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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

11/8/85

*KW*

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE (Coordinate with Larry Speakes)  
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*  
SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: Address to the Nation

DATE: November 14, 1985

TIME: 8:00 pm

DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

MEDIA COVERAGE:

FIRST LADY  
PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc: K. Barun  
P. Buchanan  
D. Chew  
E. Crispen  
M. Daniels  
T. Dawson  
B. Elliott  
J. Erkenbeck  
L. Faulkner  
C. Fuller  
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C. McCain  
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J. Rosebush  
R. Scouten  
R. Shaddick  
B. Shaddix  
L. Speakes  
WHCA Audio/Visual  
WHCA Operations  
N. Yates

## Monday's Peop'



Hofi Karlsdottir

### There she goes

The new Miss World, if you really care, is 22-year-old Hofi Karlsdottir of Iceland. She was crowned last week in competition in London.

### Words to the wise

Keep my three kids in mind when you're talking arms reduction with Gorbachev, Amy Stevenson told President Reagan in a three-page letter last week. Since then, after the president referred to the Metairie, La., housewife's letter in a television speech, Mrs. Stevenson, 30, has been bombarded with telephone calls. She said it was the first letter she had ever written to an elected official, but she refused to discuss her politics or say whether she is a Reagan fan.

she  
sr

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



Date: Nov. 15, 1985

TO: Kim White

FROM: LINAS KOJELIS  
~~Associate Director~~ *Spec. Asst. to the President*  
Office of Public Liaison  
Room ~~438~~ *196* OEOB, Ext. ~~2741~~ *6573*

SUBJECT: List of Attendees, Presidential  
Luncheon for Religious Leaders,  
Nov. 8, 1985

The attached is for your:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Information            | <input type="checkbox"/> Review & Comment   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Direct Response        | <input type="checkbox"/> Appropriate Action |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Draft Letter           | <input type="checkbox"/> Signature          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> File                   | <input type="checkbox"/> Other              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Please Return By _____ |   |

Comments:

*Per your request.*

Most Reverend Paul Antanas Baltakis  
Bishop of Lithuanian Americans

\* \* \* \* \*

His Eminence Joseph L. Bernardin  
Cardinal of Chicago

\* \* \* \* \*

Dr. Ralph Bohlmann  
President  
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod  
International Center

\* \* \* \* \*

Dr. Ernest Gordon  
CREED

\* \* \* \* \*

Reverend Alexander Karloutsos  
Vicar to the Archbishop  
Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of  
North and South America

\* \* \* \* \*

Dr. D. James Kennedy  
Coral Ridge Presbyterian Church

\* \* \* \* \*

His Eminence John J. Krol  
Cardinal of Philadelphia

\* \* \* \* \*

His Eminence Bernard F. Law  
Cardinal of Boston

\* \* \* \* \*

Elder Neil A. Maxwell  
Apostle  
Church of Jesus Christ of  
Latter-day Saints

\* \* \* \* \*

Rabbi Israel Miller  
Yeshiva University

\* \* \* \* \*

His Eminence John J. O'Connor  
Cardinal of New York

\* \* \* \* \*

Rev. Casimir A. Pugevicius  
Director  
Lithuanian-American Catholic  
Services

\* \* \* \* \*

Rabbi Stanley Rabinowitz  
Adas Israel Synagogue

	*	*	*	*	*
Bishop John Scharba					
Ukrainian Orthodox Church	*	*	*	*	*
Dr. Rabbi Ronald B. Sobel					
Temple Emanuel	*	*	*	*	*
Dr. Charles Stanley					
President					
Southern Baptist Convention	*	*	*	*	*
Skrypnyk Mstyslav Stefan					
Metropolitan					
Ukrainian Orthodox Church	*	*	*	*	*
Dr. Thomas Zimmerman					
Superintendent					
Assemblies of God	*	*	*	*	*

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

Monday, November 4, 1985

INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT  
BY SOVIET NEWS ORGANIZATIONS

October 31, 1985

The Oval Office

2:05 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: May I welcome you all -- it's a pleasure here. And I appreciate very much the opportunity to be able to speak, in a sense, to the people of your country. I've always believed that a lot of the ills of the world would disappear if people talked more to each other instead of about each other. So I look forward to this meeting and welcome your questions.

Q Mr. President, we appreciate greatly this opportunity to ask to you personally questions after you kindly answered our written questions. We hope that they will be instructive and -- well, facilitate success for your forthcoming meeting with our leader.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm looking forward to that meeting. I'm hopeful and optimistic that maybe we can make some concrete achievements there.

Q We are planning to ask our questions in Russian. I don't think -- I think you don't mind.

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q Mr. President, we have become acquainted with the answers which you furnished to our written questions. They basically reflect the old U.S. proposals. They have been evaluated -- which have been evaluated by the Soviet side as being unbalanced and one-sided in favor of the U.S. side. And you have not answered concerning the new Soviet proposal. And this reply to the new Soviet proposal is what is of greatest interest before the meeting in Geneva.

THE PRESIDENT: When this interview is over, later this afternoon at 3:00 p.m., I will be making a statement to our own press -- well, to all the press -- to the effect that we have been studying the Soviet proposal and tomorrow in Geneva, our team at the disarmament conference will be presenting our reply which will be a proposal that reflects the thinking of the original proposal that we had, but also of this latest. Indeed, it will show that we are accepting some of the figures that were in this counter-proposal by the Secretary General.

There are some points in which we have offered compromises between some figures of theirs and some of ours. But that will all be -- all those figures will be available tomorrow, and I will simply be stating today that we have -- that that is going to take place tomorrow in Geneva. But it is a detailed counter-proposal that -- to a counter-proposal, as is proper in negotiations, that will reflect, as I say, the acceptance on our part of some of this latest proposal as well as compromises with earlier figures that we'd proposed.

MORE

THE PRESIDENT: In the first place, yes, if someone was developing such a defensive system and going to couple it with their own nuclear weapons -- offensive weapons -- yes, that could put them in a position where they might be more likely to dare a first strike. But your country, your government has been working on this same kind of a plan beginning years before we ever started working on it, which, I think, would indicate that maybe we should be a little suspicious that they want it for themselves.

But I have said, and am prepared to say at the summit, that if such a weapon is possible, and our research reveals that, then, our move would be to say to all the world, "Here, it is available." We won't put this weapon -- or this system in place, this defensive system, until we do away with our nuclear missiles, our offensive missiles. But we will make it available to other countries, including the Soviet Union, to do the same thing.

Now, just what -- whichever one of us comes up first with that defensive system, the Soviet Union or us or anyone else -- what a picture if we say no one will claim a monopoly on it. And we make that offer now. It will be available for the Soviet Union, as well as ourselves.

And if the Soviet Union and the United States both say we will eliminate our offensive weapons, we will put in this defensive thing in case some place in the world a madman some day tries to create these weapons again -- nuclear weapons -- because, remember, we all know how to make them now. So, you can't do away with that information. But we would all be safe knowing that if such a madman project is ever attempted there isn't any of us that couldn't defend ourselves against it.

So, I can assure you now we are not going to try and monopolize this, if such a weapon is developed, for a first-strike capability.

Q Mr. President, I would like to ask you about some of the matters which concern mutual suspicion and distrust. And you indicated at your speech at the United Nations that the U.S. does not extend -- does not have troops in other countries -- but there are -- has not occupied other countries. But there are 550,000 troops -- military personnel outside of the United States. In 32 countries, there are 1,500 military bases. So, one can see in this way which country it is that has become surrounded. And you have agreed that the Soviet Union has the right to look-out for the interest of its security. And it is inevitable that the Soviet Union must worry about these bases which have -- which are around it.

The Soviet Union, in turn, has not done the same. So, how do you in this respect anticipate to create this balance of security which you have spoken about?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I can't respond to your exact numbers there that you've given. I don't have them right at my fingertips as to what they are. But we're talking about two different things -- we're talking about occupying a country with foreign troops, such as we see the Soviet Union doing in Afghanistan, and there are other places, too -- Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia.

Yes, we have troops in bases. The bulk of those would be in the NATO forces -- the alliance in Europe along the NATO line -- there in response to even superior numbers of Warsaw pact troops that are aligned against them. And the United States, as one of the members of the alliance, contributes troops to that NATO force.



Vietnam? Yes, when Vietnam -- or let's say, French Indochina -- was given up as a colony, an international forum in Geneva, meeting in Geneva, established a North Vietnam and a South Vietnam. The North Vietnam was already governed by a communist group and had a government in place during the Japanese occupation of French Indochina. South Vietnam had to start and create a government.

We were invited into -- with instructors, to help them establish something they had never had before, which was a military. And our instructors went in in civilian clothes. Their families went with them. And they started with a country that didn't have any military schools or things of this kind to create an armed force for the government of South Vietnam.

They were harrassed by terrorists from the very beginning. Finally, it was necessary to send the families home. Schools were being bombed. There was even a practice of rolling bombs down the aisles of movie theaters and killing countless people that were simply enjoying a movie. And finally, changes were made that our people were allowed to arm themselves for their own protection.

And then, it is true, that President Kennedy sent in a unit of troops to provide protection. This grew into the war of Vietnam. At no time did the allied force -- and it was allied. There were more in there than just American troops. -- At no time did we try for victory. Maybe that's what was wrong. We simply tried to maintain a demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. And we know the result that has occurred now.

And it is all one state of Vietnam. It was conquered in violation of a treaty that was signed in Paris between North and South Vietnam. We left South Vietnam, and North Vietnam swept down, conquered the country, as I say, in violation of a treaty.

But this is true of almost any of the other places that you mentioned. We -- I've talked so long I've forgotten some of the other examples that you used.

Q Grenada.

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q Grenada.

THE PRESIDENT: Grenada. Ah. We had some several hundred young American medical students there. Our intelligence revealed that they were threatened as potential hostages and the government of Grenada requested help, military help, not only from the United States, but from the other Commonwealth nations -- island nations in the Caribbean -- from Jamaica, from Dominica, a number of these others. They in turn relayed the request to us because they did not have armed forces in sufficient strength.

And, yes, we landed. And we found warehouses filled with weapons, and they were of Soviet manufacture. We found hundreds of Cubans there. There was a brief engagement. We freed the island. And in a very short time, our troops came home, after rescuing our students, rescuing the island. There are no American troops there now. Grenada has set up a democracy and is ruling itself by virtue of an election that was held shortly thereafter among the people, and of which we played no part.

And there is the contrast: The Soviet troops have been in Afghanistan for six years now, fighting all that time. We did what we were asked to do -- the request of the government of Grenada -- and came home.

MORE

There are Americans buried on Soviet soil. And it just seems to me -- and what I look forward to in this meeting with the General Secretary -- is that people don't start wars, governments do. And I have a little thing here that I copied out of an article the other day and the author of the article uttered a very great truth. "Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed. They arm themselves because they distrust each other." Well, I hope that in the summit maybe we can find ways that we can prove by deed -- not just words, but by deeds -- that there is no need for distrust between us. And then we can stop punishing our people by using our wherewithal to build these arsenals of weapons instead of doing more things for the comfort of the people.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. President, and --

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

(end of formal interview)

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(start of informal comments)

Q -- it's a pity, sir, too, that there can't be enough time to have your answers for all our questions --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, all right. Okay.

Q Thank you, Mr. President.

Q Unfortunately, Mr. President, we cannot discuss with you the history of questions which we just asked already because we have sometimes a very different attitude of that. But no time.

Q As you know, the world is sort of different.

THE PRESIDENT: I was waiting for a question that would allow me to point out that, under the detente that we had for a few years, during which we signed the SALT I and the SALT II Treaties, the Soviet Union added over 7,000 warheads to its arsenal. And we have fewer than we had in 1969. And 3,800 of those were added to the arsenal after the signing of SALT II. So --

Q But --

Q But still you have more warheads --

THE PRESIDENT: No, we don't.

Q -- Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, no we don't.

Q Yes, you have -- well, to 12,000 --

Q You know, it's an interesting phenomenon because in '79, after seven years of very severe -- I would say the -- researching in -- SALT II, the -- President Carter and other specialists told that there was a parity in strategic and military. And then you came to the power and they said -- you said it sounded that the Soviet Union is much ahead. Then, recently, in September, you said almost the same, though the Joint Chiefs of Staffs told this year that there is a parity. What is the contradiction?

THE PRESIDENT: No, there really isn't. Somebody might say that with the sense of that we have sufficient for a deterrent, that, in other words, we would have enough to make it uncomfortable if someone attacked us. But, no, your arsenal does out-count ours by a great number.

MORE

RESPONSES TO PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED  
WRITTEN QUESTIONS

QUESTION ONE

Q: The forthcoming meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and you, Mr. President, is for obvious reasons looked upon as an event of special importance. Both sides have stated their intention to make an effort to improve relations between our two countries, to better the overall international situation. The Soviet Union has, over a period of time, put forward a whole set of concrete proposals and has unilaterally taken steps in various areas directly aimed at achieving this goal. What is the U.S. for its part going to do?

THE PRESIDENT: I fully agree that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev has special significance, and I am personally looking forward to it very much. I sincerely hope that we will be able to put relations between our two countries on a safer and more secure course. I, for my part, will certainly do all I can to make that possible.

We of course study every Soviet proposal carefully and when we find them promising we are happy to say so. If, on the other hand, we find them one-sided in their effect, we explain why we feel as we do. At the same time we, too, have made concrete proposals -- dozens of them -- which also cover every sphere of our relationship, from the elimination of chemical weapons and resolution of regional conflicts to the expansion of contacts and exchanges, and we hope these receive the same careful attention that we give to Soviet proposals.

Let me give you a few examples. One thing that has created enormous tension in U.S.-Soviet relations over the last few years has been attempts to settle problems around the world by using military force. The resort to arms, whether it be in Afghanistan, Cambodia, or in Africa, has contributed nothing to the prospects for peace or the resolution of indigenous problems, and has only brought additional suffering to the peoples of these regions. This is also dangerous, and we need to find a way to stop attempts to solve problems by force. So I have proposed that both our countries encourage parties to these conflicts to lay down their arms and negotiate solutions -- and if they are willing to do that our countries should find a way to agree to support a peaceful solution and refrain from providing military support to the warring parties. And if peace can be achieved, the United States will contribute generously to an international effort to restore war-ravaged economies -- just as we did after the second world war, contributing to the recovery of friends and erstwhile foes alike, and as we have done on countless other occasions.

Both of our governments agree that our nuclear arsenals are much too large. We are both committed to radical arms reductions. So the United States has made concrete proposals for such reductions: to bring ballistic missile warheads down to 5,000 on each side, and to eliminate a whole category of intermediate-range missiles from our arsenals altogether. These have not been "take-it-or-leave-it" proposals. We are prepared to negotiate, since we know that negotiation is necessary if we are to reach a solution under which neither side feels threatened. We are willing to eliminate our advantages if you will agree to eliminate yours. The important thing is to begin reducing these terrible weapons in a way that both sides will feel secure, and to continue that process until we have eliminated them altogether.

MORE

QUESTION TWO

Q: The Soviet Union stands for peaceful coexistence with countries which have different social systems, including the U.S. In some of your statements, the point has been made that in spite of differences between our countries, it is necessary to avoid a military confrontation. In other words, we must learn how to live in peace. Thus, both sides recognize the fact that the issue of arms limitation and reduction is and will be determining in these relations. The special responsibility of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. for the fate of the world is an objective fact. What in your opinion can be achieved in the area of security in your meeting with Gorbachev?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, I would say that we think all countries should live together in peace, whether they have the same or different social systems. Even if social systems are similar, this shouldn't give a country the right to use force against another.

But you are absolutely right when you say that we must learn to live in peace. As I have said many times, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. And this means that our countries must not fight any type of war.

You are also right when you say that our countries bear a special responsibility before the world. This is the case not only because we possess enormous nuclear arsenals, but because as great powers, whether we like it or not, our example and actions affect all those around us.

Our relations involve not only negotiating new agreements, but abiding by past agreements as well. Often we are accused by your country of interfering in your "internal" affairs on such questions as human rights, but this is a case in point. Ten years ago we both became participants in the Helsinki Accords and committed ourselves to certain standards of conduct. We are living up to those commitments and expect others to do so also. Soviet-American relations affect as well regional conflicts, political relations among our friends and allies, and many other areas.

The fact that our countries have the largest and most destructive nuclear arsenals obliges us not only to make sure they are never used, but to lead the world toward the elimination of these awesome weapons.

I think that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev can start us on the road toward the goal our countries have set: the radical reduction of nuclear weapons and steps to achieve their complete elimination. We can do this by finding concrete ways to overcome roadblocks in the negotiating process and thus give a real impetus to our negotiators. Of course, we will also have to deal with other problems, because it will be very hard to make great progress in arms control unless we can also act to lower tensions, reduce the use and threat of force, and build confidence in our ability to deal constructively with each other.

MORE

--On intermediate-range nuclear forces, we believe the best course is to eliminate that entire category of forces, which includes the 441 SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union has deployed, and our Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. If this is not immediately acceptable, we have also offered an interim agreement which would establish an equal number of warheads on U.S. and Soviet missiles in this category, at the lowest possible level.

--In the area of space and defense, we are seeking to discuss with Soviet negotiators the possibility that new technology might allow both sides to carry out a transition to greater reliance on defensive weapons, rather than basing security on offensive nuclear forces.

So that there would be no misunderstandings about our research program on new defensive systems which is being carried out in full compliance with the ABM Treaty, I sent the director of our Strategic Defense research program to Geneva to brief Soviet negotiators. Unfortunately, we have not had a comparable description of your research in this area, which we know is long-standing and quite extensive.

Frankly, I have difficulty understanding why some people have misunderstood and misinterpreted our position. The research we are conducting in the United States regarding strategic defense is in precisely the same areas as the research being conducted in the Soviet Union. There are only two differences: first the Soviet Union has been conducting research in many of these areas longer than we have, and is ahead in some. Second, we are openly discussing our program, because our political system requires open debate before such decisions are made. But these differences in approaches to policy decisions should not lead to erroneous conclusions. Both sides are involved in similar research, and there is nothing wrong in that.

However, this does make it rather hard for us to understand why we should be accused of all sorts of aggressive intentions when we are doing nothing more than you are. The important thing is for us to discuss these issues candidly.

In sum, what we are seeking is a balanced, fair, verifiable agreement -- or series of agreements -- that will permit us to do what was agreed in Geneva in January: to terminate the arms race on earth and prevent it in space. The United States has no "tricks" up its sleeve, and we have no desire to threaten the Soviet Union in any way. Frankly, if the Soviet Union would take a comparable attitude, we would be able to make very rapid progress toward an agreement.

QUESTION FIVE

Q: The Soviet Union has unilaterally taken a series of major steps. It has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has undertaken a moratorium on any kind of nuclear tests. It has stopped deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the European part of its territory and has even reduced their number. Why hasn't the U.S. done anything comparable?

THE PRESIDENT: Actually, we have frequently taken steps intended to lower tension and to show our good will, though these were rarely reciprocated. Immediately after World War II, when we were the only country with nuclear weapons, we proposed giving them up altogether to an international authority, so that no country would have such destructive power at its disposal. What a pity that this idea was not accepted!

Not only did we not use our nuclear monopoly against others, we signalled our peaceful intent by demobilizing our armed forces in an extraordinarily rapid way. At the end of the war in 1945, we had 12 million men under arms, but by the beginning of 1948 we had reduced our forces to one-tenth of that number, 1.2 million. Since the 1960's we have unilaterally cut back our own nuclear arsenal: we now have considerably fewer weapons than in 1969, and only one third of the destructive power which we had at that time.

The United States and the NATO allies have repeatedly said that we will never use our arms, conventional or nuclear, unless we are attacked.

Let me add something that might not be widely known in the Soviet Union. In agreement with the NATO countries, the United States since 1979 has removed from Europe well over 1,000 nuclear warheads. When all of our withdrawals have been completed, the total number of warheads withdrawn will be over 2,400. That's a withdrawal of about 5 nuclear weapons for every intermediate-range missile we plan to deploy. It will bring our nuclear forces in Europe to the lowest level in some twenty years. We have seen no comparable Soviet restraint.

If the Soviet Union is now reducing its intermediate range missiles in Europe, that's a long overdue step. The Soviet Union has now deployed 441 SS-20 missiles, each with three warheads--that is 1323 warheads. I don't have to remind you that this Soviet deployment began when NATO had no comparable systems in Europe. We first attempted to negotiate an end to these systems, but when we could not reach agreement, NATO proceeded with a limited response which will take place gradually. Today, the Soviet Union commands an advantage in warheads of 7 to 1 on missiles already deployed. Our position remains as it has always been, that it would be better to negotiate an end to all of these types of missiles. But even if our hopes for an agreement are disappointed and NATO has to go to full deployment, this will only be a maximum of 572 single-warhead missiles.

MORE

Moreover, President Carter cancelled both the enhanced-radiation warhead and the B-1 bomber in 1978, and the Soviet Union made no corresponding move. In fact, when asked what the Soviet Union would reduce in response, one of your officials said, "We are not philanthropists." In 1977 and 1978 the United States also tried to negotiate a ban on developing anti-satellite weapons. The Soviet Union refused a ban, and proceeded to develop and test an anti-satellite weapon. Having already established an operational anti-satellite system, the Soviet Union now proposes a "freeze" before the U.S. can test its own system. Obviously, that sort of "freeze" does not look very fair to us; if the shoe were on the other foot, it wouldn't look very fair to you either.

The issues between our two countries are of such importance that the positions of each government should be communicated accurately to the people of both countries. In this process, the media of both countries have an important role to play. We should not attempt to "score points" against each other. And the media should not distort our positions. We are committed to examining every Soviet proposal with care, seeking to find areas of agreement. It is important that the Soviet government do the same in regard to our proposals.

The important thing is that we both deal seriously with each other's proposals, and make a genuine effort to bridge our differences in a way which serves the interests of both countries and the world as a whole. It is in this spirit that I will be approaching my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

END