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## ICELAND TALKING POINTS

- U.S. went to Iceland in order to narrow differences, where possible, between US and Soviet positions and lay groundwork for more productive negotiations.

- By that measure, meeting a success. Achieved significant movement on START, INF, Nuclear Testing; even aspects of ABM/SDI, though latter obviously remains formidable obstacle. Specifically:

-- START: Agreement on 50% offensive warhead reduction, to be implemented by reductions to 1600 SDNVs, 6000 warheads; important advances in counting rules; Soviet recognition of requirement for "significant cuts" in heavy ICBMs.

-- INF: 100 global warhead limit (zero in Europe) a major advance (over 90% reduction for Soviets); freeze on short-range INF, pending negotiation of reductions.

-- Nuclear Testing: Plan for US ratification of TTB/PNE treaties (contingent on adequate verification), to be followed by negotiations on further testing limitations in phase with nuclear weapons reductions.

-- ABM/SDI: Both sides moved on minimum time sides should limit themselves to research, development and testing of strategic defenses (US from 7 1/2 years to 10, contingent on adequate verification, and coupled with plan for 50% reduction in strategic forces in 5 years, elimination of all ballistic missiles in 10. Soviets moved from 15 years to 10; though very significant differences remain on overall approach.)

- Significant headway as well on other pillars of the relationship:

-- On human rights, U.S. stressed crucial importance of this issue; Soviets agreed to regularize discussions.

-- On regional conflicts, two sides had vigorous discussions of Afghanistan, Central America, Angola, Cambodia, Middle East, and Iran-Iraq; U.S. laid down important markers concerning Soviet behavior.

-- On bilateral exchanges, sides agreed on a work plan to accelerate negotiations in a number of areas including consulates, space cooperation, nuclear safety.

- In arms control we intend to build on Iceland results to seek further progress at Geneva.

-- Gorbachev has said that Iceland proposals are still on the table.

-- Ball now in Soviet court to assure continuation of Iceland momentum.

- Soviet attempt at Iceland to hold progress in all areas of arms control hostage to acceptance of Soviet views on ABM/SDI an unconstructive and unfortunate position; retrogression from Gorbachev's Geneva summit agreement to move forward in areas of common ground.

-- Historic opportunity to reach agreements in other key arms control areas demands responsible Soviet behavior; if opportunity lost, world will clearly understand where blame lies.

-- U.S. ready now to proceed, as matter of highest priority, to reach agreements on START, INF, Nuclear Testing along lines discussed at Reykjavik.

- ABM/SDI issue requires further work to reconcile fundamental US/USSR differences.

-- Soviets sought to kill by ban on essential testing outside the laboratories.

- Important for Soviets to understand SDI not a bargaining chip but a key element of US approach to more secure world for all.

- Case for transition from offense to defense-based systems a compelling one; in both countries' interests.

-- Only realistic hope to eliminate nuclear "balance of terror," threat of massive annihilation.

-- Wholly non-threatening to Soviet Union; no significant offensive potential in SDI systems (Soviet specialists understand this).

-- U.S. offer to share benefits of strategic defense a generous one; belies Soviet allegations of U.S. intent to exploit technological lead to Soviet disadvantage.

- SDI essential to U.S. even with agreement on reduction and ultimate elimination of ballistic missiles, in order to hedge against abrogation, cheating, and third country threats; provide continuing incentive for offensive reductions; and offer stability during critical transition period and insurance thereafter.

-- Scale of deployment will depend, in part, on scope of threat.

- Hope sober reflection will lead Soviets to recognize that SDI is not a threat to be killed through negotiation, but a key element of our mutual transition to a safer and more secure world.



-- We will be working to lay the logic of this position before the Soviets at Geneva, while trying to move them to proceed now to lock up agreements in other areas where major progress recorded at Reykjavik.

- In short, Reykjavik was worthwhile; no second thoughts about wisdom of acceding to Gorbachev's request for pre-summit discussions.

-- Road to agreement with Soviets is never smooth; ideological differences, distrust, divergent strategic outlooks and force structures complicate progress.

-- Reykjavik represents an important chapter in ongoing arms control dialogue between two countries.

-- Clear understanding of others' positions and motivations necessary for productive negotiation; progress achieved on that score as well as substantively in key areas.

-- We emerged having narrowed differences, and with clear appreciation that Soviets' obsession with SDI represents the most significant obstacle to be overcome at this point.

- Opportunities created by Iceland discussions too important to let languish. U.S. hopes for further near-term progress based on:

-- Essential balance, fairness, and mutual benefit of those agreements which were shown by discussions in Reykjavik to be achievable.

-- Soviets' capability to assess the negotiating climate realistically, and recognize when time has come to deal.

-- President's strong and unwavering position on essentiality of developing, testing, and ultimately deploying SDI.

-- Soviets' understanding that historic opportunities may well be forfeited if it does not reach agreement in time remaining to this US administration.

- Strong support of U.S. public has been and will continue to be essential to US success in complex task of reaching comprehensive and enduring settlements with Soviets.

-- Patience, persistence, and supportive Congress vital as well.

-- Renewed economic dynamism, refurbished U.S. military strength, and Allied cohesion also play critical roles.



- Gorbachev's challenge at this point is to rise to occasion in statesmanlike manner and collaborate with us in reaching agreements which will lay foundation for stable long-term strategic relationship between the two countries, leading to ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM: LINAS KOJELIS, x6573

SUBJECT: Attached Think Piece

The attached memorandum is for your review and comment. It is meant to serve as an initial stab at an overall strategy for the next 3-4 weeks. Please give me your thought by 3:00 p.m. today. Thank you.

Distribution

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# DRAFT

## POST-ICELAND PUBLIC OUTREACH

Administration public outreach efforts in preparation for the Iceland meeting, and the great interest exhibited by the media and general public, gives us an excellent opportunity, especially during the next month, to promote our objectives in three key areas of U.S./Soviet relations; arms control, human rights and regional conflicts. Although the media is focusing 99% of its attention on arms control issues, the Iceland meeting will heighten both media and general public interest in all aspects of U.S./Soviet relations. In this atmosphere, almost any RR or VP event aimed at getting a particular Administration position publicized will have an excellent opportunity for succeeding.

Of course there is no reason to believe that this heightened interest in U.S./Soviet relations will have a long lifespan. Under normal circumstances, this interest would probably taper off slowly after 3-4 weeks. Unfortunately, this time period coincides with this year's election cycle. The Congressional elections will hamper a post-Iceland public outreach strategy by (a) diverting media and public attention from international issues in general, and (b) siphoning off time from RR's and VP's schedules for post-Iceland events.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that U.S./Soviet relations will be a major point on the Administration's agenda over the next two years. Thus, it would serve the Administration well to take advantage of public interest by promoting its foreign policy agenda through an aggressive public outreach effort. Such an effort is especially important, should the Soviets and/or media initiate a "Iceland failed because of SDI" campaign, allowing the Soviets to get off the hook on human rights and regional issues.

Arms Control: Perhaps like no event over the past three years, the Iceland meeting has raised public curiosity about SDI. The heightened public curiosity give us an excellent opportunity to educate the general public on SDI. It is especially important for the Administration to nurture and develop a broad pro-SDI constituency, as SDI's opponents may seek to "punish" the President for his Iceland "failure" by further cutting SDI funding and including harmful unilateral restrictions on arms research, testing and development.

### Possible events:

1. RR visit to SDI research facilities
2. Briefing and luncheon with the RR for science writers and editors and pro-SDI columnists
3. RR meeting with pro-SDI scientists

# DRAFT

4. RR speeches on SDI to appropriate forums outside of Washington, D.C.

These Presidential and Vice Presidential events should be supplemented by events at the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level.

Human Rights: The issue of human rights is one which naturally puts the Soviets on the defensive. Increased public understanding of Soviet human rights abuses would automatically increase U.S./Western leverage over the Soviets at any future negotiating forums on any issues.

1. RR commemorates 30th Anniversary of Hungarian Revolution, October 1986. Good opportunity for RR to underscore non-compliance of East Bloc with Helsinki Accords
2. RR/VP participation at human and religious rights dinner sponsored by Lithuanian Catholic Religious Aid, Waldorf Astoria, New York, October 25.
3. RR meeting with divided spouses
4. RR meeting with Soviet Jewry leaders or address at major Jewish convention

Regional Issues: Just as is the case with human rights, the media and public will have heightened interest in U.S./Soviet disagreements in regional conflicts.

1. RR meeting with Afghanistanian freedom fighters
2. RR meeting with victims of Cuban violence in Angola
3. RR meeting with Indochinese refugee leaders



THE PRESIDENT'S ICELAND MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

Executive Summary

The President went to Iceland to promote the main objectives of American foreign policy: true peace and greater freedom in the world. He met with General Secretary Gorbachev for 10 hours of frank and substantive direct talks. We achieved our objectives.

The President focused on a broad four point agenda for improved U.S.-Soviet relations: Human Rights; Arms Reductions; the Resolution of Regional Conflicts; and Expanding Bilateral Contacts and Communications.

Increasing and Overwhelming Public Support

Private media polls immediately following the Iceland meeting found overwhelming support by the American people for the President.

- o The Wall Street Journal/NBC News and the New York Times/CBS News polls registered 71% and 72% (respectively) approved of the President's handling of the Iceland meeting.

Building Upon Iceland Meeting

- o Never before in the history of arms control negotiations has so much progress been made in so many areas, in so short a time.
- o The U.S. and Soviet Union came very close to an agreement that would secure massive reductions of the most threatening weapon systems: offensive ballistic missiles.
- o Mr. Gorbachev's non-negotiable terms on the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would have perpetuated America's vulnerability to Soviet missiles. Where the security of the American people and our Allies is involved, no agreement is better than a bad agreement.
- o SDI was a main inducement for the Soviets to negotiate for deep cuts in offensive arsenals. SDI remains the best insurance policy that any future arms reduction agreements will be implemented and complied with by the Soviets.
- o Notwithstanding the disagreements on SDI, the President is calling upon the Soviet leadership to follow through on arms reduction accomplishments at Reykjavik and continue to discuss our differences on strategic defense, which have been narrowed.
- o We will vigorously pursue, at the same time, progress in other areas of the agenda, especially human rights.

ARMS REDUCTION AT ICELAND -- HISTORIC PROGRESS

Unlike the past, the U.S. is now dealing from a position of strength and confidence. General Secretary Gorbachev suggested the Iceland meeting, and the President accepted in an effort to further the US/Soviet dialogue in all four areas of the agenda.

- o Because of U.S. strength and confidence, and the inducement of SDI to negotiate, unprecedented progress was made toward dramatically reducing offensive nuclear arsenals.
- o Mr. Gorbachev held progress in all areas, including arms reduction, hostage to his non-negotiable demand that the U.S. cut back and effectively kill SDI. The President insisted that SDI remain viable under the terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which, unlike the Soviet Union, the U.S. has complied with.
- o To break the deadlock, the President offered: A 10 year commitment not to deploy any future strategic defense system, coupled with 50% reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces in the next five years and mutual and total elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles over the following five years.
- o Mr. Gorbachev rejected the President's offer, refusing to allow SDI testing -- the heart of any research program.

Current Impasse; Future Opportunities

- o Mr. Gorbachev's non-negotiable terms on SDI would have perpetuated America's vulnerability to Soviet missiles. Where the security of the American people and our Allies is involved, no agreement is better than a bad agreement.
- o The USSR wants to continue to base global security on the threat of mutual annihilation. President Reagan seeks a safer world with peace and deterrence based increasingly on defensive means.
- o In 1984, when the Soviets failed to achieve their objectives to weaken NATO's defensive capability in Europe, through negotiating intransigence and continuing SS-20 deployments, they walked out of all nuclear arms negotiations. In 1985, they were back at the table and, in 1986, for the first time, dramatic progress has been made toward mutual reductions.
- o The President believes that additional meetings can build on the major progress toward arms reduction and achieve final breakthrough agreements. The President's invitation for a U.S. Summit -- the objective that Iceland was intended to prepare for -- remains open.



## SDI Not the Problem: It's the Solution

- o In SDI, we are investigating defensive systems to enhance future security for America and our Allies by being able to destroy attacking missiles. It will have no offensive function. There is no rational reason to oppose SDI research.
- o Insurance -- Why should the Soviets, in opposing SDI, insist that America and its Allies remain vulnerable to Soviet missile attack? Strategic defenses would help underwrite arms reduction agreements against cheating or abrogation, while defending against attack from other countries.
- o By denying a potential attacker hope of gaining meaningful military benefit, SDI is the best lever to achieve real arms reductions. SDI deters use of offensive systems, thereby rendering future investments in offensive systems imprudent.
- o The Soviets have longstanding and massive strategic defense programs of their own, going well beyond research, and have the only operational anti-ballistic missile system in the world, a system they are steadily improving.
- o By refusing the President's far-reaching arms reduction offer and making his own non-negotiable demand on the United States, Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity for progress toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
- o Nonetheless, the ideas and progress for radically reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons presented at Reykjavik can be built upon at the table in Geneva.

## Human Rights

Respect for human rights is as important to peace as arms reductions because peace requires trust. The President told Gorbachev the Soviets' human rights performance is an obstacle for improved relations between our two countries.

- o A country that breaks faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers.
- o The Soviet Union signed the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The Soviets should abide by them -- allowing free emigration and the reunification of divided families, and religious and cultural freedoms -- instead of throwing those who monitor the Soviet compliance (e.g. Yuri Orlov) in jail.
- o We will continue to press for improvements in the coming weeks and months.
- o The Soviets, for the first time, agreed to regular bilateral discussions on humanitarian and human rights issues.

Expanded cultural exchanges -- The President reaffirmed his commitment to continue to broaden and expand people-to-people exchanges -- where Soviet citizens and Americans may see first hand more of each other's country and culture.

Regional Conflicts -- The President raised the serious problems caused in the world by Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, and continued military support of the regimes in Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia, that are waging war on their own people. We cannot take seriously the token troop "withdrawals" from Afghanistan which they have announced.



THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)

The U.S. and her Allies are defenseless against a deliberate or accidental nuclear attack.

- o The U.S. presently deters nuclear attack by threatening retaliation. SDI offers a safer and more moral alternative: employing technology to protect people instead of threatening their annihilation.

Challenge for the Present and Insurance for the Future

- o SDI is a broad-based program to demonstrate the feasibility of effective strategic defenses. Like the Apollo Project, SDI is a revolutionary program that merits a full-scale national effort.
- o SDI taps the finest scientific minds in the U.S. and other countries to investigate a range of defensive technologies. This research will lead toward an informed decision on defensive options in the early 1990s.
- o SDI has induced the Soviets to negotiate for deep cuts in offensive arsenals. It is the best insurance policy that any future arms reduction agreements will be implemented and complied with by the Soviets, and it guards against ballistic missile attack by third countries.

SDI Progress

- o Some in Congress would cripple SDI with short-sighted budget cuts giving the Soviets a key concession they have not been able to win through negotiations. Sustained research has already produced major technical advances:
  - June 1984 -- a non-nuclear interceptor destroyed an unarmed warhead in space;
  - Fall 1985 -- successful laser tests compensate for atmospheric distortion while tracking rockets in flight;
  - Spring 1986 -- A high-power laser destroyed a static target;
  - June 1986 -- a self-guided missile intercepted a target moving at three times the speed of sound;
  - September 1986 -- Successful Delta launch, track, and intercept in space of target vehicles.

SDI: Also a Prudent Hedge Against Existing Soviet Strategic Defense Programs

- o The Soviet Union has upgraded the world's only deployed Anti-Ballistic Missile defense system, which protects Greater Moscow, and is constructing a large missile tracking radar in Siberia, in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
- o The Soviets have deployed the world's only operational weapon for destroying satellites.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SDI

The media and political opponents of SDI have found it convenient to present SDI in caricature, as the "so-called 'Star Wars' proposal." It is no wonder that many Americans are confused about the President's proposal and think the U.S. currently has a defense against missiles!

- o An Associated press-Media General poll released in August found that 60 percent of Americans felt that the U.S. had either a good or an excellent defense against a Soviet missile attack.
- o In fact, the U.S. is utterly defenseless against Soviet rockets.

Americans Want Enhanced Security

When the American people are asked to evaluate concepts, rather than the labels such as "Star Wars," they support SDI. Evidence:

Two days after the President's return from Iceland, polls taken by major news organizations showed the public supports President Reagan's refusal to surrender his Strategic Defense Initiative.

- A New York Times/CBS News poll shows 68 percent support.
- Nearly 60 percent polled by the Washington Post/ABC News poll said Reagan should retain his commitment to SDI.
- According to the Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll, only 15 percent of the American people think SDI is a bad idea.

Penn + Schoen Associates (9/27/86)

Question: SDI is a research program to develop a system to destroy incoming nuclear missiles before they reach their targets. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. going ahead with the research and development phases of SDI?

Favor -- 81%      Oppose -- 13%

Question: If such a system could be developed, would you favor or oppose using it in the United States?

Favor -- 78%      Oppose -- 13%

ABC News (1/4/85 - 1/6/85)

Question: Do you favor or oppose developing such defensive weapons (which use lasers and particle beams to shoot down enemy missiles), or what?

Favor -- 49%      Oppose -- 44%

Heritage Foundation/Sindlinger & Co. Poll (5/27/85)

89 percent of the American people would support a Strategic Defense program if it would make a Soviet Missile attack less likely.



SDI -- Enhance Peace/Safer World

Gallup Organization (1/25/85 - 1/28/85)

Question: In your opinion, would developing this system (Star Wars or space-based defense against nuclear attack) make the world safer from nuclear destruction or less safe?

Make world safer -- 50%      Make world less safe -- 32%

Decision Making/Information (2/8/86 - 2/9/86)

Question: SDI, is a good idea because it will help deter a Soviet attack, increase the chance of reaching an arms control agreement, and reduce the risk of war. Others say that SDI, is a bad idea because it will upset the balance of power, accelerate the arms race, and increase the risk of war. Is SDI research a good idea or a bad idea?

Good idea -- 62%      Bad idea -- 31%

SDI -- Technical Feasibility

CBS News/New York Times (1/2/85 - 1/4/85)

Question: Ronald Reagan has proposed developing a defensive nuclear system in space that would destroy incoming missiles before they reach the United States, a system some people call Star Wars. Do you think such a system could work?

Yes -- 62%      No -- 23%

SDI -- Arms Reduction

Louis Harris and Associates (3/2/85 - 3/5/85)

Question: Agree or disagree...Once the Russians knew we were successfully building a new anti-nuclear defense system, they would be much more willing to agree to a treaty that would halt the nuclear arms race.

Agree -- 52%      Disagree -- 44%

Gallup Organization (1/25/85 - 1/28/85)

Question: Would the United States' developing this system Star Wars, a space-based defense against nuclear attack, increase or decrease the likelihood of reaching a nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union?

Increase -- 47%      Decrease -- 32%

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

October 13, 1986

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

8:00 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

The implications of these talks are enormous and only just beginning to be understood. We proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. We offered the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the Earth by 1996. While we parted company with this American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.

But first, let me tell you that, from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. And it is for these aims I went the extra mile to Iceland.

Before I report on our talks though, allow me to set the stage by explaining two things that were very much a part of our talks, one a treaty and the other a defense against nuclear missiles which we are trying to develop. Now you've heard their titles a thousand times -- the ABM Treaty and SDI. Those letters stand for, ABM, anti-ballistic missile, SDI, strategic defense initiative.

Some years ago, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit any defense against nuclear missile attacks to the emplacement in one location in each country of a small number of missiles capable of intercepting and shooting down incoming nuclear missiles, thus leaving our real defense -- a policy called Mutual Assured Destruction, meaning if one side launched a nuclear attack, the other side could retaliate. And this mutual threat of destruction was believed to be a deterrent against either side striking first.

So here we sit with thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on each other and capable of wiping out both our countries. The Soviets deployed the few anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow as the treaty permitted. Our country didn't bother deploying because the threat of nationwide annihilation made such a limited defense seem useless.

For some years now we have been aware that the Soviets may be developing a nationwide defense. They have installed a large modern radar at Krasnoyarsk which we believe is a critical part of a radar system designed to provide radar guidance for anti-ballistic missiles protecting the entire nation. Now this is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

MORE



Believing that a policy of mutual destruction and slaughter of their citizens and ours was uncivilized, I asked our military a few years ago to study and see if there was a practical way to destroy nuclear missiles after their launch but before they can reach their targets rather than to just destroy people. Well, this is the goal for what we call SDI and our scientists researching such a system are convinced it is practical and that several years down the road we can have such a system ready to deploy. Now, incidentally, we are not violating the ABM Treaty which permits such research. If and when we deploy the treaty -- also allows withdrawal from the Treaty upon six months' notice. SDI, let me make it clear, is a non-nuclear defense.

So here we are at Iceland for our second such meeting. In the first and in the months in between, we have discussed ways to reduce and in fact eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. We and the Soviets have had teams of negotiators in Geneva trying to work out a mutual agreement on how we could reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. And so far, no success.

On Saturday and Sunday, General Secretary Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz and I met for nearly 10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to just arms reductions. We discussed what we call violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets, refusal to let people emigrate from Russia so they can practice their religion without being persecuted, letting people go to rejoin their families, husbands and wives separated by national borders being allowed to reunite.

In much of this the Soviet Union is violating another agreement -- the Helsinki Accords they had signed in 1975. Yuri Orlov, whose freedom we just obtained, was imprisoned for pointing out to his government its violations of that pact, its refusal to let citizens leave their country or return.

We also discussed regional matters such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. But by their choice the main subject was arms control.

We discussed the emplacement of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia and seemed to be in agreement they could be drastically reduced. Both sides seemed willing to find a way to reduce even to zero the strategic ballistic missiles we have aimed at each other. This then brought up the subject of SDI.

I offered a proposal that we continue our present research and if and when we reached the stage of testing we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests. And if the program was practical we would both eliminate our offensive missiles, and then we would share the benefits of advanced defenses. I explained that even though we would have done away with our offensive ballistic missiles, having the defense would protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles. After all, the world now knows how to make them. I likened it to our keeping our gas masks even though the nations of the world had outlawed poison gas after World War I.

We seemed to be making progress on reducing weaponry although the General Secretary was registering opposition to SDI and proposing a pledge to observe ABM for a number of years as the day was ending.



Secretary Shultz suggested we turn over the notes our note-takers had been making of everything we'd said to our respective teams and let them work through the night to put them together and find just where we were in agreement and what differences separated us. With respect and gratitude, I can inform you those teams worked through the night till 6:30 a.m.

Yesterday, Sunday morning, Mr. Gorbachev and I, with our foreign ministers, came together again and took up the report of our two teams. It was most promising. The Soviets had asked for a 10-year delay in the deployment of SDI programs.

In an effort to see how we could satisfy their concerns while protecting our principles and security, we proposed a 10-year period in which we began with the reduction of all strategic nuclear arms, bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and the weapons they carry. They would be reduced 50 percent in the first five years. During the next five years, we would continue by eliminating all remaining offensive ballistic missiles, of all ranges. And during that time we would proceed with research, development and testing of SDI -- all done in conformity with ABM provisions. At the 10-year point, with all ballistic missiles eliminated, we could proceed to deploy advanced defenses, at the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.

And here the debate began. The General Secretary wanted wording that, in effect, would have kept us from developing the SDI for the entire 10 years. In effect, he was killing SDI. And unless I agreed, all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons would go down the drain -- cancelled.

I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away SDI -- there was no way I could tell our people their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things: our freedom and our future.

I'm still optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.

So you can see, we made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. From the earliest days of our administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions. We were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We declared the principal objective of American foreign policy to be not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world. And that's why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

And yet, at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, and ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

Now, this policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. For the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction -- not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues that are fundamental.

As I mentioned, one such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "And, is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?"

I made it plain that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we're all from Missouri -- you got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. Summit meetings cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item. And this area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think, then, that you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our four-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

And let me return again to the SDI issue. I realize some Americans may be asking tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand? Why not give up SDI for this agreement?

Well, the answer, my friends, is simple. SDI is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik. SDI is America's security guarantee -- if the Soviets should -- as they have done too often in the past -- fail to comply with their solemn commitments. SDI is what brought the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland. SDI is the key to a world without nuclear weapons.

The Soviets understand this. They have devoted far more resources for a lot longer time than we, to their own SDI. The world's only operational missile defense today surrounds Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union.



What Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a new version of a 14-year-old ABM Treaty that the Soviet Union has already violated. I told him we don't make those kinds of deals in the United States.

And the American people should reflect on these critical questions.

How does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against Soviet missiles -- fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so -- forever?

So, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or any future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to Reykjavik. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States.

And on this point, I know you're also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I'm ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it's different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past five and a half years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might; your support has restored our military strength. Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

So, if there's one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we're dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs.

Our ideas are out there on the table. They won't go away. We're ready to pick up where we left off. Our negotiators are heading back to Geneva, and we're prepared to go forward whenever and wherever the Soviets are ready. So, there's reason -- good reason for hope.

I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our naval installation at Keflavik -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline.



As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been...unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers," John Quincy Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a nation. My fellow Americans, we're honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

Another President, Harry Truman, noted that our century had seen two of the most frightful wars in history. And that "The supreme need of our time is for man to learn to live together in peace and harmony."

It's in pursuit of that ideal I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week. And it's in pursuit of that ideal that I thank you now for all the support you've given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

END

8:21 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Release at 6:00 P.M.

October 14, 1986

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
DURING BRIEFING  
WITH NETWORK ANCHORS AND COLUMNISTS

The Roosevelt Room

1:24 P.M. EDT

MR. BUCHANAN: Let me just state the ground rules very briefly. The President will be first. He will be ON THE RECORD, brief opening remarks, Q and A for 15 minutes, followed by the Secretary of State, the same thing; Don Regan, the same thing; and it will be over in an hour. We'll have a transcript available in Room 45 for everyone here, and we are going to release the transcript today to the press.

THE PRESIDENT: Please, sit down, and welcome to the White House. It is a particular pleasure to have you here so soon after returning from a meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, and that meeting marked new progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.

For the first time on the highest level we and the Soviets came close to an agreement on real reductions of both strategic and intermediate-range weapons. For the first time we got Soviet agreement to a worldwide figure of 100 intermediate-range warheads for each side -- a drastic cut. For the first time we began to hammer out details of a 50 percent cut in strategic forces over five years. We were just a sentence or two away from agreeing to new talks on nuclear testing. And maybe most important, we were in sight of an historic agreement on completely eliminating the threat of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996.

I can't help remembering being told just a few years ago that radical arms reduction was an impossible dream, but now it's on the agenda for both sides. I think the first thing that is important to do is to put these talks and what occurred into perspective.

You'll recall that just over a week ago in talking about going to Iceland, I said that we did not seek nor did we expect agreements. We described our trip as a base camp before the summit to be held here in the United States. And if there was a surprise in Reykjavik, it was that we discussed so much and moved so far. No one a week ago would have thought there could have been agreement in so many areas. While we didn't sign a document, and there remains significant differences, we must not mistake the absence of a final agreement for the absence of progress.

Historic gains were achieved. As you know, after a great deal of discussion, our talks came down to the Strategic Defense Initiative -- SDI. I offered to delay deployment of advanced strategic defense for 10 years while both sides eliminated all ballistic missiles, but General Secretary Gorbachev said that his demand that we give up all but laboratory research on SDI -- in effect kill the program -- was non-negotiable.

Now the Soviets have made a strategic defense program for years, they've breached the ABM Treaty, and as I noted last night, may be preparing to put in place a nationwide ABM system. For us to abandon SDI would leave them with an immediate permanent advantage and a dangerous one, and this I would not do. Abandoning SDI would

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also leave us without an insurance policy that the Soviets will live up to arms reduction agreements.

Strategic Defense is the key to making arms reduction work. It protects us against the possibility that at some point, when the elimination of ballistic missiles is not yet complete, that the Soviets may change their minds. I'm confident that the Soviets understand our position. They may try to see if they can make us back off our proposals, and I am convinced that they'll come back to the table and talk.

So here's how I would sum up my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland. We addressed the important areas of human rights, regional conflicts, and our bilateral relationship. And we moved the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on arms reduction to a new plane. We laid a strong and promising foundation for our negotiators in Geneva to build on. And I'm disappointed, of course, that Mr. Gorbachev decided to hold all agreements hostage to an agreement on SDI. But during our Geneva summit we agreed to move forward where we had found common ground, especially on a 50 percent reduction in strategic arsenals, and an INF agreement. I hope he will at least remember that commitment in the next few weeks, because for our part, we'll seek right away in Geneva to build on the democratic -- or the dramatic progress that we made in Iceland.

Now I think you have a few questions.

Q Mr. President, before going to Reykjavik you characterized Mr. Gorbachev as one of the more frank Soviet leaders with whom you have had dealings. Do you stand by that characterization or do you think Mr. Gorbachev has perhaps engaged in a little duplicity in Reykjavik?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm not going to use the word "duplicity" there, but I do say, having had an opportunity in these past several years and before him to speak to, while not their outright leaders -- their general secretaries, because they kept disappearing -- talk to other Russian leaders. And I think the very nature of the talks that we had in Iceland, and the fact that we were finding ourselves in agreement in the extent to which we would disarm and all.

But, yes, he was more open than I have experienced before, and it wasn't until we then got down to this proposal of theirs with SDI, but we ran into a roadblock and finally -- and he made it plain then that everything that we'd been talking about was contingent on our agreeing to that one phase.

But there's -- no, I'm not saying to you he's an easy mark in any way. He's totally dedicated to their system, and frankly, I think he is -- I think he believes sincerely their propaganda about us -- that we're beholdling to industrial and military complexes and so forth.

Q Mr. President, now that you have met that base camp, is the summit -- how important right now is this summit that was originally scheduled for after the election? Is there a chance that there will be a summit, or doesn't it matter?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he brought up the matter of summit, and referred to it several times as if he was expecting to be here for the summit. I have to say that our negotiators -- arms negotiators -- have gone back to Geneva. All of these things have gone with them, and it contains all of the notes and memorandums from all of the meetings as to the extent of the agreement that we had reached with regard to the various types of missiles and so forth.

And so I have to believe that as they continue to look at that and see that there was only one major point of disagreement that we had that -- I'm going to continue to be optimistic.



Q Mr. President, on the subject of the one sticking point that looms so large -- if you could just explain to us your reasons for the way you handled it, on one point particularly. When it became apparent that all of the concessions that General Secretary Gorbachev was willing to make in the offensive area were contingent on this demand with regard to SDI, did you feel that you had an option of saying, we'll get back to you -- we'll study this, we'll turn it over to our experts, I'll give it some more thought? If you had that option, you clearly didn't take it. You decided to make clear to him then and there and subsequently in public that you were rejecting it. Why was that necessary, particularly given the fact that you told us here only a week or so ago that no great agreements were expected out of this meeting? It's not as though we were all out there waiting for you to come out with either a big agreement or a big disagreement.

THE PRESIDENT: No, actually, as a matter of fact he, himself, from the very beginning had said that what we were talking about is the necessity for coming to some agreements that would then lead to being able to sign things and finalize things at the forthcoming summit.

So actually we progressed in those discussions farther than I think either one of us had anticipated we would. And with SDI, I think that is the absolute guarantee. First of all, I would pledge to the American people that there was no way that I would give away SDI. And looking at their own record -- the ABM Treaty -- they're in violation of that now.

Now the ABM Treaty, which he kept referring to as if it was the Holy Grail, I asked him once what was so great about a treaty that had our governments saying to our people, we won't protect you from a nuclear attack? That's basically what the ABM Treaty says. On the other hand, we know and have evidence that they have been going beyond the restrictions of the ABM Treaty with their Krasnoyarsk radar, which shows the possibility of being able to provide radar-directed missiles in a defense not just for one spot -- Moscow, as the treaty had provided. We never, of course, took advantage of the fact that we could defend one spot. We didn't think that was a very practical idea.

But that they are embarked on a strategic defense initiative of their own. And we feel that, first of all, there are other countries, other individuals, that now that everybody knows how to make a ballistic missile that could be and that are -- well, some have them already, others developing -- it's true that we are the two that endanger the world most with the great arsenals that we have.

But this would be the guarantee against cheating. You wouldn't have to be suspiciously watching each other to see if they were starting to replace missiles. This would be the guarantee against in the future a madman coming along. I've likened it, and I explained it to him in this way, that right after World War I -- and I reminded him that I was the only one there old enough to remember these times -- the nations got together in Geneva to outlaw poison gas, but we kept our gas masks, and thank heaven we did because now, years later, poison gas is being more and more recognized as a legitimate weapon.

Q But are you saying, sir, that he left you no choice but to say yes or no there on the spot, and that you had no option to say, very interesting, we'll study it, we'll get back to you?

THE PRESIDENT: There wasn't any need of that. There wasn't any way that I was going to back away from that -- from SDI.

Q Mr. President, are you confident that we are going to have another summit?

THE PRESIDENT: I can't say that I'm confident, that I



have any practical evidence other than the fact that he several times referred to the forthcoming summit that would take place here in the United States.

Q What did you say when he said that?

THE PRESIDENT: The only mention I made of it at all was at one point I asked him legitimately -- I said, "Would you like to propose a date -- suggest a date for that forthcoming summit?" And at that time his reason for not doing it, he said, was because, well, until we our people have all worked things out and we know about how long it's going to take to make the plans for the summit, why I think we should wait on naming a date. And that was the last time that it was mentioned.

Q Was that after the deadlock, sir? Was that after the deadlock or before the deadlock?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, that was before the deadlock, yes.

Q Before?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q Mr. President, I'm puzzled about something. You two gentlemen talked for nearly 11 hours. Obviously there was harmony because there were unprecedented agreements between you two. And yet in the final analysis SDI became the major hang-up. I get the impression that all along Mr. Gorbachev never indicated to you that this was hanging back there in the dark. And my question is, was he deceitful?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not going to use that word or say that because where this came up was, both of us finally at a point proposed that -- on Saturday night -- that our teams take all of these voluminous notes that had been taken in all of the meetings and discussions with all of the things that had been discussed, and they go to work that night, and they did, and they worked all night in two groups -- well, I mean there were two -- their groups and our groups, but two on each side. One of our groups was dedicated to putting together all the discussion that we'd had on human rights and regional conflicts and so forth. They worked until, as I understand it, about 3:30 a.m. in the morning. And the other group was to go through all the things to come back and find where had we really been in agreement, where there was no problem between us, and where were the sticking points that had not been resolved? And I guess that group worked until about 6:00 a.m. in the morning, didn't they? And then Sunday we went into that -- what was supposed to be a two-hour meeting and wound up being an all-day meeting.

They brought back to us -- put together the things that we had all proposed and that seemed that we could agree on, and the places where we were stuck. And that was the first time really that it became evident about SDI, because what I had proposed early on was what I talked about here. I told him that what we were proposing with SDI was that once we reached the testing stage we would -- well, before that, that right now we were ready and willing to sign a treaty -- a binding treaty that said when we reached the testing stage that both sides would proceed, because we told him frankly that we knew they were researching also on defense, nor was that ever denied. And we said we both will go forward with what we are doing. When we reach the testing stage, if it's us, we'll invite you to participate and see the tests. And if it develops that we have -- and I said or if you have perfected a system that can be this kind of defense that we're talking about, then we share, so that there won't be one side having this plus offensive weapons, but that we eliminate the offensive weapons and then we make available to all who feel a need for it or want it this defense system so that safety is guaranteed for the future.



Q Mr. President, you don't want to use the word "deceit," but I'm still puzzled. You wouldn't -- it seems to me that you wouldn't have agreed with Mr. Gorbachev as you agreed if you had known that once you got to the 11th hour he would spring this all on SDI or nothing at all.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think this came out of the summary then that came back from our teams to us where all of this was put together in a kind of an agreement. And what -- they weren't denying SDI openly. What they were doing was framing it in such a way that in a 10-year delay they would literally kill SDI, and there just wouldn't be any.

Q Mr. President, did you tell Mr. Gorbachev that SDI was, as you described it to us, an insurance policy that they will live up to agreements to reduce weapons? And what did he say to you in response?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm trying to remember all the things that were said. It was just that they were adamant, that -- and the use of words, it came down to the use of words, and their words would have made it not just a 10-year delay, but would have meant that we would come to the end of the reducing the weapons and we -- well, SDI would have been killed. And we proposed wording that the research that we were carrying on would be carried on within the provisions of the ABM Treaty, and this wasn't good enough for them.

MR. BUCHANAN: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Appreciate it.

THE PRESIDENT: The boss says I'm through here. You can take them up with the Secretary of State.

All right, thank you very much.

END

2:40 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 13, 1986

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

8:00 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

The implications of these talks are enormous and only just beginning to be understood. We proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. We offered the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the Earth by 1996. While we parted company with this American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.

But first, let me tell you that, from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. And it is for these aims I went the extra mile to Iceland.

Before I report on our talks though, allow me to set the stage by explaining two things that were very much a part of our talks, one a treaty and the other a defense against nuclear missiles which we are trying to develop. Now you've heard their titles a thousand times -- the ABM Treaty and SDI. Those letters stand for, ABM, anti-ballistic missile, SDI, strategic defense initiative.

Some years ago, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit any defense against nuclear missile attacks to the emplacement in one location in each country of a small number of missiles capable of intercepting and shooting down incoming nuclear missiles, thus leaving our real defense -- a policy called Mutual Assured Destruction, meaning if one side launched a nuclear attack, the other side could retaliate. And this mutual threat of destruction was believed to be a deterrent against either side striking first.

So here we sit with thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on each other and capable of wiping out both our countries. The Soviets deployed the few anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow as the treaty permitted. Our country didn't bother deploying because the threat of nationwide annihilation made such a limited defense seem useless.

For some years now we have been aware that the Soviets may be developing a nationwide defense. They have installed a large modern radar at Krasnoyarsk which we believe is a critical part of a radar system designed to provide radar guidance for anti-ballistic missiles protecting the entire nation. Now this is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

MORE



Believing that a policy of mutual destruction and slaughter of their citizens and ours was uncivilized, I asked our military a few years ago to study and see if there was a practical way to destroy nuclear missiles after their launch but before they can reach their targets rather than to just destroy people. Well, this is the goal for what we call SDI and our scientists researching such a system are convinced it is practical and that several years down the road we can have such a system ready to deploy. Now, incidentally, we are not violating the ABM Treaty which permits such research. If and when we deploy the treaty -- also allows withdrawal from the Treaty upon six months' notice. SDI, let me make it clear, is a non-nuclear defense.

So here we are at Iceland for our second such meeting. In the first and in the months in between, we have discussed ways to reduce and in fact eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. We and the Soviets have had teams of negotiators in Geneva trying to work out a mutual agreement on how we could reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. And so far, no success.

On Saturday and Sunday, General Secretary Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz and I met for nearly 10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to just arms reductions. We discussed what we call violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets, refusal to let people emigrate from Russia so they can practice their religion without being persecuted, letting people go to rejoin their families, husbands and wives separated by national borders being allowed to reunite.

In much of this the Soviet Union is violating another agreement -- the Helsinki Accords they had signed in 1975. Yuri Orlov, whose freedom we just obtained, was imprisoned for pointing out to his government its violations of that pact, its refusal to let citizens leave their country or return.

We also discussed regional matters such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. But by their choice the main subject was arms control.

We discussed the emplacement of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia and seemed to be in agreement they could be drastically reduced. Both sides seemed willing to find a way to reduce even to zero the strategic ballistic missiles we have aimed at each other. This then brought up the subject of SDI.

I offered a proposal that we continue our present research and if and when we reached the stage of testing we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests. And if the program was practical we would both eliminate our offensive missiles, and then we would share the benefits of advanced defenses. I explained that even though we would have done away with our offensive ballistic missiles, having the defense would protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles. After all, the world now knows how to make them. I likened it to our keeping our gas masks even though the nations of the world had outlawed poison gas after World War I.

We seemed to be making progress on reducing weaponry although the General Secretary was registering opposition to SDI and proposing a pledge to observe ABM for a number of years as the day was ending.

Secretary Shultz suggested we turn over the notes our note-takers had been making of everything we'd said to our respective teams and let them work through the night to put them together and find just where we were in agreement and what differences separated us. With respect and gratitude, I can inform you those teams worked through the night till 6:30 a.m.

Yesterday, Sunday morning, Mr. Gorbachev and I, with our foreign ministers, came together again and took up the report of our two teams. It was most promising. The Soviets had asked for a 10-year delay in the deployment of SDI programs.

In an effort to see how we could satisfy their concerns while protecting our principles and security, we proposed a 10-year period in which we began with the reduction of all strategic nuclear arms, bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and the weapons they carry. They would be reduced 50 percent in the first five years. During the next five years, we would continue by eliminating all remaining offensive ballistic missiles, of all ranges. And during that time we would proceed with research, development and testing of SDI -- all done in conformity with ABM provisions. At the 10-year point, with all ballistic missiles eliminated, we could proceed to deploy advanced defenses, at the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.

And here the debate began. The General Secretary wanted wording that, in effect, would have kept us from developing the SDI for the entire 10 years. In effect, he was killing SDI. And unless I agreed, all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons would go down the drain -- cancelled.

I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away SDI -- there was no way I could tell our people their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things: our freedom and our future.

I'm still optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.

So you can see, we made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. From the earliest days of our administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions. We were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We declared the principal objective of American foreign policy to be not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world. And that's why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

And yet, at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, and ways to prevent war and keep the peace.



Now, this policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. For the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction -- not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues that are fundamental.

As I mentioned, one such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "And, is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?"

I made it plain that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we're all from Missouri -- you got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. Summit meetings cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item. And this area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think, then, that you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our four-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

And let me return again to the SDI issue. I realize some Americans may be asking tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand? Why not give up SDI for this agreement?

Well, the answer, my friends, is simple. SDI is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik. SDI is America's security guarantee -- if the Soviets should -- as they have done too often in the past -- fail to comply with their solemn commitments. SDI is what brought the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland. SDI is the key to a world without nuclear weapons.

The Soviets understand this. They have devoted far more resources for a lot longer time than we, to their own SDI. The world's only operational missile defense today surrounds Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union.

What Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a new version of a 14-year-old ABM Treaty that the Soviet Union has already violated. I told him we don't make those kinds of deals in the United States.

And the American people should reflect on these critical questions.

How does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against Soviet missiles -- fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so -- forever?

So, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or any future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to Reykjavik. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States.

And on this point, I know you're also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I'm ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it's different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past five and a half years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might; your support has restored our military strength. Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

So, if there's one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we're dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs.

Our ideas are out there on the table. They won't go away. We're ready to pick up where we left off. Our negotiators are heading back to Geneva, and we're prepared to go forward whenever and wherever the Soviets are ready. So, there's reason -- good reason for hope.

I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our naval installation at Keflavik -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline.



As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been...unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers," John Quincy Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a nation. My fellow Americans, we're honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

Another President, Harry Truman, noted that our century had seen two of the most frightful wars in history. And that "The supreme need of our time is for man to learn to live together in peace and harmony."

It's in pursuit of that ideal I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week. And it's in pursuit of that ideal that I thank you now for all the support you've given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

END

8:21 P.M. EDT