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Special Report

TERRORISM

During the year 1985 alone, there were 3,012 incidents of terrorism perpetrated throughout the world. These acts, most of which took place in Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe, represent a new international warfare.

This war, though never declared, is being fought every day. Unlike openly declared hostilities with clearly defined sides, this

war targets civilians. It follows none of tenets of the Geneva Convention. Prisoners taken have no rights, no protections. They wear no uniform, carry no weapons; but they are the direct object of this deliberate carnage.

This month, *THE WORLD & I* examines the current status of the most active terrorist organizations, and traces the background of their development. World-

renowned experts have lent their experience to this report, supplying information yet unpublished about the inner workings of several of these groups.

Terrorism may be the World War of our day. The need for an intelligent counter to it cannot be overemphasized. The very structure of the future world may well be at stake.

EXPLODING THE MYTH OF THE PLO

by Jillian Becker

If the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) can be said to exist at all anymore, it can only be as a political fiction. This has been the case for some years now, but until a few months ago it suited the interests of many states, both Western and Eastern, to believe in it the way older children still let themselves believe in Santa Claus—and for the same reason: most of them still hoped it might bring them a present, namely, peace negotiations.

The PLO before 1982

The PLO was never a cohesive organization. Before its ultimate disintegration in 1982, it consisted of eight groups, supported by different Arab powers. These were inimical to each other, and within the PLO the enmities were fought out, frequently and with bloodshed, group against group, so representative were they, not of the Palestinians, but of their masters.

The largest group was Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat, who from February 1969 had the title of chairman of the PLO. He received money chiefly from Saudi Arabia, some from other Arab oil producers, and some from taxes levied on Palestinian workers in a number of Arab states.

The second biggest was Saiqa, supported by Syria, whose interest in "liberating" Palestine was to acquire it as a Syrian province. Another was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), led by a Greek Orthodox Lebanese doctor, George Habash, whose first patron was President Nasser of Egypt.

From his group two others had broken off in the late 1960s and become constituent factions in their own right: first, the PFLP-GC (General Command), led by a Syrian named Ahmad Jibril, supported by Syria; and then, the PDFLP (the Democratic Front), led by a Jordanian Bedouin Chris-

tian named Nayef Hawatmeh, who developed a closer relationship than the others with the Soviet Union.

Hostility between the three groups remained intense through all the years that they were nominally associated with each other under the PLO umbrella—from which, at times, the PFLP all but totally severed itself.

Then there was the ALF (Arab Liberation Front), an Iraqi group with few Palestinian members, which positively did not seek a Palestinian state since its declared aim was a single, unified Arab state under Iraqi hegemony.

In 1977, another group broke off from the PFLP-GC, naming itself the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). Its main backer was Iraq, but it was also partly financed by Libya. One of the smallest groups was the Palestine Popular Struggle Front, formed by Palestinians of the

West Bank and consisting of about 100 members.

What bound them together just sufficiently was the 1968 covenant, which declared that the aim of the PLO was the total annihilation of Israel through armed struggle only.

After the 1973 war, which the Arabs claimed as a victory, the possibility arose of a Palestinian state being established by negotiation at a multinational peace conference presided over by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The question of whether to enter into negotiations or not split the loosely bound PLO into two main policy groups opposed to each other. On the one side, Fatah, the PDLFP (which followed the Soviet line, and the Soviet Union wanted the peace conference), and Saiga (which did as Syria wished it to do, and Syria was being armed by the Soviet Union) agreed that their aims could be attained by negotiation as well as armed struggle and that "Palestine" could be "recovered" in stages instead of all at once—first; the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza; then, Israel.

On the other side, the remaining groups (not including the PLF, which had not yet come into existence) rejected both modifications and so came to be known as the "rejectionists." The Fatah-led side was the majority by far, and so the new "moderate" proposals were adopted as official policy by subsequent Palestine National Councils (PNCs), one which met in 1974, when the "stages" idea was ratified, and one in 1977, when political negotiation was accepted as an auxiliary means to achieve the Palestinian state.

For all the divisions within it, the PLO occasionally gave the appearance of unity during the years that it held territory in Lebanon. In 1975 and 1976, the alien PLO, heavily armed by Syria, and in alliance with some revolutionary Lebanese factions, waged a civil war against the Lebanese Christians. Syrian forces came in

to impose peace and gain control of the territory, but Israel warned them not to advance or dig in too close to her border. President Hafez Assad of Syria handed over West Beirut to Yasser Arafat and drew back his forces to the east of Lebanon, where they remain to this day.

The PLO gained unchallenged possession of most of southern Lebanon, subjecting the Lebanese and Palestinian refugees alike to the arbitrary and trigger-happy rule of its internally warring factions.

When President Sadat of Egypt made his historic journey to Jerusalem in November 1977, the immediate response of all the PLO groups was to declare themselves united in their opposition to Egypt's treachery. But within a few weeks, they split apart irrevocably over reactions to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Arafat wanted to keep a line open to Sadat, but the other groups wanted only Sadat's blood. Mutinies raged within Fatah itself, not for the first time.

In 1973, a splinter group led by Abu Nidal (real name, Sabri al-Banna) mutinied and has attacked Arafat men with as much fury as Israelis ever since. Arafat, in turn, condemned Abu Nidal to death and ordered the death of a number of his rival's followers. In 1978, some 140 Fatah men broke away, most of them under the leadership of Abu Daoud who had planned the massacre of the Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Munich in 1972; some of Abu Nidal's men joined forces with the new rebels. Groups proliferated as the "united" organization continued to crumble away.

The final, visible dissolution of the PLO came when the organization was pushed out of Beirut by the Israelis in August 1982. Arafat sought for somewhere to go, for an Arab government that would take him in. President Bourguiba finally agreed to let him lodge in Tunis, with a small contingent of armed supporters.

TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE

MIDDLE EAST

PALESTINIANS

Arab Liberation Front (ALF)
Abu Nidal Group
Al-Asifa
Al-Saeir
Arab Nationalist Movement
Arab Nationalist Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
Arab Revolutionary Army—Palestine Command
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
Black September Group
Black September-June Organization
Eagles of the Palestine
The Storm (al-Saiga)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Popular Struggle Front (PSF)
Palestine Liberation Front
Palestine Communist Party
Palestine National Front (PNF)
Palestine Liberation Organization
Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine

BAHRAIN

Al-Sanduaq Al-Husseini Society
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
National Liberation Front Bahrain
Popular Liberation Front of Aman and The Arab Gulf

IRAQ

Al-Daawa (The Call)
Dawah Party
Dissident Baathists
Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK)
Iraqi Communist Party (ICP)
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)
Kurdish Socialist Party (Bassok)
National Front for the Liberation of Iraq (NFLI)
National Democratic and Pan-Arab Front
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq
Unified Kurdistan Socialist Party (UKSP)

ISRAEL

Arab Liberation Front
Black June Organization
Black September Organization
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Heroes of the Return
Movement of Arab Nationalists
Palestine Armed Struggle Command
Palestine Liberation Army
Palestine Liberation Front
Palestine Liberation Organization
Palestine National Front in Occupied Territories
Palestine National Liberation Movement
Palestine Popular Struggle Front
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command
Rejection Front
Sa'iqe
Nature Carta
Redemption of Israel
Jewish Defense League
JORDAN
Arab Nationalist Movement
Force 17
Jordanian Communist Party (JCP)
Moslem Brotherhood
KUWAIT
Moslem Fundamentalists

The rest of the fighters who remained loyal to him, about one-third of the Palestinian fighting force, were banished to an island off the coast of Yemen. Among those who went with Arafat to Tunis was the leader of the PLF, Abu Abbas, and most of its small membership, although some of them broke away and went to

Damascus. The ALF retracted into Iraq.

The other faction leaders were allowed into Syria by Assad, and there they went, unreconciled to each other, and their fighting men were shut away in camps. An initial restlessness among them was soon settled by the prompt arrival of Assad's tanks.

After 1982

In 1982, a full-scale internecine war broke out within the Fatah organization. Arafat returned to Lebanon, to the northern town of Tripoli, where he still had some supporters in the camps. Angry cohorts of rebel Fatah fighters, armed and paid by Syria and led by a Fatah officer, Abu Musa (real name, Musa Sa'id), besieged the camps; they were bitter at what they saw as their betrayal in 1982 by inept, cowardly, and greedy commanders, especially Abu Ammar (better known as Yasser Arafat) and Haj Ismail, who had ruled Sidon with the gun and greatly enriched himself with loot but had fled ignominiously before the Israeli advance in June 1982.

They rained fire upon Arafat and his last few supporters in Lebanon, Palestinians who, being encamped in the north, had not

had to live under his tyranny between 1976 and 1982. He would certainly have been killed had he not run for his life to the sea and sailed away under the protection of the United Nations.

From then on, Arafat was the leader of a minority faction of the PLO—except that it was no longer possible to speak of the PLO and its factions. New groups were formed out of the disintegrated parts. Arafat's remnant of Fatah, along with the PDFLP, the PFLP, a part of the PLF, and a newly formed communist group, banded together as the Democratic Alliance. The remaining factions, those under the protection of Assad, called themselves the National Salvation Alliance. Which group now was "the sole representative of the Palestinian people"—as the PLO had been termed by the Arab states since 1974?

Western wishful thinking

Still the world—that is, the United Nations, Western governments and the media, and the Soviet Union spoke of "the PLO." What they meant by it was Arafat and his broken piece of a group. He still bore the title of PLO Chairman, making it possible, with a little political license,

to call that piece the PLO. He also held another asset: a fair amount of support among Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories. The great powers still hoped that he might be able to speak for the Palestinian people if only negotiations could be launched to settle territorial disputes.


It must have seemed to Arafat that his luck was endless. With no effective armed strength, with such as he had removed too far from Israel to launch attacks across its borders, with Arab leaders—Qaddafi and Assad—refusing to let him set foot in their territory, he was nevertheless courted by newsmen, received by the Pope, and made welcome and treated as a head of state in many lands, both East and West. His "minister of foreign affairs," Farouq Qaddoumi, was sought out in Tunis by a junior minister of the British Foreign Office, Douglas Hurd, now Home Secretary.

Which group now was "the sole representative of the Palestinian people"—as the PLO had been termed by the Arab states since 1974?

It was rumored that President Assad was worried that Arafat might set up a Palestinian government-in-exile in Cairo; Mubarak of Egypt received him with honor, and King Hussein of Jordan conducted a series of talks with him. Something was expected of him by the powers, and as long as this was the case, he went on smiling for the cameras.

Apparently the world supposed that he could deliver peace, or negotiations for peace, or permission to the king of Jordan to negotiate for peace—if only he would. By the look of it, "the PLO," in his person, had never been so important, even in its heyday, when its chairman had received a standing ovation in

STUCTURE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)



COURTESY — CDS

the United Nations (just fourteen months after the Munich Massacre by his Black September terrorists) or when he had sat like a president of his own little state in Lebanon.

Yet he may have suspected how hollow was the ground on which he walked, how it quaked beneath red carpets spread for him even in Western Europe. In November 1984, he managed to call a PNC in Damascus, with some slight support from his less unfriendly partners in the old PLO. The assembly itself was packed with notables on whom he could rely. The idea was that he would be strengthened by their assured support by the mere fact that a PNC of some kind had been summoned to lend a semblance of legitimate sanction to such decisions and actions as he might be pushed to take, however much opposition might be voiced by other faction leaders and the heads of the "progressive" Arab states.

The Events of 1985

In February 1985, Arafat reached an agreement with King Hussein of Jordan. It was widely hailed as a breakthrough. There would be a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the media claimed, ready to start peace talks with Israel. The Israeli government declared itself willing to enter into such talks, provided there were no PLO members in the Arab team.

King Hussein wanted the long-sought multinational conference. He would understandably feel safer from the wrath of other Arab heads of state if both the United States, as arms suppliers to the "conservatives," and the Soviet Union, as arms suppliers to the "progressives," were to participate. The prospects for a negotiated peace looked more promising than ever before. Arafat must have felt head-of-stateship for himself, or something very much like it; to be almost within his grasp. He had to bring off just one more trick. The conference would have to declare the West Bank and Gaza a self-governing Palestinian entity, but the issue

of whether it would be a province of Jordan, as the king wished it to be or a Palestinian state, as he must have it, would be clarified, once the territory had been wrested from Israel's grasp.

But the conference itself had to get under way without his conceding recognition to Israel, without seeming to abandon the armed struggle, and with his own men as the Palestinian side of the Arab negotiating team to prove that his PLO was still the "sole representative of the Palestinian people."

Even to Arafat himself, it must have looked like a tough proposition. But his luck might hold, and something might turn up to help him unexpectedly as it so often had before.

Whatever the media had reported, he had not, in fact, conceded the Israeli conditions backed by the United States: recognition of Israel's right to exist, abandonment of the armed struggle, and no PLO members in the Jordanian team. The talks he had been having over many months with the government of Jordan had not been about how to make peace with Israel or about which Palestinians could join a Jordanian negotiating team.

They had for most of that time been about whether or not the king could be persuaded to let Arafat's fighters come from their distant island and establish themselves in bases in Jordan so they could make raids on Israel. The February 1985 agreement had been a compromise. The king finally conceded that Arafat might have a headquarters in Amman but no bases for the Fatah militiamen—the *fedayeen*—anywhere in Jordan.

Arafat was disappointed but did not contradict the king when he announced his joint-delegation plan (Palestinian names to be decided later). After all, Arafat had agreed, that negotiation might accompany armed struggle more than ten years ago, so there was nothing new in that.

King Hussein had learned his lesson bitterly. Fifteen years ear-

TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE

LEBANON

Al Amal
Arab Democratic Party
Arab Socialist Action Party
Armenian Community
Armenian Revolutionary Federation
Al-Mourabitoun Militia
Alawite Youth
Arab Liberation Party
Cedar Guardians
Christian Militia
Conservative Lebanese Front or Kufur Front
Druse Progressive Socialist Party
Free Lebanese Army
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon
Fityán Alí Organization
Guardians of the Cedars of Lebanon
Hezbollah
Islamic Amal
Islamic Group
Independent Nasserite Movement
Kataeb
Lebanese National Movement
Lebanese Revolutionary Party (LRP)
Lebanese Communist Party
Lebanese Forces
Lebanese Youth Movement
Lebanese Red Brigades
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions
Marada Militia
Maronite League
Marada Brigade
Movement of the Disinherited
Murabitoun
Muslim Brotherhood
Musawi
Nationalist Front
National Guards
National Liberation Militia
National Movement
National Resistance Front
Organization of Holy Struggle
Organization of Revolutionaries of the North (ORN)
Organization of the Baath Party
Organization of Communist Action
Organization of the Oppressed in the World
Palestine Liberation Organization
Permanent Congress of the Lebanese Order of Monks
Phal'Ange, or Lebanese Phalangist Party
Pink Panther Militia
Populist Nasserite Organization
Progressive Socialist Party
Progressive Vanguard
Rawnaq Al Islah Militia
Revolutionary Islamic Organization
South Lebanon Army
Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party
Tanzim
Towhid Tigers Militia
Union of Forces of the Working People-Corrective Movement
Zahia Bloc
Zghartan Liberation Army
Workers' League
OMAN
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO)
Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG)
QATAR
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula
Shi'ite Moslem Fundamentalists

lier, the fedayeen had established their own state within a state in his kingdom. Armed by Syria, they had nearly toppled him from his throne by force. They had coveted Jordan as part of Palestine. In 1970 and 1971, he had gone to war against them and finally expelled them after much bloodshed. They would have won

if Syrian intervention on their side had not been stopped by the Israelis, who, as a warning, massed their own forces on the Israeli-Syrian-Jordanian border. King Hussein will not easily be persuaded to give another opportunity to Arafat brethren to attempt his destruction again.

Arafat lacked strength in his bargaining position. He had only one ace in his hand. King Hussein had, under threat of death, recognized the PLO as "the sole representative of the Palestinian people" at an Arab summit held at Rabat in 1974. At least two-thirds of his subjects on the East Bank of the Jordan are Palestinian—that is, they were born in the area designated as Palestine when it came under British mandatory rule after the First World War. That fact could, however, be overlooked.

The West Bank was a different story: there, just about all the Arab inhabitants are Palestinian. His acquiescing in the Rabat decision was tantamount to a formal acknowledgment that the rightful claimant to the West Bank was not he but the PLO. He could not enter into negotiations over territory, and therefore over a peace settlement, with Israel without the agreement of the PLO, as long as there was anything widely recognized as owning that name. He needed Arafat's consent—unless the other Arab states were willing to reconsider the Rabat decision.

Jordan was not strong enough to defy the veto of the PLO alone, as Egypt had done. But all decisions of the Arab League have to be unanimous. If Arafat could not make the king's peace with Israel possible, then Assad, King Hussein's worst enemy, would have to be persuaded to let him negotiate with Israel, recognize Israel, call off the holy war against Israel—all that Assad stood fiercely against! But last summer, it still looked as if Arafat was capable of giving King Hussein the go-ahead, so the king did not need to petition Assad. That hopeless attempt was to come later.

Passing the political buck

President Assad owes his swollen prestige chiefly to the refusal of the West to insist on his withdrawing from Lebanon; to its failure to condemn or even officially notice his command over the suicide terrorist squads that emerged from Baalbek to kill hundreds of Americans in the U.S. embassy in Beirut and the Marine headquarters in 1983 and 1984; and to the stream of visiting Arab leaders, and occasional American diplomats, who come to kneel figuratively speaking on his mat. He can say a decisive "no" and there is no one to compel him to change his mind.

Or is there? The Soviet Union has some 7,000 advisers in Syria and has armed Assad's army so heavily with small arms, artillery, fighter aircraft, and SAM (surface to air) missiles, that it is reasonable to believe that he is susceptible to Soviet influence. The Soviet Union, however, was still looking to Arafat to get them into a peace conference with a status equal to that of the United States. That would give the Soviets what they have long been craving—a legitimate role in the Middle East.

It is for that prize the Soviets have hitherto been giving their support to Arafat. They saw that Western European governments, anxious that there should be somebody who could negotiate for the Palestinians, were prepared to grant him recognition, in varying degrees, as leader of a "representative" body, which they continued to call the PLO. The Western European governments gave him that recognition partly because the Soviet Union did, which meant that the Soviets would not oppose any agreement he might reach, and partly because the conservative Arab states continued to recognize him as chairman of the PLO. The conservative Arab leaders had to recognize somebody as leader of the PLO in which they had invested special rights of decision; and Arafat, unlike the other faction chiefs, belonged by background

TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE

SAUDI ARABIA

Baath Party of Saudi Arabia
Communist Party of Saudi Arabia
Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Man in Saudi Arabia
El-Selaf El-Saleh (Sunnite)
Moslem Revolutionary Movement in the Arabian Peninsula
Party of Labor
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula
Shiite Moslem Fundamentalists
Union of the People of the Arabian Peninsula

SYRIA

Arab Communist Organization
Islamic Front in Syria
Moslem Brotherhood
National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria
National Salvation Command
Party of Communist Action
Vanguard of the Arab Revolution

SOUTH YEMEN

Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen - FLOSY
National Democratic Front - NDF
National Liberation Front - NLF
Organisation for the Liberation of the Occupied South - OLOS
South Arabian League

YUGOSLAVIA

Cominformists
Croat Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (Hrvatska ilegalna Revolucionarna Organizacija—HIRO)
Croat Liberation Movement (Hrvatski Oslobođiteljski Pokret—HOP)
Croat National Congress (Hrvatsko Narodno Vijeće—HNV)
Croat National Resistance (Hrvatski Narodni Otpor—HNO)
Croatian Intelligence Service
Croatian National Liberation Forces-Fighters for a Free Croatia
Croatian National Resistance
Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo—HRB)
Croatian Youth (Hrvatska Mladost—HM)
Drina
Fighters for a Free Croatia (Borciza Slobodnu Hrvatsku—BSH)
Freedom for the Serbian Fatherland (SOPO)
Krizari (Crusaders)
Rebel Croat Revolutionary Organisation (Ustasa Hrvatska Revolucionarna Organizacija—UHRO)
Trotskyist Organization
United Croats of West Germany (Ujedinjeni Hrvati Njemačke—UHNJ)
World League of Croat Youth (Svetska Liga Hrvatske Omladine—SLHO)
Young Croatian Army for Freedom
Young Croatian Republican Army

ALBANIA

Anti-Communist Military Council

AUSTRIA

Justice Guerrilla

BELGIUM

Julien Lahaut Brigade
Revenge and Freedom

CYPRUS

Enosis Movement (EOKA-B)
Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston—EOKA (National of Cypriot Fighters)
Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston-B—EOKA-B (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters-B)

and inclination to their side of the great conservative-progressive divide.

Israel blocked the possibility of the Soviet Union participating in multinational peace talks by insisting that it would accept no country with which it does not have diplomatic relations. This has prompted the Soviets to con-

sider reestablishing such relations, which were broken off after Israel's victory in 1967. Israel has another object in view in entering discussions to this end with the patron of her bitterest enemies: the release of Jewish would-be emigrants from the Soviet Union.

The British invitation

The months of 1985 wore on, and visible developments were slow. Arafat prevaricated. He could not now, at this vital juncture, give up his claim to "sole representative" status and let other men acceptable to Israel but distant from him negotiate for territory. He wanted Palestine on the map, but he could not take the step that might now bring it into existence. He waited. And his luck held. Something turned up for him once more.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, while on her official visit to Egypt and Jordan in September 1985, decided that two members of Arafat's PNC might have talks with the foreign secretary. Her decision was sudden. In Cairo, she told the press that she, like President Reagan, hoped for a Palestinian delegation as part of a Jordanian negotiating team and was only waiting for acceptable names of persons not connected with the PLO to be put forward. In Aqaba, Jordan, a few days later, she announced that Mr. Mohammed Milhem and Bishop Elia Khoury, both members of Arafat's PNC, were to come to London for talks with the foreign secretary. Somewhere up in the clouds between Cairo and Amman it seems, she had changed her mind. Or perhaps King Hussein persuaded her to accept the persons Arafat was prepared to send.

The invitation restored Arafat to the forefront of the world-shaking Middle East political drama. Fair prospects opened before him again. Here at last was official recognition of his organization's representative status by the British government. No jun-

ior minister was to meet with his people now, but the foreign secretary himself. Perhaps, through Thatcher, his shrunken PLO might even reach the best position of all—recognition by the United States government.

Thatcher could not have examined the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian question of the moment with her usual care and insight. If the role of mediator was what she had in mind, the choice of two men entirely unacceptable to one side of any proposed peace talks—the Israeli side—was counterproductive. Perhaps she hoped that if she extracted from these two representatives a promise that the PLO would recognize Israel and give up violence, it would be so significant a breakthrough that Israel would relent and smooth the way to a settlement after all.

Probably assurances were given by King Hussein, or attributed to him, that the two PNC men would declare themselves willing to pursue peaceful means only to settle the Palestinian question and that they would recognize Israel's right to exist. It is more than likely that Arafat believed that once Mr. Milhem and Bishop Khoury were in London, a verbal formula might be devised, like so often in the past, of such a kind as to convey one meaning to Britain and the West (moderation) and quite another to the Arab world (steadfastness).

Sir Geoffrey Howe did not offer proofs to back up his assurances that these were "men of peace" who were willing to recognize Israel's right to exist, although such proofs were requested. In fact, all available evidence pointed the other way. Both men had gone on record as saying, firmly and publicly, several times in the preceding months, that they would most certainly not abandon the armed struggle.

Howe did, however, assure Britain and the world that they would sign a clear statement committing themselves to abandonment of violence and recognition

But the cold-blooded murder of an elderly, crippled American, Leon Klinghoffer, on the Achille Lauro was not so easily digestible.

of Israel. A clear statement in plain English? No. They would not, could not do it, they said. They went away without meeting Howe.

The British government was left with egg on its face, though not nearly as much as if the meeting had taken place. The excuse for having ventured to the brink was that assurances had been given by King Hussein. But King Hussein, through the national press, denied all culpability. He himself, he said innocently, had been misled.

Howe also wore a look of wounded innocence. Yet innocence had not been within splashing range. The truth is, there had been excellent reason to call off the meeting before the arrival of the two PNC envoys, had not the foreign office been blindly determined that it should take place. What is remarkable in retrospect is how tenaciously some civil servants must have clung to their plan of getting the foreign secretary to receive Arafat's men in the face of events that should have induced anyone in a position of responsibility for Britain's fair name to abandon it.

Arafat overreaches himself

It was while the visit of Arafat's envoys to London was awaited that the murder of three Israelis at Larnaca was carried out by members of Arafat's Force 17, one of whom was a British citizen. And soon afterwards came the terrorist attack on the Achille Lauro cruiser, carried out by members of the PLF.

The Larnaca affair did not send a noticeable tremor through

Britain or any other Western country and the news media generally found that those killings could be borne with fortitude. But the cold-blooded murder of an elderly, crippled American, Leon Klinghoffer, on the Achille Lauro was not so easily digestible. The media hastened to report that Arafat was acting as honest broker, trying to persuade the terrorists on the vessel to stop their action. He was being assisted by another honest broker, Abu Abbas, but then again they were his men, and not members of the other piece of the PLF loyal to Assad. And if he was their leader, then he must surely have had something to do with their activities in the first place. Furthermore, Abu Abbas had his office in Arafat's Tunis headquarters. If such actions as this could be planned in those headquarters without Arafat knowing, there was little point in negotiating with him, or getting his signature to any agreement whatsoever, since he clearly had no control even over those nearest to him. If, on the other hand, he had been party to the plans, did this not contradict the British foreign secretary's assertion that his two representatives were men of peace who had abandoned violence in favor of negotiation?

Abu Abbas welcomed his men ashore in Cairo, and the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, made a plane available to them. When the United States asked him not to let them go, he replied that it was too late, they had already gone. But they had not, and the Americans knew it. When it did leave Egypt, the United States Air Force compelled the plane to land on Italian soil. The Italian prime minister, Mr. Craxi, preferred to uphold the tale of Abu Abbas being an honest broker and thus let him go, to the fury of the United States administration. By then, it was fairly obvious that Arafat's faction had no intention of abandoning violence.

Still, the British foreign office did not call off the projected meeting with Arafat's men.

But the case is worse even than that. The disastrous and ugly truth about all that diplomatic folly is this: the very fact that the British government declared Milhem and Khoury to be men of peace, its insistence that Arafat's PLO was willing to abandon the armed struggle and recognize Israel, forced Arafat to launch the Larnaca and Achille Lauro plans. He had to prove to the Arab world that he was still what he was paid to be—the wager of the holy war against Israel.

Pride before a fall

He had made his worst mistake. Just as it seemed that Thatcher would raise him to the heights of success, he fell.

Arafat is now thoroughly discredited. Even his own propagandists cannot deny it, but they are doing their best to repair the colossal damage. They print headlines announcing his "comeback."

As yet, however, no such thing is perceptible, nor is it very likely.

If the West looks upon him with distaste, it is not worth the Soviets' while to go on backing him as their most likely entry ticket to a peace conference. After all, he had never really been their sort.

But Arafat knows that if he loses Soviet support he will drop out of the wide political arena where he has circled and performed for nearly twenty years. He is therefore very anxious to please the Soviets. When, very recently, he was warned by Moscow not to interfere in the bloody faction fighting between rival power groups of communist South Yemen, he strove to obey. His fighters remained passive on their Kamaran Island—which indicates that over them, at least, he still has some control.

How long these wild men will contain their frustration is a question that might trouble Ara-

fat himself as he shifts insecurely between Tunis and Baghdad. In Tunis, he is no longer welcome since Israel's punitive raid on his headquarters there after the Larnaca killings. In Baghdad, he has been granted a narrow foothold by President Saddam Hussein, perhaps through Abu Abbas's honest brokerage. For Arafat himself, the question of how he can use his fighters has importance but not for the rest of the world. He has fallen, and it will not be easy for him to rise again. His power of veto has been suspended. What will happen now depends on King Hussein, Hafez Assad, Israel, the United States, the Soviet Union and Western Europe, all of which are watching each other for the next move. ■

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'TRACING LIBYA'S SHADOWY DEEDS

by Yonah Alexander

An alleged Libyan connection to the December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports has focused attention on Tripoli's role in the global spread of contemporary terrorism.

To be sure, "state-sponsored terrorism" may be defined as the deliberate employment of violence or threat by sovereign states or their proxies to attain strategic objectives by creating overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the actual victims attacked or threatened.

In other words, the main goal of state-sponsored terrorism is to undermine the stability of pluralist states with representative governments.

Indeed, Libya's policy and actions are a manifestation of state-sponsored terrorism in the Middle East and the international arena. Under the leadership of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, Libya sponsors and provides substantial assistance to the rejectionist elements among the Palestinian terrorist groups, and also supports terrorist groups in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

In pursuit of Qaddafi's objectives of expanded state power and influence, Libya employs tactics of assassination and violence against opponents of its regime and against other targets. Libya is also one of the main centers for the training of international terrorists.

Primary target: other Libyans

Direct Libyan terrorist activity is focused upon Libyan dissidents living in exile and involves Libyan embassies as operational bases. Continuing his campaign to silence the opposition, in February 1984, Qaddafi once again ordered all Libyan exiles to return home or to face death at the hands of

Libyan Revolutionary Committees.

Dissidents in Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy, and Austria were attacked in 1985, as Qaddafi's instructions were implemented.

Moderate Arab leaders Qaddafi deems as insufficiently dedicated to the armed struggle against Israel are an additional target of Libyan terrorism. Libya has been connected to assassination plots against Egyptian President Mubarak and former Sudanese President Nimeiri.

Other moderate leaders, such as the presidents of Zaire and Chad, have also been the object of Libyan-backed plots. Moderate Arab states are themselves victims of Libyan attacks as illustrated by the implication of a Libyan ship in the July 1984 mining of the Suez Canal.

Diplomatic channels

Libyan diplomatic support of terrorist groups is extensive and diverse. Libya's diplomatic service was used, for example, to assist the Palestinian terrorists involved in the 1972 Olympic Munich massacre. Libyan diplomatic pouches are used to smuggle money and weapons to Palestinian terrorists operating in Western Europe. Forged passports, cash, and documents are provided by Libyan authorities to international terrorists.

Libya has also sent arms, by diplomatic courier, to many revolutionary groups that engage in terrorist acts. For example, the PLO attack against the Saudi Embassy in Sudan was perpetrated with weapons received through Libya's diplomatic pouch and the Libyan chargé d'affaires in Switzerland was expelled when he was accused of transferring arms to local terrorists in April 1983.

According to some reports, Libyan embassies also serve as arms warehouses. Even terrorists organizations based in Indonesia have received money and weapons from Libya. In these cases, the Libyan Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, serves as the contact for the Asian terrorists and the Libyans.

The involvement of Libyan embassies is not limited to the role of supplier. Two Libyan diplomats were forced to leave Spain in December 1985, following the discovery of evidence that they had been planning an attack.

Diplomatic messages of support are broadcast from Libya to encourage terrorist organizations in their activities. The Libyan secretary of information, Muhammad al-Zuway, has confirmed Libya's support of terrorism by proclaiming that "We are proud to be used...We assert to the whole world that we provide material, moral, and political support to every liberation revolution in the world."

In the international arena, Libya serves Soviet foreign policy objectives (although no formal relationship exists), and Soviet weapons are distributed through Libya to subversive groups and terrorist organizations.

Greasing palms

Aided by its oil revenues, Libya provides substantial financial support to terrorist groups worldwide. According to the U.S. State Department, Libya is a "potential source of funds for virtually any groups claiming to be anti-Israel and anti-United States." Allocations for the funding of various terrorist organizations have been reported at \$100 million annually.

The PLO, for example, received Libyan grant money to fund specific terrorist acts such as the

1972 Munich Olympic murders, the 1975 Vienna kidnapping of OPEC ministers, and the 1976 attack on an Israeli jet at the Istanbul airport. Also, Libyan funds have become available to leftist elements throughout Latin America.

In 1981, for example, Libya provided \$100 million to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and, since May 1982, has made several deliveries of arms to the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas. Consistent with its policy of combatting Western influence, Libya has also provided guerrilla training and almost \$5 million in financial aid to the New Caledonian National Socialist Kanak Liberation Front.

Among the terrorist groups that received Libyan financial assistance are the Irish Republican Army, Muslim insurrectionists in the Philippines, Iranian terrorists during the Shah's rule, and Palestinian terrorists. Testimony of the massive scale of Libyan financial aid to the PLO can be found in the statement by Ahmed Jibril, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command wing of the PLO, in an interview with the Beirut daily, *As-Safir*, July 19, 1981, "Libyan aid is such that there is no end for further Arab aid....Libyan aid to the Palestinians amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars," Jibril said.

Teaching terror

Instruction in terrorist tactics and weapons is provided by Libya to a wide variety of terrorist organizations. A series of camps have been set up in Libya for training in conventional warfare and terrorism.

According to the State Department, several camps in Libya are devoted entirely to instructing terrorists in a range of explosives and weapons for use in assassination and sabotage. Training camps for Palestinian terrorists were established in Libya as early as 1972. Argentine, German, and Japanese terrorists have also received such training, along with groups and individu-

als from Eritrea, Syria, Somalia, South Yemen, Chad, Morocco, Tunisia, the Philippines, Sardinia, and Corsica. Latin America is represented in the training camps with Colombians, Salvadorans, Surinamese, Chileans, Costa Ricans, Hondurans, and Nicaraguans in attendance.

According to *Akher Sa'a*, the semi-official Egyptian weekly magazine, at least ten camps have been identified in Libya for training terrorists. Newspapers have reported that mercenaries of various nationalities are working for the Libyans and receive their training in these camps.

Handing out arms

Massive quantities of weapons are supplied by Libya to various terrorist organizations. Libyan involvement in Lebanon is no secret, as indicated by Druse leader Walid Jumblatt: "I receive arms from my friend Colonel Qadafi and I don't hide this. The weapons come through Syria...."

Nicaragua is another recipient of Libyan arms. In April 1985, weapons, including a supply for the Colombian M-19 terrorist group, were sent from Libya to Nicaragua on jets supposedly transporting medical supplies. The jets were intercepted before they reached their destination.

Libya is also the conduit through which Soviet arms are distributed to terrorist groups worldwide. In 1981, for example, large quantities of Soviet weapons from various sources were transferred by Libya to the PLO. This weaponry included multiple rocket launchers and surface-to-air missiles operated by PLO guerrillas under Libyan supervision. After the visit to Libya in May 1981 of Ibrahim Kalilat, leader of a Lebanese leftist organization Murebitan, additional arms including long-range 130mm artillery, BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, and Gran missiles were transferred to Libya.

Embracing international criminals

Finally, Libya has repeatedly

TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE

AFRICA

LIBYA

Arab Revolutionary Brigades
Libyan National Association
Libyan National Salvation Front
Libyan Baathist Party
Red October
Pan Arab Command
Warriors for Imam Moussa Sadr
7 April Libyan Organization
Martyrs of Palestine

ALGERIA

National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale—FLN)
Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (Comité Révolutionnaire pour l'Unité et l'Action—CRUA)
Secret Army Organisation (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète—OAS)
Secret Organisation (Organisation Secrète—OS)

ANGOLA

Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente da Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda—FLEC)
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional da Libertação de Angola—FNLA)
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola—UNITA)
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola—MPLA)

CABINDA

Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)

CANARY ISLANDS

Canary Islands Independence Movement
Canary Islands Intelligence Service
Movement for Self-Determination and Independence for the Canary Islands (MPAIAC)

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Central African Movement for National Liberation (Mouvement Centrafricain de Libération Nationale—MCLN)
Independent Reflection Group (Groupe Indépendant pour la Réflexion—GIRA)
Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (Mouvement pour la Libération du Peuple Centrafricain—MLPC)
Oubanguian Liberation Front (Front de Libération Oubanguienne—FLO)
Oubanguian Patriotic Front (Front Patriotique Oubanguien—FPO)

CHAD

Chad Armed Force (Force Armée du Tchad—FAT)
Chad Liberation Movement (Mouvement pour la Libération du Tchad—MPLT)
Chad National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad—Frolinat)
Common Action Front (Front d'Action Commune—FAC)
National Patriotic Movement (Mouvement National Patriotique—MNP)
Northern Armed Forces (Forces Armées du Nord—FAN)
Popular Armed Forces (Forces Armées Populaires—FAP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Chad (Front Populaire pour la Libération du Tchad—FPLT)
DJIBOUTI
National Independence Union (UNI)
Popular Liberation Movement
Somali Coast Liberation Front (FLCS)

demonstrated that it will not be constrained by accepted legal standards of international conduct. Libya is a potential source of safe haven for many international terrorist groups. In 1972, Libya provided sanctuary to the Palestinian terrorists who perpetrated the Munich Olympic murders.

In 1975, Libya gave refuge to

the terrorist who had taken 60 hostages at the Vienna OPEC meeting. The Venezuelan terrorist, "Carlos," has operated out of Libya for many years and in return for his activities has been given a home in Libya. Egypt has asserted that the Libyan connection to the hijacking of the Egyptian Boeing 737 to Malta "is very clear."

The Palestinian Abu Nidal group, accused of the Rome and Vienna airport attacks, has confirmed ties to Libya. The Egyptian magazine *Al-Mussawar* reported that a member of Fatah verified that Abu Nidal works with Libyan intelligence services. Abu Nidal operates without constraints in Libya and, according to the State Department, it has been reliably reported that the group is now headquartered in Libya. Libya openly welcomes terrorist groups; the Libyan News Agency encourages Palestinians to relocate their camps and bases to Libya.

The State Department reports that Libya is attempting to strengthen its ties with other terrorist groups in the region. Accordingly, in April 1985, Qaddafi established a "command" of revolutionary groups in the region. He stated: "Our mission in this command is to turn the individual suicide operations and the aspirations of the Arab citizens into an organized civilized act," and that Arab goals can be realized only through the use of revolutionary groups.

Qaddafi also said: "There is no escape and no way out but confrontation." Qaddafi has imparted this same message in the Caribbean islands where, according to the State Department, he advised leftist politicians to by-pass legal means and move directly to violent acts to replace the region's moderate regimes.



Sprinkled throughout Libya are camps to train revolutionaries in specific functions such as desert warfare, underwater sabotage, assassination, explosives and combat.

Time for reassessment

It is becoming increasingly clear that Libya's role in promoting terrorism calls for an immediate reexamination of all options available to the Free World in combatting this form of covert warfare.

The most important first step for the Free World is to develop a comprehensive program of awareness, education, and response regarding terrorist threats and countermeasures within the context of state-sponsored terrorism when it can be identified as constituting an act of war.

Liberal democracies must try to break down the distinction between terrorists and national liberation movements used by Libya and some other Third World nations, discrediting these liberation ideologies and creating an atmosphere more conducive to a wide range of self-defense strategies.

It is essential for the Free World to protect vigorously the moral and cultural system that entitles it to resist and, if possible, banish terrorism as an unlawful form of conflict.

It is the principle that should guide democracies in the fight against terrorism. Otherwise, the Free World will remain hostage to blackmailers well into the twenty-first century. ■

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ABU NIDAL—THE SPLINTER FESTERS

by Yonah Alexander

The December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports have brought the Abu Nidal group of Palestinian revolutionaries to a new position of prominence in the world's attention.

Although the group remained out of the limelight for a period of time prior to this, Abu Nidal was not inactive. The State Department reported connections between Abu Nidal and 60 terrorist attacks during the past eight years, 30 of these occurring since the beginning of 1984. Attacks took place in over 20 countries on three continents, illustrating the group's ability to operate where it wishes.

Abu Nidal's involvement in the airport attacks and the November 1985 hijacking of an EgyptAir passenger plane have renewed interest and concern about the group's activities.

The group was established in 1974, when Sabri al-Bana, known as Abu Nidal, broke away from Yasser Arafat's Fatah organization following disputes over ideology and methodology. Specifically, in 1974, Arafat limited PLO terrorist activity to Israel and the occupied territories. Nidal disagreed with the restriction, believing that any operations forwarding the Palestinian cause were warranted, regardless of their location.

Abu Nidal found an ally in Iraq who aided him in forming his organization, officially named the Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC), also known as Black June, and allowed him to operate from Iraqi soil. Syria also influenced the group beginning in the late 1970s and elements of the organization relocated to Syria as Baghdad began curtailing Abu Nidal activity originating from Iraq in

the early 1980s. Abu Nidal remained under Iraqi patronage until 1983, when Iraq expelled the group and closed all except one of its offices.

Most of the FRC's several hundred members currently reside in Syria and Lebanon. In addition, there are a number of cells throughout Western Europe and the rest of the Middle East. Libya has been increasingly involved with Abu Nidal since 1984; some sources indicate that the group's headquarters are now situated in Libya.

Agenda: no compromises

Abu Nidal's objective is to liberate the Palestinian homeland using violence as its leading tool. The group seeks to sabotage all diplomatic efforts aimed at renewing negotiations between the Arab states and Israel, viewing such actions as capitulationist. Accordingly, Abu Nidal's attacks target those states and individuals that are partial to reconciliation attempts.

Arafat and the PLO are not immune themselves to the group's terrorist activities. Arafat has been the object of many assassination attempts, and in 1978, PLO representatives in Britain, Kuwait, and Paris were murdered. Four people died in an attack on the PLO's Istanbul office.

Abu Nidal was implicated not only in these events, but also in the 1984 assassination of former West Bank Mayor Fahd Qawasmeh, a Palestinian moderate, shortly after his election to the PLO Executive Council, and the 1985 murder of a Palestinian in Amman. For the part he played in these and other extremist acts, a PLO tribunal sentenced Abu Nidal to death in absentia.

Murder on the Nile

Egypt often finds itself the victim of Abu Nidal operations. Abu Nidal was linked to the 1978 killing of the secretary-general of the Afro-Asian People's Organization, a former Egyptian minister, in Cyprus. This eventuated a gun battle between Egyptian commandos sent to Cyprus and Cypriot forces who, according to Egypt, were Palestinian-backed. The skirmish led to Egypt's decision to revoke all special privileges given to Palestinians residing in Egypt. More recently, Abu Nidal's hijacking of the EgyptAir craft to Malta caused the death of 59 people following an Egyptian rescue attempt.

Abu Nidal increased its activities against Jordan after King Hussein agreed to host a November 1984 Palestinian National Committee meeting. The February 1985 agreement between Hussein and Arafat to work towards a common negotiating position in the Arab-Israeli conflict only served to enhance Abu Nidal's campaign against Jordan. The Jordanian Alia airlines has been a frequent target with explosions at its offices in Spain, Greece, and Italy; a rocket was fired at one of its planes as it prepared to take off from Athens—luckily the rocket failed to explode.

An attempt to blow up another Jordanian jet enroute from Pakistan to Jordan was foiled. Jordanian diplomats and embassies are also favorite targets. In 1983, two security men at the Jordanian Embassy in Athens were attacked, and in 1985 alone the embassy in Rome was fired upon, a Jordanian diplomat in Turkey was killed, and a plot to assassinate the Jordanian ambassador to Greece was discovered.

The moderate Gulf state of Kuwait has been a victim of Abu Nidal attacks. In 1982, there were attempts on the lives of Kuwaiti diplomats in Spain and Pakistan. Two restaurants in Kuwait were bombed in 1985. In late 1985, Abu Nidal stated that attacks against Kuwait would continue as long as Kuwaiti ties with the organization remained severed.

As the prime obstacle to the realization of a Palestinian state, Israel has been subjected to many terrorist attacks. The latest incident was the attack on the El Al counters at the Rome and Vienna airports. Assaults in the past, such as the June 1982 shooting of the Israeli ambassador to Britain, have also been linked to Abu Nidal. Three Abu Nidal terrorists were caught, tried, and received 30-year sentences in connection with the ambassador's shooting.

The arrest of Abu Nidal members in London precipitated a rash of attacks against British targets. Operating under the name Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems (ROSM), the group assassinated British diplomats in India and Greece in 1984. The attacks continued in 1985 as the British Airways offices in both Spain and Rome were bombed. Once again using the name ROSM, the group kidnapped a British journalist in Lebanon.

If other Western European countries are not direct targets of Abu Nidal assaults, an increasing number of them are being utilized as staging sites for operations. Two-third's of Abu Nidal's almost 20 attacks in 1985 happened in Europe, according to the State Department. In 1981, a city counselor involved in the Austrian Israeli lobby was murdered and following this the Congregation of Vienna Synagogue was attacked. Also, in Vienna, a bomb exploded next to the door of the apartment of the chief rabbi of Vienna in 1982. Two terrorists attacked Jews in the Central Synagogue in Rome that same year. In 1985, two hotels were bombed in Athens and the assaults on the Rome

and Vienna airports took place.

Abu Nidal's strengthened Libyan ties have enabled it to operate in Western Europe with greater ease. According to British military sources in December 1985, Abu Nidal's services were acquired by Libya's Qaddafi for \$12 million a year. The group was to focus its attention on hijackings with Britain, the United States, Israel, and Egypt as its primary targets. These acts were to be implemented in conjunction with Libyan intelligence.

The group seeks to sabotage all diplomatic efforts aimed at renewing negotiations between the Arab states and Israel, viewing such actions as capitulationist.

Perhaps in accordance with the arrangement, Abu Nidal sent a number of terrorist squads to Europe, two of which were responsible for the Vienna and Rome airport attacks. The surviving gunman from the attacks was quoted as saying: "There are 300 of us, all devoted to suicide actions. We have support from Qaddafi and maybe Syria." Libyan financing, training, and provision of safe haven in addition to logistical support will most likely translate into further Abu Nidal European operations against a variety of targets. ■

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TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE

EGYPT
Atonement and Holy Flight from Sin (Al Taktir Wal Hijra)
Al Jihad Conservative Organization
Al Islamiya
Al Jamiat
Arab Egypt Liberation Front
Coptic Societies in the Near East
Egyptian National Front - ENF (Jabhat al-Wataniya al-Miariya)
Holy War (Al-Jihad)
Muslim Brotherhood Egyptian Communist Party (ECP)
Egyptian National Front
Front for the Liberation of Egypt
Islamic Association
Libyan National League
Moslem Brotherhood
National Coalition
National Front
New World Vanguard
Repentance and Holy Flight
Social Arab Nasserist Party
The Coptic Orthodox Church

ETHIOPIA
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)
ELF-General Command
ELF-Revolutionary Council
Eritrean Liberation Front—Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF)
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)
Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU)
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP)
Oromo National Liberation Front (ONLF)
Popular Liberation Forces (PLF)
Somali-Abo Liberation Front (SALF)
Tigre Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)
Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)

GUINEA BISSAU
African Party for the Liberation of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde—PAIGC)

KENYA
Mau Mau
Northern Frontier District Liberation Front (NFDLF)

LESOTHO
Besothe Congress Party (BCP)
Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA)

LIBERIA
Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA)
Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL)
Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations (Coordinación de Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas—CORU)
DuBois Clubs
George Jackson Brigade
Jewish Defence League
Ku Klux Klan (KKK)
May 2 Movement
National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP)
New American Movement (NAM)
New World Liberation Front (NWLF)
October League
Omega 7
Organisation of Afro-American Unity
Polar Bear Party

MALAWI
Congress of Second Republic of Malawi
Malawi Freedom Movement (MAFREMO)
Socialist League of Malawi (LESOMA)

MAURITANIA
Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania
Free Man Movement
Mauritanian Democratic Union
Walfougi Front

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MUAMMAR AL-QADDAFI

by John Rees and Martha C. Powers

Sebha, a town of less than 40,000 people deep in the Fezzan desert, the geographical heart of Libya, provided a genesis for Muammar al-Qaddafi's Green Revolution.

It is conceivable that Sebha may also be Qaddafi's nemesis.

It was in Sebha high school in 1959 that the 15-year-old son of Abu Meniar and Aissha al-Qaddafi first heard Egypt's charismatic leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser, on the radio program, "Voice of the Arabs," beamed from Cairo.

As Colonel Qaddafi, now 44, said recently in an interview with Peter Enahoro of *Africa Now*: "Nasser was the hero of the Arab nation. He was the pioneer of Arab union and Arab nationalism. He was a powerful opponent of colonialism all over the world, and he was loved by the ordinary masses, the simple masses." Certainly Nasser became an inspirational force and the intellectual mentor to Qaddafi.

Libya had been ruled since independence in December 1951 by King Idris al-Sanussi, childless, ascetic, and a former head of the Sanussi Islamic order. He was surrounded by corrupt officials in his own government, from the oil companies, and from foreign corporations. While Idris was a reclusive ruler, his government generally did nothing out of step with Western interests.

For example, Libya gave little support to President Nasser or to the Palestinian cause against Israel. And though it promoted the Sanussi Islamic order and its calls for practicing a simple, Koranic life, the regime was exceedingly lax about enforcing Islamic laws against alcohol and similar vices.

Revolution in the classroom

Under the inspiration of Nasser's vision of a pan-Islamic empire, the young Qaddafi formed a revolutionary cell among his classmates. Some of his Sebha high school classmates he later persuaded to follow military careers in order to place themselves in a position to take power. These men became the core of Qaddafi's Free Officers movement and the coup of September 1, 1969.

The names of the other cell members, then of little significance, now are critical to an understanding of Qaddafi. They included Abdel Salem Jallud, second in command to Qaddafi, Bashir al-Hawadi, Mustafa al-Kharoubi, Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir, and Ali al-Houdry.

For the past 25 years, they have been loyal and trusted advisers to Qaddafi, and serve and have served in such posts as chief of staff, head of intelligence, army chief of staff and ambassador to the United States. From then until the present, the powerful elite of the Qaddafi regime have been his own tribesmen and those of Major Jallud's Meghara tribe. Some 300 of their kinsmen hold various offices.

But there is now much more to Sebha than the genesis of Qaddafi's revolution and its modern airport and huge building complexes. Sebha, in fact, for some time has been a prime topic of conversation in Libya's coffee shops and in the intelligence agencies of the West. Within a year of his seizure of power, Qaddafi dispatched his chief of staff, Jallud, to Peking on a cash-and-carry mission for an atomic bomb.

By hook or by crook

Turned down by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, Qaddafi scoured the world to find the technicians and materials for an "Islamic bomb." By 1981, two West German firms, Orbital Transport und Raketen-Aktiengesellschaft (OTRAG) and Kraftwerkunion AG (KWU), had commenced operations in Sebha under the direction of the Libyan military, to manufacture and test rockets. Other Western technicians are reported to be in Sebha to help reach Qaddafi's goal of providing Libya with the capacity to manufacture weapons-grade enriched uranium and to construct nuclear warheads.

Qaddafi has not achieved a nuclear breakthrough despite the many years of activity at Sebha. The nuclear technologies he seeks are very complicated and much of the equipment necessary is highly restricted by the Western nuclear powers. Technological, acquisition, and maintenance problems are believed to have kept Qaddafi relatively far from achieving that goal, according to Western intelligence sources. Indeed, intelligence officials in the United States are skeptical of the project's capabilities as a whole; but in Libya, the well-informed believe that Sebha, which in the not distant past was an isolated tribal stronghold in the desert, is both the Athens and the Los Alamos of Qaddafi's Green Revolution.

The coup

The start of the revolution was nearly effortless. King Idris and Queen Fatimah were vacationing in Turkey, and he had already said several times that he wanted

to abdicate in favor of his designated heir. After several postponements, Qaddafi's coup began at dawn on September 1, 1969. It was over quickly with little violence and much bluff. Qaddafi tells how he led the attack on the main Benghazi garrison from a Centurion tank—with no ammunition! The garrison quickly surrendered. "All they asked was not to be fired at from the tank," recounted Qaddafi.

Central to his success were the three years that he and his former schoolmates from Sebha spent in Benghazi's military college, from which he graduated in 1966; and the expertise in radio and signals intelligence that he acquired during a nine-month military course in England. This made him aware of the central importance of secure communications channels among the plotters; and so Qaddafi developed codes for radio transmissions among the Free Officers' Movement plotters who became the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

With the advantage of hindsight, it is apparent that neither President Nixon nor National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger understood the significance of Qaddafi's seizure of power in Libya. The 25-year-old lieutenant (who promptly promoted himself to colonel) was regarded by the policymakers of the U.S. State Department during his first few years in power as an American asset. This warmth towards Qaddafi continued despite his expulsion of British and American forces from Wheelus Airfield in 1970. Qaddafi was perceived as a protector of Western interests by continuing to pump large quantities of oil.

Yet there were many signs that a visionary or fanatical element was present in Qaddafi's character. His dramatic raising of wages and living conditions was viewed as a sort of "populism" not revolutionary socialism. "Islamicization of Libya" under Qaddafi was seen as an outgrowth of na-

With hindsight...it is apparent that neither President Nixon nor National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger understood the significance of Qaddafi's seizure of power...Qaddafi was perceived as a protector of Western interests.

tionalism and to court favor with the populace.

Qaddafi imposed the Islamic *Sharia*—the laws of the Koran—and strictly enforced the ban on alcohol. Street names were changed into Arabic; Christian churches were closed and their crosses torn down; and the Italian and Jewish communities were expelled—Qaddafi's revenge for the period when Libya was an Italian colony and for the 1967 humiliation of Nasser in the Six-Day War.

Foreign banks were turned into Libyan stock companies; and not only was the sale of alcohol banned, but frivolous entertainment, now termed "cultural depravity" in Tripoli's nightclubs and cabarets was ended. Indeed, soon after the coup, Qaddafi, accompanied by a squad of military police, went to the Bowdlerina nightclub. Pistol in hand, he walked into the middle of the floor show and announced that the club was closed. Qaddafi's dramatic gesture led at least one member of the intelligence community in Libya to speculate that the colonel had been using the movie *Casablanca*, as his training film.

But despite these excesses, the State Department remained quiescent, accepting them as proof-positive that Qaddafi was a

good, if perhaps fundamentalist, Moslem; and concluded that this meant that he therefore had to be a good anti-Communist.

Mr. Nice Guy

During this period, from the coup to the first Soviet-Libyan arms deal in 1974, Qaddafi provided a considerable amount of corroboration that this was, indeed, the case. In Qaddafi's early speeches, there was frequent criticism of the Soviet Union and communism. He denounced Moscow's role in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, and sent Moslem Pakistan several squadrons of Northrop F-5 fighter bombers. He complained about the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty of 1972 and supported Egypt's President Anwar Sadat in his expulsion of the nearly 18,000 Soviet "military advisers and experts" that same year.

Only one year earlier, the governments of Libya and Egypt had cooperated in preventing a coup by Sudanese Communists against that country's President Jaafer Nimeiry. Qaddafi ordered his air force to force down in Libya a British airliner carrying two of the coup's leaders. He handed the plotters over to Nimeiry who had them hanged.

These actions and policies of militant anticommunism resulted in his being termed an "ignorant anti-Soviet" by the Kremlin, and Soviet publications delivered many attacks on Libya. Not only did these attacks and actions by the Soviets keep Libya in active commercial collaboration with the Western world, but also provided "what amounted to CIA protection of Qaddafi's regime and person," according to John K. Cooley, author of *Libyan Sandstorm* [Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982].

Cooley, who served in the Middle East as a correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*, United Press International, NBC News, and ABC News, has detailed a number of instances where the CIA, sometimes joined by colleagues from the British

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also called MI6), French SDECE, and the Italian intelligence services, prevented Qaddafi's enemies from overthrowing his regime.

Within the Arab world, Qaddafi was perceived, with excellent reason, as the CIA's prime asset in North Africa. Apparently within the CIA itself there were some who believed that the "Brother Colonel" could be of use to America. Interestingly, when he imposed restrictions on the press, and his courts in 1972 began to integrate *Sharia* laws into the se-

Apparently within the CIA itself there were some who believed that the "Brother Colonel" could be of use to America.

cular legal system, these actions were reported as being a part of his anti-Communist, pro-Moslem grand design and created little or no apprehension outside Libya.

In 1973, however, Western apprehension began to grow when Qaddafi suspended the Libyan legal code, established political education camps, created a nationwide network of "Popular Committees" (which replaced the former civil service), and armed the entire country.

Now he was supreme, but he moved cautiously to consolidate his power. By 1977, he was ready to change Libya's official name to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab *Jamahiriyah*—a word that means "state of the masses." Under the new governmental structure, he remained the de facto head of state—the general secretary—and was addressed as the "Brother Colonel."

The direct Soviet relationship with Colonel Qaddafi dates to 1972, which was a watershed year in the Middle East, and in particular for Qaddafi, who ap-

plauded Sadat's expulsion of the 18,000 Soviet experts and advisors from Egypt. The Kremlin did not dwell on its loss, and intensified attempts to find, create, or cultivate another friendly regime in North Africa.

They judged that Libya made the best target despite Qaddafi's early record of anticommunism and his promotion of strict application of Islamic law. Approaches were made regarding sales of Soviet arms. Qaddafi sent his deputy, Major Jallud, who was then holding the post of prime minister, to Moscow.

Jallud negotiated a deal with the Soviets intended to give Libya an armory amounting to one billion dollars. It included modern Soviet MiG fighters, bombers, surface-to-air missiles, and hundreds of tanks. Later that year, Qaddafi signed an additional arms agreement for another two billion dollars in weapons with the Soviets. The establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tripoli followed quickly. By 1975, trade agreements had been signed. Qaddafi was even able to conclude a pact under which the Soviet Union provided nuclear technology for a research reactor and a nuclear power plant.

The courtship by the Soviet Union had paid off. Libya accepted the first detachments of several thousand military and technical advisers from the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact countries, and Cuba.

By the late 1970s, Qaddafi had become a very important Soviet asset and ally, permitting the Soviet Union to reposition tanks and other weapons there, serving as a refueling site for Soviet transports headed for Angola, and granting Moscow permission to establish electronic intelligence stations on the Mediterranean and deep in the desert. It is also obvious that the Kremlin's leaders also have strong reservations about embracing Qaddafi as an ally so closely that they would be committed to defending his regime absolutely.

Lover's spat

Qaddafi's visit to Moscow last fall was a complete failure for the Libyans. First, the Soviets would not agree to invest more money into the 880-megawatt nuclear power plant being built on the Gulf of Sirte, which Libya needs to meet its growing demands for electricity. Second, the Kremlin rejected his attempt to barter oil, in lieu of cash, to pay for his arms purchases (after all, the Soviets already accept 150,000 barrels of Libyan oil per day by way of the Finnish state oil company, Nesteoy). Third, Qaddafi wanted, but did not get, a mutual defense treaty. In other words, Qaddafi was informed that the "Brezhnev doctrine does not extend to the shores of Tripoli."

Qaddafi retaliated by refusing to conclude an agreement to give the Soviet Black Sea Fleet Libyan harbor facilities. He also snubbed General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev when Qaddafi and his entourage (including his contingent of glamorous, miniskirted, and hooded female bodyguards) failed to arrive at a banquet at which Moscow's foreign diplomatic corps were present. The excuse offered to Gorbachev's chief of protocol was that the motorcade had gone to the wrong address.

Still, while Qaddafi and Gorbachev may bicker, the Libyan regime knows that it needs the Soviet Union to help ward off its overthrow (there have been at least a half dozen attempts on Qaddafi's life in the past two years) and to provide the weaponry and technical expertise to fulfill Qaddafi's great ambitions. For their part, the Soviet leaders understand perfectly how much weaker their position would be in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa if they were to lose Libya.

The Libyan scripture

Like many revolutionary visionaries with a utopian and totalitarian bent, Qaddafi produced a book outlining his vision. Qaddafi's version is less wordy than *Mein Kampf* and is called the

Green Book. The first of the three slim volumes appeared shortly after Qaddafi seized power, and as an effort to broaden his support among the Libyan masses while he continued to destroy the traditional leadership. He also proposed arming the entire Libyan nation and abolishing the regular army—an indication that dissent in the RCC worried him.

Non-Libyan Arab critics have dismissed Qaddafi's precepts and slogans as "half-baked ideology and romantic idealism, containing seasonings of Italian fascism, Islam, socialism, misapplied sociology, and history." *The Green Book*,

There, heavily influenced by Marx and Hegel, Qaddafi set forth his view that all "national liberation movements—all ethnic and religious minorities—must be supported against 'colonialism'.

Volume I, *The Solution of the Problem of Democracy*, attacks "false democracy" (the ones with elected parliaments and constitutions, referenda, competing political parties, etc.) as "demagogic" and asserts that the "most tyrannical dictatorships the world has known have existed under the shadow of parliaments."

His system is essentially that of an absolute dictator controlling a mob formed into "people's committees" and "people's congresses." Even Qaddafi acknowledged that under his system, "the stronger part of society is the one that rules." The implementation of the "people's committees" at every level of Libyan society by Qaddafi's zealots caused enormous disruptions.

Objections to the revolutionary transformation of Libyan society were looked upon as treason. But

Qaddafi persevered and in March 1977 announced that the official name of the country was the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahariya. His foreign embassies, as such, were abolished and recast as "people's bureaus."

During the past decade, Qaddafi's name has become inextricably linked with international terrorism. His commitment to supporting terrorism has its underpinnings in Volume III of the *Green Book*. There, heavily influenced by Marx and Hegel, Qaddafi set forth his view that all "national liberation movements—all ethnic and religious minorities—must be supported against 'colonialism.'"

Terrorist spawn

Qaddafi entered the international terrorism arena through his support for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the individual *sedayeen* terrorist organizations that comprised it. Qaddafi is believed to have directly financed and supported some of Al Fatah's Black September activities, including the 1972 Munich massacre. When Yassir Arafat cut back on Black September operations, Qaddafi recruited a number of Fatah-trained terrorists for hit teams operating directly under the Libyans, supervised by Major Jalud.

There is no doubt that Qaddafi initiated and fully supported the December 1975 raid on the OPEC oil ministers meeting in Vienna, that he paid the Soviet-trained Venezuelan terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez ("Carlos the Jackal") some \$2 million for that attack, or that he rewarded "Carlos" with a villa in Libya. Likewise, Qaddafi became the primary supporter for George Habash's polyglot killers of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who included in their ranks Arabs, Latin Americans, Japanese, and Germans.

To date, the record of Qaddafi's backing of terrorists ranges from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and PLO, through the Red Army

Faction of West Germany, to the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, South Pacific Kanak militants from French-ruled New Caledonia, Caribbean revolutionary groups, and more recently, the Fatah Revolutionary Council led by Abu Nidal and the largely unknown Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger—a savage band of nomadic Toureg tribesmen.

It should be noted also that for generous applications of Libyan petrodollars, some notorious American mercenaries, including ex-CIA operatives like Frank Terpil and Edwin P. Wilson, went to work for Qaddafi in the 1970s. Qaddafi's American and British mercenaries smuggled surveillance devices and military equipment to Tripoli, and became involved in training terrorists and manufacturing bombs and other sophisticated devices for Libya's assassins. Many reports link this Terpil-Wilson network to the "hit-squads" that were dispatched in 1981 to kill President Reagan and members of his cabinet.

Their failure did not diminish Qaddafi's hatred of the United States. Indeed, it led to increased financing for violence-oriented groups in America, such as the Nation of Islam (Black Muslims), Republic of New Afrika (RNA), and the American Indian Movement.

Qaddafi understands that the Western intelligence and security agencies must react to his threats whether or not he intends to carry out an action. His threats and public statements can force airline companies, corporations, and governments to spend billions for security measures. So long as he occasionally sends out hit teams like those who carried out the slaughters at Rome and Vienna in December, his every word will be heard carefully throughout the world.

The Middle Eastern view

While to the West Qaddafi is the "godfather of terrorism," to most Arab and African leaders,

Qaddafi understands that the Western intelligence and security agencies must react to his threats whether or not he intends to carry out an action.

he has been seen as a consummate and inveterate meddler in their internal affairs. His repeated calls for the overthrow of these leaders have added to the political uncertainty of Africa (from Algeria, Morocco, Mali, and Tunisia through Niger, Chad, and Egypt, to Nigeria, Liberia, Sudan and on the Arabian peninsula, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

But in the recent past, Qaddafi's audacity in confronting the Western powers and in challenging the United States has revitalized Islamic and African unity with the Libyan Jamahiriyah.

During January, Fez, Morocco's traditional center for Islamic culture, hosted two gatherings of the foreign ministers of the 35 members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), joined by delegations from ten African states including Nigeria. These countries closed ranks with Libya to deliver stinging denunciations of the United States for the economic embargo against Libya declared following massacres by the Abu Nidal group at the international airports in Vienna and Rome. Abu Nidal's attacks had been directly subsidized and supported by Libya.

This "boomerang effect" of the U.S. sanctions has established a basis for the resurgence of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism which has been a Qaddafi goal all of his life.

Qaddafi is generally very popular with Libyans living in their own country. He has taken pains to spend some of his oil wealth on scores of housing projects, clinics, elementary and technical schools,

and development projects that provide employment. The physical living standards of the average Libyan have improved dramatically at the same time that their traditional Islamic culture has come under attack from Qaddafi's "Green Revolution," and even as the restricted political freedoms as they enjoyed under King Idris were eradicated by Qaddafi's totalitarianism.

Recently, a Qaddafi-licensed demonstration in Tripoli ended with the public burning of money—which some believe may lead to the implementation of a "cashless society" as proposed in the *Green Book*. Furthermore, in Tripoli and eight other cities, land registry offices have been attacked by mobs led by the revolutionary committees, who burned all files relating to land ownership and tenure.

Most observers believe that after 16 years of Qaddafi's rule, opposition to the abolition of money, land ownership, and tenure would be uncoordinated and ineffective.

Anti-Qaddafi factions in the military have surfaced several times during unsuccessful coup attempts. The most recent was in November 1985, when one of Qaddafi's cousins, Colonel Hassan Ishkal, a highly trusted military aide who commanded the crucial central region headquartered in the coastal town of Sirte, was gunned down when he tried to confront his cousin in his Bab-al Aziziya barracks headquarters. Some say that Qaddafi himself did the killing. The mortally wounded Ishkal was taken to a hospital where he died. No official notice was taken of his funeral, although the official story circulated said he died in a traffic accident. Some Libyan opposition groups have claimed that Ishkal was the leader of a pro-U.S. cabal in the Libyan army, and linked his death to a *Washington Post* story which "leaked a reported CIA plot to destabilize Qaddafi's regime."

Qaddafi could rule for another 30 years, but should his boyhood home of Sebha become a nest of

nuclear weapons with which he sought to impose his domination over North Africa and the Middle East, his meeting with nemesis would be likely to be sudden and swift. ■

John Rees and Martha Powers are with Mid-Atlantic Research Associates, publishers of Early Warning.

TERRORIST TRAINING CAMPS
(Listed by host nation)

LIBYA

al-'Azisiyya Camp (south of Tripoli)
al-Jada'im Camp
al-Kashaf Camp al-Ma'had Camp
al-Mard Camp (east of Tobruq)
al-Sa'iq'a Camp
al-Shahid Maqarief Camp
al-Takbali Camp (in Tripoli)
al-Tamimi Camp (East of Derna)
Aouzou Camp (in northern Chad)
April 7 Camp (south of Tripoli)
Bir al-Ghanem Camp (about 50 miles SW of Tripoli)
Ghadames Camp (at Ghadames on the western border)
Green Mountain Camp (in Cyrenaica)
Jaghbug Camp (at the Jarabub Oasis near Egypt)
Jurman Camp: same groups as the foregoing.
Khums Camp (at the Khums on the Tripolitanian coast)
Kufra Camp (at the Kufra oasis in South East Libya)
Ma'ar Ra's Talal Camp

SOUTH YEMEN

Hauf
Mukallah
Al-Gheidah
Dhali
Naqub
Shuqra
Sheikh Othman
Ghaida
Labej
Aden
SYRIA
Hamoria

LEBANON

Tyre
Damur
Beirut
El Badawi
Nahrel Bared
Ba'albek

IRAQ

Baghdad

ALGERIA

Bilda

Soumma

BULGARIA

CUBA

ANGOLA

CYPRUS

MOZAMBIQUE

NICARAGUA

Vietnam

NORTH KOREA

IRAN

NORTH YEMEN

SOVIET UNION

Tashkent

Batum


Odesa

Baku

Simferopol

The Lenin Institute (Moscow)

Patrice Lumumba Friendship University



JIHAD: NO EXCUSE FOR TERRORISM

by William F. Willoughby

As the growing frustrations over international terrorism continue, particularly where it is known that Palestinians and other Arabs are involved, it is tempting for the extemporaneous analyst to attribute this kind of terrorism's genesis to the Moslem concept of *jihād*, or what is too facilely termed a "holy war."

This is a dangerous mistake that could lead to trouble in trying to combat terrorism.

At an Islamic conference last year in Teheran, some Iranian scholars advanced a concept of *jihād*, based, wisely, on broad Moslem teachings rather than the Shi'ite teachings generally adhered to in Iran, to justify Iran's war against fellow Moslems in Iraq.

Dr. Majid Khadduri of Washington, D.C., a much-respected Islamic scholar connected with the Johns Hopkins University Washington Center, said that when Moslems are involved in terrorist acts, particularly those against unarmed, innocent civilians, such individuals are operating outside the sanctions of the Moslem faith.

Jihād, he said, neither historically nor contemporarily, condones actions such as those which killed innocent people at the Vienna and Rome airports.

They are the acts of individuals acting contrary to the precepts of their religion, he said.

Khadduri, in his book *The Islamic Conception of Justice*, published by the John Hopkins University Press, says that the *jihād*, to which many antagonists of the Moslem nations appeal, is indeed "the just war of Islam" which every Moslem is obliged to "fight."

Although it is described in this manner, very few teachers of Is-

lam, even in the days of its rapid expansion out of Arabia and into Northern Africa and parts of Europe and Asia, have really ever seen it as pretense for armed coercion against people who did not embrace the beliefs of Islam.

In the Koran (IX, 5), God commanded the believers to spread His Word and establish His law and justice over the world. Kad-duri said that in dealing with peoples other than the People of the Book (Jews, Christians and others who live by holy scriptures), the world was divided into two classes: the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-Harb*.

The *dar al-Islam* is the house of believers where God's law and justice are given practical expression in all aspects of life. The *dar al-Harb*, on the other hand, are people believed by Moslems to be "in a state of nature," that is, unbelievers. These people were the objects of *jihād*.

Insofar as Moslems believe they are under mandate to extend God's law and justice to all the earth, every individual Moslem is under this obligation. It differs very little in principle or in practice from the mandate put upon Christians by Jesus, when, after the Resurrection, He commanded the remaining eleven apostles (Matt. 28:18-20): "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost—teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you...."

Notwithstanding the vicissitudes of Church history, this command is not ordinarily interpreted as one to wage war or even to use coercion to make converts. Like-

TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE

IRAN

Araya
Azadegan Movement
Armed Movement for the Liberation of Iran
Arab Popular Movement of Arabistan
Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF)
Baluchistan Peoples' Democratic Organization (BPDO)
Baluch Pesh Merga (Baluch Volunteer Force)
Black Wednesday Brigade
Bahai Faith
Baluchi Autonomist Movement
Bahai Community
Forghan (Koran)
Forghan
Hezbollah (Party of God)
Iran Liberation Army (ILA)
Iran Liberation Movement (ILM)
Islamic Arab Front for the Liberation of Baluchistan (IAFLB)
Iranian National Front (INF)
Islamic Jihad
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)
Kurdish Sunni Moslem Movement
Komalah
Kurdish Junni Muslim Movement
Liberation Front of South Arabistan
National Front (NF)
National Front of the Iranian People (NFIP)
National Democratic Front (NDF)
National Council of Resistance for Liberty and Independence (NCR)
National Resistance Movement
Nationalist and Revolutionary Front of Iran
Organization of Marxist Leninists
People's Sacrificers
People's Crusaders
People's Fighters
People's Party
Pars Group
People's Fedayeen (Fedayeen-e-Khalq)
People's Mujahideen (Mujahideen-e-Khalq)
Peykar (Struggle)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Ahvaz (Jabhat Tahrir Ahvaz)
Razmandegan (Fighters)
Party of Equality
Group of the Martyr
Arab Political and Cultural Organization (APCO)
Turkoman Autonomists
Tudeh (Party of the Masses)
Union of Communists

wise, the Moslem concept of *jihād*, though couched in the language of war, in modern times, is not conceived of as engaging in a war of aggression to accomplish God's will on the earth.

Yet, like the Christian's evangelical duty, it is a warfare of sorts, but quite different from a physical sense of warfare. In the Koran (II, 257), Dr. Khadduri stresses,

What happened in expanding a particular Moslem state, however, was a different matter, and it dealt with administering *Pax Islamica*, or relations between Moslem and non-Moslem communities so order could be regulated via

special treaties and agreements based on canon law and standards of justice of each community tolerated by *Pax Islamica*. This primarily related to the governance of personal matters.

That was the arrangement for those not out of harmony with the sense of God's law and justice as Moslems viewed it. Such tolerated peoples could hold to their own creeds and laws of conduct by paying a poll tax called the *jizya* to the Moslem state.

Not so the "world" surrounding *dar al-Islam*, namely the *dar al-Harb*. This was considered, under the doctrine of *jihad*, "the territory of war."

This territory of war, Dr. Khadduri said, was the object, not the subject, of Islam. "It was the duty of the *imam*, head of the Islamic state, to extend the validity of its law and justice to the unbelievers at the earliest possible moment." Numerous accommodations were afforded these objects of Islam.

He said the *dar al-Islam*, or community of believers, "was in theory neither at peace nor necessarily in permanent hostility with the *dar al-Harb*, but in a condition which might be described as a 'state of war,' to use modern terminology, because the ultimate objective of Islam was to establish peace and justice with communities which acknowledged the Islamic public order."

The instrument, he said, through which Islam sought to achieve its objectives was the *jihad*. Islam, contrary to popular notions often perpetuated by the film industry, prohibited all kinds of warfare except in the form of the *jihad*, itself not really a war in the physical sense unless defensively forced to become that.

Khadduri said the *jihad*, "though often described as a holy war, did not necessarily call for fighting, even though a state of war existed between the two *dars*...since Islam's ultimate goals might be achieved by peaceful as well as by violent means."

Jihad, Islamic scholars explain, does not mean "war" in the mate-

rial sense, hence, ruling out terrorism, as much as it means "exertion," "effort" or "attempt." In other words, in order to fulfill the obligations upon the individual to function as God's emissary in pursuing the path of right and justice, one must not necessarily literally fight, but he must make an honest attempt at fulfilling his obligation.

Pure and simple, as viewed by Khadduri, "the *jihad* may be defined as a religious and legal duty which must be fulfilled by each believer either by the heart and tongue in combatting evil and spreading the Word of God, or by the hand and the sword in the sense of participation in fighting."

Two early Islamic scholars, Abu Hanifa (died 150 A.H./768 A.D.) and Shaybani (died 189 A.H./804 A.D.) stressed that tolerance should be shown to unbelievers, and they advised the *imam* to wage war only when the inhabitants of *dar al-Harb* came into conflict with Islam.

Slightly later, Shafi'i (died 204 A.H./820 A.D.) formulated the doctrine, according to Khadduri, that the *jihad* had for its intent the waging of war on unbelievers for their disbelief and not only when they entered into conflict with the Islamic state. Under that concept, the distinction between a defensive war and an offensive war became confused.

In this evolution (some would see it as a devolution) of the nature of the *jihad*, fighting against the unbeliever because of his disbelief was enjoined "permanently until the end of time."

Another doctrine, that of the authority of the *imamate*, as well as tenets of the Shi'ite Moslems, held that this kind of fighting had to be carried out even if the *imam* were in error.

Despite this interpretation, this did not always mean that the faithful went to war.

Time and existing reality were on the side of tempering a bellicose application of *jihad*, although there have been regional tendencies toward aggressiveness based on it.

By Moslem legal theory, Khadduri explained, "the state of war between the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-Harb* would come to (its) end when the public order of the latter is superseded by the former." This would mean that *jihad's* objectives would have been accomplished, hence no need for the *jihad*.

The objective was not as easy to attain as was anticipated, and eventually the believers became more accustomed to a state of "dormant *jihad*" than to a state of hostility. Even though a state of war existed and the conditions could not be fully established, contacts between Moslems and non-Moslems, on the personal and official levels, were nonetheless conducted by peaceful means.

Too, there is a curious escape mechanism concerning *jihad* from the Koran itself, acknowledging the proper use of common sense. The duty of the *jihad* was commanded by God, Koran (LXI, 10-13), and assures its martyrs instant paradise, but its execution in the more virulent methods was binding only when there was strength enough among the community of believers to attempt it Koran (II, 233).

Thus, it was the onslaught of the Christian Crusaders and of the Mongols that allowed the jurist-theologian Ibn Taymiya, as Khadduri says it, "(to make) concessions to reality by reinterpreting the *jihad* to mean waging a defensive war against unbelievers whenever they threatened Islam."

He said that unbelievers who made no attempt to encroach upon Islam's domain were not the objective of Islam, "nor should law and religion be imposed upon them by force." Those same types, however, who consciously took the offensive against *dar al-Islam*, "would be in an entirely different position."

As to the possibility of someone, or some Moslem group, today invoking the rubrics of *jihad* as their defense of terrorism, this might happen, but it would be without the sanction of Moslem leadership.

None of the religious and political leaders, however, can altogether stop individual terrorists or terrorist groups, no matter under what pretense they say they are terrorists. In the current state of affairs in Islam, such terrorists, if they tried to use the modern concept of *jihād* as their portfolio, clearly would be doing a disservice to Islam, and by inference, to the God whose commands they profess to obey.

In fact, no matter what his actions against Israel, one should take at face value Palestinian Liberation Organization President Yasser Arafat's condemnation of all terrorism. This condemnation seems to stem from deeply held and nearly inviolable Moslem precepts.

On November 4 last year in Cairo, he reiterated in fact and in principle what the PLO declared 11 years earlier in the United Nations, "to condemn all terrorism."

In Cairo, with the blessing of

"Religion...was and still is to be carried out by peaceful means, as there should be no compulsion in the spread of the Word of God."

the Moslem world's most significant political leader, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Mr. Arafat said, "The PLO denounces and condemns all terrorist acts, whether those involving countries or by persons or groups, against unarmed innocent civilians in any place."

Mr. Arafat's declarations against terrorism, whether they are clearly from himself or have been pressed upon him by other Moslem political and religious leaders, seems to illustrate that point. They are consonant with current Moslem teaching.

Acts against Israel, insofar as

his Palestinian people are in a struggle against that nation, are another matter, based on political, more than religious, considerations.

As for branding what is going on in the Middle East between the PLO and Israel as exactly the same thing as happened at the Vienna and Rome airports, it hardly seems to fit, even though, unfortunately, the same results occur.

In the Palestinian situation, religion plays no real part in the motivation. The Palestinians, most of them Moslems and Christians, do not fight because of some religious doctrine. They do not keep themselves in a state of hostility toward Israel because most Israelis are Jews, but for hurts that go deeper than that. The Israelis react accordingly.

Both seek to survive honorably, but haven't yet found the way to do it.

Much of international terrorism seems to be tied to that issue between the Palestinians and Israel, whether it happens in Tel-Aviv or Beirut or Rome.

It would appear that one might better read between the lines of what Mr. Arafat has said concerning terrorism and take him at his word. It clearly would be—perhaps not in earlier days of Islam—unwise for the American government or any other to operate on the notion that the teachings of Islam are the instigators of terrorism.

By no means should the Moslem teachings on *jihād* be used as the scapegoat. To do so would only exacerbate the situation and further alienate the Moslem nations—unnecessarily. ■

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CASTRO'S CUBA: CONDUIT TO GLOBAL TERRORISM

by L. Francis Bouchev

International terrorism ranks among the biggest news stories of this decade. New accounts of terrorist bombings, kidnappings, or hijackings feature prominently in the news daily.

Much of the terrorism perpetrated in the world today aims to support the geopolitical goals of the Soviet Union and its allies. The United States and its allies in this hemisphere have been among the principal targets of this international terrorist network. In order to make more effective their assault on civil order and stability in the West, Communist terror groups act in concert. The Cuban government, acting at the behest of Moscow, has been instrumental in forming and sustaining this terrorist network from its inception, twenty years ago, to the present day.

A fateful meeting

The new strategy for terrorism emerged at a gathering in Havana in 1966. During the first two weeks of that fateful year, 513 delegates representing 83 subversive organizations assembled for the First Conference for Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity in order to plan and proclaim "a global revolutionary strategy to counter the global strategy of American imperialism."

This meeting, which came to be known as the Tricontinental Conference, heralded all-out guerrilla and terrorist warfare. The plan formulated by the gathering advocated a joint strategy of violence by terrorists in the industrialized West coupled with guerrilla wars in the third world. The ultimate goal: to surround the Free World nations with hostile Communist regimes.

The Tricontinental Conference was called not to initiate subversive operations but to weave together a network of terrorist and guerrilla groups in order to increase the level of violence against the United States and its allies. Significantly, the resolutions adopted at the conference called for collaboration not only between socialist countries and "national liberation movements" but also between "democratic workers and student movements" in Western Europe and North America, especially those formed to oppose U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

Thus began the collaboration and interaction of the orthodox Communists with the eclectic new leftists who typically harbored anti-Soviet sentiments and viewed themselves as untainted by Stalinism.

With this conference, the Soviet Union, which sent the largest delegation, ended its policy of relying on national Communist parties around the world and turned instead to "national liberation movements," that is, to the men with the guns.

Conveniently disregarding the official Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence," Soviet chief delegate Sharof Rashidov promised "all-around assistance to the unification of the anti-imperialist forces of the three continents in order to provide greater impetus to our common struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism—led by the U.S. capitalists."

The greatest success of the Cubans and the Russians at the conference was the passage of resolutions damning the United States as the main enemy of Third World liberation movements. The general resolution of the confer-

ence, for instance, referred to American imperialism as the "inplacable enemy of all peoples of the world" and called for "revolutionary violence" to oppose it. The resolution further charged that "the United States is behind every aggressive action committed by other imperialists," principally, the nations of Western Europe.

In short, revolution anywhere was defined as violence against the United States and its allies.

Fidel Castro did not always show the same degree of subservience to Soviet direction as he does today; for that reason, he has been an exceptionally effective bridge and intermediary between Moscow and the more innocent and idealistic Left.

In fact, the Cuban Communist Party played no important part in his anti-Batista revolution and, on occasion, he showed considerable independence from Soviet policy until 1968. He seized the initiative, for instance, in allowing Che Guevara to start guerrilla war in Bolivia, from which he hoped to revolutionize all of South America.

Castro was even inclined to criticize the Soviets publicly, and he took occasion to act against Cuban Communists who wanted their country to be unreservedly pro-Soviet. As a consequence, the Soviets twice tried to engineer Castro's overthrow. Then, in the spring of 1968, they cut off the flow of Soviet oil to Cuba and curtailed shipments of other goods and materials needed by Cuban industry. With the Soviets holding these goods hostage, Castro was forced to surrender Cuba's independent foreign policy stance.

In 1969, the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) was put under the direct com-

mand of the Soviet Union, henceforward to act as the Spanish-speaking branch of the KGB.

Having accepted Soviet control, Castro refocused Cuba's resources to assaulting U.S. interests in a fashion totally consistent with the tricontinental formula. Occasionally, these assaults took the form of direct subversive efforts against the United States.

In the 1980 Mariel boatlift, for instance, many intelligence agents infiltrated the United States, along with thousands of hardened criminals, mental patients, homosexuals, and legitimate refugees. He also promoted direct destabilization of the United States through his plans to incite racial violence between blacks and Cuban Americans in Florida and through his narcotics trafficking schemes.

Moreover, in 1970, the Cuban government established within the DGI a center for the purpose of planning sabotage and espionage missions in the United States and in order to train English-speaking agents to carry out these missions. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States expelled several Cuban "diplomats" for lending financial aid to black extremists. In 1972, the FBI arrested three such diplomats at Cuba's UN mission and seized explosives which the Cubans planned to use for blowing up sections of New York's subway system. The list goes on and on.

Even before 1970, the DGI provided training and support for guerrilla operations in places where Cuba saw no interests of her own. For instance, Cuban agents have trained guerrillas of both the IRA and the Front de Liberation Quebecois (FLQ). Although the FLQ is now quiescent, Cuba continues to maintain support liaison with the IRA through British Communists and DGI personnel in Cuba's embassy in London.

Latin America and Africa are, however, more often the objects of Castro's attention. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Castroite insurgencies in these areas usually

TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE

CUBA
Abdala
Alpha 66
Anti-Castro Commando
Anti-Communist Commandos
Brigade 2506
Condor
Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations (CORU)
Cuba Action
Cuba Action Commandos
Cuban Anti-Communist League
Cuban C-4 Movement
Cuban Liberation Front
Cuban National Liberation Front (FLNC)
Cuban Power (el Poder Cubano)
Cuban Power 76
Cuban Representation in Exile
Cuban Revolutionary Directorate
Cuban Revolutionary Organization
Cuban Youth Group
International Secret Revolutionary United Cells
JCN (expansion unknown)
Latin American Anti-Communist Army
Movement of Cuban Justice
Movement of the Seventh (M-7)
National Integration Front (FIN; Cuban Nationalist Front)
Omega 7
Pedro Luis Botel Comman
Pedro Ruiz Botero Commandos
Pragmatistas
Scorpion (el Alacran)
Second Front of Escambray
Secret Anti-Castro Cuban Army
Secret Cuban Government
Secret Hand Organization
Secret Organization Zero
Young Cubans
Youths of the Star
LATIN AMERICA
ARGENTINA
Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (Alianza Anticomunista Argentina—AAA)
Armed Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación—FAL)
Armed Peronist Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas—FAP)
Armed Revolutionary Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—FAR)
Montoneros
National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN)
National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional—MLN)
People's Guerrilla Army (Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo—EGP)
People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—ERP)
Red Brigades of Worker Power (Brigades Rojas del Poder Obrero—BRPO)
BOLIVIA
Bolivian Revolutionary Workers' Party (Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Bolivianos—PRTB)
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR)
National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN)
BRAZIL
Armed Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguardia Armada Revolucionaria—VAR)
Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário—PCBR)
Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil—PCdoB)

BRAZIL (continued)

Grupo de Eleven (Grupos de Onze—G-11)
National Liberating Action (Ação Libertadora Nacional—ALN)
National Liberation Commando (Comando da Libertação Nacional—COLINA)
National Revolutionary Movement (Movimento Nacionalista Revolucionário—MNR)
Peasant Leagues (Ligas Camponesas)
Popular Action (Ação Popular—AP)
Revolutionary Movement 8 October (Movimento Revolucionário do Outubro 8—MR-8)
Revolutionary Popular Vanguard (Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária—VPR)
Workers' Politics (Política Operária—POLOP)
CHILE
Fatherland and Liberty (Patria y Libertad)
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR)
People's Organised Vanguard (Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo—VOP)
White Guard (Guardia Blanca)
COLOMBIA
April 19 Movement (Movimiento 19 Abril—M-19)
Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC)
Communist Party of Colombia Marxist-Leninist (Partido Comunista de Colombia Marxista-Leninista—PPC-ML)
Group of Revolutionary Commandos—Operation Argemiro Gabaldon
Independent Revolutionary Workers' Movement (Movimiento Obrero Independiente y Revolucionario—MOIR)
Invisible Ones
Military Liberation Front of Colombia
Movement of the 19th (M-19)
National Liberation Armed Forces
National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN)
People's Revolutionary Army—Zero Point
Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación—EPL)
Red Flag
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Liberal Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal—MRL)
Revolutionary Workers Party
September 14 Workers Self-Defense Command
United Front for Guerrilla Action
United Front for Revolutionary Action (Frente Unido de Acción Revolucionaria—FUAR)
Workers' Self-Defense Movement (Movimiento de Autodefensa Obrera—MAO)
Workers', Students' and Peasants' Movement (Movimiento de Obreros, Estudiantes y Campesinos—MOEC)
COSTA RICA
Revolutionary Commandos of Solidarity
Roberto Santucho Revolutionary Group
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Dominican Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Dominicano—MPD)
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR)
Revolutionary Movement 14 June (Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio—MR-14)
Trinitarian National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional de los Trinitarios—MLNT)
Twelfth of January Liberation Movement
United Anti-Reflection Command
HAITI
Coalition of National Liberation Brigades
Haitian Coalition

failed, due to counterattacks led by the United States. But, in the mid-1970s, when President Jimmy Carter began allowing United States defense capabilities to decline, the Tricontinentals unifications scored a spectacular success. In 1979, Castro succeeded in unifying the three Nicaraguan Sandinista factions into one nine-

man combined National Directorate. Cuba provided this new Sandinista Front with the weapons, military advice, and diplomatic support necessary for overthrowing the Somoza regime and capturing control of the Nicaraguan revolution.

The Sandinista leadership had, of course, been in Havana for

the Tricontinental Conference 13 years before and many times after. Since the revolution, the Sandinista regime has served as a clearinghouse for Cuban, PLO, Libyan, and Soviet aid to terrorists and guerrillas throughout Latin America. Three thousand Cuban troops and countless other Eastern-bloc advisors now help to defend and supervise the Sandinista regime against the Nicaraguan people.

Taking orders from Moscow

Although Castro might have intended the Tricontinental Conference to be a means for gaining international influence independent from the Kremlin, by 1968 he had lost all remnants of effective Cuban sovereignty and regional leadership to the Soviet Union. Cuba now follows Soviet directions; this is a grave threat to freedom and democracy in Central and South America. Indeed, Cuba and Nicaragua act as agents provocateurs for their Soviet masters throughout the region. Castro has declared repeatedly that he will try to overthrow any Latin American government that follows a foreign policy different from his own.

His foreign policy record demonstrates his continual determination to accomplish this.

First, Cuba provided many arms and soldiers to Guevara's National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas in Bolivia. Ultimately, Guevara's plans for the victory of a rural-based guerrilla movement over superior conventional forces failed, partly because the KGB torpedoed it. The ELN also lost because Guevara and it failed to win civilian support and to build the urban component that is essential for any successful guerrilla action.

Cuba then inspired Cuban Communist movements in South America's Southern Cone, notably in Chile. Although many analysts classify the "Popular Unity" regime of Salvador Allende as democratic, it actually sought to impose upon Chile a socialist to-

talitarianism with all power in the hands of a new elite which would rule in the name of the Chilean people.

One instrument for the imposition of this socialist totalitarianism was the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Organized by Chilean Communists in 1965, the MIR supported Allende but did not officially form part of his government after he came to power in 1970. Rather, the *Miristas*, who did so much to destabilize Chilean democracy through their terrorist activities, served as his storm troopers his 'Marxist-Leninist Brownshirts' after he came to power. Havana has always been a major source of the MIR's ideological inspiration, and has provided arms and training to MIR revolutionaries.

Argentina on the brink

A number of pro-Cuban Communist groups were active in Argentina immediately before and during Juan Peron's return to the presidency in 1973, and in the period following his death until the military took control to stave off collapse in early 1976.

Among the most significant and dangerous terrorist groups of the political Left was the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), a Cuban-oriented body that merged in late 1973 with the larger and stronger Montoneros. The FAR-Montonero alliance attempted with mixed success to persuade official Peronist youth organizations of the need for "popular war," that is, assassinations, bombings, and sabotage.

The Cuban-allied Montonero movement was one of the main factors which contributed to Argentina's instability. It began to concentrate its attacks on urban centers in early 1975. Increasing cooperation between the Montoneros and the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP)—which began as an urban guerrilla movement but announced the formation of rural units in June 1974—intensified the guerrilla threat to Argentina to the extent that the army felt

compelled to take primary responsibility for counterinsurgency operations in 1975. Formerly, this task had belonged to the police.

The *Armed Kuberatuib Fircesm* (FAL) was yet another pro-Cuban terrorist organization sowing social disorder in Argentina. Although it is hard to classify ideologically, the FAL was an urban guerrilla group with clear Marxist tendencies. To the outsider, all the various factions and sects of communism tend to remain simply Communist. But from the inside the nuances appear as important differences.

Founded in 1970, the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army was an important Argentine terrorist group with far-flung international connections—for instance, with the Basque ETA. The alliances that the ERP entered with other pro-Cuba groups suggest a picture of Havana and, by extension, Moscow, joining hands with these Argentine Trotskyites for revolutionary purposes. The ERP worked closely with the Tupamaro movement in Uruguay, and in February 1974 it allied with the MIR of Chile, the Tupamaros, and the ELN of Bolivia, all of which have close ties with Havana. The joint program of these terrorist groups calls for all the peoples of Latin America to "join actively in the revolutionary struggle against imperialism that is already taking place in our continent under the flag and example of Che Guevara."

Attacking Uruguay's prosperous democracy

The terrorist group with which Cuba has had the closest ties is probably the Tupamaros of Uruguay. In the early 1970s, three thousand Tupamaro rebels succeeded in destroying the free, democratic, and socially advanced society of Uruguay, one of the smallest, but most prosperous of the Latin American nations.

Uruguayan authorities, in a virtual state of war against these terrorists, extracted from captured Tupamaros all possible in-

formation about the group and its operation. They found that Cuban involvement in the rebellion was extensive and constituted nothing short of Cuban armed intervention in Uruguay's internal affairs. Indeed, the Uruguayan government made just such a charge.

Cuban support of the Tupamaros was extensive. A Tupamaro headquarters existed in Cuba, operating with the knowledge, support, advice, and at the initiative of the Cuban government as a base for subversive activities in Uruguay. Moreover, Tupamaro leaders took ideological inspiration from Castro, and rebel units received Cuban arms and money.

In June 1968, the Cubans invited the Tupamaros to send one of their leaders to Cuba for meetings with Cuban officials. Direct ties between Havana and the Tupamaros date from this time. Visit followed visit as the Tupamaros sought from Cuba arms, money, and other assistance. In 1971, a Tupamaro representative was named to serve as full-time intermediary between the Tupamaro leadership and the Cubans. Cuban trainers instructed Tupamaro soldiers in the preparation and use of incendiaries and explosives, firearms, sabotage, and espionage. They put this training to use during their many operations, including the murder of U.S. State Department employee Dan Mitrione in 1970.

Castro's success in fomenting revolution in Uruguay should give U.S. officials cause for concern. Like the United States, Uruguay is not an underdeveloped country. For more than a half century it had the most complete welfare system outside of Scandinavia. Its tradition of democracy was deep-seated. Indeed, the principal supporters of the Tupamaro insurgency—middle class citizens and young professionals—had enjoyed, throughout their lives, the fruits of that order. That such a society could face a Cuban-supported terrorist onslaught should convince U.S. citizens that we are far from immune to terrorist attacks.

The terrorist "transmission belt"

Since 1969, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been the world's key terrorist squadron, mostly because it serves as the main "transmission belt" for conveying Soviet aid to other terrorist groups outside of Latin America. It has also trained and collaborated with the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. Moscow uses the PLO as a middleman in order to camouflage its encouragement of violence against Westerners and their interests while publicly "seeking détente."

Starting in the Middle East, the PLO has become active in terrorism and in occasional conventional military operations in Africa (Angola), Western Europe (especially Italy), and the North American mainland via Nicaragua, in complete symbiosis with the shifting emphases of Soviet opportunism. Clearly, the Russians chose well when, in 1969, they picked the PLO to be their favorite terrorists for implementing the strategy plotted at the Tricontinental Conference three years earlier.

Libya

Libya has become another key link added to the terrorist chain that was forged with the Tricontinental Conference. Her oil-rich dictator, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, positively crows that he is "proud to assert to the whole world that we provide material, moral, and political support to every liberation movement in the world."

The colonel's swagger is well justified, however. In 1976, he used a slush fund of over \$580 million for terrorists from all over the world according to his former minister of planning, Omar el-Meheishi. The figure is probably higher by now, but it suggests how this new Barbary pirate has managed to finance subversion of countries all around the Mediterranean and even as far away as Nicaragua.

Training for foreign terrorists is just as important as Qaddafi's bankrolling of them, howev-

er, and like his Russian arms suppliers, Qaddafi does not particularly care who he is helping, as long as they are violent.

According to reporters from London's *Daily Mirror* and Milan's *Correire Della Sera*:

There are Italian Red Brigadists and Black Brigadists getting military training shoulder-to-shoulder in the camps, learning to kill and handle arms. Qaddafi makes no distinction between extreme right and extreme left. He uses these youths to reach one of his objectives—the destabilization of the Mediterranean area.

The Italian Red Brigade, which murdered former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, and its founding member, Godfather Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, who died in March 1972 while blowing up an Italian electric pylon, were Castro's bridge to European and Mid-

The plan formulated by the gathering advocated a joint strategy of violence by terrorists in the industrialized West coupled with guerrilla wars in the third world. The ultimate goal: to surround the free world nations with hostile communist regimes.

dle Eastern terrorism. As heir to one of the world's great fortunes, Feltrinelli was a publisher who hailed from Milan. Working very closely with Castro, Feltrinelli helped finance the Tricontinental, the organization that fosters symbiotic relations between far left grouplets and official Communist organizations. Feltrinelli also

founded Europe's first Castroite review, *Tricontinental*, and set up a *Centrale* in Switzerland in order to coordinate operations in South America, Portugal, Spain, France, and Germany.

Feltrinelli was not content simply to admire Castro's revolution; he wanted to duplicate it in Europe on a grand scale. He had a particular desire to transform Sardinia into the Cuba of the Mediterranean. In May 1968, he made his first contact with Germany's murderous Bader-Meinhof Red Army Faction. In more than 20 of Feltrinelli's "safe" apartments in Milan, the Italian police subsequently discovered evidence of cash payments routed through Switzerland to the German terrorists. Feltrinelli's role in the founding of the German terrorist movement is crucial. In 1969 he traveled to Jordan where he established the first training arrangement with the PLO. By 1972, when the Japanese United Red Army carried out its massacre at Israel's Lydda Airport, it was discovered that their commandos had been trained at camps in Syria and Lebanon, their money came from West Germany, their weapons came from Italy, and they were acting in behalf of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Over the ensuing decade, the Spanish ETA conducted operations in Central America, the Irish IRA murdered Queen Elizabeth's uncle, Lord Mountbatten, and the Salvadoran FMLN gunned down six Americans and seven others at a San Salvador café.

Twenty years after the event, the Tricontinental Conference is a footnote to history and Fidel Castro is reported in failing health. But the offspring, tricontinental terrorism, is a very menacing international reality. ■

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TERRORISM'S TENACIOUS ROOTS IN LATIN AMERICA

by Charles Franklin

Terrorism runs deep in Latin America. Even before Columbus and the first conquistadores came from Spain almost five centuries ago, Inca, Aztec, and other Indian societies systematically used terror as a form of coercion, both within their own populations and against others.

Since then, revolutionaries with an aggregation of causes, bands of the disaffected, the military, and governments in many guises have done the same. In the name of liberty, nationalism, various forms of sectarianism, and just plain greed, terrorism has sunk twisting, tenacious roots in both stony and fertile soil. Hardy, pernicious *lianas*, often twining from country to country, have sprung up during the last 25 years.

The Venezuelan story

In the early 1960s, guerrillas with Communist catechisms took to the mountains in Venezuela, and made forays into the cities, too, killing, kidnapping for ransom and political effect, and robbing banks. Newly installed Fidel Castro in Cuba, less than a thousand miles to the northwest, vowed to help destabilize the democratic government only recently wrested from a long reign of dictatorship.

But the Robin Hood cum Marxist aura the insurgents sought to foster was definitively rent after they kidnapped a high official of the Instituto de Seguros Sociales—the social security agency. The rebels tortured him brutally, distributed gruesome photos of their handiwork to the press, and left the man dead in a car abandoned in Caracas.

An almost visible shock wave

ran through the country. The guerrillas had banked on it; they were getting desperate. An unspoken divide had been crossed in this long-running battle with the authorities. Itchy trigger fingers and wild machete blows were one thing in Latin America, where machismo and frontier conditions often prevailed; torture publicly revealed and murder of a civilian figure with no direct connection to the fighting was another.

The message was clear—no body was safe. But government forces stepped up their actions, and soon began to prevail. Safe havens in the countryside disappeared. For the first time, army troops occupied Central University in Caracas, with loss of life, seizing a large cache of arms and ammunition in undermining what the government called “a terrorist base of operations for armed subversion.”

Today, in a twist of historic irony, stability is so pronounced that one of the guerrilla masterminds, Teodoro Petkoff, now is number two of the Movimiento al Socialismo, the third-ranked political party. He regularly appears on television talk shows in a suit and tie and sonorous language to match his most conservative opponent.

Terrorism remains a harsh fact of life, however, in many other places. In Central America, intense internal fighting continues in Nicaragua and El Salvador, where terrorists last year shot up an outdoor cafe to kill unarmed, off-duty U.S. Marine embassy guards and others out for the evening. Guatemalans draw uneasy breaths with a newly-elected president. Death squads on the Left and the Right have literally dumped thousands of bodies of

tortured victims by the side of the road and in garbage heaps.

Colombia's long-running battles with Communist M-19 guerrillas, who work closely with drug growers and dealers, exploded in the world's eyes late last year. A terrorist band stormed the Palace of Justice in Bogota and held the Supreme Court justices hostage. More than 100 people died, and many were wounded as a bloody counterattack wiped out the M-19 captors.

The continuing effort to undermine democracy in the country, with many accusations that Cuba and Nicaragua have played significant roles in providing arms and training, has traumatized a number of court justices into leaving their posts.

To the south in Peru, the Maoist renegades of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) have repeatedly bombed, machine-gunned, tortured, and killed peasants, politicians, and other targets in the city and countryside. A new group, Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, named after a famous Inca of centuries ago, has taken credit for a series of violent acts, such as machine-gunning and bombing the U.S. Embassy and attacks on U.S. companies in Lima, including Citibank, IBM, and Texaco. In the last 20 years, more than 70 U.S. diplomats, including six ambassadors, have been murdered abroad for political reasons, where none had been previously.

The election last year of a radical-liberal president, Alan Garcia, has done nothing to placate the terrorists, although he has moved vigorously to investigate and act on charges that the military tortured and killed indiscriminately in reaction to Sendero.

ro's bloody excesses.

Elsewhere, there are stirrings of guerrilla activity in Ecuador and Bolivia, both democracies, and Chile, a dictatorship. Some close to the scene argue that groups throughout South America are developing closer ties. On the other side, reports of state terrorism to counter the rebels are growing.

A defector from the Chilean secret services, Andrés Antonio Valenzuela Morales, was interviewed by *Cauce*, an opposition publication in Santiago. The interview was banned, but showed up later in *Diario de Caracas* of Venezuela and *Mensaje*, a magazine published in Chile by the Catholic Church.

He attested to widespread torture, and many cases of "the disappeared" being thrown into the ocean: "Their stomachs were slit open so they wouldn't float." Reportedly on the secret service's most wanted list, he now lives under an assumed name in France.

A spiral of terror

But by all odds, the kind of spiraling drama whereby terrorist acts breed terrorist reactions has achieved an extra edge of bitter ruthlessness in Argentina.

In the late 1960s, smartly dressed residents of the capital, Buenos Aires, still liked to refer to their city as the Paris of South America. A highly developed country with a predominantly European population, its capital city has a higher standard of living than that of many of its counterparts in the West, despite deep economic problems.

It was home for Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an upper-class revolutionary who played a major role in helping Fidel Castro take over Cuba a decade earlier and then died in an aborted effort to win Bolivian miners and peasants to Communist causes.

In Argentina, an avowedly left-wing Peronist urban guerrilla group, the Montoneros, started in earnest early in 1970 after years of sporadic violence back and

forth with government forces, by kidnapping Lt. Gen. Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, president in the 1950s.

He was executed June 1, 1970, by a "revolutionary court" for almost 300 alleged "crimes."

The next day, the government introduced the death penalty for the first time since 1886.

The Montoneros were led by Mario Firmenich, who came from a solid upper-middle class family in Buenos Aires, like Che Guevara before him, and graduated from Catholic University. The faction was one of several highly organized and violent extreme leftist movements in Argentina, and soon came to the fore, all the while arguing, as did others, that it was arming itself to combat attacks by the Right.

Firmenich, who traveled to Havana to parade around in a uniform of his own design, held press conferences at which he claimed great successes. By 1975, these included the largest guerrilla operations ever carried out in his homeland. A navy missile-launching frigate near La Plata was blown up. An air force transport was bombed, killing four and injuring 25. At least 30 soldiers and guerrillas were killed, and 30 guerrillas captured, when the Montoneros seized the airport at Formosa, near the Paraguayan border, and hijacked an airliner. Kidnappings and assassinations continued into 1976. Military targets and police stations were repeatedly attacked and those on duty killed. A bomb planted in a Defense Ministry lecture hall killed 14 people and injured 20.

Stung into sharper reprisals, the military took over in a coup in 1976. Secret squads in civilian clothes and unmarked cars abducted, tortured, and killed men, women, and children in a widening net of terror.

Gen. Ramón Camps, chief of the Buenos Aires provincial police, was credited with causing the "disappearance" of some 5,000 people himself, out of an overall total of about 11,000. Speaking to a Spanish correspondent in 1982,

he was asked if the military had fought terrorism with terrorist methods.

"Why not?" Camps said.

A few years earlier, the governor of the entire state of Buenos Aires, home to almost a third of Argentina's 30 million population, said: "First we will kill the subversives; then we will kill their collaborators; then . . . their sympathizers, then . . . those who remain indifferent; and finally, we will kill the timid."

The greying of terrorists

Later, the military opened a museum in the capital to show some of the worst acts of the left-wing terrorists of the 1970s. Any indication that thousands of people had been murdered, tortured, and robbed by the military without recourse to law, or only in the most fragmentary way, was conspicuously absent. A chief player in these dark episodes was Alberto Astiz.

Son of a retired vice-admiral, Astiz, born in 1950, joined the navy himself and went to the United States in 1975 for a year's course in combating subversion.

Subsequently, as one of a small group of officers called "Grey Wolves," he led a largely independent task force which was cited for arresting up to 2,000 people, most of whom did not survive the arrest. Among these were a young Swedish woman, Dagmar Heegelin, who was judged to be a case of mistaken identity, and

Death squads on the left and the right have literally dumped thousands of bodies of tortured victims by the side of the road and in garbage heaps.

two French nuns.

Astiz, whose nickname at the Argentine Naval Academy was "the handsome sailor," at one

point went undercover at the embassy in Paris, returned to infiltrate the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, who regularly demonstrated for information about "the disappeared," and ended up in 1982 on a mission to set up a military base on South Georgia, preparatory to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. He captured a small party of British Marines, was captured in turn without a real struggle and returned home after a stay in a British jail, as England won the war of the South Atlantic and the defeated, disgraced ruling junta felt compelled to call elections.

Peace and democracy were returned to Argentina, if with renewed outbreaks of subversion and bombings tied to the military, which prompted President Raúl Alfonsín to impose a state of siege on the eve of congressional elections last year.

At the same time, the Center for Defense Research, in a report to the Ministry of the Interior, cited possible ties between the self-styled People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Montoneros, and Sendero Luminoso, from Peru. Mario Firmenich, extradited a year ago in October from Brazil to stand trial, called the center's charges a "self-justifying excuse of oligarchic terrorism for coup purposes," and in this instance government officials, political parties, and human rights organizations, worried about destabilization, also criticized the report.

Firmenich, after traveling to Cuba, Mexico, and Europe, settled in Brazil with his Argentine wife, a fellow Montonero, and had a child born there. It was thought this would guard him against extradition, but in a country also newly returned to democratic rule, the Supreme Federal Court granted Argentina's request for his return. A prosecutor has called for a life sentence against Firmenich for a kidnapping in 1974 in which two people died and a ransom of \$60 million was supposed to have been paid. (He can-

TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE

NICARAGUA

Nicaraguan Armed Revolutionary Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Nicaragua—FARN)

Sandinist National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional—FSLN)

EL SALVADOR

Armed Forces of National Resistance (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional—FARN)

Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista de El Salvador—PCES)

Farabundo Martí Popular Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Martí—FPL)

February 28 Popular Leagues (LP-28)

National Democratic Organisation (Organización Democrática Nacional—ORDEN)

People's Armed Revolutionary Forces (Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo—FRAP)

People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—ERP)

Popular Leagues of 28 February (Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero—LP-28)

Popular Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque Popular Revolucionario—BPR)

Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC)

United Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular Unificada—FAPU)

White Fighting Union (Unión Guerrera Blanca—UGB)

Workers' Revolutionary Party of Central America (Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos)

GUATEMALA

Guatemalan Anti-Salvadoran Liberating Action Guerrillas (GALGAS)

Guatemalan Labour Party (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo—PGT)

Guatemalan Nationalist Commando

Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres—EGP)

National League for the Protection of Guatemala

National Liberation Movement

Peoples Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)

Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes—FAR)

Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—FAR)

Revolutionary Movement Alejandro de León 13 November (Movimiento Revolucionario Alejandro de León 13 Noviembre—MR-13)

Revolutionary Organisation of the People under Arms (Organización Revolucionaria de Pueblo en Armas—ORPA)

Secret Anti-Communist Army (Ejército Secreto Anticomunista—ESA)

Twelfth of April Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario 12 Abril)

Twentieth of October Front (Frente 20 Octubre)

White Hand (Movimiento de Acción Nacionalista Organizada—MANO, hence Mano Blanca)

GUYANA

People's Temple

HONDURAS

Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Popular Cinchonero—MPL)

People's Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo—MRP)

People's Revolutionary Union (Unión Revolucionaria del Pueblo—URP)

Workers' Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores de América Central—PRTC)

MEXICO

Armed Communist League (Liga Comunista Armada—LCA)

Armed Vanguard of the Proletariat (Los Lacandones)

Mexican People's Revolutionary Army (National Revolutionary Civic Association (Asociación Cívica Nacional Revolucionaria—ACNR)

Party of the Poor (Partido de los Pobres)

People's Armed Command

People's Liberation Army

People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo—FRAP)

People's Union (Unión del Pueblo)

Revolutionary Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Revolucionario—MAR)

Twenty-Third of September Communist League (Liga Comunista 23 Septiembre)

United Popular Liberation Army of America (Zapatista Urban Front (Frente Urbana Zapatista—FUZ)

PARAGUAY

Agrarian Peasant Leagues (Ligas Agrarias Campesinas—LAC)

First of March Organisation, also known as Politico-Military Organisation (Organización 1 Marzo, or Organización Politico-Militar—OPM)

Political Military Organization

Popular Colorado Movement (MoPoCo, dissident faction of Colorado Party)

PERU

Armed Nationalist Movement Organization (MANO)

Condor

Front of the Revolutionary Left (Frente de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—FIR)

Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR)

MTR (expansion unknown)

National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN)

Peruvian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAP)

Peruvian Communist Party - Red Flag (Partido Comunista Peruano - Bandera Roja)

Revolutionary Vanguard

Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso—SL)

Tupac Amaru

URUGUAY

Armed Popular Front (FAP)

National Liberation Movement (MLN, Tupamaros)

Organization of the Popular Revolutionary-33 (OPR-33)

PCU (expansion unknown)

Raul Sendic International Brigade

VENEZUELA

Armed Forces of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional—FALN)

Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR)

Popular Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Popular Revolucionario—MPR)

Red Flag (Bandera Roja)

Revolutionary Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria—MAR)

Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP)

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)

Venceremos (We Shall Overcome)

Weatherman

Zero Point (Punto Cero)

UNITED STATES

Armed Forces of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional—FALN)

Black Panther Party (BPP)

Boricua Popular Army (Ejército Popular de Boricua—EPB, or Los Macheteros)

not be tried in the Aramburu case because of an amnesty granted in 1973.)

No action has been reported against Astiz, last seen enjoying the sun on a private beach in Mar del Plata. At the end of January this year, however, the Argentine government agreed to repay \$82

million and return 40 properties to the Graiver family, accused by the previous military junta of financing Marxist subversion in the 1970s. More than a hundred people had been arrested and tortured in connection with the case, including Jacobo Timmerman, editor of *La Opinion*, a Graiver-

owned newspaper, who wrote a book about his experience that focused world attention on Argentina's "dirty war."

Working from within

Just as Teodoro Petkoff has become an establishment figure in his native Venezuela, in Uruguay, next door to Argentina, a guerrilla group no less violent than the Montoneros, the Tupamaros, have gone legitimate. (They were portrayed in the Costa-Gavras film, *State of Siege*.) Now simply one of many small leftist groups in a country where democracy also returned recently, the Tupamaros this year were seeking to join the Broad Front, an opposition coalition which counts Communists and Christian Democrats in its lineup. A former rebel leader, Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro, says many ideas resulted from countrymen who had been jailed or in exile. At 43, and a former medical student, he was jailed himself for 15 years.

For a final note, jail is the setting for a popular film and play,

based on the novel, *Kiss of the Spider Woman*, by Argentine Manuel Puig. One of the two leading characters, who share a cell, is a revolutionary, Valentín. The other is a homosexual hairdresser whom officials use to track some of Valentín's cohorts. While the location is unstated, it clearly is in Latin America and plays like Buenos Aires.

In the course of the story, Valentín, bitter in his indictment of society, softens. No longer does terrorism seem to be the answer to correcting ills, nor does the violent overthrow of the existing order. And then, when his cellmate is released, Valentín's revolutionary comrades shoot him, suspecting that he led the police to them.

In the end, the revolution not only eats its own children, in the well-worn judgment; it also eats and spews out many others. ■

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UNRAVELING THE SOVIET TERRORIST WEB

by Yossef Bodansky and Louis Rees

Terrorist attacks intensified considerably in 1985. They were diversified in the extreme: explosions at NATO installations in Europe, the hijacking of a ship and aircraft in the Mediterranean, the assault on the Colombian Supreme Court in Bogota, and the year-end attacks on passengers in the airports of Vienna and Rome.

Yet, carrying out a successful act of terrorism is a complicated undertaking, of which the act of violence is the simplest part.

To carry out an attack, terrorists rely on a vast, complex and demanding support system. This system supplies weapons, explosives, false documents, target selection, transportation, in-country support, operational intelligence, evacuation, medical and legal assistance.

An effective support network should be able to transport a group of terrorists from their safe haven to a foreign country, enable them to operate there, and then evacuate them safely. Often this happens. If performed correctly, and if strategy so demands, the support net should be able to complete these missions without being discovered by the local security forces, even after the attack.

Common factors

Despite their diversity, both geographical and political, the terrorist inventory for 1985 had two common denominators. They were directed against Western targets, and the terrorists could not have carried them out without support.

Though ostensibly unrelated, many of these acts of terrorism represent a small, visible fraction of a massive clandestine infrastructure. In the cases in which

the infrastructure can be traced to some extent, it leads almost invariably to the Soviet Union and its regional clients and surrogates such as Angola, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Libya, Nicaragua, North Korea, and Syria. It is less than credible that such infrastructures could be consolidated without the active participation of the secret services of these states, under the overall coordination of the Soviets.

Indeed, the worldwide escalation of terrorist activities reflects the growing significance of "special operations" in the heartlands of the countries who stand opposed to Soviet global strategy.

Terrorism, a relatively cheap, cost-effective, and safe (at least for its sponsors) method of coercion, has been used since the time of Lenin by the Soviet Union whenever its leaders judged that this tactic would most easily and efficiently achieve their objective with the least cost to themselves.

In the late 1960s, the Soviet Politburo decided that terrorism against countries allied with the United States could be useful in undermining public confidence and promoting a number of Soviet foreign policy goals, including the installation of regimes friendly to Moscow, at the expense of the United States and its allies.

In the Soviet Union's tactical handbook, terrorism is an element of war, but not necessarily of the prolonged "low-intensity" variety that the Western defense establishments dwell at length on counteracting.

During the 1970s, the Soviet Union revamped its strategy for fighting and winning a major war in Europe. The task of strategists like Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov

was to devise a way to win without unleashing a crushing nuclear response by the United States. Ogarkov convinced the Soviet leaders that this could be done with a massive, lightning-fast, nonnuclear Soviet drive without warning into the deep rear of the NATO countries so that the allies could not use nuclear weapons without destroying their own populations.

The success of that sort of offensive obviously depends to a great degree on the Soviet Union's ability to paralyze and confuse the political and military leadership of the allies, and to actively deny NATO the chance to use European-based nuclear weapons by capturing and/or destroying them in the hours immediately before the main attack.

The Soviets intend to do this by "special operations" behind enemy lines during what they term "prewar hostilities," meaning the hours before war is declared or before the main components of the Soviet armed forces are committed to battle. Control over these operations is in the hands of the *Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye* (GRU)—the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff.

Under GRU direction, Soviet SPETSNAZ (special operations) teams would be dropped by parachute, land from minisubmarines and have penetrated the target countries with false passports in civilian, non-Soviet guise. Some would assassinate political leaders and top military commanders; others would go to the homes of base commanders and fighter and bomber pilots and carry out their assassinations. Others would sabotage NATO base facilities, key choke points like bridges, and destroy power

stations, while other units would attempt to capture and destroy nuclear weapons stockpiles in Western Europe before they could be dispersed.

The SPETSNAZ terror and sabotage teams would be supported, sometimes directly, by local terrorists. Indeed, in Soviet eyes, the prime objective of their support of terrorism is to establish in advance assets for facilitating optimal conditions for these special operations.

The delivery of strategically significant strikes of the kind called for by the current Soviet military theory necessarily requires the development of a diversified support and intelligence infrastructure well in advance of hostilities. Moreover, this infrastructure must be fully tested as to its reliability.

Constructing alibis

It goes without saying that underground activity of such magnitude cannot escape some notice by the Western intelligence agencies. And so it is important to conceal as much of the Soviet infrastructure as possible by introducing ready-made "excuses" to "explain" these activities from the outset in such a way that the trail leads away from the Soviet Union.

The activities of terrorist groups, both locally based and international, serve as the best cover. If given no reason to investigate further, the law enforcement bureaucracy rarely looks further than the known problem. If a cache of weapons or explosives is found, if a bomb explodes along a NATO pipeline, it is routinely blamed on the local terrorist group—especially if some anonymous caller telephones a statement or mails a communique to a wire service or newspaper. The response from the authorities becomes, "It must have been the...." which can be filled in Red Army Fraction, Direct Action, Palestine Liberation Organization, or Macheteros, depending on the country. The "they-did-it" syn-

TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE

EUROPE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
 Black Cells (Schwarze Zellen)
 Black Help (Schwarze Hilfe)
 German Action Groups (Deutsche Aktionsgruppen—DA)
 German Empire Party (Deutsche Reichspartei—DRP)
 German Socialist Student Association (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund—SDS)
 Guerilla Diffusa (Guerilla Dispersion—GD)
 Holger Meins Commando
 National Socialist Common Action Group (Aktionsgemeinschaft Nationaler Sozialisten—ANS)
 People's Socialist Movement of Germany/Workers' Party (Volks-sozialistische Bewegung Deutschlands/Partei der Arbeit—VSD-PdA)
 Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion—RAF)
 Red Help (Rote Hilfe)
 Revolutionary Cells (Revolutionäre Zellen—RZ)
 Second of June Movement (Bewegung 2. Juni)
 Socialist Empire Party (Sozialistische Reichspartei—SRP)
 Socialist Patients' Collective (Sozialistisches Patientenkollektiv—SPK)
 Union for the Protection of the Tyrol (Tiroler Schutzbund)
 Wehrsportgruppe Hoffman (Defence Sports Group Hoffman)
FRANCE
 Action for the Rebirth of Corsica (Action pour la Renaissance de la Corse—ARC)
 Action Front for the Liberation of the Baltic Countries
 Andreas Baader Commando
 Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy (Noyaux Armés pour l'Autonomie Populaire—NAPAP)
 Association of Corsican Patriots (Associo di Patrioti Corsi—APC)
 Autonomous Intervention Collective Against the Zionist Presence in France
 Avengers
 Basque Justice (Euzkai Zuzentasuna—EZ)
 Breton Fight (Argad Breizh—AB)
 Breton Liberation Front (Front de Libération de la Bretagne—FLB)
 Breton Nationalist Resistance Movement (Mouvement de Résistance Nationaliste Bretonne—MRNB)
 Charles Martel Club (Club Charles Martel)
 Committee for Socialist Revolutionary Unity
 Committee of Coordination
 Communist Youth Movement, Marxist-Leninist (Union des Jeunes Communistes, Marxistes-Léninistes—UJC-ML)
 Confrontation (Faire Front)
 Corsican National Liberation Front (Front de la Libération Nationale de la Corse—FLNC)
 Corsican Peasant Front for Liberation (Front Paysan Corse de Libération—FPCL)
 Corsican Revolutionary Action (Action Révolutionnaire Corse—ARC)
 Delta
 Direct Action (Action Directe—AD)
 Enbata Galerna
 European Nationalist Faeces (Faisceaux Nationaux Européens—FNE)
 Federation for European National Action (Fédération d'Action Nationale Européenne—FANE)
 French National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale Française—FLNF)
 French Revolutionary Brigades (Brigades Révolutionnaires Françaises—BRF)
 Group for the Defense of Europe
 High School Action Committee (Comité d'Action Lycéen—CAL)

FRANCE (continued)
 Hordago (Je Tiens)
 International Revolutionary Solidarity
 International Solidarity
 Iparretarrak (Those from the North)
 Jewish Self-Defense Front
 Masada Action and Defense Movement
 Movement of Youthward Brothers in War of the Palestinian People
 New Action Front Against the Independence and Autonomy of Corsica (Front d'Action Nouvelle Contre l'Indépendance et l'Autonomie—FRANCIA)
 New Order (Ordre Nouveau)
 Organization Delta
 Red Army Faction of Southern France
 Revolutionary Communist Youth (Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire—JCR)
 Secret Army Organisation (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète—OAS)
 6th of March Group
 Solidarity Resistance Front
 Talon Law
 Twenty-Second March Movement (Mouvement 22 mars)
 We Must Do Something
 Youth Action Group

ITALY
 Armed Communist Formations
 Armed Proletarian Nuclei (Nuclei Armati Proletari—NAP)
 Armed Proletarian Power
 Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari—NAR)
 Autonomous Workers Movement
 Black Order (Ordine Nero—ON)
 Combatants for Communism
 Front Line (Prima Linea—PL)
 Mussolini Action Squads (Squadre d'Azione Mussolini—SAM)
 New Order (Ordine Nuovo—ON)
 October XXII Circle (Circolo XXII Ottobre)
 Partisan Action Groups (Gruppi d'Azione Partigiana—GAP)
 Permanent Struggle (Lotta Continua)
 Proletarian Committee of Subversion for Better Justice
 Proletarian Internationalism
 Proletarian Justice
 Proletarian Squad
 Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse—BR)
 Red Guerrilla
 Revolutionary Action Group
 Revolutionary Action Movement (Movimento d'Azione Rivoluzionaria—MAR)
 Revolutionary Fascist Nuclei (Nuclei Fascisti Rivoluzionari—NFR)
 Workers' Vanguard (Avanguardia Operaia)
NETHERLANDS
 Free South Moluccan Youth Organisation (Vrije Zuidmolukse Jongeren—VZJ)
 Red Brigades
 Red Help (Rode Hulp—RH)
 Red Resistance Front (Rood Verzetfront—RVF)
 Red Youth (Rode Jeugd—RJ)
 Revolutionary Peoples Resistance of the Netherlands
PORTUGAL
 Action Group for Communism
 Armed Revolutionary Action (Acção Revolucionária Armada—ARA)
 Front for the Liberation of the Azores (Frente de Libertação das Açores—FLA)
 Front for the Liberation of the Madeira Archipelago (Frente de Libertação do Arquipélago de Madeira—FLAMA)

drome can account automatically for all signs of clandestine or terrorist activity just as the appearance of a confessed "serial murderer" raises the hopes of many officers and prosecutors seeking to put "solved" to the burden of unsolved crimes.

Other actions can be encour-

aged that effectively serve to distract and strain the resources of Western security agencies. Repeated demonstrations, for example, near or on key military bases could serve as cover for surveillance of the movements of mobile missiles, aircraft, ships, and submarines (after all, there has been

no declaration of war between the NATO allies and the Soviet bloc, so legally it is not treason to collect such data), the testing of sabotage techniques, and the conditioning of police and security guards to deal gently with those who penetrate base security.

The activities of local terrorist groups covertly under Soviet control can also serve as "false flag" operations, obtaining assistance and cooperation from radical malcontents who would never directly assist the Soviet Union, particularly its "liberation" at the hands of Soviet tanks, missiles, and poison gas. Since the support network should be active to a certain degree, so as to maintain readiness, its involvement with the terrorists serves as the best practice and justification. These networks also are believed to be involved with certain levels of the Middle Eastern drug traffic which finances the network's operations with ample sums of untraceable cash.

The supply of weapons, explosives, and cash constitutes special technical challenges. Intelligence sources report that these items usually are smuggled into the target country by diplomatic pouch (either Soviet or one of its allies). But if Western counterintellig-

In the late 1960's, the Soviet Politburo decided that terrorism against countries allied with the United States could be useful.

ence agents successfully trail a Soviet GRU officer operating under cover as a diplomat or Aero-flot official, they are unlikely to see him handing over a suitcase full of explosives and guns to a member of the local terrorist organization. Instead, he will leave items in several dead drops selected at the last minute.

Then a contact in each cell of the terrorist organization will be

contacted and sent to collect the materials. In turn, the contact will distribute it to members of the cell. This ensures that even if one contact is arrested, he will be unable to give the authorities much information about what is being planned. In addition, the GRU officer does not make direct contact with the local terrorists, or give any idea as to what the materials are to be used for. Thus, even if he should defect, as did Serge Bokhan in Greece, the information that can be provided on the terrorists and their plans is limited.

The ultimate purpose of the Soviets in developing terrorist support networks is to employ them against key political and military targets far behind NATO lines in advance of the main Soviet offensive. Soviet military doctrine emphasizes that for any special operation (read, terrorist support) network to be effective, it must be centralized and diversified so that it can support a wide variety of operations with little or no modification, and, most importantly, with little or no forewarning. The network must be activated, tested, and evaluated periodically to maintain that efficiency.

The Soviets also attempt to make contact and exert influence and control over local terrorist groups as they arise. They do not want their networks accidentally exposed by the police or Western security services in the course of investigations of uncontrolled terrorist acts or other crimes. By controlling the entire support system in a country or a city, they can forestall a terrorist action if they judge that their network would be adversely affected by the aftermath.

The Terrorist component

The key purpose of Soviet support for the creation of terrorist infrastructures and the establishment of influence and control over terrorist organizations worldwide is to develop terrorist "assets" as a powerful "fifth column" capable of striking far be-

hind the front lines just before an offensive.

For example, responsibility for the conduct of any deep strategic offensive into Western Europe lies with the Soviet combat command which is called the Western Theater of War (ZTV are its Russian initials). The commander of the the ZTV at present is Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the strategist responsible for the reorganization of the Soviet military strategy and structure, and who now commands the highest combat post in the new Soviet military order he devised and implemented. The special operations forces are under the command of the supraunits of the Soviet military structure—the "Theaters of Military Operations" (TVDs) and their various fronts.

The most important Soviet "special operations" groups are the SPETSNAZ formations of the GRU, the airborne troops (VDV), and naval infantry (MP). As a rule, the VDV is comprised of airborne divisions (VDDs) and special duty brigades (BONs), while the MP is comprised of brigades (MPBs). During peacetime, the main units for special operations of strategic nature are deployed in Vitebsk in the Byelorussian Military District and in Tula in the Moscow Military District. Each formation includes a SPETSNAZ brigade, an airborne division and their combat support elements. Specifically, these are the 27th SPETSNAZ Brigade and the 103rd Guards Airborne Division of the Belorussian Military District; and in the Moscow Military District, the 3rd SPETSNAZ Brigade and the 106th Guards Airborne Division.

Strict security is maintained by forbidding any Soviet officer who might have knowledge of actual preparations for war from leaving Soviet soil. The threat of defection is thereby ruled out. All that a member of the support net or a terrorist himself can tell an interrogator is the nature of training they received and their own specific tasks. They know neither the reason for their as-

signments, nor the command to which they belong, nor in many cases that they were working for the Soviets.

Despite the traditional Russian xenophobia, the GRU and the military services of the Soviet allies do provide diverse types of SPETSNAZ terrorist training to reliable foreigners. Most foreigners are given regular military training that prepares them for simple acts of terrorism. Their task, and that of the organizations to which they belong, is to maintain a certain level of terrorist activity in peacetime and, upon specific activation from Moscow (usually through a commander who may be an Arab, a Mexican, a Puerto Rican, or American, but who is also a Soviet agent), escalate their campaign of extreme terrorism against civilian objectives in order to create massive panic among the civilian population as well as serve as a diversion for the Soviet SPETSNAZ detachments on the eve of the war.

The main elements of the GRU's SPETSNAZ forces maintain (via the 3rd Directorate of their respective RUs) their own nets of foreign SPETSNAZ fighters. These foreigners are highly trained and tightly controlled by the GRU. They have two prime missions. Some operate as commanders and instructors of various local terrorist organizations, where they use only a small part of their actual training. When activated at the outset of war, they will lead their unsuspecting followers in specific missions on behalf of the Soviet Union. The others, usually the better trained and most reliable, return to their countries of origin as "sleepers." Upon activation, they will also carry out specific missions; but in many cases, they will act directly with Soviet SPETSNAZ detachments dropped by parachute or who have otherwise entered their native countries covertly.

Intelligence sources estimate that the Soviets have planted dozens of such foreign national SPETSNAZ fighters in many

Ogarkov convinced the Soviet leaders that this could be done with a massive, lightning-fast, nonnuclear Soviet drive without warning into the deep rear of the NATO countries so that the allies could not use nuclear weapons without destroying their own populations.

Western capitals. It is believed that their main task will be to lead SPETSNAZ killer squads to assassinate political leaders and sabotage national installations in an immediate "prewar" situation.

Tight control is maintained over the GRU's foreign SPETSNAZ fighters in a manner similar to the way the GRU maintains control over its spies and agents. There is one important difference. In handling ordinary spies and agents, the GRU case officer often leaves Soviet territory to meet them in their own or in a third country. Sometimes, a GRU officer overseas could be in contact with a leader of a terrorist organization ignorant of his true status as a foreign SPETSNAZ and that he has another controller in the Soviet Union. In this way, the Soviets can maintain supervision of their agent while ensuring that his true identity and significance will not be betrayed should the GRU officer abroad defect.

Do these groups of SPETSNAZ and their related terrorists operate in the United States? We believe they do.

Sabotage and terrorism to be carried out by SPETSNAZ units inside the United States in the

event of the imminent outbreak of hostilities plays an important role in the Soviet scenario calling for rapid achievement of total victory over and occupation of Western Europe in the initial, nonnuclear phase of war. Isolating Europe from American assistance would ensure Soviet success. Defectors from the Soviet bloc who have worked at the United Nations in New York say that there are both KGB and GRU SPETSNAZ officers there working as "international civil servants" or in technical employee roles. This gives them great freedom of movement. Others are attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington or to the San Francisco consulate. Their role is to identify vulnerable choke points in this country, and to devise methods for their eventual sabotage. As far back as 1957, for example, the GRU surveyed U.S. oil refineries for simultaneous sabotage in case of war. Other defectors in the recent past have claimed that SPETSNAZ teams are assigned to Soviet diplomatic missions and would assassinate political and military leaders in the event of imminent hostilities.

Cultural exchange plays role

In this regard, it should be noted that the Soviets do their utmost to ensure that as many as possible of the commanders of SPETSNAZ teams assigned to operate in the United States are able to examine personally their future target. The Soviets recognize the great differences between life in the Soviet Union and the United States and have decided that this necessitates exposing SPETSNAZ officers and some troops, even if sparingly, to conditions in the United States. To accomplish this, they have worked out some ingenious methods, such as international athletic competitions. Soviet SPETSNAZ personnel travel to their target countries mainly in the guise of being a sports team or delegation. Once in the United States, some of the "sportsmen" perform "errands" for the KGB and the GRU.

which might range from the relatively innocent collection of readily available background material, to the purchasing of certain specific items, especially electronic gadgets, or the checking and servicing of dead drops.

As Western concern with SPETSNAZ capabilities has grown, there have been some disturbing indications that the covert infrastructure has increased through the insertion of foreign SPETSNAZ via Latin America. It is suspected that one of the tasks of the 60-odd SPETSNAZ troops and the many Cuban intelligence officers in Nicaragua is to train and prepare bogus "refugees" for their roles in the covert infrastructure that penetrates America.

Clandestine support for terrorists in different parts of the world is a small price for the Soviet Union to pay for the concealment of its SPETSNAZ troops. There is ample evidence that this price is being paid. ■

Yosief Bodansky and Louis Rees are with Mid-Atlantic Research Associates, publishers of Early Warning.

TALKING SENSE TO TERRORISTS

by David Nissen

His fellow police officers used to call him "Bring 'Em Out Alive" Bolz. As founder and coordinator of the New York Police Department's Hostage Program, Captain Frank Bolz was the chief negotiator in 285 crisis situations, and succeeded in rescuing more than 850 hostages without losing a single one.

His success rate, he believes, is partially due to the nature of the hostage crises he handled. "In the domestic situation, there's just me and the perpetrator. I (as the negotiator) can look stupid—it doesn't matter. The goal is just to save lives, including that of the perpetrator."

"But in the international arena," he said, "the rules are different. The perception by the world is important. The country can't be made to look foolish. The future safety of our citizens depends upon how we are perceived."

Bolz pointed out that "in local law enforcement, there is no acceptable casualty rate, while in military operations there is."

"And international terrorism is a form of warfare," he emphasized.

"It is necessary to keep up U.S. image and safety in the world."

In spite of these differences between local and international considerations, however, Bolz found that there are many principles of negotiating that can and should be used on the international scene.

Consider the disastrous handling of the terrorist attack at the 1972 Olympic Games at Munich, where West German officials "were concerned about keeping overt security arrangements to a minimum" in order to counterbalance the world community's memory of the last Olympic Games in Germany in 1936, which were a virtual paean

to the Third Reich, orchestrated by Adolf Hitler.

Bolz points out that at the previous Olympics, in 1968 in Mexico City, two black American athletes had raised black-gloved fists skyward during the National Anthem.

"The ICO (International Committee for the Olympics) should have learned at least this much from the Smith-Carlos affair," Bolz writes in his book, *Hostage Cop*, "in an age of satellite communication, the chance to reach a billion or more people in a single act of protest would be very tempting for anyone with a message for the world."

"And of course," he went on, "no group posed as obvious a threat as the assortment of pro-Palestinian terrorist groups that had already demonstrated a predilection for violent, eye-catching stunts on behalf of their cause."

The fact that there were no contingency plans for such an attack, in retrospect, was the biggest mistake of all, Bolz said.

Criticizing what he termed "Israeli intransigence" during that tragedy, again for the sake of "how the world will perceive us," he wrote, "The idea at Munich was not to re-fight biblical wars, it was to save lives then and there."

Keep them talking

In general, Bolz said, hostage negotiation follows certain universal principles.

The first principle, apparent enough, is: *Communicate*. "A man with a hostage wants to communicate," Bolz points out; whatever else you do, keep the lines of communication open.

In his own experiences Bolz preferred to communicate directly with the perpetrator. He patiently discussed their problems with

them, cajoled them, flattered them, fed them, promised them they wouldn't be hurt if they surrendered, and calmed them. "But," he added, "I never lied to them."

Bolz gave the example of a siege by "Cat" Olsen at the Bankers Trust in Greenwich Village, New York, in 1975. While Bolz responded to the gunman's request for beer and sandwiches, but parried his demands for Patty Hearst's release from jail, a getaway plane to be landed in front of the bank, and \$2 million in cash.

There is a thin line to be walked on the negotiator's part, between not lying and not telling a potentially dangerous truth, however. If the PLO hijacks an American jet and threatens to kill hostages unless the American negotiator releases 100 of their comrades from another prison, Bolz said, "You don't have the authority to grant that demand—but you can't tell him that."

Never say an absolute "no" to the perpetrator. If you do, you'll put him in a position of absolute frustration. This leads to aggressive behavior—murder, violence, suicide.

"You must keep negotiations centered on problem-solving," Bolz emphasized. "You must keep all avenues open. As long as the terrorist perceives that they are open, he keeps his options open."

Bargain wisely

Never give something for nothing. "You must get something in return for what you give," Bolz listed as another basic negotiating technique.

For instance, if the captor demands that a certain person be brought to the scene, do so, but on the condition that one or more

people be released.

In communicating with the perpetrator, always try to establish a one-on-one human rapport with him. Bolz, in training negotiators, told them to "put yourself in the perpetrator's shoes. Convince him the world, as embodied by one cop doing the talking, can understand his problems and help him cope."

In this way, a negotiator can sometimes "attain a remarkable level of spiritual unity with someone who would normally be perceived as his total enemy—an angry man with a gun."

One way this is done is the "good guy, bad guy" method. If the perpetrator demands something fairly easy, the negotiator with the better rapport grants it. If it clearly can't be given, then a second negotiator, the "bad guy" is called over to refuse it. But the main negotiator keeps reassuring the captor, "We're on your side; we're doing everything we can for you."

Don't lose authority

One thing Bolz feels a negotiator should never do is to beg.

He gives the example of one transit policeman who was trying to talk a man into releasing a woman he held hostage at knifepoint on a subway. He had dropped to his hands and knees, saying: "I'm begging you man, let the lady go."

This is the worst thing you can do, according to Bolz.

"What the perpetrator needed to see in the police who confronted him at that moment was cool, subdued authority... He was heightening the tension by displaying just the opposite—a lack of control and an abandonment of authority. You urge, cajole, reason, even order on occasion. When you employ emotion, it is under a controlled situation, designed to elicit a specific reaction. *You never beg*" (p. 125).

After Bolz arrived at the scene, he had police check the man's record. They brought in a

What to do if you are taken hostage

1. Don't be a hero. Accept your situation, and be prepared to wait. Any drastic action on the part of the victim might bring immediate violent action from the captor.

2. The first 15 to 45 minutes are the most dangerous. Follow instructions. Do not hesitate. After as little as 10 minutes, the phenomenon of transference, or Stockholm Syndrome, can start to develop, and under the influence of this he is less likely to harm you. You will not be able to avoid it. It is natural, and it is what has kept many hostages alive.

3. Don't speak unless spoken to and then only when necessary.

4. Try to r...witwithout turning your back on your captor. (Sometimes negotiators have had to wake up hostages to release them.) There have also been incidents when the perpetrator fell asleep (physically and psychologically exhausted), and the hostages just walked out.

5. Don't make suggestions. If he uses it and it goes wrong, he may think you planted it and are trying to trick him.

6. Don't try to escape unless you are absolutely sure that you will be successful. If you are recaptured, the captor might use violence to "teach others a lesson."

7. If anyone, including you, needs any special medical attention, inform your captors. They do not want anyone to die on their hands or they would not have taken hostages in the first place.

8. Be observant. You may be released or escape and can help the police. Try to remember everything that you see and hear.

Memorize things about the captors, their description and conversations. What names do they use or how do they refer to one another? What precipitated the takeover? Where are the hostages being kept? Has a routine been established in terms of eating and/or sleeping? Try to recall the number and identity or descriptions of the other hostages.

9. Be prepared to answer the police on the phone.

10. Don't be argumentative or create agitation with the captors or other hostages.

11. Treat the captor like royalty. Don't turn your back on him unless ordered to do so. But don't stare at him either. A "down the nose" look may bring a violent reaction.

12. Be patient.

13. If a rescue attempt is taking place, or you hear a noise or shooting, hit the floor and stay down. Keep your hands on your head and don't make any fast moves. If and when you are ordered out, follow directions quickly—again with your hands in the open. Be prepared to be frisked when greeted by the police. Their intelligence may be incomplete or incorrect, and you don't want to bring about an erroneous reflex reaction if you balk. Remember, it's nothing personal.

The above is verbatim from the appendix of *Hostage Cop*, Captain Frank Bolz and Edward Hershey/Rawson (New York: Wade Publishers, 1979) pp.313-316.

Manhattan Legal Aid attorney who had represented him previously on other charges.

"I'll do what I can for you, Gilberto," the lawyer told him. He thought for a second, nodded, and held the knife out to a transit patrolman.

This illustrates another absolute

must in negotiating: intelligence work behind the scenes. You must find out everything and anything about the captor and what makes him tick, even what are his likes and dislikes. "If some guy shows up and says 'I'm that guy's brother and I know I can talk him out of there'....first find out from the

guy's wife if maybe he hates his brother!"

"You have to be able to raise and lower his anxiety," Bolz said. "You have to wear him down physically and psychologically."

One guideline true for both local and international situations, is: "Never challenge a terrorist directly. Don't think you can 'call his bluff.'"

If Qaddafi says he'll send suicide hit teams to Washington, take him at his word. Even if he backs down, someone else might take you up on it—a sympathizer or a "copycat, who craves attention."

Headline drama

And make no mistake about it, Bolz said, the goal of any terrorist is attention, and the media is a large consideration for that reason. "You must remember that

terrorism is theater. Their goal is not to have a lot of people killed, but to have a lot of people watching.

"In the theater of terrorism, the perpetrator is the star, the hostages are the supporting players, and the public is the audience, spotlighted by the media which illuminates it.

"The role of the media is to inform people, to be the watchdog, and to be an observer. They should *not be participants*. If they become participants, they can be manipulated by the terrorists."

Bolz said that when Flight 847 was hijacked last year, "the media really lost its head when they made that phone call to Nabih Berri in an attempt to 'serve the family' of one of the hostages."

"The idea of bringing the media into a hostage incident has

strengths and weaknesses," Bolz says, "We have permitted pool reporters to observe the negotiations in action, but never to become part of the incident. The introduction of television cameras can sometimes spur antics by the perpetrators of the siege—endangering not only the progress of negotiations but the safety of the hostages as well."

"A reporter can be a negotiator's ally or, inadvertently, at times his enemy.

"When Bolz can use the presence of the media to assure a worried gunman that he will be arrested without being attacked by police, he is thankful for the press. If the police ascertain that someone conducting a siege is listening to the radio, they can even use the press to help advance negotiations. They did it to let Cat Olsen know that they understood he had not been trapped in the bank during a routine holdup. And they did it again in 1977, to tell a band of Croatian nationals who had invaded the Yugoslav Embassy that U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim had received a copy of their demands.

"But when newsmen phone their questions directly to a perpetrator—or worse, begin to play amateur psychologist—while the police are forced to sit helplessly, they are no longer journalists but participants, and quite likely unqualified for that role."

On the other hand, Bolz was emphatic that the media should cover terrorist incidents. "If hijacking becomes so commonplace that it doesn't get media coverage, the perpetrators will simply escalate the scale of violence until the media will have to cover it," Bolz reasoned.

You may be surprised to learn, Bolz added, that the Soviet Union has problems with terrorists "but you never hear about it *because they control their media.*"

Meanwhile an open and free society like America's has become increasingly vulnerable to

The Stockholm Syndrome

It is named for the reaction of the victims of a six-day siege in the vault of a Swedish bank.

A lone gunman, trapped during a robbery attempt, herded a man and three women into the vault and then demanded and received the release of a former confederate who had been imprisoned. For almost a week, under the most intolerable conditions imaginable, the two men held off police.

Without plumbing facilities, all hostages were required to relieve themselves into wastebaskets. One of the women went through her menstrual cycle without sanitary napkins. Hostages were paraded into the vault door with a loaded gun held under their chins. They were tied to safe deposit boxes with metal wire around their necks, so that if authorities bombarded the vault with tear gas the hostages would faint and collapse against the wire, choking to death.

Finally, police drilled through the vault, shot gas into it, and forced everyone out. But at the end, the four hostages *encircled*

their captors, to protect them from possible harm by the police!

Later one of the women said she was in love with the bank robber and would wait for his release from prison to marry him.

Psychologically, the captor has had life and death control over the victim and has allowed the victim to survive, earning a sort of everlasting gratitude, the ultimate in transference. Cruelty, it appears, only served to heighten the emotional value of those susceptible to it. The pattern has been called survival identification. The Dutch, who equate most hostage cases with military actions, call it aggressor identification, and they note that it is hardly a new phenomenon. Europeans observed it extensively amid the horrors of Nazi concentration camps, where some victims earned places of honor with their captors by emulating them and often outdoing the Nazis themselves in their cruel treatment of fellow prisoners.

(From *Hostage Cop*, Frank Bolz)

terrorism both from within and from abroad.

Not ideologues

Bolz sees the "internal anti-U.S. terrorist" as not as ideologically motivated as he is generally perceived to be. This "idealism" is especially diminished in "second- and third- generation terrorists," Bolz explained, "whose concern now is with self-profit. They use bankrobbing as a means to fund themselves. The cause is not so important anymore, but the tactics have become a way of life."

Some foreign terrorists in this country really are not anti-America. "They just see this country as a stage (well illuminated by the media, of course)."

Very real terrorist threats are the various Palestinian and Muslim groups. "The PLO will travel anywhere in the world," Bolz said, "to call attention to their fight against Israel."

He recounted how they once tried to put mercury in Haifa oranges. Their hijackings and airport attacks are aimed at destroying tourism in Israel.

Here in America, Bolz points out there exists "an infrastructure of Muslim students (most of whom, of course, are *not* terrorists) that provide a PLO terrorist with the ability to move easily and invisibly about."

Bolz notes that there are also "defunct American terrorists" (leftovers from the 1960s groups like the Weather Underground) who will still offer PLO terrorists "safe houses" and weapons as a payback for former training they received in Libya! In addition, Bolz warned, substantial amounts of

unaccounted-for explosives are hidden throughout the country.

- Not everyone who purports to be willing to die for their "noble cause" is actually willing to do so, Bolz noted, citing the suicide jeep attack on our military compound in Lebanon as one illustration; there were triggering devices in the jeep to explode the ammunition in case the driver lost his nerve and jumped out!

For the same reason, according to Bolz, the Japanese kamikaze pilots used to takeoff in planes with no landing gear.

"When these terrorists get away from the reinforcement of their group," he explained, "they are less likely to truly believe that by dying for their holy cause they will get an automatic ticket to heaven."

Bolz said he supports Reagan's economic sanctions against Libya. He added that "we must understand that an economic boycott can take 1 1/2 years to produce results."

As for stronger retaliation against Libya, he advised the government not to play its hand. "If we do use military options, don't *say* we are, just *do* it. On the other hand, if we say we're going to do something and then *not* do it, that's even worse."

He quoted Teddy Roosevelt: "Speak softly but carry a big stick."

He does not favor retaliating with violence. "We must be absolutely certain we're retaliating at the right people. If we retaliate and kill innocents or send out assassins—then we are the same as terrorists." ■

David Nissen is a free-lance writer from Brooklyn, New York. He has worked as a reporter and editor of the metropolitan section of The New York City Tribune.

FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE

by Neil C. Livingstone

Perhaps it is a sign of the times. The first sentence diagramed in the new *Harbrace College Handbook* is "The hijacked plane has safely landed." Terrorism, it seems, is an all-pervasive feature of modern life, inescapable even in a college handbook on style.

Virtually every news magazine and wire service named terrorism as one of its top news stories in 1985, eclipsed only by the AIDS epidemic on some lists.

There is little promise of relief in 1986 with respect to international terrorism. Libya's erratic strongman, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, has publicly declared that, if provoked, he will train and equip Arab guerrillas for "terrorist and suicide missions" against Israel and the United States.

Mohammed Abbas, the accused mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking, allegedly told a Western reporter that he plans to hold a secret conference of "revolutionary forces" to develop a global strategy for waging war against the United States in 1986.

The so-called Islamic Jihad similarly has vowed to intensify its "holy war" against the U.S. Add to this increased attacks in recent months against U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) targets by European terrorists, and trepidation by authorities in this country that Central American violence may soon spill over into U.S. cities.

Nevertheless, despite widespread public concern over international terrorism, many observers are asking whether it isn't becoming a little like the weather: something everyone talks about but no one does anything about. With the exception of the daring mid-air interception of the Egyptian jetliner bearing the Achille Lauro pirates, the United States has scored few real victories against international terror-

ism. Even that episode can be attributed more to a fortuitous set of circumstances and the dogged determination of one National Security Council staffer than to any particular policy or design.

More typical is the fact that the hijackers of TWA flight 847 and the planners and state supporters of the December Rome and Vienna airport massacres are still at large. The United States has yet to exact retribution for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Beirut and Kuwait, the kamikaze attack on the U.S. Marine barracks at the Beirut airport that left 241 dead, and dozens of other outrages perpetrated by terrorists over the years.

Critics contend that the Reagan administration came to power with talk about "swift and effective retribution" against terrorists but that little tough action has been witnessed to date.

Some observers have even gone so far as to express the view that terrorism is simply a cost of doing business in the modern world, and also note that terrorists are too elusive to hit back at effectively. Striking at terrorist safe havens and supporters like Syria, Libya, and Iran, they contend, is also ill-advised since absolute proof of guilt is hard to come by, and military action runs the risk of expanding into a major conflict.

The plain fact is that the United States does not have a comprehensive and consistent policy for dealing with international terrorism. Nor does it possess many of the required tools, economic and military. Principles have been enunciated, and some capabilities enhanced, but much remains to be done.

Who's to blame

The reasons behind this state of affairs are complex and can be traced back to the traumas suffered by the defense and intelli-

TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
October 15 Commando
UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND
Angry Brigade
Anti-Nazi League
Black Liberation Army
British Movement
First of May Group
Free Wales Army (Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru—MAC)
International Marxist Group (IMG)
Irish Freedom Fighters
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP)
Keepers of Wales (Cadwyr Cymru—CC)
Loyal Citizens of Ulster (LCU)
Loyalist Association of Workers (LAW)
Militant
National Front (NF)
National Party (NP)
People's Democracy (PD)
Protestant Action Force (PAF)
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
Radical Student Alliance (RSA)
Red Flag 74
Red Hand Commandos
Shankill Defence Association (SDA)
Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone)
Socialist Workers' Party (SWP)
Tartan Army
Troops Out Movement (TOM)
Ulster Defence Association (UDA)
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UPV)
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Ulster Workers' Council (UWC)
Workers' Revolutionary Party (WRP)
Young Militants
WEST GERMANY (Federal Republic of Germany)
Andreas Baader Commando of the Red Army Faction
Baader Solidarity Group
German Liberation Popular Front, Andreas Baader Brigade
Holger Meins Brigade
Holger Meins Kommando, Revolutionary Cell
International Anti-Terror Organization
Puig Antich-Ulrike Meinhof Commando
Red Army Faction (RAF, Baader-Meinhof Gang)
Revolutionary Cell Brigade Ulrike Meinhof
Robert E. D. Straker Commando of the Territorial Resistance Army
MOROCCO
Forward Movement (Itai Amam)
National Union of Moroccan Students
Popular Front for the Liberation of Segouia el Hamra and Rio de Oro, or Polisario Front
MOZAMBIQUE
Free Africa Movement (Movimento da Africa Livre)
Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique—Frelimo)
Mozambique Resistance Movement (Movimento da Resistência Moçambicana—MRM, also known as Mozambique National Resistance)
Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique—Coremo)
United Mozambique Front (Frente Unida Moçambicana—FUMO)
NAMIBIA
South West African National Union (SWANU)
South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO)

gence establishments in the 1960s and 1970s, bureaucratic inertia and infighting, congressional opposition to needed reforms and legislation, and finally, simply to

a lack of will.

Within the administration proposals to adopt a strong proactive policy against international terrorism have produced a firestorm of controversy replete with public bickering and accusatory late-night phone calls laced with profanity between top officials.

Some senior CIA officials have accused proponents of a tougher policy of wanting to transport the agency back to "the bad old days" when it was vilified by Congress and in the media. They maintain that a proactive posture would involve unacceptable risks and never be fully understood or supported by the public. Others believe that it would be all right for some other agency to pursue such a policy, just so long as it is not the CIA.

Many in the Pentagon also have serious reservations about putting the prestige and power of the U.S. armed forces on the line to combat terrorism. Fighting terrorism is viewed in many circles as a sordid and politically charged kind of warfare that will inevitably tarnish military reputations and destroy careers.

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has picked up this theme, articulating the belief that combat forces should be used extremely cautiously and then only with "clearly defined political and military objectives." To this end, Weinberger has cited six tests that should be met before any decision is made to employ force abroad, which for all practical purposes would rule out the use of force in anything less than a general war or an attack on the United States.

Weinberger reportedly opposed the interdiction of the Achille Lauro hijackers and has even gone so far as to suggest that there might be a role for the United Nations in combatting global terrorism, an organization that only two months ago, after more than a decade of debate, finally summoned up the courage to pass a watered-down resolution condemning international terrorism.

Congressional impasse

The situation in Congress is even worse. Many members display a nearly total lack of understanding about terrorism; some go as far as to actually embrace certain terrorist groups as "freedom fighters."

As an example of the inanities and inconsistencies which abound in Congress, Senator Howard Metzenbaum, who recently raised the prospect of assassinating terrorists, is the same legislator who, last year, blocked passage of an administration bill designed to curtail support of foreign terrorist groups by American citizens. Metzenbaum contended that the legislation amounted to an abridgement of free speech.

For pure fatuousness, however, nothing exceeds Senator Gary Hart's gratuitous suggestion in the wake of the Achille Lauro incident. "I think we ought to infiltrate terrorist groups," offered Hart. "I think we ought to anticipate these things and head them off."

Perhaps a former Hart campaign aide, Frank Mankiewicz, was right when he quipped that the Colorado senator "has had only two new ideas in his life: his name and his age." Hart, it also should be remembered, bears more than his share of responsibility for the weakened state of the American intelligence and defense capabilities needed to contend with international terrorism.

Not to be outdone by Hart as an exemplar of muddled thinking, Representative Barbara Mikulski and several other members of congress recently introduced bills to require such antiterrorist measures as screening all ship cargo and baggage, restricting access to vessels and their cargo, and various additional security measures aboard ship. Mikulski submitted her legislative proposal despite the fact that the Achille Lauro incident was the only ship hijacking in more than two decades. Mikulski's proposed security enhancements, moreover, would not only be imprac-

tical and prohibitively expensive but would rank as a classic example of attempting to lock the barn door after the cows have already gotten out.

Then there is Senator Dave Durenberger. Durenberger, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, chided the administration for not consulting with Congress before acting to intercept the plane bearing the Achille Lauro hijackers, maintaining that such consultation is required under the War Powers Act.

Not only can Durenberger's interpretation of the War Powers Act be faulted but the kind of consultation he is calling for is a sure formula for paralysis instead of action when the opportunity to strike back against international terrorism occurs. It is also clear evidence of the degree to which Congress has degenerated into the role of critic rather than partner in the making of U.S. foreign policy.

Response that works

When all is said and done, the U.S. response to international terrorism must be more than solely defensive and reactive; it must also be proactive and preemptive. In other words, terrorism will never be suppressed until we go on the offensive and turn the hunters into the hunted. Since state-sponsored terrorist groups are eight times as lethal as those lacking such support, the United States must also find effective ways to punish nations that aid and abet terrorist groups and provide them with safe havens.

Such efforts do not necessarily imply the use of force, although force must surely remain an option. Cooperative measures to isolate and punish states that violate the norms of international behavior, including trade sanctions and travel boycotts, should be tried before military action. However, European reluctance to join in U.S. sanctions against Libya only increases the likelihood of a military confrontation since the failure of peaceful measures will

make nonpeaceful measures almost inevitable.

President Reagan reportedly has given the green light to intensified covert actions against terrorists and their patrons. This includes stepped-up efforts to destabilize and undermine "bad actors" like Qaddafi and to engage in so-called "black work" or "dirty tricks" against individual terrorist organizations. American agents have disrupted terrorist communications and travel plans and have even sold them defective weapons and bomb material. In one case, terrorists in Lebanon were provided with ultrasensitive bomb detonators that were responsible for the explosion of a terrorist bomb when it was being loaded into a vehicle.

U.S. actions, nevertheless, remain far short of a general declaration of war against international terrorism. In the event that the Reagan administration takes off the gloves and opts for such a strategy, what form is it likely to take? Some of the initiatives that could be considered are as fol-

Today only about 25 cents out of every 100 dollars of the Pentagon's budget is devoted to special operations, despite the fact that low-intensity warfare is the predominant warfare of our time.

lows:

1) The United States should engage in linkage politics and hold the Soviet Union, its East-bloc allies, and client states like Libya, Cuba, South Yemen, Nicaragua, and Syria responsible for violence flowing from their support of various terrorist movements. Closer relations with the Soviet Union should be predicated on a significant reduction in the present level of support Moscow provides, di-

rectly or indirectly, to terrorist-sponsoring states and to organizations like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

2) Unless they are widely observed, trade sanctions have little impact. Thus, trade, aid, and other economic benefits, even most favored nation status (MFN), should be withheld from countries that do not support U.S. sanctions against terrorist-sponsoring states. At the very minimum, trade benefits should be denied to opportunistic and predatory nations that moved rapidly to fill the vacuum left by the United States when it imposed sanctions on Libya. The imposition of new trade restrictions on Japan, West Germany, and the United Kingdom, to name only a few of the culprits, will place pressure on those governments to take a more cooperative and responsible view of the problem.

3) The Hughes-Ryan Act, which requires congressional approval of all covert actions and the reporting of such activities to Congress, should be modified to exempt operations against foreign terrorists. While progress has been made to limit the number of individuals consulted in Congress, the figure is still too high in view of recent leaks regarding U.S. antiterrorist activities.

4) For the most part, air strikes and salvos from battleships have little real utility in combatting terrorism and conjure up the image of trying to kill a fly with a sledgehammer. More surgical methods are needed that involve targeting individual terrorists and their leadership for assassination. This would require a change in Executive Order 12333, which currently prohibits the government from engaging in assassination.

In this regard, it must be recognized that terrorism is a form of warfare. Accordingly, our object should not be to arrest and try international terrorists but to destroy them. Terrorist acts occurring abroad should be regarded as acts of war (or piracy) and

TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE

SOMALIA

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia (DFLS)
Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF)
Somali Liberation Front
Somali National Movement (SNM)
Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF)
Somali Workers' Party (SWP)

SUDAN

Beath Arab Socialist Party
Council for the Unity of Southern Sudan
Democratic Unionist Party
Sudanese Communist Party
Sudanese National Front
Sudanese Socialist Popular Front

TUNISIA

Arab National Rally (RNA)
Islamic Progressive Movement (MIP)
Islamic Trend Movement (MTI)
Movement of Socialist Democrats (MDS)
Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR)
Popular Unity Movement (MUP)
Progressive Nationalist Front for the Liberation of Tunisia (FNPLT)
Revolutionary Party of the Tunisian People (PRPT)

Tunisian Armed Resistance (RAT)
Tunisian Communist Party (PCT)

SOUTH AFRICA

African National Congress (ANC)
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)
South African Communist Party (SACP)
White Commando (Wit Kommando)

SPANISH SAHARA

Mustafa el Wali Bayyid Sayed International Brigade

SUDAN

Arya Nya
Azania Liberation Front (ALF)
Sudan African Liberation Front (SALF)
Sudan African National Union (SANU)
Sudan Communist Party (SCP)
Sudanese Socialist Popular Front (SSPF)

UGANDA

Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM)
Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF)
Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF)
Uganda National Resistance Movement (UNRM)

Uganda Popular Front (UPF)
Ugandan People's Movement (UPM) or Ugandan Patriotic Movement

WESTERN SAHARA/MOROCCO

Association of People from Sahara (AOSARIO)
People's Front for the Liberation of Saguaiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario)

ZAIRE

Council for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa (Conseil pour la Libération du Congo-Kinshasa—CLC)

Congo National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale du Congo—FLNC)
National Movement for Union and Reconciliation in Zaire (Mouvement National pour l'Union et la Réconciliation—MNUR)

Peoples Army of the Oppressed in Zaire (APOZA)
Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP)

ZIMBABWE

African National Council (ANC)
Patriotic Front (PF)
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)

should be treated as such.

We were fortunate indeed that the Achille Lauro hijackers who were intercepted over the Mediterranean and forced to land in Sicily were not brought back to the United States to stand trial. One can only imagine the media circus that would have resulted. Moreover, there probably would

have been 500 ambulance-chasing lawyers eager to offer their free services to the terrorists for free in exchange for the publicity that the case would surely have generated. All, of course, would have claimed that they were motivated solely by high ideals. And think what a forum such a trial would have provided for the terrorists to heap invective on the United States and Israel.

5) One intriguing idea might be to get the private sector involved by issuing letters of marque and reprisal to enterprising counter-terrorist entrepreneurs, as provided for in Article 8 of the Constitution. Just as privateers were once granted licenses by the Congress to hunt pirates, so too should generous bounties be paid for the death or forceful delivery to the United States of fugitive foreign terrorists. This would be a marked improvement over the present law that simply provides rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of certain terrorists.

Rewards of several million dollars or more for the notorious Abu Nidal and the murderers of TWA Flight 847 passenger Robert Stethem could be expected to have a chilling effect on the masterminds and gunmen of international terrorism, so long accustomed to carrying out their atrocities with impunity. It would require them to spend far greater energy and resources on their own security; energy and resources that otherwise would have gone into the commission of terrorist acts.

While it has proven very difficult to infiltrate terrorist groups, some success has been achieved in compromising terrorist operations through the payment of bribes. The availability of large bounties would entice at least some terrorists to sell out their own comrades and confederates.

6) The U.S. unconventional war-fighting capability is currently hamstrung by too few resources, interservice rivalries, and a lack of support at the highest levels of the Pentagon. The

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abortive 1980 mission to rescue the American hostages in Iran serves, at least in part, as a graphic illustration of the problems affecting this nation's special operations readiness.

Today only about 25 cents out of every 100 dollars of the Pentagon's budget is devoted to special operations, despite the fact that low-intensity warfare is the predominant warfare of our time. Only a handful of our top military men have any special operations experience, and many are unsympathetic to the notion of elite troops like the U.S. antiterrorist Delta unit or even the army's Special Forces. Indicative of this bias, Delta is oriented more toward rescue operations than toward actually striking back at terrorists.

It is time to get serious about developing the special operations capabilities needed to successfully engage terrorists and to pre-deploy such units where they can be of most use in times of need. Promotion channels must be opened up to special operations specialists so that their views are reflected in the decision-making councils at the Pentagon, and more priority must be given to expanding, training, and equipping special operations forces.

7) It is time to get control of our borders. Not only do we need to tighten the screws on illegal immigration but visas should be denied to nationals of states that support terrorism. It is ironic

that Americans are restricted by the U.S. government from traveling to Libya while Libyans are permitted access to the United States. According to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), there are 3,501 nonimmigrant Libyans in this country; however, the INS has no idea of the whereabouts of more than a third of them.

Forty-six percent are students; nevertheless, some of these "students" are in their mid-30's, have intelligence or military backgrounds, and appear to be living on incomes of more than \$40,000. One so-called "student" in Canada turned out to be a Libyan previously expelled from West Germany for terrorist crimes. Two other Libyan "students" were convicted and sentenced to prison terms for purchasing weapons and silencers from an FBI undercover agent in Philadelphia.

At a time when the leader of Libya threatens to sponsor terrorist violence in the streets of the United States, the presence of a large Libyan student population within our borders, not to mention those in Canada and Mexico, is not a comforting thought.

In the final analysis, the worst way to address the problem of international terrorism is to posture and make hollow threats, which, when the United States fails to respond forcefully to terrorist outrages, make us seem like the proverbial "paper tiger." Moreover, such threats may only goad terrorists into more bitter and frequent attacks against U.S. targets. It is time, therefore, for the administration to lower its rhetoric and to increase its level of action, striking back hard at terrorists and their patrons whenever the opportunity presents itself.

Ultimately, it is hoped that our actions will speak louder than words. ■

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DEFUSING THE RADICAL ENTENTE

by Evans Johnson

Incidents of terror against the peoples, facilities, and businesses of free world nations are not random acts of violence, but part and parcel of a coordinated and directed war that the West, thus far, has failed to confront with the same sense of purpose and power that enabled the Allies to defeat the Axis bloc in World War II.

This is the clear conclusion reached by an assembly of experts on terrorism, Soviet foreign policy, and NATO military policy, who met last month in Tel Aviv at a conference on State Terrorism and the International Situation, sponsored by the International Security Council (ISC).

The participants did more than wring their hands and recite the known list of atrocities that have been written in blood on the pages of the last 15 years. They singled out a "radical entente" of Soviet client states that provide the support network for most terrorist groups.

More importantly, they spelled out a plan of action to counter international terrorism, a program that must be spearheaded by the United States.

"The campaign of terror has become a regular form of warfare," the conference's Tel Aviv Declaration asserted.

"It is not deployed in a set battle with a direct confrontation of military forces, but is, for all that, a blunt and brutal military instrument, extremely flexible, adaptable to almost any circumstance, unpredictable in its thrusts," reads the declaration.

"And, since terror does indeed terrify, it tends to paralyze its targets and victims, and often succeeds in draining them of the will to fight back."

The declaration was read by former deputy U.S. Ambassador

to the United Nations Charles Lichenstein, who served under Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick. Lichenstein was known then for his sharp tongue and clear understanding of the role the Soviet Union has played in polarizing nations and peoples against each other since 1945.

He is also a critic of the trend in the Reagan administration to speak loudly but carry a small stick against terrorism.

"The combination of (Secretary of State) George Shultz's wrath and that of *The New York Times* (which had recently run an editorial about terrorism headlined "We're Beginning to Get Angry") must be causing fear and trembling throughout the terror circuit from Damascus and Tripoli to Nicaragua and Cuba," Lichenstein quipped.

The former ambassador listed what he saw as the three key aspects of modern terror:

- Terrorism is war. "We are speaking of a weapons system that is devastatingly effective."

- With very few exceptions, all terrorism is state-sponsored, state-implemented, or state-condoned.

- "State terrorism, handwringers to the contrary notwithstanding, is controllable."

During several closed-door working sessions, retired U.S. and Israeli senior military intelligence officers butted heads and finally reached agreement. Former ambassadors from Japan, Europe, and the United States, two former heads of state from Latin America, and serving Israeli military officers specializing in counterterrorism argued about the most dangerous groups and nations. Finally, they spelled out specific options for quelling the "rising tide" of international terror.

The first working paper on state terrorism, prepared by former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand William Kintner and national security specialist Col. Richard Lawrence, USAF (ret.), identified three support-groups of nations that enable the "radical entente" of Libya, Syria, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba to thrive:

- "Some are active sponsors—the Soviet Union is at the forefront;

- "Some provide ancillary life-support systems;

- "Some, by their silence or their attempt to buy off the terrorists, lend legitimacy to them and prevent concerted and effective international counterterrorism."

"Although individual acts of terrorism may appear to be random because of the opportunistic nature of each event," the report says, "much of the evidence points to an alarming degree of coordination among the perpetrators with a set of well-defined goals."

Although the Kremlin may not directly control groups such as the PLO, Italy's Red Brigades, or Direct Action in France, Moscow's "guidance and influence can be found behind almost all acts of international terrorism," the working group concurred.

"The alarming combination of five radical nations" clearly documented by Dr. Avigdor Haselkorn, "working in concert...has targeted the West, principally and ultimately the United States, to drive U.S. presence and power back to the shores of North America.

"Their repeated demonstration of the capability to foment well-timed terrorist attacks over wide ranges of the globe clearly show their intent to stretch thin the forces and response capability of the United States, so as to emas-

culate it as the ultimate defender of Western goals and values."

The working group concluded that there is no doubt that Moscow is pulling strings behind the scenes, though "it has taken considerable steps to not appear in the foreground of terrorist sup-

"The campaign of terror has become a regular form of warfare...terror does indeed terrify, it tends to paralyze its targets and victims and often succeeds in draining them of the will to fight back."

port."

And, the group said, "there is no question that without the extensive support network" of the radical entente, "the terrorist would be, at best, a minor irritant and a short-lived phenomenon."

Once identified, once exposed, the sponsors and the actors on the stage of international terrorism must be dealt with. This was the unequivocal conclusion of the Tel Aviv conference.

The group, headed by Robert Morris and Capt. Eugene McDaniel, USN (ret.), who was a POW in Vietnam for six years, and who now is president of the American Defense Foundation, proposed that a five-part "coordinating mechanism" of specialists in six fields be established on a national basis, first in the United States.

Composed of military, diplomatic, intelligence, psychological, social, and economic experts, the mechanism should be "permanent in nature and designed to operate continuously." Its primary mechanisms or tasks would be:

- Strategic—"This mechanism should establish and monitor, continuously, the development of national strategy for coping with

the broadest range of products associated with terrorism.

It should be a matter of highest national priority that the development of appropriate command structure be ready to provide appropriate forces, adequate communications, and operational planning. It should work to coordinate all government agencies in order to achieve the desired goal."

- Intelligence—"This mechanism should engage in the exchange, collection, analysis, and sharing of intelligence."

- Judicial—"This mechanism should be prepared to impose sanctions, embargoes, preemptive activities, and other appropriate actions."

- Legislative—"This mechanism should make recommendations to legislative bodies for statutes, laws, and regulations."

- Psychological—"This mechanism should immerse itself in examining the dimension of the violence inherent in acts of terrorism and use the examination of that measure of violence and take appropriate action."

The working group also suggested the mechanisms work to some degree with the media so that the nature and extent of the terror threat can be more widely understood, and so that there can develop more support for whatever actions the government may take to counter terrorism, including preemptive raids—a policy hinted at by Secretary of State Shultz on April 3, 1984, but not yet acted upon, at least to the public's knowledge.

The Tel Aviv Declaration also urged the Reagan administration to crack down on any nation, including U.S. allies, that does not vigorously combat terrorism, "by bringing to bear alike on nations that support, or condone, or tolerate terrorism, the full weight of its economic and political leverage."

Although some European nations have developed bilateral police and intelligence programs to fight terrorism, Dr. John C. Loulis said that they have not been able to devise pan-European or

NATO programs, nor have they been willing to consider significant sanctions against countries that support or condone terrorism.

"However," the general director of the Center for Political Research in Athens said in a paper, "The need for common European action against terrorism is becoming more and more urgent with rising terrorist activity" on the continent.

"What seems to be lacking more than anything else in Europe," Loulis said, "is a common will."

Joel Lisker said that Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-Alabama) has already included some of the conference proposals in legislation now before the U.S. Senate.

Specifically, Senate bill S. 1941, International Terrorism Deterrence Act, and S. 1942, Military Installation Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1985, Lisker said, require the government to designate and punish economically and politically nations that support terrorist groups in any way. The second bill mandates tighter security for U.S. military facilities and stricter control over access to national security intelligence and technology to counter espionage.

Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner, Jr., USA (ret.), a special adviser to the secretary of state for Latin American affairs, drew special attention to "narco-terrorism" in the Western Hemisphere, and the romantic image some U.S. politicians paint of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

A singular difficulty in combating terrorism via legislation has been the handful of members of Congress who regularly fraternize with known Communist and Soviet bloc front groups, such as the World Peace Council.

But Sumner reserved his wrath for Jesse Jackson, a presidential contender in 1984.

"Fidel Castro and Daniel Ortega have developed a special dimension to their institutionalized form of terrorism," Sumner told the conference. "I refer to the drug and narcotic connection

Traveling Despite Terrorism

While foreign terrorists have yet to bring their carnage to the shores of the United States, Americans traveling abroad are considered prime targets. Two out of every five international terrorist attacks result in American casualties or damage to U.S. property.

The impact of recent threats and attacks has shaken the travel industry. Americans traveling abroad, either for business or holiday, are questioning their safety in light of international terrorism. In many cases, Americans have decided to alter their plans, or cancel their trips altogether.

The insecurity felt by the American traveler is reflected in current travel patterns. While total U.S. travel was up 10.6 percent in 1985, travel abroad rose by less than half that amount. Al-

which provides a financial base for the terrorism. Simply stated, the drugs flow north, and the arms and money return south.

"I find it particularly interesting and quite depressing to see Jesse Jackson exhorting the youth of our country to reject the drug scene, while at the same time he and his wife are enthusiastically and publicly supporting the very states and their leaders who are moving drugs into this country and other countries of the free world."

Two former Israeli diplomats, Gideon Rafael and Shaul Ramati, suggested that an Alliance to Combat Terrorism (ACT) be established internationally.

ACT, Ramati said, would coordinate intelligence gathering specifically about terrorism by agencies of the member nations. More pragmatically, it would build an international counterterror paramilitary unit, to strike at terrorists and to rescue hostages.

Because the force would not belong to one nation, terror groups could not hold a specific government hostage by kidnapping its leaders to force the release of jailed terrorists. ■

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though it is not the only factor, the appeal of international travel has diminished in the wake of recent terrorist assaults.

High-risk countries in Europe (especially Greece and Italy), Latin America, and the Middle East, have experienced a definite decline in tourism. According to the American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA), there is a noticeable change in American travel plans to countries that have been the scene of recent terrorist attacks.

Air travel is not the only area affected. Three major cruise lines have altered their Mediterranean summer itineraries as a result of the public's concern about potential terrorist attacks. Passenger perception of vulnerability has led to "significant" reductions in advance bookings, according to ASTA. Norway is even supplying counterterrorist "sea marshals" to sail with one of its major cruise lines. The Princess Cruise Line has even moved the "Love Boat" to safer waters. Its new routing will have it carrying passengers between Seattle and Alaska.

Americans should continue to travel. If we stay home out of fear, the terrorists will have won. Although their targets are often American people and property, terrorists are actually striking at the fundamental values of Western democracies.

Americans, however, should show prudence when choosing a destination. While Libya is the only country off limits to U.S. travelers because of terrorism, several government agencies suggest Americans practice caution if they are visiting Syria, Turkey, Colombia, Peru, or Guatemala. Americans also are encouraged to avoid Lebanon, South Yemen, Angola, Uganda, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, if possible.

Choosing a destination can be a difficult decision for adventurous travelers. In the wake of recent events, common sense should be the guide as to where to go. Avoiding countries afflicted by internal strife is not necessarily succumbing to terrorist tactics, but may be a wise decision.

American travelers do have a method for fighting back against international terrorists. The passport can be an effective tool to put economic pressure on countries who support terrorism with their actions or lack of action. Countries whose economies rely heavily on tourism, for example Greece and Italy, can be affected. By avoiding countries that refuse to enforce proper safety measures or those that allow captured terrorists to escape justice, Americans can express their opposition to such indifference to or complicity with internation-

al terrorism. Even though the travel advisory has been lifted, Greece still feels the impact of recent events.

Traveling abroad is still safe and should be enjoyable. Of the 24.7 million Americans who traveled to foreign lands in 1985, only 161 were injured by terrorists. Statistics for 1985 confirm that the probability of becoming a fatality of terrorism is literally less than one in a million. There is a greater probability of being killed on the way to the airport in an auto accident than at the hands of terrorists in an airport attack.

To put the threat into perspective, the probability of dying in a fall at home is 276 times greater than in a terrorist attack. For every American who was fatally wounded by terrorists in 1985, 25 Americans drowned in their own home.

International terrorism should be a concern for the American traveler. However, with a little common sense, Americans can continue to travel safely. By avoiding countries that directly or indirectly give aid to terrorists, Americans can enjoy their travel, defend their democratic integrity, and demonstrate their contempt for unacceptable behavior.

—by *John N. Tenuta*

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FIRST CLASS

(NEWSPAPER — EXPEDITE)

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Charles Krauthammer

Government As Rescue Squad

When Lyndon Johnson sent the Marines into the Dominican Republic in 1965, the official justification was to safeguard and evacuate endangered Americans. To no one's surprise, our boys stayed on a bit to put down a communist threat and install a friendly (and, mind you, a democratic) government. That is how we used to do things: when for traditional geopolitical reasons we needed to intervene, the rescue of Americans was a convenient pretext.

Rescue is a pretext no more. It has become an end in itself, a primary, obsessive end of American diplomacy. In the process, American foreign policy has become a slave to hostages. From the Vietnam POWs to the *Mayaguez*, from the Iranian to the TWA hostages, from Nicholas Daniloff to David Jacobsen, American diplomacy has moved to an astonishing degree from the traditional pursuit of national interest to the rescue of individuals. We have become an international rescue squad.

And now, with the McFarlane mission, the individualization of American foreign policy reaches its apex. Iran has revealed that, in September, President Reagan sent Robert McFarlane and four others on a bizarre diplomatic mission to Tehran. According to the speaker of the Iranian parliament, they came bearing Irish passports, a Bible, a cake in the shape of a key (it never reached its destination: hungry revolutionary guards

polished it off at the airport)—and a plane-load of weapons.

Which brings us to the bizarre part: the deal being discussed. In exchange for helping to "curb terrorism" and release American hostages held in Lebanon, the United States helps Iran get spare parts for its war against Iraq. Now, nothing would be more destructive to American interests in the Persian Gulf than an Iranian victory over Iraq. And nothing prevents that outcome more than Iran's technological inferiority. The high-tech weapons bought by the shah are on the shelf for lack of spare parts. Restoring the flow could be a crucial factor in helping Iran win the war.

Which is exactly why the mullahs are swallowing their hatred for the Great Satan and offering to deal. (The mullahs, also desperate for money, are demanding \$500 million in frozen assets and U.S. help in raising oil prices.) After six years, they are just short of toppling Iraq. Any marginal boost to their war effort could be decisive.

For the United States, preventing Islamic fanaticism from sweeping through the Persian Gulf is a crucial national interest. And yet, as a ransom for hostages and protection money against future terrorism, we are considering altering our policy, tilting toward Iran and thus jeopardizing that interest. (And more than just considering. The Post reports that the release of three American hostages in Lebanon over the past 14 months followed secret shipments of military cargo to Iran.) Such a capitulation would constitute an appalling act of dereliction.

Easy for me to say. What if I had a loved one being held hostage in Beirut? Wouldn't I be screaming for the government to do anything necessary to get the hostages back? Of course, I would. Families are right to use every instrument they can to force government to capitulate.

Which is why hostage families should not make foreign policy. Victims' families don't decide the punishment of *domestic* criminals. Courts do that. Courts were invented so that the general interest (it is "The People"—not "The Victim's Family"—v. John Doe) would replace private vengeance. Diplomacy was invented to secure the general safety of the nation, not the safety of individuals.

Why has our diplomacy been turned on its head? To a certain extent, all societies are concerned about rescuing individuals. (The urge is particularly compelling, and most justified, when the individuals are POWs and others captured in service to country.) All the more so in America, where individualism is a uniquely powerful creed. But these are still insufficient explanations for the rescue fixation of American foreign policy of the last 15 years.

The power of television is, of course, one factor. On video, such abstractions as national interest or collective security have no meaning. They cannot be represented in pictures. A grieving family can.

More important, however, is leadership, a failure of leadership. It takes courage to risk the safety of visible, countable individuals in the name of some larger, national purpose. Wartime leaders—Lincoln and Eisenhower—had precisely that kind of courage. Courage is not to be confused with callousness. Preferring nation over individual was a decision they made with great agony. But they made it.

We are unwilling to. And so long as we are, America will remain hostage, by choice. In exchange for considerations that include shipments of military equipment to Iran, three American hostages have been released in Lebanon during the past 14 months. During the past two months, three new Americans hostages have been seized in the streets of Beirut. This is commerce without end.

NEW YORK TIMES 6 NOVEMBER 1986 Pg.1

Internal Strife Stirs Iran to Rethink Foreign Policy

By ELAINE SCIOLINO

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Nov. 5 — The war with Iraq and a desperate economic situation have intensified the internal turmoil in Iran, prompting Iranian leaders to rethink some aspects of foreign policy, according to diplomats and experts on Iran.

In addition, these experts say that some Iranian leaders may be questioning the wisdom of giving unlimited support to radical Islamic groups abroad, and that a campaign has been stepped up to discredit Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, the designated successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian spiritual leader. Mr. Montazeri is a passionate promoter of exporting revolution.

"Because of very low reserves in hard currency and gold, the regime is in a tight economic bind," said Shahrough Akhavi, professor of government at the University of South Carolina. "Iran needs arms; it needs to sell its oil, and for these reasons it may be trying to project a better image abroad."

As evidence of flexibility in Iranian policy, some experts cite several recent developments. These include the arrest last month of the head of the organization charged with exporting Iran's revolution, the settlement last week of a dispute involving a \$1 billion loan to France, and Iran's key role in August in helping to negotiate an agreement in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

In addition, the experts said that if Iran aided in the release of the American hostage David P. Jacobsen in Lebanon on Sunday, as reports suggest, that might indicate a willingness to have quiet direct contacts with the United States to facilitate shipments of arms, and not to improve relations.

The Reagan Administration said today that it was pursuing through many channels the release of the Americans held in Lebanon. A senior Administration official confirmed that the United States was working with other countries to try to free the hostages and refused to rule out that Iran might be one of them. [Page A10.]

The experts on Iran warned against attributing too much importance to the reported visit to Iran by Robert C.

McFarlane, the former American National Security Adviser.

"The Iranians may have only been trying to get from the Americans the arms and spare parts paid for before the revolution that were never delivered," said Shaul Bakhash, a professor of history at George Mason University who writes extensively on Iran. "It certainly doesn't signal a willingness to improve relations with the United States."

But Iran's internal situation remains unclear to outside political analysts with little access inside the country, and making conclusions about what happens behind the closed doors of Ayatollah Khomeini's home in the Teheran suburbs is a risky business.

Experts agree that the various moves coincide with an increasingly public power struggle inside Iran that has been reflected in recent months in policy decisions, in shifts in personnel and in official statements. Conflicting statements by Iranian leaders on whether Iran would be willing to negotiate with the United States to help free hostages believed held by Shiite extremists in Lebanon is only the most recent example.

Although it is unlikely that these developments put Ayatollah Montazeri's succession in doubt, it is becoming more apparent, the experts said, that he will be unable to govern with the same authority as Ayatollah Khomeini and may have to share power with other clerics.

The arrest of Mehdi Hashemi, the brother of Ayatollah Montazeri's son-in-law, who headed the powerful Bureau for Liberation Movements Abroad, and other Montazeri loyalists on charges including murder, kidnapping and illegal possession of weapons, is seen by some experts as an attempt to curtail Ayatollah Montazeri's influence in foreign policy.

Advocate of Exporting Revolution

While pursuing a moderate policy at home, Ayatollah Montazeri has advocated exporting the Iranian revolution. He meets regularly with Lebanese Shiite leaders during their pilgrimages to Iran and has succeeded in channeling money, weapons and other support for various Islamic movements.

"These arrests are related to the running debate over who should control Iran's foreign policy," Mr. Bakhash said. "There is no doubt they discredit Montazeri's particular line and weaken him politically, but it is less a struggle over succession than an argument over

policy."

Mr. Hashemi, a protégé of Ayatollah Montazeri with followers in the Baalbek area of Lebanon, ran an Isfahan-based operation that enjoyed virtual independence in its training and proselytizing of Moslem fundamentalists from around the world.

Two members of Parliament and other Iranians, including Ahmed Montazeri, who is believed to be a distant relative of the Ayatollah, were arrested with Mr. Hashemi. Iranian sources said rumors were untrue that Ayatollah Montazeri's son was also arrested.

No Universal Backing

In addition, Ayatollah Montazeri's criticism of Government-run industry, his support of private property and his appeal for an end to persecution of "liberals and moderates" does not sit well with younger radicals who favor sweeping economic and social changes. He has never enjoyed the universal backing of the ruling Council of Experts that appointed him as Ayatollah Khomeini's successor, and he never received the backing of the senior so-called grand ayatollahs, who oppose the idea of one cleric as political head of state.

But no evidence supports rumors inside Iran that Ayatollah Montazeri had submitted his resignation to Ayatollah Khomeini, when the elder cleric summoned him to Teheran after the Hashemi arrest. Iranian scholars say Ayatollah Montazeri has been designated the next spiritual leader of Iran and cannot reject it.

Similarly, experts on Iran say nothing substantiates rumors that Ayatollah Khomeini suffered a severe heart attack and cannot function in day-to-day politics. They said that only the Iranian leader could have written recent letters attributed to him and acted with swiftness and authority against Mr. Hashemi's group.

Nowhere has debate over policy been more apparent than in determining Iran's strategy in its war with Iraq, now in its seventh year. "This is a time of extraordinary turmoil and behind the scenes infighting inside Iran," said Gary Sick, author of a recent book, "All Fall Down," on Iran's revolution and the hostage crisis. "All the signs from the outside suggest there is a great deal of internal dispute, largely about the war and how it is to be fought," said Mr. Sick, who was on the National Security Council during the Iranian Revolution and the seizure in 1979 of the United States Embassy in Teheran.



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Abraham D. Sofaer

TERRORISM AND THE LAW

Terrorism poses important political and diplomatic challenges. It is designed to call attention, through the use of violence, to the causes espoused by terrorists, and to bring about changes in policy favorable to those causes. The United States and its allies—and all other affected nations—must deal with this threat to civilized order with all appropriate measures, ranging from diplomatic to military.

One potential means for dealing with terrorism is law. Americans are particularly attracted to the law as a means for repressing violence, and are committed domestically and internationally to using law to control criminal conduct and to resolve disputes. They invoke the law almost instinctively, and repeatedly, assuming that it regulates international conduct and, in particular, provides a system for bringing terrorists to justice.

Recent terrorist incidents have led to many efforts to use the law, virtually all of which have failed. The law has a poor record in dealing with international terrorism. Some terrorists are killed or captured during the course of their crimes, but few of those who evade these consequences are afterward found and arrested. The terrorist who is prosecuted is likely to be released far earlier than his sentence should require, often in exchange for hostages taken in a subsequent terrorist episode.

The time has come to ask, frankly and honestly, why international terrorism is so loudly condemned, and yet so prevalent. What good is the law in fighting international terrorism? Why has it failed?

II

One reason for the law's ineffectiveness is that terrorism, in essence, is criminal activity. In applying law domestically, gov-

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ernments seek to punish and deter crime as effectively as possible. But they recognize that law cannot eliminate crime. They can expect even less of the law in dealing with international terrorism. The world has no international police force or judicial system.

The stock response to complaints about the law's failure to deal effectively with terrorism is that *more* laws are needed. That is a misleading answer. Important gaps do exist in the legal structure that governs terrorist acts, and the Reagan Administration is working with Congress and with other nations to close them. For example, the U.S. government lacks a domestic legal basis to prosecute the terrorists who killed an American citizen, Leon Klinghoffer, during the October 1985 *Achille Lauro* cruise ship hijacking, or the terrorists who killed four American civilians on a hijacked Trans-World Airlines flight earlier that year. The Senate has passed a statute establishing jurisdiction for terrorist murders of Americans, and its adoption by the House would be welcome. Americans must not deceive themselves, however, that new laws, closing gaps, will overcome the problems that render law ineffective. Recent events have demonstrated that, even when laws clearly govern particular conduct, they are often disregarded or otherwise fail to achieve their purpose.

The reasons for the law's failure tolerably to control terrorism go much deeper than the absence of law enforcement authority or mechanisms. International law and cooperation in less controversial areas have often proved reasonably effective. In the area of terrorism, however, the law has failed to punish and deter those who use violence to advance their political goals.

Civilized nations have tried to control international terrorism by condemning it, by treating it as piracy, by prosecuting terrorists under the laws of affected states, by creating international norms establishing as criminal certain acts wherever committed, and by cooperating through extradition and other devices in aiding nations attacked by terrorists. An appraisal of these efforts leads to a painful conclusion: the law applicable to terrorism is not merely flawed, it is perverse. The rules and declarations seemingly designed to curb terrorism have regularly included provisions that demonstrate the absence of international agreement on the propriety of regulating terrorist activity. On some issues, the law leaves political violence unregulated. On other issues the law is ambivalent, providing a

basis for conflicting arguments as to its purpose. At its worst the law has in important ways actually served to legitimize international terror, and to protect terrorists from punishment as criminals. These deficiencies are not the product of negligence or mistake. They are intentional.

III

Americans too readily assume that others agree that at least certain aspects of international terror are unacceptable. While many fanatics obviously approve of terror, less recognized and more significant is the fact that the acceptance of terror is far more widespread. Indeed, many nations regard terrorism as a legitimate means of warfare.

The United Nations General Assembly began devoting special attention to the subject of terrorism after two especially heinous actions. On May 30, 1972, Japanese terrorists, working with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, attacked civilian passengers at Lod Airport in Israel with automatic weapons, killing 28 and wounding 78. On September 5, 1972, terrorists from the Black September organization murdered 11 members of the Israeli Olympic Team in Munich.

On September 8, 1972, U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim asked for inclusion in the General Assembly agenda of an item entitled "Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms." He urged "that all concerned turn away from senseless and destructive violence," and noted that the world community should continue "to exert its utmost influence in seeking peaceful ways" to find solutions "for the problems underlying such acts of terrorism."

The secretary-general's statement evoked angry opposition, which took the immediate form of protests against considering terrorism without considering its causes. The secretary-general reiterated his request on September 20, but acceded to the pressures by adding that it was no good considering terrorism "without at the same time considering the underlying situations which give rise to terrorism and violence in many parts of the world." He assured the protesters that he did not intend "to affect principles enunciated by the General Assembly regarding colonial and dependent peoples seeking independence and liberation."

The two concessions made by Mr. Waldheim may at first glance seem innocuous. In the United Nations, however, they

were significant. Attributing acts of terrorism to injustice and frustration obviously tends to excuse, if not justify, those acts. This is especially so when the causes are all assumed to be sympathetic. The language concerning efforts to seek "independence" and "liberation" also implied justification for terrorist acts. These concepts related to the principles adopted in previous U.N. resolutions supporting "self-determination" and wars of national liberation, in the pursuit of which oppressed people were authorized to resort to all available means, including armed struggle.

A General Committee debate on Waldheim's proposal took up the question of the causes of terrorism, as well as the concepts of self-determination and wars of national liberation. Many nations opposed adding terrorism to the agenda and strongly suggested their support for certain terrorist actions. For example, the representative from Mauritania said that the expression "terrorist" can "hardly be held to apply to persons who were denied the most elementary human rights, dignity, freedom and independence, and whose countries objected to foreign occupation." Citing situations in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, he said "such peoples could not be blamed for committing desperate acts which in themselves were reprehensible; rather, the real culprits were those who were responsible for causing such desperation."

In the General Assembly the item was amended to include Waldheim's language on the causes of terrorism and the matter was referred to the U.N. Sixth Committee, on legal affairs. There the representative from Guinea, among others, very clearly supported the right of national liberation movements "to undertake any type of action to ensure that their countries attained independence." The Cuban representative rejected any proposal of "rules for the purpose of assigning legal limits" to revolutionary armed struggle. "The methods of combat used by national liberation movements could not be declared illegal while the policy of terror unleashed against certain peoples was declared legitimate." The Madagascar representative could not have been clearer:

Acts of terrorism inspired by base motives of personal gain were to be condemned. Acts of political terrorism, on the other hand, undertaken to vindicate hallowed rights recognized by the United Nations, were praiseworthy. It was, of course, regrettable that certain acts in the latter category affected innocent persons.

And the Algerian representative presented the philosophical rationale used since time immemorial to justify terror:

His delegation did not agree with the statement in the Secretariat's report that the legitimacy of a cause did not in itself justify recourse to certain forms of violence; those serving the cause in question should have a choice of the means to be used.

These assertions have been repeated in one form or another in the years since that first debate. During this period, the General Assembly passed seven resolutions on terrorism and its causes. The first, adopted on December 18, 1972, had little to say about the type of terrorism which had led to the subject's being placed on the agenda. It expressed "deep concern" over increased acts of violence that took innocent lives or jeopardized fundamental freedoms, and invited states to consider joining relevant conventions. But the resolution was a victory for those who supported the right to use all available measures to advance the ends of self-determination and wars of national liberation. The resolution in fact condemned only one thing: "the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien regimes."

A resolution on terrorism adopted in 1977 added another important element. It invited the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism to study *first* the underlying causes of terror, and then to recommend measures to deal with acts of terrorism. A 1979 resolution for the first time condemned acts of terror, but it referred to the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention, which seek to give groups fighting wars of national liberation the protection of the laws of war. Finally, in December 1985, after a further series of terrorist acts, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that "unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism." This resolution contains several provisions calling for international cooperation against terrorism. At the same time, however, it reaffirmed each people's inalienable right to self-determination, and the legitimacy of struggles against colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination. The debates preceding and following the adoption of this resolution make clear that many states continue to believe that "wars of national liberation" justify or excuse terrorist acts. For example, the Angolan representative, echoing the comments of the delegates from Algeria, Bulgaria, Kuwait and Sri Lanka, among others,

made it clear that "acts of terrorism could not be equated, under any pretext, with the acts of those who were fighting colonial and racist oppression and for their freedom and independence."

The wide acceptance of the premise that terrorist acts can be lawful in the pursuit of proper goals is an uneasy first lesson. The United States of course also recognizes that oppressed people are sometimes justified in resorting to force, but only if properly exercised. For example, such uses of force must be consistent with the laws of war and should not be directed at innocent civilians, include hostage-taking, or involve torture. In contrast, the U.N. debates and resolutions relating to terrorism do not suggest principled limits on the use of force, or any reasoned, fair-minded basis for determining which peoples are entitled to wage wars of national liberation. The result is a clear signal to all that those groups deemed by the majority to be oppressed will be free legally to use force, and therefore cannot fairly be called terrorists. In other words, acts of terrorism by such groups are not wrong, and the law has no proper role in punishing or deterring such acts.

IV

The legitimacy of political violence is a notion that has also worked its way deep into international law enforcement. Most countries have treaties that obligate them to extradite to other states persons accused of committing, in those states, the crimes associated with terrorism, such as murder, hijacking, bombing, armed assault and robbery. Yet extradition requests are frequently refused, often because the offense is characterized as "political" conduct which the law exempts from extradition.

Some relatively recent decisions, denying extradition on the ground that the charge is a "political offense," illustrate how detrimental the law can be in the battle against terrorism. In 1972 five individuals hijacked a plane in the United States, extorted \$1 million and flew to Algeria, where they were received as political militants. In 1976 they made their way to France, which refused to extradite the five, although they had presented no evidence of political motivation beyond the claim that they were escaping racial segregation in America and were associated with the "black liberation movement." More recently, the United States failed to obtain the extradition of Abu Abbas, thought to have masterminded the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, from two countries through which he passed follow-

ing the incident (Italy and Yugoslavia). Despite U.S. assertions of their treaty obligation to hold Abbas, these states released him, Yugoslavia claiming that he was entitled to diplomatic immunity because he carried an Iraqi diplomatic passport.

Some decisions by U.S. courts are equally disturbing. In 1959 a federal court refused to extradite Andrija Artukovic to Yugoslavia for the alleged malicious murders of 200,000 Croats in concentration camps, after determining that these murders were "political." Some 27 years later the United States successfully deported Artukovic, and he is currently standing trial in Yugoslavia. In recent cases U.S. courts have refused to extradite four alleged Irish Republican Army gunmen on the ground that an uprising exists in Northern Ireland, which makes crimes in furtherance of the revolt "political."

How did the United States get to the point of giving sanctuary to terrorists who kill people in order to get their way in a democracy such as the United Kingdom? Or to an alleged mass murderer? The story is both interesting and instructive.

The "political offense" claim as a defense against extradition has noble roots. It developed in the period of the French and American Revolutions, and reflected the value the new democracies placed upon political freedom. Thomas Jefferson commented, for example, that "unsuccessful strugglers against tyranny have been the chief martyrs of treason laws in all countries." At that time political offenses were associated with acts against the security of a state, such as treason, espionage and sedition.

The concept was soon expanded, however, to so-called relative political offenses—ordinary crimes committed in a political context or with political motivation. An important early case on this point is *In re Castioni*, decided in 1891, in which the English courts denied extradition for a killing that occurred in the midst of a demonstration against the government of a Swiss canton that refused to submit its new constitution to a popular vote. The shooting served no purpose. But the court found it "political" because it was incidental to and a part of a political disturbance. Even if an act is "cruel and against all reason," the court held, its perpetrator is protected if he acted "for the purpose of furthering and in furtherance of a political rising." *Castioni* was quickly qualified in England, when in 1894 one of the many anarchists of the period, Théodule Meunier, was extradited to France for placing bombs in a Parisian café and

an army barracks. But it took hold in the United States and elsewhere.

In 1894, the same year *In re Meunier* was decided, a U.S. court refused to extradite high officials of El Salvador accused of murders in their unsuccessful effort to retain power (*In re Ezeta*). Relying on *Castioni*, the court held that all acts associated with an uprising were political offenses. The court accepted without discussion the premise that the doctrine was politically neutral, and that protection should be given equally to democrats and dictators. It also explicitly rejected the notion that the offender's conduct in killing noncombatants could disqualify him from the doctrine's protection. During hostilities, said the court, "crimes may have been committed by the contending forces of the most atrocious and inhuman character, and still the perpetrators of such crimes escape punishment as fugitives beyond the reach of extradition."

The ruling in *Ezeta* had some support in U.S. and foreign practice during the nineteenth century. Granting asylum to revolutionaries and victims of revolutions was seen as enlightened. That was the period during which republican government first became a widespread reality. But the political-offense doctrine has another side. Several incidents, diplomatic decisions and rulings during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries indicate that the United States and other countries have taken their particular interests and political ideals into account in formulating the doctrine's contours. This has led to certain limitations of the concept of a political offense.

A particularly dramatic instance followed the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Despite the political nature of the crime, the United States sought and obtained assurances from Great Britain and Italy respectively for the apprehension abroad of John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt, one of Booth's suspected conspirators. Surratt was actually captured in Egypt and sent back to the United States on an American navy vessel. The need to protect heads of state was recognized by other nations as well, and is now a widely accepted qualification to the political-offense doctrine.

During the American Civil War the United States seized in Morocco, with the acquiescence of the Moorish governor, two Confederate sailors who had gone ashore to obtain coal. An objection was raised that the sailors should have been allowed to assert the political-offense doctrine. Secretary of State William Henry Seward rejected the argument, reasoning that the

men were "taken in the very act of war against this government." Similarly, in 1946 France and Belgium agreed to surrender to each other individuals convicted of war-related crimes committed during World War II. One offender sought to defeat a Belgian extradition request by claiming that the spying and assassination with which he was charged were political offenses. The French courts rejected the argument because France could not be deemed a neutral on the issue: "the offense was committed in time of war both against an ally and against France, whose interests were linked."

The more recent problem of aircraft hijacking demonstrates how the doctrine can still be applied in accordance with U.S. national interests. During the 1950s, despite America's strong opposition to aircraft hijackings, the United States and its Western allies refused requests from Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., Poland, Yugoslavia and other communist regimes for the return of persons who hijacked planes, trains and ships to escape. But when aircraft hijacking reached epidemic proportions in the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States determined that hijacking of aircraft carrying passengers was too serious a problem and too great a threat to the safety of innocent passengers to be tolerated. The United States reexamined its policy and "concluded that the hijacker of a commercial aircraft carrying passengers for hire should be returned regardless of any claim he was fleeing political persecution."

Thus, the United States suggested in 1969, during consideration of the Hague Convention on Hijacking, that the political-offense exception should be eliminated for that crime. The suggestion was rejected and the political-offense exception was retained, however, in both the Hague hijacking convention and the Montreal sabotage convention. Nations therefore remain authorized (though not required) to refuse, on political grounds, to extradite suspects in such universally recognized crimes as hijacking and sabotage.

For several years the United States has been prepared to revise its treaties with democratic allies to narrow the political-offense exception and make it inapplicable to crimes of violence and breaches of antiterrorist conventions. In 1983, for example, the United States signed a revised treaty with Italy that narrowed the political-offense exception to exclude, in certain circumstances, offenses covered by a multilateral agreement, such as the hostage-taking or aircraft hijacking conventions. The United States and its people are opposed to rebellions,

revolutions and political assassination in democracies, since their political systems offer a peaceful means to seek change. Thus, revolutionaries should not be encouraged in a democracy by the treatment of their violent acts as acceptable political conduct. A doctrine born to reflect the United States' belief in freedom should not be permitted to serve the interests of those seeking to impose undemocratic views through force.

To advance this objective, the Reagan Administration recently signed a Supplemental Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, which narrows the political-offense doctrine to exclude most violent crimes. Similar treaties with other nations are being negotiated. But the proposed treaty with Great Britain has run into fierce opposition in the Senate. Intense lobbying and strong, emotional concern about the Irish problem may lead the Senate to refuse to ratify this treaty. That would be a grave setback. It would make the United States no better than the other nations that have their favorite terrorists. If the United States fails to reject absolutely the use of force against a democracy that is its closest ally, it will lose credibility in urging other states to cooperate in its own efforts against terrorism.

v

The law against piracy provides another illustration of how international law has failed adequately to control politically motivated crimes. The *Achille Lauro* incident presented the question whether the acts of the hijackers of that vessel constituted piracy "under the law of nations," and were therefore felonies under U.S. law. The hijackers stole money and jewelry from the ship's passengers, but their primary purposes were political. They were allegedly seeking to commit acts of violence in Israel, where the vessel was scheduled to dock, and after taking control they demanded that Israel release certain terrorists it had imprisoned. Is such an enterprise "piracy"?

The traditional law of piracy could have been one vehicle for obtaining jurisdiction over terrorists, with fewer loopholes for political crimes than recent conventions. Piracy law has long been inapplicable to state vessels and recognized belligerents when they engaged in lawful acts of war. Those who believed that belligerents should not be treated as pirates reasoned that they were the enemies only of a particular government, not of mankind. This recognized exclusion contained a crucial limitation: it applied only if the insurgents

confined themselves to depredations against the country with which they were at war. Where individuals engaged in an insurgency attacked nonbelligerents, the exclusion did not apply and the rebels were treated as pirates.

The modern law of piracy purports to modify significantly these traditional rules. The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas define piracy as any illegal act of violence, detention or depredation committed against a ship "for private ends." The private-ends requirement was used deliberately to exclude acts with public or political motives. The rapporteur for the International Law Commission, which drafted the Geneva high seas convention, explained that "he had defined as piracy acts of violence or depredation committed for private ends, thus leaving outside the scope of the definition *all wrongful acts perpetrated for a political purpose.*"

The approach of these two conventions would substantially contract the reach of the law of piracy. The "private ends" requirement, at least as described by the rapporteur, would expand the traditional "insurgency" exclusion to cover all persons claiming to be politically motivated. Moreover, the exclusion's traditional limitation to acts committed against a country with which the insurgents are at war appears to have been either overlooked or abandoned. As a result, the conventions arguably place all politically motivated acts outside the universal jurisdiction of sovereign states.

Conceivably, the conventions could be read to cover indiscriminate attacks on civilians, or attacks motivated by race or nationality, having no ordinary relationship to an insurgency, such as the murder of Mr. Klinghoffer. But the terrorists involved in the *Achille Lauro* affair would no doubt claim they were acting politically, even in killing Klinghoffer, and hence could not be called pirates under the conventions.

The "private-ends" requirement undermines some positive achievements contained in the two conventions. The piracy provisions in the conventions were intended to confirm the existence of universal jurisdiction for any nation to capture and punish all persons who committed wrongful acts on the high seas or in the air, or in any other place where no state has jurisdiction. In fact, the conventions go further than merely permitting countries to act. Both contain an article providing that "all States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy" and the commentary to the Geneva

Convention on the High Seas states that "any State having an opportunity of taking measures against piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it by international law." But by narrowing the definition of piracy, these conventions exclude from the international duty to repress piracy "to the fullest possible extent" all politically motivated attacks on vessels and aircraft.

VI

The exclusion of terrorist acts from the reach of legal prohibitions is not the only means by which law has been employed to legitimize terrorism. Another approach has been to secure for terrorism a legal status that obscures or denies its fundamentally criminal nature. The laws of war mark the line between what is criminal and what is an act of combat. A person who kills someone is normally guilty of homicide. If he does it during combat, however, he is a soldier and can only be held as a prisoner of war, and may be punished only if the killing violates the laws of war. Radical groups responsible for terrorist acts have long sought legitimacy by securing recognition as combatants under the laws of war.

The effort of radical groups to acquire legal legitimacy had a significant success in the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, which met between 1974 and 1977. The conference, under the auspices of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), was called to improve the laws of war set forth in the Geneva conventions of 1949. It produced two additional protocols to the Geneva conventions: Protocol I dealing with international, and Protocol II with non-international, armed conflict. The United States participated in the Geneva conference and signed the protocols, but the President has decided not to seek Senate ratification of Protocol I, and has decided to seek several reservations and understandings as conditions to the ratification of Protocol II.

The ICRC and the conference developed many constructive ideas to help minimize the suffering of combatants and non-combatants in armed conflict. But from the beginning of the conference, an effort was made to extend the law of international armed conflicts to cover activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other radical groups, many of whom were accorded observer status.

The first substantive address, by then-President Moktar Ould

Daddah of Mauritania, urged the conference to recognize "certain values and elementary rights which went beyond the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," because millions were "still under colonial oppression in the African continent, while international Zionism had placed the Palestinian population in an impossible situation." He asked the conference to consider, not only effects, but causes as well, and to recognize "there were such things as just wars." Daddah said, "It was quite obvious that it was the Zionists who wanted to throw the Arabs into the sea. . . . National liberation movements did not want to shed blood, only to secure recognition of their rights."

The Geneva diplomatic conference adopted in its first session what is now Article 1(4) of Protocol I, with 11 of 99 nations, including the United States, abstaining, and only Israel dissenting. This article would make the laws of international armed conflict applicable to "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-determination." Never before has the applicability of the laws of war been made to turn on the purported aims of a conflict. Moreover, this provision obliterated the traditional distinction between international and non-international armed conflict. Any group within a national boundary claiming to be fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation or a racist regime can now argue that it is protected by the laws of war, and that its members are entitled to prisoner-of-war status for their otherwise criminal acts. Members of radical groups in the United States have already tried to do so in federal courts.

The ICRC and most Western nations expressed no admiration for this article. Some contend, however, that as a result of the new rule humanitarian law now governs the actions of national liberation groups. While the PLO and other "freedom fighters" may now claim the benefits of the laws of war, they thereby became bound to obey these rules. This, in some eyes, is seen as an advance for humanitarian law.

In fact, radical groups rarely have the resources and facilities to provide the protections for prisoners of war required by the laws of war. Even if they had the resources, these groups have no inclination to provide such protections, or to abide by the law's limitations on the actions they may take, particularly against noncombatants. In fact, the supporters of Article 1(4), no doubt recognizing that the PLO and some other "freedom fighters" have concentrated their guns, bombs and rockets on

civilian noncombatants, obtained an additional protection for these groups. Article 44(1) provides that, once a group qualifies as a national liberation movement, protected by Article 1(4), no conduct by individual members of the group can lead to the loss of its status as a protected organization. The rationale for this rule is that individuals should be punished separately for their conduct. The effect is to preserve the right of such organizations to be treated as combatants, even if they routinely engage in acts of terror against civilians.

The Geneva diplomatic conference went even further in accommodating the needs of radical groups, at the expense of the civilian population that humanitarian law is intended to protect. A fundamental premise of the Geneva conventions is that, to earn the right to protection as military fighters, soldiers must distinguish themselves from civilians by wearing uniforms and carrying their weapons openly. Thus, under the 1949 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, irregular forces achieve combatant (and, if captured, prisoner-of-war) status when they (1) are commanded by a person responsible for subordinates, (2) bear a fixed, distinctive insignia recognizable from a distance, (3) carry weapons openly, and (4) conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Fighters who attempt to take advantage of civilians by hiding among them in civilian dress, with their weapons out of view, lose their claim to be treated as soldiers. The law thus attempts to encourage fighters to avoid placing civilians in unconscionable jeopardy.

The terrorist groups that attended the conference had no intention of modifying their conduct to satisfy these traditional rules of engagement. Terrorists are not soldiers. They don't wear uniforms. They hide among civilians and, after striking, they try to escape once again into civilian groups. Instead of modifying their conduct, therefore, the terrorist groups succeeded in modifying the law.

Article 44(3) of Protocol I recognizes that "to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack." But the provision goes on to state "that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities, an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself." In such situations, "he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided . . . he

carries his arms openly: (a) during each military engagement, and (b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate." Furthermore, the section provides that "acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as perfidious"—for example, feigning protected status prior to a military engagement by using signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations, or nations that are not parties to the conflict.

These changes in traditional rules undermine the notion that the protocol has secured an advantage for humanitarian law by granting revolutionary groups protection as combatants. Under the Geneva conventions, a terrorist could not hide among civilians until just before an attack. Under Protocol I, he may do so; he need only carry his arms openly while he is visibly engaged in a deployment or while he is in an actual engagement.

These changes have more than merely symbolic significance. The radical groups represented at the conference lobbied hard for them and succeeded. After the vote on Protocol I, the PLO's representative "expressed his deep satisfaction at the result of the vote, by which the international community had reconfirmed the legitimacy of the struggles of peoples exercising their right to self-determination." He then specifically cited Article 1(4) as authority for the PLO's actions in Israel.

VII

Protocol I's recognition of wars of national liberation recently received rhetorical and symbolic reinforcement in what one would have thought was a most unlikely place: the U.N. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. The convention, adopted by the General Assembly in 1979, makes criminal the taking of hostages, requires nations to enact implementing legislation, and imposes an extradite-or-prosecute obligation. Nearly 30 countries, including the United States, are currently parties to the convention. One extraordinary provision *precludes* extradition where the suspect is likely to be unfairly treated, thus providing a ready excuse for refusing to extradite. But the obligation to prosecute remains. On the whole, the convention establishes a useful scheme for combating hostage-taking by terrorists, a goal that the U.N. Security Council reaffirmed on December 18, 1985, by the adoption of a reso-

lution condemning unequivocally all acts of hostage-taking and abduction.

A review of the negotiating history of the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, however, reveals the deep division over the propriety of terrorist acts. The negotiations began in 1977 and were completed in 1979. At the outset, a number of countries sought to exclude from the convention hostage-taking by national liberation movements. Some states, including Libya, went further and sought not only to exempt such movements, but to define hostage-taking to include the act of subjecting persons to colonialism, racism or foreign domination. In other words, all the people living in a country determined to have a racist government would be deemed to be hostages, and the government to be a hostage-taker.

These radical proposals were eventually rejected during the 1979 session. Advocates of political violence did, however, win a significant victory. The nations that opposed excluding liberation movements from the coverage of the convention were required to accept a reference, in Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva conventions, to the treatment of national liberation fighters as combatants. This reaffirmation took the form of Article 12 of the hostage-taking convention, which provides that, to the extent the 1949 Geneva conventions and the 1977 additional protocols impose substantively identical obligations with regard to an instance of hostage-taking, the hostage-taking convention will not apply to the armed conflicts ("in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-determination") specified in Article 1(4) of Protocol I.

Article 12 of the hostage-taking convention does not, in my view, create a legal gap in coverage. All instances of hostage-taking remain subject to an obligation by the state in which a hostage-taker is found either to extradite or to prosecute. Nevertheless, the states that sought this provision succeeded in using the hostage-taking convention to achieve a rhetorical and political victory. They can now argue that the structure and language of Article 12 represent some measure of acceptance that members of national liberation movements are combatants, not terrorists, since hostage-taking by such movements are covered by the laws of war and excluded from the convention. The delegate from Yugoslavia, for instance, expressed the view that the committee considering the convention had,

by its action, "reaffirmed . . . that the struggle of the liberation movements was legal, that it was based on provisions of international law of war and that it could not be confused with the criminal activity of irresponsible persons and terrorist groups and organizations."

It is comically bizarre to suggest, as Article 12 requires in specified circumstances, that persons like Abu Abbas must be treated as wayward soldiers, rather than as international criminals. That the laws of war and the laws against hostage-taking have been structured to permit that result reflects the strength of influence terrorist organizations and their supporters now wield in international law.

VIII

Not all diplomatic efforts to quell terrorism have been as negative as the foregoing. For example, the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, is generally considered a successful negotiation by the West. It is interesting, however, to examine the manner in which certain countries, after failing to change the text of this convention, managed nonetheless to obtain concessions that serve their purpose of circumventing its clear and absolute obligations.

In 1973 the U.N. General Assembly adopted the protected persons convention, and over 60 nations are currently parties, including the United States. The convention defines a class of internationally protected persons, and requires governments to make criminal certain violent acts directed against such persons or their property, and to extradite or prosecute suspected offenders found in their territory. The convention text is non-polemical, and its coverage is relatively comprehensive—not surprising when one realizes that it was drafted, negotiated and adopted by its principal beneficiaries: diplomats.

What is surprising, however, is how close the negotiations came to being derailed, and the lack of underlying consensus that the discussions reflect.

The Sixth Committee of the United Nations began considering the draft version of the protected persons convention on October 4, 1973. On November 15, when agreement had been reached on the majority of the provisions, the delegate from Mali, on behalf of a group of 36 countries, introduced a proposed additional article that caught many other delegations by surprise. The article would have made the protected persons

convention inapplicable to "peoples struggling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid in the exercise of their legitimate rights to self-determination and independence." The Mali delegate, stating a theme repeated by others, claimed the article was needed to prevent the convention from "serving as a pretext for colonial and racist regimes to intensify the suppression of the national liberation movements recognized in various United Nations decisions and resolutions." The delegate from Morocco said his delegation could not favor a convention that would protect the governmental agents of certain states "against all risks." The brutal truth is that, by implication, the proposed article advocates that the right of self-determination include the right to commit violent acts against diplomats.

This position was unacceptable to the United States as well as others. It was eventually rejected after intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations between November 15 and December 6, but on a basis that cast a pall over the exercise. The United States acquiesced in a Sixth Committee recommendation to the General Assembly that it adopt, along with the draft convention, a resolution recognizing that nothing in the protected persons convention could "in any way prejudice the exercise of the legitimate right to self-determination and independence . . . by peoples struggling against colonization, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid." In addition, Paragraph 6 of the resolution declared "that the present resolution, whose provisions are related to the amended Convention, shall always be published together with it." While these provisions cannot be considered law, they are a clear indication of what many governments believe, and of the muscle those states were able to bring to bear in getting the resolution adopted as part of a package deal.

This put the United States on notice that, in the future, other governments may rely on the resolution to circumvent the absolute obligations of the protected persons convention itself. In fact, Burundi's accession to the convention reserved the right not to apply its terms to national liberation movements, and Iraq indicated when it acceded that it intended to accord protected status to the representatives of certain national liberation movements. In short, even so seemingly neutral an issue as the protection of diplomats failed to escape the political divisiveness that pervades the world community on questions of the appropriate use of violence.

IX

The law's support for political violence has been manifested most recently in the efforts of some nations to establish doctrinal bases for curtailing the use of force against terrorists and their supporting states.

International law regulates the use of force by a country in the territories of other states, whether to capture or attack terrorists or to rescue hostages located there, or against the states themselves for sponsoring terrorists or conspiring with them in specific terrorist activities. In general, a nation may *not* enter upon another's territory without its consent. Similarly, a state may not stop, board, divert or otherwise interfere with another's vessels or aircraft without some adequate basis. Finally, the use of force against another country's territorial integrity or political independence is prohibited, except in self-defense, and any use of force must be both necessary and proportionate to the threat it addresses.

These principles have been respected by the United States. If they were applied, however, in such a manner as to preclude any use of force for any purpose, international law would serve to insulate the perpetrators of international violence from any control or punishment for their crimes. States could then continue using terrorism to accomplish their objectives with little cost or interference.

The principle of territorial sovereignty is not the only principle of law that must be weighed in considering objections against attacks on terrorists, attempts to rescue hostages and actions against countries that sponsor terrorism. States have duties to cooperate in preventing terrorists from using their territories in perpetrating criminal acts, and many governments have explicitly undertaken to extradite or prosecute terrorists guilty of hijacking, sabotage and hostage-taking. These obligations cannot be disregarded in evaluating the propriety of antiterrorist operations. Furthermore, under the U.N. Charter, just as under customary international law, victims of terrorism are not powerless to defend themselves. The charter reaffirms the *inherent* right to use force in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack.

Since the days of President James Madison, the United States has repeatedly acted against armed bands that attacked Americans and then fled, seeking sanctuary in neighboring countries unwilling or powerless to prevent or punish their acts. With

the acquiescence of the harboring state, as in the case of U.S. operations in Mexico against Pancho Villa's terrorist attacks in the early part of this century, or without such permission, as in the case of Andrew Jackson's actions to stop attacks from Spanish Florida, the United States has used its forces to bring an end to terrorist attacks on American citizens and interests.

Other nations, when confronted with terrorist attacks, have defended themselves with force. In the celebrated case of the *Caroline*, the British pushed over Niagara Falls a ship carrying some members of an armed band of New Yorkers that was in the process of supporting an insurrection in Canada. While the American government thought the British had acted too harshly, both governments agreed on the law: the use of force in self-defense is appropriate so long as it is necessary and proportional. The International Court of Justice recognized this principle in the *Corfu Channel* case, where Britain had swept mines from the channel after suffering damage to its ships. In holding Albania liable for the damages, the court reaffirmed the "well-recognized" principle that every country has an obligation "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."

As Secretary of State George Shultz has said, in the fight against terrorism as in the struggle to deter aggression:

The law is a weapon on our side and it is up to us to use it to its maximum extent. . . . [A] state which supports terrorist or subversive attacks against another state, or which supports or encourages terrorist planning and other activities within its own territory, is responsible for such attacks. Such conduct can amount to an ongoing armed aggression against the other state under international law.

Some public officials and international law experts have questioned the premise that harboring and supporting terrorists who attack a nation is a form of aggression. Others suggest that force may not be used against a government that sponsors terrorist acts. The United States has never accepted such a paralyzing view of the right to act in self-defense. Strong legal support exists for the U.S. position on these issues, as reflected in universally recognized principles of conspiracy and agency law and in several U.N. resolutions, including the Friendly Relations Declaration and the U.N. Definition of Aggression. Here, as in other areas, states and individuals opposed to U.S. policies, or to the use of force in general, are invoking law as a mask for their political interests.

The U.S. bombing raid launched against Libya on April 14, 1986, illustrated the need nations sometimes have to use force against states that sponsor terrorism. After terrorists from the Abu Nidal group attacked passengers in Rome and Vienna on December 27, 1985, killing 19 civilians, including five Americans, President Reagan clearly signaled the United States' intent to rely upon its right of self-defense. He said:

By providing material support to terrorist groups which attack U.S. citizens, Libya has engaged in armed aggression against the United States under established principles of international law, just as if he [Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi] had used its own armed forces.

Despite this clear warning, Libya deliberately arranged for at least two attacks aimed at American noncombatants and U.S. interests. One plan was to fire automatic rifles and hurl grenades at civilians lined up at the U.S. embassy in Paris. French cooperation enabled the United States to thwart this plan, and several Libyans involved were deported. The United States was not so fortunate in West Berlin. Libyans at their people's bureau (embassy) in East Germany informed their home base that a planned attack would take place on April 5. A bomb exploded at a discothèque frequented by U.S. soldiers, killing Sergeant Kenneth T. Ford and a Turkish woman, and injuring over 200 persons, including 50 Americans. Shortly thereafter, on April 6, the same people's bureau informed Tripoli of the successful attack, and assured Tripoli that the bombing could not be traced to Libya.

These communications, following Qaddafi's long history of support for terrorism, and his threats against U.S. citizens, established overwhelmingly that Libya was responsible for the attack. In addition, the President was faced with strong evidence of some 30 possible impending Libyan attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel throughout the world. The April 14 strikes were to deter these and other planned attacks.

Some governments have condemned the action against Libya, claiming to disbelieve U.S. claims that Libya attacked American citizens and was planning further attacks. Others have ignored U.S. claims, and simply characterize Reagan Administration actions as "criminal" or "brutal." They oppose the use of force, even in self-defense. But no cogent argument has been made questioning the legal principles upon which the United States has relied. A resolution condemning the United

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States was vetoed by the United States, France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council on April 21. Its adoption would have given state-sponsored terrorism its ultimate legal defense, immunizing international aggression against noncombatants from the use of force in self-defense.

Law can make clear that state-supported terrorism is illicit, and may thus serve to deter it. But terrorist-supporting nations will not surrender seriously held ambitions to expand their power and influence simply because the law is against them. Legal argument alone will not protect law-abiding nations and peoples against Qaddafi or Iran's Khomeini. Nor will the prospect for peaceful settlement of disputes with such regimes be enhanced by U.S. promises to abjure force or by unrealistic limits on its flexibility. If Americans overestimate the limits of their own tolerance, they may allow U.S. adversaries to do so as well, thereby inviting reckless activity. The policeman is apt protection against individual criminals; but national self-defense is the only protection against the criminal state.

X

The law, as presently formulated, cannot reasonably be expected effectively to repress international terrorism. International terrorism is still supported by many nations as a legitimate means of struggle against regimes deemed by them to be colonial, alien or racist. At the behest of these states, and by the acquiescence of others, international law has been systematically and intentionally fashioned to give special treatment to, or to leave unregulated, those activities that cause and are the source of most acts of international terror.

The failure of international law to control terrorism is a matter of great strategic concern. Ineffective methods for dealing with terrorists through the law will inevitably lead to antiterrorist actions more primitive and dangerous than cooperation among sovereign states, including conventional military actions in self-defense, will provide. These dangers are especially heightened with terrorism that is state-supported.

Civilized nations and peoples cannot give up on law, however frustrated they may feel by its shortcomings. In fact, the point of this essay is that law is not presently being used to counter terrorism; it has been placed very much at the service of those who embrace political violence. Our challenge is to create a broader understanding among peoples and governments to bring about a shift in the objects that international law is designed to serve.

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FIRST CLASS

(NEWSPAPER — EXPEDITE)

Terrorism

How The West Can Win

BY BENJAMIN NETANYAHU

Terrorism

The realization that wild beasts prowl our airways and waterways, that they can escape retribution by fleeing to countries that respect, indeed worship, the law of the jungle, has steadily been replacing our older conception of justice, order and accountability in international affairs.

So writes Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations, in a forthcoming book whose assertive title sums up its argument—*Terrorism: How the West Can Win* (Farrar, Straus & Giroux; \$18.95). The book grew out of a 1984 meeting of international officials and experts in Washington that explored the question: Just what can be done to stop terrorism?



Israeli Ambassador Netanyahu

The West's failure to answer the question was underscored once again last week when a terrorist bomb tore a hole in the fuselage of a TWA 727 en route from Rome to Athens. The explosion killed four American passengers, who were sucked out of the plane and fell 15,000 ft. to their death. Libya's Muammar Gaddafi disclaimed responsibility, but concern remained high that he would attempt to exact revenge—sometime,

somewhere—for the U.S. Sixth Fleet's bloodying of his forces.

Netanyahu, a former soldier, businessman and the editor of *Terrorism*, has a strong personal reason for his concern with the subject. He is the younger brother of Lieut. Colonel Jonathan Netanyahu, leader of the daring Israeli commando force that rescued all but three of the more than 100 hostages held captive aboard a skyjacked airliner at Entebbe, Uganda, in 1976. The Israelis lost only one of their men during the raid, but that was Jonathan Netanyahu, shot dead at the age of 30 by an airport guard. Ambassador Netanyahu, who organized the Jonathan Institute to fight terrorism, sees in the overall results of Entebbe a lesson to be widely applied today. Though some will surely find his prescriptions too tough and will quarrel with his refusal to give undue weight to the root causes of terrorism, the fact remains that no Israeli plane has been seized in the ten years since Entebbe. What follows is excerpts from his introduction and essay, along with a selection of brief quotes from other contributors to the book.



Lieut. Colonel Netanyahu

International terrorism is not a sporadic phenomenon born of social misery and frustration. It is rooted in the political ambitions and designs of expansionist states and the groups that serve them. Without the support of such states, international terrorism would be impossible.

Access to the media is also indispensable. First the terrorists seize our attention by committing a brutal act. Only then does the real performance begin: the communiqués, the parading of dazed hostages before the cameras, the endless interviews in which the terrorists are respectfully asked to explain their demands and conditions. Slowly, imperceptibly, the initial horror recedes, and in its place comes a readiness to accept the terrorist point of view.

We are asked to shed our normal revulsion for murderous acts and accept the notion, endlessly repeated, that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." This is precisely what the terrorist would like us to believe. It is completely untrue. At the risk of belaboring the point, I offer a formal definition: Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends. This distinction lies at the heart of the matter. For without a clear

understanding of terrorism, the problem cannot be tackled.

Terrorists habitually describe themselves as "guerrillas," but guerrillas are not terrorists. They are irregular soldiers who wage war on regular military forces. Terrorists choose to attack weak and defenseless civilians: old men, women and children—anyone in fact *except* soldiers if terrorists can avoid it.

This indeed is one of terrorism's most pernicious effects: it blurs the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, the central tenet of the laws of war. It is not only that the terrorist breaks down this standard but that we begin to accept his standards. With each fresh attack, the public is conditioned—first by the terrorists, then by their compliant interpreters in the press—to equate innocent hostages with jailed terrorists and to accept the notion that the murder of children is a regrettable but understandable expression of the terrorists' purported grievances.

There are those who say that war is war and that any attempt to define ethical limits is futile. But short of the rare and difficult case of total war, such as during World War II, most people would agree that there is a significant difference between waging war on armed combatants and attacking de-

fenseless civilians. None of the resistance movements in Nazi-occupied Europe conducted or even condoned, terrorist attacks against German noncombatants, such as officers' wives or children. Without such distinctions, the concept of war crimes loses any meaning. For if everything is permissible, why not gas innocent people or machine-gun children?

It is here that the terrorist parts company with humanity. He declares a total war on the society he attacks. For him everyone is a legitimate target. A baby is fair game; he may, after all, grow up to be a soldier. So is the baby's mother; she gave birth to this future soldier. No one is spared, ordinary citizens and leaders alike.

Having defined all of society as a field of combat, the terrorist demands that his activity, which would ordinarily be viewed as gangsterism, be treated with the respect given to legitimate warfare. That is why he often takes on all the trappings of a soldier; that is why he issues "communiqués" instead of simple statements and why he insists that his jailed accomplices, who are in fact dangerous criminals, be accorded the status of prisoners of war.

Though terrorism as such is not new in history, or even in this century, today's terrorism differs in its extent and its violence; it now attacks the territory and citizens of nearly all the democracies. It began its rapid growth in the 1960s. It was sparked by the early successes of two groups of terrorists: the P.L.O., which introduced airline hijacking as an international weapon, and European radical factions, which carried out increasingly bold bombings, kidnappings and assassinations throughout the Continent. Terrorist groups, seemingly independent from one another, soon proliferated throughout Europe, Japan, North and South America and the Middle East. But as the evidence piled up, the Arab

P.L.O., the Iranian *mujahedin*, the Armenian A.S.A.L.A., the German Baader-Meinhof gang, the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army and others were often found to be linked not only to one another but to the Soviet Union and radical Arab regimes. Only after the P.L.O.'s expulsion from Beirut did captured P.L.O. documents reveal the role of its terrorist minstate in Lebanon as a training center and launching ground for what had become a kind of terrorist international.

This collaboration between Marxist and Muslim radicals is not accidental. Modern terrorism has its roots in two movements that have assumed international prominence in the second half of the 20th century, Communist totalitarianism and Islamic (and Arab) radicalism. These forces have given terrorism its ideological impetus and much of its material support. Both legitimize unbridled violence in the name of a higher cause, both are profoundly hostile to democracy, and both have found in terrorism an ideal weapon for waging war against democracy.

Indeed, international terrorism is overwhelmingly an extension of warfare sustained and supported by the states built on the foundations of Marxism and radical Islam. The Soviet Union, several of its East European satellites, Cuba and North Korea, and Middle Eastern states such as Libya, Iran, Syria, Iraq and South Yemen have given terrorists weapons, training and money. They have also provided sanctuary, safe passage and safe houses—often their very embassies. And they have

supported terrorism on the crucial political level, legitimizing it and blocking international measures against it.

Why have certain radical states begun to resort to terrorism? Since the end of World War II and the dawn of the nuclear age, the waging of war has become increasingly expensive and risky. For a superpower like the Soviet Union, a direct confrontation with the West entails the unacceptable risks of atomic war. For smaller states, conventional war can also escalate into intolerable conflict or outright defeat. Terrorism is part of the broader trend toward waging war by proxy. It permits regimes to engage in aggression while evading responsibility or retaliation.

As the number of attacks has increased tenfold in the past decade alone, a clear pattern has emerged. The targets of terrorism have been, more and more, Britain and Germany, Spain and Portugal, France and Italy, Israel and Japan, and, above all, the U.S. (whose nationals accounted for roughly a third of terrorism's victims since 1968)—in short, the West. A network

of professional terrorists seeks to weaken and demoralize democratic societies by attacking their citizens, their leaders, their institutions, thereby disrupting their way of life and sapping their political will. And it is a growing threat. Terrorist attacks now kill and injure not one or two but hundreds at a time. Few doubt that other, more lethal, weapons may be employed in the future.

The terrorist's strategy is premised on the ability to deliver future blows, no matter what. The fear and intimidation that terrorism thrives on are totally dependent on this threat. The primary task in fighting terrorism, then, is to weaken and ultimately destroy the terrorist's ability to launch attacks. This is often presented as a difficult or even impossible task. It is asserted

that the clandestine nature of terrorism and the openness of Western societies make terrorism against the West nearly impossible to root out. I would argue the exact opposite. Terrorism can be stopped. The minute you weaken its ability to deliver repeated blows, you have broken its back. And it is well within the means of the West to achieve this.

Consider, for example, the classic terrorist act, the taking of hostages. More than any other act of terrorist violence, it reveals two underlying characteristics of terrorism. First, it is an unmistakably *deliberate* assault on the people who are seized, precisely because they are noncombatants. Second, it affords a stage for dramatization and distortion. Hostage taking places a government in a terrible dilemma: if it uses force to release the hostages, it might end up with more people killed than if it gives in. If it yields, the terrorists emerge victorious. Sometimes the terrorists resolve this dilemma by killing a few hostages and threatening to murder the rest if their demands are not met. The government can then argue that since more hostages are about to be killed, it must take action immediately.

But suppose the terrorists have not started killing hostages. Should they not fear a forcible response? The more terrorists believe that military intervention is likely, the less prone they will be to continue their siege. In the hijacking of both the TWA airliner out of Athens last summer and the cruise ship *Achille Lauro* last fall, a principal reason that the terrorists released



July 1976: Cheering crowd welcomes home Israeli who piloted the rescuers of hostages at Entebbe, Uganda.

TERRORISM

their hostages was their belief in imminent intervention—retaliation afterward in the case of the airliner and military rescue of the *Achille Lauro* (both American and Italian forces were poised to storm the ship on the day the pirates surrendered).

Terrorists have often escaped retaliation because of the sloppiness of the West's thinking about the use of force. America's loss of clarity in the wake of Viet Nam has become a general Western malaise. The rules of engagement have become so rigid that governments often strait-jacket themselves in the face of unambiguous aggression. But a fundamental principle must be recognized: under no

circumstances should a government categorically rule out a military response simply because of the risk of civilian casualties. There is a practical and a moral basis for this position. In practical terms, an inflexible rule against risking civilian casualties would make any military action virtually impossible. In moral terms, an absolute prohibition on civilian casualties today condemns to death or injury many future victims. Terrorism, undeterred, will inevitably increase.

Responsible governments seek to minimize civilian casualties. But they do not grant immunity to an aggressor simply because their response might endanger civilians. If this is true in normal combat, it is truer still in the case of terrorism. An absolute prohibition on civilian casualties provides the terrorist with an invincible shield. This is not only true in cases in which he fears retaliation following his attacks (for example, when



September 1972: With nine Israelis held hostage, an Arab terrorist surveys Olympic Village in Munich

cases, the government refused to capitulate to the terrorists' demands. Soldiers overcame the terrorists and liberated the hostages. This was by no means an easy course to follow. The government painfully recognized that its policy made some civilian casualties unavoidable; in 1974 at Ma'alot, 21 schoolchildren were massacred by the P.L.O. before the terrorists were themselves killed.

But the result of this determined refusal to yield was that hostage taking gradually became a rarity inside Israel. This was not because the P.L.O. was unable to stage such incidents but because it finally realized that there would be no surrender and that the terrorists would fail and probably be killed. Contrary to popular myth, cases of suicidal terrorism are rare; overwhelmingly, terrorists want to live, to escape unpunished.

The P.L.O. sought to overcome Israel's resolve by seizing

the terrorist seeks immunity by planting his bases among civilians). It is also true during the taking of hostages, when the terrorist even more brazenly seeks immunity by daring the authorities to risk the lives of innocent victims by taking action.

Terrorists generally do fear military intervention, and that fear has a tremendously inhibiting effect on hostage taking. This is best demonstrated in the case of Israel. No other nation suffered more from this form of attack. In the 1970s Israel experienced a large number of hostage takings, including the hijacking of planes and the seizing of schools, apartments, hotels and buses. In all these

For the Democracies, a "Moral Right, Indeed Duty, to Defend Themselves"

The Washington conference that led to the book Terrorism: How the West Can Win attracted an international galaxy of Cabinet ministers, legislators, military officers and scholars. Some highlights of what they said:

"A purely passive defense does not provide enough of a deterrent to terrorism and the states that sponsor it. It is time to think long, hard and seriously about more active means of defense—defense through preventive or pre-emptive actions against terrorist groups *before* they strike.

"We will need to strengthen our capabilities in the areas of intelligence and quick reaction. Intelligence will be particularly important, since our societies demand that we know with reasonable clarity just what we are doing and against whom we are acting. Experience has taught us that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be

taken against those who engage in it.

"Clearly there are complicated moral issues here. But there should be no doubt of the democracies' moral right, indeed duty, to defend themselves."

—Secretary of State George Shultz

"The most powerful totalitarian state of our time is also the principal supporter and sponsor of international terrorism. In the late 1960s, Soviet theorists began to emphasize the 'armed road' as the way to achieve power in the western hemisphere. They have set about supporting terrorist groups in this hemisphere. These technicians in violence and propaganda are called national liberation movements.

"The United Nations' acceptance of so-called national liberation movements as legitimate is a good indicator of the moral confusion that has come to surround this view of violence as the preferred method of political action. Since the 1970s, the U.N. General Assembly

has passed numerous resolutions asserting its support for the right of 'national liberation movements' to 'struggle by all means . . . to achieve power.' It has consistently condemned countries for attempting to defend themselves against terrorist violence. The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate use of force has not so much been blurred as stood on its head."

—Former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

"Terrorism denies the distinction between state and society, public and private, government and individual, the distinction that lies at the heart of humane belief. For the terrorist, as for the totalitarian state, there are no innocent bystanders, no private citizens. Terrorism denies that there is any private sphere, that individuals have any rights or any autonomy separate from or beyond politics. There are thus no standards according to which the individual citizen, or the threatened society, can attempt to come to terms with the totalitarian terrorist. There is no way to satisfy his demands."

—Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

Israeli planes or hostages outside Israel. But these attempts were defeated as well. In the most celebrated example, the case of Entebbe, Israeli troops flew more than 2,000 miles, liberated the hostages and killed their captors. For a decade afterward, not a single Israeli or Israel-bound plane was hijacked, and virtually no attempts were made to seize Israeli hostages abroad.

The refusal to capitulate and the decision to apply force were adopted in several important instances by other governments. The German government forcibly liberated German hostages on the hijacked Lufthansa airplane in Mogadishu in 1977, the Dutch successfully stormed a train hijacked by the South Moluccans (1977), and the British freed the occupied Iranian embassy in London (1980). For some time afterward, these countries experienced no further hostage takings. Far from engendering a cycle of increased violence, the application of military force or the prospect of such application inhibits terrorist violence.

The only sensible policy for attacked governments, then, is a refusal to yield and a readiness to apply force. This is a policy that says to the terrorist, I will not accept your demands. I demand that you release the hostages. If you do not do so peacefully, I am prepared to use force. I am proposing a simple exchange: your life for the lives of the hostages. The only "deal" I am willing to make with you is that if you surrender peacefully, I will not kill you.

Obviously, there can be complicating circumstances. What



April 1984: London Constable Yvonne Fletcher lies dying after a gunman fires from Libyan embassy

as the experience of Israel, West Germany, Britain and Holland shows, more often than not such specially trained units succeed.

Suppose the terrorists have not merely seized hostages but have hidden them? Perhaps the most celebrated case is the kidnaping of Italy's former Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades. Italy refused to capitulate, and Aldo Moro was murdered. As tragic and painful as the decision was, it was the right one, as was the firm Italian policy in the immediate aftermath of the Moro kidnaping. Unlike the weakness it later showed during the *Achille Lauro* affair, the Italian government mounted a vigorous effort to hunt down the Red Brigades and improve the effectiveness of its security forces. By the time of the next major kidnaping, that of General James Dozier, it was able to apprehend the terrorists and liberate their hostage. Whether or not such rescue is pos-

if military intervention truly does endanger the lives of most or all of the hostages? This is not quite as frequent as might at first appear. Many governments have specialized forces trained to overcome terrorists before they kill most of their hostages.

Rescuing hostages requires impressing on military forces the importance of minimizing firepower. In storming a building, the normal military procedure is to shoot first and look later. But in rescuing hostages, the soldiers' job is exactly the opposite: they must look first and shoot later, and even then only when it is absolutely necessary. Sometimes they fail, as in last year's Egyptian rescue attempt in Malta. But

"If there are no 'good' terrorists, it follows that civilized states must act collectively against all of them. We have to grasp the fact that to hurt one terrorist movement is to hurt them all. So, on the military level, I would like to see a coordinated, well-financed, informal and secret effort by the major civilized powers to discover and exchange information about movements, routes, identities, weapons stocks, methods, plans, codes, safe houses and bases of all terrorists everywhere. We must be prepared to devise and carry through concerted operations. The hydra is less likely to survive if struck simultaneously in several places. All the democracies must have trained antiterrorist units, and they must be accustomed to acting in concert.

"For the terrorist, there can be no hiding places. The terrorist must never be allowed to feel safe anywhere in the world. A terrorist kept constantly on the defensive is an ineffective terrorist."

—Author Paul Johnson
(Modern Times)

"We must realize that fighting terrorism poses a problem of external defense,

not only one of internal law-and-order. It is irrelevant to ask whether we endanger democracy if we fight terrorism with appropriate means. Second, our defense has to be collective, coordinated by all democratic countries. Third, we must stop making exceptions for terrorists, whatever the causes they claim to espouse. Fourth, we must understand that terrorism is not an isolated phenomenon. It is part of the Soviet Union's program of global domination, a program that includes among its interim objectives the achievement of military superiority, the promotion of one-sided doctrines of non-interference, the domination of the Socialist International and the nonaligned movement, and the waging of systematic disinformation."

—Author Jean-François Revel
(Without Marx or Jesus)

"Little imagination is needed to understand the dangers to the world if terrorist regimes and groups were ever to acquire nuclear weapons. Libya's Colonel Gaddafi has for years tried to acquire nuclear weapons. He has pressed the Soviets to supply him with a pluto-

nium-producing reactor. He has offered Pakistan cash and uranium in a nuclear trade. He has tried to buy nuclear weapons from China. At the very least, he is building the intellectual resources in Libya to help make weapons of his own. Libya's Tajura Nuclear Research Center offers use of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium. The leaders of the West must face up to the ultimate terrorist threat."

—Senator Alan Cranston

"Is there some compensating advantage that justifies television interviews with terrorists? I do not believe there is. The justification commonly advanced is that "we need to know what these people think." But that is nonsense. To begin with, we invariably know what they think long before they appear on television to tell us. Second, what they say on television is not necessarily what they think (which is much more accurately conveyed by what they do—kneecapping, amputations, point-blank murder and the like). It is sugared propaganda."

—John O'Sullivan, associate editor,
the Times of London

sible, governments must persist in refusing to capitulate.

Perhaps the most complicated case of hostage taking is that in which the terrorists find refuge in the territory of a country hostile to the West. Short of declaring war, what can be done? It is often difficult, though by no means impossible, to launch a limited military operation to rescue the hostages. In any case, the principle remains the same—the refusal to yield and the threat of intervention or retaliation. Retaliation can take several forms, against the terrorists themselves and the governments that shelter them. The main point is that both the terrorists and their governmental patrons must believe that they will eventually be punished (preferably sooner rather than later).

What is true of hostage taking is true of other forms of terrorism. The terrorist always considers, and fears, a forceful response from his victims' government. To the extent that he believes he will be tracked down and punished, he will curb them. Deterrence works on terrorists just as it does on anyone else.

Terrorists may at first respond to a government's policy of firmness with an acceleration of violence, but they usually cannot withstand a sustained and resolute policy of resistance and active pursuit. Retaliation and pre-emption against terrorism are thus acts of self-defense. Denying the necessity for such self-defense, and blurring the moral basis for it, is dangerous. It undermines a basic principle on which government authority is based. A government's first obligation is to protect its citizens. Confusion or vacillation fools no one, least of all terrorists.

One point is central: international terrorism as we know it would simply not be possible without the collaboration of governments that have used terrorism to wage hidden war against their adversaries, especially the West. After the *Achille Lauro* piracy, Abul Abbas, its mastermind, skittered from Egypt to Italy to Yugoslavia to Iraq to South Yemen, where he finally found his most suitable haven. Without the collusion or acquiescence of friendly or passive governments, he would have been caught and brought to trial. The support of friendly regimes and the passivity of others are the crucial assumptions under which international terrorism operates.

Just as hostile governments have caused the internationalization of terror, they are also the key to its end. For states are no less susceptible than the terrorists they support to a sober calculation of costs and benefits. The very reason certain regimes rely on terrorists is to be able to wage war without the risks that war entails. As long as they are successful in denying complicity or involvement, they will easily escape retribution.

Once this is understood, the democracies can begin to act effectively in three broad areas against offending states.

POLITICAL PRESSURES. These could range from international condemnation to cutting off diplomatic relations (as the U.S. and Britain did with Libya). Political pressures signal to the terrorist state that the victim not only is unwilling to yield but is prepared to expose the offender to public censure. This could force other states to take a position against the offender, or at least to curb their support for it. Since many states sponsoring terrorism depend on the ability to deny complicity in terrorist

crimes, this is not a minor threat. In the severance of diplomatic relations, an added penalty is the shutting down of embassies. Terrorists simply cannot sustain a concerted campaign of attacks in most Western countries without sanctuary or inviolable means of passing funds, arms and intelligence.

The embassies and diplomatic pouches of Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, South Yemen and other Middle Eastern states, as well as Soviet bloc embassies, have turned parts of Western Europe into a veritable playground of terrorists. Weapons, passports, money, safe houses have all been made available to terrorists by people hiding behind diplomatic immunity. Without embassies, the effectiveness of terrorism in the West would be sharply diminished.

ECONOMIC PRESSURE. Most of these countries desperately need Western goods, weapons or credit. There are certain sophisticated products, including advanced weapons, that only the West can supply. If the democracies used but a fraction of their enormous economic clout, they could cause regimes supporting terrorism to rethink some of their activities.

Economic pressure could be a combination of boycott and embargo. In the case of Libya, a prime offender, the U.S. has willingly forfeited hundreds of millions of dollars of trade to send an unmistakable and economically painful message to that regime. Another potent sanction that can be readily applied is the denial of landing rights in major Western capitals to the commercial planes of terrorist states. The same could apply to docking rights for the ships of offending states.

MILITARY ACTION. This cannot be ruled out, nor should we be bashful about discussing it. When we talk about using military force, we must first consider unilateral action, one state's taking action against terrorists or a state that shelters them. Obviously, if a terrorist action occurs on a government's own soil, it will take action to protect its own citizens and foil the terrorists.

But what about a terrorist attack on a country's citizens abroad, in embassies, businesses or airlines? In the case of a hijacking, piracy or other hostage taking, the responsibility of securing the release of the hostages is that of the government on whose soil (or ship or plane) the incident takes place. One would hope such governments would adopt a firm policy against the terrorists, but if a government cannot or will not undertake forcibly to end a hostage crisis, it forfeits a certain measure of jurisdiction. The country whose nationals (or plane or ship) are held hostage has the right to act when the host country refuses to do so. Take the case of Entebbe. Uganda had an obligation to intervene and end the hijacking. When it refused to do so, the right to act passed to Israel and France (most of the passengers were Israeli; the plane was French). Since France was not considering any military move (although it helped in gathering intelligence), Israel had a perfect right to act.

This is at odds with a widely held view that national sovereignty is absolute and cannot be violated. But of course it is not absolute. Countries do not have the right to do anything within their borders. They risk the intervention of other states if they fail to live up to elementary international obligations.



June 1985: Armed Arab hijacker with John Testrake, pilot of TWA Flight 847, during long siege in Beirut

Sovereignty does not in any way preclude a government from allowing another government to assist in or carry out a rescue operation, as, for example, the Somalis did when they approved the intervention of West Germany's antiterrorist unit in the Mogadishu incident. In most cases, therefore, even weak or hesitant governments have a choice. Bluntly put, they can either do it themselves or let someone else do it.

What about the use of force in circumstances other than hostage taking? Western governments already possess ample intelligence evidence (such as satellite photos of training camps, interception of communications, reports from agents in the field) of continuous support for terrorists from certain governments. Such a record of complicity is more than strong enough to justify punitive action against these criminal states. Plenty of military or strategic targets can be struck to inflict severe damage, while avoiding excessive, if any, civilian casualties.

Two objections are frequently raised. First, the prospect of reprisals. Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, who clearly harbored the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal prior to his attacks on Americans and others in European airports last December, promised to retaliate if the U.S. took any action against him. He went so far as to promise to set the Mediterranean ablaze and even to precipitate global war. Such bluster should be viewed realistically. It emanates from fear. It also at times may be partly realized. We should recognize that a successful war on terrorists will involve a succession of blows and counterblows, and some unavoidable casualties along the way. What is required is a commitment to a continuous campaign against its sponsors, not just erratic responses to individual terrorist acts. There are no "one-shot" solutions. A forceful response against aggression may very well elicit reprisals initially. But over the long run, it is the only way to make governments stop launching terrorist killers. They need to know, they must know, that the West will not sit back and take it.

The second objection raised to military action against states sponsoring terrorism is that it will induce political consequences unfavorable to the West, such as the weakening or collapse of friendly regimes in the Middle East. Actually, these very regimes, despite their public pronouncements, would secretly welcome such action; after all, they too are frequently victims of the terrorist war. Still, what about unfavorable political developments? In many regions of the world, especially the Middle East, anger precedes respect. There may be a lashing out at Western or pro-Western targets following a military action, but there is a concomitant, if grudging, assessment by the terrorists of new limits. A posture of weakness, a repeated refusal to confront and punish the regimes behind the terrorists, not only invites further aggression but ultimately weakens the West's position, and consequently the position of its allies, in these regions and throughout the world.

Terrorists and the states that support them are serious adversaries. They are devious, ruthless and persistent. But the West has worsened the problem by its own disunity. For too long terrorists have succeeded in the strategy of divide and con-

quer. Governments have made separate deals with terrorists, allowing them, for example, freedom of movement in exchange for promises of immunity. But terrorists, who by their very nature ridicule the notion of law and treaties, always violate their agreements. The Western countries must face up to a simple truth: no deals are possible with terrorists. The success of terrorism in one part of the world encourages terrorists everywhere. Terrorism is an indivisible problem, and the fight against terrorism must be indivisible as well.

This means that you cannot "understand" terrorism when directed against someone else while opposing it when directed against yourself. Terrorism threatens the foundation of lawful and humane existence everywhere. And it thrives on weakness. It is naive to think that the I.R.A. does not take note of periodic British courting of the P.L.O. The same applies to the Red Brigades vis-à-vis the Italian government's dealings with Arab terrorists, and so on.

What is required is a basic realignment of international attitudes toward terrorism.

While all governments offer rhetorical opposition to terrorism, including the adoption of a U.N. resolution condemning terrorism in 1985, in practice they fall into one of three categories: a few governments actually oppose terrorism, and do so consistently; others actively support terrorists; but most fall into a third broad category, the neutrals. They either acquiesce in terrorism or refuse to actively oppose it.

The measures against states that support terrorism are essential, but we must also do away with the middle ground of neutrality. Governments must be made to understand that if they acquiesce in terrorism, they are in practice supporting it. The provision of safe passage to foreign terrorists, such as Egypt offered to the hijackers of the *Achille*

Lauro, should be considered an act of simple collusion. It is tantamount to offering a foreign army passage through your territory in time of war. Similarly, accepting a hijacked airplane or ship without accepting the concomitant responsibilities of preventing the escape of the terrorists is also an act of collusion; so is the refusal to extradite or punish terrorists.

The provision of sanctuary for terrorists is also an act of collusion. I am not talking about taking in war refugees who have laid down their arms (as France did after the Spanish Civil War). I am talking about permitting armed bands to wage terrorist war against a neighboring state from one's own territory. This is not one of the privileges of sovereignty. It is a clear act of aggression. It can and should be treated as such by the attacked state, which has every right to take action against the terrorists or the government that shelters them. It may do so either in hot pursuit, in retaliation or even in pre-emptive action. The right of self-defense takes precedence over sovereignty.

When a state deliberately employs terrorists, the distinction between striking back at the terrorists themselves or at the governments that shelter them is one of practical consideration, not of principle. There is certainly no moral imperative to confine the retaliation to the actual perpetrators; the terrorists, after all, are merely servants of the government. In war, limiting a counterattack to exactly those soldiers who fired at you would be absurd.



October 1985: Marilyn Klinghoffer, whose husband was slain on the *Achille Lauro*, holds flag from his coffin

Lesser forms of tolerating terrorism, like lax security safeguards in airports, should be considered a tacit form of collusion with terrorists. It allows them to penetrate air routes and attack civilians from all countries. Offending governments should be told that their airports will be cut off from the international aviation system until they improve security.

The broad assortment of "neutral" states that repeatedly, or as a matter of policy, facilitate the operations of terrorists must be told that they risk being subjected to some or all of the sanctions that outright supporters of terrorists invite upon themselves.

A policy of firmness will make it clear that individual terrorists will be pursued, caught and punished; that the organizations that launch them will be subject to attack; that the governments that shelter them will face political, economic and, ultimately, military retaliation; that other governments that collude less brazenly will also be held accountable.

What, then, has inhibited the widespread adoption of this policy by the West? I believe it is the persistent effects of three vices.

One is greed, or a heedless promotion of economic self-interest, whatever the political or moral consequences. A second is political cowardice, which means sitting it out while your ally is attacked, or responds to an attack, so as not to invoke the wrath of the terrorists. Both factors played a part in the immediate rejection by several governments of the American initiative for sanctions against Libya following the attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports. Neither cowardice nor greed will easily disappear. If, however, the U.S. persists in its firm stance, I believe that it will eventually succeed in pressuring, even shaming, other Western states into compliance.

But there is a third, even more pernicious impediment that needs to be overcome: a confusion that is both moral and intellectual. We in the West believe in the capacity of politics to mitigate, and resolve, all conflict. We automatically tend to endow an adversary with the same assumptions. These could not be more misplaced than in the case of terrorists, who use political language to destroy the concept of politics altogether. And even when we catch a glimpse of this truth, we fail to grasp its essence. For the West is in awe of fanaticism. It is confused before a supposed willingness to die for a cause, believing that such readiness must be based on a cause that is at least partially just. Even a cursory reading of history tells us how dangerous a notion that is. No people were more prepared to sacrifice their lives for a cause than the Hitler Youth.

But our present notions of terrorism are informed not by history but in large measure by the media. This is why terrorists, in their war against the West, devote so much of their strategy and their effort to capturing the Western press and using it for their own purposes. But this need not succeed. Terrorism's reliance on the press and television of the democracies gives the media tremendous power not only to amplify terrorism's message but also to snuff it out. They can and should refuse to broadcast indiscriminately interviews with terrorists. They can and should expose the sham of terrorists' claims. They can and should expose their grisly acts for what they are.

What the public has a right to demand of journalists is the same scrupulousness and professionalism, no more and no less,

that they would show in the case of covering organized crime and its bosses. The proven power of a thorough press investigation to expose and to repudiate such corruption—indeed, to galvanize public opposition against it—is exactly the power that can be harnessed against terrorism. A thoughtful press can turn terrorism's greatest weapon against the terrorists themselves.

This is the responsibility of the West's press. It is second only to the responsibility of its political leadership. For only a determined leadership can make the West overcome the impediments of greed, cowardice and moral confusion.

Which leadership? It can come only from the U.S., which alone has the capacity to align the West's resistance, alone can credibly threaten the offenders and alone can impel the neutrals to shed their neutrality. The U.S. appears to be moving in this direction, albeit sometimes at an uncertain pace. The more the U.S. resorts to action, like punishing terrorists and their backers, the greater the number of states that will join the American effort to combat terrorism. Allies and adversaries alike, the entire world is

waiting to see the depth of the American resolve.

The West can win the war against terrorism, and fairly rapidly. But it must first win the war against its own inner weakness. That will require courage. First, government leaders must have the political courage to present the truth, however unpleasant, to their people. They must be prepared to make difficult decisions, to take measures that may involve great risks, that may even end in failure and subject them to public criticism.

Second, the soldiers who may actually be called upon to combat terrorists will need to show military courage. It will be up to them to decide whether they can or cannot undertake a particular operation that a government is considering. In the special units of the Israeli army, for example,

no one has ever simply been told by the political leadership that he must accept a perilous assignment. The commanders are always asked: Is it possible? Do you think you can do it? And if they ever said it could not be done, or even if they expressed doubts, that would have been the end of the matter.

But there is also a third kind of courage: the civic valor that must be shown by an entire people. All citizens in a democracy threatened by terrorism must see themselves, in a certain sense, as soldiers in a common battle. They must not pressure their government to capitulate or to surrender to terrorism. This is especially true of public pressure on government by families of hostages. Such pressure can only be called a dereliction of civic duty. If we seriously want to win the war against terrorism, we must be prepared to endure sacrifice and even, should there be the loss of loved ones, immeasurable pain.

Terrorism is a phenomenon that tries to evoke one feeling: fear. It is understandable that the one virtue most necessary to defeat terrorism is therefore the antithesis of fear: courage.

Courage, said the Romans, is not the only virtue, but it is the single virtue without which all the others are meaningless. The terrorist challenge must be answered. The choice is between a free society based on law and compassion and a rampant barbarism in the service of brute force and tyranny. Confusion and vacillation facilitated the rise of terrorism. Clarity and courage will ensure its defeat. ■



December 1985: After the massacre at Rome's Da Vinci Airport, victims are tagged for identification.



FOR YOUR INFORMATION

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October 1986

ATTACK NEAR JERUSALEM'S TEMPLE MOUNT
PART OF "ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST ZIONIST CANCER THROUGHOUT OUR
PALESTINIAN SOIL" (PLO-Arafat)

One Civilian Killed, 32 Civilians Injured in Attack

On the evening of October 15, 1986, PLO terrorists hurled two hand grenades at a group of Israeli soldiers and their families congregated near the Temple Mount, in the Old City of Jerusalem. ~~The Temple Mount is the site of two Moslem holy places -- the Al-Aqsa and Dome of the Rock Mosques -- as well as of the Jewish people's most highly revered holy place and the historic focus of its aspiration for national redemption and independence, the Western Wall.~~

One civilian was killed in the resulting explosions, and, among the 66 persons injured, which included some Arabs, 32 were civilians, amongst them 13 women and 7 children.

Responsibility for the attack was assumed by the "military spokesman" of the PLO. In an announcement issued the same evening by the Palestinian Center in Cairo, the spokesman also said:

"This heroic act confirms the decision on escalation adopted by the Palestinian leadership at its last meeting, when it undertook to continue the policy of the armed struggle against the Zionist and colonialist cancer throughout our Palestinian soil."

The PLO representative in Cairo, Tayeb Abd ar-Rahim, told the French News Agency on October 15 that the decision under which the Jerusalem attack was carried out was taken by the Supreme Military Council of the Palestinian Center in Baghdad, ten days ago.

Notably, the attack took place in the midst of the Jewish Holiday season, when large numbers of people congregate in the vicinity of the holy places. (The attack came, incidentally, after many months of quiet in Jerusalem.)

Previous PLO attacks against civilians congregated in various holy places include bombings or shootings at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron in October 1968 (45 injured) and in November 1968 (6 injured), near the Western Wall in October 1971 (16 injured), a synagogue in Jaffa in August 1975 (3 injured), on the Via Dolorosa in Jerusalem in August 1981 (1 killed), near Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem in August 1982 (1 injured), near the Cremisan Monastery, Beth Jallah, in October 1984 (2 killed) and near the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in November 1985 (1 injured).

Palestinian terrorist attacks on Jewish religious targets abroad include the bombings of synagogues in a number of European cities: Paris in October 1980 (3 killed, 20 injured), Vienna in August 1981 (2 killed, 19 injured), Antwerp in October 1981 (2 killed, 90 injured), Rome in October 1982 (1 infant killed, 34 persons injured) and Istanbul in September 1986 (23 killed, 3 injured).

The outrage near the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on October 15th follows a long chain of threats by the PLO leaders, from Arafat down, the last two of which were uttered only a few days ago (October 4th and 9th). Thus:

PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in Kuwait, reported by ~~AP~~ October 9, 1986:

"Arafat vowed his revolution will not drop the armed struggle against Israel..."

Secretary of Fatah Revolutionary Council Sahr Abu Nizar in an interview for the Arabic Weekly Al-A'alam, London, October 4, 1986:

"Our struggle and liberation are strategy and not tactics. There is no way to stop the struggle except through the realization of the objectives of the Palestinian people, which are: return, liberation, and the establishment of an independent state throughout the national Palestinian soil."

The language of the PLO announcements points up that organization's objective, the establishment of a PLO-run Palestinian Arab state to be used as a springboard for the annihilation of Israel. In the pursuit of that end, all means are fair, in the PLO's book. That is why the PLO will not shrink from carrying out the most brutal random assaults anywhere (even in the hallowed Old City of Jerusalem, within meters of Moslem and Jewish holy places) and against any kind of human target. Ostensibly, this time the target was a group of soldiers; but, even in this case, half of the victims were civilians. Ultimately, the PLO has targeted peace negotiations for attack.

In the wake of this new bloody manifestation of the PLO doctrine, Israel feels entitled to demand of those countries that permit the operation of PLO offices in their territories that these offices be closed down forthwith and their personnel expelled from those countries.



FOR YOUR INFORMATION

October 1986

Handwritten:
JETA
8/9/1986

SYRIAN AND IRANIAN-BACKED TERRORISM:
PARIS AND LEBANON

The organization behind the recent spate of bombings in Paris is LARF, the "Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction." It was founded in Lebanon in 1980 by the Abdullah brothers, who, despite their Orthodox Christian background, are pro-Syrian Marxists.

In the past, various attacks on American and Israeli targets in Europe have been attributed to LARF. Georges Ibrahim Abdullah is now serving a four-year term in a French prison for his terrorist activities, including involvement in the murders of Israeli diplomat Yaakov Barsimantov and American military attache Charles Ray.

Through the current round of terrorist violence, LARF, acting under Syrian influence, is seeking to free its imprisoned comrades from French (and Italian) jails. Although there is no conclusive evidence that Syria itself instigated the Paris bombings, Syria could have prevented such terrorism had it chosen to do so. LARF's headquarters and training camps, and those of some other terror groups active in Europe, are located in tightly-controlled Syrian-occupied Lebanon and in Damascus itself.

LARF has forged ties with the violent French terrorist organization known as "Direct Action;" ASALA -- the "Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia;" and remnants of the Wadi Haddad faction of the PLO, the PLO's George Habash, and the PLO's Ahmed Jibril, all of which are under Syrian influence.

Indeed, on September 30, the French Minister of Cooperation, Michel Aurillac, implicated that the terrorists responsible for the Paris attacks who left France were "exfiltrated" by "professional secret agents" from Syria. Another senior French official stated that "the Syrian angle is virtually a certainty. Everything, including the indications we are getting from other Arab countries, indicates that the key to this is in Damascus."

The terrorist acts being perpetrated against the South Lebanese Army (SLA) and UNIFIL soldiers in southern Lebanon are the work of Hezbollah, the so-called "Party of God," which is backed by Iran and assisted, at least indirectly, by Syria. Hezbollah's goal is to force a collapse of Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon in order to establish a radical Khomeini-style regime, reach Israel's border, and instigate terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians in the Galilee. While Syria does not wish to see the Hezbollah strengthened at the expense of the Shi'ite Amal militia, the free hand that the Syrians have given to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon relieves Syria of pressure in the Bekaa Valley and in Beirut, where it is currently seeking to impose its own authority. Syrian assistance to Hezbollah and its Iranian advisers includes free movement through Syrian lines.

Coordinated activity of this sort between the Syrian and Iranian governments has been preceded by discussions between the foreign ministers of those two countries, who, together with the foreign minister of Libya, have met on several recent occasions, the latest of which was on August 24th.