduced our forces to one-tenth of that number, 1.2 million. Since the 1960's we have unilaterally cut back our own nuclear arsenal: we now have considerably fewer weapons than in 1969, and only one third of the destructive power which we had at that time.

The United States and the NATO allies have repeatedly said that we will never use our arms, conventional or nuclear, unless we are attacked.

Let me add something that might not be widely known in the Soviet Union. In agreement with the NATO countries, the United States since 1979 has removed from Europe well over 1,000 nuclear warheads. When all of our withdrawals have been completed, the total number of warheads withdrawn will be over 2,400. That's a withdrawal of about 5 nuclear weapons for every intermediate-range missile we plan to deploy. It will bring our nuclear forces in Europe to the lowest level in some twenty years. We have seen no comparable Soviet restraint.

If the Soviet Union is now reducing its intermediate range missiles in Europe, that's a long overdue step. The Soviet Union has now deployed 441 SS-20 missiles, each with three warheads--that is 1323 warheads. I don't have to remind you that this Soviet deployment began when NATO had no comparable systems in Europe. We first attempted to negotiate an end to these systems, but when we could not reach agreement, NATO proceeded with a limited response which will take place gradually. Today, the Soviet Union commands an advantage in warheads of 7 to 1 on missiles already deployed. Our position remains as it has always been, that it would be better to negotiate an end to all of these types of missiles. But even if our hopes for an agreement are disappointed and NATO has to go to full deployment, this will only be a maximum of 572 single-warhead missiles.

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Moreover, President Carter cancelled both the enhanced-radiation warhead and the B-1 bomber in 1978, and the Soviet Union made no corresponding move. In fact, when asked what the Soviet Union would reduce in response, one of your officials said, "We are not philanthropists." In 1977 and 1978 the United States also tried to negotiate a ban on developing anti-satellite weapons. The Soviet Union refused a ban, and proceeded to develop and test an anti-satellite weapon. Having already established an operational anti-satellite system, the Soviet Union now proposes a "freeze" before the U.S. can test its own system. Obviously, that sort of "freeze" does not look very fair to us; if the shoe were on the other foot, it wouldn't look very fair to you either.

The issues between our two countries are of such importance that the positions of each government should be communicated accurately to the people of both countries. In this process, the media of both countries have an important role to play. We should not attempt to "score points" against each other. And the media should not distort our positions. We are committed to examining every Soviet proposal with care, seeking to find areas of agreement. It is important that the Soviet government do the same in regard to our proposals.

The important thing is that we both deal seriously with each other's proposals, and make a genuine effort to bridge our differences in a way which serves the interests of both countries and the world as a whole. It is in this spirit that I will be approaching my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

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