

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Maseng, Mari: Files (OPL)
Folder Title: Iceland Trip (1)
Box: OA 14573

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/15/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: --

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON ICELAND

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MILLER - ADMIN.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BARBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SS	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MASENG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: The attached is for your use.

RESPONSE:

86 OCT 15 P 5 : 44
RECEIVED OPL-WW

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

ICELAND TALKING POINTS

- U.S. went to Iceland in order to narrow differences, where possible, between US and Soviet positions and lay groundwork for more productive negotiations.
- By that measure, meeting a success. Achieved significant movement on START, INF, Nuclear Testing; even aspects of ABM/SDI, though latter obviously remains formidable obstacle. Specifically:
 - START: Agreement on 50% offensive warhead reduction, to be implemented by reductions to 1600 SDNVs, 6000 warheads; important advances in counting rules; Soviet recognition of requirement for "significant cuts" in heavy ICBMs.
 - INF: 100 global warhead limit (zero in Europe) a major advance (over 90% reduction for Soviets); freeze on short-range INF, pending negotiation of reductions.
 - Nuclear Testing: Plan for US ratification of TTB/PNE treaties (contingent on adequate verification), to be followed by negotiations on further testing limitations in phase with nuclear weapons reductions.
 - ABM/SDI: Both sides moved on minimum time sides should limit themselves to research, development and testing of strategic defenses (US from 7 1/2 years to 10, contingent on adequate verification, and coupled with plan for 50% reduction in strategic forces in 5 years, elimination of all ballistic missiles in 10. Soviets moved from 15 years to 10; though very significant differences remain on overall approach.)
- Significant headway as well on other pillars of the relationship:
 - On human rights, U.S. stressed crucial importance of this issue; Soviets agreed to regularize discussions.
 - On regional conflicts, two sides had vigorous discussions of Afghanistan, Central America, Angola, Cambodia, Middle East, and Iran-Iraq; U.S. laid down important markers concerning Soviet behavior.
 - On bilateral exchanges, sides agreed on a work plan to accelerate negotiations in a number of areas including consulates, space cooperation, nuclear safety.
- In arms control we intend to build on Iceland results to seek further progress at Geneva.
 - Gorbachev has said that Iceland proposals are still on the table.
 - Ball now in Soviet court to assure continuation of Iceland momentum.

- Soviet attempt at Iceland to hold progress in all areas of arms control hostage to acceptance of Soviet views on ABM/SDI an unconstructive and unfortunate position; retrogression from Gorbachev's Geneva summit agreement to move forward in areas of common ground.

-- Historic opportunity to reach agreements in other key arms control areas demands responsible Soviet behavior; if opportunity lost, world will clearly understand where blame lies.

-- U.S. ready now to proceed, as matter of highest priority, to reach agreements on START, INF, Nuclear Testing along lines discussed at Reykjavik.

- ABM/SDI issue requires further work to reconcile fundamental US/USSR differences.

-- Soviets sought to kill by ban on essential testing outside the laboratories.

- Important for Soviets to understand SDI not a bargaining chip but a key element of US approach to more secure world for all.

- Case for transition from offense to defense-based systems a compelling one; in both countries' interests.

-- Only realistic hope to eliminate nuclear "balance of terror," threat of massive annihilation.

-- Wholly non-threatening to Soviet Union; no significant offensive potential in SDI systems (Soviet specialists understand this).

-- U.S. offer to share benefits of strategic defense a generous one; belies Soviet allegations of U.S. intent to exploit technological lead to Soviet disadvantage.

- SDI essential to U.S. even with agreement on reduction and ultimate elimination of ballistic missiles, in order to hedge against abrogation, cheating, and third country threats; provide continuing incentive for offensive reductions; and offer stability during critical transition period and insurance thereafter.

-- Scale of deployment will depend, in part, on scope of threat.

- Hope sober reflection will lead Soviets to recognize that SDI is not a threat to be killed through negotiation, but a key element of our mutual transition to a safer and more secure world.

-- We will be working to lay the logic of this position before the Soviets at Geneva, while trying to move them to proceed now to lock up agreements in other areas where major progress recorded at Reykjavik.

- In short, Reykjavik was worthwhile; no second thoughts about wisdom of acceding to Gorbachev's request for pre-summit discussions.

-- Road to agreement with Soviets is never smooth; ideological differences, distrust, divergent strategic outlooks and force structures complicate progress.

-- Reykjavik represents an important chapter in ongoing arms control dialogue between two countries.

-- Clear understanding of others' positions and motivations necessary for productive negotiation; progress achieved on that score as well as substantively in key areas.

-- We emerged having narrowed differences, and with clear appreciation that Soviets' obsession with SDI represents the most significant obstacle to be overcome at this point.

- Opportunities created by Iceland discussions too important to let languish. U.S. hopes for further near-term progress based on:

-- Essential balance, fairness, and mutual benefit of those agreements which were shown by discussions in Reykjavik to be achievable.

-- Soviets' capability to assess the negotiating climate realistically, and recognize when time has come to deal.

-- President's strong and unwavering position on essentiality of developing, testing, and ultimately deploying SDI.

-- Soviets' understanding that historic opportunities may well be forfeited if it does not reach agreement in time remaining to this US administration.

- Strong support of U.S. public has been and will continue to be essential to US success in complex task of reaching comprehensive and enduring settlements with Soviets.

-- Patience, persistence, and supportive Congress vital as well.

-- Renewed economic dynamism, refurbished U.S. military strength, and Allied cohesion also play critical roles.

- Gorbachev's challenge at this point is to rise to occasion in statesmanlike manner and collaborate with us in reaching agreements which will lay foundation for stable long-term strategic relationship between the two countries, leading to ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/15/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: --

SUBJECT: POST-SUMMIT SURVEY

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MILLER - ADMIN.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BARBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> SS	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MASENG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: The attached is survey information from Dick Wirthlin for your use. If you have any questions, please call Dick.

RESPONSE:

86 OCT 15 P 1 : 25
RECEIVED OPL-WW

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

POST-SUMMIT SURVEY
October 13-14

Decision/Making/Information
Contacts: Richard Wirthlin
Dee Alsop
556-0001

OVERVIEW

Post-Summit

1. Sample: Stratified random probability sample of adult Americans (over 18 years of age).
2. Scope and Timing: October 13: 500 respondents
October 14: 500 respondents
3. Interviewing Mode: Telephone
4. Note -- Column #1: Respondents interviewed October 13 only
Column #2: Respondents interviewed October 13 & 14
Column #3: Respondents interviewed October 14 only

Pre-Summit

1. Sample: Same as post-summit.
2. Scope and Timing: October 9th and 10th
3. Interviewing Mode: Same as post-summit.

Q 3: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling ...

HIS JOB AS PRESIDENT

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	<i>Pre Summit</i> OCT 13	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	-	-
**Difference Score	209 42%	440 44%	230 46%	-	-
Total Approve	<i>64</i> 352 70%	717 72%	364 73%	-	- <i>↑6 (↑3)</i>
Total Disapprove	<i>34</i> 143 29%	277 28%	134 27%	-	-
Strongly Approve (1)	204 41%	411 41%	208 42%	-	-
Somewhat Approve (2)	148 30%	306 31%	156 31%	-	-
Somewhat Disapprove (3)	73 15%	127 13%	54 11%	-	-
Strongly Disapprove (4)	70 14%	150 15%	80 16%	-	-
No Opinion	5 1%	7 1%	2 *	-	-
Mean	2.0	2.0	2.0	-	-
Standard Deviation	1.06	1.07	1.08	-	-
Standard Error	0.05	0.03	0.05	-	-
Standardized Performance Score	66	66	66	133	133

Q 14 Some people say that the collapse in arms talks in Iceland was a major setback in arms negotiations with the Soviet Union and that we missed a historic opportunity to end the arms race. Other people say that the collapse in arms talks in Iceland was NOT a major setback in arms negotiations. They are just a small part of a larger process which actually helped both sides recognize areas of agreement and identify more clearly points of agreement.
Which is more closer to your opinion -- that the collapse in the Iceland summit talks was a major setback or was not a major setback?

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	OCT 13 -----	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	- -	- -
Setback	108 22%	199 20%	91 18%	- -	- -
Not a setback	383 77%	784 78%	402 80%	- -	- -
No opinion	10 2%	16 2%	6 1%	- -	- -

Q 20: Ronald Reagan missed his best chance so far to negotiate a meaningful nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union.

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	OCT 13	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	-	-
**Difference Score	-142 -28%	-333 -33%	-187 -37%	-	-
Total Agree	175 35%	327 33%	155 31%	-	-
Total Disagree	317 <u>63%</u>	661 66%	342 <u>68%</u>	-	-
Agree strongly (1)	82 16%	154 15%	73 15%	-	-
Agree somewhat (2)	93 19%	174 17%	82 16%	-	-
Disagree somewhat (3)	149 30%	299 30%	150 30%	-	-
Disagree strongly (4)	167 33%	361 36%	192 38%	-	-
No opinion	9 2%	12 1%	3 1%	-	-
Mean	2.8	2.9	2.9	-	-
Standard Deviation	1.08	1.07	1.07	-	-
Standard Error	0.05	0.03	0.05	-	-

+ 5

Q 19: If the Soviets feel so strongly about the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative, then they must feel it has a good chance, if developed, to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles.

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	OCT 13	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	-	-
**Difference Score	236 47%	476 48%	244 49%	-	-
Total Agree	353 71%	709 71%	359 72%	-	-
Total Disagree	116 23%	233 23%	115 23%	-	-
Agree strongly (1)	184 37%	394 39%	209 42%	-	-
Agree somewhat (2)	168 34%	315 31%	150 30%	-	-
Disagree somewhat (3)	61 12%	131 13%	70 14%	-	-
Disagree strongly (4)	55 11%	102 10%	45 9%	-	-
No opinion	31 6%	58 6%	27 5%	-	-
Mean	2.0	1.9	1.9	-	-
Standard Deviation	1.00	0.99	0.98	-	-
Standard Error	0.05	0.03	0.04	-	-

↑ + 5

Q 26: Some people say that research on a defense against nuclear-armed missiles, such as SDI, is a good idea because it will help deter a Soviet attack, increase the chance of reaching an arms control agreement, and reduce the risk of war. Other people say that research on a defense against nuclear-armed missiles, such as SDI, is a bad idea because it will upset the balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR, accelerate the arms race, and increase the risk of war. Which statement is closer to your own opinion -- that research on a defense against nuclear-armed missiles is a good idea or bad idea?

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	<i>Presummit</i>	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE		500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	- -
Good idea	<i>62</i>	377 75%	745 75%	370 74%	- -
Bad idea	<i>36</i>	112 22%	233 23%	119 24%	- -
No opinion	<i>2</i>	11 2%	21 2%	11 2%	- -

(JUDGE)

OCTOBER 14, 1986

DROPBY DEBRIEFING ON ICELAND FOR
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICERS

WELCOME TO THE WHITE HOUSE COMPLEX. I WANTED ALL OF YOU TO COME OVER THIS AFTERNOON TO HEAR FIRSTHAND ABOUT OUR MEETINGS IN ICELAND. BUT BEFORE I TURN TO MY REPORT, LET ME FIRST SAY THAT I COULDN'T HAVE GONE TO REYKJAVIK WITHOUT THE HARD WORK AND DEDICATION ABOVE AND BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY OF YOU MEN AND WOMEN I SEE BEFORE ME. YOU LABORED NIGHT AND DAY TO GET US READY FOR THAT MEETING. AND I KNOW WE SORT OF SPRUNG IT ON YOU AT THE LAST MINUTE. I'M GRATEFUL TO ALL OF YOU FOR THE FINE WORK YOU DID.

LET ME SAY THANKS AS WELL TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SMALL TEAM I TOOK WITH ME TO THE MEETING. THEY WORKED AROUND THE CLOCK.

- 2 -

A FEW OF THEM GOT NO SLEEP AT ALL WHILE WE WERE THERE. I'VE LONG HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR EVERY ONE OF THEM, AND THAT RESPECT GREW EVEN STRONGER IN THOSE 4 DAYS. THEY WERE AN OUTSTANDING TEAM, AND ALL AMERICANS CAN BE PROUD OF THEM AND THE WORK THEY DID.

AND YOU CAN BE PROUD OF THE FRUIT YOUR WORK IS BEARING, FOR THE REYKJAVIK MEETING MAY HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR A MAJOR ADVANCE IN THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. AT REYKJAVIK THE SOVIET UNION WENT FARTHER THAN EVER BEFORE IN ACCEPTING OUR GOAL OF DEEP REDUCTIONS IN THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FOR THE FIRST TIME, WE GOT SOVIET AGREEMENT TO A FIGURE OF 100 I.N.F. WARHEADS WORLDWIDE FOR EACH SIDE -- A TRULY DRASTIC CUT. FOR THE FIRST TIME, WE BEGAN TO HAMMER OUT THE DETAILS OF A 50-PERCENT CUT IN STRATEGIC FORCES OVER 5 YEARS.

WE WERE JUST A SENTENCE OR TWO AWAY FROM AGREEING TO NEW TALKS ON NUCLEAR TESTING. AND -- MAYBE MOST IMPORTANT -- WE WERE IN SIGHT OF AN HISTORIC AGREEMENT ON COMPLETELY ELIMINATING THE THREAT OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES BY 1996.

BELIEVE ME, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEETING AT REYKJAVIK IS NOT THAT WE DIDN'T SIGN AGREEMENTS IN THE END. THE SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT WE GOT AS CLOSE AS WE DID. THE PROGRESS WE MADE WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONCEIVABLE JUST A FEW MONTHS AGO. ON ISSUE AFTER ISSUE, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF ARMS REDUCTION, WE SAW THAT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WAS READY FOR SERIOUS BARGAINING ON REAL ARMS REDUCTIONS.

FOR ME, THIS WAS ESPECIALLY GRATIFYING. JUST 5-1/2 YEARS AGO, WHEN WE CAME INTO OFFICE, I SAID THAT OUR OBJECTIVE MUST NOT BE REGULATING THE GROWTH IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH IS WHAT ARMS CONTROL, AS IT WAS KNOWN, HAD BEEN ALL ABOUT. NO, I SAID THAT OUR GOAL MUST BE REDUCING THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- THAT WE HAD TO WORK TO MAKE THE WORLD SAFER, NOT JUST TO CONTROL THE PACE AT WHICH IT BECAME MORE DANGEROUS. WELL, NOW THE SOVIETS, TOO, ARE TALKING ABOUT REAL ARMS REDUCTION.

LET ME SAY THAT THIS WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE SUPPORT WE'VE HAD FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OVER THE LAST 5-1/2 YEARS. BECAUSE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE STOOD BEHIND US AS WE WORKED OVER THE YEARS TO REBUILD OUR NATION'S DEFENSES, WE WENT TO THE ICELAND MEETING IN A POSITION OF STRENGTH.

AND THE SOVIETS KNEW THAT WE HAD THE SUPPORT NOT ONLY OF A STRONG AMERICA, BUT A UNITED NATO ALLIANCE THAT WAS GOING AHEAD WITH DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. SO, YES, IT WAS THIS STRENGTH AND UNITY THAT BROUGHT THE SOVIETS TO THE BARGAINING TABLE. AND PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, OF COURSE, WAS AMERICA'S SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

NOW, AS YOU KNOW, I OFFERED MR. GORBACHEV AN IMPORTANT CONCESSION ON S.D.I. I OFFERED TO PUT OFF DEPLOYMENT FOR A DECADE, AND I COUPLED THAT WITH A 10-YEAR PLAN FOR ELIMINATING ALL SOVIET AND AMERICAN BALLISTIC MISSILES FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN THE MOST SWEEPING AND IMPORTANT ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSAL IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD. BUT THAT WASN'T GOOD ENOUGH FOR MR. GORBACHEV. HE WANTED MORE.

HE WANTED US TO ACCEPT EVEN TIGHTER LIMITS ON S.D.I. THAN THE A.B.M. TREATY NOW REQUIRES -- THAT IS, TO STOP ALL BUT LABORATORY RESEARCH. HE KNEW THIS MEANT KILLING STRATEGIC DEFENSE ENTIRELY, WHICH HAS BEEN A SOVIET GOAL FROM THE START. OF COURSE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS LONG BEEN ENGAGED IN EXTENSIVE STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS OF ITS OWN. AND UNLIKE OURS, THE SOVIET PROGRAM GOES WELL BEYOND RESEARCH, EVEN TO DEPLOYMENT. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE GIVEN THEM AN IMMEDIATE, ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGE AND A DANGEROUS ONE. I COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT AGREE TO THAT. I WON'T SETTLE FOR ANYTHING UNLESS IT'S IN THE INTEREST OF AMERICA'S SECURITY.

AMERICA AND THE WEST NEED S.D.I. FOR LONG-RUN INSURANCE. IT PROTECTS US AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT, AT SOME POINT, WHEN THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES IS NOT YET COMPLETE, THE SOVIETS MAY CHANGE THEIR MINDS. WE KNOW THE SOVIET RECORD OF PLAYING FAST AND LOOSE WITH PAST AGREEMENTS. AMERICA CAN'T AFFORD TO TAKE A CHANCE ON WAKING UP IN 10 YEARS AND FINDING THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE AN ADVANCED DEFENSE SYSTEM AND ARE READY TO PUT IN PLACE MORE MISSILES OR MORE MODERN MISSILES AND WE HAVE NO DEFENSE OF OUR OWN AND OUR DETERRENCE IS OBSOLETE BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET DEFENSE SYSTEM. IF ARMS REDUCTION IS TO HELP BRING LASTING PEACE, WE MUST BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THE VITAL STRATEGIC BALANCE WHICH HAS FOR SO LONG KEPT THE PEACE.

NOTHING COULD MORE THREATEN WORLD PEACE THAN ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS WITH LOOPHOLES THAT WOULD LEAVE THE WEST NAKED TO A MASSIVE AND SUDDEN SOVIET BUILD-UP IN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. MY GUESS IS THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THIS, BUT WANT TO SEE HOW MUCH FARTHER THEY CAN PUSH US IN PUBLIC BEFORE THEY ONCE AGAIN GET DOWN TO BRASS TACKS.

SO HERE'S HOW I SEE THE MEETING IN ICELAND ADDING UP. WE ADDRESSED THE IMPORTANT ISSUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL CONFLICTS, AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. AND MR. GORBACHEV AND I GOT AWFULLY CLOSE TO HISTORIC AGREEMENTS IN THE ARMS REDUCTION PROCESS. WE TOOK DISCUSSIONS INTO AREAS WHERE THEY HAD NEVER BEEN BEFORE. THE UNITED STATES PUT GOOD, FAIR IDEAS OUT ON THE TABLE, AND THEY WON'T GO AWAY. GOOD IDEAS, AFTER ALL, HAVE A LIFE OF THEIR OWN.

THE NEXT STEP WILL BE IN GENEVA, WHERE OUR NEGOTIATORS WILL WORK TO BUILD ON THIS PROGRESS.

THE BIGGEST DISAPPOINTMENT IN ICELAND WAS THAT MR. GORBACHEV DECIDED TO MAKE OUR PROGRESS HOSTAGE TO HIS DEMAND THAT WE KILL OUR STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAM. BUT, YOU KNOW, I'VE HAD SOME EXPERIENCE WITH THIS KIND OF THING. ONE OF MY PAST JOBS WAS AS A NEGOTIATOR OF LABOR AGREEMENTS. I GOT USED TO ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER WALKING OUT OF CONTRACT TALKS. IT DIDN'T MEAN THAT RELATIONS HAD COLLAPSED OR THAT WE HAD REACHED AN INSURMOUNTABLE IMPASSE. IT SOMETIMES MEANT THAT A LITTLE MANEUVERING WAS GOING ON. IT'S IMPORTANT FOR US RIGHT NOW TO SEE THE REAL PROGRESS THAT WE MADE AT REYKJAVIK AND TO UNITE SO THAT WE'LL BE STRONG FOR THE NEXT STAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS.

- 10 -

IF WE DO THAT, I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE IT
WITHIN OUR GRASP TO ACHIEVE SOME TRULY
HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGHS.

LAST WEEK I DESCRIBED ICELAND AS A BASE
CAMP ON OUR WAY TO THE SUMMIT. THIS WEEK,
I WANT TO REPORT TO YOU THAT I BELIEVE THERE
EXISTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PLANT A PERMANENT
FLAG OF PEACE AT THAT SUMMIT. I CALL ON THE
SOVIETS NOT TO MISS THIS OPPORTUNITY.
THE SOVIETS MUST NOT THROW THIS AWAY --
MUST NOT SLIP BACK INTO A GREATER ARMS
BUILDUP. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DON'T MISTAKE
THE ABSENCE OF A FINAL AGREEMENT FOR THE
ABSENCE OF PROGRESS. WE MADE PROGRESS.
WE MUST BE PATIENT. WE MADE HISTORIC
ADVANCES -- WE WILL NOT TURN BACK.

#

(Judge/ARD)
October 14, 1986
Noon

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPHY ICELAND DEBRIEFING FOR EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OFFICERS
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1986

Welcome to the White House complex. I wanted all of you to come over this afternoon to hear firsthand about our meetings in Iceland. But before I turn to my report, let me first say that I couldn't have gone to Reykjavik without the hard work and dedication above and beyond the call of duty of you men and women I see before me. You labored night and day to get us ready for that meeting. And I know we sort of sprung it on you at the last minute. I'm grateful to all of you for the fine work you did.

Let me say thanks as well to the members of the small team I took with me to the meeting. They worked around the clock. A few of them got no sleep at all while we were there. I've long had great respect for every one of them, and that respect grew even stronger in those 4 days. They were an outstanding team, and all Americans can be proud of them and the work they did.

And you can be proud of the fruit your work is bearing, for the Reykjavik meeting may have set the stage for a major advance in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. At Reykjavik the Soviet Union went farther than ever before in accepting our goal of deep reductions in the level of nuclear weapons. For the first time, we got Soviet agreement to a figure of 100 I.N.F. warheads worldwide -- a truly drastic cut. For the first time, we began to hammer out the details of a 50-percent cut in strategic forces over 5 years. We were just a sentence or two away from agreeing to new talks on nuclear testing. And -- maybe most important --

we were in sight of an historic agreement on completely eliminating the threat of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996.

Believe me, the significance of the meeting at Reykjavik is not that we didn't sign agreements in the end. The significance is that we got as close as we did. The progress we made would have been inconceivable just a few months ago. On issue after issue, particularly in the area of arms reduction, we saw that General Secretary Gorbachev was ready for serious bargaining on real arms reductions.

For me, this was especially gratifying. Just 5-1/2 years ago, when we came into office, I said that our objective must not be regulating the growth in nuclear weapons, which is what arms control, as it was known, had been all about. No, I said that our goal must be reducing the number of nuclear weapons -- that we had to work to make the world safer, not just to control the pace at which it became more dangerous. Well, now the Soviets, too, are talking about real arms reduction.

Let me say that this wouldn't have been possible without the support we've had from the American people over the last 5-1/2 years. Because the American people have stood behind us as we worked over the years to rebuild our Nation's defenses, we went to the Iceland meeting in a position of strength. And the Soviets knew that we had the support not only of a strong America, but a united NATO alliance that was going ahead with deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. So, yes, it was this strength and unity that brought the Soviets

to the bargaining table. And particularly important, of course, was America's support for the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Now, as you know, I offered Mr. Gorbachev an important concession on S.D.I. I offered to put off deployment for a decade, and I coupled that with a 10-year plan for eliminating all Soviet and American ballistic missiles. This may have been the most sweeping and important arms reduction proposal in the history of the world. But that wasn't good enough for Mr. Gorbachev. He wanted more. He wanted us to accept even tighter limits on S.D.I. than the A.B.M. treaty now requires -- that is, to stop all but laboratory research. He knew this meant killing strategic defense entirely, which has been a Soviet goal from the start. Of course, the Soviet Union has long been engaged in extensive strategic defense programs of its own. And unlike ours, the Soviet program goes well beyond research, even to deployment. So, in contrast to the proposals we came so close to agreeing on at Reykjavik, this proposal would have given the Soviets an immediate, one-sided advantage and a dangerous one. I could not and would not agree to that.

And just as important, America and the West need S.D.I. for long-run insurance. We know the Soviet record of playing fast and loose with past agreements. America can't afford to take a chance on waking up in 10 years and finding that the Soviets have an advanced defense system and are ready to put in place more missiles or more modern missiles and we have no defense of our own and our deterrence is obsolete because of the Soviet defense system. If arms reduction is to help bring lasting peace, we

must be able to maintain the vital strategic balance which has for so long kept the peace. Nothing could more threaten world peace than arms reduction agreements with loopholes that would leave the West naked to a massive and sudden Soviet build-up in offensive and defensive weapons. My guess is that Mr. Gorbachev understands this, but wants to see how much farther he can push us in public before he once again gets down to brass tacks in private.

So here's how I see the meeting in Iceland adding up. Mr. Gorbachev and I got awfully close to historic agreements in the arms reduction process. We took discussions into areas where they had never been before. The United States put good, fair ideas out on the table, and they won't go away. The next step will be in Geneva, where our negotiators will work to build on this progress.

The biggest disappointment in Iceland was that Mr. Gorbachev decided to make our progress hostage to his demand that we kill our strategic defense program. But, you know, I've had some experience with this kind of thing. One of my past jobs was as a negotiator of labor agreements. I got used to one side or another walking out of contract talks. It didn't mean that relations had collapsed or that we had reached an insurmountable impasse. It sometimes meant that a little maneuvering was going on. It's important for us right now to see the real progress that we made at Reykjavik and to unite so that we'll be strong for the next stage in negotiations. If we do that, I believe

that we have it within our grasp to achieve some truly historic breakthroughs.

Last week I described Iceland as a base camp on our way to the summit. This week, I want to report to you that I believe there exists the opportunity to plant a permanent flag of peace at that summit. I call on the Soviets not to miss this opportunity. The Soviets must not throw this away. Do not slip back into a greater arms buildup. The American people don't mistake the absence of a final agreement for the absence of progress. We made progress. We must be patient. We made historic advances -- we will not turn back.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1986

13

MEMORANDUM FOR PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

FROM: MARI MASENG

SUBJECT: Post-Iceland Campaign

As everyone agrees, the President needs the support of all to regain the upper hand with the Soviets. As was the case with Grenada, the liberals in the Congress will quickly come around when they see the swing of public opinion behind us. We need to put together a bipartisan show of strength to first affirm the President's decision and then to define it as tough, rather than obstinate (as our opponents are already characterizing it). The following are some ideas our operation could execute to contribute to such a campaign of support:

Former Presidents: If Carter could be convinced (and he should, since we just did him such a big favor and Brzezinski is on our side), we should arrange for the three living former Presidents to come to the White House to meet with the President and proclaim support, or at least issue simultaneous statements. Nixon and Ford at least should be willing to do television interviews in support.

Former NSC advisors: At this level, they should be willing to brief jointly at the White House, appear on Nightline and do other interviews.

Former Secretaries of State: Obviously, we have some overlap here, and depending on who is willing to participate, we may wish to eliminate one of the categories. However, this does pull in Haig who is usually willing to be vocal.

Retired generals, admirals, and selected Defense Secretaries: (We need to stay away from Brown, and this grouping would allow us to).

Allies: Margaret Thatcher, Kohl and others should be willing to praise the President for his stance. After all, they could not have felt comfortable with the prospect of total disarmament in the face of continued arms in the Soviet Union. The NATO countries have only token conventional forces and have relied almost totally on the nuclear umbrella. Shultz should be pressed to arrange a chorus of support in Europe. The left has already begun to vocalize attacks there.

Members of the Congress: We must move quickly here as almost all index fingers on the Hill are already testing for the wind. We could start with some of our stalwarts on Armed Services -- like Thurmond, et al., and pick up as we go along. Statements should be read on the floor, Members should go to the galleries, etc.

Democrats for a strong defense -- As with Grenada, we may be able to benefit from the philosophy of some Democrat leaders, particularly those from the South. Robb was early to our defense in Grenada, for example. We should plumb the Governor ranks.

State Legislatures: Again in a bipartisan manner, if there are any still in session, these bodies would probably be willing to pass resolutions in support of the President.

Scientists for SDI: We have a schedule proposal approved, but pending a date, to bring scientists in to discuss the program with the President. This could be either a Cabinet Room or 450 meeting designed to demonstrate how realistic the program is.

Young scientists: This event would take the opposite format of the one above and would be spun toward the idea of preserving our freedom for the next generation. (Many youth events could be arranged with this twist).

Site visit: As has been proposed, the President should visit a facility where the program is being researched and tested.

Demonstration of commitment: I don't know enough about the program to suggest specifics, but when that test was launched this summer, it went miles toward convincing the public that this was a viable program. It was obviously expensive, but I'm sure that if we put our minds to it, there are many things we could do with similar impact.

450 Briefings: There is no end to the groups we could brief at the White House to provide a continuing forum for our messages. We could also turn a myriad of other events to this purpose. Generally, we should echo the comments of Brzezinsky this morning when he declared the Soviet focus on this program "ominous." We should remind the public at every opportunity of their outrageous and aggressive behavior over the years and around the world. We should point out that the Soviets are well along the way to having their own defense and they want to rob us of ours. We should point out the unsettling manner in which they tried to trick/trap the President. We should remind people how they walked out of Geneva and then walked back in when we stood firm. Our surrogates should attack our opposition for siding with the Soviets; make them appear weak (as they are). We should evoke the same images we did in the past -- peace through strength, deeds not words, dangerous world, etc. After all, the President was not negotiating with Great Britain in Reykjavik, and some people seem not to see the difference. We are not dealing with Great Britain here, and some people seem to forget it.

Outside events: We should look for blue-collar, middle class, Americana events for the President to address -- such as the truckers, the VFW, etc. to win standing ovations with his stance. We can gather up the normal supporters -- e.g. conservatives -- and should work them into our campaign -- but democrat, middle-of-the-road audiences would be the most effective.

One final note -- this could be turned into a political bonanza if we play it right. If we act defensive, we will lose everything (including the Senate and SDI).

MEMORANDUM FOR PATRICK J. BUCHANNAN

FROM MARI MASENG

SUBJECT POST-ICELAND CAMPAIGN

As everyone agrees, the President needs the support of all to regain the upper hand with the Soviets. As was the case with Grenada, the liberals in the Congress will quickly come around when they see the swing of public opinion behind us. We need to put together a bipartisan show of strength to first affirm the President's decision and then define it as tough, rather than obstinant (as our opponents are already characterizing it). The following are some ideas our operation could execute to contribute to such a campaign of support:

Former Presidents -- If Carter could be convinced (and he should since we just did him such a big favor and Brzenski is on our side) we should arrange for the three living former Presidents to come to the White House to meet with the President and proclaim support, or at least issue simultaneous statements. Nixon and Ford at least should be willing to do television interviews in support.

Former NSC advisors: At this level, they should be willing to brief jointly at the White House, appear on Nightline and do other interviews.

Former secretaries of state: Obviously we have some overlap here, and depending on who was willing to participate we may wish to eliminate one of the categories. However, this does pull in Haig who is usually willing to be vocal.

Retired generals, admirals and selected defense secretaries. (We need to stay away from Brown, and this grouping would allow us to.)

Allies: Margaret Thatcher, Kohl and others should be willing to praise the President for his stance. After all, they could not have felt comfortable with the prospect of total disarmament in the face of continued arms in the Soviet Union. The NATO countries have only token conventional forces and have relied almost totally on the nuclear umbrella. Shultz should be pressed to arrange a chorus of support in Europe. The left has already begun to vocalize attacks there.

Members of the Congress: We must move quickly here as almost all index fingers on the hill are already testing for the wind.

We could start with some of our stalwarts on Armed Services -- like Thurmond, et al, and pick up as we go along. Statements should be read on the floor, members should go the the galleries, etc.

Democrats for a strong defense -- As with Grenada, we may be able to benefit from the philosophy of some Democrat leaders, particularly those from the South. Robb was early to our defense in Grenada, for example. We should plumb the Governor ranks.

State Legislatures: Again in a bipartisan manner, if there are any still in session, these bodies would probably be willing to pass resolutions in support of the President.

Scientists for SDI: We have a schedule proposal approved but pending a date to bring scientists in to discuss the program with the President. This could be either a cabinet room or 450 meeting designed to demonstrate how realistic the program is.

Young scientists: This event would take the opposite format of the one above and would be spun toward the idea of preserving our freedom for the next generation. *(Many youth events could arranged w/ this twist)*

Site visit: As has been proposed, the President should visit a facility where the program is being researched and tested.

Demonstration of commitment: I don't know enough about the program to suggest specifics, but when that test was launched this summer it went miles toward convincing the public that this was a viable program. It was obviously expensive, but I'm sure that if we put our minds to it there are many things we could do with similar impact.

450 Briefings: There is no end to the groups we could brief at the White House to provide a continuing forum for our messages. We could also turn a myriad of other events to this purpose. Generally we should echo the comments of Brzenski this morning when he declared the Soviet focus on this program "ominous". We should remind the public at every opportunity of their outrageous and aggressive behavior over the years and around the world. We should point out that the Soviets are well along the way to having their own defense and they want to rob us of ours. We should point out the unsettling manner in which they tried to trick/trap the President. We should remind people how they walked out of Geneva and then walked back in when we stood firm. Our surrogates should attack our opposition for siding with the Soviets; make them appear weak (as they are). We should evoke the same images we did in the past -- peace through strength, deeds not words, dangerous world, etc. After all, the President was not negotiating with Great Britain in Reykjavik, and some people seem not to see the difference.

We are not dealing with Great Britain here, and some people seem to forget it.

Outside events: We should look for blue-collar, middle class, Americana. events for the President to address — such as the truckers, the VFW, etc to win standing ovations w/ his stance. We can gather up the normal supporters — e.g. conservatives — and should work them into our campaign — but democracy, middle-of-the-road audiences would be the most effective.

One final note — this could be turned into a political bonanza if we play it right. If we act defensive, we will lose everything (including the Senate + SOI)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MARI MASENG

FROM: LINAS KOJELIS *LK*
SUBJECT: Long Range Planning Meeting

Mari, we are working with NSC for a schedule proposal for a signing ceremony for proclamation commemorating 30th Anniversary of Hungarian Revolution. Dates, October 14-17.

- good opportunity for post-Iceland address by President Reagan on East/West issues.
- We have never done anything for 5 million Hungarian Americans.
- Hungarian Americans overwhelmingly supported RR in 80 and 84.
- Hungarian Americans have supported us on tax reform, SDI, Central America and U.S. overseas broadcasting.
- House and Senate both passed resolution overwhelmingly.

DRAFT



SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

October 2, 1986

TO: FREDERICK RYAN, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: MARI MASENG, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON

RODNEY McDANIEL, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PROPOSAL: For the President to host a proclamation signing ceremony for "National Hungarian Freedom Fighters Day."

PURPOSE: To commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956; to pay tribute to Hungarian contributions to the United States; to discuss U.S. concerns regarding Eastern Europe in light of the Iceland meeting and expected U.S.-Soviet summit.

BACKGROUND: The Hungarian ethnic community has devoted itself to furthering the ideals of liberty and justice for people struggling to free themselves from communist oppression. Many Hungarian immigrants have made substantial contributions to the United States. Groups such as the National Federation of American Hungarians have actively supported the President's policies throughout his administration. Hosting the proclamation signing would be a proper tribute to those who fought to free Hungary from Soviet rule in 1956. Such a ceremony would show the Hungarians that their courageous and valiant efforts have not been forgotten.

DATE: October 8-17 DURATION: 10 minutes

TIME: Open LOCATION: East Room

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: This would be President Reagan's first ever hosting of Hungarian-Americans at the White House.

PARTICIPANTS: 150-200 representatives of Hungarian-American and human rights organizations.

It would also be an excellent forum for the President to discuss the results of his meeting in Iceland with Mr. Gorbachev

DRAFT

SEQUENCE OF
EVENTS:

After a briefing on defense and foreign policy issues, the President enters, makes brief remarks, signs the proclamation, and departs.

REMARKS
REQUIRED:

Brief remarks

MEDIA:

Open

RECOMMENDED BY:

Mari Maseng

PROJECT
OFFICER:

Linas Kojelis, x6573

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Date: 10/3

TO: *Mari*

FROM: **LINAS KOJELIS**
Special Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison
Room 196 OEOB, Ext. 6573

The attached is for your:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Information | <input type="checkbox"/> Review & Comment |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Direct Response | <input type="checkbox"/> Appropriate Action |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Draft Letter | <input type="checkbox"/> Signature |
| <input type="checkbox"/> File | <input type="checkbox"/> Other |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Please Return By _____ | |

Comments:

file - Iceland

SUGGESTIONS FOR PUBLIC OUTREACH
FOR ICELAND MEETING
October 1986

Background: The President's announcement of the Iceland meeting with Gorbachev surprised the general public, including to key constituencies which have special interest in U.S./Soviet relations. While they believe the President will stand firmly on his four part agenda, they seek reassurances that the meeting will not turn in favor of the Soviets. This is especially true in light of the manner in which the Daniloff case was resolved, an outcome which they believe came as a result of the U.S. bending to Soviet pressures.

A series of meeting, one each day before the President's departure, would:

1. provide the President an opportunity to reassure human rights, ethnic and national defense groups, thereby gaining their understanding and support
2. provide media forums for the President to accentuate the four parts of the U.S. agenda
3. be an indication to the Soviets that the President is coming to Iceland with the support of the American people
4. publically accentuate the contrast between the way in which a national consensus is brought together in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

The meetings should be announced as a package as soon as they are agreed upon.

1. Human Rights, Christian, Soviet Jewry and East European ethnic groups:

Place: Cabinet Room

Program: Briefings on four issues of U.S. agenda (arms control, human rights, bilateral and regional issues)

Drop-by by RR

2. Religious leaders:

Place: Roosevelt Room

Program: Briefings on four issues of U.S. agenda (arms control, human rights, bilateral and regional issues)

30 minute meeting with RR

3. Pro-defense and foreign policy groups:

Place: Cabinet Room

Program: Briefings on four issues of U.S. agenda (arms control, human rights, bilateral and regional issues)

Drop-by by RR

Additional ideas:

1. Pro-Defense Women's Leaders: The President could meet with members of the women's delegation who traveled to Geneva last November to support him on SDI and arms control. The meeting would help offset the Bella Abzug/Jane Alexander "Women for a Meaningful Summit" publicity which promotes nuclear freeze and opposes SDI as "women's positions."

Place: Oval Office

1. Vice Presidential meeting with Ukrainian American leadership: After having supported President Reagan very strongly in 1980 and 1984 and having lobbied on his behalf on a host of defense and foreign policy issues, the Ukrainian American community has felt very let down by the Administration, especially in light of the Medvid case, and the refusal of senior Administration officials to consult with them after the Chernobyl disaster. A meeting with the Vice President would help reassure this constituency.

Place: Roosevelt Room

Program: Briefing on four issues of U.S. agenda (arms control, human rights, bilateral and regional issues)



Heritage Foundation

Mari,

FYI & Distribution

LOUIS J. CORDIA

Director

Executive Branch Liaison

Lou

214 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NE • WASHINGTON, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400

October 8, 1986

THE DANGERS OF OVERSELLING THE MINI-SUMMIT

INTRODUCTION

This weekend's meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, between Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has raised high public hopes for improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations. These expectations, however, should be placed in the context of current realities. After a year in power, Gorbachev has yet to significantly alter any of Moscow's policies at home or abroad; rather, he has shown himself adept at packaging Soviet policies in ways that appear more progressive but yield nothing of substance.

Soviet objectives at the talks are clear: to achieve U.S. concessions either on principles or on substance in the arms control area, to encourage the perception that it is the U.S. rather than Moscow which is the stumbling block to peace and arms control, and to deemphasize regional tensions and human rights issues. For a variety of reasons, U.S. objectives are no longer completely clear. Indeed the current unusually reactive and inconsistent U.S. approach to the Soviets could undermine the Administration's gains of the past several years.

TROUBLESOME DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The Reagan Administration has a number of solid accomplishments to its credit with respect to U.S. foreign and defense policy: a restoration of national confidence, a necessary defense modernization program, the Strategic Defense Initiative, the use of military force where necessary and a willingness to support insurgencies against Soviet-backed communist regimes. The Administration also deserves credit for its consistent policy of realism toward the Soviet Union.

But there are signs that the Administration's vision of world politics may be starting to unravel.

A number of potentially troublesome developments have occurred recently: 1) a lack of unity on major national security issues within the Administration itself, and between the White House and the Congress; 2) open differences on important arms control issues between the Defense and State Departments; 3) congressional cutbacks in the President's defense budget, attempts by the House of Representatives to dictate arms control policy to the White House, and the Senate's override of the President's veto of sanctions against South Africa; 4) the haste, on the part of the U.S., to swap an innocent American hostage, Nicholas Daniloff, for an accused Soviet spy, sweetened by a release of only one Soviet dissident; 5) the earlier decision by the Administration to subsidize grain sales to the Soviet Union despite the adverse consequences for America's posture with its allies; 6) the decision to hold a summit before the November congressional elections; 7) the toning down of Administration criticisms of the Soviet role in regional conflicts and in supporting terrorism, and the lack of human rights inherent in the Soviet political system.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Moscow in recent months has exhibited an uncharacteristic subtlety in dealing with the West. Fundamental policies have not changed, but their packaging has been more sophisticated. The visits by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to both Canada and Mexico just prior to the meeting in Iceland demonstrate a growing Soviet tactical aggressiveness. Moscow is also aware of upcoming U.S. elections and the expectations that have been raised, at least in part by the Administration itself, regarding progress on arms control issues.

The Soviets are seeking to use the public relations euphoria surrounding the meeting in Iceland to entice the Administration into signing arms control agreements on terms fundamentally at odds with American national interest, while real threats to peace, such as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, involvement in Africa and Central America, and sponsorship of forces blocking an Arab-Israeli settlement in the Middle East would remain unresolved.

Realizing the intense American concern over Soviet human rights violations, the Kremlin may make token concessions in individual cases to encourage the Administration's pursuit of "quiet diplomacy" in this area, a policy opposed by many Soviet human rights activists, such as Anatoly Shcharansky, who believe that "quiet diplomacy" actually relieves the pressure on the Soviets to abide by the international agreements on human rights they have signed.

The Soviets will try to exploit American eagerness for a "dialogue" as well as the personal relationship between the leaders of the two nations in order to achieve their strategic goals.

A Soviet priority will be to convince President Reagan to change his instructions to U.S. arms control negotiators in such a way as to make a full-blown summit, complete with the signing of several arms control agreements, possible in the nearest future. This is a favorite Soviet negotiating tactic: force Americans to make concessions when they have no time for thorough study of the long-term consequences.

Specifically, the Soviets are trying to make the United States go along with a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which would effectively prevent the United States from matching the massive modernization of Soviet strategic offensive forces carried out in the last fifteen years, and make impossible development of one of the most promising strategic defensive technologies against Soviet missiles, the X-ray laser.

The Soviets will seek to use the meeting in Iceland to create an impression that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is the obstacle to a new strategic arms control agreement, not the Soviet refusal to: 1) end violations of existing arms control agreements; 2) accept effective verification measures; and 3) substantially reduce deployment of their destabilizing SS-18 and SS-19 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

OBSTACLES TO AN INF AGREEMENT

Another Soviet priority is an agreement on the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. There the Soviets want a short-term agreement, so that in a few years NATO again will have to go through a divisive debate on redeployment of American INFs in Western Europe in response to possible Soviet redeployment of SS-20 missiles west of the Urals. Such an agreement would also leave largely intact their mobile force of SS-20s east of the Urals, thus creating an image of weakened American commitment to its allies and friends in the Pacific basin.

There are, however, several fundamental issues that must be resolved before an INF agreement could be signed:

Duration of an agreement: Moscow has been seeking an "interim" or short-term agreement. But a pact of short duration could result in future Soviet redeployment of SS-20s or equivalent systems. This would return NATO to where it was in the 1979-1983 period, when the response to the original SS-20 deployments created domestic difficulties in NATO countries and nearly split the alliance.

New production lines: Earlier arms agreements have limited only deployed missile launchers and have not included undeployed missiles and the production of new systems which perform the same mission as systems limited by the agreement. (For example, SALT I failed to prevent replacement of old heavy SS-9s with new heavy SS-18 ICBMs.) If an INF agreement reduced current deployments but did not cover systems held in reserve (Moscow is believed to have at least two SS-20s in reserve for every system deployed) or failed to prohibit the production of new systems, then the U.S. and NATO could actually end up worse off militarily and politically.

GLCM/P2 Mix: The U.S.-deployed INF systems include both slow-flying ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and faster-flying single-warhead Pershing II intermediate-range missiles. These deployments were made in reaction to the Soviet deployment of the fast-flying three warhead SS-20 intermediate-range missile. The Soviets would like to have all 108 Pershing II missiles removed from Europe, leaving only some of the slower-flying cruise missiles in place. These are easier to defend against than the Pershings. But it would be both symbolically and militarily inequitable for Moscow to have the more capable SS-20 deployed while the NATO deployment consisted only of the less capable GLCMs.

Shorter-Range INF Systems: In addition to the SS-20, Moscow has also deployed missiles with a somewhat shorter range--the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23. These missiles are mobile and can cover many of the same targets now under threat from the SS-20. Thus, an agreement that reduces Soviet SS-20s while leaving the Kremlin free to deploy the shorter-range missiles at will, or to increase their numbers, could nullify any political or military benefits of an INF agreement.

Geographical Distribution of INF Systems: Moscow currently has about 250 SS-20s deployed in the European Soviet Union, but also has about 180 deployed in Soviet Asia. If the U.S. were to allow the Asian SS-20s to remain in place while the Soviets reduce their SS-20s in Europe, it would create serious political problems with U.S. Asian allies, who would conclude that the U.S. places a lower priority on their security, and leave open the possibility that Moscow could move its mobile Asian-based SS-20s to Europe.

Verification Issues: Even assuming other problems could be resolved, the verification of destruction of current SS-20s and restrictions on production or deployment of new systems would still be necessary. Moscow has until now steadfastly rejected the kinds of intrusive on-demand inspection measures, including on-site inspection of factories, necessary to assure fulfillment of arms control treaty obligations.

Aside from these specific obstacles, the prospect of an INF agreement raises more fundamental issues. First, to the extent that the original NATO INF deployment had a military as well as political

rationale, would a reduction inhibit NATO's ability to deter Soviet attack, or to prevail if it ever occurred? Would it not place even more dependence upon a NATO conventional capability that is already suspect? Second, to the extent that the INF deployment was intended to serve the political function of "coupling" the U.S. to Europe in the event of a Soviet attack, would an agreement undermine that coupling and raise further questions about the extent of the U.S. commitment to NATO? Third, should the U.S. be willing to sign any new arms control agreement while Soviet violations of existing agreements (for example, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation of the ABM Treaty) remain unresolved?

POLICY FOR THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING

At his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan should insist repeatedly, privately and publicly, on the following points.

1) Stable peace can be achieved only on the basis of a broad political settlement of conflicts. Therefore, arms control agreements will not bring peace unless major regional conflicts, fueled by Soviet direct and proxy interventions, are settled.

2) Settlement of regional conflicts will not be achieved by Soviet attempts to attain complete victory. It should be made clear to Gorbachev that only speedy and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan would result in a genuine political settlement in that area.

3) The Strategic Defense Initiative is not a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations. It offers a hope of a world no longer threatened by nuclear annihilation. Negotiation should, therefore, be over how, not whether, to deploy strategic defense.

4) There can be no further arms control agreements until past Soviet violations of existing agreements are rectified. New arms control agreements must incorporate iron-clad provisions for on-demand verification. A total ban on nuclear testing, moreover, is impossible at this time because of U.S. defense requirements.

5) Soviet violations of human rights make the American public distrust the Soviet Union. Americans will never trust a government which does not allow its own citizens to voice their opinion and exercise their religious beliefs freely.

6) Soviet massive espionage effort conducted in the United States, particularly from the United Nations, is a serious obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

At the same time, Reagan must be concerned about U.S. and allied public opinion and perceptions. The President should continue efforts to lower expectations, which to some extent have been inflated by Administration officials, about the results of the meeting. He must point out repeatedly that there are still serious obstacles to even a INF agreement, let alone one covering strategic offensive forces. Finally, Reagan should emphasize that it is Soviet unwillingness to substantially reduce SS-18 and SS-19 deployments, not the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, that is the real barrier to an arms agreement.

It would be unwise for President Reagan to make any concessions in the hope that the Soviets would reciprocate later. Such a hope would be based not only on a false assumption about Soviet international conduct, but also on a misreading of the domestic political situation in the Soviet Union. While Gorbachev's personal power seems to be relatively strong, his ability to design and implement policies different from the mainline of the tradition of Soviet Communism is at best in doubt. Consequently, the President must follow the only proven method for dealing with the Kremlin--he must stick to his principles and not give an inch without a simultaneous and equivalent Soviet concession.

W. Bruce Weinrod
Director of Foreign Policy
and Defense Studies

Mikhail Tsypkin, Ph.D.
Salvatori Fellow
in Soviet Studies

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1986

RECEIVED OPL-WW
86 OCT 17 AIO: 14

MEMORANDUM FOR MARI MASENG

FROM: TOM GIBSON *TG*
SUBJECT: Iceland Meeting and SDI

Attached for your use is the Iceland Meeting and SDI package.

Please note that there are two sets of materials, identical except for letterhead.

1. Talking Points are for Administration spokesmen.
2. Issue Briefs are for private individuals and supporters (including governors, state legislators, mayors, etc.)

Please let me know if you need any additional information.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN

FROM: TOM GIBSON *TG*
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: White House Talking Points

Attached for your information and use are talking points on the President's Iceland meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, arms reduction, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. Also included is the text of the President's address to the nation on October 13, 1986.

If you have any questions concerning these materials, please contact the Office of Public Affairs at 456-7170.

THE PRESIDENT'S ICELAND MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

Executive Summary

The President went to Iceland to promote the main objectives of American foreign policy: true peace and greater freedom in the world. He met with General Secretary Gorbachev for 10 hours of frank and substantive direct talks. We achieved our objectives.

The President focused on a broad four point agenda for improved U.S.-Soviet relations: Human Rights; Arms Reductions; the Resolution of Regional Conflicts; and Expanding Bilateral Contacts and Communications.

Increasing and Overwhelming Public Support

Private media polls immediately following the Iceland meeting found overwhelming support by the American people for the President.

- o The Wall Street Journal/NBC News and the New York Times/CBS News polls registered 71% and 72% (respectively) approved of the President's handling of the Iceland meeting.

Building Upon Iceland Meeting

- o Never before in the history of arms control negotiations has so much progress been made in so many areas, in so short a time.
- o The U.S. and Soviet Union came very close to an agreement that would secure massive reductions of the most threatening weapon systems: offensive ballistic missiles.
- o Mr. Gorbachev's non-negotiable terms on the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would have perpetuated America's vulnerability to Soviet missiles. Where the security of the American people and our Allies is involved, no agreement is better than a bad agreement.
- o SDI was a main inducement for the Soviets to negotiate for deep cuts in offensive arsenals. SDI remains the best insurance policy that any future arms reduction agreements will be implemented and complied with by the Soviets.
- o Notwithstanding the disagreements on SDI, the President is calling upon the Soviet leadership to follow through on arms reduction accomplishments at Reykjavik and continue to discuss our differences on strategic defense, which have been narrowed.
- o We will vigorously pursue, at the same time, progress in other areas of the agenda, especially human rights.