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
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TERRORISM

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Political Terror in the Muslim World

Elie Kedourie



THERE IS A prevalent (and justifiable) impression that an appreciable part of terrorist activities today originate, and frequently take place, in the world of Islam, and particularly in its Arab portion. The Western public has become acutely aware of these activities owing to the electronic media and their ability speedily to report terrorist outrages in a graphic and striking manner. But the fact that political terrorism originating in the Muslim and Arab world is constantly in the headlines must not obscure the perhaps more significant fact that this terrorism has an old history. More significant, because this old history will serve to account for, and in great measure to explain, the recourse to political terrorism today, it will be seen to be more than simply a passing contemporary phenomenon. For it is, on the contrary, a phenomenon by no means easy to eradicate.

Jurists have made lucid and necessary distinctions which enable us to distinguish terrorism from, say, "guerrilla warfare", or what Clausewitz called the *petite guerre*. For our present purposes, if terrorism can be cursorily described as "intimidation through thuggery", then much of modern political terrorism may be described as ideological thuggery. In other words, when terrorism is political it is very often the case that the terrorist is moved by a political ideal which he wants to realise. Its realisation is thought to be brought nearer by, and thus a justification of, the use of terrorist methods.

The *locus classicus* of such a doctrine may be found in Bakunin's and Nechaev's famous *Revolutionary Catechism* (1869), while the terrorists' state of mind and the dialectic leading from idealistic fervour to actual murder are powerfully conveyed in works such as Dostoevsky's *The Possessed* (1871) and Joseph Conrad's *The Secret Agent* (1907) and *Under Western Eyes* (1911).

Though political terrorism in Islam has not produced documents quite like the *Revolutionary Catechism* or imaginative evocations of the terrorists' world like Conrad's or Dostoevsky's, yet there can be no doubt that the ideological impulse is just as present and just as ruthless in the case of Islam as in that of Europe.

The first political assassination to take place in Islam is, I suppose, that of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet who became the fourth Caliph. He was murdered in the year of 661 (of the Christian era) by a member of a group of his former supporters who came to believe that Ali was following a policy at variance with the word of God. Much better known, of course, much more formidable and longer lasting in their terrorist activities, were the so-called "Assassins", an off-shoot of the Isma'ili Shi'ites who established the Fatimid Caliphate in Cairo in 969.

The Assassins were votaries of a religion which held that the only legitimate ruler of the Muslims, the Imam, was the descendant of Isma'il (himself seventh in the line of succession from the Imam Ali), in their eyes the sole legitimate legatee of the Prophet. Under the impulsion of a leader of genius, Hasan-i Sabbah (d. 1124), who may be considered as a foremost exponent of the theory and practice of terrorism,¹ comparatively small groups of Isma'ilis in Eastern Persia and Syria adopted and perfected assassination as a weapon against Sunni rulers and their officials, as well as against Crusader leaders. Of the murder of the well-known Seljuq vizir, Nizam al-Mulk, in 1092, Hasan-i Sabbah is declared in an Isma'ili account to have said that "the killing of this devil is the beginning of bliss".

The followers of Hasan-i Sabbah also held that terrorism was an efficient weapon because, as an Isma'ili writer put it:

"by one single warrior on foot a king may be stricken with terror, though he own more than a hundred thousand horsemen."

Such belief in the efficacy of terrorism held a certain plausibility for Hasan-i Sabbah and his followers because of the character of the states against which they pitted themselves. These were centralised despotisms in which (to adopt Hegel's description of Oriental realms) one man alone was free. To do away with this man and, possibly, with his immediate entourage, seemed to offer an easy way of toppling a régime, even perhaps of destroying a state. This condition of centralised despotism has, by and large, continued to characterise the world of Islam where the gap between ruler and ruled has, if anything, increased in modern times, and where one finds a noticeable lack of political institutions which may serve to articulate the body politic and give it strength and resilience.

¹ See Bernard Lewis, *The Assassins* (1967).

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But, in the end, the Assassins failed. However many rulers and their servants they managed to murder, they could not possibly prevail against the organised military power, resting on an extensive territorial base, of the rulers whom they challenged. In this respect, what is true of the Assassins would, I think, also generally hold true of terrorism in the modern world, the world of Islam included.

The assassins sent out by Hasan-i Sabbah and his lieutenants were known as *fidai's* or *fidawis*, i.e. those who offer themselves up in sacrifice for the sake of their cause. The expression, as well as the phenomenon, has survived. It has come to be used by the terrorists who have emerged in another Shi'ite society—that of the Twelver Shi'ites, i.e. those Shi'ites who believe that the legitimate ruler of the Muslims is the twelfth descendant of Ali, who disappeared in about 873. This Imam, now hidden, will reappear in his own good time, and when he does so will be recognised as the Mahdi, the rightly-guided one, the Master of the Hour, Living Proof and bringer of Resurrection.

In Twelver Shi'ism, therefore, there is what might be called a built-in Messianism. This Messianism has usually encouraged political passivity, but it can also fuel political activism of an extreme kind, and lead to terrorist acts, as with the Assassins. The activities in Iran this century (from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s) of the Fedayan-i Islam led by a cleric who called himself Nawab Safevi are a case in point. Among the murders for which the Fedayan were responsible was that of the Prime Minister, Razmara, and of a well-known writer, Kasravi, who held anti-Islamic views. The same Messianic radicalism and the same readiness for self-sacrifice mark those Iranian devotees of Ayatollah Khomeini (the Imam, as they call him) harboured by Syria, who are thought to have been responsible for the suicidal attacks in 1983 on the US Embassy in Beirut, and on US, French and Israeli bases in Beirut and Tyre, as well as those Shi'ites who, during the same year, attacked the US Embassy and other public buildings in Kuwait.

Beliefs and political attitudes within Shi'ism in its different varieties account, then, for a tendency to resort to terrorist action, and for what might be called a terrorist mentality—a tendency manifest in the past, and present today. The Isma'ilis organised their activities from the safety of fortified castles dominating a comparatively exiguous hinterland. After the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, terrorism came to enjoy a sanctuary considerably less vulnerable and facilities much more extensive than Hasan-i Sabbah could have dreamed of. Khomeini's Iran thus exemplifies the idea of a "terrorist state"—a state which, as a matter of course, organises and supports terrorist activities against foreign individuals and groups whom, for one reason or another, it desires to eliminate or intimidate. Of this now useful, albeit ghastly, concept the evidence shows that the USSR, Syria, Libya and Iraq offer further exemplifications.

TERRORISM IN THE WORLD OF ISLAM has other roots which are not indigenous, which in fact come from Europe. Modern European political thought and

attitudes have a prominent strand of violence—of what I have called a European feature became part of the world market which itself was a European market, passed, of course with much else, into Islam.

One of the earliest figures of this theory and practice, was the we Afghani (1838-97) whose activities in the Muslim world. Afghani was a strange amalgam of Western and certainly believed in assassination. In the 1870s, together with his disciple Mufti of Egypt), he plotted the murder of Isma'il. This plot came to pass decades later, while at Constantinople encompassed the murder of Nasir al-Din, a minded murderer whom he despised. He was caught and interrogated, partly European, partly Shi'ite, with the stamp of Afghani's inspiration of bloodshed which accompanied the justification for killing the tyrant, that Afghani was the Mahdi, the one who would manifest himself at the end of the age of injustice, and fill it with justice.

A more purely European provocation of movements and activities in the Muslim world this century. This is the case with Wafiq al-Murad, a Muslim pharmacist who murdered the British Consul of Egypt, Butros Ghali, in 1910 and who, in his prison cell, was busy writing a *Constitution* and Rousseau's *Social Contract* a political treatise to deal with the establishment of an Islamic government.

In the second and third decades of this century saw a proliferation of secret terrorist nationalist parties, and particularly in the Middle East, many of whom believed that the murder of British and French officials with British dominance and in the name of a new earth. Nasser, as he tells in *My Revolution* (1959), was himself drawn to the lure, the excitement, and the thrill of murder. So was his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, who at the end of World War II political assassination.

In Algeria, again, in the 1950s, the "Front al-Hadj's overt political party, the "Organisation" attached to it, was engaged in terrorism. Messali had been an organiser among Algerian workers and was of his "Special Organisation" leadership of the FLN—its terrorist organisation.

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is a body in the Muslim world to be distinguished from a European model. The West Bank after the Six Day War, the Gaza Strip were conquered by Israel. The PLO guerrillas would challenge the

territories, these guerrillas being sheltered by (and finding cover among) the sympathising local populations. The PLO would, thus, be applying the tactics enunciated and put into practice by the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists. They would circulate in the occupied territories "like fish in water". This strategy was speedily shown to be a failure; and guerrilla action was replaced by terrorist activity properly speaking, against Israeli, Arab, and foreign civilian targets. This has perforce remained the dominant strategy of the PLO, any attempt to transform it into a regular military force or peoples' militia having so far failed, as has indeed the strictly terrorist strategy also.

OTHER GROUPS in the world of Islam have practised terrorism as a matter of European-inspired doctrine and strategy.

The Armenian Dashnaks and Hinchaks in the Ottoman Empire, who were active especially during the 1890s, derived their doctrines from Western ideologies, and they followed the example of various revolutionary groups in Czarist Russia. Again, Armenian terrorism against Turkish targets, in emulation of the Left-wing terrorist groups in Germany and Italy who have been active in the last two decades, has reappeared—encouraged perhaps by the Soviets, and certainly helped by the PLO, with whom Armenian organisations have established links in the Lebanon.

Both Left-wing and Right-wing terrorism appeared in Turkey in the 1970s, inspired by Marxist or Nationalist ideologies, and most probably clandestinely armed and supported by the Soviet bloc. The Turkish civilian governments in power during that decade proved powerless to check and arrest their activities. The military régime, however, which took over in 1980, succeeded in suppressing them. The most notorious exploit to be accomplished by these groups was the attempted murder of the Pope by Mehmet Ali Ağca, who is alleged to have been sent on his mission by the Bulgarian Secret Service.

In Iran, again, various Left-wing terrorist groups, whom the Shah's régime collectively described as "Islamic Marxists", took part in the movement which led to the downfall of this régime, only to be ruthlessly hunted and destroyed by Khomeini's régime, which had been a beneficiary of their activities.

WE HAVE, FINALLY, TO CONSIDER a third group of terrorists in the world of Islam, who have been extremely active over the last few years. Their inspiration is different from that of the first two groups considered so far. These are the terrorists connected with, or stemming from, the movement of the Muslim Brethren which Hasan al-Banna formed in Egypt in the late 1920s. The movement originally aimed at the regeneration of Islam in Egyptian society—a society corrupted and pulverised through European domination and the influence of godless European ideas. By a natural dialectic this regeneration came to be seen as involving nothing less than making the Koran itself the

Constitution of Egypt—as the slogan of the Brethren has it, "Islam our banner, and the Koran our constitution." It is for this reason that the movement of the Brethren is rightly described as "fundamentalist", in the sense that it preaches a return to the fundamentals of Islam, as these are supposed to have been in the time of the Prophet and of the first four, Rightly-Guided, Caliphs.

To pursue such an ideal was, then, necessarily to be involved in politics; and Banna's movement, from being concerned solely with social welfare and purely religious teaching, came increasingly to aspire to a political role. By the outbreak of World War II, the Brethren had become a political force to be reckoned with in Egypt, and Banna an important political personage able to mobilise and organise large numbers of followers. In order to realise the goals of his movement, Banna created and controlled a secret "Special Apparatus" which was used for clandestine activities, including assassinations. These activities must have considerably alarmed the authorities, and Banna was assassinated in 1949 (it is said on the orders of King Faruq).

The military régime which replaced the monarchy in 1952 seemed at first well-disposed to the Brethren, who may even have hoped that their programme would actually be realised under the auspices of the so-called "Free Officers", many of whom (including Nasser and Sadat) had had dealings with Banna and his lieutenants, and seemed sympathetic to their aims. But it was not long before the military régime and the Brethren were in conflict. When, in 1954, an attempt was made to assassinate Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Brethren were held responsible. The movement was suppressed and driven underground, and many of its leaders were executed or imprisoned. Among them was one of the ablest of the Brethren, Sayyid Qutb, who was to remain in prison, apart from a short interval, between 1954 and 1966 when he was in turn condemned to death and executed. What brought about such harsh treatment was the publication in 1965 of a short book by Sayyid Qutb, *Signposts on the Road*, which the military régime considered so subversive and dangerous that it was moved to publish a rejoinder, *Signposts on the Road to Treason and Reaction*.

Signposts on the Road taught that sovereignty belonged only to God, and that the existing rulers of Muslims, by disregarding this divine truth, and by claiming to exercise a merely terrestrial sovereignty, proved themselves to be unbelievers and usurping tyrants. With such rulers the Muslims could in no way compromise, and to them no obedience was due. This clear-cut and categorical doctrine seems to have been the inspiration of a number of terrorist activities of which Egypt has been the scene during the last decade—activities all based on the premise that the actual ruler of Egypt possessed no legitimacy, and that it was mandatory to kill him.

The year 1974 saw a conspiracy to kill President Anwar Sadat, organised by a Palestinian, Salih Sirriya, who was caught and executed. There followed, in 1977, another terrorist outrage perpetrated against a man of religion who was Minister of Pious Foundations. This was organised by an Egyptian, Shukri Mustafa, who had been a member of the Brethren, and who formed a group of Muslims, popularly

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known as the Group of Excommunication and Withdrawal. (Shukri preached the withdrawal of the faithful, i.e. his followers, from the general Islamic society, which he anathematised as one of unbelief, *kufir*—hence the appellation of his group.) Following the murder of the Minister, al-Shaykh al-Dhahabi, Shukri was caught and executed. Lastly, there was the *Jihad* or Holy War Group, from whom Sadat's assassin was to emerge, and who were inspired by an electrician, Abd al-Salam Faraj, author of an opusculé, *The Hidden Duty*. The duty in question—which for the author was, though hidden, as much a pillar of Islam as the other publicly acknowledged obligations—was that of killing the Muslim ruler who compromised with unbelievers and unbelief.

Sadat was one such. This conviction, together with resentment at the arrest of a brother on suspicion of involvement in Islamic extremism, led the twenty-four-year-old Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambuli to organise Sadat's murder on 6 October 1981, at the military review commemorating the eighth anniversary of the outbreak of the Yom Kipur War, and the successful Egyptian crossing of the Canal.

Having done the deed, Islambuli identified himself and declared that he had just killed Pharaoh.

THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN SYRIA have, likewise, engaged in terrorist activities. Their target is the Ba'thist régime which, in their eyes, is doubly reprehensible. Ba'thist doctrine is secularist, and for nearly two decades now the Ba'thist Party and régime have been controlled by a faction of Alawites—in Sunni eyes heretics beyond the pale. The Brethren have organised the murder of numerous Ba'thist officials and officers.

One of the most notorious of their exploits was the murder in 1979 of 83 Alawite cadets at the Artillery School in Aleppo. In 1980, an unsuccessful attempt was made on

President Assad's life. In retaliation a large number of Brethren interned in a concentration camp were exterminated in cold blood. In Aleppo in 1980, and again in Hama in 1981, forces of the régime descended on Sunni quarters, killing indiscriminately in an attempt to terrorise the population and dissuade it from offering shelter and help to the Brethren. The official terror was not efficacious enough. An insurrection broke out in February 1982 in Hama, leading the régime to bomb the city from the air, and to raze a large part of it, indiscriminately killing thousands of citizens in the process.

A conspiratorial and terrorist movement thus met its match in a régime equally conspiratorial and terroristic. Syria under the Ba'th was then, in yet a different sense, a terrorist state in that (like Germany under Hitler, and the Soviet Union most conspicuously under Stalin) it totally brushed aside legality in its dealings with its citizens.

WHATEVER ITS ORIGINS and inspiration, whether it is Mahdist zeal in Shi'ism, or ideological fervour instilled by European activist ideologies, or the desire to extirpate corruption and restore a pristine purity imagined to mark the Prophetic era, terrorism in modern Islam is unlikely to prove a flash in the pan. It is one manifestation of the deep dislocation suffered by Islamic society in modern times, and attests to the widespread belief in the promise and efficacy of violent political action—a belief derived in equal measure from European ideologies and from bellicosity *vis-à-vis* the Unbeliever and the Heretic which is a feature of traditional Islam. It also underlines the simultaneous prevalence of Muslim régimes which, issuing from conspiracies and *coups d'état*, are devoid of legitimacy. It is not easy or practicable to discriminate between intra- and inter-state terrorism in the world of Islam since, however defined, the goals of the terrorists usually transcend the boundaries of the state as usually recognised.

Terrorism: The Challenge and the Response



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, before the Brookings Institution Conference on Terrorism, Washington, D.C., December 10, 1986.

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this important conference on terrorism. I note from your program that you have already heard the perspectives of many distinguished academics and specialists; this afternoon, I would like to present our views on this scourge. More specifically, there are three questions that I want to address.

First, what exactly is terrorism?

Second, why is the United States so concerned about terrorism?

And third, what are we doing to combat it?

Let me begin with some observations on the nature of terrorism. In recent years, we have learned a good deal about what terrorism is and is not. What once may have seemed the random, senseless acts of a few crazed individuals has come into clearer focus as a new pattern of low-technology and inexpensive warfare against the West and its friends. And, while it is an alarming pattern, it is a threat that we can identify, combat, and, ultimately, defeat.

Terrorism is a sophisticated form of political violence. It is neither random nor without purpose. On the contrary, terrorism is a strategy and tool of those who reject the norms and values of civilized people everywhere.

Today, humanity is confronted by a wide assortment of terrorist groups whose stated objectives may range from separatist causes to ethnic grievances to social and political revolutions. Their methods include hijackings, bombings, kidnappings, and political assassinations. But the overreaching goal of virtually all terrorists is the same: to impose their will by using force against civilians.

The horrors they inflict on the defenseless are calculated to achieve very specific political purposes. They want people to feel vulnerable and afraid; they want citizens to lose faith in their government's ability to protect them; and they want to undermine the legitimacy not only of specific government policies but of the governments themselves.

Terrorists gain from the confusion and anarchy caused by their violence. They succeed when governments alter their policies out of intimidation. They also succeed when governments respond to terrorist violence with repressive, polarizing actions that alienate the authorities from the populace—and, thereby, play directly into the terrorists' hands.

State-Sponsored Terrorism

As you may well know, terrorist violence is hardly a new phenomenon. Nearly two centuries ago, for example, the Barbary pirates conducted their own form of terrorism, operating from North African ports and leading to the landing of U.S. marines on the shores of Tripoli. Similarly, the forerunner of the car bomb,

the cart bomb, dates back to Napoleonic times. Nevertheless, certain features of modern-day terrorism seem to be, if not historically unprecedented, then certainly very unusual.

To begin with, a good deal of contemporary terrorism is state sponsored. As an example, consider one of the most notorious terrorist groups of our day, the Abu Nidal organization. This group now receives backing and support from Libya; it finds sanctuary in Eastern Europe; and Damascus has provided it with important logistical support since 1983. Indeed, Syria allows Abu Nidal's group to maintain training camps in areas of Lebanon under Syrian control. Syria also provides the group with travel documents, permits its operatives to transit freely, and continues to sanction the operation of Abu Nidal's facilities in Damascus.

Nor is Abu Nidal the only terrorist group supported by Syria. Damascus also provides varying amounts of support to other radical Palestinian groups. Non-Palestinian terrorist groups, as well, have facilities or have received training in Syria or Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon. These groups include the Japanese Red Army, the Kurdish Labor Party, the Armenian terrorist organization ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia], and al-Zulfikar of Pakistan. In the past, we have had to rely on intelligence sources for information on Syrian support for international terrorism. More

recently, however, public trials in London and Berlin have conclusively demonstrated Syria's complicity in terrorist actions.

Unfortunately, Syria is not the only state which supports terrorism. Iran, Cuba, Libya, and South Yemen are also key members of today's terrorist international. Indeed, the deadly combination of direct government assistance such as arms, explosives, communications, travel documents, and training, on the one hand, and violent individuals or groups, on the other hand, is a major factor in both the growth and the effectiveness of terrorism in recent years.

The Soviet Role

In the past, terrorism was almost exclusively the weapon of the weak, a gesture by small groups of determined extremists to call attention to their cause. Today, however, we see that even a major power like the Soviet Union supports terrorist activity in pursuit of its ambitions.

We should understand the Soviet role in international terrorism without exaggeration or distortion. The Soviet Union officially denounces the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Yet here, as elsewhere, there is a wide disparity between Soviet statements and actions. The Soviet Union uses terrorist groups to advance its own purposes and goals, including the weakening of liberal democracy and the undermining of regional stability. One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups can be found in almost every society. But, certainly, in some countries terrorism has been more violent and pervasive because of support from the Soviet Union and its satellites—notably Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

Terrorism and Democracy

In thinking about terrorism, certain facts must be faced. All states and all political systems are vulnerable to terrorist assault. Nevertheless, the number of terrorist incidents in totalitarian states is minimal; markedly fewer acts are committed against their citizens abroad than against westerners. This discrepancy has not arisen simply because police states make it harder for terrorists to carry out acts of violence. It also reflects the fundamental antagonism between terrorism and democracy.

One reason that the United States is so concerned about terrorism, wherever it takes place, is that it is largely directed against the democracies—often against our fundamental strategic interests, always against our most basic values. The moral values upon which democracy is based—individual rights, equality under the law, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, and the peaceful resolution of disputes—all stand in the way of those who seek to impose their will, their ideology, or their religious beliefs by force. The terrorists reject and despise the open processes of democratic society and, therefore, consider us their mortal enemy.

States that sponsor terrorism use it as another weapon of warfare against the United States and our allies. Through terrorism, they seek to gain strategic advantages where they cannot use conventional means of attack. When terrorists, reportedly with Iranian backing, set out to bomb Western personnel in Beirut, they hoped to weaken the West's commitment to defend its interests in the Middle East. When North Korea perpetrated the murder of South Korean Government officials in Rangoon, it sought to weaken the non-communist stronghold on the mainland of East Asia. When Syria participated in the attempt to blow up the El Al airliner and murder over 300 people, it attempted to strike a major blow against Israel, the United States, and Britain.

In Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere, the United States is a principal target of terrorist violence, not so much because of what we do or don't do but, rather, because of what we are: a nation dedicated to the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Preventing Future Terrorist Violence

Terrorist violence is taking an increasingly grim toll on human life. Last year, for example, nearly 800 terrorist attacks hit citizens and public facilities in 84 countries; over 900 persons were killed, of whom 38 were American. As an American official, I highlight the number of Americans who have been killed. But, no matter what their nationality, 900 deaths are just too many.

The potential of future incidents is even more worrying. Terrorists now rely on guns, grenades, and bombs to spread ruin and fear. That is bad enough. In the future, however, states which support terrorists could provide even more lethal means of destruction. The fact that this has not happened yet does not allow us to be complacent about the future. On

the contrary, the essence of an effective policy is to identify a danger to our interests before it is self-evident and implement a sensible preventive response.

U.S. Counterterrorist Policy

What I have said thus far should give you a clear conception of this Administration's view of the phenomenon of terrorism. Now let me turn to the third and final point I want to discuss this afternoon: U.S. counterterrorist policy. I hardly need say that this is a particularly controversial topic just now. Many of you, I am sure, have strong views on this subject. Yet I urge you not to lose sight of the many real and substantial achievements this Administration has made in the fight against terrorism. Much of this effort receives little attention and takes place in the realm of intelligence gathering, in the cluttered offices of analysts, or in the laboratories of scientists trying to develop better ways of detecting hidden explosives.

What are these achievements? During the past few years, we have made remarkable progress in thwarting potential attacks. Only successful terrorist acts receive front-page coverage, but I'd like to draw your attention to the attempts that fail—largely due to our efforts. Last year alone, we and our friends foiled more than 120 planned terrorist attacks. For example, in Turkey this April, security officers arrested Libyan-supported terrorists who were planning to attack the U.S. officers club in Ankara during a wedding celebration. In Paris, at about the same time, officials thwarted a similar attack planned against the visa line at the U.S. Embassy.

A number of initiatives have contributed to this progress. We have been developing our own intelligence capabilities vis-a-vis international terrorists and sharing that intelligence with other nations in a timely fashion. We have expanded international cooperation in the fields of law enforcement and counterterrorist training. Under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, which began in April 1984, we have established active exchange and training programs with 32 foreign governments.

States which may not actually train and fund terrorists but which ignore terrorist activity in their own countries pose a particularly difficult problem. Unless their own citizens are the targets of terrorist acts, many nations assume it's not their problem. We are responding to this unwillingness to act by

discussing terrorism with all nations—not just our allies. I recently returned from a trip to Eastern Europe, which is an area well known for its leniency toward terrorists. Eastern Europeans are realizing that terrorism is their problem too: there were Hungarians at the Vienna airport when it was attacked last year, and Romania recently stated its opposition to terrorism. There is much more to be done in Eastern Europe, but with continued effort, we can make all countries understand that terrorism is a crime against humanity.

We are also for putting teeth into international antiterrorism conventions. For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization toughened its regulations dramatically after the hijacking of TWA Flight 847. In response to the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, the International Maritime Organization began to develop similar regulations for seaborne transportation. Last year, the UN General Assembly adopted a strong resolution declaring terrorism a crime, whatever the rationale.

We have taken great strides toward bringing our diplomatic installations in threatened areas up to the standards necessary to protect our people. All of our posts have conducted intensive reviews of their security needs, and these reviews have been the basis for speedy action. We have made immediate improvements at 23 high-threat posts. We are planning to construct new office buildings that will measure up to the latest security standards. The Inman commission [Advisory Panel on Overseas Security] has estimated that improving the security of our institutions abroad will cost \$4.2 billion over a 5-year period. Congress has approved less than \$1 billion for the first stage. There is obviously a great need for increased funding over the next 5 years.

Our research into new technologies for enhancing physical security is also continuing. We have begun working with the private sector to help corporations improve their capacity for dealing with terrorists. We have passed tougher laws against terrorism, such as the Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, which makes terrorist acts against Americans abroad punishable in U.S. courts. And we are urging other nations to tighten their procedures for issuing visas to suspected terrorists.

We have also developed our own counterterrorist military capabilities to react swiftly to terrorist situations. In both the *Achille Lauro* affair and last April's assault on Tripoli, we demonstrated our willingness and ability to use

force against terrorists and against states that support them. Col. Qadhafi now has no illusions about our determination—and neither should any others who would use terrorist violence against us.

Most important, perhaps, we are helping to educate the public about the real nature of the terrorist threat. Over the years, too many of us have accepted uncritically certain very misleading views about the nature of terrorism—views which disarm us intellectually and strengthen our adversaries. For any counterterrorism policy to be effective, these misconceptions must be dispelled.

Misconceptions About Terrorism

What misconceptions am I referring to? Let me briefly mention three of them. We have all heard the insidious assertion that “one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter.” What this constitutes, of course, is an attempt to justify terrorism as a legitimate form of warfare and political struggle.

When Secretary Shultz addresses this issue, he sometimes quotes the powerful rebuttal of this kind of moral relativism made by the late Senator Henry Jackson. Senator Jackson's statement bears repeating today.

The idea that one person's “terrorist” is another's “freedom fighter” cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word “freedom” to be associated with acts of terrorists.

So spoke Scoop Jackson. So should we all speak.

Another fallacy we often hear is that military action taken to retaliate against or preempt terrorism is contrary to international law. Some have even suggested that to use force against terrorism is to lower ourselves to the barbaric level of the terrorists. But, as the President and Secretary Shultz have pointed out time and again, the UN Charter is not a suicide pact. Article 51 explicitly allows the right of self-defense. It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from acting in our self-defense. On the contrary, there is ample legal authority for the view that a state which supports terrorist or subversive attacks against another state or which supports terrorist planning within its

own territory is responsible for such attacks. Such conduct can amount to an ongoing armed aggression against the other state in international law. As the President said in connection with Libya's support for terrorist violence:

By providing material support to terrorist groups which attack U.S. citizens, Libya has engaged in armed aggression against the United States under established principles of international law, just as if [it] had used its own armed forces.

All of us can agree, I hope, that the United States has not only the right but the obligation to defend its citizens against terrorist violence. We should use our military power only if the stakes justify it, if other measures are unavailable, and then only in a manner appropriate to a clear objective. But we cannot rule out the use of armed force in every context. Our morality must be a source of strength, not paralysis. Otherwise, we will be surrendering the world's future to those who are most brutal, most unscrupulous, and most hostile to everything we believe in.

A third argument we sometimes hear is that by openly discussing terrorism, we're only giving the terrorists unwarranted recognition and legitimacy. According to this line of reasoning, we should downplay public expression of our concerns in the hope that a low profile will deprive the terrorists of the visibility they seek. Unfortunately, terrorist groups have shown great skill in dealing with the media, and their crimes are likely to attract considerable press and television attention, regardless of what the U.S. Government does. Under these circumstances, our duty is clear: we must persist in our campaign to build a broad coalition, at home and abroad, willing to stand up against terrorism.

Conclusion

Let me conclude with a final observation. Recent events may have raised doubts in some minds about the credibility of U.S. counterterrorist policy. But I can assure you that this Administration's overall policy is well in place, and it remains a sound framework for countering the terrorist scourge. Today, as in the past, our policy is based on four principles.

- We consider terrorism a criminal activity that no political cause can justify.
- We refuse to make concessions to terrorists.

- We regard state-sponsored terrorism as a menace to all nations and promote cooperation among states on practical measures to track down, arrest, and prosecute terrorists.

- We encourage international cooperation in isolating terrorist states to make it clear that costs will be imposed on those states that support or facilitate the use of terror.

Implementing these guidelines will not be easy. There are no magic solutions or quick fixes; and, as in all situations where human lives are at stake, there are political complexities and moral dilemmas that cannot be wished away. But, bilaterally and multilaterally, we are working at home and abroad in

our war against terrorism. We are in this war for the duration, and we are determined to win. ■

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TERRORISM

THE
WORLD & I

(THE WASHINGTON TIMES) FEBRUARY 1987

Pg. 16

The Politics of Terror

by Yonah Alexander

The use of terrorism as state policy has provided small groups the opportunity to violently impose their presence upon national-level political processes throughout the world, in turn altering the quality of life to a profound degree.



THOMAS HARTWELL/TOMM

The scope and nature of Syria's involvement in terrorist activity has been obscure in the minds of many observers over the years. The reason is simple. State sponsorship of terrorism is fundamentally a secret, or covert, action program, ranging from the use of propaganda to politically legitimize violence to the supply of funds, training, arms, and other operational assistance to carry out these ends. Syria's role in these activities has fluctuated over the years and moved from place to place in accordance with Damascus' changing impression of what its vital interest is in the Middle East and beyond. Specific terrorist operations have sometimes seemed to be no more than the coincidental by-product of Syrian propaganda and militant behavior. While it is not always easy to determine whether a particular terrorist action or series of actions in any targeted country is inspired or directed by Damascus, the pattern of Syrian sponsorship of violence in different countries is becoming clearer and clearer.

Syria has been linked with the latest violent attacks perpetrated in West Berlin, London, Madrid, and Paris. Unfortunately, the nature of the Syrian regime and the objectives of President Hafez al-Assad are poorly understood. That is, the government is comprised largely of the 'Alawite minority and constantly has to contend with opposition threats. In addition to responding to internal threats, Assad actively sponsors terrorist groups and operations as an adjunct to his foreign policy in the Middle East and the international arena.

Reign of terror

More specifically, Syria, as a military dictatorship, is based upon repression and terror directed against its own citizens. In 1981, for instance, Damascus security forces led by Rifat Assad, brother of the president and a contender for the presidency, summarily executed over 1,000 political prisoners in the desert at Palmyra.

An Amnesty International report in 1983 on the Syrian government massacre of the Muslim Brotherhood opposition movement at Hama in February 1982 asserted that "when law and order was restored . . . estimates of the dead on all sides ranged from 10,000 to 20,000." The report alleges that there were mass

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Downtown Damascus. Assad's presence, which has long dominated Syria, now looms throughout the Middle East.

executions and that cyanide gas was used to kill the inhabitants. It also details the systematic abduction, detainment, and torture of those considered politically threatening to extract confessions. According to various reports, the methods of torture included beating, electric shock, isolation, and sexual assault. Another example of repression there relates to the status of the Jewish community. The 4,500 Jews in Syria are forbidden to emigrate and may travel abroad only by leaving family members behind as hostages.

Syrian terrorism is not only directed internally. It is also employed against its citizens abroad. After the attempted assassination of Assad in July 1980, his brother Rifat, in his capacity as head of the security forces, threatened that Syria would pursue and liquidate its enemies, both "inside Syria and abroad." Thus, in 1985 three Syrian terrorists were arrested in Stuttgart on a mission to assassinate a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood living in West Germany whose wife had been previously murdered.

Glorification, encouragement, and direction of terrorism has been a central tenet in the policy of Ba'ath Syria since 1966. Assad, speaking on Damascus Radio on April 21, 1972, observed, "If it had not been for Syria, there would not have been any fidayun action." More recently, in a speech to the National Federation of Syrian Students in Damascus on May 4, 1985, Assad expressed his support for suicide squads, stating: "My conviction of martyrdom is neither incidental nor temporary. The years have entrenched this conviction . . . I hope my life will end in martyrdom." It is not surprising, therefore, that Syria, in its efforts to enhance among its own citizens an awareness of the value of martyrdom, honored the suicide bombers by naming schools after them. Also, suicide bombing is encouraged through videotaped broadcasts on television in which martyrs are filmed before their mission against a background of official emblems and a picture of Assad.

According to the testimony of Malia Soufanaji, a young Lebanese girl captured on November 5, 1985, in south Lebanon before she could detonate explosives carried on a mule, Brig. Gen. Ghazi Kna'an, the chief of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, is recruiting suicide bombers from his base in the Bekaa Valley.

Narcoterrorism and Syria's role

Narcoterrorism, the use of drug-trafficking, is also an important element of Syria's terrorist policy. Damascus' motives are tactical: It desires to obtain hard currency to enable terrorists to finance arms purchases with narcotics and narcotics revenues, and to assure a steady flow of intelligence from traffickers and weapons brokers.

Syria's activity in Lebanon is a case in point. Prior to the 1975-1976 civil war in Lebanon, hashish made up perhaps 10 percent of the crop in the Bekaa Valley. When the Syrian army entered Lebanon in 1976, hashish increased to almost 85 percent of the Bekaa crop and provided up to 30 percent of Lebanon's foreign exchange.

That the hashish trade increased during the Syrian army occupation is no coincidence. An almost feudal system exists in Lebanon, where all warring factions are involved in the drug trade, each receiving a share of the profits. Muslims, Christians, Druze, and the PLO have turned to the drug trade to finance arms purchases.

This activity has the blessing of Assad. His brother, Rifat, is reportedly at the top of the corruption ladder. The Syrian army controls many of the hashish fields, the northern Lebanese truck routes, and several Lebanese ports. It provides safe passage to smugglers for payoffs. Moreover, the Syrian secret services even brought Turkish experts to grow heroin in the Bekaa Valley. Syrian military helicopters are sometimes used to transport large quantities of drugs from the valley to Syria. From there these drugs are shipped to Western Europe, either by sea or by air.

It is suggested that Syria's fear of losing the income derived from drug-smuggling operations in Lebanon is a major reason for its desire to stay in that country. American sources have suggested that the attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut served as a warning to Washington to leave the drug trade alone.

In short, the Syrian drug trade bankrolls terrorist attacks in the Middle East and beyond, and feeds raw material into the Bulgarian drug operation, which is a major source of narcotics to Western Europe and the United States.

Syria's terrorist infrastructure

Indeed, over the years, Syria has itself perpetrated and played a role in terrorist operations, particularly against Israel, the West, and moderate Arab regimes. Many of these operations have been related to Syria's longstanding interest in Lebanon. To oversee these operations, Syria has set up an extensive organizational infrastructure—in Syria itself, in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley (which is under Syrian control), and in the major capitals of Europe—all staffed by Ba'ath Party members and Syrian security personnel, who recruit additional manpower when needed from among Syrian students at universities abroad. This latter network is under the authority of the Syrian

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Reign of Terror

A Profile of Hafez al-Assad



If Syrian President Hafez al-Assad could destroy Israel, he would. In his view, it would be a holy war, just as the defeat of the crusaders in the twelfth century was a holy war. To Assad, Israel is synonymous with the crusaders, and he is the modern version of Salah ad-Din Yusuf I, the legendary Muslim hero who defeated the crusaders and conquered Jerusalem. Assad openly identifies with Saladin, believing his place in history is every bit as significant as the twelfth-century Muslim's. He even keeps a picture of Saladin's victory in Hattin in his Damascus office. There is, of course, a vast gulf between the dreams of a despot and their implementation. Syria cannot prevail in a war against Israel by itself, so Assad, a ruthlessly pragmatic man, hides his time.

Assad's ultimate goal, like that of Libyan leader Muammar Qad-

afi, is pan-Arabism—a unified Arab nation. That, of course, could not be accomplished without destroying Israel. So realizing such a goal is, at present, unattainable. Assad works on a slightly less lofty objective—the creation of Greater Syria, with himself as absolute ruler.

Greater Syria, as Assad envisions it, would be composed of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the region historically known as Palestine. If he could obtain this objective militarily, fine, but he would be just as content to gain control through strategic alliances. He was already well ahead with this idea in the 1970s. He had most of Lebanon under his control, and he had a very close alliance with Jordan. The PLO as well was within his influence, though he has had problems with them—some are opposed to him—and he expelled PLO leader Yas-

ser Arafat from Lebanon in 1983 against the advice of the Soviet Union.

As a man who rose through the ranks of the military to take control of the country in 1970, Assad is well aware whence his power comes, and it is not through popular fiat. Assad had labored hard to ingratiate himself to the Muslim population, building many mosques and publicly masquerading as a Muslim. But he is an Alawite, a minority group that Muslims view as heretical and inferior. It is not an exaggeration to say that Assad is hated by many factions within his own country, and for that reason he has carefully cultivated a cult of followers within the military. Alawites are only 12 percent of the population, but they hold all the key combat command posts within the armed forces. Assad also has an extensive network of internal security forces ready to

quell any signs of dissent.

Assad, as is true with most people and situations in the Middle East, is not easily pigeonholed. Those whom one might conclude logically to be his natural allies may in fact be Assad's mortal enemies, while those whom he professes to hate may be reaping the benefits of Assad's largesse.

The Iran-Iraq War serves Assad's purposes, putting him in a position of potential peacemaker and ultimately increasing his influence over the fertile crescent. Iraq and Syria have nearly identical religions, yet they are enemies; Iran and Syria have little in common, yet Assad supports Iran in the conflict.

Interest in regional politics came early to Assad. As a boy he attended an Arab nationalist school, and by the age of 15 he was known for his speeches denouncing

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the French, who controlled Syria at the time. He supported the Ba'ath Party, but as an Alawite there was not much opportunity to advance politically, so Assad joined the air force. He claims he volunteered to fight Israel at 17, and though not true, it is the kind of myth Assad has created for himself that helps sell his version of pan-Arabism. By deceit, caution, manipulation, and stamina, Assad has prevailed where others failed. His opportunity came in 1966, with the overthrow of Amin Al-Hafiz. Through shrewd alliances, he eventually emerged as the country's leader in 1970. Ever since then he has been attempting to legitimize his regime.

—Moohe Ma'oz

Moohe Ma'oz is the author of numerous books and memoirs on Syria. The most recent, The Sphinx of Damascus: Assad of Syria, A Political Biography, is scheduled for publication in 1987.

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embassies, thus enabling those engaged in terrorist activities to pass as diplomats and to use the diplomatic pouch for the transfer of arms.

The various Palestinian terrorist organizations have maintained central commands in Damascus and regional bases in Syria for many years. Those headquartered in the Syrian capital include the Fatah-Abu Musa Faction (rebels who broke from Arafat's Fatah Royalists in 1983); Saiqa (the terrorist arm of Syria's Ba'ath Party, serving as Syria's agent within the PLO); the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, headed by George Habash, with Marxist orientation); the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP, under the leadership of Naif Hawatme); the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC, led by Ahmad Jibril, a former officer in the Syrian army); the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF, a pro-Syrian faction led by Abdel Fatah el Ghanem); the Popular Struggle Front (PSF, headed by Dr. Samir Ghisha); the Popular Arab Liberation Movement (led by Naji Alush); and the Abu Nidal ("Black June," under the leadership of Sabri el-Bana).

Moreover, the Syrian communications media provide support to these Palestinian terrorist groups, particularly the radical "rejectionist" factions. Daily broadcasts on Radio Damascus are made by these groups under the supervision of Syrian technicians.

Diplomatic assistance is provided to such terrorist groups as Abu Nidal, Saiqa, the PLO rebels, Eagles of the Revolution, Hezbollah, the PFLP, the DFLP, and the DFLP-GC. All of these maintain offices in Damascus.

Syria also furnishes passports and ID papers for the personnel of these organizations, particularly Saiqa and the PFLP-GC, for use in terrorist operations. Members of these groups have been provided safe haven in Syrian embassies worldwide.

Syria also encourages the establishment of an international network of terrorist movements. A case in point is the January 30, 1986, agreement between the Abu Nidal group and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), signed in Damascus following Syrian pressure.

Syria is among the several Arab states that contribute financial support to the Palestinian cause through the Arab League Fund set up at the 1974 Rabat Conference. However, compared with the share provided by some of the oil-rich Arab states, Syria's portion is meager. Most of Syria's direct financial support is disbursed to two Palestinian terrorist groups: Saiqa, which it established, and the PFLP-GC.

A variety of international terrorists are trained by Syria, both within its borders and in the Syrian-controlled Ba'albek in eastern Lebanon. The training, which includes basic military training and special

weapons instruction, is carried out in former army camps, under the direction of the Syrian army. In the Beka'a Valley, in eastern Lebanon, Rifat Assad and his forces run an organization of training camps for recruits from all over the world. These recruits are members of the terrorist groups under Syrian sponsorship. The training is coordinated with other states that sponsor terrorism, such as Libya and Iran. Under the aegis of the Syrians, for example, Iran attempts to spread its militant brand of Islam and revolutionary upheaval throughout the Arab world, while Syria uses the Iranian-supported terrorist groups (Hezbollah, Islamic Amal, and so forth) to do its bidding inside Lebanon.

In addition to Middle Eastern groups, members of other movements also receive training in the Beka'a Valley, under Syrian control. Those who are afforded this opportunity include groups such as the Japanese Red Army, the Petani Liberation Movement (Thailand), the Eritrean Liberation Movement, and the Sahara Liberation Movement.

Syria supplied weapons to the Fatah forces in Lebanon until it began backing the mutiny against it in May 1983. Thereafter, it denied the Fatah loyalists any access to their weapons depots and warehouses in Syria and the Beka'a Valley, while actively supporting the Fatah rebels, led by Col. Abu Musa. Weapons to members of the Syrian-backed Saiqa and the PFLP-GC continued to flow. Before the Fatah mutiny, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat indicated that Syria used to ship "sophisticated weapons" to his forces in Lebanon, including shoulder-launched SAM-7 missiles.

In the Beirut bombings, circumstantial evidence has led intelligence analysts to conclude that Syria had sponsored and helped to organize some of the attacks. Syria also furnished the weapons (obtained from the Soviet Union) used in the training of these terrorist groups.

Syria actively sponsors terrorist groups and operations as an adjunct to its foreign policy through Lebanon. For example, Syrian officers arranged the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel in September 1982. According to an intelligence report, the bomb that killed Gemayel was placed by Habib Chartouny, a member of the Syrian People's Party in Lebanon. His "operator" was Captain Nassif of the Syrian intelligence service, who convinced Chartouny that the bomb would "scare" rather than kill Gemayel. Even a supposed ally such as Lebanese Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt was marked for annihilation by Syria for refusing to adhere completely to its policies (he was assassinated in March 1977). Others who have been eliminated by Syrian operatives include Arab journalists who did not support Damascus'

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role in Lebanon. One such victim was Salim al-Luzi, the editor of a Lebanese newspaper, *Al-Hawadeth*, whose hands were burned by acid in March 1980 to serve as a warning to others not to criticize Syria.

More significantly, Syria arranged and actively

In the Beirut bombings, circumstantial evidence has led intelligence analysts to conclude that Syria sponsored and helped organize some of the attacks.

supported a number of terrorist bombings against American and Israeli targets. According to American and Middle Eastern intelligence sources, Syria was implicated in the April 18, 1983, the October 23, 1983, and the September 20, 1984, car-bomb attacks against U.S. diplomatic and military compounds in Beirut. Syria's motivation lay in its opposition to the pressure mounted by the American-led multinational peacekeeping forces in Lebanon.

In general, Syria exploited the weakness of the Lebanese government and the perpetual factional conflicts there to initiate various terrorist attacks for the purpose of exhausting Israel's determination to maintain the south Lebanon security zone. Toward these ends Damascus supports the terrorist activities of different groups in that country, including Palestinians, Shiite, and left-wing Lebanese movements.

Selected targets of Syrian terrorism

Holding Palestine to be an integral part of territory taken from it unlawfully, Syria has a direct emotional involvement in Palestinian terrorist activity. An adamant guardian of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians," Syria was the first Arab state bordering Israel to offer Palestinian terrorists a sanctuary for launching operations against that nation.

All the Palestinian terrorist groups based in Syria have operated in Israel. For instance, in May 1986 a Fatah-Abu Musa cell was uncovered in Jerusalem. This unit was responsible for several acts of terrorism, including wounding the American tourist David Blumenfeld on March 7, 1986, in the Old City; murdering Zehava Ben Ovadia, an Israeli, on April 13,

Syrian embassy personnel provide diplomatic assistance to many terrorists groups, and the members of these groups have been provided safe haven in Syrian embassies worldwide.

1986, in East Jerusalem; wounding the German tourist Swider Rite in the Old City; and murdering the English tourist John Appelby on April 29, 1986, in East Jerusalem. To be sure, Syrian support of Palestinian terrorism is not limited to attacks in Israel itself. Operations abroad against Israeli and Jewish targets are also encouraged. For instance, on September 28, 1973, Saiqa terrorists captured a train carrying Russian immigrants while it was stationed at the Austrian border. The terrorists held three Jews hostage. In return for the Jews' release, Austria agreed to close the "Schenao" immigration station.

On March 26, 1979, an explosive device was thrown at the Israeli embassy in Ankara. The Eagles of the Revolution (an alias of the pro-Syrian Saiqa terrorist organization) claimed responsibility. And on September 30, 1985, a small bomb damaged the El Al office in Amsterdam. The attack was carried out by the Abu Nidal group.

Syria actively supports Palestinian "rejectionist" terrorist groups as part of its determination to prevent the PLO from negotiating with Israel. For example, the Syrian-backed Abu Nidal group assassinated Isham Sartawi, an Arafat aide who had proposed a dialogue with Israel.

On March 2, 1986, two terrorists assassinated the mayor of Nablus in the West Bank, Zafer al-Masri, a Palestinian appointed by Israel. Both the Abu Nidal group and the PFLP claimed responsibility.

For many years, Damascus was engaged in terrorism directed against Jordan, because of Amman's interest in the Arab-Israeli peace process and its support of Iraq, Syria's enemy, in the Iran-Iraq War. On February 6, 1981, Hiasam Muheissan, Jordan's chargé d'affaires in Lebanon, was kidnapped by the Eagles of the Revolution. In October 1984, the Jordanian ambassador to India was shot in New Delhi and

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Amman's ambassador in Rome was wounded by Abu Nidal terrorists supported by Syria. Moreover, Syrian complicity was evidenced in the hijacking of the Jordanian airline, Alia, on June 11, 1985.

On September 6, 1986, in Istanbul, 30 Turkish Jews gathered for a Sabbath service at their Neve Shalom Synagogue. Four Arabs, posing as photographers, entered the house of worship, and after locking the doors with iron bars, attacked the congregation with submachine guns and hand grenades. When the massacre was over, 21 worshippers were dead and four others were wounded.

This attack was linked to the Abu Nidal group by Turkish prosecutors in Ankara on November 6, 1986. The Turkish indictment accused six Palestinians for their involvement not only with the synagogue incident but also with other attacks in 1983 and 1982, including an attempt to place a bomb on an Alitalia flight and the attempted car-bombing of a U.S. officers club in Izmir.

Although there is no evidence of Syrian terrorist operations in the United States itself, Americans have been targeted by Syrian-supported terrorist groups, suggesting a strategic dimension. Some 270 Americans have been killed as a result of attacks in the Middle East and Europe, including the October 1983 operation directed against the Marine barracks in Beirut; the September 1984 suicide bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in Beirut; the December 1984 hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner to Tehran; the June 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847; the December 1985 simultaneous attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports; and the April 1986 attack on the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin.

The attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27, 1985, implicate Syria. Muhammad Sirhan, an Abu Nidal member and one of the terrorists apprehended in Rome, disclosed that he was trained in the Beka'a Valley, which is controlled by Syria, and that Syrian intelligence officers authorized the two attacks. The two terrorists caught in Vienna also stated that they had arrived by flight from Syria.

Moreover, according to various reports, some of the terrorists carried Moroccan passports that had been forged in Damascus. Responsibility for the attacks in Rome and Vienna lies with the head of the Field Security Department in the Syrian air force, Gen. Muhammad al-Khouli, one of Assad's closest advisers.

Indirect Syrian involvement in terrorist attacks in France has been apparent, for one reason because Syria and France differ on their Middle East policies. An example of a recent attack is the February 4, 1986, explosion at the Eiffel Tower. ASALA, which has close operational ties with the Abu Nidal group, claimed responsibility for that incident. The spate of bombings in Paris in September 1986 by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (led by Georges Ibrahim Abdullah, now serving a four-year term in a French prison) has a Syrian link. French officials indicated that Damascus "footsteps" relate to the fact that the perpetrators of the attack were "exfiltrated" by "professional secret agents" from Syria.

A Syrian link is apparent in the March 29, 1986, explosion at the Arab-West German Friendship League building in West Berlin. An investigation revealed that the terrorists worked under the instructions of the Syrian embassy in East Berlin. The explosives used in this operation were identical to those used in the April 5, 1986, La Belle discotheque explosion.

In this attack the three terrorists apprehended (Ahmed Hazi, Farouk Salameh, and Faiz Swana) admitted to receiving explosives from the Syrian embassy in East Berlin. Hazi reportedly had trained with his brother, Nizar Hindawi (connected with the subsequent London operation), for two weeks in an intensive course at the Abu Nidal camp in Damir, east of Damascus.

The London incident, which occurred on April 17, 1986, and involved an El Al flight, was carried out under full Syrian direction. The interrogation of the terrorist and other evidence reveal that the the decision to attack was made by a group connected directly with the intelligence and security services in Syria.

Syrian involvement in the London attempt included planning, logistics, training, and financial support of the terrorist. Hindawi, the man who attempted to plant the bomb, arrived in the United Kingdom six weeks prior to the incident, accompanied by a Syrian intelligence officer. After the attempt failed, Hindawi was given shelter in the Syrian embassy in London. Intelligence agents had instructed Hindawi, at the beginning of 1986, to befriend an English woman and ensure that she would get on a passenger flight

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unwittingly carrying a rigged suitcase. The British court convicted Hindawi and sentenced him to 45 years in prison.

Two recently convicted terrorists, Ahmed Hazi and Nazir Hindawi, reportedly trained for their operations at the Abu Nidal camp in Damir, east of Damascus.

On June 26, 1986, an attempt by the Fatah-Abu Musa terrorists to put a suitcase bomb on an El-Al plane at Madrid airport was aborted. A July 3, 1986, *Foreign Report* article asserts that "our sources say the operation was run by the intelligence service of the Syrian air force. They predict more trouble. The relative calm that has prevailed since the American raids on Libya on April 15th may soon be over."

The Syrian-Soviet connection

It is evident that Syrian involvement in terrorism is supported indirectly by the Soviet Union. Moscow has three broad goals in the Middle East that partly coincide with Syrian objectives:

First, to stir up trouble for the West in the highly visible Lebanon, particularly because such a policy entails no serious financial burden and is politically low-risk. The Soviet exploitation of surrogates, such as the Lebanese Communist Party, is useful in recruiting Shiites for terrorist activities against Western and Israeli targets in an area of great strategic importance.

Second, to regain irredentist territories in the Soviet orbit. Moscow's goals in relation to Turkey are not only to undermine NATO's southern flank but also to incorporate portions of eastern Turkey (for example, Kars and Ardahan) into the Soviet Union because of their strategic significance and geopolitical relationship to neighboring ethnic minorities in western Iran.

Third, to help create new states in which it will have considerable influence as a result of its support those countries' claims for self-determination. Soviet assistance to the PLO aims to achieve this end. The PLO, with this kind of encouragement and support, has reached out in all directions against Western "imperialist" forces.

Although Syria has its own agenda with Lebanon, Turkey, and Israel, as a client-state, Damascus relies on Moscow's massive military support. For example, from June 1982 to June 1985 Syria received Soviet matériel valued at approximately \$4 billion. Some of this equipment was acquired free of charge and some at a discount.

It is not surprising, therefore, that at Moscow's instigation, as part of the Soviet plan to coordinate a widespread terrorist network drawn from Palestinian and Shiite terrorist groups, a meeting of the foreign ministers of Syria, Libya, and Iran took place in January 1985. The officials agreed to escalate terrorist activities against U.S. interests, with Syria and Libya organizing Palestinian hit squads and Iran coordinating suicide attacks in Lebanon.

Although no clear evidence is available to show a direct Syrian-terrorist link to Moscow, the Soviet Union cannot escape accountability. For instance, the terrorists involved in the attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985 carried, according to various reports, AKM assault rifles (a modern version of the Soviet Kalashnikov). These weapons were manufactured in Romania less than a year before they were used.

Recent reports that Moscow was embarrassed by Syria, a country that it fully supports and that was caught red-handed in the Berlin and London attacks, is part of the Soviet campaign of psychological warfare and propaganda. After all, Moscow roundly criticized the U.S.-sponsored declaration against terrorism at the May 1986 economic summit in Tokyo as a U.S. attempt to justify its own "neoglobalist" policies, the U.S. interception of the Egyptian jet carrying the *Achille Lauro* hijackers, and the U.S. bombing of Libya.

In short, seeking to camouflage its direct support of international terrorism, Moscow operates on two levels: (1) It denies any connection with ideological violence and denounces specific acts of terrorism when politically expedient; and (2) it channels support to terrorists in the Middle East through the transmission belt of Libya, Syria, and the PLO.

Yet, despite Syria's denial of direct or indirect involvement in terrorist activities, Damascus has been playing a major role in the initiation, planning,

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and execution of a variety of operations, not only in the Middle East but also in Western Europe. Palestinian groups (Saiqa, Abu Nidal, Abu Musa's Fatah, PFLP, PFLP-GC, and DFLP), Lebanese organizations (the National Syrian Party and others), and various non-Arab movements, such as ASALA, are being supported by Syria. By utilizing terror, Syria hopes to overthrow hostile regimes in the Middle East, prevent Arab-Israeli peace arrangements, and undermine Western interests in the region, thus indirectly serving Soviet interests as well.

Since 1979 Syria has been on the U.S. government's terrorism list, and it is unlikely that its name will be removed in the near future. Three major reasons account for it:

First, despite the brutalization of Assad's regime in all spheres of life in the country, there remains a considerable segment of the population—including members of the Ba'ath Party, the bureaucracy, and the military—which identify with or support Damascus policy of terror.

Second, Syria considers terrorism as "warfare-on-the-cheap," a form of low-intensity conflict that raises the cost to opponents of the regime, to parties to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and to Assad's regional rivals.

And third, since the lip service paid to "détente" and "peaceful coexistence" has not been accompanied by any manifest weakening of Soviet ambitions in the Middle East and elsewhere, Moscow will continue to support dictatorial Syria, including state sponsorship of terrorism.

Several recent developments indicated that the West's policies may be changing. Britain broke relations with Damascus following the evidence of its

involvement in the El-AJ terrorist scheme. Furthermore, the foreign ministers of the European Community, meeting in London in November 1986, agreed on a four-point action plan: an immediate ban on arms sales to Syria, suspension of high-level visits between the European Community countries and Damascus,

By utilizing terror, Syria hopes to overthrow hostile regimes in the Middle East and undermine Western interests, thus indirectly serving Soviet interests as well.

increased surveillance of Syrian missions in European Community countries, and tighter security against the Syrian state airline.

Analysts suggest that these steps should be supplemented by working out a realistic strategy that would require, first and foremost, coherent planning procedures as well as improved decision-making systems.■

Yonah Alexander is a professor and director at the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism at the State University of New York. He is also a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Global Strategy Council and a Distinguished Scholar, the National Forum Foundation.

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Timeline of Syrian-Sponsored Terrorist Incidents Worldwide: 1983-1986

November 6—Turkey. Turkish prosecutors issued an indictment accusing six Palestinians working for the Abu Nidal organization of killing a Jordanian diplomat in July 1985. The indictment also linked the men with four other actions: the September 6, 1986, attack on an Istanbul synagogue, in which 21 persons were killed; an attempt to place a bomb on an Alitalia flight in 1983; the attempted car-bombing of a U.S. officers club in Izmir in 1983; and the killing of a Palestinian student in Ankara in 1982.

June 26—Spain. A Spaniard attempted to board an El Al flight with a suitcase bomb, apparently without knowing it. The suspect arrested by Spanish police carried



a Syrian passport. A spokesman for the Abu Musa group, which is almost totally dependent on Damascus, claimed responsibility for planting the bomb, although the Syrian government denied involvement.


April 17—England. El Al security discovered a Syrian-made bomb in the luggage of an Irish woman as she attempted to board a plane for

Tel Aviv. A British court found her boyfriend, Nizar Hindawi, guilty of the attempted bombing, and the British government announced that it had conclusive evidence of Syrian official involvement in the terrorist act.

March 29—West Germany. Three Palestinians bombed the German-Arab Friendship Union with an explosive device; a trial is pending.

Although the groups cited here have links with Syria, the list is not intended to be all-inclusive but rather to illustrate Syria's involvement in and support for international terrorism and terrorist groups.

U.S. STATE DEPT.



Reports say the bomb was provided by the Syrian embassy in East Berlin. Eleven people were injured.

March 2—The West Bank. Two gunmen assassinated the mayor of

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TERROR...CONTINUED

Nablus, Zafer al-Masri, a Palestinian appointed by Israel. Both the Abu Nidal group and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility.

December 27—Italy and Austria. Abu Nidal terrorists simultaneously attacked El Al ticket counters in the Rome and Vienna airports, killing more than 20 people, including five Americans, and wounding some 120 others. (Although these attacks were committed under Libyan sponsorship, reports on the Italian investigation indicate that the Rome terrorist team received training in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon and passed through Damascus.)

September 25—Italy. A bomb exploded in a British Airways office in Rome, injuring 15 people. Police arrested Hassan Itab fleeing the scene. Itab claimed he was a member of the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, an Abu Nidal cover name, and was later identified by witnesses as the same man who threw a grenade at the Jordanian Airline office in Athens in March.

September 18—Greece. Michel Nimri, a Jordanian magazine publisher and reportedly a personal friend of Yassir Arafat, was assassinated in Athens. Black September, a name used by the Abu Nidal group, claimed responsibility the next day.

September 16—Italy. A grenade attack on a Rome sidewalk cafe left 38 tourists injured, including nine Americans. Police arrested a Palestinian in connection with the attack. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, another Syrian-linked group, claimed responsibility on September 19.

September 3—Greece. Terrorists threw hand grenades that wounded 19 British tourists at the Glyfada Hotel in Athens. Black September claimed the attack was to pressure the Greek authorities to release a man arrested near the Jordanian embassy on August 31 (see next entry).

August 31—Greece. Police arrested a heavily armed man near the Jordanian embassy in Athens. Samir Salameh acknowledged membership in Black September and claimed he planned to assassinate the Jordanian ambassador.


August 8—Greece. A bomb exploded in the kitchen of the London Hotel in Athens, injuring 13 people—nine of them British subjects. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims claimed responsibility, contending the hotel was a "hideout" for British spies.

July 24—Turkey. The first secretary at the Jordanian embassy in Ankara was assassinated by a lone gunman. Responsibility for the incident was claimed by Black September.

July 11—Kuwait. Two bombs exploded within minutes of each other, killing eight people and injuring 89 in two cafes about 10 kilometers apart. The Arab Revolutionary Brigade claimed responsibility.

July 1—Spain. A bomb exploded at the British Airways ticket office in Madrid, damaging the TWA office upstairs as well. The AHA ticket office nearby was hit by automatic weapons fire and two grenades that failed to explode. One person was killed and 27 were wounded.

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September 30—Netherlands. A small bomb damaged the El Al office in Amsterdam. The Fatah Revolutionary Council—the Abu Nidal group's official name—claimed responsibility.

TERROR...CONTINUED

Claimed by the Organization of the Oppressed, the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, and Black September.

April 4—Greece. A rocket was fired at a Jordanian airliner as it was taking off from Athens airport. The projectile hit the plane but did not explode. Black September claimed responsibility.

April 3—Italy. A rocket narrowly missed the Jordanian embassy on the fifth floor of an office building in Rome. No casualties were reported. Black September claimed responsibility.

March 21—Italy. Three unidentified men threw hand grenades into a Jordanian airline office in Rome, injuring two people. Black September claimed responsibility.

March 21—Greece. An unidentified man threw a hand grenade into the Jordanian Airline office in Athens, injuring three people. Claimed by Black September (see September 25, 1985, incident).

March 21—Cyprus. An unidentified man threw two hand grenades into the Jordanian Airline office in Nicosia. Claimed by Black September.

March 9—United Arab Emirates. A bomb was found on a Jordanian Airliner. The young Palestinian who carried the bomb onto the Karachi-to-Amman flight said he thought he was transporting drugs to support Abu Nidal terrorist operations.

February 22—Jordan. The Jordanian

People's Revolutionary Party placed a bomb at the American Center for Oriental Research in Amman. The bomb was found and defused.

January 10—Jordan. A bomb planted by the Jordanian People's Revolutionary Party was defused near a USAID employee's home. The explosives had neither a power source nor a timing device.

December 29—Jordan. Two unidentified gunmen assassinated Fah al-Qawasmeh, a member of the PLO Executive Committee and former mayor of Hebron, outside his home in Amman. Two witnesses to the shooting were injured by gunfire as they tried to block the assassin's fleeing vehicle. Black September claimed responsibility.

December 14—Italy. Ismail Darwish, a leading military figure in the Fatah movement, was gunned down on a Rome street by an unidentified man who fled on a waiting motor scooter. The Arab Revolutionary Brigade claimed responsibility.


December 4—Romania. The deputy chief of mission of the Jordanian embassy was shot and killed as he was getting into his car in Bucharest. Black September claimed responsibility.

December 2—Jordan. A guard discovered a bomb concealed in an attaché case inside the American Life Insurance and Citibank building in Amman. Bomb technicians defused the device, which contained 18 blocks of TNT and a timer. The Jordanian People's Revolutionary Party was later determined to be responsible.

October 4—Cyprus. A car bomb

exploded behind the Israeli embassy in Nicosia, slightly injuring one person. Claimed by Abu Musa's Fatah dissident organization.

August 13—Jordan. Jordanian police defused a bomb consisting of several hundred grams of Soviet-made explosives near the residence of a U.S. embassy official. The Jordanian People's Revolutionary Party was later determined to be re-



sponsible.
August 11—Jordan. Members of the Jordanian People's Revolutionary Party tried to set off a bomb outside the Jordan radio and television station. The bomb was discovered and defused.

August 3—Jordan. A bomb exploded

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TERROR...CONTINUED

ed under a water truck parked near the U.S. embassy warehouse in Amman. There were no casualties and only minor damage. The Abu Nidal group claimed responsibility.

May 29—Cyprus. Abdullah Ahmad Suleiman el Saadi, a former Saiqa officer who had switched his allegiance to Arafat, was murdered in Limassol. Four Syrian men and

two women were arrested for the murder and subsequently deported from Cyprus.

May 3—Cyprus. An unidentified man shot and killed Palestinian publisher Hanna Muqbil and wounded his secretary in Nicosia. Muqbil was reportedly a former member of Abu Nidal who had defected to Arafat's camp.

March 24—Jordan. A bomb was defused outside the British consulate in Amman. The Abu Nidal group claimed responsibility.

March 24—Jordan. A bomb was discovered and defused outside the British cultural center. The Abu Nidal group claimed responsibility.

March 24—Jordan. A bomb exploded in the parking lot of the Intercontinental Hotel, which is across the street from the U.S. embassy, damaging two vehicles and slightly injuring a USAID employee and his daughter. A second bomb was discovered in the parking lot and defused. The Abu Nidal group claimed responsibility.

December 29—Spain. Two Jordanian embassy employees were attacked by a lone gunman as they were leaving the embassy. Walid Jamal Balkis was killed instantly, and Ibrahim Sami Mohammed was seriously wounded. The Arab Revolutionary Brigade claimed responsibility.

December 19—Turkey. A car bomb was discovered in an abandoned rental car midway between the French Cultural House and the Cordon Hotel used by American military personnel in Izmir. The bomb's timer apparently malfunctioned. Turkish police linked the Abu Nidal group and Syrian

agents to the incident.

November 7—Greece. Two security guards of the Jordanian embassy were wounded on a crowded street in Athens. One of the two victims died from his wounds. The Arab Revolutionary Brigade claimed responsibility.

October 26—Italy. The Jordanian ambassador to the Vatican and his driver were wounded in an assassination attempt in Rome. The Arab Revolutionary Brigade claimed responsibility.

October 25—India. The Jordanian ambassador was wounded by an unknown assailant in New Delhi. Claimed by the Arab Revolutionary Brigade.

October 13—Jordan. Two hand grenades were thrown into a police barracks in Amman. A member of the police recruited by Saiqa confessed to the attack. Local authorities suspected that Abu Nidal elements may also have been involved.

August 21—Greece. A high-level PLO official, Ma'mum Muraysh, was shot and killed by two unidentified men on a motorcycle. The victim's son and his driver were wounded. The Movement for Rebuilding Fatah claimed responsibility.

April 10—Portugal. The PLO observer to an international conference of socialists, Isam al-Sartawi, was shot to death in a hotel lobby. Sartawi's secretary was slightly wounded in the attack. The Abu Nidal group claimed responsibility.

January 1—Israel. A grenade attack on a civilian bus in Tel Aviv injured 12. Both Saiqa and Abu Nidal claimed responsibility.

MYTHS ABOUT TERRORISM

Address by

L. Paul Bremer, III

Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism

Department of State

to

Alumni of the School of International Service

American University

As prepared for delivery

November 21, 1987

Good evening, I always enjoy dealing with a knowledgeable audience, and the alumni of the School of International Service certainly qualify. Regardless of your current occupation, your presence here tonight shows a continuing interest in foreign affairs. And no one who follows foreign affairs can be unaware of the impact terrorism has had on the modern world.

The impact of terrorism has spawned a huge volume of literature and commentary from academics, pundits, journalists and a new genre of self-styled experts and consultants. Analyzing and explaining terrorism has become a growth industry.

This is healthy because we cannot begin to suppress terrorism without understanding it. Sadly, however, much of what has been written and said about terrorism has created a mythology which has served to confound the public and-- in some cases-- to romanticize terrorists. If we are to have a sound counterterrorism policy we must know the facts and debunk the myths.

Three myths in particular confuse much thinking about terrorism. They are:

1. that terrorism will disappear if its underlying causes are addressed;
2. that terrorists are crazy;
3. that initiating action against terrorism only increases terrorism.

Tonight I would like to talk a bit about these myths and tell you about our government's strategy for countering terrorism.

Myth One: Solve the Underlying Problems
and Terrorism will Cease

Terrorism, it is often argued, is the weapon of the weak, the only means an oppressed people have to secure their goals. According to this line of reasoning, a just settlement of grievances will put an end to terrorism. I find this myth particularly pernicious-- because it implicitly justifies terrorism.

The contention that responding to the underlying causes of terrorism will diminish or eliminate terrorism is unsupported by the facts. Let us examine some cases:

- o Again and again terrorist attacks in the Middle East have been specifically designed to derail progress towards a settlement.

In 1948, UN mediator Count Bernadotte was assassinated as he worked on a cease fire to end the fighting during Israel's war for independence.

In the early fifties, King Hussein's grandfather, King Abdallah was assassinated in part because of his talks with Israel.

In 1974, while I was accompanying the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on a peace mission, Palestinian terrorists seized and eventually killed most of a group of Israeli school children in the town of Ma'alot.

In the spring of 1975, on the night before Secretary Kissinger's arrival on yet another peace mission, Palestinian terrorists landed in Tel Aviv in rubber boats and launched another attack. After failing to gain entrance to a movie theatre, they seized a small hotel-- several innocent hotel guests were killed.

President Anwar Sadat was assassinated largely because he made peace with Israel.

In 1983, the Abu Nidal Organization-- at the urging of Syria-- conducted an series of attacks against Jordanian interests when Jordan seemed to be taking a more accommodationist approach to a Middle East settlement.

o It is not just in the Middle East that terrorism and the hope of solution seem to rise together.

In 1975, the year Franco died, Basque terrorists killed 16 Spaniards. Five years later, after the implementation of democratic rule and the granting of significant autonomy in the Basque region, terrorists killed 96 Spaniards-- a six-fold increase.

In Turkey, Kurdish PKK terrorists, in addition to kidnaping and murdering Kurdish village guards and headmen, have attacked bridges, roadbuilding equipment and other economic targets which might improve conditions for impoverished Kurds in Southeast Turkey.

In El Salvador, after the declaration of an amnesty and a cease fire, terrorists abducted and murdered a Salvadoran driver at the American Embassy.

- o Terrorism occurs in the most free and just societies ever known to mankind

In the United States, there have been terrorist actions by the Weathermen, the Order, the Aryan Brotherhood, the Ku Klux Klan and the Symbionese People's Liberation Army

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Badder-Meinhof Gang and the Red Army Faction have practiced terror.

In France, Action Direct has carried out vicious terrorist acts. Terrorists have also been active in other democratic, free countries-- Belgium, Italy, Canada and Japan.

- o Terrorists cite their "cause" as justification for their acts, and they may well intend to right the wrongs they condemn. But this supposed justification often conceals the real purpose of terrorist acts: Gaining political power. For example:

- o The Provisional Irish Republican Army seeks more than the incorporation of Northern Ireland into the Irish Republic. They also seek to supplant the current government in Ireland.

- o Palestinian terrorists no doubt want to resolve the grievances of the Palestinian people, but they also want to destroy Israel.

- o In Peru, the Sendero Luminoso tries to appeal to impoverished Indians whose cause they espouse. But the group's stated intention is to destroy Peruvian Society and supplant it with a new order which they will head. Unless we understand that most terrorism is carried out in the pursuit of political power, we risk becoming bogged down in weighing the relative worth of various "causes."

Individuals frequently join groups because of a need to "belong."

Moreover, recent psychiatric research makes it clear that many of the terrorists themselves are not truly motivated by the "cause." For example, Dr. Jerrold M. Post of George Washington University concludes that the "cause" is not the fundamental reason most terrorists join up. The "cause" provides the rationale, but the motivation is the terrorist's desire to belong to a group.

Social isolation and personal failure are frequently seen in pre-terrorist histories. Studies in Italy and Germany have shown that members of the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades were often from incomplete family structures and had shown a high frequency of educational and job failure. Fully a third had been convicted in juvenile court before they joined a terrorist group. While the leadership remains focussed on the political goal, many of the rank and file join, not out of deep ideological commitment to a "cause," but because the terrorist group in effect offers a "home," a "family."

The clearest example of the this phenomenon may be found the Basque ETA organization. In the Basque region only eight percent of the population is from mixed Spanish-Basque heritage. Their children have a very hard time being accepted in Basque society. Yet fully 40 percent of ETA members are from mixed heritage.

Causes can be addressed without giving in to terrorism

Of course we cannot and should not ignore underlying problems while we devote ourselves to countering terrorism.

No country has done more to promote a peace settlement in the Middle East than the United States. We recognize the legitimate grievances of many groups in the region. But we will continue our counterterrorism efforts even as seek a settlement.

The FBI and other law enforcement agencies will continue to pursue a Symbionese Liberation Army even as our society attempts to deal with poverty and racial justice.

It is our view that nothing justifies terrorism. Accepting a cause as just does not require accepting terrorism as the solution.

Myth Two: Terrorists are Suicidal Lunatics

It is important that we understand the distinction between behavior that is sick-- the product of a mental disorder; and behavior that is sickening-- so grotesque that we cannot imagine doing it ourselves.

Most terrorists are not crazy. In fact, it is their sanity which makes them dangerous. Instead, we should regard terrorists as calculating fanatics. They may use unstable or violence-prone people in their operations, but it is their ability to calculate and plan which makes them dangerous. Terrorism, in this sense, is rarely "mindless."

Nor does their distortion of good and evil make terrorists insane. Russian terrorist Mikhail Bukanin put it this way:

"To the revolutionist, whatever aids the triumph of the revolution is ethical; all that hinders it is unethical and criminal."

Perhaps a few examples can illustrate:

- o At first glance, the 1985 Rome and Vienna airport massacres carried out by the Abu Nidal Organization with Syrian and Libyan assistance, would seem the work of lunatics. What could be gained by slaughtering holiday travelers at random?

The attacks were not random, but directed against the El Al counters. The purpose was to terrify El Al passengers and travelers to Israel, thus weakening Israel's economy and contacts with the rest of the world.

That people with no connection to the Middle East conflict might die was of no interest to the terrorists. All that mattered was that ANO believed the attacks would "further the revolution."

- o Last month, Sendero Luminoso occupied a small village in the Department of Ayacucho and captured eight members of the local civil defense force. After a mock trial, the villagers were tortured and beheaded.

Such grotesque treatment of the very people whose support Sendero seeks might seem counter-productive. Actually, it is an example of "enforcement terrorism." The intention is to terrify the campesinos into supporting Sendero, or at a minimum, to prevent them from collaborating with the government in any way.

- o "Enforcement terrorism" is widespread in the Middle East. Most Palestinian terrorism over the years has been directed against rival Palestinians and other Arabs. For example, while the Abu Nidal Organization's goal is the destruction of the state of Israel, only 14 percent of its attacks have been against Israeli or Jewish targets. Sixty-three percent of all attacks have been against Palestinian and Arab targets. Clearly, "enforcement" is a major goal for the ANO. And most of what they are enforcing is a hard-line against negotiation or accommodation with Israel.

Few Terrorist Attacks are Intended to end in the Death of the Terrorist

Spectacular bombings, such as those against the Marine barracks and U.S. Embassies in Beirut have drawn attention to suicide attacks. The large numbers of deaths and the difficulty of defending against someone who intends to die make these attacks quite literally terrifying. Yet, very few terrorist attacks are deliberately suicidal.

According to a study of terrorist missions between 1968 and 1974, less than two percent of all terrorist attacks are genuinely suicidal. Specifically, of the international terrorist acts covered by the study:

- o In only 1.2% of the cases was the mission truly suicidal, that is a successful mission required the death of the perpetrator

- o In 35.4% of the cases, the terrorists were willing to die but preferred to live.

- o In a full 62.8 % of the cases, elaborate escape plans were made.

While the United States in particular has suffered grievous losses from suicide missions since this study was completed, more recent events do not suggest dramatic variations in these figures.

Myth Three: Military Retaliation only Fuels Terrorism

This myth is dangerous because it can paralyze us into inaction. We have so often heard that violence is not the solution to all problems that we run the risk of believing that violence is not the solution to any problem.

For example, a day after the U.S. strike on Libya on April 15, 1986, 97 Western terrorism experts meeting at a seminar in Aberdeen, Scotland, unanimously agreed that the United States had committed an error.

Neither the morality of nor the justification for the strike was at issue; efficacy was. The view was that the air strike would just stimulate Qadhafi to more terrorism, that terrorist attacks would spiral upward.

The predictions of these experts were wrong. What happened was the opposite. The attack demonstrated that the prudent application of force can deter future terrorism: we believe that as many as 35 attacks planned by Libya were averted within weeks after the attack.

Yes, Qadhafi still practices terrorism-- witness his continued campaign to assassinate dissidents abroad and the recently intercepted shipment of 150 tons of arms to the IRA. But he has become increasingly secretive about his movements and has tried to paint a more moderate self-portrait.

Moreover, we must recall that military actions have non-military consequences far removed from the scene. While some friendly governments questioned the wisdom of our actions, the message of U.S. resolve to respond to terrorism was unequivocal and as surely understood in Western capitals as in terrorist training camps. Overall, there was a dramatic drop in Middle East sponsored terrorism in Europe following our Libya attack and the accompanying diplomatic and political measures we and our allies took.

Conclusion

The American people, indeed much of the world, have become preoccupied with terrorism. A recent poll showed that some 69 percent of the American people wanted government action on terrorism.

Well, our government is taking action, but action based on not myths, but understanding:

- o We understand that we will not stop terrorism solely by addressing the "root causes." While a cause may be worthy of our support, terrorists are not. Their "solutions" are always predicated on the terrorists coming to power.
- o We understand that most terrorists are not crazy. They are fanatics whose actions are purposeful steps designed to advance their political agenda.
- o We understand that military or other forceful reactions do not necessarily lead to more terrorism. Indeed, progress toward dealing with the "causes" of terrorism may well increase terrorism in the near term.

Based on our understanding of these realities, our government has fashioned a three-part policy designed to suppress terrorism:

One: Firmness towards Terrorists

We believe that terrorists are logical and goal-oriented. Thus we should make no concessions to them. If we make concessions, give into their demands, there is every reason to believe that we will be attacked again. Behavior rewarded is behavior repeated.

Two: Pressure on Terror-Supporting States

Some nations use terrorist surrogates as a foreign policy tool, as just one more way of accomplishing national goals. If we can raise the cost to those states, we can go a long way towards reducing terrorism.

Three: Practical Measures to Bring Terrorists to Justice

In spite of myths to the contrary, we know that most terrorists are not eager to be killed or imprisoned. If we

can identify, track, arrest and punish terrorists-- treat them like criminals-- we can reduce the number of terrorist attacks.

* * *

This strategy is working. In 1983 and 1984, international terrorism increased 30 to 40 percent each year. It leveled off in 1985 and declined slightly in 1986. There would be a dramatic drop off in the number of incidents in 1987 were it not for increased Afghan-government supported terrorism in Pakistan.

Why these improvements? Because the international political and philosophical climate is changing. Governments which used to tolerate terrorists have become tougher. More and more we are seeing world debate focussing on the effects of terrorism, not the "causes."

* * *

But I don't want to mislead you. Dealing with terrorism is a long-term project. We are not likely to eliminate terrorism completely. But by demythologizing it, by dealing with realities and concentrating on common sense responses, we can set about the business of making the world a safer place.

Thank you very much.

TERRORISM: ARREST WARRANT FOR ABU ABBAS

Q: Why has the U.S. dismissed the arrest warrant for Abu Abbas, mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking?

A: -- THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IS CONTINUOUSLY REVIEWING AVAILABLE EVIDENCE TO PROSECUTE INDIVIDUALS FOR ACTS OF TERRORISM. THE DECISION TO DISMISS THE ARREST WARRANT AGAINST ABU ABRAS, ISSUED IN OCTOBER, 1985, RESULTS FROM A REGULAR REVIEW OF SUCH EVIDENCE.

-- THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION REFLECTS A TECHNICAL JUDGEMENT THAT THE EVIDENCE NOW ADMISSIBLE IN OUR OWN COURTS WOULD NOT SUSTAIN A CONVICTION HERE.

-- THIS JUDGEMENT WAS SOLELY A LEGAL JUDGEMENT. HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS OF OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US, WE STILL CONSIDER ABU ABRAS AN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST. WE NOTE THAT HE WAS CONVICTED FOR HIS ROLE IN THE ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING. WE NOTE ALSO THAT SOME OF THE KEY MATERIAL USED IN THIS CONVICTION WOULD NOT BE ADMISSIBLE IN U.S. COURTS.

-- OUR WITHDRAWAL OF THE WARRANT FOR ABRAS IN NO WAY LESSENS OUR INTEREST IN SEEING THAT HE IS BROUGHT TO JUSTICE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK EVIDENCE THAT WILL ALLOW US TO BRING ABOUT THIS END.

^{DOJ}
-- ~~WE~~ RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDED THAT WE HAD TO WITHDRAW
THE WARRANT BECAUSE WE DID NOT WANT TO BE IN A
POSITION OF BEING UNABLE TO ACT IF HE HAD BECOME
AVAILABLE FOR PROSECUTION.

NOTE: IF PRESSED, PARTICULARLY ON QUESTIONS INVOLVING
DIFFERING RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURES IN THE ITALIAN
AND U.S. LEGAL SYSTEMS, QUESTION SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT.

Q: Does the U.S. reward offer in the Achille Lauro case
still stand?

A: -- THE REWARD OFFER OF NOVEMBER 25, 1985 STILL
STANDS FOR "INFORMATION LEADING TO THE APPREHENSION
AND EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF ABU EL
ABBAS AS WELL AS ANY OTHERS NOT YET IN CUSTODY"
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING. THE
U.S. CONTINUES TO BE STRONGLY INTERESTED IN SEEING
THESE PERPETRATORS BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.

Q: Was the decision to withdraw the arrest warrant
coordinated between the State and Justice Departments?

A: -- YES.

Q: Has the U.S. been in touch with Italy about this?

A: -- YES.

Q: Did the Department inform the Klinghoffer family?

A: -- NO.

Drafted: S/CT:TMiller
1/11/88 x78911 Doc 0020J

Cleared: S/CT:LPBremer

EUR:ABohlen

EUR/WE:ABorg (Italy question)

L/LEI:JDolan

DS:FMatthews (reward question)

EUR/WE:DGraze

DOJ:KMorrissette

TERRORISM

THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR FEBRUARY 1986 Pg. 30

WE'RE ALL MODERATES NOW

by Joshua Muravchik

Andres Almarales, the leader of the group of M-19 guerrillas whose seizure of Colombia's Palace of Justice last November resulted in one hundred or so deaths, apparently began the operation by walking into the building right past guards who recognized him but did not try to keep him out. He was not visibly armed at the time—the weapons were carried in by subordinates who attacked the building shortly after his entry—but still, why was he not stopped?

When this question was put to the Colombian Minister of Justice in an interview after the bloody episode, he replied:

You remember in M-19 there were groups called hard-line and soft-line. Almarales was one of those persons who always wanted a dialogue. He was always here in the city. He came to Congress to have meetings. He was a good speaker and was well known for not being one of the radicals of that movement.

Almarales's "moderation" seemed to have been reconfirmed during the early part of the episode when his behavior toward his hostages was, according to some survivors, "gentlemanly." But as government forces moved in, so the *New York Times* reported, "Almarales sprayed many of the hostages with automatic-rifle fire."

In this case, the Colombian government paid a tragic price for a weakness it shares with other people of democratic temper: Reasonableness and compromise seem to us so natural that we find it difficult to believe any foe could be unreasonable and implacable. We wax hopeful over any sign of moderation among our adversaries; we make much of insignificant differences among them; and when they exhibit tactical flexibility, we take it as

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proof that they, too, are reasonable. Because we believe, as Barry Goldwater learned the hard way in 1964, that even good causes should, except in extreme circumstances, be pursued by moderate means, we mistakenly infer that bad causes are improved if pursued by moderate means.

These illusions were much in evidence when the Sandinistas were fighting for power in Nicaragua. They were split into three factions, one led by the Ortega brothers, one by Tomas Borge, and one by Jaime Wheelock. The split was over strategies for reaching power, not over ultimate goals. The Borge and Wheelock factions favored patient organizing until the Sandinistas grew strong enough to seize power all on their own, while the Ortegas wanted to forge a popular front to overthrow Somoza immediately, and then consolidate Sandinista supremacy over the other anti-Somoza forces.

Because its popular front strategy entailed alliance with "bourgeois" opposition groups, the Ortega faction was labeled "moderate" by many U.S. and Latin American officials and journalists. However, some journalists (in the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Economist*), focusing on the Ortegas' call for immediate insurrection rather than on their quest for allies, inferred that theirs was the "most militant" faction. This was not the only indication of the fatuousness of the rush to discover which of the Sandinista factions was moderate. When the incoming revolutionary junta announced the ominous appointment of Borge as Minister of the Interior, the major U.S. dailies reported optimistically that Borge "is considered a pragmatist" and that he would now be "in a position to control the most radical elements among the rebels." Borge, it seemed, was now the moderate. A few months later, the same *Washington Post* cor-

respondent who had characterized the Ortegas as "moderates" and Borge as a "pragmatist" wrote of Jaime Wheelock, the leader of the third Sandinista faction: "Outsiders tend to consider Wheelock the most 'intellectual' and 'reasonable' of the Sandinistas." In sum, none of the Sandinistas' three factions missed its turn as the embodiment of our imperishable hopes that there were moderates among them.

In the Middle East, the main beneficiary of our indefatigable quest for moderates has been Yasir Arafat. Although Arafat calls himself a revolutionary and has long headed the world's premier terrorist organization, he is widely regarded as a "moderate." You might call him a moderate terrorist revolutionary. The justification for this oxymoron is that there are other factions of the PLO more radical than Arafat's. This fact alone seems to weigh more heavily in many assessments of Arafat than his own deeds. Thus, for days after the *Achille Lauro* hijacking began, we found it hard to believe that a wing of a Palestinian group close to Arafat was responsible, just as for days after the murder of three Israelis on a yacht off Larnaca, we found it hard to believe that the assassins came from Force 17, Arafat's bodyguard.

For some, the image of Arafat as a moderate is so firmly embedded that evidence to the contrary only produces an effect psychologists call "cognitive dissonance." Rather than alter their estimation, these people simply refuse to absorb the contradictory evidence. Thus, *Newsweek* magazine predicted a few years ago that Arafat's Fatah would lose ground to more radical factions, saying "the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine . . . is likely to gain recruits attracted to its infamous Black September past." The irony here

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

USPACOM...CONTINUED

centers of the unified and specified commands. Expected fielding is in the late 1980s. The scope of this program likely will be dictated by developments in the Secure Voice Improvement Program (SVIP).

SVIP is the major secure voice enhancement effort in USPACOM. The program will provide Secure Telephone Units (STU-III), which are now in the final stages of development. These secure telephones promise to be relatively inexpensive and will provide a high level of security for a broad community of users in the theater. The STU-IIIs are expected to be in use by the late 1980s.

Crisis Communications

Crisis management operations require a specially tailored communications package. USCINCPAC has such a package now, and will move to an enhanced capability in the very near future. The current Joint Crisis Management Capability (JCMC) package consists of a small, manpack secure communications capability. A single channel ultra high frequency (UHF) satellite terminal provides connectivity for a deployed team. The enhanced JCMC, scheduled for fielding in mid-1986, will consist of an upgraded version of the Joint Airborne Communications Center Command Post, JACKPOT.

The upgraded JCMC system will contain both terrestrial radio and satellite transmission capability. Terminal equipment will provide secure voice, teletype and facsimile operations. Three shelters will accommodate operations, staff and communications functions for ground operation. However, JACKPOT also will be capable of secure communications while airborne enroute to a crisis location.

Interoperability

"The day has passed when the United States can or should go it alone. The most effective means of countering the growing challenge to peace and stability worldwide is through a concerted effort on the part of all people who cherish their independence."¹ These words, written by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, while he was Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, refer to the need for diplomatic, economic and military cooperation between the United States and its Pacific basin friends and allies. If military cooperation is to be successful, interoperable communications among U.S. forces, friends and allies are essential.

Within USPACOM, efforts are directed at achieving the necessary degree of communications interoperability to afford the operations community with an effective command and control capability. USPACOM continues to develop a Combined Interoperability Plan for tactical C³ systems that is aimed at the standardization of tactical digital link standards. Other efforts include plans for interoperable communication security equipment and antijam radio systems. USPACOM goals for communications interoperability are high, but progress in this area can be very slow. Nevertheless, USPACOM is committed to providing those communications links required to conduct cooperative defense efforts within the Pacific basin.

The CINC's Advocacy Role

As the operational commander responsible for the employment of forces within the theater, USCINCPAC must ensure that component plans and programs support the theater plans and priorities. In the past, decisions that had a significant impact on the theater war fighting capability were made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the services and components without consultation with the operational commander. There now is a greater awareness at all levels that issues concerning component force structure weapon systems, sustainability and other similar plans and programs must be coordinated with the affected commander in chief (CINC). Making the theater CINC a player on the Defense Resources Board (DRB) has had a very positive effect on the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) process.

In addition to making significant inputs to key planning documents, such as the Joint Strategic Planning document and more importantly the Defense Guidance document, USPACOM increasingly influences the programming and budgeting phases. Throughout the year, USPACOM advocates USCINCPAC's position on C³ programs to the service components and, in turn, supports the USPACOM component C³ system priorities with OSD, JCS and the service staffs. It is a good team effort. Programs that have service advocacy and CINC support usually get funded.

The unified commands have one additional tool at their disposal to influence C³ programs, the CINC Command and Control Initiative Fund. Instituted in 1981, this relatively small fund allows the unified commander to solve C³ problems quickly with his own funds. To date, the funds have been used for small command center upgrades, quick reaction connectivity requirements, architectural studies, technical assistance and minor automation acquisitions. All of these programs have been implemented quickly and efficiently and have increased the CINC's war fighting capability.

The unified command's role in PPBS is increasing. But the most important point to remember is that the operational commander is the one who must advocate the programs to support his theater capability—including the C³ programs. Here at HQ USCINCPAC, we are doing just that. We are linking the C³ programs with the operational capabilities they support. HQ USCINCPAC must ensure that C³ systems will be fielded to support the operational requirements. The challenges are many. The C³ posture is improving at USPACOM, but persistent effort must continue in order to meet the requirements of the operations community. I believe we can do it.

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Footnote

¹ "U.S. Pacific Command: Protecting an Area of 100 Million Square Miles." Adm. William J. Crowe, USN, *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum*, Summer 1985, p. 8.

MGen. Robert G. Lynn, USA, is Director, Command and Control and Communications Systems for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii.

MODERATES . . . CONTINUED

was that Black September, the perpetrators of the Munich Olympics massacre, the murder of U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel, and other atrocities, had already been acknowledged to have been a covert arm of Arafat's Fatah, not the PFLP—a fact known to everyone who followed Middle East affairs but apparently one *Newsweek* found unassimilable.

What makes Arafat's faction more "moderate" than the PLO "radicals" is its policy of combining "armed struggle" with "political struggle," and its professed willingness to set up a Palestinian state on the territories Israel occupied in 1967. This, say the radicals, constitutes capitulation to Zionism's claim to a share of historic Palestine. Not so, say members of Arafat's group, theirs is a policy of "stages." A Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, says the Palestinian National Council (the PLO's "parliament"), "will fight . . . to complete the liberation of all the Palestinian land." This is the true extent of their moderation.

Our yearning to discover moderates is of course not unknown to the likes of M-19, the Sandinistas, and the PLO. They deliberately cultivate it, as did their forebears. Stalin himself sought to convey such an image and succeeded in misleading even the hard-headed Truman. Former Secretary of State Stettinius recorded in his diary in late 1945 that after Potsdam Truman fretted over Stalin's health. "The President said, of course, it would be a real catastrophe if Stalin should die at the

present time. If this happened, there would be no telling what might happen inside Russia. . . . He said he thought that Stalin was a moderating influence in the present Russian government."

Stalin, of course, was pulling Truman's leg, but, ironically, Stalin's effort to present himself as a "moderate" had at least a strand of historic truth. In the great battle twenty odd years earlier for Lenin's mantle, Stalin was the moderate and Trotsky the radical. Trotsky wanted to push the revolution onward and outward without respite, while Stalin wanted first to consolidate. Stalin did not believe in restricting socialism to one country forever, but only until circumstances were auspicious for its expansion. We'll never know what would have happened had Trotsky prevailed, but who in the West will argue now that Stalin was the more desirable foe?

As a moderate, Stalin stood on firm Leninist ground. The inventor of Communism had written in his classic pamphlet, *"Left Wing" Communism—An Infantile Disorder*, that those Communist purists who would "not permit tacking, conciliatory maneuvers, or compromising," were guilty of a "mistake that . . . is causing great prejudice to Communism." Lenin added, "Left doctrinairism persists in . . . failing to see . . . that it is our duty as Communists to master all forms . . . and to adapt our tactics. . . ."

The implicit assumption of our

quest for moderates is that tactical flexibility signifies a willingness to compromise about ultimate objectives. But for Lenin and Stalin, it signified no such thing. For they were ideologues, as was Almarales, as are the Ortegas, and as is, in a somewhat different way, Arafat.

We Americans have little understanding of ideology. We use the term loosely, often speaking of liberalism and conservatism as "ideologies." But there is an essential difference between ideologies like Marxism or revolutionary nationalism and "ideologies" like liberalism or conservatism. The latter are nothing more than attitudes or predispositions with which various issues are approached. But a true ideology elevates one single issue—be it the struggle for socialism or for Palestine—to a place of overarching importance and judges all other issues only in terms of their impact on it.

Tactical flexibility may actually come easier for ideologues than for others because the goal is firmly fixed, but compromise about the goal itself is unlikely. That is why when confronted with ideological groups, the key question we need to ask is what is their goal, not who among them are the moderates. If the goal itself is threatening, those who are more flexible in their choice of tactics may well be the more dangerous foes. And as the Almarales case reminds us, the same flexibility that allows them to talk so reasonably at one moment also allows them to act with utmost ruthlessness when they judge that their cause demands it. □

MEDIA PERSPECTIVES

SAIS
REVIEW

WINTER-SPRING 1986

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REPORTING HOSTAGE CRISES: WHO'S IN CHARGE OF TELEVISION?

Edward M. Joyce

TELEVISION COVERAGE OF HOSTAGE CRISES HAS BROUGHT a new dimension to an old problem. Thanks to the technology of modern news reporting, a story unfolds hour by hour, day by day in full public view, bringing home to the American people as never before the helplessness and humiliation of their government in the face of apparently irrational, inhuman terrorist demands. Television seems such a ubiquitous feature of these episodes that the public has come to associate the attentions of the media apparatus to some degree with the motivation of the hostage-takers. Inevitably, allegations are made that television itself is a major contributor to the problem. It is claimed that television coverage of such incidents abets the terrorists' desires for publicity and manipulates the public's reactions. Many charge that, instead of being a mere observer, recorder, and disseminator of events around the world, television should more properly be considered an active participant in them and a shaping force in determining the political response to them.

Any number of authoritative commentators have suggested that the role of television in hostage-taking incidents is less than salutary. After Hanafi Muslims took over the B'nai Brith headquarters in Washington in March 1977, setting off a clamor over television coverage of the siege, four psychiatrists told United Press International that "hostage-taking acts of terrorism feed on publicity and encourage similar events." According to an official at the National Institute of Mental Health, Dr.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

Edward M. Joyce is senior vice president of the CBS Broadcast Group, in charge of CBS World Wide Enterprises. He served as president of CBS News from 1983 to 1985.

White House, Expressing 'Our Outrage,' Imposes Several Sanctions Against Syrians

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 14 — The White House announced several economic and political sanctions against Syria today, saying they were "to express our outrage" against reported Syrian involvement in an attempt to blow up an Israeli airliner in London.

"These measures and our own actions will send a clear and unequivocal message to Syria," said Larry Speakes, the White House spokesman. "Its support of terrorism is unacceptable to the international community of nations."

The sanctions were also designed to show solidarity with Britain, which broke relations with Syria last month. That move came hours after the conviction of Nezar Hindawi, a Jordanian accused of trying to plant a bomb in the luggage of his Irish fiancée who was about to board an El Al Israel Airlines jumbo jet for Israel.

Britain contended that the evidence showed that Syrian Government agents had directed the plot.

Thatcher in Washington

The White House announcement was made as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain arrived here for talks Saturday with President Reagan at the Presidential retreat at Camp David, Md. It was also meant to demonstrate anew, despite criticism over dealings with Iran, that the Administration remained firmly opposed to terrorism.

These were the sanctions announced by the White House:

¶Export controls were tightened on

such items as aircraft, helicopters and related parts and components.

¶No Export-Import Bank credits will be made available to Syria.

¶The United States will terminate an aviation agreement with Syria, although no airlines now fly between the two countries.

¶No tickets will be permitted to be sold in this country for travel aboard the Syrian Arab airline.

¶The two American oil companies operating in Syria — Marathon Oil and the Pecten Syria Petroleum Company — have been told that the United States

regards their continued involvement in Syria "inappropriate."

¶More vigorous procedures will be applied to Syrian visa applications. A travel advisory will be issued warning Americans of the "potential for terrorist activity originating there."

¶The size of the United States Embassy in Damascus and the Syrian Embassy in Washington will be reduced, and no high-level visits will occur.

Mr. Speakes said, "These measures are intended to convince the Syrian Government that state support of terrorism will not be tolerated by the civi-

lized world."

He said Syria could play an important role in a key region of the world, "but it cannot expect to be accepted as a responsible power or treated as one as long as it continues to use terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy."

Trade is low between the two countries, amounting to about \$100 million a year, almost all of it in the sale of American goods and agricultural products to Syria.

It was unclear if Syria would try to retaliate. The Syrians are said to have some influence with radical groups in

eastern Lebanon, and in the past some freed hostages have been released to Syrian custody.

'Record of Terrorism'

The State Department said, "Syria clearly has a long record of involvement in terrorism."

The department said that from the mid-1970's to 1983, Syrian personnel were directly involved in terrorist operations, mostly against other Arabs, including Syrian dissidents, moderate Arab nations like Jordan and Palestinians loyal to Yasir Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as against Israeli and Jewish targets.

By the end of 1983, it said, Syria had curtailed the use of its own agents.

"Instead," the department said in a statement, "it began to rely more heavily on terrorist groups made up of non-Syrians who have bases and training facilities in Syria and Syrian-occupied areas of Lebanon. The most notorious of these is the Abu Nidal organization."

'Scores of Attacks'

It said such groups backed by Syria have carried out "scores of attacks" against Palestinian and other Arab, Turkish, Israeli and Western targets in the last three years.

In the last three years, nearly 500 people have been killed or wounded in such attacks, the State Department said.

Syria has been on an official State Department list of countries that support terrorists since the list was first drawn up in 1979. The others are Iran, Libya, Cuba and Southern Yemen.

Drop in Currency Deepens Beirut's Divisions

By IHSAN A. HIJAZI

Special to The New York Times

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Nov. 14 — A steep decline in the Lebanese pound touched off angry recriminations in the Lebanese Cabinet today, with Moslems blaming the President, a Christian, and Christians pinning responsibility on the Prime Minister, a Moslem.

Prime Minister Rashid Karami said this week that the time had come to replace President Amin Gemayel. Mr. Gemayel's Christian supporters have responded that it is Mr. Karami who should step down, as they seek to blame him for Lebanon's deteriorating economic and political conditions.

Since the beginning of the year, the value of the Lebanese pound has declined by 300 percent against foreign

currencies on the Beirut free exchange market. Since Lebanon is a country that imports nearly 90 percent of its needs and must pay hard currency for what it imports, the fall of the pound has drastically eroded the incomes and life savings of the Lebanese.

There have been warnings from political and religious leaders, as well as from press editorials, that people could soon be starving if drastic measures are not taken. Trade unions have threatened open-ended strikes if wages are not doubled immediately.

But it is up to the Government to take such measures, and the Cabinet — five Moslems and five Christians — has not been meeting because of the lingering conflict over Lebanon's political system.

The Cabinet convened in September

as a committee of national dialogue, but it could not agree on such questions as how the country should be ruled in the future and what relationship it ought to have with its neighbor Syria. The discussions were cut short, and political deadlock again took hold.

When the discussions broke down, so did a truce that was announced at the start of the talks, and the rival Moslem and Christian militias canceled their pledges to give up the illicit ports they have operated since the Lebanese civil war broke out 11 years ago.

Those sea outlets have drained the Government treasury, depriving it of 60 percent of the customs duties it might expect each year. Instead, the income has gone to the country's private armies, to pay gunmen's salaries and buy munitions.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND TERRORISM

- o Middle East is the primary source of terrorism today.
 - More than 35 % of terrorist incidents occur there.
 - Middle Easterners also account for about one fourth of all terrorist incidents in Europe.

 - Two main categories of Middle Eastern terrorists:
 - Fanatical Palestinians operating against Israel, moderate Arab States or the West--often working with the support of Libya, Iran or Syria; and
 - Shia zealots from various states working largely against the US and Western targets under the general inspiration and guidance of Iran;

- o What are the Causes?
 - frustrations of traditional societies confronting rapid modernization, including maldistribution of income, oil wealth and unfulfilled expectations;
 - Intractable political problems such as Arab-Israeli question, East-West competition, strategic oil resources and strategic location
 - Deep seated political animosities: e.g. Arab-Israeli, intra-Arab (e.g. Syria and Iraq), Persian-Arab; Islamic fundamentalist-secularist, and anti- and pro-communist divisions.
 - A sense of hopelessness and a profound lack of faith in the peaceful means of attaining one's political and personal goals, peaceful or otherwise.
 - Exploitation of disaffected by charismatic leaders with no respect for human life or dignity (e.g. Qadhafi and Khomeini)

- o Knowing the groups is essential but difficult.
 - Multiplicity of groups. Some with only a few members; others often split, multiply and merge. (e.g. Achille Lauro hijackers are one of three splinter groups of PLF which itself is a splinter.
 - Organizational structure less important than personal loyalties e.g. Amal characterized as moderate, Hizballah as radical; in fact, some Amal members more radical than Hizballah, but are loyal to Amal leaders. Same true of PLO groups.
 - Lack of discipline and tendency to freelance Both groups and individuals within them notorious for freelancing without informing nominal superiors. Others with no affiliation commit acts on their own or in the name of better known groups. Not rare for several groups or no group to claim credit for an attack.

- o How to Cope with Middle East Terrorism:
 - Prepare for all eventualities with good security.
e.g. up-grade security measures for personnel and installations abroad and educate private and official Americans of dangers.
 - Good intelligence is critical: know who is the enemy, their agenda and plans of action.
 - Increase cooperation, including:
 - intelligence sharing
 - Anti-Terrorism Assistance program: already initiated with Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and the GCC states; and are exploring programs with others.
 - Strengthen legal actions, including tighter national laws, extradition treaties and international understandings
 - Demonstrate willingness to use force if necessary.

- o What must we do to win the war Against Terrorism in the Region?
 - Recognize that we face a long-term fight with no quick fixes.
 - Begin to address underlying political causes of terrorism, particularly among Palestinians and Shi'a groups.
 - Seek cooperation with friendly states.
 - Strengthen the recognition among all states in the region that the techniques of terrorism are a threat to all of them.
 - When using force, we must ensure that we have good intelligence for a successful operation and avoid overreacting so that we create new generations of anti-American terrorists.
 - Take steps to isolate and penalize all states that continue to support terrorism in the Middle East, specifically Iran, Libya, Syria and South Yemen.

April 27, 1985

Libya: A Chronology of Export Controls
and Foreign Relations*

19 June	1970	<u>Wheeler Air Force Base closed and handed over to Libya.</u>
4 August	1972	<u>American Ambassador recalled.</u>
26 October	1973	<u>Libya bans oil exports to the US.</u>
15 February	1974	<u>Three US oil companies nationalized by Libya.</u>
3 January	1975	<u>Libya lifts oil embargo.</u>
February	1978	<u>Lockheed withdraws support team from Libya.</u>
	1979	<u>Libya uses civilian aircraft to send troops to the aid of Idi Amin during Uganda's war with Tanzania.</u>
2 December	1979	<u>Attack on US Embassy in Tripoli.</u>
December	1979	<u>Libya designated as a nation repeatedly supporting acts of international terrorism by Secretary of State.</u>
1 January	1980	A validated license is required for foreign policy purposes for the export to Libya of crime control and detection equipment (which includes vehicles designed for military purposes) and certain aircraft and helicopters. License applications generally considered favorably on a case by case basis. In addition, a validated license is required for the export to Libya of off-highway wheel tractors of a carriage capacity of 10 tons or more. License applications generally considered favorably on a case-by-case basis for exports of such tractors in reasonable quantities for civil use. 15 C.F.R. 385.4(d)(e); 45 Fed. Reg. 1595 (Jan. 8, 1980); issued pursuant to Section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), 50 U.S.C. App. 2405.

*This chronology does not cover export controls on munitions or nuclear-related items.

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- 15 February 1980 US closes Embassy in Tripoli and removes token staff. Most of the employees had left in December 1979, after a mob attacked and set fire to the American Embassy.
- 16 May 1980 Foreign policy export controls extended to all exports to Libya of goods or technology that are already subject to national security controls if the export is for a military end-user end use and is valued at \$7 million or more. License applications considered on a case-by-case basis, 15 C.F.R. 385.4; 45 Fed. Reg. 33955 (May 21, 1980); issued pursuant to Section 6 of the LAA.
- 3 October 1980 Three US fighters warn off eight Libyan fighters planning to intercept a US reconnaissance aircraft flying 380 kilometers off Libya's coast.
- 8 May 1981 US expels all Libyan diplomats.
- 19 August 1981 Gulf of Sidra incident. Two Libyan SU-22/F111ER aircraft are shot down by US Navy F-14/Torcats during an Open Ocean Missile Exercise in the Gulf of Sidra.
- 24 September 1981 Use of bulk licensing arrangements for supply of parts and accessories to Libyan aircraft prohibited. 15 C.F.R. 390.7, 46 Fed. Reg. 47067 (Sept. 24, 1981).
- 28 October 1981 Foreign policy controls extended to require validated license for certain additional aircraft (including helicopters) and parts and accessories to limit Libyan use of US aircraft in military intervention in neighboring countries. License applications generally approved on a case-by-

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case basis for aircraft unlikely to be diverted to military use because they are destined to priority civil use. Applications generally denied for exports that would constitute a high risk of increasing Libyan military capabilities. 15 C.F.R. 376.16, 385.4; 46 Fed. Reg. 53023 (Oct. 28, 1981); issued pursuant to Section 6 of the EAA.

10 December 1981

State Department implements Presidential appeal for corporations to withdraw American citizens from Libya by sending cables to the Chief Executive Officers of companies with business in Libya.

11 December 1981

State Department restricts use of US passports for travel to, in, or through Libya. Public Notice 787, 46 Fed. Reg. 63712 (Dec. 11, 1981); pursuant to E.O. 11295 and in accordance with 22 C.F.R 51.72(a)(3). This restriction has been renewed annually and remains in effect today.

10 March 1982

Imports of Libyan crude oil prohibited. Proclamation No. 4907, 3 C.F.R. 1982 Comp. p. 21; issued pursuant to the President's authority including his authority under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, 19 USC 1862.

12 March 1982

Foreign policy export controls extended to require a validated license for exports to Libya of virtually all US-origin commodities or technical data. Subject to

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certain exceptions, license applications to export national security controlled items and oil gas equipment and technology will generally be denied. 15 C.F.R. 385.7; 47 Fed. Reg. 11249 (Mar. 16, 1982); issued pursuant to Section 6 of the EAA.

Use of project or service supply licensing procedures prohibited for exports and reexports to Libya. 15 C.F.R. 373.2, 373.3 (47 Fed. Reg. 11249 (Mar. 16, 1982)).

11 March 1983

Nonimmigrant status of Libyan nationals, or foreign nationals acting on behalf of a Libyan entity, who is engaged in aviation maintenance, flight operations, or nuclear-related studies is terminated. Certain benefits to such individuals barred where intent is to obtain such education or training. 8 C.F.R. 214.5, 48 Fed. Reg. 10296 (Mar. 11, 1982); issued pursuant to Section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)27.

April 1983

Brazil confiscates military cargo on Libyan aircraft en route to Nicaragua.

20 March 1984

Licensing policy for exports to Libya amended: subject to certain exceptions, license applications to export goods or technical data which would directly contribute to the development or construction of the Ras Lanuf petrochemical complex will generally be denied. 15 C.F.R. 385.7; 49 Fed. Reg. 10247 (Mar. 20, 1984); issued pursuant to the EAA.

12 April 1984

Shooting incident at People's Bureau in London results in killing of policewoman.

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- 10 April 1984 - ...
- 12 June 1984 - ...
- September 1984 - Libya and France announce withdrawal of ...
- December 1984 - ...
- 5 December 1984 - ...
- 10 April 1985 - ...
- 15 November 1985 - ...
- 5 December 1985 - ...
- 27 December, 1985 - Abu Nidal attacks on Rome & Vienna
- 7 January 1986 - President Rissav's Transatlantic ...
- 8 January 1986 - ...

June 11, 1986

TERRORISM STATISTICS

1985

Middle East terrorist incidents: 370

Spillover into other areas: 68

1986 (January through May)

Middle East terrorist incidents: 214

Spillover into other areas: ~~8~~ 13

s Linked ast Week

He cited the hijacking of an airliner last fall and the two attacks in December. A member of Administration officials privately today that there is "pretty good" evidence to support the decision to attack the West coast. The decision was made after the attack on the Gulf of Sidra. The President Reagan sent craft carriers and support to the gulf, with the avowed purpose of exercising the right to sail in international waters. Colonel Qaddafi said that Libya has sovereignty over the gulf, a claim the United States does not recognize. The Libyans fired at the ships, and American forces retaliated against a missile attack and several Libyan attacks.

Intelligence Missions Increased

Qaddafi vowed retaliation. However, he denied involvement in the T.W.A. airliner. Administration officials said that in the months the United States and its West European allies have fully increased intelligence operations directed at terrorist groups. There was being done to watch these groups, people and countries, he asserted.

He said that about 10 days ago, operations led to information that was connected with Colonel Qaddafi stage a major attack on Americans and "others." They were believed to be Europeans. Officials also said that the operation had up evidence that Colonel Qaddafi was making every effort to help Palestinian and others help Libyan nationals out of the country.

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Qaddafi Said to Be 'Scared'

Officials said that Colonel Qaddafi is "very scared" by American operations in the Gulf of Sidra, and that he is very careful when we had our eyes on him.

Administration officials and legislators said they have no doubt that Libya provides general support for terrorist groups in the form of money, weapons, and the like. But they said that direct links were difficult to establish.

John Oakley, head of the State Department's office of counterterrorism, said about this Sunday in a television interview. Referring to the direct attack, he said the Administration has "suspicions, not the confirmed spoke of 'connections,' a firm link, between Libya and the attacks in December. On the surveillance of Americans, he was even stronger phrase, saying the Administration had "confirmed re-

Officials said that even though the evidence was lacking, the Administration intended to press ahead with its campaign of identifying connections with the attacks. As one official said, "This is our way of sensitizing Americans and Europeans about the risks and preparing the way for follow-on responses." Some of these officials said that American military action was being used at this time.

12 Months of Terror: The Mideast Connection

Links between groups and countries made by American experts on terrorism.

1985

April 12, Madrid. Bomb explodes at restaurant outside city frequented by U.S. servicemen, killing 18 Spaniards and wounding 82 people, including 14 Americans.

Claim: Islamic Holy War.
Link: Syria and Iran.

April 13, Paris. Bombs explode at branch of Israeli-owned Bank Leumi and National Immigration Office and at offices of rightist weekly newspaper Minute the next day.

Claim: Direct Action, a French guerrilla group, says attacks were carried out by "Sana Mheidieh commando," a reference to a Lebanese woman who carried out suicide bomb attack in Lebanon.
Link: Libya and Syria.

June 14, Athens. Two Lebanese Shiite gunmen hijack T.W.A. jetliner on Athens-to-Rome flight with 104 Americans aboard and force it to fly to Beirut. American Navy diver, Robert D. Stethem, is killed. A Shiite Amal militia leader, Nabih Berril, negotiates on behalf of hijackers; hostages released after 17 days.

Link: Syria.

June 19, Frankfurt. Bomb explodes at Frankfurt's international airport, killing 3 and wounding 42.

Claim: Arab Revolutionary Organization, which some experts believe is the Palestinian Abu Nidal group.
Link: Libya and Syria.

July 1, Madrid. Terrorists bomb building housing offices of T.W.A. and British Airways and attack offices of Jordanian national airline, Alla. One killed and 27 wounded.

Claim: Organization of the Oppressed.
Link: Unknown.

Aug. 8, U.S. Rhein-Main Air Base, near Frankfurt. Car bomb explodes, killing 2 Americans and wounding 20 Americans and Germans.

Claim: Direct Action and the Red Army Faction.
Link: Libya.

Sept. 3, Athens. Two grenades are thrown into lobby of Greek hotel, wounding 18 British tourists.

Claim: None, but anonymous woman telephone caller tells Greek newspaper that unless unidentified Palestinian is released, Black September guerrilla group "would fill Athens with bombs."
Link: Libya.

Sept. 16, Rome. Grenades are thrown into Café de Paris, wounding 38 people, including 9 Americans.

Claim: Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems.
Link: Unknown.

Sept. 25, Rome. Bomb explodes in Rome ticket office of British Airways, killing 1 and wounding 14.

Claim: Palestinian teenager claiming to be a member of Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems is arrested and confesses to police.

Oct. 7, Mediterranean. Four hijackers seize Achille Lauro cruise ship. An American, Leon Klinghoffer, is killed a day later; hijackers surrender in Egypt Oct. 9.

Claim: Hijackers claim to be members of Palestinian Liberation Front.
Link: Tunisia, Libya, Syria.

Nov. 23, Athens. Egyptair jetliner is hijacked on flight from Athens to Cairo and forced to land in Malta. An American passenger, Scarlett Marie Rogencamp, is killed; Egyptians then storm plane; 57 passengers and 2 hijackers are killed.

Claim: Hijackers claim to be members of a group called Egypt's Revolution, but Abu Nidal's Arab Revolutionary Command and the Organization of Egypt's Revolutionaries also issue statement claiming responsibility.

Nov. 24, Frankfurt. Car bomb explodes at U.S. military shopping center, wounding 35, including 33 Americans.

Claim: None, but Abu Nidal group is suspected of involvement.

Dec. 7, Paris. Bombs explode at Galeries Lafayette and Printemps department stores, 39 people wounded.

Claim: The Palestinian Liberation Front, a faction of the P.L.O.

Dec. 27, Rome and Vienna. Gunmen attack airports and 20 people are killed, including 4 terrorists and 5 Americans, and more than 110 others are wounded.

Claim: Surviving gunmen say they are members of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, a renegade Palestinian group headed by Abu Nidal.

1986

Feb. 3, Paris. Bomb explodes on Champs-Élysée, wounding 8 people.

Claim: Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Political Prisoners, which demands release of 2 Arabs and 1 Armenian jailed in France, including leader of Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions.

Feb. 4, Paris. Bomb explodes in crowded bookshop in Latin quarter, wounding 4 people. That evening, bomb is discovered in Eiffel Tower, but police defuse it.

Claim: None issued.

Feb. 5, Paris. Bomb explodes in Forum des Halles shopping mall, wounding 9.

Claim: None.

March 20, Paris. Bomb explodes on Champs-Élysée, killing 2 and wounding 28. Second bomb found on subway train is defused.

Claim: Committee of Solidarity With Arab and Middle Eastern Political Prisoners.

April 5, West Berlin. Bomb explodes in a discothèque popular with American troops, killing one American serviceman and a Turkish woman and wounding 204 people, including more than 50 Americans.

Claim: West German terrorist groups and previously unknown group calling itself Anti-American Arab Liberation Front. U.S. officials say there are clear indications of Libyan responsibility for attack.

West Germany Stepping Up
Its Surveillance on Libyans