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*Background/
Briefers
P 601*

KOREA: MILITARY BALANCE

Q: What is the current military balance between North and South Korea?

A: -- The comparative military balance continues to favor the North. The North has about 770,000 men under arms, compared with about 620,000 in the South. North Korean forces are well equipped, and have a substantial advantage (at least 2-to-1) in several key categories of offensive weapons: tanks, long-range artillery, and armored personnel carriers. The North has perhaps the world's largest commando force, of some 80,000-100,000 troops, designed for insertion behind the lines in time of war. North Korea also has more than twice as many combat aircraft than the South, although ROK/US forces have the qualitative edge. North Korean exercises have revealed impressive sophistication in terms of joint and combined forces operations.

-- In addition to their size and their capabilities, the challenge posed by North Korean forces is compounded by factors of time and distance. The bulk of North Korean forces are deployed well forward, along the DMZ and further deployments toward the DMZ in recent months are troubling. Given the proximity of Seoul to the DMZ (some 25 miles,

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about the distance from Washington to Dulles airport), ROK and US forces are presented with an extremely difficult indications and warning problem. Consequently, a high state of readiness is required at all times.

-- North Korea devotes 20-25 percent of its GNP to military expenditures, compared to about 6 percent by the ROK. However, the South's GNP is four times larger than that of the North, and its economy far more dynamic. Thus, the ROK is likely to make continued gradual gains in redressing the military imbalance. For now, however, and for the foreseeable future, the South will face a formidable military challenge.

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KOREA: SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Q: How much military assistance do we give Korea?

A: -- We provided \$230 million in FMS credits in FY 84 and \$220 million in FY 85. We are requesting \$228 million for FY 86. These credits, at treasury rates, are for the purpose of helping Korea to meet the goals of its Force Improvement Plan and thereby narrow the existing, dangerous military imbalance with the North. That plan calls for the expenditure of over 9 billion dollars during the ROK's current Force Improvement Plan (FIP II) (1982-86), much of it from the US. FMS credits provide partial financing for those purchases. Korea is committed to spending six percent of its gross national product for defense, although its impressive economic performance has caused the actual figure to slip to about 5.5 percent of GNP. Korea is expected to continue that high rate of expenditure in view of the continuing threat from the North.

-- ROK efforts to modernize its forces and hence narrow the North's military lead are essential to the maintenance of an effective deterrent and to the preservation of peace and stability in Korea and in Northeast Asia.

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ILLEGAL HELICOPTER DIVERSION TO NORTH KOREA

Q: How could you allow advanced U.S. helicopters delivered to our sworn enemies in North Korea?

A: -- At this point, I can only say that the matter is still under investigation. We have already taken action against one of the firms which we believe to have been involved, and we are looking for ways of ensuring that this unfortunate incident does not happen again.

Q: -- But that's cold comfort after the fact. How can you guarantee that there will be no repetition, and how can you guarantee that spare parts for the machines won't find their way to North Korea?

A: -- No system of controls is perfect, of course, but we will be looking very closely at ways to tighten up the control system and we will be consulting closely with your Government. I should point out that this incident is only one example of the larger problem of diversion of strategic goods from the United States and other friendly governments to unfriendly nations. It is a problem which requires cooperation among all governments which are concerned about such diversions.

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KOREA: THIRD-COUNTRY SALES

Q: It has come to our attention that the ROK is an important arms supplier to such countries as Iran. Is this true, and if so, what are we going to do about it?

A: -- Information about the sales of arms by Korean firms is less than completely reliable; however, we have made known to the Korean Government--and to a number of other governments as well--our deep concern about the potentially destabilizing effects of arms sales to the Middle East.

Q: I have been informed that in fact Iran is one of Korea's major customers; why should we give security assistance to the ROK when it turns around and provides arms to Arab radicals?

A: -- We provide security assistance to the ROK in order to assist its own efforts to reduce the present dangerous military imbalance with the North. The North Korean threat is genuine, immediate and formidable. Countering it, and preventing war by maintaining a credible deterrent, requires the ROK to strengthen its own forces through the purchase in this country of sophisticated weapons. FMS is an important element in the force improvement program.

-- As I said, we take a serious view of arms sales to certain Middle Eastern countries by any country with which we are allied.

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KOREA: NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND TRIPARTITE TALKS

Q: For over a year North Korea has tried to get the USG to agree to tripartite talks. Why are we unwilling to talk to North Korea? Wouldn't a gesture from the US serve to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula?

A: -- We had, as a matter of fact, modified our guidance concerning contact between executive branch officials and North Korean diplomats just prior to the Rangoon bombing on October 9, 1983. That guidance was rescinded following the Rangoon atrocity. The North Korean tripartite talks proposal dates from that same period and may have been a propaganda ploy aimed at reducing the stigma attached to that act of international terrorism that resulted in the death of 17 senior ROK officials. However, there are other difficulties with the tripartite proposal.

-- It is a principle of this and former administrations that we will not enter into talks with North Korea without the full and equal participation of South Korea. North Korea is unwilling to accept this as is clearly shown in the proposed agenda for such talks. First and foremost, Pyongyang wants to negotiate a peace treaty bilaterally with the United States to replace the Korean Armistice, followed by the withdrawal of US forces from the South. Only then is North Korea willing to discuss non-aggression and reunification with South Korea. Our position is that Korean issues must first be discussed directly between North and South and that such direct contacts must be the primary

vehicle for reducing tension on the peninsula.

Q: But North Korea has, in fact, entered into such talks?

A: -- Yes. North-South economic talks and Red Cross family reunification talks were agreed upon following the unprecedented delivery of North Korean flood relief materials to South Korea in late September 1983. The first rounds were held in a cordial atmosphere in November. However, Pyongyang postponed the second round of economic talks and deferred scheduling the second Red Cross meeting following the November 23 shooting incident in the DMZ occasioned by a defecting Soviet language student. In early January, North Korea criticized the annual combined US-ROK "Team Spirit" military training exercise as incompatible with dialogue and again postponed talks which had been rescheduled in mid-December for January. North Korean statements since that time indicate that Pyongyang may be willing to reschedule talks following the conclusion of "Team Spirit 85" in mid-April.

Q: Are the "Team Spirit" exercises provocative and incompatible with dialogue as asserted by North Korea?

A: -- The "Team Spirit" exercises have been held annually at the same time each year for a decade. When North Korea rescheduled talks in December, they had no reason to believe that this year's exercises would not be held. As to the

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claim that they are incompatible with dialogue, North Korea proposed North-South sports talks in early 1983 at a time when the "Team Spirit" exercises were underway. The exercises are defensive in nature and not aimed at "an invasion of North Korea" as claimed by Pyongyang. This year, as in the previous three years, North Korea and China were invited through the Military Armistice Committee to send observers to the exercises. I would note that North Korea regularly holds large scale military exercises which are not announced and to which observers are not invited. The UN Command has proposed through the Military Armistice Commission as confidence building measures that each side notify the other of impending military exercises and invite observers. North Korea has not responded.

Q: If North Korea is talking directly with the South, why do we continue to refuse to talk with Pyongyang?

A: -- We have followed the progress of the talks closely and publicly welcomed the inter-Korean dialogue. As yet, however, the talks have not produced substantial results nor resulted in a decrease of tension. Only time will tell if Pyongyang is seriously interested in lowering tension or simply involved in another propaganda aimed at giving the semblance of reasonableness. Until such time as the talks produce real results, it is premature to consider expanded forums for discussion of Korean issues.

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KOREA: DOMESTIC POLITICS/HUMAN RIGHTS

Q: Has Korea made progress in human rights and political development?

A: -- Korea still has a way to go, but there have been many encouraging developments, especially in the past year or so. Between December 1983 and May 1984, over 400 prisoners in politically related cases were freed, reducing the number of prisoners of conscience to its lowest point in years. There is a new policy in which the police have been withdrawn from campuses and students are allowed to demonstrate on-campus, as opposed to off-campus, for the first time in years. Over 1,300 students who had been expelled for protest activities were allowed to return to school. Eighty-six professors who had been forced to resign in 1980 were allowed to return to their positions last fall. Among the encouraging developments is also the fact that the ban on the political activities of 551 Koreans, originally scheduled to last until 1988, has been removed from all but 15 people. People freed from the ban played an important part in forming a new opposition party, supported, among others, by Mr. Kim Dae Jung and Mr. Kim Young Sam. This new party won second place in the February 12 National Assembly election, making it the largest opposition party in the Assembly.

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KOREA: KIM DAE JUNG'S RETURN TO KOREA

Q: What is the USG position concerning the incident that occurred on Kim Dae Jung's arrival in Seoul?

A: -- We protested the incident to the Korean Government and asked for an investigation, the results of which we are awaiting. Our Embassy asked the Korean Government for an assurance concerning the safety of the Americans accompanying Mr. Kim; such assurance was given.

-- Lost in the news of the incident is the fact that the Korean Government kept its pledge not to put Mr. Kim back in jail. We have expressed the hope that the present restrictions on him will be relaxed as soon as possible.

-- We had worked hard so that Mr. Kim's return would be as trouble free as possible. We regret that it was not without incident, but we believe it is important now to focus on the future. We will continue to follow closely Mr. Kim's treatment by the Korean authorities in the weeks and months ahead as we work to encourage political liberalization in Korea. In this regard, we note that the campaign for the National Assembly election February 12 saw greater exercise of freedom of speech than has been the case for some time in Korea. We welcomed the election as contributing to further political progress in Korea.

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KOREA - TRADE DISPUTES

Q: There has been a great deal in the press lately about trade problems with Korea -- GSP renewal, steel, textiles and other controversies. Are our trade relations with Korea in trouble?

A: --Korea is a rapidly advancing middle-level economy with a gross national product of about \$80 billion, and is the United States' seventh-largest trading partner. Two-way trade between Korea and the United States last year was over \$15 billion. We are Korea's largest trading partner. Given the large volume of our trade and the growing competitiveness of many Korean industries, there is a much larger range of potential economic problems than in the past. It is not surprising that the rapid change in our economic relationship has led to some difficulties, but I do not consider those difficulties insoluble. Indeed, several of the most contentuous issues, such as GSP renewal and color television dumping have already been resolved, and the steel issue is basically settled although some details are still under negotiation. There are also some issues, such as access to the Korean market and protection of intellectual property rights in Korea, in which we are extremely interested.

Q: The Koreans seem concerned about rising US protectionism directed at Korea. Are we closing our doors to Korean exports?

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A: --Korean exports to the United States rose by about 34 percent in 1983 and another 30 percent last year. The US trade deficit with the world is ballooning, and our trade deficit with Korea was \$3.5 billion last year. The press play in Korea concerning rising US protectionism does not seem to be supported by the evidence. There are protectionist pressures in the United States, of course, but they are not dominant. In addition, there is much that the Korean Government could do in the way of import liberalization which would greatly help us keep our markets open.

Q: More than forty percent of Korean exports to the United States are controlled in some manner by the U.S. Government. Doesn't that suggest that the U.S. is indeed protectionist?

A: --I would like to point out that a significant proportion of those products which you say are under controls are controlled by anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties. It is important that your manufacturers understand that we consider such duties the proper response to unfair trade practices by our trading partners. The recent color television dumping problem, for example, arose because Korean manufacturers are selling their products in the United States for about ten percent less than they are sold in Korea. We simply will not allow such practices in our

market when they result in unfair competition for domestic U.S. manufacturers.

--I believe you should also be aware of the growing feeling in the United States that many U.S. trading partners are unfairly excluding U.S. products from their domestic markets. In areas ranging from computers to cigarettes and from insurance to advertising services, U.S. manufacturers are concerned about barriers to trade or outright exclusion from the Korean market. Such trade barriers make it very difficult for us to contend with domestic protectionist pressure.

Q: But Korea is a developing country with a balance of payments deficit, a heavy defense burden, a large foreign debt and no natural resources. Isn't it unfair for the United States to insist on unrestricted exports to Korea and thereby ruin our developing industries?

A: --I doubt that you would find many American steel, textile, automobile, electronics, shipbuilding or many other industrial executives who would agree with your characterization of Korea's industrial status. Korea is an attractive market for many U.S. industries, and the prospect of Olympics-related sales has caused many more industries to become interested in Korea. Our economic relations with Korea are now no longer the big brother -

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little brother relationship of the 1950's; we are now friendly competitors in many economic areas and we both have to adjust to those changed circumstances. The bottom line is that if you continue to exclude competitive U.S. goods and services from your market, you make it almost impossible for us to keep our market open in those areas where you are most competitive.

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KOREA: WOLFOWITZ MURDER BOARD Q's and A's

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EAP: LDAnderson, Acting
EAP: ILLibby

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POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA

Since December 1983, the Korean Government has:

- released most prisoners in politically related cases, reducing the number of prisoners of conscience to the lowest number in years (less than 100)
- introduced a more tolerant campus policy, which:
 - o saw the release from prison of 360 student protesters
 - o allowed all 1,361 expelled students to return to school
 - o saw withdrawal of police from campuses, and anti-government protests on campus permitted for first time in years
 - o allowed 86 professors forced to resign in 1980 to return to their teaching positions
- restored the civil rights (voting, holding office) of 714 former prisoners in political cases
- lifted the political ban on 286 people, reducing from 551 to 15 the number originally banned until 1988
- allowed, despite numerous restrictions, one of the most vigorous campaigns in recent Korean history for the February 12 National Assembly election; new opposition party, led, among others, by still banned opposition politicians Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, made a strong showing to win second place
- did not put Kim Dae Jung in jail on his return to Korea

The Korean economy very dynamic; middle power status; ROK has become our 7th most important trading partner; GNP grew 7.5% in 1984

ROK has already completed the Olympic stadium complex for 1988

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CHECKLIST ON POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA FOR
THE SECRETARY'S APPEARANCE
BEFORE THE COMMONWEALTH CLUB IN CALIFORNIA

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1985

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REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
AS INTERVIEWED ON NBC-TV'S "TODAY SHOW"
FEBRUARY 11, 1985

JANE PAULEY: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Good morning.

MS. PAULEY: Do you agree with Ambassador Walker that the Americans traveling with Kim provoked that melee at the airport?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Things didn't go according to the agreements that we thought we had worked out for his arrival. The traveling party didn't go as was described and the Korean Government didn't react the way we thought they might have, so there was some misunderstanding there and it led to this scuffle, but that's not really the main point. The main point is whether or not in Korea progress is being made toward a more open society, a more democratic society, and I think there is some progress, although they are a long way from where we'd like to see them.

ROBIN LLOYD: Mr. Secretary, I'll take it from here. Given the fact that Saudi Arabian King Fahd is here in Washington, undoubtedly you'll be focusing much of your attention on the Middle East. King Fahd will be seeking more arms and he will be asking the United States for a greater commitment on the Mideast peace process. Are we prepared to give him either of these requests?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think we will be talking with him about the whole strategic situation in the Middle East and certainly about the peace process. We're in the process ourselves of reviewing how we think the level of armaments in various countries is shaping up and how it might change as our analysis of the strategic situation shows it should, so we're not, in this meeting, going to be negotiating things, but rather, sharing information and raising the level of understanding. As King Fahd said to me yesterday, he said, I come not as a negotiator, but as a friend. And so, in that spirit, our object will be to raise the level of understanding on both sides.

MR. LLOYD: He will be the first of many Arab leaders to come to Washington over the next six months. They will all be urging the United States to get involved in the Mideast peace process. Can we afford to stay on the sidelines?

SEPARATELY BY ESCALATOR. MR. AND MRS. KIM WERE TAKEN TO A KOREAN GOVERNMENT VEHICLE, AND AFTER ABOUT 45 MINUTES PROCEEDED TO THEIR HOME.

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, CONGRESSMEN FEIGHAN AND FOGLIETTA AS WELL AS MS. DERIAN AND FORMER AMBASSADOR WHITE AND SOME NEWSMEN WERE HANDLED ROUGHLY. THERE WERE REPORTS THAT MR. KIM ALSO WAS HANDLED ROUGHLY. HOWEVER, MR. KIM TOLD THE EMBASSY THAT HE WAS NOT.

I WOULD ADD THAT OUR EMBASSY OFFICERS WERE NOT PERMITTED TO GO NEAR THE AIRPLANE, WHICH MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT, NOR WERE THEY ALLOWED TO HELP EXPEDITE AIRPORT FORMALITIES. EVIDENTLY THE KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL WHO WAS TO ACCOMPANY THE FLIGHT FROM TOKYO DID NOT DO SO, OR AT LEAST DID NOT DO THE BRIEFING.

WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYONE WAS SERIOUSLY HURT, BUT ONE OR TWO KOREANS OR KOREAN-AMERICANS ACCOMPANYING MR. KIM MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO A HOSPITAL. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, ONE OF THESE MEN HAS A HEART CONDITION AND WAS TAKEN TO THE HOSPITAL AS A PRECAUTION.

OUR EMBASSY HAS PROTESTED AND HAS ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR AN INVESTIGATION, AN EXPLANATION, AND

GUARANTEES (THAT) THE PROPER TREATMENT OF THE AMERICANS ACCOMPANYING MR. KIM WILL BE ASSURED. WE HAVE RECEIVED A PROMISE OF AN INVESTIGATION AND ASSURANCES THAT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT WILL ASSURE THE SAFETY OF THE AMERICANS.

AS WE MADE CLEAR MANY TIMES BEFORE MR. KIM'S DEPARTURE FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR SEOUL, WE HAD HOPED FOR A TROUBLE-FREE RETURN AND WE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT FOR SEVERAL WEEKS CONCERNING THE RETURN. WHILE THIS OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HAPPEN, WE'D LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT THE REGRETTABLE EVENTS OF TODAY ARE ONLY PART OF THE STORY. MR. KIM'S TREATMENT BY THE KOREAN AUTHORITIES IN COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS WILL CONTINUE TO BE SOMETHING THAT WE WILL FOLLOW CLOSELY, AS WE WILL FOLLOW AND WORK TO ENCOURAGE POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN KOREA. IT SEEMS TO US THAT RESTRAINT AND COMPROMISE WOULD HELP KOREA ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF A MORE LIBERAL POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE THAT ALL, INCLUDING THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT, ESPOUSE.

Q COPY OF THAT?

A YOU CAN HAVE A COPY OF THAT, YES. YOU'LL HAVE TO GIVE US A LITTLE TIME RIGHT AFTER TO GET YOU THE COPIES -- SOME TYPOS.

Q DO YOU HAVE THE EXACT WORDING OF THE PROTEST THAT YOU MADE?

A I DON'T HAVE THAT AVAILABLE, NO.

Q "DEPLORE" -- YOU ARE DEPLOREING THE FACT THAT U.S. OFFICIALS WERE DENIED ACCESS AT THE SCENE AT THE AIRPORT. YOU'RE NOT DEPLOREING THE REPORTS THAT PEOPLE WERE PUSHED, BEATEN, TREATED -- HANDLED -- WHATEVER YOU SAID? YOU SAID "HANDLED ROUGHLY."

THE ONLY THING YOU'RE DEPLOREING IS THAT THE U.S. OFFICIALS WERE NOT ALLOWED TO GO TO THE PLANE?

A NO. I THINK THE THRUST OF THE REMARKS IN THE STATEMENT THAT I'VE JUST READ TO YOU IS COMPREHENSIVE IN ITS ESSENCE, AND I WILL STAND ON THAT STATEMENT IN ALL ITS ASPECTS.

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON KIM DAE JUNG INCIDENT

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING, FEBRUARY 8, CONCERNING KIM DAE JUNG.

BEGIN TEXT

STATEMENT: AS YOU KNOW, MR. KIM DAE JUNG RETURNED TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA YESTERDAY. ALTHOUGH HE IS SAFE AND UNHURT, THE RETURN WAS NOT, TO USE OUR PHRASE, "TROUBLE-FREE." ALL THE FACTS ARE UNDERSTANDABLY NOT YET CLEAR, AND THERE IS A FAIR AMOUNT OF CONFLICTING INFORMATION BEING CIRCULATED.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT HAS KEPT US INFORMED IN ADVANCE OF THE PLANNED ARRIVAL SCENARIO FOR MR. KIM AND THE ENTOURAGE. AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT, MR. KIM AND HIS WIFE WOULD BE TAKEN IN A GOVERNMENT CAR TO HIS HOME SEPARATELY FROM THE ENTOURAGE. THE KOREAN AUTHORITIES WOULD EXPEDITE THE AIRPORT FORMALITIES FOR A FEW MEMBERS OF THE ENTOURAGE WHO WOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE IN SEPARATE TRANSPORTATION TO MR. KIM'S HOME. THE REST OF THE

ENTOURAGE WAS TO PROCEED TO THE REGULAR AIRPORT FORMALITIES.

IN ADDITION, THE GOVERNMENT PLANNED, WE WERE TOLD, TO HAVE A KOREAN OFFICIAL BOARD THE PLANE IN TOKYO TO EXPLAIN IN DETAIL THESE ARRANGEMENTS TO MR. KIM AND THE ENTOURAGE. THE ADVANCE PERSON FOR MR. KIM'S ENTOURAGE INFORMED THE EMBASSY THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WERE ACCEPTABLE AND COMMUNICATED THE NAMES OF CONGRESSMEN FEIGHAN AND FOGLIETTA AND AMBASSADOR WHITE AS THE THREE WHO WOULD ACCOMPANY MR. KIM TO HIS HOME IN A SEPARATE CAR.

THE ARRIVAL SCENARIO DID NOT, OF COURSE, GO AS IT SHOULD HAVE. FACTS ARE, UNDERSTANDABLY, NOT YET CLEAR, BUT IT APPEARS THAT WHEN SOME OF THE GROUP ACCOMPANYING MR. KIM RESISTED POLICE EFFORTS TO SEPARATE THEM FROM MR. KIM ON DISEMBARKING FROM THE PLANE, THE KOREAN SECURITY OFFICERS RESPONDED WITH CONSIDERABLE FORCE.

U.S. EMBASSY OFFICERS WHO HAD BEEN PROMISED ACCESS TO THE DISEMBARKING CONGRESSMEN WERE INITIALLY DENIED ACCESS BY KOREAN AUTHORITIES AT THE SCENE -- A FACT WHICH WE DEPLORE. MR. AND MRS. KIM WERE PUT ON AN ELEVATOR WHILE THE MEMBERS OF THE ENTOURAGE WERE FORCED TO DESCEND

Q I'M NOT QUITE SURE HOW TO PHRASE THIS, BUT WHAT I WANT TO GET AT IS, TO WHAT EXTENT HAS PRESIDENT REAGAN BEEN KEPT APPRISED OF THE DEVELOPMENTS AND TO WHAT EXTENT DID HE HAVE A ROLE OF FORMULATING THE PROTEST, OR DECIDING ON

THE PROTEST OR --

A WELL, RALPH, I'M NOT GOING TO GET INVOLVED IN INTERNAL U.S. GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

Q DO YOU KNOW WHEN THE PRESIDENT WAS INFORMED? THE WHITE HOUSE SAID HE WOULD BE BRIEFED. DO YOU KNOW WHEN HE WAS?

A I'M NOT GOING TO GET INVOLVED IN THOSE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS.

Q CAN YOU TELL US WHETHER THE WHITE HOUSE WAS AWARE AT 9:15 THIS MORNING WHEN THE SPOKESMAN AT THE WHITE HOUSE WAS ASKED ABOUT THIS MATTER, WHETHER HE WAS AWARE THAT A PROTEST HAD BEEN FILED, HAD BEEN LODGED?

A THAT WHO WAS AWARE, RALPH?

Q THAT THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN WAS AWARE OF THIS OR NOT? CAN YOU TELL US WHETHER HE WAS AWARE AT 9:15 THIS MORNING?

A I CAN'T COMMENT ON THAT, RALPH.

Q: CAN YOU TELL US WHEN THE PROTEST WAS LODGED?

A I DON'T HAVE THAT SPECIFIC INFORMATION.

Q IS PRESIDENT CHUN'S VISIT IN ANY WAY IN JEOPARDY BECAUSE OF THIS?

A NO. WE EXPECT THAT PRESIDENT CHUN'S VISIT WILL PROCEED AS SCHEDULED.

Q WHAT IF THE RESTRAINT THAT YOU'VE URGED BE SHOWN IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS IS NOT SHOWN?

A THAT'S A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. I'M NOT GOING TO ANSWER THAT.

Q IN AN INTERVIEW ON THE PHONE THIS MORNING WITH ABC, MR. KIM HIMSELF SAID HE IS CONCERNED FOR HIS LIFE. WHAT'S YOUR INFORMATION ABOUT THAT?

A I HAVE NO SPECIFIC COMMENT ON -- TO ADD TO HIS REMARK.

Q DO WE UNDERSTAND THAT KIM IS UNDER HOUSE ARREST, PROTECTIVE CUSTODY, OR WHAT IS HIS STATUS?

A IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT MR. KIM IS NOT BEING ALLOWED TO LEAVE HIS HOME. AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR, WE REGRET ANY STEPS SUCH AS THIS ONE THAT DO NOT PROMOTE THE GOAL OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA. WE HOPE THAT THESE RESTRICTIONS ON KIM WILL BE LIFTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Q COPY OF THAT?

A NO.

Q HOW WERE THE AMERICANS FOUGHED UP? THERE WERE REPORTS THAT CONGRESSMAN FEIGHAN AND FORMER AMBASSADOR WHITE WERE THROWN TO THE GROUND. DO YOU KNOW IF THAT'S TRUE?

A I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO THE EXACT DETAILS. WE'VE RECEIVED CONFLICTING REPORTS, AND ALL THE INFORMATION ISN'T IN NOW, AND I DON'T WANT TO TRY TO STATE ANYTHING AUTHORITATIVELY FROM THIS PODIUM AT THIS TIME.

Q YOU'RE SAYING THE U.S. ASKED THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF THE AMERICANS WHO WERE IN THE TRAVELING PARTY, I PRESUME, AND RECEIVED THOSE ASSURANCES.

WAS THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT ASKED TO INSURE MR. KIM'S SAFETY BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?

A I'LL HAVE TO REFER YOU TO THE STATEMENTS THAT WE'VE MADE THAT WE EXPECTED MR. KIM'S RETURN TO GO SMOOTHLY AND BE TROUBLE-FREE.

Q AND IT DIDN'T, SO WAS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER -- TODAY IN THE PROTEST WAS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER?

A I DON'T WANT TO GET DRAWN OUT INTO THE EXACT DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WE'VE HAD.

CORNIE?

Q CAN I GO ON TO NEW ZEALAND? ARE WE FINISHED?

Q NO.

Q NO, NO.

A NO. I THINK --

Q I'M SORRY TO BE REPETITIVE. WHAT DID YOU SAY ABOUT CHUN'S FORTHCOMING VISIT?

A WE EXPECT THE PRESIDENT OF KOREA'S VISIT TO PROCEED AS SCHEDULED.

Q THERE ARE SEVERAL UNANSWERED QUESTIONS. COULD YOU KEEP US POSTED AS THE DAY PROGRESSES IF THESE QUESTIONS BECOME ANSWERABLE?

A CERTAINLY. CERTAINLY.

Q ANOTHER QUESTION --

A ROBIN?

Q DOES IT SEEM AT THIS TIME THAT THIS WAS SORT OF A SPONTANEOUS PROBLEM THAT AROSE BECAUSE OF WHAT MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS CHAOTIC EVENTS AT THE AIRPORT, OR WAS THIS SOMETHING PRE-PLANNED?

A WELL, ROBIN, PERHAPS I CAN ANSWER THAT QUESTION BY STATING THAT THERE WERE UNDERSTANDINGS WE THOUGHT WE HAD WITH THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WERE NOT CARRIED OUT.

Q CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC?

A AS I SAID, WE HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT EMBASSY OFFICERS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE AIRCRAFT WHEN MR. KIM DEPLANED. THEY WERE NOT. WE REGRET THIS, GIVEN THE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN TOWARD MR. KIM'S RETURN TO KOREA.

WE WOULD ALSO REPEAT THAT IT IS IMPORTANT NOW, GIVEN THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT'S ASSURANCES THAT THERE WILL BE AN INVESTIGATION AND THAT THE PROPER TREATMENT OF THE AMERICANS WILL BE ASSURED, TO MOVE FORWARD TOWARD THE GOAL OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION THAT WE ALL DESIRE.

Q IN AN INTERVIEW, CONGRESSMAN FOGLETTA WAS CRITICAL OF THE U.S. EMBASSY, SAYING THAT THEY DID NOT LET THE GOVERNMENT KNOW WITH SUFFICIENT CERTAINTY THEIR DESIRE TO HAVE THE AMERICANS PROTECTED. ARE YOU CONVINCED THAT THAT WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD, THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE -- IN THAT DELEGATION WOULD BE PROTECTED?

A I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO THOSE TYPES OF DETAILS, BUT I WOULD -- OUR EMBASSY HAS WORKED VERY ACTIVELY ON THIS MATTER.

Q YOUR STATEMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY REFERENCE TO THE WAY THE KOREAN POLICE TREATED THE DEMONSTRATORS SUPPORTING MR. KIM. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THAT?

A I HAVE NOTHING ON THAT.

RALPH?

Q I KNOW THAT BECAUSE OF THE SCHEDULING OF THE THING IT'S VERY UNLIKELY THAT ANY REFERENCE TO THIS WOULD BE INCLUDED -- THIS INCIDENT -- WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT THAT IS TO BE RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT NEXT WEEK, BUT IN YOUR VIEW SHOULD WE READ THAT REPORT ON SOUTH KOREA DIFFERENTLY AS A RESULT OF THE EVENTS OF TODAY? AND, IF YOU DON'T HAVE AN ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION, I'D ASK YOU TO TAKE THAT QUESTION IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE REPORT IS DUE OUT, AND WE ALL HAVE TO MAKE JUDGMENTS ABOUT SOUTH KOREA'S HUMAN RIGHTS BEHAVIOR.

A WELL, I THINK, RALPH, THE PHYSICAL PROCESS OF PRINTING THE REPORT I THINK IS WELL ON ITS WAY, AND I THINK THAT SPEAKS TO ITSELF.

Q RIGHT. BUT CAN YOU HELP US WITH SOME GUIDANCE ON HOW WE SHOULD READ WHATEVER CONCLUSIONS THE U.S. DRAWS THAT WE DON'T KNOW ABOUT?

A RALPH, IN THE SHORT TIME I'VE BEEN HERE, I'VE GROWN TO ADMIRE YOUR INTELLIGENCE AND YOUR COMPETENCE, AND I AM NEVER GOING TO TELL YOU HOW TO READ. (LAUGHTER)

Q RIGHT.

Q THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH KOREA HAS SET CERTAIN RULES FOR THE CAMPAIGNING FOR THE FORTHCOMING NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS AND TAKEN CERTAIN STEPS. FOR EXAMPLE, 14, NOW 15 OR 16, LEADING POLITICIANS ARE UNDER HOUSE ARREST. THE FREEDOM OF TRAVEL AND APPARENTLY OF EXPRESSION OF CANDIDATES HAS BEEN RESTRICTED. CERTAIN SLOGANS AND POSTERS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED BY POLICE.

WHAT IS THE CHARACTERISTIC -- THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN SO FAR IN THE EYES OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH BEFORE THE NICARAGUAN ELECTION, FOR EXAMPLE, CHARACTERIZED THE SITUATION LEADING UP TO THAT POLL.

A THE ONLY WAY I CAN RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTION IS TO REPEAT WHAT I HAVE SAID SEVERAL TIMES THIS AFTERNOON:

THAT WE HOPE THAT THE COUNTRY WILL MOVE FORWARD TOWARD THE GOAL OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION THAT WE ALL DESIRE, AND I'LL HAVE TO STAY WITH THAT.

Q AS IN THE CASE OF THE KIM ARRIVAL, HAS THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT ABOUT THESE PRE-ELECTION PRACTICES?

A I CANNOT GET INVOLVED IN DISCUSSING OUR DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES.

Q WHAT IS THE GOAL OF THIS INVESTIGATION, THAT IT SHOULD BE DETERMINED WHETHER THIS WAS ORDERED FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR THAT PEOPLE BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE IF THEY ASSAULTED SOMEONE, OR WHAT?

A SIMPLY TO GET TO THE FACTS, AND THEN PROCEED FROM THAT POINT ON.

Q AND THEN IF ANYBODY'S GUILTY OF ASSAULT, THEY SHOULD BE -- OR THE UNITED STATES WOULD WANT THEM TO BE PUNISHED?

A I'M NOT GOING TO GET INVOLVED INTO THAT STAGE OF SPECULATION.

Q DO THE EMBASSY OFFICIALS THERE FEEL THAT THE INCIDENT CREATES ANY INCREASED DANGER IN ANY WAY FOR THE REST OF THE ENTOURAGE, OR HAVE THEY ADVISED OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ENTOURAGE IN ANY WAY ABOUT THE SITUATION?

A I HAVE NOTHING FOR YOU ON THAT.

Q HOW CAN WE CHANGE?

A CAN WE NOW CHANGE, OR DO YOU WANT TO --

Q NO. ONE MORE.

A ANY MORE QUESTIONS --

Q ONE LAST QUESTION: WHEN WILL WE BE GIVEN THE PROTEST NOTE, OR WILL THAT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US?

A THAT'S NOT OUR NORMAL PRACTICE, ROBIN --

Q I KNOW.

A -- TO DIVULGE DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES.

Q IN THIS CASE THERE'S SOME QUESTION AS TO WHAT EXACTLY IT WAS THAT YOU PROTESTED, SO WE'D LIKE TO SEE IT, IF POSSIBLE.

A THAT'S GETTING INTO OUR DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES, AND IT'S JUST NOT OUR PRACTICE TO DO THAT.

Q IS THIS DEPARTMENT GOING TO ASK FOR FUTURE SAFETY OF MR. KIM?

A TO ASK FOR THE FUTURE SAFETY?

Q RIGHT.

A I THINK WHAT I'VE STATED IS A SUFFICIENT CHARACTERIZATION OF OUR POSITION ON MR. KIM.

Q DO YOU KNOW WHO IN THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT WILL DO THIS INVESTIGATION?

A I HAVE NO DETAILS. NO.

Q DO YOU HAVE ANY MORE REASON TO BELIEVE THE ASSURANCES THAT YOU'RE BEING GIVEN ON THE INVESTIGATION THAN YOU OBVIOUSLY NOW HAVE TO BELIEVE THE ASSURANCES YOU WERE GIVEN ON THE TRAVEL-FREE ARRIVAL?

A I HAVE NO COMMENT ON THAT.

Q SINCE THERE ARE QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT YOU'RE PROTESTING AND YOU DON'T WANT TO GIVE US THE PROTEST NOTE, COULD YOU IN YOUR OWN WORDS SAY NOW OR PERHAPS TAKE THE QUESTION OF WHAT IT IS PRECISELY THAT WE'RE PROTESTING?

A I THINK IF YOU LISTENED CAREFULLY TO ONE OF MY RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS, I SAID THERE WERE UNDERSTANDINGS WE THOUGHT WE HAD WITH THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WERE NOT CARRIED OUT.

Q THAT'S NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH, I DON'T THINK.

Q ARE YOU PROTESTING THE VIOLENCE THAT SURROUNDED HIS ARRIVAL?

A I WENT FURTHER. I SAID WE HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT EMBASSY OFFICERS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE AIRCRAFT WHEN MR. KIM DEPLANED. THEY WERE NOT. ET CETERA.

Q ARE YOU ALSO PROTESTING THE VIOLENCE?

A I'M NOT -- I DON'T WANT TO TRY TO CHARACTERIZE EXACTLY WHAT'S IN THAT PROTEST.

Q YOU ARE LEAVING THE IMPRESSION -- FOR WHATEVER IT'S WORTH, IT SEEMS TO ME YOU'RE LEAVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PROTEST -- THAT WHAT REALLY ANNOYS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN THIS MATTER IS THAT GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS IN SOUTH KOREA, WERE NOT ALLOWED TO APPROACH AN AIRPLANE, AS OPPOSED TO HAVING LODGED ANY PROTESTS OVER THE ACTIVITIES THAT OCCURRED THAT WERE CARRIED OUT BY MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST MR. KIM AND HIS ENTOURAGE.

MAYBE I -- I MAY HAVE MISSED SOMETHING THAT YOU READ, AND MAYBE WHEN WE READ THE STATEMENT AGAIN WE'LL HAVE A BETTER FEELING OF IT, BUT IS THAT THE IMPRESSION YOU WANT TO LEAVE?

A I'VE GONE INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL TO GIVE YOU THE BEST INFORMATION AND THE MOST DETAILED INFORMATION WE HAVE ON WHAT HAS HAPPENED. I DON'T THINK YOU SHOULD INTERPOLATE FROM THOSE REMARKS THAT OUR CONCERN IS BASICALLY ONLY IN LOGISTICAL DETAILS.

I ALSO STATED THAT WE HAVE MADE CLEAR MANY TIMES BEFORE MR. KIM'S DEPARTURE FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR SEOUL WE HAD HOPED FOR A TROUBLE-FREE RETURN, AND WE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT FOR SEVERAL WEEKS CONCERNING THE RETURN.

WHILE THIS OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HAPPEN, I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT THE REGRETTABLE EVENTS OF TODAY ARE ONLY PART OF THE STORY. MR. KIM'S TREATMENT BY THE KOREAN AUTHORITIES IN COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS WILL CONTINUE TO BE SOMETHING THAT WE WILL FOLLOW CLOSELY, AS WE WILL FOLLOW AND WORK TO ENCOURAGE POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN KOREA.

THESE, I THINK, RALPH, QUITE FRANKLY GO BEYOND THE DETAILED APPROACH THAT YOU'VE TAKEN.

Q HOW CAN WE CHANGE?

Q BUT THE QUESTION IS, ARE YOU PROTESTING THE TREATMENT OF MR. KIM AND THE AMERICANS ON THE ARRIVAL LAST NIGHT BY THE KOREAN POLICE?

A I CAN ONLY REPEAT WHAT I SAID "THERE WERE

UNDERSTANDINGS WE THOUGHT WE HAD WITH THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WERE NOT CARRIED OUT."

Q WHAT IS YOUR VIEW ON HIS DETENTION -- EFFECTIVELY, HIS DETENTION -- HIS CONFINEMENT TO HIS HOME? IS THAT PART OF THE PROTEST? IS THAT AN ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR?

A WE REGRET ANY STEPS SUCH AS MR. KIM NOT BEING ALLOWED TO LEAVE HIS HOME, STEPS THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS NOT PROMOTING THE GOAL OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA.

BUT, AGAIN, DON'T TRY AND PIN ME DOWN ON EXACTLY WHAT'S IN A PROTEST OR NOT. I'M NOT IN A POSITION TO DIVULGE EXACTLY WHAT WAS CONTAINED IN OUR PROTEST.

ARE WE READY TO CHANGE, OR --

Q IS ALL OF THIS A SETBACK FOR POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN KOREA?

A I THINK MY STATEMENT ADDRESSES THAT QUESTION.

ARE WE READY TO CHANGE?

Q WHY THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT DIDN'T STAND BY THEIR PROMISE (SIC)?

A EXCUSE ME?

Q WHY THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT DIDN'T STAND BY THEIR PROMISES WAS GIVEN TO THE UNITED STATES (SIC)?

A YOU'LL HAVE TO ADDRESS YOUR QUESTION TO THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT.
SHULTZ

SUBJECT: EXCERPTS FROM WHITE HOUSE PRESS BRIEFING OF
FEBRUARY 8, 1985 RE KIM DAE JUNG

1. FOLLOWING IS EXCERPT FROM FEBRUARY 8 TRANSCRIPT OF
WHITE HOUSE PRESS BRIEFING (BY LARRY SPEAKES) REGARDING
KIM DAE JUNG'S ARRIVAL IN SEOUL.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

9:17 A.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: WHAT WE'RE DEALING WITH NOW ARE PRESS
REPORTS ABOUT THE ARRIVAL OF KIM DAE JUNG. WE'VE SEEN
THOSE. WE HAVE--THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS SEEKING
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE EMBASSY. THE SITUATION,
AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE IT NOW, IS NOT TOTALLY CLEAR.
SO WE ARE WAITING FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

WE WOULD EXPECT THE STATE DEPARTMENT --

Q: YOU SAY THE SITUATION IS NOT CLEAR?

MR. SPEAKES: YES.

Q: WELL, DIDN'T EVERYBODY SEE MORNING TELEVISION? I
MEAN IT WAS FAIRLY CLEAR ON -- IN THE PICTURES.

MR. SPEAKES: WE WOULD EXPECT THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO BE
ABLE TO ADDRESS THE FACTS AND GIVE A SITUATION REPORT
ALONG WITH OUR GOVERNMENT'S REACTION AT THEIR NOON
BRIEFING TODAY. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE UPDATED THIS
MORNING WITH WHAT WE HAVE IN HAND BY EUD MCFARLANE.

WE HAVE BEEN -- THE STATE DEPARTMENT, OF COURSE, IS
RECEIVING REPORTING FROM OUR AMBASSADOR, WHOSE NAME IS
RICHARD WALKER. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN OUR ANNOUNCE -- IN
THE ANNOUNCED PLAN FOR THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT CHUN IN
APRIL.

THAT'S THE EXTENT OF WHAT I HAVE ON IT.

Q: WELL, IF HE WAS ROUGHED UP -- I MEAN, IF AMERICANS
WERE ROUGHED UP, YOU'D STILL WANT THIS MAN TO COME TO
THIS COUNTRY?

Q: QUESTION.

MR. SPEAKES: SHE SAID -- DID YOU SAY THE AMERICANS WERE
OR IF THEY WERE?

Q: WELL, LET UNDERSTAND THEY WERE.

MR. SPEAKES: I THINK WE WOULD LIKE TO BE CLEAR --

Q: WHAT WAS THE QUESTION?

Q: WASN'T PAT DERIAN -- PARDON?

MR. SPEAKES: HELEN, DO YOU WANT TO RESTATE YOUR QUESTION
FOR THE REAR OF THE ROOM?

Q: YES.

Q: IF WE COULD GET THE TV TURNED OFF BACK HERE --

Q: IF, INDEED, VIOLENCE OR -- IF, INDEED, AMERICANS WERE
ROUGHED UP AT THE AIRPORT, WOULD WE STILL WANT THE
PRESIDENT OF KOREA TO COME HERE?

Q: PAT DERIAN SAID ON TELEVISION THAT SHE WAS PUSHED AND
SHOVED. I MEAN, IT -- AND THE PICTURES SEEM TO SUPPORT
IT. I MEAN, THERE DOESN'T SEEM TO BE ANY QUESTION.

Q: TAKE THE "IF" OUT.

MR. SPEAKES: WE'RE WAITING ON THE FACTS BEFORE WE MAKE
ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE
PLANS FOR PRESIDENT CHUN TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES IN
APRIL.

Q: WHAT ASSURANCES DID WE HAVE FROM THE KOREAN
GOVERNMENT REGARDING KIM'S RETURN?

MR. SPEAKES: WE HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD BE
ALLOWED TO RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY AND IT WOULD BE
TROUBLE-FREE AS BEST AS THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT COULD
GUARANTEE THAT.

Q: DID WE RECEIVE ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULDN'T BE
ARRESTED OR PLACED UNDER HOUSE ARREST, AS HE APPEARS TO
HAVE BEEN?

MR. SPEAKES: THAT, TOO, IS -- ONCE AGAIN, YOU'RE DEALING
WITH SOMETHING THAT YOU'RE NOT CERTAIN OF. DID WE
RECEIVE ASSURANCES HE WOULDN'T BE ARRESTED? YES, WE DID.

Q: DO YOU EXPECT THAT THE AMBASSADOR'S REPORT IS GOING
TO DIFFER FROM WHAT WAS ON TELEVISION?

MR. SPEAKES: WELL, IRA, I THINK YOU'VE BEEN IN THE
REPORTING BUSINESS LONG ENOUGH TO UNDERSTAND THAT YOU
CANNOT ARRIVE AT THE TOTAL FACTS AROUND A SITUATION
SITTING HERE, NOR YOU CAN FROM A MINUTE-AND-A-HALF
TELEVISION REPORT.

SO I THINK WE HAD THREE EMBASSY OFFICERS ON THE SCENE.
THEY WERE WITNESSES TO WHAT TOOK PLACE THERE. AND WHEN
WE RECEIVE THEIR TOTAL AND FULL REPORT, THE STATE
DEPARTMENT WILL BE READY TO TELL YOU WHAT THEY THINK OF
IT.

Q: THERE WERE INTERVIEWS WITH SEVERAL AMERICANS,
INCLUDING CONGRESSMEN. AND ONE OF THEM, WHO I CAN'T
RECALL --

MR. SPEAKES: ALSO THERE HAVE --

Q: -- WHO I CAN'T RECALL, SAID HE WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH
THE EMBASSY'S HANDLING OF THE PROBLEM --

MR. SPEAKES: I UNDERSTAND --

Q: -- THE QUESTION THAT HE WILL --

MR. SPEAKES: I UNDERSTAND WHAT THESE INDIVIDUALS SAID. I'VE SEEN WHAT THEY'VE SAID --

Q: LARRY --

MR. SPEAKES: ALSO, IT'S INTERESTING TO POINT OUT THAT KIM DAE JUNG HAS DONE INTERVIEWS, PRESUMABLY IN HIS HOUSE OR SOME OTHER LOCATION --

Q: ON TELEPHONE IN HIS HOUSE.

MR. SPEAKES: TELEPHONE, AND THERE'S ALSO A TELEVISION INTERVIEW.

Q: YES, BUT HE SAYS HE CAN'T LEAVE, LARRY.

MR. SPEAKES: PARDON?

...NOT ON YOUR ...YOUR OWN NETWORK.

Q: WELL, WHAT DO YOUR REPORTS SAY? WHAT HAVE YOUR -- WHAT HAVE THE AMERICAN OFFICERS REPORTED SO FAR?

MR. SPEAKES: ONCE AGAIN, WE'RE WAITING ON FULL REPORTING --

Q: YOU HAVE NOT HAD ANY REPORTS FROM THEM?

MR. SPEAKES: WE HAVE HAD REPORTING, BUT WE'RE WAITING ON FULL AND COMPLETE REPORTING AND -- WHICH WE WILL GET.

Q: HAS THIS GOVERNMENT FILED ANY KIND OF PROTEST AT THIS POINT OR ARE YOU WAITING?

MR. SPEAKES: DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO THAT.

Q: WHAT'S THE GENERAL U.S. POLICY TOWARD COUNTRIES THAT ASSAULT CONGRESSMEN? WE'VE HAD THAT WITH DIANA -- (LAUGHTER) THE AIRPORT.

Q: WELL, THEN ARE YOU SUGGESTING THAT WHAT WE THINK HAPPENED IS NOT THE CASE?

MR. SPEAKES: I'M ASKING YOU, IRA, TO DRAW YOUR

CONCLUSIONS ONCE YOU HAVE THE FULL FACTS, NOT TO DRAW THE CONCLUSIONS FROM WHAT YOU MAY THINK HAPPENED AT --

Q: WHERE'S HE GOING TO GET THE FULL FACTS? FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT?

MR. SPEAKES: -- 13,000 MILES AWAY.

Q: PRESUMABLY, SOMEONE HAS TALKED BY PHONE WITH THESE EMBASSY DESERVERS. WHAT IS LACKING AT THIS POINT IN TERMS OF MAKING THESE ASSESSMENTS?

MR. SPEAKES: I THINK YOU KNOW FROM YOUR OWN BRILLIANT AND LONG REPORTING CAREER THAT IT DOES TAKE TIME TO BE SURE THAT YOU HAVE ALL THE FACTS AND ALL THE FACTORS INVOLVED.

Q: YOU HAD THREE PEOPLE ON THE SCENE.

MR. SPEAKES: HELEN, I'M NOT GOING TO ARGUE WITH YOU. NOW, THE POINT IS THAT WE ARE WAITING ON FULL REPORTING --

Q: I'M NOT ARGUING WITH YOU. I'M ASKING --

MR. SPEAKES: -- AND UNTIL WE GET THAT FULL REPORTING --

Q: -- YOU, WHAT DID YOUR PEOPLE SEE?

MR. SPEAKES: -- I WILL NOT BE COMMENTING, AND THE COMMENTS WILL COME FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

Q: WELL, THEN, DON'T CAST --

MR. SPEAKES: NOW, IF YOU WANT TO CONTINUE TO BEAT THE DRUMS, GO RIGHT AHEAD.

Q: -- ASPERSIONS ON WHAT WE SAW ON TELEVISION OURSELVES.

MR. SPEAKES: I DIDN'T CAST ASPERSIONS ON IT. I SIMPLY ASKED YOU --

Q: -- YOU HAD THREE OBSERVERS THERE.

MR. SPEAKES: -- AS ANY REPORTER WOULD BE TO WAIT UNTIL YOU GET THE FACTS BEFORE YOU JUMPED TO CONCLUSIONS.

Q: OKAY. AND I'M TELLING YOU THAT YOU HAVE SOME OF THE FACTS AND I DON'T KNOW WHY YOU WON'T CONVEY THEM.

MR. SPEAKES: IF YOU WANT TO STAY HERE AND BEAT THE DRUMS, GO RIGHT AHEAD. YOU'RE WELCOME TO DO IT.

CANDY?

Q: IT'S NOT BEATING THE DRUMS.

Q: OTHER THAN SEEKING INFORMATION FROM, I ASSUME, THE U.S. EMBASSY IN SEOUL --

MR. SPEAKES: YES.

MR. SPEAKES: I DON'T KNOW. I THINK YOU WOULD HAVE TO ASK THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON --

Q: AS FAR AS YOU KNOW, THE FACT-FINDING SO FAR IS LIMITED TO A REPORT -- GETTING A REPORT FROM THE EMBASSY?

MR. SPEAKES: THE FACT-FINDING FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT --

MR. SPEAKES: -- TO U.S. EMBASSY SEOUL IS -- ON THAT. BUT U.S. EMBASSY SEOUL MAY BE DOING EXACTLY WHAT YOU SAY. I DON'T KNOW.

STEVE?

Q: LARRY, ISN'T THE ADMINISTRATION GETTING A LITTLE EMBARRASSED ABOUT WHAT APPEARS TO BE ALMOST A TREND? WE HAVE THE AQUINO MURDER IN THE PHILIPPINES WHEN HE RETURNS. WE HAVE A TAIWANESE DISSIDENT APPARENTLY MURDERED IN THE UNITED STATES BY HIS OWN GOVERNMENT, ANOTHER NORTH PACIFIC ALLY. AND, NOW WE HAVE THIS THIRD EVENT. IT SEEMS THAT ALL OF OUR FRIENDS OUT THERE ARE CAUSING MORE PROBLEMS FOR US PUBLIC RELATIONWISE THAN THE VIETNAMESE, FOR GOODNESS SAKE.

MR. SPEAKES: WHAT WOULD YOU SUGGEST WE DO?

Q: I WONDER IF THERE ISN'T SOMETHING THE ADMINISTRATION COULD DO OR SPEAK OUT, IF IT ISN'T BECOMING A TAD BIT EMBARRASSING?

MR. SPEAKES: THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SPOKEN OUT
REPEATEDLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND SO FORTH.

BERNIE?

Q: GIVEN THE FACT THAT WE RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT HE
WOULDN'T BE ARRESTED, WERE WE CAUGHT -- WAS THE
ADMINISTRATION CAUGHT BY SURPRISE BY THESE DEVELOPMENTS?

MR. SPEAKES: I REALLY NEVER ANSWER WHETHER WE'RE
SURPRISED OR NOT SURPRISED. I MEAN, WE --

Q: YOU WEREN'T SURPRISED?

MR. SPEAKES: GO AHEAD, FRANK.

Q: I JUST WANT TO HEAR THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION, IF
IT'S ALL RIGHT. YOU WERE IN THE MIDDLE OF --

MR. SPEAKES: NO, I FINISHED. GO AHEAD.

Q: YOU HAD MENTIONED THAT KIM HAD MET WITH WHITE HOUSE
AND STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE.
WHAT WAS DISCUSSED AT THAT --

MR. SPEAKES: DON'T THINK WE'D GO INTO THOSE DISCUSSIONS.

Q: WAS IT -- DID IT REVOLVE AROUND HIS RETURN HOME AND
THE ASSURANCES THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN
REGARDING HIS ARRIVAL BACK HOME?

MR. SPEAKES: ANSWER ONE: I DON'T THINK WE GO INTO THOSE
DISCUSSIONS.

END TEXT. SHULTZ

SUBJECT: EXCERPTS RE KIM DAE JUNG AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING,
FEBRUARY 11

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RE KIM
DAE JUNG AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING, FEBRUARY 11.

BEGIN TEXT

Q AMBASSADOR WALKER IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE AMERICAN
DELEGATION THAT ACCOMPANIED KIM HOME PROVOKED --
DELIBERATELY PROVOKED THE MELEE AT THE AIRPORT. IS THAT
YOUR UNDERSTANDING?

SECONDLY, IS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT MR. KIM IS UNDER
HOUSE ARREST, AND WHAT IS YOUR STATEMENT ABOUT THAT?

A IN RESPONSE TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION, AS WE HAVE SAID,
EVENTS AT THE AIRPORT WERE CONFUSING. AND THERE ARE
SEVERAL CONFLICTING REPORTS ABOUT WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED.

WE ARE AWAITING THE AN GOERMENT' F T
OF THEIR INVESTIGATION, AND WE HOPE THAT THE INCIDENT CAN
SOON BE PUT BEHIND US.

LET ME SAY THAT, IN OUR VIEW, WE NEED TO LOOK TO THE
FUTURE IN KOREA. LOST IN THE NEWS ABOUT THE UNFORTUNATE
INCIDENT AT THE AIRPORT IS THE FACT THAT MR. KIM WAS NOT
PUT BACK IN JAIL. WE HOPE THAT THE PRESENT RESTRICTIONS
AGAINST HIM WILL BE RELAXED.

THERE JS AN IMPORTANT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION THAT
WILL GET UNDERWAY IN KOREA JUST A FEW HOURS FROM NOW. BY
ALL ACCOUNTS IT IS ONE OF THE MOST DYNAMIC ELECTIONS IN
KOREAN HISTORY. IT IS BEING CONTESTED BY SEVERAL
OPPOSITION PARTIES, INCLUDING A NEW ONE THAT HAS THE
SUPPORT OF MR. KIM DAE JUNG AND MR. KIM YOUNG SAM.

Q DOES THE DEPARTMENT SHARE THE VIEW OF THE AMBASSADOR?
IS THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT?

A WE DON'T WANT TO COMMENT FURTHER UNTIL WE RECEIVE THE
RESULTS OF THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT'S INVESTIGATION INTO THE
INCIDENT.

Q HOW ABOUT YOUR OWN EMBASSY'S STATEMENT, ED? YOU HAVE A
REPORT FROM THE EMBASSY, AND THE AMBASSADOR SAYS THAT THE
TWO CONGRESSMEN AND MISS DERIAN RENEGED ON AN AGREEMENT.

DID THEY OR DID THEY NOT RENEGE ON AN AGREEMENT?

A I THINK IN THE ORIGINAL STATEMENT WE MADE ON FRIDAY, WE
SAID THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN UNDERSTANDINGS

Q WITH THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT; NOT WITH THE --

A -- THAT WERE NOT FOLLOWED THROUGH ON. I'D JUST LIKE TO
LEAVE IT AT THAT.

Q WELL, YOU HAVE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION DENYING THAT
THEY MADE ANY SUCH AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING A MEMBER OF
CONGRESS. CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT WHAT THE
AGREEMENTS WERE?

A I DON'T WANT TO COMMENT FURTHER UNTIL WE GET THE
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION.

Q SIR, THERE WERE FILM CLIPS WHICH MILLIONS OF AMERICANS
SAW -- I SAW THEM AND PERHAPS YOU DID, TOO -- OF ONE
AMERICAN CONGRESSMAN BEING HUSTLED OUT, RATHER
MANHANDLED, BY TWO KOREAN SECURITY PEOPLE. THERE WERE
OTHER FILM CLIPS THAT SHOWED THESE DISTRESSING THINGS,
AND I DON'T SEE HOW THEY CAN BE CONFUSING. THE AMERICANS

SEEMED TO BE BADLY TREATED.

DID YOU SEE THE FILM CLIPS, SIR?

A I DID SEE THOSE FILM CLIPS; YES, I DID.

Q WHAT WAS YOUR ESTIMATION OF THEM?

A MY PERSONAL OPINION HAS ABSOLUTELY NO VALUE AT ALL IN
WHAT I THOUGHT OF THOSE FILM CLIPS. BUT I DO WANT TO
REITERATE THAT, YOU KNOW, WE ARE AWAITING THE RESULTS OF
THIS INVESTIGATION AND TO BE INFORMED BY THE KOREAN
GOVERNMENT OF EXACTLY THEIR REPORT ON WHAT HAS HAPPENED
AND WHAT THEY PLAN TO DO ABOUT IT.

RALPH?

Q IN THE INTERIM, DOES YOUR STATEMENT ON FRIDAY, WHICH
SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT NOT
UPHOLDING AGREEMENTS, STILL STAND? YOU NEVER SAID THAT
THE PARTY DID NOT UPHOLD AN AGREEMENT. THE ONLY THING
THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS SAID IS THAT THE KOREAN
GOVERNMENT DID NOT LIVE UP TO CERTAIN UNDERSTANDINGS THAT
WERE MADE?

A UH-HUM.

Q AND IN YOUR VIEW THAT STANDS TODAY?

A I THINK SECRETARY SHULTZ THIS MORNING, ON HIS INTERVIEW
ON TELEVISION ON THE "TODAY" SHOW STATED OUR POSITION
QUITE CONCISELY. "THINGS DIDN'T GO ACCORDING TO THE
AGREEMENTS THAT WE THOUGHT WE WORKED OUT FOR HIS
ARRIVAL. THE TRAVELLING PARTY DIDN'T GO AS WAS
DESCRIBED, AND THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT DIDN'T REACT THE WAY
WE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT HAVE. SO THERE WAS SOME
UNDERSTANDING THERE, AND IT LED TO THIS SCUFFLE. BUT
THAT'S NOT REALLY THE MAIN POINT".

"THE MAIN POINT" THE SECRETARY SAID "IS WHETHER OR NOT,
IN KOREA, PRORE DEMOCRATIN OAD TYWARD A MORE O EN
SOCIETY, A MORE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY" -- AND I'M QUOTING --
"AND I THINK THERE IS SOME PROGRESS ALTHOUGH THEY ARE A
LONG WAY FROM WHERE WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM." I THINK
THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS QUITE

DIRECTLY.

Q WAS THERE A MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE AMERICANS?

A I'M NOT GOING TO BE DRAWN INTO THAT SPECULATION.

Q WHAT IS THE AMBASSADOR'S VIEW OF DISCUSSING --

Q I WANTED TO BE SURE THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ -- IT SOUNDS LIKE HE'S SAYING THE SAME THING THAT THE AMBASSADOR DID, THAT THE TRAVELLING PARTY DIDN'T GO AS DESCRIBED; THEY DIDN'T DO THEIR PART AND THE KOREANS DIDN'T DO THEIR PART, SO THERE'S A MISUNDERSTANDING THAT BOTH SIDES DIDN'T DO WHAT THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO? THAT'S WHAT HE'S SAYING?

A THAT'S YOUR INTERPRETATION OF WHAT HE IS SAYING --

Q NO, NO, I'M ASKING --

A I THINK HIS REMARKS ARE VERY CLEAR.

Q THEY DON'T SPECIFICALLY SAY THAT. THEY SOUND LIKE THEY'RE SAYING THAT.

A I THINK HIS REMARKS ARE PRETTY CLEAR. THAT'S YOUR SPECULATION. I'LL LEAVE IT AT THAT. YOU HAD A SECOND QUESTION ON --

Q AMBASSADOR LEW IS COMING OVER. IS THIS BEING DISCUSSED BETWEEN SECRETARY ARMACOST AND --

A I HAVE NOTHING FOR YOU ON THAT.

Q ED, CAN YOU BE SPECIFIC ON KIM NOT BEING ALLOWED TO PRACTICE HIS RELIGION TO GO TO CHURCH YESTERDAY, AND THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT PREVENTING A PRIEST FROM ENTERING HIS RESIDENCE?

A NO, I DON'T THINK I HAVE ANYTHING SPECIFIC IN THAT TYPE OF DETAIL FOR YOU, NO..

Q ARE YOU WORKING ON THE PROBLEM OF HIS HOUSE ARREST? IS THE U.S. INVOLVED IN THAT?

A TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, MR. KIM HAS NOT BEEN PERMITTED TO LEAVE HIS HOME.

Q ON FRIDAY, IN DESCRIBING THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, THE FIRST APPARENT DEPARTURE FROM THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE BEFOREHAND, SEEMED TO BE THAT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO BOARD THE PLANE

IN TOKYO, I BELIEVE, AND THEN BRIEF ON -- GIVE A BRIEFING ON THE PLANE AS TO HOW THINGS WOULD WORK, HE SAID HE EITHER DIDN'T GET ON THE PLANE OR HE DIDN'T BRIEF, IN ANY CASE.

WHAT -- YOU WEREN'T SURE WHAT HAPPENED THERE. WHAT DID HAPPEN? DO YOU KNOW ANY BETTER NOW?

A AGAIN, WE'RE AWAITING THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION TO GET THAT TYPE OF DETAIL.

Q WELL, WHY DO YOU HAVE TO WAIT TO --

A WE ALLUDED TO THAT, BUT WE WANT TO GET THE RESULTS OF THIS INVESTIGATION.

JOHN?

Q IF YOU'RE AWAITING THE RESULTS, WHY DIDN'T YOUR AMBASSADOR AWAIT THE RESULTS. HE HAS PRONOUNCED HIMSELF ON THE SITUATION ALREADY, WITHOUT HAVING THE RESULTS. I MEAN, ARE YOU -- DO YOU AGREE WITH HIM? ARE YOU LEAVING HIM OUT TO HANG OUT THERE ON HIS OWN, OR WHAT?

A I THINK THE AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS PROBABLY CAME IN RESPONSE TO STATEMENTS MADE ABOUT HIM AT THE TIME, BUT I DON'T WANT TO BE DRAWN ANY FURTHER INTO THAT.

Q WELL, IT'S AMAZING. YOU MEAN, YOU JUST LEAVE YOUR OWN REPRESENTATIVE -- ARE YOU DISAVOWING HIM, OR ARE YOU SUPPORTING HIM, OR --

A WE ARE NOT DISAVOWING OUR AMBASSADOR --

Q IS HE SPEAKING IN A VACUUM?

A - IN SEOUL IN ANYWAY, AND I WOULD NOT -- I WOULD CERTAINLY STEER YOU AWAY FROM THAT SPECULATION.

Q WELL, IS HE SPEAKING IN A VACUUM?

A I SAID THE EVENTS AT THE AIRPORT WERE CONFUSING. THERE ARE A LOT OF CONFLICTING REPORTS COMING OUT OF WHAT HAPPENED, AND I DON'T THINK WE'D WANT TO CHARACTERIZE THE AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS IN THAT TYPE OF CONTEXT, JOHN.

Q ALL RIGHT. LET ME ASK YOU ONE LAST QUESTION ON IT, THEN. SINCE HE IS THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE -- SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN

KOREA, ARE THE STATEMENTS THAT HE IS QUOTED AS MAKING TO BE TAKEN AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE OFFICIAL U.S. VIEW OF WHAT HAPPENED?

A YOU WILL HAVE TO STICK BY THE STATEMENTS THAT WE ARE MAKING HERE ON THE SITUATION. I AM NOT GOING TO BE DRAWN INTO THAT, JOHN.

Q I'M ASKING YOU IF AMBASSADOR WALKER SPEAKS FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WHEN HE MAKES A STATEMENT. I DON'T THINK THAT'S A DIFFICULT THING TO ANSWER.

A AMBASSADOR WALKER IS THE PRESIDENT'S REPRESENTATIVE IN KOREA. HE OBVIOUSLY IS THE TOP LEVEL AMERICAN OFFICIAL IN KOREA. I MEAN, I'M NOT JUST GOING TO BE DRAWN INTO COMMENTING ON WHY HE MAY HAVE SAID SOMETHING OR HAS NOT SAID SOMETHING. I THINK WE HAVE TO STICK BY WHAT WE ARE TELLING YOU AND PUTTING IT IN THE FULL CONTEXT OF WHAT I HAVE JUST TOLD YOU HERE TODAY AND SECRETARY SHULTZ'S REMARKS THIS MORNING.

Q ED, DOES THE UNITED STATES -- WILL THE UNITED STATES HAVE AN OFFICIAL, OR WILL THERE BE UNOFFICIAL OBSERVERS OF THE ELECTION ON TUESDAY?

A WELL, OF COURSE, OUR EMBASSY IS, OBVIOUSLY, FOLLOWING THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH KOREA VERY CLOSELY, BUT I DON'T HAVE A SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO YOU IN TERMS OF HAVING DESIGNATED OBSERVERS, PER SE.

Q ED, IN CONNECTION WITH THE ELECTION, YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR STATEMENT EARLIER THAT YOU EXPECT -- OR YOU HOPE THAT THE RESTRICTIONS ON MR. KIM WILL BE RELAXED.

A OH-HUH.

Q DO YOU EXPECT THAT MR. KIM WILL BE ABLE TO VOTE IN THE ELECTIONS? THERE'S BEEN SOME DOUBT EXPRESSED BY HIM AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO VOTE?

A CONCERNING THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT MR. KIM TO VOTE, AND ALSO THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT CLERICS TO ENTER MR. KIM'S HOME TO PERFORM RELIGIOUS SERVICES, WE REGRET THIS SITUATION AND HOPE THAT RESTRICTIONS ON MR. KIM WILL BE LIFTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Q BUT NOT BEFORE TUESDAY'S ELECTIONS?

A AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Q ALSO, MR. KIM SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT YOU -- MEANS THE UNITED STATES -- BELIEVES IN HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THAT YOU SUPPORTED MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS AROUND THE WORLD LIKE CUBA, NICARAGUA, MAINLAND CHINA, AND NOW IN PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH, PHILIPPINES AND SOUTH KOREA.

NOW, WHERE ARE THOSE HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ALSO HOW LONG THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THESE DICTATORSHIPS?

A WELL, LET ME RESPOND TO YOU IN THIS WAY, SINCE WE ARE DISCUSSING THE KIM DAE JUNG CASE: ALTHOUGH, AS SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID THIS MORNING, KOREA STILL HAS A LONG WAY TO GO, THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS TOWARD A MORE OPEN AND MORE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN KOREA.

THERE HAVE BEEN MANY ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE PAST YEAR OR SO. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL IMPORTANT AMNESTIES OF PRISONERS IN POLITICALLY RELATED CASES THAT HAVE REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE TO ITS LOWEST POINT IN YEARS.

THERE IS A NEW POLICY IN WHICH THE POLICE HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM CAMPUSES, AND STUDENTS ARE ALLOWED TO DEMONSTRATE ON-CAMPUS AS OPPOSED TO OFF-CAMPUS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS.

360 STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS WERE RELEASED FROM PRISON BETWEEN DECEMBER 1983 AND MAY 1984 AND ALLOWED TO RETURN TO SCHOOL ALONG WITH NEARLY 1,000 OTHER STUDENTS WHO HAD BEEN EXPELLED FOR PROTEST ACTIVITIES. 86 PROFESSORS WHO HAD BEEN FORCED TO RESIGN IN 1980 WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THEIR POSITIONS LAST FALL.

AMONG THE ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS IS ALSO THE FACT THAT A NEW OPPOSITION PARTY SUPPORTED, AMONG OTHERS, BY MR. KIM DAE JUNG AND MR. KIM JUNG SAM, HAS BEEN FORMED AND IS CONTESTING THE FEBRUARY 12 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION.

THE NEW PARTY'S LEADERSHIP IS COMPOSED LARGELY OF POLITICIANS WHO WERE FREED SEVERAL YEARS EARLY FROM THE POLITICAL BAN IMPOSED ON THEM IN 1980. THAT BAN WAS ORIGINALLY IMPOSED ON OVER 500 KOREANS AND WAS SCHEDULED TO LAST UNTIL 1988.

LAST YEAR THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT LIFTED THE BAN ON AN ADDITIONAL 286 PEOPLE, REDUCING THE TOTAL REMAINING UNDER THE BAN TO 15.

THE CURRENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS ONE OF THE MOST VIGOROUS AND OPEN IN RECENT KOREAN HISTORY.

WE WOULD ALSO NOTE AGAIN THAT LOST IN THE NEWS OF THE UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT AT THE AIRPORT IS THE FACT THAT THE

KOREAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT, AS MANY FEARED, PUT MR. KIM BACK IN JAIL.

Q COPY OF THAT AND YOUR FIRST STATEMENT ON --

A YES. YOU MAY. MY FIRST STATEMENT ON THIS.

Q WHY THE BAN WAS NOT LIFTED ON MR. KIM TO MAKE CANDIDATE -- SINCE HE IS THE MOST-FAVORED CANDIDATE IN SOUTH KOREA?

A YOU WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS YOUR REMARKS TO THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT. I CAN'T GET DRAWN INTO THAT SPECIFIC.

Q (INAUDIBLE)

Q WOULD I BE WRONG IN SAYING THAT THE REASON KIM WASN'T PUT BACK IN JAIL WAS BECAUSE THAT WOULD INTERFERE WITH PRESIDENT CHUN'S VISIT HERE IN APRIL?

A I'M NOT GOING TO -- THAT'S A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. I'M NOT GOING TO ANSWER IT.

Q BUT IF THE VISIT IS SCHEDULED FOR APRIL, IS IT TOO EARLY TO TELL, THEN, IF THIS WHOLE INCIDENT WILL HAVE AN EFFECT ON THAT VISIT?

A COULD YOU REPEAT YOUR QUESTION?

Q YES. IF THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN APRIL, IS IT TOO EARLY TO TELL IF THIS WHOLE INCIDENT WILL AFFECT THAT VISIT IN ANY WAY?

Q PROCEED ON SCHEDULE. SHULTZ

1-5-5
2-14

KOREA: CANCELLATION OF PRESIDENT CHUN'S VISIT TO U.S.

Q: If Kim Dae Jung should remain under house arrest and we don't have a formal apology from the Korean government for the airport incident, will we cancel President Chun's visit?

We have one - see press guidance

A: We are concerned about these problems, but I believe it is clear that, on the whole, Korea is nevertheless making progress toward democratization. One measure of this is the recent National Assembly election, giving the opposition a greater role in the country's political future. Cancelling the visit of President Chun, who is the head of state of an ally with whom we have important security, economic, political, and North/South Korean issues to discuss, would not be helpful in any of these areas. Our concerns for democracy and human rights in Korea have been helped by our ability to speak directly and frankly in private to the government of Korea. It is widely recognized, even by Mr. Kim himself, that our past interventions on his behalf (FYI only: in both 1973 and 1980-81 periods) are probably the reason why he is alive today.

THE SECRETARY'S APPEARANCE
BEFORE THE
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
AND THE
SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE

FEBRUARY 19, 1985

Drafted: EAP/K: WD Straub *WDS*
2/14/85 x7717 Wang 6968K

Cleared: EAP/K: HIsom *WDS*
HA/HR: TMurphy *WDS*
EAP: DAnderson *Acting*
EAP: PWolfowitz *PW*
P: WItch *WDS*
S/S:
S/S: O

to 5-5
2-14

KIM DAE JUNG'S RETURN TO KOREA

I. INCIDENT AT THE AIRPORT

- o USG protested the breakdown in arrangements agreed upon concerning Mr. Kim's return
- o Relieved no one seriously hurt in melee
- o Department and Embassy Seoul had worked hard for trouble-free return
- o Several understandings, which might have prevented the unfortunate incident, were not kept
- ~~o We have asked Korean Government for an investigation into how the incident occurred~~
- o Lost in news about unfortunate incident is fact that Korean Government did not re-imprison Kim

II. THE FUTURE

- o We have expressed hope that restrictions on Kim's freedom of movement will be removed soon
- o We will continue to encourage political liberalization in Korea
- o No change in President Chun's scheduled visit to U.S.
- o Much remains to be done, but significant political and human rights progress in past year: police off campuses; most political prisoners released; just concluded National Assembly election one of most vigorously contested in Korean history, in which new political party supported by Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam won second largest number of seats to become the major opposition party

SECRETARY'S TESTIMONY BEFORE
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
FEBRUARY 19, 1985

KIM DAE JUNG'S RETURN TO KOREA

Drafted: EAP/K:WDStraub *WJ*
2/13/85 x7717 6960K

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EAP:PWolfowitz *PW*
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P:Witoh *W*
S/S-O:
S/S:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

UNCLASSIFIED

REPUBLIC OF KOREA: FOREIGN POLICY

The Republic of Korea, a divided country surrounded by Japan, China, and the Soviet Union, pursues, in stark contrast to North Korea, an outward-looking foreign policy. Its closest ties are with the United States and Japan, but it maintains diplomatic relations with the overwhelming majority of the world's states.

The ROK's ties with the US center on the US commitment to assist in deterring the North Korean military threat as outlined by the ROK/US security treaty. In recent years, however, trade and cultural ties have also expanded greatly. The ROK is now the United States' seventh-largest trading partner and the fourth largest market for US agricultural exports. Several hundred thousand Koreans have immigrated to the US, where they have made a name for themselves as hard-working, law-abiding neighbors.

Relations with Japan focus on trade and Japanese investment in Korea. Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Korea in 1983 and President Chun's visit to Tokyo in 1984 were historic firsts. The two men have indicated a desire to heal the wounds of the colonial past and begin a new era of Korean-Japanese friendship. Discussion of cultural and technological exchange may bring about a gradual broadening of the relationship.

The ROK has worked in recent years to diversify its economic ties. Since the oil shocks of the 1970s, it has won bids for numerous mammoth construction projects in the Middle East. It has also worked hard to develop joint ventures in Africa and Southeast Asia.

The ROK does not have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Bloc, but actively seeks better relations with them. In particular, the ROK supports the concept of cross-recognition, under which the ROK's major allies would establish diplomatic relations with North Korea at the same time that Pyongyang's major allies established diplomatic relations with Seoul.

The ROKG supports the principle of universality of membership in international organizations and does not oppose North Korean membership in such bodies. Both Koreas have observer status in the United Nations General Assembly, but full membership has been denied the ROK because of North Korean opposition. The ROK does, however, enjoy membership in 17 UN agencies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and UNESCO.

(WANG 6100K)

November 2, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

UNCLASSIFIED

REPUBLIC OF KOREA: RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

The fundamental US-ROK relationship has never been stronger. Korean confidence in the American security commitment--the centerpiece of ROK/US relations--is high. The ROK/US security treaty, signed more than 30 years ago, has been successful in its fundamental aim of deterring North Korean aggression and preserving peace on the peninsula.

Economically, the ROK is the United States' seventh largest trading partner, and two-way trade is expected to exceed \$18 billion this year. Korea ranks fourth in the world as an export market for US agriculture, with 1984 sales expected to exceed \$2 billion. US exports to Korea will rise about 19% this year after rising 5% in 1983, thus bucking the trend of an overall decrease in US exports in 1983. Nevertheless, Korean-American economic relations are somewhat strained at the moment, as emerging Korean nationalistic sentiment and pre-election campaigning in Korea collide with the upsurge in US protectionist sentiment fed by our own election campaign.

In the area of human rights, the ROKG has taken several significant steps since late last year, lowering tensions in the ROK and providing encouragement to the USG and concerned Americans that further progress in that area is possible as the ROK approaches the critical year of 1988, when President Chun will turn over power and Seoul will host the 1988 summer Olympic Games.

Culturally, the US and the ROK recently signed a memorandum of understanding designed, among other things, to increase mutual understanding through teacher training and textbook research. The exhibition of "5,000 Years of Korean Art" in several American cities a few years ago gave Americans a greater appreciation of the depth and individuality of Korean culture. Close to 30,000 Koreans immigrate to the US each year. Now numbering several hundred thousand in the US, Korean immigrants have earned the reputation of being hard-working and law-abiding neighbors.

(WANG 6099K)

November 2, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

US Amb.: Richard L. Walker	Head of State: President CHUN Doo Hwan
DCM: Paul M. Cleveland	Prime Minister: CHIN Iee Chong
Control Officer: Paul Ray	Foreign Minister: LEE Won Kyung
	Defense Minister: YOON Sung Min

Country Data:

Pop.: 40 million (1983)	Nat'l Budget: \$13.2b (1984)
Per Cap GNP: \$1,963 (est'84)	Def. Budget: \$4.37b (1984)
GNP: \$79.7b (1984 est.)	Active Duty Military: 620,000
Inflation: 2%	US Forces in Country: 40,000
Unemployed: 3.8% (1984 est.)	

1984
Human
Rights
Report

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA*

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, formed in 1948 during the Soviet administration of the northern half of the Korean peninsula, is a rigid Communist dictatorship, strictly dominated by one man, Kim Il-sung, and his family. Although some internationally respected human rights are acknowledged by the Constitution and laws, individual rights are entirely subordinated in practice to the ruling Korean Workers' (Communist) Party, with its overriding aim of imposing a social revolution and enforcing unanimous popular support for the country's governing system and its leaders.

The latest Constitution, promulgated in 1972, purports to guarantee a wide range of rights, including: freedom of the press, religion, work, and association, and freedom from sex discrimination. Other provisions of that Constitution, as well as the fact of Communist Party control, render meaningless most of these guarantees. While there were pro forma elections to the Supreme People's Assembly in February 1982, free elections do not exist in North Korea since citizens have no choice among candidates.

Kim Il-sung is committed to reunification of the divided peninsula, by whatever means is necessary. To this end, his Government has periodically attempted to destabilize the Republic of Korea, for example by the attempt to assassinate the President of the Republic of Korea in a bombing attack in Rangoon, Burma, on October 9, 1983. Four Burmese and 17 South Koreans, including four cabinet ministers and a number of senior advisers and officials, were killed in this North Korean action. Despite North Korea's delivery of flood relief goods to the South in 1984 and the positive response to South Korean proposals for bilateral talks on economic cooperation and family reunification, it continues to improve its military forces targeted against the South.

North Korean leaders justify regimentation and militarization of society in the name of reunification. The North Korean people are subject to rigid controls. Persons who fail to cooperate with the regime face imprisonment, confiscation of property, or enforced removal to remote villages. Surveillance by informers is prevalent. Movement outside one's own village requires documented permission. Punishment for "political crimes" against the state is severe. Available information indicates that the practices of forced relocation of families and ideological indoctrination have intensified in recent years.

The state's intervention in the individual's activities in North Korea goes well beyond curtailing assembly and expression. The authorities attempt to shape the

*The United States does not have diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; even representatives of governments that do, as well as journalists and other occasional invited visitors to North Korea, are not permitted the freedom of movement that would enable them effectively to assess human rights observance there. Most of this report, therefore, is a repeat of previous human rights reports based on information obtained over a period of time extending from well before 1984. While limited in scope and detail, the information is indicative of the human rights situation in North Korea today.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

consciousness of the populace. Preschool children are drilled in homage to Kim Il-sung and his family, while youths and adults are required to participate in daily ideological training conducted by youth organizations or at places of employment. The propaganda requires rote recitation of party maxims and positions and strives for ideological purity. The result is that North Korea's society is one of the most highly regimented and controlled in the world today. At least two North Korean security organizations enforce these controls.

Virtually no outside information other than that approved and disseminated by the North Korean authorities is allowed to reach the North Korean public. Foreigners who have traveled to Pyongyang, the capital city, have been surprised to learn how little the North Korean populace knows of the outside world. Senior government officials, however, seem to be somewhat better informed.

Security ratings for each person are based on such considerations as class origin, ideological fervor, and reliability, and whether any of the individual's relatives or associates collaborated with Japanese occupation authorities (1910-1945) or have attempted to defect to other countries. These ratings determine access to the better jobs, schools, medical facilities, and stores, as well as admission to the Korean Workers' Party, the route to the highest levels and privileges of the society. Any individual whose relative or close family associate has settled in South Korea is treated as suspect by the North Korean authorities.

In 1984, for the first time, North Korea's government-controlled radio explicitly referred to Kim Il-sung's son, Kim Chong-il, as his father's eventual "successor." The younger Kim, who was elevated to several senior leadership positions in 1980, is reportedly assuming increasing control of the Government and party. That Kim Il-sung appears thus far to be able to ensure his succession by his son, a first for any Communist country, indicates the enormous power he has assumed in 36 years of rule. The absence of any evidence of public debate about the succession is also indicative of the lack of real popular participation in the political process.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political Killing

No reliable information is available on politically motivated killing in North Korea. However, the North Korean attitude toward political killing was clearly demonstrated in the Rangoon bombing and the November 23, 1984 shooting in the Joint Security Area of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing North and South Korea.

After a careful investigation, the Government of Burma determined that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was responsible for the October 9, 1983, attempt to assassinate Republic of Korea President Chun Doo Hwan during his visit to Burma. The bomb killed four cabinet ministers and a number of senior advisers and officials. Two North Korean army officers were brought to trial in Rangoon for the attack, and on December 9, 1983, were found guilty and sentenced to death.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

In the DMZ incident a young Soviet student who wanted to defect broke away from a tour group and ran across the military demarcation line into the area controlled by the U.N. Command. The North Korean security guards opened fire on the fleeing Soviet, triggering an exchange of fire in which several lives were lost, and unsuccessfully pursued the defector across the line with guns blazing.

b. Disappearance

There is no information available on disappearance.

c. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Freedom House's 1983-84 report states that "torture is reportedly common" in North Korea. The accounts of torture and beatings of crew members of the USS Pueblo after their capture in 1968 are well-known and documented. The only other reliable source on prison conditions and treatment of prisoners in North Korea is Venezuelan poet Ali Lameda, who was detained in North Korea from September 1967 through 1974, allegedly for attempted sabotage and espionage. While physical torture was not used on Mr. Lameda, he stated that Korean prisoners were routinely beaten. Lameda noted that "beating was also used as a means of persuasion during interrogation."

Lameda reported the use of deprivation of food to force "confessions," as well as solitary confinement, continuous interrogation, enforced waking periods, poor or nonexistent medical treatment, and 12 hours of forced labor per day. In addition, prisoners were denied family visits, parcels, correspondence, writing materials, newspapers, and clothing changes. Prisoners appeared to be regarded as persons without any rights.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Information on specific criminal justice procedures and practices in North Korea is extremely scarce. North Korea has refused to permit outside observation of its legal system and practices. The accounts provided by the crew members of the USS Pueblo and by Venezuelan poet Ali Lameda, while clearly from an earlier period, comprise virtually all the specific information available on the operation of the criminal justice system in North Korea.

North Korean law provides that the period prisoners may be held for interrogation shall not exceed two months. This period may be extended indefinitely, however, if the Interrogation Department obtains approval of the Chief Prosecutor. Lameda, himself, was detained for 12 months without trial or charge. His request for a lawyer of his choice and an open trial were ridiculed as "bourgeois." Habeas corpus or its equivalent does not exist in practice.

According to newspaper reports, North Korean defectors in South Korea estimated in April 1982 that at least 105,000 "ideological offenders" were being held in eight major camps in the North. Amnesty International has received unconfirmed reports of arrests of those opposed to heir apparent Kim Chong-il.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The North Korean Constitution states that courts are independent, and judicial proceedings are to be carried out in strict accordance with law. All courts, however, are responsible to the people's assemblies, which effectively means total governmental control of the judiciary. Article 138 states that "cases are heard in public, and the accused is guaranteed the right to defense; hearings may be closed to the public as stipulated by law." Lameda was twice denied public trial. After his first arrest he was imprisoned for a year without a hearing; after his second arrest, he was put through a closed session without benefit of counsel of his choice, or even knowledge of the charges. His tribunal was under the direction of the Ministry of Internal Security, with one person serving as both judge and prosecutor.

Lameda stated that, other than to admit guilt, he was refused the right to speak out or defend himself at his trial. His "defense counsel" represented him by making a lengthy speech praising Kim Il-sung and then requesting a 20-year sentence, which the tribunal imposed after five minutes of deliberation.

In a 1979 interview with American journalist John Wallach, North Korean Supreme Court Justice Li Chun-uk noted that the defense counsel's job is "to give the suspect due punishment." Open court appears to consist of an announcement of the term of imprisonment, which has already been determined by the Provincial Safety Bureau.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The populace is subjected to continuous indoctrination, designed to shape individual consciousness. Preschool children are drilled in homage to Kim Il-sung and his family, while youths and adults are required to participate in daily ideological training conducted by youth organizations or at places of employment. The propaganda requires rote recitation of party maxims and positions and strives for ideological purity. At least two North Korean security organizations enforce these controls.

Reports, primarily from defectors, indicate that forced resettlement, particularly for those deemed politically unreliable, is common. Permission to reside in, or even enter, Pyongyang is strictly controlled.

According to reports in South Korean journals, Japanese wives of Koreans repatriated from Japan since 1959 have not been permitted to visit Japan and, because their letters are subject to strict censorship, many have lost contact with their families.

The Constitution states that "citizens are guaranteed the inviolability of person and residence and the privacy of correspondence." Lameda reported, however, that his residence was not respected and that listening devices were used against him. He was arrested and his collected papers and poetry destroyed without warrant.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution states that "citizens have the freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, association, and demonstration." In fact, North Koreans enjoy none of these rights. Such activities are permitted only in support of government objectives. Other articles of the Constitution that require citizens to follow the "socialist norms of life" and to obey a "collective spirit" take precedence over individual political or civil liberties. Censorship of foreign and domestic media is enforced, and no deviation from the official government line is tolerated. Listening to foreign media broadcasts is prohibited, and violators reportedly are subject to severe punishment. Most North Koreans do not possess radios but must listen to government media through loudspeakers installed in their apartments. Artistic and academic works are controlled by the Government, and visitors report that a primary function of plays, movies, operas, and books is to contribute to the cult of personality surrounding "the great leader," Kim Il-sung, and his son, "the beloved leader," Kim Chong-il.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Government has developed a pervasive system of informers throughout the society. No public meetings can be held without governmental authorization. Trade unions and professional associations appear to exist solely as another method of governmental control over their members. They have no effective rights to organize, negotiate, or strike.

c. Freedom of Religion

Although the Constitution guarantees that "citizens have religious liberty and the freedom of antireligious propaganda," North Korea, in fact, has severely persecuted Christians and Buddhists since the late 1940's. No churches have been rebuilt since the Korean War. The regime uses religious organizational facades to proclaim the practice of religious freedom but appears to have long since purged the membership out of existence. Persons whose family or relatives once had a strong religious involvement are discriminated against. Though religious practice appears impossible, some foreign visitors to North Korea believe that the Government does not currently persecute the small number of Christians who continue to worship at home.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Internal travel in North Korea is strictly controlled. A travel pass is required for any movement outside one's home village and is granted only for required official or personal travel. This requirement is strictly enforced. Foreign travel is limited to officials or trusted artists and performers. Emigration is not allowed, and few refugees or defectors succeed in fleeing the country. Retaliation reportedly is taken against the relatives of those few persons who manage to escape. According to Freedom House, "rights to travel internally and externally are perhaps the most restricted in the world: tourism is unknown--even to communist countries."

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

In 1959 North Korea began actively encouraging Korean residents overseas to repatriate to "the Fatherland." Some observers estimate that during the next several years over 100,000 overseas Koreans, almost all from Japan, voluntarily repatriated to North Korea. Since then, however, reports of the harsh treatment given repatriates reached overseas Koreans, reducing the flow to North Korea to a trickle. (Because of their "corruption" by exposure to foreign influences, repatriates are isolated from North Korean society after their arrival until they can be indoctrinated and their ideological reliability gauged.)

North Korea has permitted some overseas Korean residents to enter its territory to visit their relatives, and several have made repeat visits.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Political processes in North Korea are dominated by Kim Il-sung, who leads the Korean Workers' Party, and also heads the Government. Kim has groomed his son Kim Chong-il to succeed him, and there are reports that Kim Chong-il has been acquiring increasing power and influence. The legislature, the Supreme People's Assembly, has never taken any action other than unanimous passage of resolutions presented to it by the leadership. In an effort to create an appearance of democracy, North Korea has created several "minority parties." They exist only as rosters of officials who have token representation in the People's Assembly and completely support the government line.

Free elections do not exist in North Korea. Although elections to the Supreme People's Assembly were held in February 1982, and to city and county assemblies in March 1983, in all cases only one candidate was approved by the government party in each electoral district, and, according to the government-controlled media, 100 percent of the voters turned out to elect 100 percent of the approved candidates. Such "elections" in reality are a mandatory exercise in which voters are required to participate and to approve the party's candidates.

The average citizen is completely excluded from any real participation in the political process. To achieve even a semblance of real participation, one must become a member of the Korean Worker's Party. The selection process for entrance to the party is long and rigorous. Individuals from "bad social backgrounds," i.e., those who have relatives who fled south during the Korean War, those whose families had strong religious involvement or were once property owners or members of the bourgeoisie, and those who have relatives who are political prisoners, effectively are denied entry into the party and are discriminated against. Most levels of the party have no voice, serving only to carry out the decrees and "on the spot guidance" promulgated by party leader Kim Il-sung and his top subordinates.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Non-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

No organizations exist within North Korea to report on or observe human rights violations. North Korea does not

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participate in any international or regional human rights organizations. On September 14, 1981, North Korea acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. At the March-April 1984 session of the Human Rights Committee, an expert body consisting of members elected by state parties to the ICCPR, members criticized a report submitted by North Korea on its human rights practices as too short and inadequate. The North Korean representative denied that his country had any problems at all, prompting an expert member to urge that the North Korean's assurances of freedom of religion, political activity, and travel outside Korea be made known to the North Korean people.

Amnesty International has requested a visit to North Korea; the Government has not responded to or acknowledged this request. A December 1982 request by Amnesty International for information on North Korean laws, on use of the death penalty, and on reports of arrests and long-term imprisonment of political figures also received no reply.

The Amnesty International 1984 Report noted that its work continued to be seriously impaired by the absence of any official information during the year concerning any arrests, trials, or death sentences, that it continued to investigate reports that four prominent political figures had been detained for several years, and that it did not receive any replies to correspondence directed to the Government. Freedom House, in its 1984-85 report, lists North Korea as "not free."

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL SITUATION

North Korea is a less-developed country with a highly centralized, planned economy. Many observers believe that, after a short period of rapid growth in the early 1970's, the economy experienced difficulties in subsequent years due largely to economic policies that overemphasized military expenditures, stressed attainment of self-sufficiency, and pushed for rapid growth of heavy industry. More than twenty percent of North Korea's Gross National Product is committed to military expenditures, the second highest such rate in the world.

In the early 1980's the Government gradually has shifted its policy emphasis toward expanding trade. In September 1984, North Korea promulgated a joint ventures law to attract foreign capital and technology. As yet there is little evidence of foreign investor interest or any shift in internal economic priorities away from support of military industry. The apparent shift in economic policy is also shown by North Korea's apparent willingness to discuss economic trade and cooperation with the Republic of Korea.

The population of North Korea is estimated to be about 19 million, with an annual growth rate of 2.3 percent. The 1984 infant mortality rate was 30 per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy at birth was 65.8 years in 1984. The World Bank estimated in 1981 that the calorie supply available for consumption was 129 percent of nutritional requirements.

North Korea appears to have invested considerable effort and money in developing a comprehensive health care system. Both pre- and post-working age citizens are cared for by the state. Basic food supplies are heavily subsidized and

rationed. There were some reports of reduced rations and food shortages in 1983; the proportion of rice in the grain ration has been steadily reduced with grains considered less desirable, such as millet or barley, being substituted. Reportedly, because quality foods are difficult to obtain, jobs in food-handling industries are highly prized. Foreign visitors have noted that North Koreans they observed appeared adequately fed. Per capita income was estimated to be \$968 in 1982.

The party, government, and military elite enjoy significant economic privileges, such as access to special stores and medical facilities, better housing, and better education, which are not available to ordinary citizens.

The North Korean Government provides 11 years of compulsory free education to its citizens and claims to have eliminated illiteracy. The adjusted primary school enrollment ratios for 1976 were 96.6 for females and 101 for males, for a combined ratio of 98.7.

The Constitution states that "women hold equal social status and rights with men." Despite this provision, few women reach high levels of the party or the Government. Women are represented proportionally in the labor force, and personnel in small factories are predominately women. Reportedly, women are often paid less than men for similar work.

U.S. OVERSEAS - LOANS AND GRANTS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS
(U.S. FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

COUNTRY: KOREA, NORTH	1982	1983	1984	
I. ECON. ASSIST. - TOTAL...	0.0	0.0	0.0	
LOANS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
GRANTS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
I-TOTAL.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
IN \$-LOANS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
IN FOR. CURR.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
II-TOTAL.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
RELIEF. EC. DEV & WFP.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
RELIEF AGENCY.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
OTHER ECON. ASSIST.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
LOANS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
GRANTS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
PEACE CORPS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
NARCOTICS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
OTHER.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
II. MIL. ASSIST. - TOTAL...	0.0	0.0	0.0	
LOANS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
GRANTS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
MAP GRANTS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
CREDIT FINANCING.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
INTL MIL. ED. TRNG.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
TRAN-EXCESS STOCK.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
OTHER GRANTS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
III. TOTAL ECON. & MIL...	0.0	0.0	0.0	
LOANS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
GRANTS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
IV. OTHER US LOANS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
IM BANK LOANS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
OTHER.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	
ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES				
	1982	1983	1984	1946-84
TOTAL.....	3.6	0.2	0.0	4.1
IMB.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IDA.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IBRD.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IFC.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IBRD.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IFC.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IBRD.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IFC.....	3.6	0.2	0.0	4.1
IBRD.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IFC.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
OTHER-UN.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
OTHER.....	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0