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SPEECH BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT B. OAKLEY

AT THE US CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO

JUNE 16, 1986

Mayors, and Other Distinguished Guests:

It is a pleasure for me to be here today -- out of the pressure of Washington on this beautiful island. My subject matter--terrorism--is not a pleasant one but it is timely and important and of great concern to all our citizens.

My job and that of my office at the State Department is to deal with international terrorism. The State Department is the lead agency in dealing with the international threat while the FBI is the key federal agency in dealing with terrorist threats in the United States. We work closely together, however, both on a day-to-day basis and in two interagency committees on counter-terrorism established by the President one of which I chair and one which is chaired by the National Security Council (NSC). In dealing with international terrorism--that is terrorism involving persons or facilities of more than one country-- our first line of defense is overseas.

We are at an interesting and important stage in the ebb and flow of international terrorism and efforts to combat it. As President Reagan said in his May 31 weekly radio address, "History may well record that 1986 was the year when the world came to grips with the plague of international terrorism."

The past two years saw a major surge in terrorism, both internal (within Lebanon, India, Sri Lanka, Peru and Chile) and international (especially in the Middle East, Europe and Latin America). The number of international incidents rose from the 500 per year average for 1979-1983 to 600 in 1984 and 800+ in 1985.

The upward trend has been continuing during the first several months this year. Preliminary tallies indicate there were about 346 international terrorist incidents for the first five months of 1986, compared with 285 for the same January-through-May period of 1985. The number of casualties from international incidents leapt from 1279 (312 dead) in 1984 to 2177 (877 dead) in 1985. So far in 1986, from January through May, there have been 1081 casualties (318 dead), although the level of incidents seems to be declining in the past few weeks. In 1983, while the

world-wide statistics were not as bad, the bombings in Beirut caused over 250 US marines and civilians killed and over 100 wounded. For the past decade US citizens and installations have been far and away the number one target for terrorists abroad although the number of attacks directed against the U.S. has actually decreased during the past two years.

Inside the United States, the trend has been just the reverse. Aggressive investigation of terrorist acts and the successful prosecution of those responsible has helped prevent future crimes by domestic terrorists and reduce their threat to society. During the past three years, the FBI has obtained substantial success against domestic terrorist organizations. The results achieved in the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion (FALN), United Freedom Front, May 19 Communist Organization (M19C), and the Aryan Nations investigations as well as others are indicative of the positive accomplishments in counterterrorist activities by the FBI. In 1985, the number of terrorist incidents declined for the fourth straight year from a high of 51 in 1982 to a total of only 7, with 12 casualties last year--none of them involving international connections. There were several attempted incidents with international

connections (involving Sikhs, Libyans, etc.) among the 23 prevented. So far this year, there has been only one domestic terrorist incident, that involving a former Puerto Rican policeman and family.

DOMESTIC SITUATION

Because the question, "Can foreign terrorism happen here?" is raised so often, allow me to speculate on some possible reasons for these strikingly opposite trends. Perhaps it will stimulate your own thinking which probably is based upon direct local experience rather than deductive reasoning. First, this country has a reputation for pretty effective controls upon the issuance of visas, which many others do not require, and careful checking of proposed points of entry. For some reason terrorists seem to prefer normal entry points into the U.S., even with false papers, to trying to sneak across the relatively unguarded areas as do illegal migrant Mexican workers.

Second, we have a reputation for good intelligence on terrorists trying to enter from abroad or operating inside the country, due to the combined good work of the CIA, FBI, friendly countries, and state and local law enforcement

agencies. The absence of terrorism from the Los Angeles Olympics is a good example of these first two points.

(I would note that we are trying to also keep incident-free next year's Pan American Games in Indianapolis.) The arrest earlier this month of five Sikh terrorists in Montreal before they could even get to New York City and put a bomb aboard an Air India flight is another example of the second point on the role of good intelligence, as well as good cooperation with other governments.

Third, by and large the systematic, organized commission of violent acts for political purposes against innocent persons, is not a part of our culture. In Europe and the Middle East, it has been present generation after generation after generation. Violence in America tends to be either spontaneous or for criminal, not political, purposes. Terrorist groups do spring up from time to time in the U.S., particularly during periods of high socio-political tension as in the 1970's. They usually wither away rapidly -- with help from the FBI -- rather than renew themselves as in the Middle East and Europe.

One might think that ethnic or nationality groups would be more prone to terrorism -- particularly when it is

rampant in their country or has been used by extremists of similar origin such as Armenians, Palestinians, and Iranians. However, the records show this is not so. Unlike Europe, for example, where those of Middle East ethnic or national origin often feel and act as alienated strangers, in this country they tend to feel and act as Americans, as citizens concerned with the well being of this country and their place in it.

Finally, I want to highlight the important role played by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. In the U.S., combatting terrorism is not the sole responsibility of the FBI, but rather the joint responsibility of federal, state, and Local law enforcement authorities. While the FBI has been designated the "lead" federal agency to counter terrorism within the United States, state and local agencies are charged with law enforcement and public safety responsibilities in their jurisdictions. In order to effectively achieve our mutual counter-terrorism objectives, therefore, the FBI has entered into joint operations with local agencies in several field divisions where specific and persistent terrorist related activities have been present. The significant successes achieved against domestic terrorist groups are attributable, in part, to a pooling of these personnel and resources.

The FBI first experimented with the Task Force concept in 1979, when the bank robbery problem in New York City had grown to epidemic proportions. It became clear to the leadership of the New York City Police Department and the FBI that an innovative solution was required to address an increasingly dangerous situation. Accordingly, a formalized agreement, sealed by a signed Memorandum of Understanding, was entered into by both agencies. Detectives and FBI agents were detailed to a newly created task force jointly supervised by the FBI and New York City Police Department Personnel. The idea was to eliminate duplication of effort, share resources and foster cooperation.

The experiment worked. In a very real way, the Task Force became more than a sum of its parts. The skills and knowledge possessed by the police officers complemented those possessed by the agents and a spirit of cooperation replaced counterproductive competitiveness. The number of bank robberies soon declined dramatically and the solution rate soared.

With this precedent having been established, a Joint Terrorist Task Force was established in New York in 1980.

This Task Force, in its six years of existence has been successful in the investigation of numerous domestic and international terrorist groups operating in the United States. Its success was instrumental in the establishment of the much bigger task force for the Los Angeles Olympics. It also has encouraged the creation of similar task forces in Chicago, New Haven, Newark, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Boston, and Washington, D.C. to address specific terrorism problems in those areas.

OVERSEAS TERRORISM

In trying to get a broad picture of the international terrorism scene, it might be useful to start with the regional pieces.

Let's start with Middle East-related terrorism has been the major factor in the recent increase of international terrorism. The number of incidents in the region rose from 109 in 1983 to 378 in 1985. Also in 1985, there were another 60 incidents by Middle East groups which took place in Europe or elsewhere, meaning that Mideast terrorisms account for over 50% of the world-wide total for 1985. So far in 1986, there have been 214 incidents of Middle East

origin with a dozen conducted by Middle East groups in Europe.

There are a variety of factors and actors behind this situation, of which the Israel-Palestinian dispute is only one component. This category includes terrorism conducted by radical Arab governments and Palestinian groups trying to disrupt the peace process, destroy moderate Arab governments, carry on intra-Arab power struggles or seize a place in the world power structure as well as vent their anger at Israel and the United States.

State support is a major reason for increased Middle East terrorism. Qadhafi has used and supported terrorism around the world more for purposes of personal pride and national power than for any real concern for Palestinians or the Arab-Israeli dispute. Syria has also used terrorism systematically to enhance its power in the region. Iranian terrorism is inspired by Khomeini's brand of politico-religious fanaticism, linked both to the Iran-Iraq war and the desire to "purify" the Islamic world by removing pro-Western Arab governments and the Western cultural presence, starting with the United States and France.

Cuba and Nicaragua are active state supporters of terrorism in Latin America and the Caribbean, in some cases sharing support for terrorist groups with Iran or Libya. The traditional politico-economic stimulus for guerilla warfare and terrorism in this part of the world has recently been reinforced by narcotics trafficking -- with traffickers using terrorists to protect processing centers and as hit men, and the terrorists obtaining money and arms from narcotics traffickers. Colombia is a particularly flagrant case in point. There is also increased cooperation and coordination among terrorist groups especially the M-19 of Colombia and Alfaro Lives of Ecuador. Peruvian terrorism, very much on the increase, is more indigenous than dependent upon outside support.

In Western Europe there has been a slowdown over the past year of traditional indigenous, ideological terrorism even while the spillover of Middle East terrorism has increased. This slowdown results primarily from increased security awareness and counter-terrorist measures, which make operations more difficult; Belgian successes in capturing key terrorists and crippling the CCC; France capturing Andre Olivier, leader of the national faction of Action Directe, thus reducing the capability of this group;

Italian authorities last month in Naples convicting 62 Red Brigades terrorists, and continuing to dismantle that once intimidating organization.

U.S. PROGRAM

Looking back, a key turning point for the US in the fight against terrorism was 1983, when the bombings took so many lives at the American Marine barracks and Embassy buildings in Beirut. This prompted the Reagan Administration to undertake a special Presidential study and issue specific new policy guidance.

As a result of this new Presidential guidance, the Administration developed a comprehensive counter-terrorism program based upon a combination of unilateral, multilateral and international actions. It uses a variety of diplomatic, economic, legal, intelligence and military means, based upon the premise that the primary legal, political, moral and practical responsibility for dealing with terrorism abroad is that of foreign governments. If they do not have the political will or the ability to act against terrorist, the problem will get worse rather than better. What we can do alone in other countries is obviously limited, although we

are strengthening our capabilities to do so. Many of our programs are aimed at getting others to do more.

Actions Taken Over The Past Two Years. The pace of our unilateral and cooperative international programs and other activities aimed at terrorism abroad has been quickening in response to the threat:

- We have intensified our bilateral relationships with friends around the world. We already work closely with such friends as Canada, Britain and Israel. Meanwhile we are discussing common counter-terrorism efforts with countries where we have previously not had such close ties such as Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and Egypt; in one form or another we have significant cooperation efforts underway with some 50 governments;

- Improved intelligence collection, better security and closer international cooperation helped us deter or preempt more than 180 international terrorist actions over the past 18 months; financial dealings, and expelling their officials and others suspected of terrorist activities.

The FBI made a preemptive move a year ago against a Libyan ring which was plotting targeting anti-Qadhafi Libyans in the U.S. A Libyan official was expelled from the UN mission and grand jury action was taken against other Libyans;

-- We have dedicated more resources and given a still higher priority to collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence on terrorist groups and activities abroad, as well as sharing it with other key governments;

-- We have improved the security of our embassies and consulates and heightened the security awareness of our personnel; major improvements have been made in the physical security of over 100 US diplomatic missions over the past two years;

-- We have used a wide range of our unilateral sanctions against such countries as Libya and Iran, imposing controls on exports of key spare parts and equipment,

-- Our covert action and military capabilities for action against terrorists have been strengthened; I can not go into details for obvious reasons but the success in

apprehending the terrorists who hijacked the the Achille Lauro is one example of what they can do. Another and even more dramatic example, was the military operation against Libya in April. We will be judicious in the use of these capabilities but shall not hesitate to do so when the circumstances are right;

-- We have begun to cooperate more closely with the private sector in sharing information on threats abroad and how to counter them. The Overseas Security Advisory Panel has been active in systematically exchanging information on techniques and technology to counter terrorism as well as threat information. A regular but informal relationship has recently been established with the tourist industry;

-- We have worked hard and successfully in international organizations such as the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council in establishing the principle that terrorism is a threat to all nations and should be considered as a crime. In the specialized UN agencies new standards for aviation and maritime security have been established;

-- We have made effective use of recent legislative tools, such as the rewards programs, the Crime Act of 1984, and the Foreign Assistance Act. We believe it is useful to have more legal tools for the anti-terrorism effort. We support, for example, S.1429, which recently passed the Senate, making it a federal crime to kill or conduct other terrorist acts against Americans overseas.

-- In two years over 2,000 civilian officials from 32 friendly foreign governments have participated in our Anti-Terrorist Assistance program managed by the State Department; this not only improves their abilities to protect their own governments and US and other citizens in their countries from terrorist attack, it also means closer cooperation with the United States in combatting terrorism.

The ATA program is a very good example of a cooperative effort against terrorism which involves local governments such as yours. A number of metropolitan police departments around the country ranging from New York City to Charleston, South Carolina to San Diego, California have helped train their counterparts from overseas. This has been a very successful program. The State Department helps organize the

sessions; local U.S. city and county authorities such as police departments and the FBI, the FAA and others provide the facilities and skilled manpower on a reimbursable basis. We also provide some limited equipment such as airport x-rays and bomb disposal equipment. If your police or other experts are invited to take part in the program, I hope you can participate. Fighting terrorism has to be a cooperative effort.

THE PAST YEAR

In 1985, a year ago this week, we suffered through the hijacking, hostage taking and murder aboard TWA 847. This dramatically televised 17-day event was followed by the Achille Lauro hijacking and murder plus the deliberate killing of unarmed US Marines and civilians in San Salvador, terrorist attacks in Colombia, bombings of military bases in Germany and the December 27 bloody attacks upon Rome and Vienna airport airports. These underlined the importance of the new action study completed at year's end by Vice President Bush's Task Force and its recommendations for a still more active unilateral and multilateral effort to counter terrorism. The task force report found the system in

place to be sound but in need of fine-tuning and higher priority with a more action oriented urgent approach.

The first tangible reaction was the President's January 8 decision to stop all US business activities in Libya, seize its assets in this country, and call for our allies to join in a campaign of collective, non-military pressure strong enough to convince Qadhafi to stop his support for terrorism. The President made clear that the US reserved the right to take unilateral action if collective action failed to deter Qadhafi. Unfortunately, there was virtually no response by our allies and Libyan-supported terrorism directed against the United States became more blatant, widespread and deadly. This included orders in late March from Tripoli to Libyan embassies to conduct attacks on US-related targets in dozens of countries aimed at inflicting large-scale, indiscriminate casualties.

The result was the bombing of La Belle Discotheque where there were 200 casualties, including two American sergeants killed. Similar, but abortive attempts took place elsewhere. For example, French and Turkish security forces working with the U.S. discovered, prevented and exposed

publicly actions by Libyan officials to conduct very lethal attacks against US Government installations.

In other countries, the Libyans never got that far, probably recognizing their inadequacies in face of close controls. President Reagan's response was to invoke the right of any country to self-defense when attacked by another country. This led to the carefully calibrated April 15 raids upon terrorist related targets in Tripoli and Bizerte.

What has been the result of the limited use of force in self-defense against Libya? First, a marked reduction in Qadhafi-supported terrorism, apparently due to internal Libyan disarray, the compromise of Libya's external terror network, and the tighter controls placed upon Libyan activities all around the world by governments more determined than before to avoid terrorism in their countries. Second, absence of strong negative reaction which some had feared from other Arab governments suits or the USSR the former have showed little sympathy and no tangible support for Qadhafi. The latter's words have been strongly supportive but their military support has been zero. Third, a sudden recognition by European and other

governments of the serious dangers posed by international terrorism and a new willingness to work together to deter and prevent it.

For example, the Foreign Ministers of the twelve European Community countries on April 21 agreed to reduce the size of the Libyan People's Bureaus (LPB's); and increase cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. They also agreed to impose tight controls upon the entry and movement of all Libyans, including diplomats and other government officials. On May 5 in Tokyo, the leaders of the seven governments of the Economic Summit countries agreed to a series of actions be taken against international terrorism and states who support it, again identifying Libya. In addition to reiterating and strengthening the actions agreed to by the EC, the Tokyo statement called for improved extradition procedures, strengthening the Bonn Declaration on civil aviation security, and greater international cooperation generally, including use of the United Nations.

The Europeans also agreed to cut off military sales to Libya and not to fill-in behind the departing American skilled personnel. Italy, which has long standing major

historic, cultural and economic ties with Libya has, nevertheless, has reduced its presence from about 17,000 to less than 2,000 since the beginning of this year and is beginning to cut its imports of Libyan oil.

Actions to make Qadhafi understand he must pay an increasing price for supporting terrorism have now been taken by fourteen of the fifteen governments who participated in these two meetings; Greece being the only exception. Some 100 Libyans, most of them so-called diplomats, have been expelled; economic and commercial ties have dwindled rapidly; etc. The specific actions vary from country to country, but we can draw two conclusions about them. First, they are unquestionably having a significant direct political and economic impact upon Libya and seem to be having an indirect but also appreciable impact on other governments which support terrorism; second, they represent an unprecedented collective effort to combat terrorism, which has important future implications for international enforcement.

We must keep up the momentum of which has been achieved with such difficulty by means of both unilateral and multilateral actions against international terrorism. At

the same time, we must not exaggerate the threat nor allow ourselves to be intimidated by it. Nothing encourages the terrorist more than seeing that they have succeeded in panicking public or political opinion, which is a paramount objective.

While losses of tourist dollars help prod some countries such as Greece to tighten up their security, and the changed vacation plans have benefited some U.S. cities and the Caribbean, there seems to have been an excessive preoccupation with terrorism by the media and public in recent months. A number of friendly countries are suffering important economic losses and the terrorists may feel that they are succeeding in creating tensions within the Western Alliance and will be successful over time in creating an isolationism mentality in this country which will erode our economic, strategic and political interests abroad. Such a feeling would only encourage more attacks upon Americans.

In summation, we must take a cool, calm and cooperative as well as determined approach in fighting terrorism. The terrorists must not be allowed to get the best of us. Fighting terrorism is a long-term effort which will draw on the best within us.

DRAFT

SPEECH BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT B. OAKLEY

TO DISTRICT CONVENTION B'NAI B'RITH

May 31, 1986

It is a pleasure to be here this week. It is an appropriate time, even though the violence of terrorism seems a long way from this peaceful resort.

This also is an appropriate place to discuss terrorism,. B'Nai B'Brith and other Jewish organizations have been among the most sensitive and responsive to the terrorism problem and the most supportive of efforts to combat it. Just recently, your organization endorsed the supplemental extradition treaty with Great Britain which has been bogged down in the Senate. We greatly appreciate your support on this issue, which I'll discuss in more detail later.

This is an appropriate time to discuss terrorism and not just because nearly every week, indeed almost every day, the newspapers and networks carry reports which remind us of the terrorist threat or that Americans, French, and others are being held prisoner in Lebanon. I could have said this nearly every week since the hijacking of TWA 847 almost a year ago.

What makes this time period different however is that we are at a very interesting and important stage in our long fight against international terrorism. 1986 may be the year the free world finally took concerted action against the terrorism threat.

We are in the follow-stage of several key events:

--The December attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports.

-- The March bombing of the discotheque in Berlin in which an American soldier was killed and some 230 persons were injured--a fourth of them Americans.

--The U.S. military operations against Libya in April which resulted from the evidence that Libya and its bomb-throwers, Abu Nidal, were behind the Berlin bombing, the Rome and Vienna airport attacks and the Egyptian Airliner hijacking to Malta last October.

--The Tokyo Summit conference this month in which the Summit Seven countries approved a declaration calling for strong economic and other measures against countries supporting terrorism. Libya was singled out.

These were major developments and have greatly changed the terrain of the anti-terrorism battle. In one sense, the attacks on Rome, Vienna airports, the disco were not startling new developments. There is a long and sad history of such deliberate indiscriminate attacks against civilians. And airline hijackings have been with us for the past 15 years, although major terrorist-related hijackings had declined in recent years until the end of 1984.

What is new is that our European allies and other like-minded nations are taking additional steps against terrorism. Some of the measures involve doing more of what we have been doing over the past several years--improving the collections and exchange of information on terrorists. Other measures, especially in the economic area, are not new for us but are for the Europeans.

For example, take the public measures agreed upon in the Tokyo summit attended by the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany and Japan and Italy. The public measures agreed upon by the heads of government included banning arms sales to states supporting terrorism; restricting diplomatic/consular missions of states supporting terrorism; denying entry of all persons, including diplomats, who have been expelled from any of the other countries in conjunction with terrorist activities; improving extradition procedures for crimes involving terrorism; stricter visa and immigration requirements for nationals of states supporting terrorism; and closer police and security cooperation to fight terrorism.

These measures by themselves are not cure-alls, but they are important steps. Now, we are in the important phase of trying to encourage followup actions.

They come against a background of long efforts by the US to counter the tide of terrorism. I think it would be useful to provide some of the context and the overview before discussing in more detail where we go from here.

A preliminary review of statistics shows that in 1985, there were more than 800 incidents of international terrorism. There were 2223 casualties of which 28 of the killed and 139 of the injured were Americans. Over the past two years, international terrorism has risen sharply (60%) from the yearly average of about 500 for the 1978-83 period.

Preliminary figures for the first three months of 1986 indicate that there were _____ terrorist incidents.

Inside the United States, the trend was reversed. The number of terrorist incidents actually perpetrated declined in 1985 for the fourth straight year to a total of only 7, and none of them involved international connections.

There are a number of diverse reasons and causes behind this disturbing trend abroad, with state support and toleration of terrorist groups the most important.

Middle East-related terrorism is a major cause for the increase, with the number of incidents rising from 109 in 1983 to 378 in 1985. Within that category, there are a variety of factors and actors. The Israeli-Palestinian dispute is only one component, and it includes terrorism conducted by radical Arab governments and Palestinian groups trying to disrupt the peace process and destroy moderate Arab governments, as well as vent their anger at Israel and the United States.

There is also the terrorism inspired by Khomeini's brand of politico-religious fanaticism linked to the Iran-Iraq wars and the desire to purify the Islamic world by removing pro-Western Arab governments and the Western presence, starting with that great Satan, the United States.

The most deadly of the Middle East terrorist attacks came from the Abu Nidal group which shifted the locus of its leadership from Iraq to Syria in 1983. In early 1985, Abu Nidal focused his attacks against Jordanian and main-stream Palestinian officials. Then, about the middle of the year, after Syria and Jordan began high-level discussions, Libya became his main backer and his targets shifted. The hijacking of the Egyptian airliner to Malta, in which women passengers--American and Israeli--were singled out for killing for the first time, and the Rome and Vienna airport attacks were the major operations of the Abu Nidal organization after it began to receive strong Libyan support.

Western European groups also were active. The Red Army Faction attacked American and NATO-related installations in Germany, causing several American deaths, and their counterparts in France and Belgium also carried out attacks in these countries. In Italy, last month, the Red Brigades showed some signs of revival after the Italians had dealt major setbacks to the group. In Spain, Basque separatists continued their campaign.

An American businessman was killed last year when a car bomb blew up in Madrid, wounding over a dozen Spanish Civil Guards. Overall in Europe, however, terrorist attacks on US business were down.

In Latin America, terrorist incidents grew from 81 in 1984 to 132 in 1985. Many of them were by groups trained and armed by Cuba and Nicaragua. Eighty-six of these incidents involved the United States. Thirty-five of them were attacks upon US business firms, over half of the worldwide total of 67. Hostage taking of US businessmen for ransom has its locus in Latin America. In the past 15 years over 35 have been kidnapped in Latin America.

The list is by no means complete but I cite these incidents to illustrate the variety of types of terrorists.

There is a common point, however. None of them, whatever they or their backers may claim, are some kind of romantic freedom fighters whose attacks should be excused away on the ground that they are fighting for a political "just cause." What they are conducting are criminal acts, in many cases deliberately trying to kill and wound as many innocent persons as possible

What is Our Policy and What are Our Programs?

The seriousness of the terrorist threat to the United States, to our interests abroad and indeed to the basic values of democracy of freedom became blatantly clear with the 1983 bombings of the Marine Barracks and the US Embassy which took hundreds of lives and had an evidently negative political effect. The Administration resolved to fight back with a policy of firmness and variety of programs for use at home and abroad.

Policy. As recently summarized by the Vice President's Task Force Report, it is: "

Programs at Home. The INS, Customs Service and State Department have tightened checks on persons trying to enter this country, while the FBI and CIA have increased their intelligence coverage of potential terrorist groups and individuals who might be active in the United States. The investigation of and prosecution of terrorist groups and criminal activities by the FBI and Department of Justice have also been intensified, to good effect with a number of convictions, dozens of incidents prevented, and a sharp diminution in terrorist activity. This will continue. Given the potential threat, still greater vigilance at home is required.

But it is clear from both statistics and common sense that by far the greatest threat is overseas.

Programs Abroad. Let us recognize that the primary legal, political, moral and practical responsibility for dealing with terrorism abroad is that of foreign governments. If they do not have the political will or the ability to act against terrorist, the problem will get worse rather than better. What we can do alone in other countries is obviously limited, although we are strengthening our capabilities to do so. Many of our programs are aimed at getting others to do more.

Actions Taken Over The Past Two Years. The pace of our bilateral and cooperative international programs and other activities aimed at terrorism abroad has been quickening:

- We have intensified our bilateral relationships with friends around the world. We already work closely with such friends as Canada, Britain and Israel. Meanwhile we are discussing common counter-terrorism efforts with countries where we have not had such close ties;
- We have dedicated more resources and given a still higher priority to collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence on terrorist groups and activities abroad.

- We have improved the security of our embassies and consulates and heightened the security awareness of our personnel; major improvements were made in the physical security of over 100 US diplomatic missions last year;
- We have begun to cooperate more closely with the private sector in sharing information on threats abroad and how to counter them; the Overseas Security Advisory Panel has been active in systematically exchanging information on techniques and technology to counter terrorism as well as threat information; a regular but internal relationship has recently been established with the tourist industry;
- The Inman Panel which reported last year gave us an important outside review of what needed to be done to further enhance security for the USG and the private sector and an additional boost for obtaining the necessary resources. Legislation to finance this four billion dollar program is pending in Congress. The Senate, which sharply cut the Administration's request, is expected to begin consideration of its version on Monday. The House already has passed its bill. ;
- As noted by President Reagan, improved intelligence collection, better security and closer international cooperation helped us deter or preempt more than 100 international terrorist actions during the past year. Since then, another 80 or so potential incidents have been prevented or aborted.

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We have worked hard and successfully in international organizations such as the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council establishing that terrorism is a threat to all nations and should be considered as a crime. In the specialized agencies new standards for aviation and maritime security have been established;

-- We have made effective use of recent legislative tools, such as the rewards programs, the Crime Act of 1984, and the Foreign Assistance Act. We believe it is useful to have more legal tools for the anti-terrorism effort. We support, for example, S.1429, which recently passed the Senate, making it a federal crime to kill or conduct other terrorist acts against Americans overseas.

-- Our covert action and military capabilities for action against terrorists have been strengthened; I can not go into details for obvious reasons but the success in apprehending the terrorists who hijacked the the Achille Lauro is one example of what they can do. Another and even more dramatic example, was the military operation against Libya last month. We will be judicious in the use of these capabilities but shall not hesitate to do so when the circumstances are right;

f-- In two years over 2,000 civilian officials from 32 foreign governments have participated in courses under the Anti-Terrorist Assistance program managed by the

State Department; this not only improves their abilities to protect US and other citizens in their countries from terrorist attack, it also means closer cooperation with the United States in combatting terrorism.

Future Programs. The record of our success at home has not been matched by other governments abroad, and the threat to Americans abroad has therefore increased, despite the efforts I have just described. Recognizing this, President Reagan asked Vice President Bush to chair a task force of senior officials to review our policy and our domestic and foreign programs, and see what improvements might be needed. The conclusion was that our policy programs and organization are sound, although certain improvements are needed and a greater international effort is necessary to deal with the problem of state support and tolerance of terrorism.

Coinciding with the completion of the Task Force work was the eruption of Libyan-supported terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. This caused the President to decide upon a new, more assertive policy, starting with the severance of all economic contacts with Libya, freezing its assets in this country, so they can no longer be used to finance terrorism, removing US citizens from Libya so they can not be used as hostages, calling upon other governments to join us in making Libya pay a stiff price for supporting terrorism. Qadhafi failed to heed our warnings and we had to use the military option.

The dramatic military actions against Libya last month marked a new benchmark in the struggle against terrorism. In October 1985 we passed a previous benchmark when U.S. military planes intercepted and forced down at Sigonella Air base the Egyptian plane carrying Abu Abbas and four Palestinians. These two acts lent credence to the words of Secretary Shultz, first uttered two years ago that our responses to terrorism should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention; that our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts.

The U.S. willingness to consider military measures was widely applauded in the U.S. While it was greeted with greater skepticism in Europe, Europeans did recognize that the U.S. was more serious than they had thought about what must be done to combat this modern scourge. Their actions individually and within such collective groups as the EC Foreign Ministers and the Trevi Interior/Justice Ministers showed important resolve for the first time in their efforts against Libyan terrorism.

--Fourth, the use of force does not signal how the U.S. will respond to each future terrorist incident; it opens wider the range of options of what we might consider in exceptional circumstances;

Over the past eighteen months we have identified over 150 separate planned attacks against U.S. personnel or facilities which we have preempted through better intelligence, stronger security and closer cooperation with other countries. While dramatic military actions may get the headlines, we believe that the focus of our attention should be on efforts with other countries

What Can Western Nations Do?

-- To recite the obvious, we can act alone or we can act together with other states. In dealing with terrorism, each nation can take certain actions unilaterally, but we will be more effective in the struggle if we act in concert with other states.

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The major areas of activity include:

- Gathering and more effectively using intelligence information.
- Common programs of action against states which support terrorism. What economic, political and diplomatic actions might we take in common,

-- Better coordination of joint actions.

-- The measures against terrorism approved by the leaders at the Tokyo Summit , which I cited at the beginning of my speech, are an important part of this activity. We are working toward additional activities and more effective implementation of steps already taken.

But one of the difficulties in fighting terrorism is keeping up the momentum. If there is a lull in incidents, there is a tendency by the public and governments to relax in their efforts to develop more effective counter-measures against terrorists. We must keep the momentum going. At the same time, we should not over-react. While the losses of tourist dollars help prod some countries such as Greece to tighten up their security, I think there has been an over=reaction by the media and public in recent months. A number of friendly countries are suffering important economic losses by the exaggerated fears of terrorist attacks, including Britain and Israel. The terrorists should not be allowed such victories.

We should help set an example in keeping cool, resolute, and determined.

Conclusion. We predict that on the international side, the terrorism threat is likely to continue to grow and be with us for at least another decade. There are too many causes, too many diverse actors, and too many political, religious, social and nationalistic sore spots in the world which generate individuals ready to become terrorists. Too many groups think they can make a political impact favorable to their particular cause--magnified mightily by the media around the world--and there are governments which refuse to forgo the temptation of using terrorism as a cheap form of warfare. We should not be discouraged or panicked about it, but rather, keep our cool and determination. This will be a long process; there are no magic solutions or remedies. As the terrorists increase their activities however, we are increasing ours, and indeed trying harder to get ahead of them on our own and with other governments.

We take comfort in the large number of terrorist incidents preempted abroad, at the low level of terrorism in this country. But the big increase in the number and viciousness of international terrorism incidents, and the the even sharper increase in the casualties deliberately caused by the terrorists, and the fact that the U.S. remains as the top target shows clearly that the struggle is becoming more intense and we cannot afford to be complacent.

The Reagan Administration is determined to keep at it, adding to and improving the tools we have. Strong public support has been and will continue to be extremely important in this effort and we greatly appreciate yours.

SPEECH TO NATIONAL DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MAY 13, 1986

BY CRAIG P. COY

TERRORISM IS ONE OF THE MOST BOTHERSOME AND ALSO ONE OF THE MOST ILL-DEFINED ISSUES BEFORE US TODAY. IT TROUBLES AND CONFUSES AMERICANS AS WELL AS OUR FOREIGN FRIENDS.

POLLS HAVE SHOWN THAT AMERICANS CONSIDER TERRORISM TO BE ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS FACING THE U. S. GOVERNMENT TODAY, ALONG WITH THE FEDERAL DEFICIT, STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL, AND UNEMPLOYMENT. AMERICANS WANT THEIR GOVERNMENT TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE THREAT OF TERRORISM. AND WE ARE.

THE WHOLE MATTER IS COMPLICATED BY THE SPORADIC NATURE OF THE THREAT. TERRORISM BY IT VERY NATURE IS DESIGNED TO CAPTURE THE PUBLIC'S ATTENTION, IN ORDER TO COERCE AND BLACKMAIL PEOPLE AND NATIONS INTO SUBMITTING TO THE DEMANDS OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS. IN THE ABSENCE OF AN INCIDENT, THE TERRORISTS SUBSIDE INTO OBSCURITY AS FAR AS THE PUBLIC IS CONCERNED. CONSEQUENTLY, TERRORISM IS CHARACTERIZED BY VIOLENT SWINGS IN THE PUBLIC'S MOOD FROM OUTRAGE TO APATHY.

RECENT EVENTS IN LIBYA HAVE FOCUSED OUR ATTENTION ON THE PROBLEM OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM. WE KNOW, AND THE PRESIDENT STATED IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE NATION ON APRIL 14TH, THAT OUR RAID ON LIBYA WILL NOT SIMPLY BRING TERRORISM TO AN END. THEREFORE, IF WE ARE TO CONFRONT THIS CHALLENGE -- AND WE MUST-- IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE THREAT AND ISSUES SURROUNDING THE FORMULATION OF A SOUND PUBLIC POLICY. FOR THAT REASON, I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE INVITATION TO BE HERE TODAY.

IN DEALING WITH THE TERRORISM PROBLEM, THE U. S. GOVERNMENT IS FACED WITH A HOST OF DILEMMAS, INCONSISTENCIES, AND CONTRADICTIONS. AMERICANS WANT A MORE ACTIVE AND MILITANT POLICY -- AND WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO ACT IN LIBYA -- YET THERE IS THE NATURAL REJECTION OF ANY ACTION THAT CAUSES COLLATERAL HARM TO INNOCENT PEOPLE, SUCH AS HOSTAGES OR THE FAMILIES AND NEIGHBORS OF THE TERRORISTS THEMSELVES. THE TERRORISTS ARE AWARE OF THIS ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF AMERICANS AND USE BOTH THE HOSTAGES AND INDIGENOUS CIVILIANS AS SHIELDS FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION.

WE CANNOT EVEN DEFINE TERRORISM. SOME RELY ON THAT TRITE PHRASE, "ONE MAN'S TERRORIST IS ANOTHER MAN'S FREEDOM FIGHTER." I DO NOT AGREE WITH THAT, BUT THERE ARE MANY IN CONGRESS WHO DO. MANY AUTHORITIES CONSIDER THAT THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY TO BE THE MOST SAVAGE AND BRUTAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION NOW IN EXISTENCE. YET, THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS CONTRIBUTE REGULARLY TO PROVIDE THE IRA WITH WEAPONS AND SUPPORT. THE BACKING FOR THE IRA IS SO STRONG THAT A RECENTLY SIGNED PROTOCOL TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND GREAT BRITAIN AMENDING THE POLITICAL EXCEPTION PROVISION FOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM MAY NOT BE RATIFIED IN THE SENATE. AT A TIME WHEN MRS THATCHER STOOD BY US IN OUR ACTION TO COMBAT LIBYAN TERRORISM AND WHEN WE ARE ACTIVELY SEEKING THE EXTRADITION OF TERRORISTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTS WE NEED TO STEP UP AND RATIFY THIS EXTRADITION PROTOCOL NOW.

OUR ALLIES AND LIKE-MINDED NATIONS JOIN US IN RHETORIC CONDEMNING TERRORISM, YET UP UNTIL OUR ACTION ON APRIL 14TH, THEY HAD REFUSED TO COOPERATE EXCEPT WHEN THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS WERE BEST SERVED. I AM NOT A PHILOSOPHER, BUT I HAVE TO WONDER ABOUT THE FUTURE OF A SOCIETY THAT REFUSES TO AGGRESSIVELY PROTECT ITS CITIZENS AND INTERESTS FROM WANTON KILLING AND DESTRUCTION BY CRIMINAL ELEMENTS OR CRIMINAL NATIONS.

SOME HAVE SAID THAT TERRORISM WILL ONLY BE ELIMINATED IF WE SOLVE THE ROOT CAUSES. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT FINDING SOLUTION TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE REGION AND THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, I HAVE TO WONDER HOW TERRORISM CAN ENCOURAGE THAT PROCESS. WHEN THE PLO WERE DRIVEN OUT OF LEBANON WHICH OF THE ARAB NATIONS EMBRACED THEM? QADHAFI'S ADVICE TO THEM WAS TO COMMIT MASS SUICIDE -- HARDLY THE WORDS OF SOMEONE WITH THEIR BEST INTERESTS IN MIND. SYRIA HAS REPEATEDLY THREATENED ANY JORDANIAN PEACE INITIATIVE WITH ISRAEL WITH TERRORISM AGAINST BOTH COUNTRIES. THE IRANIAN SUPPORTED HIZBALLAH ORGANIZATION HAS HELPED CREATE ANARCHY IN LEBANON. I THINK IT IS WISE TO REMEMBER THE RESULTS OF TERRORISM IN LEBANON. LOOK AT BEIRUT. NOT MANY YEARS AGO IT WAS THE FINANCIAL CENTER OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IT WAS A SYMBOL OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. TOURISTS DELIGHTED IN ITS CAREFREE GAIETY, ITS CULTURE, SOPHISTICATION, AND GRACE. TODAY THUGS AND MURDERERS COMB THROUGH THE RUBBLE. CHAOS REIGNS. NO ONE WHO KNEW BEIRUT THEN OR SEES IT NOW CAN AFFORD TO BE CONFIDENT OR RELAXED ABOUT THE CHALLENGE OF TERRORISM TO CIVILIZATION.

IN SPITE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES AND THE DILEMMAS INHERENT TO THE PROBLEM, OUR GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO MEET THE THREAT OF TERRORISM HEAD ON. WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE LIVES LOST AND THE PROPERTY DAMAGE DONE FROM INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -- PROBABLY LESS THAN ONE PERCENT OF THE FATALITIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE ON AMERICAN HIGHWAYS -- IT MAY BE HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY TERRORISM IS PERCEIVED A THREAT TO OUR VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM IS FAR GREATER THAN THE MATERIAL LOSSES IN LIVES AND PROPERTY. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE EFFECT ON THE NATION CAN BE SIGNIFICANT. WHEN THE U.S. IS PERCEIVED AS BEING UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO TERRORISM:

0 THERE IS A REDUCTION OF PUBLIC SELF-CONFIDENCE IN OUR GOVERNMENT AND OVERALL AMERICAN MORALE

0 THE RELIABILITY OF U.S. LEADERSHIP IN THE EYES OF OUR ALLIES IS ERODED

0 BOTH THE INDIVIDUAL TERRORIST AND HIS CAUSE GAIN CONFIDENCE AND COURAGE WHICH SERVES TO PROMOTE THE DARING AND FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST EPISODES.

IT IS THIS LATTER EFFECT THAT CAUSES US THE GRAVEST CONCERN AND THE ONE THAT THE PRESIDENT SOUGHT TO COUNTER BY OUR ACTION IN LIBYA TO DETER FUTURE ACTS OF TERRORISM BY LIBYA. IF WE DO NOT ACCEPT THIS CHALLENGE WE PERMIT THE TERRORISTS TO GAIN CONFIDENCE AND EXPERIENCE. THEY WILL IN TURN, ATTRACT GREATER SUPPORT AND GAIN INCREASED CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT MORE FREQUENT, SOPHISTICATED, AND DAMAGING ATTACKS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE COULD EXPECT TO SEE DIRECT TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST OUR DOMESTIC INFRASTRUCTURE, SUCH AS:

0 DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNICATION HUBS, POWER-GENERATING STATIONS OR DISTRIBUTION GRIDS

0 CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS WHICH CAN CAUSE DEATH OR DISABILITY TO LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION

0 THE EVACUATION OF LARGE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING ESSENTIAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, THROUGH THE DISTRIBUTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT

0 THE TOTAL DEVASTATION OF URBAN AREAS THROUGH THE DETONATION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE.

THE FAILURE OF THE U.S. TO UNDERTAKE POSITIVE MEASURES TODAY TO COPE WITH THE TERRORIST THREAT GIVES THE TERRORIST THE OPPORTUNITY AND THE MOTIVATION TO EXPAND HIS CAPABILITIES. WHEN A NUCLEAR DEVICE IS IN PLACE, IT WILL BE TOO LATE TO TRY TO COMBAT THAT THREAT OF TERRORISM.

FIRST, WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND HOW TERRORISM IS EXPANDING. SECOND, WE NEED TO COMPREHEND WHAT IT IS DOING TO US. THIRD, WE NEED TO TAKE SPECIFIC ACTIONS AGAINST TERRORISM, AND TAKE THEM IN A COORDINATED WAY WITH OTHER NATIONS. TERRORISM'S GREATEST ASSET IS INTERNATIONAL DISUNITY.

IT IS NOT JUST THAT TERRORIST ATTACKS ARE INCREASING IN FREQUENCY AND SOPHISTICATION. BEYOND THIS REALITY WE ARE SEEING A NEW PHENOMENA. PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY WHOLLY DISPARATE GROUPS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE GLOBE -- THE IRA, THE PLO, THE JAPANESE RED ARMY, M-19, DRUG TRAFFICKERS, RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS, SEPARATIST POLITICAL MOVEMENTS -- ARE IN CONTACT, ARE COOPERATING AND EVEN COORDINATING. THEY HAVE ONLY TWO THINGS IN COMMON. ONE, A READINESS TO KILL INNOCENT CIVILIANS. TWO, A CONVICTION THAT THEIR PARTICULAR SPECIAL INTEREST CAN BE SERVED BY UNDERMINING CONFIDENCE IN OUR GOVERNMENTS AND BY TEARING AT THE FABRIC OF OUR SHARED CIVILIZATION.

May 27
1980

ANOTHER NEW DIMENSION OF TERRORISM IS THAT IT IS SUPPORTED BY GOVERNMENTS OF RECOGNIZED STATES, LIKE LIBYA, SYRIA, IRAN, CUBA, AND ~~NORTH YEMEN~~ ^{SOUTH YEMEN} WHO OFFER TRAINING, FINANCES, TRANSPORTATION, WEAPONS, TECHNOLOGY, DIPLOMATIC POUCHES, SECURE COMMUNICATIONS, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES, AND SAFEHAVEN TO PREPETRATORS. STATES ARE GIVING TERRORISTS THE ABILITY TO PREPARE ATTACKS WITHOUT DETECTION, TO CONDUCT THEM WITH MILITARY-STYLE TECHNIQUE AND FIREPOWER, AND GET AWAY QUICKLY AND SAFELY.

IN FACT, THE VIRULENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM TODAY IS IN LARGE PART DUE TO THE COLLABORATION OF COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CLIENT STATES. TERRORISTS CANNOT SUSTAIN A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN OF ATTACKS IN THE WEST WITHOUT SANCTUARY OR DISCREET MEANS OF PASSING FUNDS, ARMS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

WE CAN DEFEAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -- BUT ONLY IF WE UNDERSTAND THE STRATEGY THAT TERRORISM IS USING AGAINST US.

IT IS A FACT THAT A NATION CAN BE RELATIVELY FREE FROM TERRORISM BY PERMITTING TERRORISTS TO COME AND GO RELATIVELY FREELY. BUT SUCH TACIT DEALS ARE A PACT WITH THE DEVIL: THE THREAT IS NOT AVOIDED, ONLY POSTPONED. WHETHER FROM GREED OR COWARDICE, GOVERNMENTS THAT ACQUIESCE IN TERRORISM ARE IN FACT SUPPORTING IT.

NO NATION SHOULD FALL INTO THE TRAP OF OPPOSING TERRORISM ONLY WHEN IT AFFECTS ITS OWN PEOPLE, WHILE IGNORING OR CONDONING OR "UNDERSTANDING" TERRORISM DIRECTED AT SOMEONE ELSE. THE MAJOR PROBLEM CONFRONTING OUR CIVILIZATION HAS BEEN OUR OWN FAILURE TO CONSIDER AN ATTACK ON ONE AS AN ATTACK ON ALL.

OUR SOCIETY WAS FOUNDED UPON SELF-RELIANCE AND SELF-CONFIDENCE OF OUR CITIZENS AS INDIVIDUALS, AS FAMILY MEMBERS AND AS A COMMUNITY. BUT WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE STRUCK BY TERRORISM THEIR WIVES, HUSBANDS, CHILDREN AND RELATIVES URGE THEIR GOVERNMENT TO CAPITULATE, TO MEET THE TERRORISTS' DEMANDS IN ORDER TO SAVE LIVES. IF THE GOVERNMENT AQUIESCES IN THESE "HUMANITARIAN DEMANDS, THE TERRORIST WINS. IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT, AND DEATH RESULTS, CITIZENS FEEL A HEIGHTENED SENSE OF THEIR OWN AND THEIR GOVERNMENT'S VULNERABILITY. EITHER WAY, CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT IS UNDERMINED.

THUS OUR GOVERNMENT AND OUR CITIZENS MUST EXERCISE WHAT HAS BEEN CALLED "CIVIC VALOR" AND STAND UP TO THE TERRORISTS NO MATTER HOW PAINFUL THE CONSEQUENCES. TERRORISM WILL NOT CEASE UNTIL ITS TARGETS DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE INTIMIDATED.

LET ME ALSO ADDRESS ANOTHER OF THE POPULAR MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT TERRORISM -- THE ONE ABOUT "ONE MAN'S FREEDOM FIGHTER IS ANOTHER MAN'S TERRORIST". FREEDOM FIGHTERS ATTACK THE ARMED FORCES OF AN ESTABLISHED REGIME; TERRORISTS DELIBERATELY MURDER AND MAIM THE UNARMED AND INNOCENT. TO EQUATE THE TWO ARGUES A MORAL RELATIVISM AND JEOPARDIZES THE FOUNDATION OF OUR BASIC PRINCIPLES, VALUES, AND CAUSES OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICIES TO LOSE STATURE. WE HEAR TERRORISM WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCES ARE ADDRESSED. WE HEAR THAT INNOCENT HOSTAGES SHOULD BE EXCHANGED FOR JAILED TERRORISTS. WE HEAR THAT THOSE WHO FIGHT BACK AGAINST TERRORISTS ARE NO BETTER THAN TERRORISTS. RIGHT AND WRONG, INNOCENT AND WICKED, THE GOOD AND THE BAD ARE EQUATED.

WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT JUST PEOPLE WITH JUST GRIEVANCES DO NOT USE TERRORISM AS A WEAPON. AND WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT IS IS THE TERRORIST WHO SEEKS TO BLOCK PEACEFULLY NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.

WE ARE TOLD THAT RESISTANCE TO TERRORISM WILL ONLY STIMULATE MORE ACTS OF TERRORISM. IN THE SHORT TERM IT PROBABLY WILL -- BECAUSE THE TERRORISTS WILL HAVE PREPARED FOR MONTHS IN ORDER TO LAUNCH SUCH AN UPSURGE IN THE EVENT OF RETALIATION. BUT TERRORISTS CANNOT WITHSTAND A SUSTAINED AND RESOLUTE POLICY OF RESISTANCE AND ACTIVE PURSUIT.

WE ARE TOLD THAT TO OPPOSE A QADHAFI IS SELF-DEFEATING, BECAUSE IT WILL ONLY ENHANCE HIS STATURE AND WIDEN HIS SUPPORT. THAT HAS NOT HAPPENED. THE REALITY IS THAT MOST OF THOSE WHO SIDE WITH QADHAFI ARE MOTIVATED BY FEAR. THE MORE RESOLUTE WE ARE IN TAKING ACTION, THE GREATER THE NUMBER OF NATIONS THAT WILL JOIN US -- AND THE MORE DETERMINED WILL BE THOSE WHO WISH TO CHANGE LIBYAN POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR RADICAL SUBVERSION, AS IN CHAD, AND TERRORISM.

AND, FINALLY, WE ARE TOLD THAT TO OPPOSE QADHAFI'S LIBYA IS FRUITLESS BECAUSE OTHER NATIONS ALSO SUPPORT TERRORISM AND THAT WE DARE NOT DO TO THEM WHAT WE DO TO QADHAFI. WE WILL SEE. TERRORISM MUST BE HALTED. A LINE MUST BE DRAWN. WE HAVE TO START SOMEWHERE. IF LIBYA -- AND OTHERS LIKE NICARAGUA -- ARE ALLOWED TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POWER THEY WILL ESTABLISH THEMSELVES DEEPER INSIDE THE PROTECTIVE CIRCLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-WEST, PRO-TERRORIST CAMP. AND THEN THAT CIRCLE WILL WIDEN EVEN FURTHER.

IT IS ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT TO STOP TERRORISM, BUT NOT AS DIFFICULT AS SOME WOULD HAVE US BELIEVE. TERRORISM'S STRATEGY IS TO LAUNCH ATTACK AFTER ATTACK; BUT WHEN THE COST OF THOSE ATTACKS EXCEED THE BENEFIT, THAT STRATEGY FAILS. AND TERRORISM'S POLICY IS TO CREATE FEAR; WHEN FEAR IS REPLACED WITH COURAGE, TERRORISM IS FINISHED.

LET ME SUM UP WHAT IS NEEDED:

0 A RECOGNITION OF THE NATURE AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

0 A DETERMINATION NOT TO SURRENDER OR CONCEDE. TERRORISTS HAVE TO BE MADE TO FEEL THAT THEIR ATTACKS WILL FAIL AND THAT PUNISHMENT IS A CERTAINTY.

0 A CONVICTION THAT WE CAN WIN -- AND A REFUSAL TO DEFEAT OURSELVES WITH ENDLESS DEBATES THAT CAN ONLY PRODUCE INACTION.

0 A DECISION TO HOLD OUT PROMINENTLY THE POSSIBILITY OF USING MILITARY FORCE AND THE WILLINGNESS TO EMPLOY OTHER, MORE DISCRETE AND LESS VISABLE MEASURES. THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO DETERRENCE.

0 UNITY AMONG OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. AND A WILLINGNESS TO COORDINATE AND COOPERATE ON A WIDE VARIETY OF PRESSURES SHORT OF MILITARY ACTION. WE MUST CREATE A COMMON DOCTRINE FOR TACTICAL COOPERATION. WE MUST BE ABLE TO COUNT ON THE COMMON RESOLVE AND COMMON ASSUMPTIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES.

THANK YOU.

*POL508 06/13/86
SUBSTANTIAL DECLINE NOTED IN LIBYAN TERRORISM (870)
(Article on Oakley remarks to young leaders conference)
By Ed Scherr
USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- A U.S. official says that Libyan-sponsored terrorism has "substantially subsided" in the wake of the U.S. air strike against terrorist targets in Libya and increased economic and political pressure against the Qadhafi regime.

He says there is a "considerable change in terms of what the Libyans would like to do and what they're able to do."

Ambassador Robert Oakley, director of the State Department's office for counter-terrorism, said June 13 that despite the decline in Libyan actions, "this doesn't mean that it can't come back."

He said that the Libyans are in "disarray" internally, and the number of people to carry out terrorist operations in Europe has been cut in half with more than 100 Libyan diplomats expelled from Western Europe on "suspicion of terrorism."

American experts, the ambassador noted, believe that the American action dealt a considerable blow not only to Qadhafi, but also to his regime. Before the attack, the Libyan regime had a "reputation of being invulnerable, of being able to at least verbally attack the United States, France or others and get away with it," he said. The air attacks have fostered "uncertainty" within Libya and cut away at Qadhafi's popular support, Oakley said.

But he added that just because the Qadhafi regime is weakened, that doesn't mean it's about to collapse.

The ambassador noted that the European Community nations have placed tight controls on the entry and movement of Libyans who are left in Europe, and the Europeans have begun to apply some economic pressure "which the Libyans are feeling."

And Oakley pointed out that Libyans discovered at the time of the U.S. air strikes that the Soviets -- who gave the Libyans all sorts of inspiration, political backing and military equipment -- were nowhere to be seen militarily. "Their support was limited only to propaganda," he said.

"It shocked the Libyans," Oakley stressed. "And since then, there hasn't been any rush" by the Soviets to provide additional arms.

Oakley said that the Soviets were probably "quite uncomfortable" about the situation, noting that last fall the United States had tried to talk to Soviet officials "about why they could become very uncomfortable by providing military support to such a mercurial, erratic, dangerous person as Qadhafi. And I think they've probably gotten the message."

He made the comments in an appearance before the annual foreign policy conference of the American Council of Young Political Leaders.

Commenting on the threat of Syrian-supported terrorism, the ambassador said "the problem of Syria is one that we take seriously." He said that the European area is aware that Syria is a threat, but "it has not been nearly as serious a threat as Libya, so far, in terms of what's actually happened against U.S. or European interests."

However, he stressed, "any terrorist action is too much, particularly when it's supported by a state." The ambassador said that it has been made very clear to the Syrians that support of terrorism "is absolutely unacceptable."

"So far, the Syrians are paying carefully attention to what happened in Libya," Oakley said, referring to the U.S. actions there, and "to the concerns expressed by different governments."

Oakley said that Soviet leaders in recent talks with Syrian and Libyan officials seem to be saying that "'we support you' -- and not meaning it very much at all in respect to Libya, but meaning it in respect to Syria. And in both cases, also saying, 'don't mess around with terrorism' because it will cause trouble that the Soviets don't want."

He said American experts believe that the Soviets in their public comments were trying to "disassociate the Soviet Union from the sort of terrorism" that the United States has reacted against very strongly and, at the same time, "proclaim their support for Syria."

Oakley told questioners that it "would be much more difficult" in dealing with Syria than with Libya. "I can't go into the specifics on how we might react, but I can assure you that we have had an exhaustive examination of the things that could be done, and we have a number of ideas in mind. We have discussed this problem with other governments," he said.

"It would be more complicated" than against Libya, he continued, "but nevertheless we would find the way to do it, if the threat was so severe that it was called for."

He emphasized that the United States is "not out looking for vengeance. We're looking to prevent terrorism."

Oakley said on the question of Americans canceling their European travel plans that there is "no reason to panic" over the threat of terrorist attacks. "There is no reason I can see for Americans to be scared in general to go abroad because 'terrorists are going to gobble us up.' We have never acted that way as a nation," he said.

He told travelers to be "prudent as to where you go" and keep informed about State Department travel advisories.

NNNN

also in "Close hold"

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA) PANEL DISCUSSION

Friday, June 6, 1986

Mayflower Hotel

"Future Trends in Terrorism"

Ambassador Oakley has provided an effective summary of where we have been over the last few years in the terrorist threat and how we are combatting it. We should not make any mistakes, however, in assuming that we are winning in the campaign against terrorists. While it is true that we have been relatively free of terrorist attacks in the United States, the number of terrorist events continues to increase and the casualties continue to climb. American tourist trade and visits to Europe have declined dramatically; American businesses around the world are removing their signs, reducing American personnel, and taking the American flag off the roofs of their buildings. The government itself has taken steps to reduce the number of official Americans overseas and in a number of missions around the world our diplomats are virtual prisoners behind the barricades we have erected to protect them. These are not signs that we are winning a war against terrorists, a campaign to stamp out this criminal behavior.

In point of fact, that statement: "War against terrorism and campaign against criminal acts" contains much of the dichotomy we face as a government in dealing with the problem of terrorism. Domestically, we approach terrorism as an issue for criminal

prosecution. We have even extended the long arm of our law to make certain terrorist acts conducted overseas subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Yet, we also talk about "the war against terrorism" -- which in the minds of some gives combatant status to those who take hostages, pirate aircraft, and bomb innocent civilians. The "war analogy" allows our opponents the use of the trite canard "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Does referring to terrorism as war, rather than criminal activity, lend dignity to terrorists and place their acts in the context of accepted international behavior? Obviously for some this is the case. In short, we have failed to determine whether or not we are engaged in a battle at the low end of the warfare spectrum -- a form of low-intensity unconventional conflict or worldwide campaign against criminals.

This dichotomy is reflected in our prosecution of the campaign and it is indeed the broad-gage approach we have taken. Bureaucratically, politically, operationally, and technically, we have sought to bring to bear all necessary assets -- law enforcement, diplomatic, economic, military, and covert intelligence services. After the Beirut and Kuwait bombing attacks in 1983, the President directed that we improve our organization to better prosecute the campaign against terrorism. This organizational arrangement was further refined as a consequence of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism in an effort to streamline the decision process and management of our

government's program. Bob Oakley and I co-chair the two interagency entities which oversee our policy and our management of incidents. The question one must ask is does this process work? My answer is sometimes.

Just a few weeks ago, the United States acted against Libya in an effort aimed at preventing further attacks on American citizens. Before our strikes, we were provided with irrefutable evidence of Libyan complicity in the bombing of a discotheque in Berlin. We had further evidence that additional attacks of this kind were being planned. Our action was surely justified, as the President noted in his remarks to the nation on the night of April 14, under the self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This action resulted from a concerted effort within the Administration to determine what steps would be most effective in preventing further Libyan-directed attacks.

In general, one can claim that the strategy worked. But, the broader question is one of resources and assets which were brought to bear on the problem. It is widely known that we were forced to use aging F-111's, based in the United Kingdom, on a 2,800 mile round-trip -- along with the assets of two carrier battle groups positioned in the Mediterranean. For a variety of reasons, our NATO allies -- and the French are a part of NATO -- refused overflight permission, forcing a route that was nearly twice as long. We were forced to this decision by a lack of other alternatives.

During the ACHILLE LAURO incident, we were blessed with accurate and timely intelligence that allowed us to intercept the Egyptian aircraft carrying the terrorists responsible for the murder Leon Klinghoffer. In this case, U.S. Navy F-14's were used to force the aircraft to land at Sigonella, where we had hastily positioned our special purpose forces.

In both cases, we used conventional military assets for counter-terrorist missions and met our immediate objectives. But, if we are indeed serious about terrorism posing a long-term threat to the national security interests of the United States, we need to be actively seeking other alternatives besides F-111's, A-6's, and F-14's.

We already have some of what we need. Our Joint Special Operations units are the finest in the world, yet they are positioned thousands of miles from where they are most needed. On several occasions, like the Egypt Air Flight #648 in November 1985, we found ourselves in a situation where we were asked to help but we unable to do so because the Maltese government was unwilling to allow our units to enter their territory to assist the Egyptian commandos in resolving the incident. We find ourselves neither correctly positioned -- given time and distance factors -- nor adequately assured of diplomatic clearance for the use of our forces -- even when American citizens are jeopardized.

When TWA Flight #847 was skyjacked by Shiite terrorists minutes after takeoff from Athens, we began a 17 day ordeal to achieve the release of 145 passengers, a 104 of which were Americans. As the aircraft shuttled between Algiers and Beirut, we found ourselves completely unable to intervene in a manner that we safely ground the airplane at a point where we could act unilaterally or with others to terminate the incident.

Despite significant improvements in our bureaucratic structure, technology and procedures for rapidly disseminating information, and a dramatically improved military capability, we are rarely able to predict or, more importantly, prevent a terrorist attack from occurring. Our covert action capability at the opening of this Administration was practically non-existent. The task of rebuilding it is slow and arduous. Had we possessed such a capability during TWA #847, it might have been possible to render the aircraft incapable of flying at a point where we could have acted to release the hostages before they could be taken from the plane in Beirut. Such a capability might have saved the lives of the 60 persons killed on Egypt Air Flight #648.

Yet, to many, particularly in our Congress, the thought of covert action is an anathema. Critics of such a capability have hamstrung our intelligence services with a series of constraints on both the service and the executive that makes such action almost impossible. Our experience with Libya just weeks ago

proves that even overt military action, no matter how popular with the American people, is a subject for intense debate.

During the Congressional consultations the day of our raid, the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the National Security Advisor were berated for not allowing sufficient time for adequate consultations. Several members criticized us for giving them "a briefing on a decision already reached," rather than the opportunity to consult. It was carefully explained that the strike could be recalled at any point up to 15 minutes before 7:00 p.m. and, if there was a consensus among those present that our action was incorrect, the President would so order. No such consensus existed. In fact, those who raised concerns about the consultation agreed with the decision to strike. Yet, despite admonitions that public revelations about the consultation or its contents would jeopardize American lives, immediately following the meeting two members walked straight to reporters' awaiting microphones.

These are significant problems which we must overcome. In addition to those essential diplomatic steps which we must take to work more closely with our allies and the formulation of additional laws which strengthen our ability to prosecute those who perpetrate such brutality, we must also:

- Improve the ability to conduct covert operations aimed at preempting terrorist acts before they occur. These actions involve disrupting, frustrating, confusing, and exposing terrorists, their organizations, and their supporters.

- Examine the current dual-oversight committee structure in the Congress. The demands for prior notification in the oversight process practically mandate inaction.

- Explore means to better position our counter-terrorist military units so that they are closer to the scene of action.

- Arrive at understandings with the legislative branch or change the current resolution on War Powers so that the President can act decisively without further jeopardizing American lives.

- Stop talking tough and start acting quietly. Effective action speaks far louder than words -- particularly in the terror camps of the Bekka valley, the Libyan desert, the Crimea, Castro's isle of pines, or Ortega's Nicaragua.

Some have suggested that a joint committee on counter-terrorism would be an appropriate legislative forum for these issues. Others have proposed that the Intelligence Oversight Act and War Powers Resolution be modified or even eliminated.

What we need is a realistic approach to a growing problem. Terrorism does indeed threaten the faith of the American people in their government. It erodes the image of reliability of the

United States as an ally. If we fail to address the problem, both the individual terrorist and his cause -- however ill-conceived -- gain strength and confidence.

It is important that we look for long-term solutions to a long-term problem, there will be no quick fixes in this effort. We should not allow ourselves to create the expectation that terrorism will indeed go away tomorrow. Yes, 1986 will hopefully, as the President has said, be the year in which the world comes to grips with the plague of terrorism. But, we should realize that the cure for the plague means tough medicine that at times will be hard to swallow.