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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

**State Terrorism
and the
International System**

Tel Aviv, Israel
January 26-28, 1986

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and the
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
Joseph Luns, guest speaker



Amb. Yehuda Blum, guest
speaker



Joel S. Lisker, guest speaker



Avigdor Haselkorn, guest
speaker



Arnaud de Borchgrave,
guest speaker

Introduction



William Kintner, committee chairman



Robert Morris, committee chairman



William Mazzocco, presented paper



John Loulis, presented paper



Richard Lawrence, rapporteur



Eugene McDaniel, rapporteur



[Participants at the ISC Conference]

The International Security Council—a nonpartisan educational organization—was established in 1984 to explore foreign and defense policy problems affecting the security of the Free World. Toward that end, sixty prominent statesmen, scholars and national security specialists from twelve countries convened in Tel Aviv (26-28 January 1986) to consider the nature, scope and character of state-sponsored terrorism. The proceedings which follow reflect in part the important deliberations of the conference participants who took time from their busy schedules to address this vital problem. The ISC is proud to have sponsored this gathering of esteemed individuals in the certain knowledge that their findings represent a unique contribution to the public debate.

At the same time, the International Security Council wishes to commend Dr. Bo Hi Pak and CAUSA International for their commitment to, and generous support of the activities of the ISC which made the convocation possible.

Dr. Joseph Churba
President
International Security Council

The Tel Aviv Declaration

A conference on "State Terrorism and the International System" was held under the auspices of the International Security Council in Tel Aviv, Israel, January 26-28, 1986. Sixty prominent senior statesmen, active and retired, military officers and national security specialists from 12 countries convened to consider the character and extent of the threat of state-sponsored terrorism to the very foundation of the international system, and the options for action open to free societies in meeting and overcoming this challenge. The following declaration reflects the consensus of the distinguished participants in demanding that the free world, led by the United States, act with resolve and dispatch in restoring international order and security.

The blood on the marble floors of the Rome and Vienna airports has been washed clean, and the dead of those treacherous terrorist attacks on innocent civilians have been buried. But, meeting here in Israel, the assembled members and guests of the International Security Council could not help but think of the long list of similar, and not unrelated, murders and massacres — the carnage at the Lod airport, just a few miles down the coastal road, and in Malta and Cyprus, in Burma and Colombia; the ill-fated passengers of so many airliners and now even tourist ships; the random victims in shopping centers and other public places in Western Europe, the Middle East and, indeed, in every region of the world; the explosions in U.S. embassies and Marine barracks; the assassinations and kidnappings and tortures...

Yet the real balance-sheet of terror cannot be reckoned in the gruesome tabulation of the sacrifices of so many families in so many countries. It must be — and we have so concluded in our days of discussions among the experts on terrorism, military and academic — in a sharper understanding of its nature and extent and a more systematic approach to our options for action. The enormities of terrorism have also presented a challenge to the international system of nations, provoking diplomatic crises and political explosions. Friends

and allies have been falling out amongst themselves on whether and how to respond to the depredations of a Terrorist International. For it does not operate haphazardly, but shows, more and more, all the signs of strategic cooperation, and transnational organization and the sponsorship of powerful tyrannical governments whose regimes have come to power by force and violence and seek to extend that power by intimidation and blackmail.

Its nature and extent have not yet been properly recognized by wide sections of Western public opinion, for it is only rarely perceived in its global dimension. Nations, great and small, show real concern only when their citizens happen to be involved. They miss the pattern and remain unprepared for the next incident, the next tragedy. **They do not understand that the terrorist onslaughts which are making their bloody mark on our civilization are not isolated phenomena.**

Except perhaps for a few crazed outbursts here and there, the campaign of terror has become a regular form of warfare, with a grimly mounting toll of casualties. It is not deployed in a set battle with a direct confrontation of military forces but is, for all that, a blunt and brutal military instrument, extremely flexible, adaptable to almost any circumstance, unpredictable in its thrusts. It destabilizes and delegitimizes. And since terror does indeed terrify, it tends to paralyze its targets and victims, and often succeeds in draining them of the will to fight back.

Nor are the world-political implications of terrorism always seen and recognized for what they are. The President of the United States and the new Party Secretary of the USSR may not have found it diplomatically proper to discuss the issue at the recent Geneva Summit. **But neither Mr. Reagan nor any of the leaders of the West can have any illusions about the role of the Soviet Union in fostering and stimulating, sponsoring and training, funding and arming terrorist groups and governments around the world.**

This is not to suggest that the Soviets push the buttons and that their hand is always, directly or indirectly, in play. None of us subscribe to that kind of over-simplification. But where they do not initiate it, they encourage it. Where they have not organized it, they exploit it. The destabilization and subversion have a pattern which serves Soviet interests, and this must be faced by leaders of the Free World even if, for the moment, it is not high on the official diplomatic agenda. Both lives and liberties are at stake. We must learn more about what we are dealing with—and do more about it.

The problem indeed is not just loose, gang-like incursions. It is terrorism—state-sponsored, state supported, state-condoned, and even

state-directed. Tyrannical and totalitarian ideologies have now subscribed to a new gospel of violence as an instrument of political change. A "Radical Entente" presently spearheaded by five militant states (Syria, Libya, Iran, North Korea and Cuba) is making coordinated efforts — by themselves and with others — to undermine the power and influence of the United States and its allies. **Here the well-documented role of the Soviet Union is to provide the professional infrastructure of terrorism including money, arms, explosives, recruitment and training, passports, infiltration and escape routes, transport, communications, safe havens, control officers, and more. Taken together, these constitute an elaborate international network of support systems for terrorists.**

In spite of the regrettable record of Western rhetoric and inactivity, diplomatic ambiguity and public confusion, action must and can be taken. **The war against terrorism is winnable.**

The precondition of victory, of civilization striking back, is an urgency born of clarity of understanding, and seriousness of purpose. Up to now both have been lacking. What is needed is resolute political leadership that not only recognizes the full extent of the international terrorist menace but also has the will to confront it with all available means—political, economic, psychological and military—supported by strong professional intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities. Every nation in the Free World possesses some of the resources needed. **Working together, sharing the information critical to an effective counter-offensive, acting as one, the power of this concert of free nations is overwhelming. Harnessed to the will to win, it is irresistible.**

Addressing specifically the political leadership of the United States, and by extension all free nations prepared to join and share in the effort, the conference on State Terrorism convened in Tel Aviv calls on the U.S. government:

- (1) to supplant existing ineffective mechanisms with a unified counter-terrorism working group, to provide overall strategic planning in the war against terrorism;
- (2) to coordinate by this mechanism all appropriate measures, including preemptive initiatives that carry the struggle against terrorism directly to its source;
- (3) to bring to bear alike on nations that support or condone or tolerate terrorism, the full weight of its economic and political leverage;
- (4) to mount a vigorous worldwide campaign of public infor-

mation concerning the essential character, direction and targets of terrorism.

The governments and people of free nations must summon the courage and the will to act in concert. We must be serious.

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Conference Chairman

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Keynote Speaker

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Former President of Costa Rica

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Welcoming Remarks

Dr. Bo Hi Pak

Mr. Chairman. Distinguished guests. Ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Tel Aviv.

During a recent flight from Asia to Europe, I had a conversation with a fellow passenger on the plane. It went something like this: He asked me, "Where are you going?" I said, "To London." He then asked, "Do you live in London?" "No," I said, "I'm only staying in London for a day, then I'm off to Paris for another day, then on to Tel Aviv and to ISC." He thought for a moment and then said, "I've never heard of that city. Where is ISC?" I responded, "I don't blame you for not having heard of ISC. Its a very small place, yet very important people from around the world come there. You may not hear about it for some time, but I promise you one thing; when the time comes that you can travel to Moscow without a visa, you will know all about ISC." I'm sure that gentleman is still puzzled, perhaps gazing at a world map searching for the location of ISC. Once again, welcome to the hidden city of ISC.

In this conference, my task is a very simple one, and yet its going to be enjoyable as well as rewarding. I will just say a few words of welcome. After that, I can sit back and have the pleasure of listening to the very interesting deliberations that will take place over the next two days.

On behalf of CAUSA International, the sponsoring organization of the International Security Council, I would like to extend my sincere thanks and appreciation to all the participants in this conference on "State Terrorism and the International System," a truly important issue which has brought us together here in Tel Aviv.

For this particular conference, we are surely in the right place. Yesterday, when Dr. Churba first met me in the hotel lobby, he said, "Israel today is the only country where we can have this kind of meeting without having battalions of security forces surrounding the hotel." How true that is.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my personal respect and admiration for the nation and people of Israel for their undaunted and determined stand for freedom and their uncompromising and decisive actions against all forms of lawlessness — whether local or international. I think that if all the free nations of the world took the stand that the State of Israel has taken for the past several decades, we would not have any need for this particular conference. As an admirer of this great nation, I salute the country and the courageous people of Israel, and especially its armed forces, for their gallant struggle, not only for their survival, but also for setting an example for the rest of the world, so that we can all survive and together build a prosperous future for our children. It is a great honor to be here in this historic and dynamic country. Let us all join in extending a special welcome to our distinguished Israeli participants.

I would like to congratulate Dr. Joseph Churba and Dr. Martin Sicker, President, and Senior Vice President of the ISC, for designing and organizing this most important conference.

The ISC, in its short span of existence has done a marvelous job. It has already addressed and taken a stand on a number of the critical international security issues of our time. Now, with the recent inaugural publication of *Global Affairs*, the ISC quarterly journal, our impact will be felt even more widely. This important project reflects the wise counsel and commitment of the distinguished members of our advisory board, as well as other international experts, many of whom are attending this conference. Please accept my heartfelt congratulations as well as appreciation for your dedication.

The ISC has already established its position as an important non-governmental forum on national security matters. I simply want to express my absolute delight with the achievements of the ISC.

I also would like to extend my appreciation to Ambassador Charles Lichenstein for undertaking the chairmanship at this conference. Although it is my first opportunity to meet him in person I have been following his career with great interest, especially during his distinguished tenure at the United Nations. He is truly one of a rare breed of American statesmen. His foresight, vision and courage are widely admired. We are privileged to be able to convene this assembly under his leadership.

We all know terrorism is a major crime against humanity. The Soviet Union and its surrogates have apparently adopted this form of violence as a means to achieve their goal of global hegemony.

Such state sponsored terrorism must be the concern not only of the governments of the Free World, but of people everywhere. Since it

threatens innocent victims, everyone is vulnerable. One need but look at the examples of KAL flight 007, the TWA hijacking last summer, the brutal murder of Mr. Klinghoffer on the Achille Lauro and the recent terrorist slaughter of innocents at the Rome and Vienna airports.

We must find a way to deter these criminal acts. In the face of intimidation and blackmail not too many people or governments have been willing to confront the issue. The International Security Council is committed to do what it can to change this. We hope to educate the public, awaken the policymakers, and induce the courage and commitment to eradicate these criminal acts once and for all. I deem it a special privilege and honor to be a part of this noble endeavor.

I look forward to joining with you in the work of the conference that lies before us. Shalom, and thank you very much.

Dr. Bo Hi Pak is President and Chairman of News World Communications, Inc., publishers of The Washington Times, the New York City Tribune, Las Noticias del Mundo and The Middle East Times. Dr. Pak is the organizer of the World Media Association and since December 1980, President of CAUSA International.

REMARKS ON STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

Ambassador Charles Lichenstein

This is the start of my second full day, ever, in the State of Israel. I feel as if I have been here close to forever. When I was serving as a diplomat some of my less charitable colleagues in the U.S. Department of State suggested from time to time that I was acting less like the deputy representative of the United States and more like the alternate representative of Israel. They did not realize what an honor they were doing me: insofar as I was discharging my official duties well and faithfully, apparently I was articulating the most fundamental values of Israel at the same time. And so I feel today as if I have come home—as an American, as a Jew and as a voluntary member of the ranks of free men.

Last evening, as a matter of fact, I felt not only that I had come home but also that I had fallen into the midst of a family reunion with my dear friends and former colleagues, Ambassador Yehuda Blum and Moriah Blum and Ambassador Arye Levin. I doubt very much that there is anyone here, particularly amongst the Israelis present, who needs to be told by me with what extraordinary distinction and effectiveness this country was represented in New York during the tenure at the United Nations of Ambassadors Blum and Levin. They provided an island of dedication to the principles of our civilization in that cesspool of hypocrisy; they represented the ideals that animate democracies everywhere. And they were stern teachers and, like most of that breed, were sometimes almost intolerable. They kept on telling the rest of us what we ought to have known anyway, and having told us, they then sat back and said in effect, "All right, now what do you intend to do about it?" It was very important instruction for me and all Americans, and for anyone else who would pay heed to their lessons during the years we spent together in the trenches in New York. So it is a special delight to have this family reunion in their home for the first time.

I also want to acknowledge the entirely too laudatory comments

made last night by Dr. Pak about me. I did not believe a word of what he said — and I wish he had gone on far far longer! I want to acknowledge, too, with profound admiration the work of CAUSA International, and particularly of the International Security Council and its founding directors and motivators — Drs. Joseph Churba and Martin Sicker, Antonio Betancourt, and the rest. They are engaged in significant and focused efforts to inform the publics of our several societies, almost in spite of themselves, about the geopolitical realities of this world, and about the choices that all of us, these publics and their leaders, must make.

The focus, of course, is on the essentially moral foundations of these choices. I salute all of those who direct the activities of CAUSA and the ISC. I am honored to be counted here among your numbers.

So, my friends, here we all are again, at yet another conference Tel Aviv, January 27th, 1986 — this must be the conference on State Terrorism and the International System. Now, I may sound like an ingrate, and I probably am, but I have to confess that my tolerance for conferences is beginning to wear thin. We are all members essentially of the same choir, and we spend an inordinate amount of time serenading each other. I note simply in passing even George Shultz is becoming impatient with all talk and no action: so let us count our blessings from whatever source they may flow.

I note also in passing that on the day following the bloody skirmishes at the Rome and Vienna airports late last month, even that tower of rectitude, *The New York Times* thundered a warning to the terrorists — to the shock troops who had been assigned to carry out those particular skirmishes, the massacres of Rome and Vienna. *The Times* warned the terrorists that finally we had had enough — by God, we were getting angry! I dare say the combination of an impatient George Shultz and an angry *New York Times* must be causing fear, trembling and sleepless nights all around the terrorist circuit from Damascus and Tripoli to Havana and Managua, even conceivably in Sofia and East Berlin and in Moscow itself.

It may well be that this conference — in part because we all *are* members of the same choir and need not waste time deploring the fact that we've got a real problem on our hands — maybe this conference can cut through the neurasthenic babble and get down to the basics, such as: who and what is the enemy we confront? How does this enemy operate? What can we do about it — indeed, what must we consider doing about it? And note that I do not say “should”, I say “must.” I hope and have a good deal of confidence that these next two days will begin to produce answers.

To help in the effort I want this morning to offer three probably over-simplified propositions to the issue of terrorism. I do not intimidate easily, as some of you know, but I do feel somewhat intimidated: I am surrounded here by super stars of counterterrorism. Nothing that I am about to tell you will come as any great surprise, but perhaps by pulling the obvious together and articulating it, our deliberations may be moved forward.

PROPOSITION ONE: The Global Setting

I have already signaled the central thrust of my first proposition referring to the skirmishes of Rome and Vienna, December 27th, 1985 — precisely one month ago today. And obviously the question must arise, why do I say skirmishes? Skirmishes in what, within what broader engagement?

The context in which we must set these deliberations of the next two days and any policies regarding terrorism are that of global conflict or global confrontation. Sometimes it is characterized as East/West, sometimes as U.S./Soviet. My own preference, however, is the following: it is most appropriately characterized as a confrontation of freedom, and those persons and nations committed to defending freedom, versus totalitarianism and those, or really I should say that one, which is committed to the ultimate hegemony of totalitarianism, everywhere and for all time.

Again I am reminded of the obvious — remarks attributed to the late Mr. Justice Potter Stewart of my country's highest court, who said in a notable decision often cited, that he could not put his finger precisely on the definition and specific characteristics of pornography but he sure knew it when he saw it. I think most of us would feel the same way about the characterization of the conflict or confrontation of which I speak.

Now, in this global setting, terrorism clearly becomes one particular mode of warfare. I am not even comfortable about such qualifiers as “unconventional” warfare, or “low intensity” warfare, or warfare by “other means.” In my judgment we are dealing with warfare, period. We are dealing with terrorism essentially as a weapons system, one blunt and brutal instrument that is used in this confrontation, infinitely flexible — adaptable to almost any circumstance, devastatingly effective because of its relative unpredictability — relative that is to say to set battles or the direct confrontation of military forces. But literally a weapons systems.

The address and telephone number of terrorism is not always easy

to pin down — least of all if we let ourselves fall into the trap of perceiving terrorism and responding to it piecemeal (insofar as we respond at all) incident by incident as though each one were a discreet event with no particular ties among them.

Terrorism in this setting has as its principle purposes: destabilization, disruption, disturbance of social peace. And it also has the purpose, as it elicits strong and effective response, of delegitimization owing, of course, to the occasional but necessary suspension of certain of the norms and the preferences in the conduct of a free and open society. I need say very little about the delegitimization function of terrorism in the State of Israel. You all know of it. You live with it every time you open the prestige press of most other Western nations in whose defense you labor so hard, and with so little thanks to show for it.

The same delegitimization process was abroad in Turkey during the years when it was necessary to suspend the democratic processes of that country in order to bring a devastating, systematic campaign of terror under some semblance of control — which was accomplished. This has been followed by the first stages in the restoration of democracy. Although again, like Israel, Turkey has received little credit or honor for having waged that battle. Delegitimization is also present today in El Salvador, where, by responding to the constant threat and reality of terrorism, the government of El Salvador is accused of having left behind the principles and the norms of the conduct of a democratic society. It is charged — and we all recognize the tactic — with being no better than its enemies, thus eliminating all crucial moral distinctions between terrorism and aims taken up against it. And, as I suggested at the very outset, these moral distinctions must lie at the base of our strategic calculation in response to terrorism.

So I suggest that terrorism must be placed in its global context. Does this mean that, always and everywhere, the Soviet hand and mind are discernable in the operations of terrorists? Of course I am not saying that. I am saying no such simplistic thing. What I am saying is that where the Soviets do not control or direct, where they do not deploy their troops, where they do not push their buttons, they do tend always to encourage and often to support — and they very definitely exploit and reap whatever benefits may be derived from the destabilizing and the delegitimizing effects of terrorism.

To say I have been amused is the wrong phrase, except in the framework of black comedy — but I have been at least bemused by the reaction in my own country and throughout the U.N. system to the “fact” that the Soviets are finally beginning to wake up to the threat of terrorism. Finally the Soviets are beginning to see what a terrible

monster they have helped unleash and, by golly, they are now joining us — the good guys — in the fight against terrorism. Oh yes, yes indeed: good guys. What incredible, incomparable, undiluted, self-decluding balderdash.

Compared and contrasted to the recent Soviet vote in the U.N. General Assembly in support of an anti-terrorism resolution, I found much more instructive what apparently took place in Beirut in recent months. You doubtless remember the circumstances. My understanding is, after the four Soviets were seized by terrorists and one of the four later killed, that the Soviets responded in eloquent and, I would suppose from the terrorists' perspective, unmistakable fashion. My understanding is that they abducted the brother of the leader of the terrorist group, murdered him, and delivered selected parts of his not very attractive but very dead body to the terrorists. Message delivered. Message received. The other three Soviet hostages were released unharmed in a matter of hours. I do indeed believe, not that the Soviets are “good guys,” but that they well understand the nature and pathology of terrorism, their own progeny.

PROPOSITION TWO: All Terrorism is State-Terrorism

I move now to the second of my three propositions. I submit that the term “state-terrorism” is fundamentally a tautology. With the occasional exception of old-fashioned pure genuine terrorism — generally individual, sometimes gang — with the exception of random, that is to say purposeless, violence. All terrorism is in fact state terrorism.

The exceptions are quite obvious. In the late sixties in my own country, in San Francisco, the Zebra gang randomly sorted out certain individuals and killed them. There was no pattern at all, except that all of the victims were white. Or the deranged Israeli soldier who shot up the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem on Easter Sunday 1982 and caused traumas that Yehuda Blum and I had to live through the next couple of weeks, as we considered this “threat to international peace” in the U.N. Security Council. Oh, again there was the jilted lover in Austin, Texas who went up to the top of the tower with a rifle, and shot up the university campus, and killed eight or twelve random victims.

I am, of course, excepting these kinds of terrorism — as I have called them, old-fashioned or original random violence. I also go along with Secretary General Luns' exceptions. Yes, there are some special cases that we should not and cannot include within our generic defi-

dition: the Armenian irredentists, for example, working out their hatred of the Turks; in part, the IRA and some Basque gangs. Mind you, to some extent these groups, too — surely the IRA and the core ETA — are supported, sustained, and utilized by the network; but, owing to the specificity of their grievances and their targeting of victims, they probably constitute a broad exception to the rule. All other forms and manifestations of terrorism which occupy so much of our attention must, it seems to me, on the basis of 99 percent plus of all that we know, be characterized as state-terrorism, in one of two senses.

On the one hand it is state-sponsored, state-supported, state-controlled and state-directed. This, if you'll pardon the expression, is the affirmative mode of state terrorism. Or, if it is not this variety, it is state condoned: this, I suggest, is the indirect or negative mode of state terrorism.

What am I referring to? On the affirmative side, obviously, I am talking about the essential infrastructure of effective terrorism: money, arms, explosives, recruitment and training, passports (forged and authentic), infiltration and escape routes, transportation and rapid communications, safe havens, by no means least, control officers in place at various key locations around the world (like Mexico City, for example, in the Western Hemisphere). I am talking about an elaborate international network of life support systems for terrorists, almost without exception — I think I'll drop the "almost" — activated and utilized with the complicity and sponsorship and support of states within the network, and I already have named a few of the capitals of the principal members of this network.

I visited Turkey for a few days in the summer of 1981. There, I was sat down by several members of the Foreign Office who told me an almost unbelievable tale involving the smuggling and running of drugs — through Sofia, Bulgaria — with the profits used in turn to procure arms and to pay the costs of the infrastructure to which I referred, the entire effort dedicated, of course, to the support and sustenance of terrorism. I scarcely believed what I heard. All of us, of course — most of those in this room — know the specifics of this tale, now that we have access to the research of Clare Sterling and Paul Henze and Yonah Alexander and many, many more.

We have come to understand that the "Bulgarian Connection" is just one manifestation of the international support system for terrorism, and I think I need say little more about that. We now have access to massive, incontrovertible documentation.

On the direct or negative side, that of state-condoned terrorism, the meaning I ascribe to that term, is equally obvious to all of you. I am

speaking, for example, of the absence of tight air- and seaport security; of shoddy intelligence or, worse, good intelligence not widely shared in timely fashion; I am also speaking of some major Western powers to extradite, or even to detain, suspected or known terrorists. The trail of Abu Abbas from Italy to Yugoslavia, and onto Syria or Iraq was a textbook illustration of this negative mode of state-sponsored terrorism.

Other forms of the same phenomenon are even more disturbing. Buy them off, we're told: wink at them, look the other way, kill them with kindness. Who is it, I sometimes wonder, who gets killed with this kindness? Chancellor Kreisky of Austria must have had some sober second thoughts towards the end of December. It was he who scoffed, in 1982, at the very notion that Col. Qaddafi was "at the heart" of the terrorist network, as some alleged. Absolutely not! Not a shred of evidence! We have since learned that those who innocently illustrated the fatuity and the appalling menace of the Chancellor's negative support of terrorism are no longer alive to tell the tale.

There is finally to be noted on this score the almost suicidal impulse on the part of many in the West — often quite genuine, in a naive, unsophisticated instigated way to preserve the freedom and openness of free and open societies at all costs, at whatever cost. Am I suggesting that it is easy to draw the line, to say what restraints must be imposed, what inconveniences must be tolerated, what departures must be countenanced from our preferred norms of civilized behavior in free and open societies? Is it easy to draw the line? Of course not. It is by no means easy or free of risk. Am I saying, nonetheless, that the line must be drawn? Yes, that is precisely what I am saying. It must be drawn, it must be drawn *now*, and it must be drawn far tighter than any but a few free and open societies have yet shown the resolve to draw it. Here in Israel, I might substitute for a "few" societies, one society.

PROPOSITION THREE: State Terrorism is Controllable

The third and last proposition that I want to submit for our consideration leads ineluctably from the previous one. It is quite simply that state-terrorism, handwringers to the contrary notwithstanding, state-terrorism in both its affirmative and negative modes is in fact in major part controllable. Not perfectly, to be sure. Certainly it is not controllable without cost and inconvenience, but as I suspect most of you would agree, it is controllable. What is lacking is the courage of realism, the courage to confront what essentially we all know about

terrorism and its effects. What is lacking is will, political will, and very candidly guts — and with specific if reluctant reference to my own nation and its government, what is lacking is strong, decisive leadership. I doubt there is all that much difference amongst us, give or take a few details, about what must be involved in the control of terrorism — always with the caveat that the best conceivable control will not be perfect — if we muster up the will to control it.

With regard to those who sponsor and support terrorism, we must be prepared to consider swift and certain retaliation. Even more important, we must be prepared to consider surgical well-planned preemption. And in both cases, retaliation and preemption, we must take action with the least possible risk to the innocent — and I do emphasize “least possible.” Some innocent blood inevitably will be spilled. I submit that the restraints the defense forces of the State of Israel imposed on themselves in the Lebanese campaign of 1982, particularly in carrying the fight to Beirut, represent an admirable illustration of the meaning of “least possible risk to the innocent.”

With regard to those who condone and thus encourage terrorism, we must contemplate severe sanctions — deliberate punishment, that is to say, for their menacing decision to turn the cheek and avert the eye, to strike “protection” deals with the terrorists. It is often said that effective sanctions are impossible, that the requisite commonality of purpose is lacking. My response? Simply that, with the leadership my country ought to be providing, I do not believe we can or should write off the commonality of purpose that might be mustered — if, as I say, the appropriate leadership were exercised.

What would be the elements, specifically, of effective control? Again, I say what is obvious. The essential foundation will have to be reliable, widely-shared intelligence and strong, effective counter-intelligence capabilities. My purpose is to infiltrate, to disrupt, to preempt, to strike where possible, by both overt and covert means, at the controlling cadres of terrorism, right up to the very top. Use of such essential intelligence and counterintelligence must be the routine police procedure of surveillance and monitoring, involving cross-border operations as necessary; tight security measures at such key strategic points as air-and sea ports, and known border crossings; identification and interdiction of such widely-known “third party” havens for terrorism as (an example already cited) the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. I must note, parenthetically, speaking of the essential intelligence foundations of effective counterterrorism, that I have reserved a very special ring right in the heart of hell for those of my

countrymen who, in the orgy of recrimination and self-doubt of the mid-seventies, who in the U.S. systematically and deliberately dismantled the intelligence capabilities of the United States — and particularly those capabilities that are most critical to the success of the effort of which I speak this morning, namely, counterintelligence and covert operations. They have a lot of answering to do.

What do I mean by severe sanctions against those who just go along with the terrorists, who condone and thus encourage terrorism? Again, I have in mind quite obvious measures. Where there is criminally lax airport security, there should then be an immediate cut-off in international flights to those places, and the suspension of reciprocal landing rights for the national flag carriers of the countries involved. If there are loose, lax controls, there must first be unequivocal private warnings followed by public warnings, followed by public advisories to U.S. citizens and businesses: don't go there, don't do business in those countries; you do so at critical risk.

Where there are extradition delays, we must be prepared to suspend the treaties that are in effect as between the countries involved. If there is a refusal to share intelligence, we must cut the offending countries out of the intelligence loop altogether and let them get along on their own as best they can.

All I am saying is that any refusal to act in effective concert should be responded to by cutting off the recalcitrants from the benefits of membership in the community of the democratic West, the community they are in effect deserting and even subverting. I believe the message, firmly delivered, will be understood. I believe it will elicit the appropriate response.

I want to return for a moment to my proposition number one, to the global strategic setting in which we must place our understanding of and our response to terrorism. I intend to conclude these remarks by, in effect, rounding off that initial proposition.

I have been speaking of the nature of state-terrorism and of its essential controllability — if there is in my own country the requisite leadership that all of us have every right to expect of the United States.

I began by insisting that we would neither understand nor control state-terrorism except as we see it in this global setting, as one instrument of the confrontation that has been forced on us — since 1917 in the broadest sense, surely since 1945 — by the most aggressive, expansionist, colonialist totalitarianism that the modern or any other era ever has known. My subject, in one word, has been in seriousness. Insofar as we are serious about the confrontation between freedom and

THE PROBLEMS OF TERRORISM

Dr. Joseph Luns

It is fitting to hold a conference on terrorism in the State of Israel, whose people have suffered more than any other nation from acts of individual and more so state-sponsored terrorism.

Throughout history there have been terror acts, mostly directed against individuals, like kings, presidents, prime ministers and well-known political figures. But hardly ever has there been such wide scale terrorism promoted and abetted by governments. Moreover, the majority of victims are completely innocent of any activity even vaguely connected with the issues the terrorists identify. And the variety of the motives behind these attacks seems well nigh inexhaustible. Some are connected with the Arab-Israel conflict, while others are motivated by political creeds, like the Northern Ireland issue or the Basque movement. Religious antagonisms likewise inspire numerous terrorist acts. The Sikhs and their aspirations, the hostility between Shiites and other Muslim sects, the hatred between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, to give only a few examples, illustrate the variety of motives. Sometimes there is a mixture of these like in Northern Ireland where Protestants and Catholics fight each other and at the same time are dedicated to the cause of a united Ireland.

Apart from these recognizable movements and terror activities, one observes these wanton acts of indiscriminate aggression this past decade as irrational and threatening the existing social and political order. These terror acts do have, however, a history, based on the more than a century old creed of anarchism. Especially in Czarist Russia but also in France and Spain and to a lesser degree in the United States and Great Britain, anarchists have resorted to murder and arson. But only in Spain did anarchism succeed in becoming a mass movement. At the beginning of the Spanish Civil War there were no less than one and a half million anarchists who seized the government of Barcelona generating chaos and great loss of life.

The terrorism resulting in the killing of a number of Turkish dip-

totalitarianism, we will be serious about state-terrorism, or proxy wars, and wars of national liberation, and disinformation, and all of the other weapons systems that the Soviets unleash in this confrontation.

If the answer is "yes" to the one — yes, we are serious — the answer must be "yes" to the others as well. But if it is "no", then I must take leave to doubt the seriousness of the posturing and the arm waving and the righteous wrath with which we greet each new obscenity in the terrorist campaign against us and our freedom and our civilization. I believe that the jury is still hung on this central issue. The outcome is far from certain. This group, this conference fills me with a certain restrained hope — but, my friends, I am not holding my breath.

Thank you very much for inviting me here.

Ambassador Charles Lichenstein was the alternate U.S. Representative to the United Nations and Deputy Representative to the United Nations from 1981 to 1984. He held various Presidential appointments in the Nixon and Ford administrations, including: Special Assistant to the President (Political Liaison); Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (Dean Burch); and Special Assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (Robert H. Finch).

lomats are a special category. These acts reflect the vengeance by Armenians and Kurds for what they call the inhuman treatment their nationals suffered more than 60 years ago at the hands of their Turkish overlords.

Terrorism today has become a major danger for nations and individuals. It is steadily growing. There are literally several terrorist acts every month. From November 1985 till January of this year there were nearly 40 terrorist attacks by more than 10 various organizations directed against the life and property of citizens of 21 nations. The most disturbing aspect of present-day terrorism is that it is not the work of isolated individuals but rather its sponsorship by states and manipulation by governments which consider it an important element in the conduct of foreign policy. These states provide a base for terrorist organizations and supply weapons, money, fake-identity papers and even issue to the individual terrorists their specific directives. In so doing, they multiply the effectiveness of criminal exploits.

While terrorist acts against Israel aim at the very destruction of that nation, the general pattern and objectives of terrorism are aimed at undermining the values of democratic nations. A case in point are the murders in Germany by the Red Army faction and those in Italy by the so-called Red Brigades. In France and Belgium there are small but very fanatical and murderous groups claiming to promote pure communism, far different from what they refer to as its watered-down version in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.

Regrettably, present-day terrorism is not everywhere regarded as the serious international problem it represents and is under-estimated in some countries of the Western world. Moreover, in some countries of the Western world, where grave dangers and serious problems exist, intelligence on terrorist movements need to be expanded and improved. There should also be greater cooperation and sharing of intelligence among the Western democracies. We have thus far failed to adopt effective coordinated measures against states engaging in terrorism. Although I recognize that collective action is of limited effect, it can nevertheless contribute to making state-sponsored terrorism less successful. What certainly can and should be done, is to take what may be called negative-collective action. By that I mean that nations guilty of abetting and sponsoring terrorism should be denied participation in political and economic activities leading to advantages and improvements in political contacts and/or economic advantages. Economic sanctions ought not be ruled out but must be carefully considered as to their effects on the guilty nation and on the sanction-taking countries themselves.

We have just witnessed a lack of international common action after the tragedies at the airports of Rome and Vienna. The United States Government failed in securing the adhesion of friendly European nations to their imposition of economic sanctions against Libya. I fully understand the American disappointment and sympathize with the feelings of frustration the absence of European solidarity engenders in America. However, one should bear in mind that the most important European countries, and especially the Federal Republic of Germany, have in contrast to the United States, far greater economic interests in Libya and profitable commercial exchanges with that country. It is at least understandable that these countries hesitate to inflict upon themselves important disadvantages by taking punitive economic measures against Libya. Even a country like the Netherlands, whose economic interests in Libya are marginal, imports oil from that country to a value of about 400 million dollars a year, while their exports to Libya amount to about 250 million dollars. Regrettably, the United States initiated its economic embargo measures without prior consultation or even information with their European friends and allies. Let us not forget that the main reproach of America against France and Great Britain at the time of the 1956 Suez crisis was that these two countries had failed to inform and consult Washington prior to their military action against Egypt. It is still debatable whether the United States was right in opposing the joint Anglo-French action against President Nasser.

At the moment there are about ten countries, of which the principal ones are Bulgaria, East Germany, Iran, Yemen, Syria, Libya and North Korea, which sponsor terrorism and use it as a political weapon against mainly the United States and the free countries of Europe. There are indications that some of these countries are even coordinating their terrorist activities by assigning to each, special targets and priorities.

One sometimes hears that the United Nations should initiate common international action against terrorism and lay down an internationally accepted code of behaviour. But, apart from the near impossibility of obtaining consensus and agreement and avoiding the use of the veto in the Security Council, it has been proved recurrently that so-called decisions or resolutions by the United Nations are of strictly marginal value. Even an agreed code of behaviour will in all probability not be honored. In my opinion, by far the best forum to consult on terrorism and to devise a common measure to combat it, is the North Atlantic Council of NATO. It is a group of like-minded countries, all democracies and all united in a strong defensive alliance. Actually, on several occasions, the Council addressed the problem and lengthy

discussions took place. Nonetheless it has proved difficult to agree on common measures and action. This is partly due to the fact that under NATO rules all decisions must be arrived at by consensus, that is to say, unanimity. Where in the past, there have been countries somewhat reluctant to fully commit themselves, more recently, there appears a greater readiness to assume common responsibilities and to agree unanimously to a program of unified measures. Some days ago a United States Deputy Secretary of State took part in the NATO Council discussions on this burning issue before visiting the capitals of the NATO-members. While the outcome is yet unclear, the response of the Council members seemed rather positive.

Although, to reiterate, there are in this world several centers of terrorist activity, the Near East is by far the most important area of organized terrorism. Although Yassir Arafat may deny it, it is certain that the PLO harbors terrorists who engage in murderous attacks against individual Israelis, and institutions like embassies, banks or EL AL offices — even against states and individuals accused of being pro-Israel.

Let us take note of the fact that terrorism has effects far beyond the individual act. As an example I can cite that the mere announcement that targets in the Netherlands would be subjected to "armed action" by Libyan commandos was enough to immediately result in massive cancellations of already booked hotel accommodations by American travelers to the Netherlands involving about 1500 American tourists. In short, the effects are often greater than the individual act. Furthermore, in nearly all countries concerned, very elaborate and costly measures of protection have been worked out around military targets, airfields, embassies and important buildings, while a number of high-placed individuals are being day and night bodily protected by security guards. Yet even the best of bodyguards doesn't guarantee the safety of the individual. Aldo Moro, the distinguished Italian statesman, was day and night protected by four security guards. It did not prevent him from being abducted and later murdered after his four security guards had all been killed while trying to protect him. In other words, complete protection can never be achieved because a terrorist is free to choose his place, time and weapon. Still, there are measures which can be taken. It was recently discovered that Austrian-made submachineguns of a plastic material have found their way in an appreciable number to training camps in Libya and Yemen. These weapons are undetectable by security devices on airfields and I submit that the most intense scrutiny as to their possible destination should be undertaken before a license for sale be given. Although I myself have not heard concrete

evidence, I have been informed that the complete freedom for individual citizens to buy weapons in, amongst other countries, the United States and Belgium has likewise facilitated the procurement by terrorists of arms.

There is no state in which terrorism has had such fatal consequences than that of Lebanon. The civil war presently destroying the social and economic fabric of this country was triggered by a succession of acts of murder and terrorism of ever escalating violence with the ensuing direct intervention by Syria and consequently by Israel. Those, like myself, who have known this hapless country during the golden days of tranquility and material well-being, are noting with deep sadness the dismemberment and chaos in which the Lebanon is presently plunged. It all started when the PLO, driven out of Jordan about 15 years ago, established its headquarters in Beirut.

Let me recapitulate some conclusions.

Terrorism is a festering sore on the body of our planet. It is too much to hope for a total cure and extermination of this plague. There are, however, a certain number of measures aimed at containing and subduing its spread and effectiveness.

First, there should be more cooperation between the various Western democracies, including Israel, as well as a thorough exchange of information among security services and governmental agencies.

Second, there should be established a special international body consisting of high ranking and fully qualified representatives which as a matter of routine should come together several times a year to exchange experiences, information and proposals for stepping up anti-terrorist actions.

Third, a thorough check on the sale of small arms and ammunition and its ultimate destination should be instituted.

Fourth, punishment of captured terrorists should be meted out according to the same rules in all countries concerned. I wonder whether it would not be possible to reestablish the death penalty for terrorist acts which have resulted in the murder of people.

Finally, countries with state-sponsored terrorism should, whenever possible, be subjected to punitive actions, for instance in the realm of air travel, the denial of economic advantages, the prohibition of arms sales and certain carefully chosen measures of direct economic boycott.

While repeating that a complete cure of this evil and the consequent virtual elimination of international terrorism cannot be achieved, I feel that more can be done to combat it along the lines I have just set forth.

Dr. Joseph Luns (Netherlands) was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1956 to 1971 and served as Secretary-General of NATO from 1971 to 1983.

TERRORISM IN RELATION TO DISINFORMATION

ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. That's about the only diplomatic thing I plan to say here this evening.

Perhaps I should explain what I'm doing here. I still don't know what I'm doing here because I was asked by Joe Churba to come to Israel for the International Security Council meeting to talk about terrorism. I couldn't quite believe what I was hearing because that's like selling ice to the Eskimos or taking coal to Newcastle. George Bernard Shaw once received an invitation from a celebrity hunter in London that said Lady "X" will be at home Thursday between 4:00 and 6:00. The author returned the card with a scribbled note which said "Bernard Shaw; likewise." So I think the lesson here is to be brief and to the point. And perhaps there is something I can add to the topic of terrorism, especially from my perspective after 40 years in the media.

The sum total of all the knowledge recorded since the beginning of recorded history going back some 5,000 years, is now doubling every ten years. Yet an extraordinarily few people seem to understand the mechanics of low-intensity low-risk high-pay out indirect warfare. And I submit to you that one of the principal reasons for this is that our mainstream media on both sides of the Atlantic, all evidence of the contrary notwithstanding, continued to portray our self-avowed enemies as misunderstood innocents and our own leaders as the foes of freedom and democracy. And no amount of liberal outrage can alter or attenuate or evade the harsh political reality that our enemies consider themselves to be in a permanent state of war with Western democracies, especially the U.S. and Israel, albeit indirect warfare conducted through a variety of proxies. There is a well-coordinated, carefully orchestrated and deceptively concealed strategy among like-minded radical states, all of them with close links to the Soviet Union, both covert and overt. Their objective is quite simply the expulsion

mation concerning the essential character, direction and targets of terrorism.

The governments and people of free nations must summon the courage and the will to act in concert. We must be serious.

Ambassador Charles Lichenstein
Former Deputy U.S. Representative to the
United Nations Council
Conference Chairman

Joseph Luns
Former Secretary General of NATO
Keynote Speaker

Mario Enchandi Jimenez
Former President of Costa Rica

Francisco Morales Bermudez
Former President of Peru

Gordon Sumner, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USA (Ret)
Former Chairman, Inter-American Defense
Board
Plenary Speaker

William Kintner
Former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand
Working Group Chairman

Robert Morris
Former Chief Counsel, U.S. Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee
Working Group Chairman

Leopold Labeledz
Editor, "Survey" Magazine (U.K.)

Melvin J. Lasky
Editor, "Encounter" Magazine (U.K.)

Shaul Ramati
Former Israel Ambassador to Japan

Joseph Churba
President, ISC

Martin Sicker
Senior Vice President, ISC

scription of the scene as I arrived from the Washington Times at 6:30 in the evening; gives you some idea of the present climate. Wyoming Avenue where I live was blocked off at both ends with a road block consisting of two police cars. There was a helicopter overhead with search lights. There were 40 secret servicemen in our basement, 10 secret servicemen in the apartment, 8 special phone lines had been installed and there was also an ambulance and blood supply. But let me give you a piece of good news, my wife asked the President during dinner about his recent medical checkup and he said, "Well, I was very happy when I came out of the CAT Scan and the CAT Scan was operated by a very beautiful young lady doctor." he explained, "And when I came out of the CAT Scan she told me that my insides were 20 years younger than my outsides."

The only serious part of the conversation was before dinner. The President reminded me that he had set a deadline for the evacuation of all Americans from Libya and that deadline is in two days time, February 1st. He seemed quite serious as he was saying that. He said, "After that they will be on their own and they will stay at their own peril."

I think the biggest mistake that our mainstream media has made over the years is to treat Qaddafi's Libya as an isolated phenomenon and the Colonel himself as some kind of lone wolf operator. He is no such animal. If he were, why did the Soviet fleet position itself off Libya's coast in recent days? Surely not to protect an isolated madman. Moscow is protecting a very valuable asset. In fact, in my last two interviews with Qaddafi he threatened to join the Warsaw Pact. I see that in recent stories he is described as a man who purchased \$12 billion worth of Soviet weaponry. It is a hell of a lot more than that. He has more tanks in his army — as a matter of fact, he has twice the number of tanks in his army — than the entire French army: 2800 tanks versus about 1300. He has 550 war planes, which is about the size of the British Royal Air Force. His Mukharabat, his secret service, has been under East German so-called technical management since 1974. And I think most of us have already forgotten that in July of '83 he told Eric Rouleau of *Le Monde* in a famous interview that he stood today as the principal guarantor of close relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab world at every conceivable level; and he mentions specifically militarily, politically, economically and ideologically. Qaddafi's ability to sponsor international terrorism with impunity is directly related to his de facto alliance with the Soviet Union. He is not a Arabian Idi Amin. Qaddafi has interfered with a mix of terrorism and lavishly funded subversion and overt military aggression in the

internal affairs of no less than 45 countries since he took over in 1969. When I was with King Hassan of Morocco last February shortly before taking over this job, King Hassan told me about a phone call he had received from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia begging him to intercede with his new friend Qaddafi because several hundred Libyan terrorists disguised as pilgrims were at that time in Mecca, with instructions to seize Mecca and would King Hassan please intercede with his friend Qaddafi and stop it, which apparently was done, according to King Hassan.

Libyan plots to mine the Red Sea, sink a ship in the Suez Canal, bomb the Aswan Dam which would have wrecked the Egyptian economy, take over the holy city of Mecca, assassinate myriad Arab leaders, and a number of European leaders as well, are all plots that have been uncovered in the last two years. And all, incidentally, conveniently overlooked by our media in their reporting of the most recent crisis. To argue, as some did in Israel recently, that the perpetrators of the December 27 terrorist attacks against Rome and Vienna airports came from Syria, not Libya, is to beg the issue. The states that sponsor terrorism know no borders. Abu Nidal and his cohorts are equally at home in Syria as in Lybia, not to mention South Yemen, Cuba, Nicaragua, etc.

Italian Prime Minister Craxi, again we have forgotten, stated a year ago in February, that Nicaragua hosts 44 of Italy's most dangerous terrorists. The statement was corroborated, at least in part, by a former Red Brigade terrorist who said that at least five of his former comrades now serve as noncommissioned officers in the Sandinista Army. BARRICADE, the official Sandinista news organ, also confirmed the presence of the Basque ETA terrorist brigade in Nicaragua. And we know from that very famous incident when Soviet supplied Libyan military cargo aircraft were detained in Brazil, that Nicaragua is a major recipient of Libyan military aid.

Nicaragua also played host to Iranian Prime Minister Mousavi, symbolic of the common ground between Islamic religious fanatics and the Marxist-Leninist state that sponsors international terrorism.

What does all this have to do with a Palestinian solution, which some well intentioned but naive people on both sides of the Atlantic believe is the root cause of most acts of terrorism. I think this is what the Texans call a "blivit" — ten pounds of horse feathers in a one pound bag.

Claire Sterling, known to all of us, when she wrote "The Terror Network," you will remember was excoriated by her liberal colleagues for mindless anti-communism. Professors Ray Cline and Yonah Alex-

ander, who wrote that famous book, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, which didn't just produce one smoking gun, but at least 15 smoking guns, disappeared almost without a trace.

Now hopefully we have something that's going to make an impact at least for a few weeks, it just came out in Washington three days ago, *Hydra of Carnage: International Linkages of Terrorism*, with an opening chapter by Bill Casey.

So not surprisingly, very few people seem to understand the hidden connections between, for instance, the Beirut slaughter of U.S. Marines which happened to coincide with pacifist marches all over Western Europe, and what the Soviets and the Cubans have been up to in Central America and in the Caribbean and in Angola and in other places.

The ideological obfuscation generated by so-called socialist countries and that other great list known as so-called progressive regimes has produced first confusion and then the corruption of thought and language. The Soviets as we all know have succeeded in identifying themselves and their expansionism in the world with the idea of progress and now, once again, disarmament. An anti-communist, and most liberals are afraid of that label, is now described as a person who is hostile to change and progress. Forgotten, of course, are the thousands of documents captured by the Israelis in South Lebanon in 1982, including the evidence that the Soviet Union had secretly supported Iran's seizure of American hostages and that thousands of terrorists from all over the Arab world and some 20 non-Arab countries had been trained in PLO camps with Soviet assistance and that hundreds had gone on to advance training in the Soviet Union, East European countries and Cuba.

Forgotten too are the thousands of documents that we captured in Grenada with still more irrefutable evidence including a massive disinformation campaign in the United States, to make the likes of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop seem like a moderate who favored pluralistic democracy.

Forgotten, too, are the Bulgarian trainers who teach car bomb techniques to Islamic terrorists in a camp near Damascus that is run by the Syrian Secret Service. This is the same Syrian Secret Service to which a KGB group is attached, that plotted the U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut and the killing of 241 marines on October 23rd, 1983.

U.S. intelligence, the National Security Advisor and the then Chief-of-Staff of the White House, Jim Baker, had the names of the three Syrian officers involved but the conventional wisdom at the time was that retaliation against Syria would trigger nuclear confrontation be-

tween the U.S. and the USSR. Again, nonsense in all its irrational splendor. You know all these things better than I do. There are 110 known terrorist groups in the world today, 80 percent of them Marxist, Marxist-Leninist, and the others Moslem or other religious fanatics. Sixty-six identified training camps exist in Marxist or pro-Marxist countries, fifteen in Libya alone. In the past year French counter-intelligence has discovered Islamic Jihad safe houses for Iranian and other Shi'ite terrorists in mosques all over France. In the past few months German counter-intelligence has uncovered links between East German agents based in West Germany and the new alliance between the Red Army Faction, the Fighting Communist cells in Belgium and Direct Action in France. And this is the new alliance that has taken credit for a wave of terrorist bombings against NATO and U.S. military installations, particularly in West Germany.

What would the end result be of such a campaign? Quite simply, the decoupling of the Western Alliance, the surge of neutralism in Europe and a rekindling of isolationism in the United States.

Forgotten too, since memories are so short, even among experts, is the fact that Qaddafi in May of '84 chaired a week-long meeting in Tripoli of well-known international terrorist leaders, including Mrs. Shigenobu, who is the head of what's left of the Japanese Red Army. She had just arrived on a flight from Damascus. Louis Farrakhan, incidently, was in Tripoli at the same time. I'm not saying that he's a terrorist leader, but it's interesting that he was there at the same time. This was carried by the Libyan News Agency.

Shortly thereafter, Qaddafi announced again, in a statement carried by the Libyan News Agency, that "We (meaning Libya) are now in a position to export terrorism, liquidation and arson to the heart of America." That was also the time when he made that other statement: "We must force America to fight on 100 different fronts all over the world." Yes, that infrastructure is in place in the United States today, whether it's the Syrian network, the Libyan network, the Palestinian network, the Cuban network or the Puerto Rican network, they are in place despite what FBI Director Judge William Webster tells us, that all is well under control. They just happen to be dormant.

I'm sure you've discussed during your conference high-tech terrorism, so I won't go into it, but some groups are obviously about to mutate into high-tech terrorists, because the states that sponsor them have indeed acquired the capability of using nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons. It is very difficult to explain to a West Point trained general who commands 15,000 men in West Germany that ten terrorists can neutralize him. But that surely is the lesson that the KGB

and others have learned from October 23, 1983 when two Kamikaze driving five-ton trucks literally triggered the unravelling of the entire Western position in Lebanon and changed the course of history.

When Alexander Haig in early 1981, in his first press conference, said that there was a growing body of evidence that the Soviets were promoting, training and funding international terrorist groups, media stars were quick to dismiss these generalizations as cold war rhetoric. But the media had no compunction whatsoever about acting as a conveyor belt for one of the most successful disinformation campaigns in recent years. For almost four years we heard a steady drumbeat from the East echoed by the Western media, to frighten Americans and Europeans into believing that the world was on the brink of a global nuclear holocaust and then blaming that horrible prospect on one Ronald Reagan.

It was in Havana, as I can reconstruct things, at the first Tri-continental Solidarity Conference in January of 1966, that the Soviet Bloc secretly decided on a two-track approach for destabilizing Western democracies.

On a government-to-government level it was to be peaceful co-existence, the smokescreen behind which the Soviet Union was to achieve military supremacy by the mid-1980s, while the West was, of course, being disarmed psychologically.

The Soviet Bloc's strategic deception apparatus is controlled by the thirteenth chief directorate of the Soviet general staff, for which the U.S. has no equivalent. Nor could we have an equivalent given the fish bowl environment in which we have to operate.

On another level the 1966 Havana Compact agreed to organize, fund and train international terrorist groups through a variety of proxies.

I personally saw a lengthy French intelligence report dated May 11, 1978. The signature on the report was Alexandre de Marenches, who was then head of the French external intelligence service, and this report explained how this global conspiracy had unfolded ever since.

Turkey, as member of NATO, was a victim of a reign of terror at the height of the period that we now refer to as "detente." All carefully masterminded by the KGB via the Bulgarian dais which operated a multi-million dollar heroin-for-guns ring based in Sofia, Bulgaria and which supplied tens of millions of dollars worth of weapons to terrorists on the far right and on the far left to keep that reign of terror going until the military were reluctantly forced to take over to try to restore a semblance of law and order in 1980 in a member country of the NATO alliance. Again we have forgotten that in his political testaments smuggled out in the spring of 1980, Dr. Andrei Sakharov warned us

go on the offensive because the alternative would be the slow erosion of our still free societies. The world is watching.

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to take very seriously indeed links between the KGB and its proxies on the one hand and international terrorist groups on the other. Our liberal media not only ignored this warning but didn't even bother to carry relevant excerpts. To deal with state-sponsored terrorism, from Libya, Syria, Iran, South Yemen, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea with whatever measures are deemed appropriate, including preemptive actions as recently advocated by Secretary Schultz, would of course be a very good beginning. But it would not, in my judgment, go to the heart of the problem, and that problem is our resolve, which frequently seems to border on the paraplegic, to face the fact that our enemies consider themselves to be in a permanent state of war against Western democracies.

No amount of pious pleas for summit meetings and spectacular quick-fix nuclear disarmament deals can change that fact of international life. To face up to this will require courage, of course (which means doing what we are afraid to do), firmness, fortitude and, I think, the application of military power. It would be a case of terminal naivete to argue that these groups are not interconnected or are not agents of state-sponsored terrorism or that they are not manipulated by proxies of the Soviet Union. The fact is that they are indeed just that. I think it is high time, especially in the United States, that terrorism become a non-partisan issue and that the media lean over backward to avoid the catchy over-simplifications that typecast anyone who speaks or writes on the Soviet and Soviet proxy connections as right-wing. To err is human, to overlook it is what the liberals call progressive education.

These days to be effective the U.S., either alone or in concert with Israel, must move militarily. I say militarily because we have stripped ourselves of covert capabilities and are forced to operate in what I previously described as a "gold fish bowl environment." The liberals protest that if we retaliate militarily we will kill innocent civilians. Was it really necessary to identify individual Nazis who had killed Americans before we entered the war against the Third Reich? Economic sanctions are of dubious utility given the tepid disposition of our European allies. Retaliation by force against all known terrorist training camps entails risks, but the talk-tough-and-carry-a-small-stick approach is far riskier. I would go further and close by saying that we must direct a proportional military response against genuine military targets in any state that directs terrorist actions against the United States. It is a war, though be it undeclared and by proxy, against Western democracies. We cannot remain on the defensive. We must

STATE RESPONSE TO ACTS OF TERRORISM

Yehuda Z. Blum

The question relating to the justifiable state response to acts of terrorism touches upon some of the essential problems of contemporary international law, such as the concepts of the non-use of force, aggression, reprisals and self-defense, as well as the interrelation between these concepts.

I propose to deal today merely with state response to externally stimulated terrorism, i.e., terrorism transcending the boundaries of the target state and not indigenous to it. It is externally stimulated terrorism operating from a sanctuary state against the target state that poses some serious problems for international law, while indigenous terrorism is normally dealt with under domestic criminal law.

To be sure, the instances of genuine indigenous terrorism seem to be nowadays the exception rather than the rule. The self-styled Symbionese Liberation Army in the U.S. would appear to qualify for such a designation.

Yet the typical terrorist of the mid-80s is considerably less self-sufficient. In the typical sense, the latter-day terrorist will be trained abroad in a sanctuary state that is not favorably disposed towards the intended target state or its regime, and his subsequent activities will also be financed by sources external to the target state. Frequently he will set out on his mission from the territory of the sanctuary state, either with its blessing or at least with its knowledge or acquiescence, and not infrequently he will also return to the sanctuary state on the completion of his mission.

It therefore becomes obvious that the traditional civil war concept often is not applicable to the situation here under consideration. Even so-called civil wars are frequently no longer authentic civil wars. Spain in the 30s, Greece in the 40s, Lebanon in the 50s and 70s, the Dominican Republic, Katanga and Biafra in the 60s, Bangladesh and Angola in the 70s, are but a few examples demonstrating the decisive foreign involvement in so-called civil wars.

It is imperative to stress the inapplicability of the civil war concept to externally stimulated and abetted terrorism situations in view of the fact that sanctuary states have generally attempted to evade international responsibility by alleging that the acts of terrorism emanating from their territory were in fact manifestations of a civil war.

From the point of view of world order, the ideal response would be for the target state to request that the terrorists either be extradited to it by the sanctuary state or punished by that state itself.

However, it is eminently unrealistic to expect the sanctuary state to cooperate with the target state in combating terrorism emanating from its territory, given the fact that terrorist activities are normally carried out with the encouragement or at least the tacit acquiescence of the sanctuary state. Quite often such terrorist activities are merely yet another and extreme manifestation of the sanctuary state's desire to subvert the target state or to topple its regime, thus reflecting the state of tension prevailing in their relationship.

For these and other reasons the target state will often have to seek out the terrorist itself, and this may involve large-scale movement of military force across international boundaries or armistice lines. It is here that the target state may find itself confronted with a serious dilemma stemming from the widely-held belief that under the provisions of the U.N. Charter and the legal regime created thereunder, it is unlawful for a state to resort in its international relations to the use of force except in cases of self-defense, as defined in Article 51 of the Charter. More specifically, the target state, in addition to being plagued by terrorist attacks, may also find itself the object of community condemnation for its alleged recourse to military reprisals which are now commonly held to be prohibited under the U.N. Charter. Thus, the U.N. Declaration of October 24, 1970 on "Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" provides that "states have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force."

States are in fact known to have formally disassociated themselves from military reprisals which they regard as an illegitimate and impermissible use of force, as distinct from their inherent right of self-defense. Typical of state attitude in this respect is the letter sent on May 29, 1974 by the then Acting U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Kenneth Rush, to Professor Eugene Rostow of the Yale Law School, in reply to the latter's suggestion that the U.S. endorse the right of military reprisal under the self-defense clause of the U.N. Charter. Mr. Rush wrote, *inter alia*:

As you know, it is the established policy of the United States that a state is responsible for the international armed force originating from its territory, whether that force be direct and overt or indirect and covert... You would add a complementary principle, namely, that where a state cannot or will not fulfill its international legal obligations to prevent the use of its territory for the unlawful exercise of force, the wronged state is entitled to use force, by way of reprisal, to redress, by self-help, the violation of international law which it has suffered.

As you know, resolution 2625 (of the U.N. General Assembly, i.e., the Declaration of Friendly Relations referred to above)... contains the following categorical statement: "States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force." That injunction codifies resolutions of the Security Council which have so affirmed.

The United States has supported and supports the foregoing principle. Of course we recognize that the practice of states is not always consistent with this principle and that it may be sometimes be difficult to distinguish the exercise of proportionate self-defense from an act of reprisal. Yet, essentially for reasons of the abuse to which the doctrine of reprisals particularly lends itself, we think it desirable to endeavor to maintain the distinction between acts of lawful self-defense and unlawful reprisal.

As Mr. Rush rightly points out, state practice is not altogether consistent with the professed condemnation of reprisals. Indeed, "this norm of international law has acquired its own a "credibility gap" by reason of the divergence between the norm and the actual practice of states." Suffice it to mention here the French bombardment of Sakiet Sidi Yussef in 1958, the United Kingdom attack on Harib, Yemen in 1964, United States action in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1965, and the numerous incidents along the Sino-Soviet border since the mid-60s to demonstrate that all the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council have on one occasion or another resorted to the use of force under circumstances which it is difficult to characterize the exercise of their right of self-defense, unless Article 51 of the Charter is stretched beyond its commonly accepted interpretation. Nor have lesser powers refrained from following great power lead on this matter. The recourse to force under circumstances other than self-defense proper has in fact become so widespread that it may legitimately be asked whether this state practice has not eroded whatever validity the pro-

hibition of reprisals may have required, high-sounding statements to the contrary notwithstanding.

Indeed, there exists a respectable body of doctrinal authority which has been maintaining in recent years that military reprisals may still be permissible under certain exceptional circumstances. At the same time, it must be stressed however, that the dominant view regards reprisals involving the use of force as impermissible and recognizes self-defense as the only exception to the general prohibition of the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.

This, of course, raises the highly germane question regarding the borderline between permissible self-defense and impermissible reprisals. Is it reprisal or self-defense when a state's armed forces attack a commando or guerrilla group which has completed its mission and has returned across the border? Does the answer to this question depend on whether there is a reasonable expectation that this group may penetrate again into the target state as soon it eludes the pursuing forces? These and similar questions clearly show how blurred the borderline between reprisals and self-defense may become on occasions, and how difficult it is to offer a clear-cut distinction between the two. Despite these obvious difficulties surrounding any attempt to distinguish between these two forms of self-help, states have in the past maintained that such a distinction was indeed possible. Thus, for example, the British delegate told the Security Council in 1964 that,

There is, in existing law, a clear distinction to be drawn between two forms of self help. One, which is of a retributive or punitive nature, is termed "retaliation" or "reprisals"; the other, which is expressly contemplated and authorized by the Charter, is self-defense against armed attack.

However, it has been pointed out that: This seemingly simple distinction abounds with difficulties. Not only is the motive or purpose of a state notoriously difficult elucidate but, even more important, the dividing line between protection and retribution becomes more and more obscure as one moves away from the particular incident and examines the whole context in which the two or more acts of violence have occurred. Indeed, within the whole context of a continuing state of antagonism between states, with recurring acts of violence, an act of reprisals may be regarded as being at the same time both a form of punishment and the best form of protection for the future, since it may act as a deterrent against future acts of violence by the other party.

To this it may also be added that the prohibition of the use of force

under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter obviously cannot be divorced from the obligation imposed on states under Article 2(3), that is, to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. These two Charter principles are in fact two sides of the same coin. A state that is unwilling to settle peacefully its dispute with another state and prefers to harass that state by means of terrorist raids and incursions into its territory, can scarcely be entitled to invoke in its favor the rule regarding the non-use of force in international relations. Regrettably, doctrine and practice alike seem to have placed a much heavier emphasis on Article 2(4) than Article 2(3). Yet it is difficult to conceive how Article 2(4) can usefully and effectively operate on the international scene without Article 2(3) being regarded as an indispensable corollary for its operation. Any construction that would sever or otherwise upset the intricate relationship that exists between these two Charter principles could only benefit the international lawbreaker. Unfortunately, the developments that have taken place over the past four decades would seem to amply substantiate this view.

Be that as it may, in view of the fact that recourse to armed reprisals has been repeatedly condemned by states and international organizations as a violation of international law, it would seem preferable to examine the alternative self-help channel available to states, namely self-defense, as a possible and legitimate state response to externally stimulated terrorist activities. Admittedly, this shift from reprisals to self-defense may be considered by some as an exercise in semantics, which it probably is. Yet the name-game appears to be *en vogue* in international society (including international lawyers), and given the indisputable potency of word symbols, there is little point in disregarding this aspect of international life.

In order to determine whether a military response by the target state against the sanctuary state may be termed as self-defense, it is essential first to define the legal character of the terrorist acts themselves and of the responsibility of the sanctuary state arising in connection with them. A convenient point of departure on this matter may be found in the works on *Oppenheim-Lauterpacht*:

States are under a duty to prevent and suppress such a subversive activity against foreign governments as assumes the form of armed hostile expeditions, or attempts to commit common crimes against life or property.

Indeed, the encouragement by a state of armed bands, the purpose of which is to carry out hostile expeditions on the territory of another state, as well as all forms of assistance granted to them and even their

very toleration on the state's territory have come to be regarded as an "indirect aggression," although there are some writers who believe that the giving of military aid and comfort in the form of arms, training, resting facilities, "volunteer" aid, etc., should be designed as an aggression pure and simple. To be sure, the definition of aggression adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 14, 1974 contains a more narrow concept when, in referring to the dispatch of armed bands, it terms as aggression merely —

the sending by or on behalf of a state or armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state of such gravity as to amount to the acts (of aggression) listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.

It is, of course, noteworthy that this rather narrow wording of the armed bands clause of the aggression definition is a result of the fierce opposition to the inclusion of the traditional concept by the Arab and some of the African states, who feared that any broader wording, which would have reflected the commonly-accepted view of state responsibility for the activities of armed bands, would have made them internationally accountable for the acts of terrorism originating from their territories. Yet it has to be remembered that the acts of aggression enumerated in Article 3 of the Definition of Aggression are not exhaustive, and that therefore other traditional forms of aggression will still be regarded as such, despite their absence from the definition.

The next question to be discussed here briefly is whether acts of terrorism are in the nature of an "armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. For it will be recalled that under that article, the right of self-defense may be exercised "if an armed attack occurs" rather than in response to acts of aggression in general.

Much turns here on whether one is inclined to give a narrow or a broad interpretation to the words "if an armed attack occurs." A number of considerations will have to be taken into account here, and among these the quantitative element is of very great significance. In other words: the degree of terrorist activity is relevant in that it may help assess the justifiability or otherwise of the plea of self-defense. Obviously, one would have to treat an isolated terroristic act emanating from the territory of one state and carried out on the territory of another state differently from an act of terrorism which constitutes but one link in a long chain of such acts, particularly when it is obvious that acts of such an intensity could not have been carried out without the encouragement, or at least knowledge or toleration, of the sanctuary state.

Moreover, in the latter situation it is even conceivable that while each of the acts of terrorism, when viewed separately, probably does not qualify as an "armed attack," the totality of such acts does reveal such a pattern. This is the so-called "Nadelstichtaktik" (tactics of the needle prick) referred to by some German international lawyers. Supporters of this concept — occasionally also referred to as the "accumulation of events" theory — hold that while each needle prick in itself may probably not amount to a serious intolerable injury to the victim, the overall effect of such needle pricks may be very serious injury and an intolerable provocation.

As Dr. Higgins has put it:

... If a state has been subjected, over a period of time, to border raids by nationals of another state, which are openly supported by the government of that state; to threats of a future, and possibly imminent, large-scale attack, and to harassment of alleged belligerent rights, may it use force in self-defense, in anticipation of the continuation of such action?

... that question, thus phrased, must be answered affirmatively — but always with the proviso that the action on self-defense is proportionate, in nature and degree, to the prior illegality or the imminent attack.

Another aspect that makes the needle-prick theory highly relevant to this discussion is the element of proportionality. As is well known, self-defense has to be proportional to the armed attack to which it responds or which it anticipates. If each of the needle pricks to which the target state of terrorist activity is subjected is taken in isolation, then a massive response by it may naturally seem excessive and disproportionate to the injury to which it is intended to respond. If however, such response is viewed against the broader context of violence to which that state has been subjected, i.e., the totality of needle pricks, an entirely different picture may emerge. It has been rightly observed that a long series of subversive activities may sometimes put the target state in greater jeopardy than one single massive conventional blow. In fact, it would appear that it is extremely difficult — to the point of being almost impossible — to apply the traditional concept of proportionality to responses to acts of terrorism.

Another difficulty directly related to this notion of proportionality stems from the fact that it is often impossible for the target state to single out for its response the terrorists within the sanctuary state, without at the same time hitting other individuals not directly involved

in the terrorist activities. Such a result will naturally be exploited by the sanctuary state to present the target state's self-defensive responses as an act of counter-terror.

The impossibility to confine self-defensive responses to the terrorists themselves, as well as to the official agencies of the sanctuary state, stems largely from the fact that terrorist organizations tend to seek cover and shelter among the general population. The inevitable outcome of this is that any attack on terrorist headquarters or installations also exposes others besides the terrorists themselves to the risk of being hit in the process. Yet it has to be remembered that from the legal point of view the target state, in responding to an act of terrorism, is entitled to regard the sanctuary state itself as the aggressive attacker, irrespective of whether that state has been unwilling or merely unable to curb the terrorist activities from its territory.

This latter aspect is worth mentioning for it has been suggested that target states should be restricted in their responses against sanctuary states if the latter appear to be unable — as distinct from unwilling — to curb the terrorist organizations operation from their territories. It is difficult to visualize, in the existing international constellation, how an objective determination could be made as to whether a sanctuary state was merely unable — though willing — to suppress the terrorists operating from its territory. Even if such a determination was somehow possible, it would still be difficult to see the relevance of this argument to the matter here under discussion and the “sovereignty” of a state made up of rights and corresponding duties.

Finally, mention ought to be made here also of the possible relevance of the attempts made by certain terrorist organizations to justify their activities by reference to the right of self-determination of peoples. Thus, it has become fashionable in recent years to attempt to deny the right of self-defense to states responding to terrorist provocations whenever the terrorist organizations involved in such activities purport to fight for self-determination and national liberation and their claim is recognized by states or international organizations. Some support to such claims seems to have been lent by certain passages in the Declaration on Friendly Relations and the Definition of Aggression and also by some of the now customary ritualistic incantations of the U.N. General Assembly adopted in their wake.

Suffice it to say here that there appears to be absolutely nothing in the U.N. Charter to justify such claims. The U.N. is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members. The right of self-defense is recognized by it as an inherent right (the French version speaks of “natural” right; the Spanish version of an “imminent” right;

the Russian version of an “inalienable” right). Thus any attempt to deprive a state of this inherent and natural right would not only be legally ineffective in respect of a right which antedates the Charter and exists independently of it; it would also be in clear violation of the Charter principle of equality of states. It must also be remembered that the concept of self-determination is permanently subordinated to the dominant purpose of the U.N., that is, the maintenance of international peace and security. No state or group of persons may therefore legitimately breach the peace in it alleged advancement of any other purpose, for such other purpose simply has no legitimate independent existence outside the context of international peace and security.

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THE RADICAL ENTENTE: REVOLUTIONARY ANTI- IMPERIALISM IN THE 1980s

Dr. Avigdor Haselkorn

Ever since the early 1980s, a core radical group of countries comprising Libya, Syria, Iran, North Korea and Cuba, has attempted to coordinate a wide-ranging strategy designed to expel the United States military, political and economic presence from key world areas. In essence this Radical Entente has been pursuing in concert what its leaders individually, and at times jointly, have advocated in public.

It should be made unequivocally clear at the outset that when the term "coordinated" is used to describe the radical expulsion strategy two meanings are intended:

1. In specific instances the radical countries have sought to operationally coordinate moves designed to harm U.S. overseas interests. Certain direct attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities abroad (e.g. the October 1983 bombing of the Marines HQs in Beirut) have been the result of such coordination. The same holds true with regard to radical activity designed to stretch U.S. forces thin. Frequently, core radical leaders have also described visits with their fellow revolutionaries as aimed at "coordinating stands in the struggle against the common enemy — U.S. imperialism."

2. More importantly, it is not suggested that Entente leaders conduct a "conference call" prior to every anti-U.S. operation. Nor is such a "call" necessary. Rather, it is imperative that we understand these countries present union via a shared ideology, a *Weltanschauung*, which identifies America as their common enemy and prescribes principles of response. The consensus among the core countries that they are "brothers-in-arms standing in the same trench against U.S. imperialism" creates a pronounced and widely-shared willingness to support each other by independently embarking on policies and acts inimical to U.S. interests. Moreover, the common objective of expelling America dictates in the minds of the core leaders a basic need for joint action due to the enormous power imbalance in U.S. favor. In the words of Libyan leader Mu'ammarr al-Qaddafi:

There must be a state of alliance in order to destroy the imperialist bases and drive the imperialists back to their borders.

The outcome of this shared anti-American ideology is a strong conviction among Entente leaders that their independent activity against the United States was permanently supported by the other core members whose own struggle against imperialism benefits theirs. In this sense the radical expulsion strategy is a coordinated campaign as each anti-U.S. activity is generally designed to support another: damaging "imperialist domination" in one front makes the promise of repulsing its "talons of aggression" from another that much closer to reality thereby enhancing its imminence.

Origins of the Radical Entente

Five historical developments, all taking place in the late 1970s, had helped to crystallize the core radical countries into a purposeful coalition:

1. The initiation of the Camp David peace process by Egypt's President Sadat in November 1977, which brought the formation of an Arab Steadfastness Front as a counter.

2. The fall of the Shah of Iran and the installation in power of the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime in early 1979.

3. The July 1979 seizure of power by the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, which had a profound impact on the policies and revolutionary doctrine of Cuba.

4. The establishment of a U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) which most of the radical countries have perceived as a direct military threat.

5. The political philosophy and special circumstances associated with Ronald Reagan's 1980 election campaign. Following the unprecedented and prolonged period of international humiliation, Reagan's election was clearly perceived by the radical leaders as signalling America's determination to regain its lost stature most likely by "settling the account" with the core countries.

Sources of Hostility Towards the United States

It has to be made abundantly clear that despite their participation in the Radical Entente, individual motivations for seeking "membership" cannot be overlooked. In the longer run some of the core countries may even become rivals — most notably in the case of future Syrian-Iranian relations. However, in the final analysis the fact remains

that these countries are presently united by a potent and lasting bond: deep-seated enmity toward, and profound anxiety over, Washington's intentions which combined has generated a demonstrated capacity to collaborate in harming U.S. interests around the world.

The most common reasons for the enmity of the five core radicals toward the United States include:

1. The U.S. is perceived as the leader of the Western world whose ideology and culture are viewed as challenging the values of both Muslim and communist members of the Radical Entente. Thus, it should be noted that save for Syrian President Hafez al-Asad, all other leaders of the core countries have come to power on the basis of grand, at times universal, doctrines designed to always substitute Capitalism, and in the case of Qaddafi's Third Universal Theory and Khomeini's Islamic Fundamentalism, also Socialism. The source of the ideological threat is manifestly American given the Marxist-Leninist tenets of Castroism and Kim Il-Sung's Chuche idea, and Muslim preoccupation with the "Westoxication" of their otherwise traditional societies. After all,

Who learns Russian, listens to Radio Moscow, watches Soviet films, buys Czech watches, or invests in the Ukraine? It is the United States and Western Europe, rather, that influence Muslims everywhere... Fundamentalists view the culture of the United States and Western Europe as the main threat because its influence so greatly exceeds that of the Soviet bloc.¹

2. America is seen as a potential direct military threat.

3. Since all of these countries hold irredentist claims against neighboring states, or have actively engaged in exporting revolution, they perceive Washington's pro-status quo policies as a cogent brake, whose removal is deemed crucial, on the way towards realizing their territorial ambitions.

4. Syria, Libya and Iran have attempted to harm American interests because of Washington's strong support for Israel. The latter is also perceived as a powerful regional check against these countries' aspirations, possibly acting in cohort with Washington.

Novel Aspects of the Radical Strategy

Four aspects are responsible for turning the radical expulsion strategy into a qualitatively new, serious threat to U.S. security interests:

1. A coordinated effort: While the core countries, with the exception of Iran under the Shah, have had a long history of supporting radical

causes (like terrorism), the novel aspect is the concerted nature of the expulsion effort, including since the early 1980s a growing interest in collaborating to harm the instruments of U.S. foreign presence and influence.

2. Motivation: It has been customary among Western observers to assume that underlying these countries' radical motivation are, first, the need for hard currency — this particularly in the case of North Korea's military support for Iran and Libya. Second, the search for political clout or legitimization — allegedly the belief among core leaders that revolutionary zeal and pronounced militancy were conducive to the cementing of their political power at home, as well as their claim for leadership of the world's "liberation forces".

In contrast, the current paper suggests that the main motivation driving the Entente's anti-Americanism is ideological and strategic. In turn, this guarantees that the participants would be less prone to compromise and more likely to "go all the way" against their implacable enemy — the United States.

3. Range of anti-U.S. activities: In recent years the study of radicalism has become synonymous with that of terrorism. By being too narrowly focused Western scholars and analysts have thus contributed to a dangerous fallacy neglecting in the process a wide range of radical activities similarly designed to harm U.S. interests but which are not normally classified as terroristic in nature. For some unexplained reason Western observers have treated ideological subversion of U.S. allies, or the massing of conventional forces on their borders, as a separate, perhaps less ominous, phenomenon unrelated to an overall radical strategy even when carried out by the very countries which at other times were denounced for their sponsorship of terrorism.

4. Target: The prime target of the radical expulsion strategy is the U.S. presence and national security interests overseas. This holds true even when such activities do not physically harm the instruments of America's foreign presence themselves. For instance, the widespread radical subversive effort noticeable in Third World countries is directed mainly against "agent" regimes known for their support of Washington. Removal of such "lackeys" is publicly connected by radical leaders with their desire to see America's logistic infrastructure destroyed as a prerequisite for eventual withdrawal of American power from the area.

Elements of the Radical Expulsion Strategy

The pattern of radical activity discernible since the early 1980s suggests there are three distinct elements to the Entente's expulsion strategy:

1. Dislodging the U.S. of external strategic assets
2. Stretching U.S. forces thin
3. Direct targeting of U.S. presence and interests abroad.

Dislodging the U.S. of External Strategic Assets:

The first operational element of the radical strategy against America involves collaboration in destroying the U.S. politico/military and political presence abroad by decoupling America's allies from Washington. Second, to impede American military deployments in key world areas by undermining their external base structure. Third, to intensify foreign condemnation and domestic opposition to U.S. overseas presence and involvement.

The prime method employed by the radical coalition to achieve these objectives includes a concerted ideological, political and economic subversion campaign launched against Third World allies of the United States. Manifestations of the three interrelated subversive techniques are often visible in an area stretching from the Philippines in the East to Latin America in the West. While it is impossible to detail in the limited space available the evidence supporting this contention several examples will testify to its prevalence:

Sri Lanka, where the United States is planning to build a powerful VOA transmitter, has been the subject of an intensified campaign to destabilize the government there. The *Colombo Daily Sunday Times*, on 22 April 1984, reported what it called a "dramatic North Korean link in the Tamil separatist campaign, while diplomatic sources said Pyongyang might be trying to destabilize the Sri Lankan government because of its pro-Western stance." Accordingly, Tamil separatist radio broadcasts picked up in Colombo and in southern India were said to have been beamed from a North Korean ship anchored in the narrow straits between India and Sri Lanka.

The weekend broadcasts — in English, Sinhala and Tamil — calling for a separate Tamil state in the north and east of Sri Lanka and advocating terrorism, are said to be beamed by a powerful transmitter which is shifted around to avoid jamming... The ship was anchored outside the new surveillance zone set up (in early April) by the National Security Ministry between Sri Lanka's coast and the maritime boundary with India and safely out of reach of the Navy and the Air Force.

In May 1984 Sri Lanka's Minister of Transport M. H. Mohamed

conducted a 5-day visit to Libya to "inquire about allegations" that Tripoli has been supporting the Tamil insurgency. Mohamed told newsmen in Madras, India that Libyan Foreign Minister Ali Abd as-Salam at-Turayki had "dismissed" charges about his country's connection with the Tamil separatists.² These denials, however, do not square with numerous reports indicating Libyan involvement with the Tamil insurgency. More importantly, from a longer term perspective, is the establishment by Libya of various Islamic institutions in Sri Lanka ostensibly to attend to the needs of its one million Muslims (7% of the population). This process would likely result in the further radicalization of the Sri Lankan society.

Recently, a representative of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) has confirmed that members of his organization were getting aid from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). He said that LTTE guerrillas have been trained at the Dar'a camp near Damascus, and were also provided with arms and ammunition.³ It may be recalled that during the 1982 "Peace for Galilee" operation, Israeli forces had captured dozens of Tamil "Tigers" who were training with Palestinian terrorists in camps in Lebanon.

Jordan: There is no question but that the Hashemite Kingdom has come under increasing radical pressures in recent months. While partly due to King Hussein's strong and persistent support for Iraq in its war with Iran, the intensification of the radical campaign to topple the Jordanian king could be traced to the growing conviction among radical leaders that Hussein holds a key position with regard to Washington's regional plans. The recent normalization of relations between Egypt and Jordan has been viewed as in line with a new imperialist "conspiracy" to establish a "moderate axis" in the Middle East under U.S. sponsorship to contain and isolate the Libya-Syria-Iran "revolutionary axis." Washington's announcement of plans to assign the Jordanian Army a regional rapid deployment mission did not alleviate these radical suspicions, of course.

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Ubaydat, in a rare moment of political candidness, provided on 15 May 1984 a detailed description of the concerted radical effort to undermine the Jordanian monarchy. Speaking in the House of Representatives, Ubaydat recounted various attempts to ideologically subvert the Kingdom by recruiting Jordanian students at home and abroad to spread anti-monarchical propaganda. He went on to state:

I do not want to discuss this subject too much, but I assure you that hardly a week passes without the authorities impounding

explosives or weapons transferred to this country to be used in this country. These explosives and weapons are not intended to be used in the occupied territories. We are not ashamed to say this... The onslaught is fierce. There are party and political organizations, some of them from the resistance factions and others. Some of them have relations with the host country, some of them have relations with Libya, and some of them have relations with Iran. Even the (Syrian-backed) Fatah dissidents who rebelled against their leadership have a role. They seceded from their leadership and they are now working against Jordan. They sent fresh quantities of weapons to Jordan. Explosives and bombs were seized. There is also the Al-Jihad Organization which is active in Egypt... (This organization) even contacted Iran with the aim of coordinating actions. Weapons were seized. It was revealed that they received training in Lebanon and in other places. There was also another religious organization owing allegiance to Iran, under the patronage of the Iranian Embassy in Jordan. Jordanian citizens were involved. They exploited the Mosques to begin their campaign. They did not name their organization in order to avoid being pursued. Those responsible for this organization visited Iran twice, contacted the Iranian charge d'affaires in Amman, and contacted other sides. This is going on continuously...⁴

Latin America

A former Salvadoran guerrilla who played a "key role" in anti-government raids in San Salvador and was recently captured, disclosed that Cuba has "directed the activities" of the insurgency since 1980 and that the guerrilla leadership was now operating from bases in Nicaragua. The former rebel, Arqimedes Canadas, also known as Comandante Alejandro Montenegro, said in an interview that before 1980 the guerrilla movement was largely "nationalistic," made up of a multitude of political and armed groups. But, he said, it gradually moved under Havana's influence to the point that Cuban military aides specifically advised Salvadoran guerrillas on tactics to cripple the government.

For instance, in meetings he and four other leaders of the People's Revolutionary Army held with four Cuban military officials in Havana and Managua in July and October 1981,

They (the Cubans) said that (in the central front) the principal activity should be the sabotage of electric power and telephone

lines to prevent the national army from using the telephone as a principal means of communication and force them to use only radio.

Canada also confirmed the central role played by the Cubans in providing and transshipping arms to the guerrillas. By June 1980, after the guerrilla leaders went to Havana,

Arms began coming in and the commanders after that meeting did not return to Salvador (but moved their base to Nicaragua)... the majority of the arms was provided by Vietnam, American m-16s. The arms came from Vietnam to Havana. Havana to Managua. Managua to Salvador.⁵

While the Cubans were assisting in the subversion of Latin America covertly, Libya made no secret of its involvement. Abd as-Salam Jallud, for example, stated in March 1984 as follows:

There are Libyans now fighting in Salvador and in Nicaragua. The small Libyan Arab people are fighting in three continents for the sake of the revolution and tide of the masses. The Libyans have managed to fight on a front extending from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Lebanon, Syria, and Chad, to South Africa. Why? For the sake of the revolution of the masses.⁶

Moreover, in January 1985, Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn-Musavi made a trip to Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. In a classic display of Entente practices, U.S. "intelligence sources," within weeks of the visit, were reporting that the Nicaraguan freighter "Monimbo" was heading for North Korea to pick up a load of small arms — including 10,000 AK-47 rifles and 100 portable rocket launchers — paid for by Iran.⁷ The Iranian Prime Minister was also said to have met with members of the Colombian M-19 in Managua and to have assured them "technical and material assistance" in their anti-imperialist struggle.⁸ The question arises as to what role has these interactions played in the sudden abrogation of the cease-fire agreement between the M-19 and the government in Colombia indicated by the spectacular and bloody rebel attack on the Colombian Justice Palace in Bogota on November 6, 1985.

Stretching U.S. Forces Thin

The second element of the radical expulsion strategy involves concerted efforts to force the U.S. to disperse its forces by confronting several fronts simultaneously. The main culprits seem to be Libya and

North Korea with important backup from Syria. Repeatedly, it could be proven that whenever one of these countries perceived itself as facing a direct American military challenge, the other has responded by launching a diversionary strategic move. In March 1983, for example, Kim Il-Sung has actually confirmed the existence of such a scheme by telling Daniel Ortega, the Nicaraguan leader:

If the people of the revolutionary countries put pressure on and deal blows at U.S. imperialism in all places where it stretches its talons of aggression, they will make it powerless and impossible to behave as dominator any longer.⁹

On 2 March 1984, Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi responded by stating:

We must force America to fight on 100 fronts all over the earth... in Lebanon, in Chad, in Sudan, in El Salvador, in Africa.¹⁰

Less than a fortnight later a lone Libyan Tu-22 dropped 5 bombs on the Sudanese city of Omdurman, while "Team Spirit 84" joint U.S.-ROK military exercises were taking place despite strong North Korean protestations. It was the third time in 13 months that the U.S. has responded to such Libyan challenges via dispatch of AWACS planes and/or Sixth Fleet units to the Gulf of Sidra opposite the Libyan shore. At the same time Pyongyang has expressed its gratitude for Libya's "firm support," and Syria has warned America against intervening in Libya by pledging its "full" support.

Importantly, it should be stressed that while these diversionary efforts might be dismissed as insignificant militarily, several considerations need to be taken into account. First, the Soviet Union, either through pre-planning or by seizing the opportunity, could time a major strategic move to coincide with other radical pressures so as to scatter U.S. military resources between several fronts. Alternatively, radical countries' desire to harm U.S. interests is such as to make an independent initiative (e.g. mining of key waterways) in support of a Soviet military move a foregone conclusion.

Second, the size of the diversionary effort depends entirely on its perpetrators. The DPRK and to a lesser extent Libya possess capabilities which in principle allow them greater impact on U.S. overseas military posture by intensifying, if they so desire, the pressure on key U.S. allies. Third, following each of the diversionary interactions evident in the 1981-1985 period, the central Libyan-DPRK activity was followed by a "secondary" interaction with Syria.

Fourth, the United States, by being unaware of true radical motivations, has actually rewarded negative behavior. It is critically important to appreciate that Entente leaders, and Qaddafi most of all, have proven themselves as masters of deception. The Libyan leader has thus not only deceived the U.S. but utilized Washington's very responses to further the subversion of U.S. allies. Aside from confirming radical ability to stretch U.S. forces thin, the frequent dispatch of American military forces has been portrayed as evidence that the Egyptian and Sudanese regimes were "agents" of America whose removal from power was not only called for but in fact divinely sanctioned.

Fifth, it would appear that in addition to specific diversionary operations launched to deflect growing U.S. military presence in the vicinity of either Libya or North Korea, the radical expulsion strategy has attempted to involve America permanently in trouble spots close to its own shores. In Qaddafi's words:

We have fought along with Nicaragua, some miles away from America. Libyan fighters, arms and backing to the Nicaraguan people have reached them because they fight with us. They fight America on its own ground. Backing Nicaragua, Grenada and Cuba means fighting America as it fights us on our borders in the Gulf of Sidra.¹¹

While some observers could thus claim that radical support for Nicaragua has been motivated by cynical self-serving interests, this is hardly the view among core radical leaders. The latter, in fact, frequently served notice that their own challenges to the U.S. have taken pressure off the "progressive forces" elsewhere, including Central America. The radical campaign against America is thus a joint one and its actions interrelated while the claim of self-interest derives from a partial interpretation.

Direct Targeting of U.S. Presence and Interests

As noted on several occasions, strikes on U.S. targets overseas were unquestionably the result of operational collaboration between at least two of the Entente members. Other hits were carried out independently. Such state-sponsored terrorist attacks against American personnel and installations overseas are designed to force the United States to withdraw its presence from key outposts as being too costly. The strikes are also intended to demonstrate Washington's inability to defend its own interests, let alone its allies.

From this particular perspective, radical attacks on defended U.S. facilities is perhaps of greater payoff to the radical expulsion strategy than strikes against isolated, vulnerable targets. The particular traits of the radical thinking have to be recognized if effective countermeasures are to be developed. It may be that defense actually provokes attacks rather than deters them. Besides, forcing the U.S. to boost the defenses of American institutions abroad entails other important benefits as well. For example, in the wake of the December 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait, as well as other official French and Kuwaiti establishments, the *New York Times* on 13 December 1983, observed as follows:

The attackers surely must have known that such bombings will force the Americans and the French to hide behind the prison-camp style barriers which presently protect the American and French embassies in Beirut. But the more isolated these foreign diplomatic missions become and the more repressive the security measures the host countries take, the more fertile the ground for spreading revolutionary ideas. In this sense Beirut is a prime example, where with each passing day of misery more and more posters of the Ayatollah Khomeini seem to appear on walls around town.

The United States could thus find itself in a dangerous and complicated vicious cycle. While neglecting the defenses of overseas installations has brought strong condemnation at home, externally, the hardening of such institutions could prove provocative, and would also seem to involve significant political costs.

In fact, recent evidence may indicate the emergence of a radical version of an "active deterrence doctrine." Accordingly, various radical figures, most prominently in Iran, have sought to explain America's "empty threats"¹², in terms of its bitter experience with the Iranian revolution. Implicitly, continued attacks on U.S. targets are thus rationalized as a means to deter America from intervening in the revolutionary countries. The more would the U.S. come under radical pressure, the less is the likelihood of a forceful American response and the greater the prospect for these regimes' continued survival. Of particular concern are recent efforts by core members to equip themselves with capabilities potentially useful in attacking U.S. naval targets, which has been assisted not only by the Soviet Union, but the greed of some West European countries as well. Such was the case with the supply of French Exocets and Italian SX-404 mini-submarines to Libya. Recently an Iranian defector recounted his training as a

kamikaze pilot in North Korea, and Syrian Defense Minister Gen. Mustafa Tlass alleged that 300 Syrian pilots have practiced suicide attacks against U.S. warships in the Mediterranean.¹³

The Soviet Union and the Radical Entente

Moscow, it has to be stated, does not appear to control the radical expulsion strategy. By all accounts, the five core countries are sufficiently motivated to pursue their anti-American activities independently. However, it would be foolhardy to assume that control is necessary to reap the benefits of the radical campaign against America. In fact, the Soviets could be hardly described as passive watchers-by. On the contrary, ample evidence exists to suggest strong Soviet support for the radical onslaught.

In general, the Soviets seem to be utilizing the intensified radical pressures to further the penetration of the target areas. Moscow has apparently concluded that under the new circumstances, countries in the Middle East and elsewhere would be reluctant to move closer to the United States even if the USSR increases its own regional presence, in order to avoid exposing themselves further to the wrath of the Radical Entente. The result is the new inroads exemplified by Soviet arms offers to Kuwait and Lebanon, Moscow's 9 October 1984 friendship treaty with the YAR, its courting of Jordan (despite strong Syrian objections), and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

With regard to the core radical countries themselves, the Soviets appear to be engaged in a threefold effort:

First, consistent and highly visible efforts to radicalize the core countries even further, while attempting to streamline their hostility exclusively toward the United States. One observer has noted:

Even in the areas where one might attribute a Soviet interest in predictability and stability — for instance on its frontier with Iran — the temptation to score off the West has overridden any innate conservatism about border security.¹⁴

Second, supplying the war. The Soviets have attempted to build up the arsenals of the core radical countries so that they can effectively defend themselves and support each other if confronted by the United States. The recent supply of shore-to-sea missiles to Syria, reportedly "the latest and most sophisticated in the Soviet arsenal... with a 150-mile range and a short reaction time," is a case in point.¹⁵ The provision of SA-5s to Libya as well as sophisticated sea mines is similarly

motivated. The upgrading of the Cuban military, both quantitatively as well as qualitatively, and the resumption of arms deliveries, including 40 MiG-23s, to North Korea, are additional worrisome indications of this trend. Consistent reports have also suggested indirect Soviet involvement in DPRK and Warsaw Pact arms deliveries to Iran.

Additionally, by augmenting the Entente's arsenal the Soviets have in effect allowed the core countries the extension of their military reach into those regions where Moscow has sought to foment trouble and undermine the U.S. position. A striking example of this evolving capability came in April 1983 when four Libyan cargo planes — three of which were Soviet-built Il-76 transports — were intercepted by Brazilian authorities, ostensibly on their way to Nicaragua. A search of the planes uncovered heavy arms, missiles, Czech rifles, a dismantled Soviet training plane and at least five tons of bombs and grenades. Newspaper accounts indicated the arms may have been bound for Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador or Colombia. Interestingly enough, in 1984, Cuba has also taken delivery of its first Il-76 Candid transport plane.

Third, deterring the U.S. from responding to the source. On several occasions Moscow has made it clear that it will not tolerate U.S. military moves designed to respond, and at times retaliate, against certain members of the Radical Entente. For example, Syrian Defense Minister Gen. Tlass, in a statement published in the Damascus daily *Al Ba'ath* on 7 March 1983, indicated as follows:

...the concentrations of aggressors, their armies and fleets, as well as their continued threats will be faced by our continued readiness and training. The army of Tishrin knows how to bring double retaliation against aggressors (i.e. Israel), depending on our Arab masses, and our friends in the world, foremost being the friendly USSR.

One year later, while on a visit to Syria, Geydar Aliyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, reaffirmed his country's support for Syria's militancy:

...the machinery of military-political pressures which was set in motion by the American imperialists malfunctions... Much credit for this goes to Syria, its staunch anti-imperialist policy, which has the Soviet Union's invariable support.¹⁶

A similar Soviet position has been taken with regard to Khomeini's struggle against the arch-satan. Frequently, the Soviets have implied

and/or demonstrated their defensive umbrella over Iran. For example, Moscow had warned Washington against attacking Iran when, in the wake of the 1980 failed rescue mission, reports indicated that America was planning to punish Tehran by seizing Kharg Island. On that occasion the Soviets had also massed troops and conducted military exercises on their border with Iran. Earlier, in January 1980, the Soviet charge in Mexico City was reported to have offered Soviet troops to defend Iran against a feared U.S. invasion.

It has to be recognized, at the same time, that since the U.S. has rarely entertained serious thoughts of striking at the core countries, Moscow's protective image is both "effective" and cheaply acquired, especially given Washington's verbal belligerency.

Some Western observers have noted that the USSR may in principle be more concerned over, at least Islamic, radicalism than America itself. They cite Soviet geographical proximity, Russia's ethnic composition and the anti-superpower rhetoric of some core radicals as elements which should cause Soviet apprehension. Consequently, it is suggested that the Soviet Union may be open to some sort of superpower cooperation in checking the radical threat to world stability. However, it is impossible to underestimate the difficulties standing in the way of such a hypothetical condominium:

1. It is illogical to assume that as radicals become more effective against U.S. worldwide presence and influence, Moscow's interest would diminish. Besides their vehement anti-Americanism, what attracts the Soviets to the Radical Entente is the geographical spread and geopolitical opportunities which the five core countries potentially offer.

2. Cooperation with the U.S. in checking radical countries is liable to undermine Moscow's position in the Third World.

3. The radical threat could become an important bargaining chip in Soviet hands, especially if Moscow operates from a position of weakness vis-a-vis the United States. In other words, by utilizing their widely-held image of "puppeteers" the Soviets may gain more strategically than by professing concern. On the other hand, a U.S. offer to establish some sort of bilateral cooperation will tacitly acknowledge existence of such an American perception conferring, in turn, important politico/strategic advantages on the Soviets.

Conclusions

While some in the West, solely preoccupied with combating terrorism, have been endlessly searching for the "smoking gun," a macro

view of the radical expulsion effort produces an entirely different "surprise": repeated, clear-cut and public confirmation by leaders of the core radical countries of their extreme malintentions towards the United States. This in spite of fears of retaliation by an enemy which some among them have themselves described as an "arch-satan," and the secretive nature of certain techniques they have employed against America's interests and presence overseas.

Indeed, the contradiction highlighted between Western assumptions favoring secrecy and dissociation vs. the actual open reaffirmation, at times boastful representation, of these countries' deep enmity, seem to have thrown intelligence estimates off balance causing many to judge radical warnings as non-credible. Till now the only beneficiaries of this confusion have been the leaders of the Radical Entente. Further, the widely-shared belief that these leaders' conduct is either "erratic" if not outright "crazy" proved in total variance with the fact that in their anti-U.S. campaign they have displayed rational judgment and fanatical attachment to the goal of driving America out of their spheres of influence.

Several other intelligence fallacies and conclusions seem to be brought up by the preceding analysis:

1. There is dangerously little attention given in the West to the role that ideology plays in guiding some international actors.

2. Radicalism has been consistently and wrongly equated with terrorism.

3. Extremist intentions openly communicated have normally been dismissed as non-credible and often ignored.

4. Assumptions that militant utterances are often a cover-up for willingness to negotiate may be flawed. In fact, it is equally plausible that in the case of the Radical Entente a willingness to negotiate is nothing but a cover-up for hostile intentions.

5. The assumption that a strategic issue acquires its true import only if presented in a Soviet context disregards the painful lessons of America in Lebanon.

6. At the same time it is impossible to overlook the record of Soviet interactions with the core radical countries. Moreover, the assumption that the Soviet-Entente link has resulted from Moscow's failures in the Third World is not only arguable, but more importantly irrelevant to the problem at hand: the consequences for the U.S. of the increased attractiveness of radical countries to Soviet foreign and military policies.

7. Deception is a game which even small powers may effectively play to their own advantage and to the detriment of an unenlightened

U.S. policy, primarily due to America's continuous preoccupation with the Soviet threat alone.

8. There is significant, recurring and detectable evidence of regular and highly intensive anti-U.S. politico/strategic interactions between all the core radical countries to warrant viewing them as members of a coalition and their activities as governed by common ideology and strategy.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Daniel Pipes, "Fundamentalist Muslims and U.S. Foreign Policy," *International Briefing*, Washington, D.C., The Heritage Foundation, 10 August 1984, pp.7-8.

² Colombo International Service, in *FBIS* (SA), 4 May 1984, p.G2.

³ *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv), 10 December 1984.

⁴ Amman Domestic Service, in *FBIS* (MEA), 16 May 1984, pp.F1-F3. Also Ubaydat's interview in *Al-Majallah*, cited in *Ar-Rai* (Amman), 9 June 1984.

⁵ In *New York Times*, 28 July 1983.

⁶ Tripoli Domestic Service, in *FBIS* (MEA), 15 March 1984, p.Q5.

⁷ *Newsweek*, 18 February 1985, p.19.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 4 February 1985, p.17. A "senior official" of the Reagan Administration was quoted as saying the "obvious concern (with regard to Musavi's trip) is that the Iranian terrorist capability might be transferred to this hemisphere or somehow used to train and equip other parts of the worldwide terrorist network.", *Baltimore Sun*, 26 January 1985.

⁹ KCNA (Pyongyang), in *FBIS* (AP), 21 March 1983, p.D11.

¹⁰ Qaddafi's speech marking the 7th anniversary of the Jamhriyah, Tripoli Voice of Greater Arab Homeland, in *FBIS* (MEA), 5 March 1984, pp.Q5-Q6.

¹¹ *New York Times*, 2 September 1984.

¹² For use of this term: Iran's President Seyyed Ali Khomeini, Tehran Domestic Service, in *FBIS* (SA), 20 May 1985, p.I3. For similar formulations, Ayatollah Khomeini's address to Qom Seminary teachers, Tehran Domestic Service, in *FBIS* (SA), 1 July 1985, p.I2.

¹³ Interview in *Al-Qabas* (Kuwait), 17 April 1984.

¹⁴ Sharam Chubin, "Gains for Soviet Policy in the Middle East", *International Security*, Spring 1982, p.130.

¹⁵ Jack Anderson, in *Washington Post*, 2 August 1984.

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TERRORISM: THE WESTERN CONNECTION

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The subject of state-supported terrorism in the Western Hemisphere has been successfully obfuscated over the past 25 years by a combination of factors. These factors include, inter-alia, a clever campaign of misinformation and disinformation by the Soviets, the Cubans and more recently, the Nicaraguans; a sympathetic media which consistently turns a blind eye on the problem, and an unwillingness amongst the free democratic countries of the Western Hemisphere to believe that terrorism could possibly destroy the social, economic and political fabric of their societies.

Whatever one's point of view, the problems of state-supported terrorism are finally percolating into the consciousness of the American people. The bloody events of recent months in Bogota shocked even the most sanguine and subsequent attempts to lay the blame for the senseless massacre on domestic political problems have been rejected by all except the sympathizers of the radical left.

It is now time for the people of the Western Hemisphere to address this problem to understand the roots, function and future of this phenomenon. Only then will there be any possibility of working out realistic and politically viable solutions.

The Roots

The roots of state-supported terrorism in the Western Hemisphere are found—not in the region—but as elsewhere, in the long-standing policies of the Soviet Union. As ably argued by Claire Sterling, the Kremlin has trained, financed and supported terrorists of every ilk by using the full spectrum of tools at their disposal to maximize the political gains in the Third World. Through the use of surrogates and manipulation of well-intentioned but misguided intellectuals, the Soviets have been able to advance their destabilization campaigns for almost two decades. More recently, a number of defectors from the

Soviet Union have confirmed what many observers had known earlier — that the evidence clearly indicates a trail leading to Moscow.

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, Director, Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, brings the problem into sharp focus:

There has been an unmistakable rise in state-supported terrorism over the past few years, with Iran, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and Nicaragua as the most active, determined, systematic supporters of terrorist groups and activities. The combination of direct government assistance in arms, explosives, communications, travel documents, and training with fanatic individuals or groups goes a long way to explaining the shift in tactics toward bombing and armed attack and the accompanying increase in the casualty rates from terrorist attack. The fact that the states I have mentioned — except Iran — receive large quantities of Soviet arms, which, in turn, flow directly to the terrorists, is hardly coincidental.

Latin America is the third great center of terrorist incidents, accounting for approximately 20 percent of the events worldwide. Social, economic and political turmoil have served to prolong existing patterns of insurgency, which have assumed terrorist dimensions in some countries — particularly Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru. There has been some spillover into Latin America from terrorism in the Middle East and Europe, particularly Iran and Libya. Cuba and Nicaragua provide the strongest encouragement and direct support for terrorist activities in other Latin American countries, particularly those with insurgency situations. They, of course, receive support from the Soviet bloc. In addition, Italian and possibly other leftist terrorists have found refuge in Nicaragua.

The Strategy

While state-supported terrorism is a global phenomenon, its objectives and strategies vary considerably depending upon the environment and opportunities presented to Soviet planners and their surrogates. The Western Hemisphere illustrates the case.

The traditional and historical position is for the Hemispheric states to oppose any penetration by a non-hemispheric power. However, crumbling of the Monroe Doctrine to be replaced by the Brezhnev Doctrine has been and continues to be a major strategic objective of the Soviet leadership.

Destruction of the security and political system of the Western

Hemisphere, thereby exposing the American southern flank, and forcing the withdrawal of U.S. forces from NATO appears to be a major cornerstone of Soviet strategy. The efforts to achieve this goal is of mixed results, but years of blood and toil have brought about the Cuban and Nicaraguan bases which actively and continuously spread state-supported terrorism throughout the hemisphere. As recently stated by Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense,

Worldwide terrorism could be reduced to “manageable proportions” if it was not backed by the Soviet Union and its allies...

Fidel Castro and Daniel Ortega have developed a special dimension to their institutionalized form of terrorism. I refer to the drug and narcotic connection which provides a financial base for terrorism. Simply stated, the drugs flow north and the arms and money return south. This strategy operating for a number of years has been quite successful. The fact that high officials of the Cuban Navy are under indictment in this country for these crimes is largely ignored by our media. Nor is the video-tape of a high Sandinista official loading drugs on to an aircraft destined for the United States given the serious media attention it deserves.

It is somewhat ironic that the drug erosion within our society finances the external subversion of our security interests. It is rather depressing to see Jesse Jackson exhorting the youth of our country to reject the drug scene while at the same time he and his wife publicly support the very states and leaders who are moving drugs into this country. I find it unreasonable to believe that Jesse Jackson and his staff are ignorant of the facts. Yet this man remains a major political figure in our country — publicly supporting and embracing Louis Farrakhan who supports Libya's Qaddafi.

President Reagan's statement of 2 January 1986 is very much to the point:

And the link between the governments of such Soviet allies as Cuba and Nicaragua and international narcotics trafficking and terrorism is becoming increasingly clear. These twin evils — narcotics trafficking and terrorism — represent the most insidious and dangerous threats to the hemisphere today.

Solutions

Ambassador Oakley has recently suggested necessary measures, some of which have been adopted. They include:

-Enhance physical and operational security of diplomatic posts

- Increase security officers
- Build new, more secure embassies where necessary
- Increase Foreign Service security training
- Increase cooperation with foreign governments who control countries from which terrorists come and those in which they operate.

Ambassador Oakley recommends maintains that "it is essential that Congress... approve... carefully controlled counterterrorist assistance to Central American police forces..."

In the civil aviation field, it is necessary to improve security through air marshalls, better security screening at U.S. airports and airlines abroad, and to increase pressure on other governments to tighten security. Interestingly enough, the U.S. is currently providing training and technical assistance to 20 governments in this field.

Aside from stressing enhanced cooperation with foreign governments, there must also be a willingness to consider the use of force in appropriate instances as Secretary of State George Shultz advocates.

In conclusion Oakley stresses the use of economic pressures and arms embargos to countries such as Iran and Libya. It is equally important to stand fast and not retreat or close military bases, or abandon our businesses — or change our policies.

State-supported terrorism in the Western Hemisphere can be dealt with somewhat differently from terrorism in the Middle East or Europe. Cuba and Nicaragua are not supported by the rest of the countries in the region. On the contrary, Cuba and Nicaragua are perceived as dangerous and for that reason are being increasingly isolated in the region. Direct military action to cope with state-supported terrorism and narcotics trafficking could be relatively easier not only because of geographical considerations, but also because a number of mechanisms are in place. These mechanisms, if activated, would greatly assist in the inter-American political and military processes which would furnish the underpinnings for military action. The Organization of American States (OAS) might furnish the political forum where the difficult and complicated will to direct military action could be forged. The appropriate sections of the IATRA (Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) more commonly known as the Rio Treaty could be invoked and the Inter American Defense Board (IADB) directed to assess the threat and recommend appropriate military action, multilateral or unilateral as the circumstance indicates. In addition, the critical and vexing problems of intelligence could be partially solved through the international staff of the IADB, provided that the Sandinista representative who sits on the board is excluded. Fortunately, the

Cubans were ejected from IADB when Fidel Castro was seen as part of the Security threat to this hemisphere.

These problems could be easily managed if the U.S. government would take the lead in bringing the countries of this hemisphere together to confront the problem. This multilateral approach is perhaps easier in this Hemisphere where the energy problem is not so closely connected to the Arab world and where geographic conditions are more favorable.

If the multilateral approach to military action is not successful, I fail to see an alternative to unilateral military action. Should Cuba and Nicaragua continue to support terrorism, drug trafficking and subversion, I believe the American people will demand direct military action to cope with this clear and present danger to our country, our value system — and most importantly, the well-being of our families.

As succinctly summarized by Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, in an address before the Americas Society in New York City, December 9, 1985:

We are seeing increasing solidarity in the fight against terrorists and international narcotics traffickers. The key countries in Latin America and the Caribbean recognize the enormous threat posed by the *narcotraficantes*, not only to the health and well-being of their people, and ours, but also the health of their democracies. The deadly alliance of drug dealers and terrorist groups such as the M-19 in Colombia has become painfully clear. It's quite a racket. The terrorists provide protection to the drug dealers, and the drug dealers give the terrorists a share of the profits. Drugs, arms and dollars are the currency in which they do their lethal trading.

U.S. assistance and leadership in the war against narcotics and terrorism are absolutely essential. We have the resources that the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean lack. We provide training and equipment to anti-narcotics units. We share information and methods. We provide funds to support narcotics crop eradication and to enhance the capacity to prevent and deter terrorist attacks.

Latin American governments do not want the U.S. to do their job for them. However, they want the job done, and they do need our help. With regional cooperation and leadership, we can make

great strides — because the overarching goal for all of us is the same. Assistance, training and political and diplomatic support are more easily provided, and accepted, when the larger cause is the defense of democracy.

Lieutenant General Gordon Sumner, Jr., USA (Ret) is the former Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board.

REMARKS ON TERRORISM

Joel Lisker

Thank you Ambassador Lichenstein. Your excellencies, ladies and gentlemen.

Let me begin by telling you something about the subcommittee which I represent.

The Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism was formed in January 1981, at the outset of the 97th Congress by Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, because he recognized the need to have a separate subcommittee within the Senate which would focus on the issues related to internal security and terrorism. At the same time, he assigned the subcommittee responsibility for oversight of the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration, including budget and authorization matters as well as their investigative priorities and practices. As you may know, the former Internal Security Subcommittee of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, which was abolished in 1978 by the then Judiciary Chairman devoted considerable efforts, with a high degree of success, to some of the issues which we are now addressing. However, they, like ourselves, found the media largely unreceptive and, therefore, much of the work which has been performed by both subcommittees has until recently been ignored by the mainstream press.

The subcommittee consists of five members. Its Chairman, Senator Jeremiah Denton of Alabama, with whom many of you are familiar, is a Vietnam legend. After having endured seven years and seven months in North Vietnam prisons and after having been subjected to the most heinous torture, he, during an interview staged by his captors, courageously blinked in morse code the message "torture," thereby alerting U.S. intelligence to what was happening to U.S. prisoners.

The other Majority members of the subcommittee are Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, Senator John East of North Carolina, and Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky. The Minority members are Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont and Senator Dennis Deconcini of Arizona.

In the past few months the U.S. demonstrated its capacity to respond effectively to a specific terrorist incident, a capability which many believed did not exist. Whether this response by the United States ushers in a new era in dealing with international terrorism remains to be seen, however all of us will agree that that episode provided a welcome departure from earlier responses which were largely rhetorical.

As you may know, the Central Intelligence Agency defines terrorism as "the threat, or use, of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups with the intent to shock or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims." The definition, I believe you will agree, makes the distinction between terrorist and freedom fighter a highly subjective one.

The definition which we prefer is one developed by Doctors Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander of CSIS for the subcommittee. It is:

The deliberate employment of violence or the threat of use of violence by sovereign states (or sub-national groups encouraged or assisted by sovereign states) to attain strategic and political objectives by acts in violation of law intended to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened.

Recent events make clear that acts of terrorism may be initiated, supported or even carried out by a government as well as by a group or faction. Terrorism has involved groups seeking to overthrow specific regimes (Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the FMLN in El Salvador), to retaliate for specific grievances (the PLO, Hiz b'Allah, Islamic Amal, Islamic Jihad), to achieve political redefinition (Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army, Basque ETA), or even to undermine international order as a whole (the Japanese Red Army).

Most important to Free World interests, Senate hearings on terrorism during the last five years have brought out sufficient evidence to conclude that there is more to terrorism than just a series of unrelated violent events perpetrated by a number of unrelated groups. We are now able to see clearly the relationship among Marxist-Leninist propaganda, drug trafficking, insurgency and terrorism directed against Western democracies.

There is a clear pattern in Soviet supported and equipped insurgencies seeking to destabilize, by revolution, whole regions such as Southern Africa; to politicize established religion, such as in Nicaragua, and to export violence against the democratic governments of neighboring

states in order to divert attention from the insurgency itself, as Nicaragua has done in El Salvador and Costa Rica.

It has happened in North Korea; Southeast Asia; North, Central, and South Africa; the Caribbean; and now in Central America. Reputedly, it has happened in Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan. As we are all painfully aware, it continues in the Middle East today. In fact, as you know, the Soviet Union itself, because of its support of Syria, became the victim of Shia terrorist attacks in Lebanon. That has been a rare phenomenon so far as the Soviets are concerned and their reported novel handling of the matter may be a tactic worth considering.

The trends are clear. Cooperation among terrorist groups is increasing. In some instances drug money finances the violence. The lethality of actions is becoming greater as more powerful and sophisticated weapons are employed. There is increasing disregard for the innocent, and greater willingness to use kamikaze for the cause. More diplomats and world leaders are targets. More states are supporting terrorism through asylum, training, arms, funds, explosives and advisors. The USSR, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Bulgaria, Nicaragua, Cuba, East Germany, North Korea, Vietnam and Angola are all supporting terrorist activities.

The pattern that emerges from studying the testimony obtained, in more than 60 hearings before the subcommittee and more recently in joint hearings with the Foreign Relations Committee, is that terrorism is the most widely practiced form of modern warfare. It is both a major force and trend in international affairs. It has the strategic advantages of low risk, low cost and total deniability. The blood is only on the hands of the fanatics, the surrogates in that kind of warfare.

Set against a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary backdrop, wars of national liberation are plunging the poor deeper into poverty, greater repression and famine. That is happening while established Western democratic governments are tied down in efforts to confront a growing burden of terrorism directed against them. As a rule, heavy security and controlled media prevent terrorism from occurring in the communist bloc countries. The bulk of intense terroristic violence is aimed against the free governments of the world, and those other governments, perhaps incrementally and somewhat less democratically aligned with them.

How are we generally dealing with this new form of warfare directed against our commerce, soldiers, diplomats, facilities and leaders? Not that well. Congress and the administration sometimes adopt self-de-

feating, even contradictory, measures that often put us at odds with our allies and friends. Most people are outraged at the violence of terrorism as depicted by the daily news, but that rage is short-lived. Few realize how we are being distracted from dealing with an underlying problem. Some governments appear to take a hard line on dealing with terrorists — no negotiations — while others give in readily to terrorist demands, developing foreign and political policy as well as releasing convicted terrorists in order to avoid violence and confrontation at home.

Finally, some nations generally opposed to armed retaliation advocate the use of economic sanctions against states that foster terrorism; however, other nations increasingly undercut the sanctions. Seldom are economic sanctions applied consistently, or even-handedly, or for the long term. The recent experience of the United States in seeking support of our European allies with respect to the economic sanctions imposed by President Reagan against Libya underscore this point.

Not too long ago we saw the case of one hardline state, Israel, exchanging 1,100 prisoners, including many terrorists, for three Israelis, an act inconsistent with Israel's announced policy and one which brought back into circulation some of the worst criminals who have ever walked the face of the earth. Moreover, some commentators believe that this highly disproportionate exchange set the stage for the TWA flight 847 drama in Beirut in mid-June of last year.

The recent retaliatory attack by Israeli armed forces against PLO headquarters in Tunisia which was used by some as justification for the seizing of the Achille Lauro will be used as an excuse for increased additional terrorist activity against both Israel and its principal ally, the United States. Moreover, while many people sympathize with Israel for the seemingly incessant terrorism perpetrated against it, the action will, in my opinion, ultimately work to Israel's detriment. After all, it was the U.S. among others that asked Tunisia, a moderate Moslem country, to allow the PLO to locate there.

Direct measured costs of terrorism to the U.S. are that since 1980, terrorist incidents overseas have taken over 350 American lives, and more than 400 Americans have suffered injuries. More than 100 Americans are acknowledged to have been kidnapped or taken hostage. I would emphasize that many more are victims, but the ransoms are often paid quietly by companies seeking to avoid publicity and who write off the ransoms as a business expense. We have come to a point in our history that requires that we establish both a foreign and domestic policy for dealing with the obvious threat.

The 1985 figures show:

<u>United States</u>		<u>International</u>	
Dead	22	Dead	912
Injured	139	Injured	1,282
Total	161	Total	2,194

In terms of our overall interests, the costs of state-sponsored terrorism applied against the U.S. are very high, and still uncounted in strategic and economic terms; loss of access to raw materials, to trade advantages, sometimes to any trade at all. The synergism between drugs and terrorism costs us dearly in social, economic and security terms.

In responding to terrorism, this administration and others before it have often promised to take swift, firm action. We have said it will pay no ransom, release no prisoners, nor yield in any way to terrorist demands. We have espoused a policy of no concessions.

Yet those statements of strong anti-terrorist policy did not stop the attacks on our Embassies in Lebanon, or the October 23, 1983, suicide bombing attack of the Marine compound at Beirut airport with the loss of 241 American lives. It did not stop the bombing of U.S. installations in Kuwait, and the continuing murders of U.S. military and civilian personnel abroad, most recently four Marines and two American civilians plus seven others in El Salvador.

The attack on our Marines in Lebanon sparked a government-wide search for an effective anti-terrorist strategy. Previously, our policy had been one of hardening potential targets, strengthening capabilities for contingency planning and crisis management, and improving offensive training of personnel to enable them to better cope with violence abroad.

When, on April 3, 1984, Secretary of State Shultz declared that Western countries had to consider preemptive action against terrorism, he signaled a potential transition in the U.S. strategy to preemptive or retaliatory measures, a pro-active strategy. The new policy was reported as being embodied in National Security Decision Directive 138, which the President signed that day.

Some observers maintain that retaliation can best be accomplished by clandestine operations. It is argued that covert actions can be selectively targeted, are less expensive and less likely to bring international condemnation. That implies, however, a covert capability that, some experts argue, is not generally present, and does not satisfy the public's demand that terrorists be publicly punished.

Critics of the covert approach, who endorse a more open response, argue that executive orders on intelligence activities signed in the wake of Watergate by President Ford and thereafter by Presidents Carter and Reagan prohibit government employees from participating in any assassination attempts. Moreover, in March 1984, just one month prior to the signing of NSDD-138, President Reagan rejected a proposal to relax the ban on assassinations.

In my own view, since the executive order was promulgated by the President, it seems to me that he has the power to relax its application on a case by case basis — perhaps by a secret executive order.

The implementation of a new, active counter-terrorist strategy will raise a number of questions for all of us. Any such measures will presumably be based on evidence that specific groups are involved in or are about to initiate terrorist actions.

Since terrorists, by the very nature of their activities, do not operate with signed contracts, and the states that sponsor terrorist operations are not likely to admit their participation and plans, the new policy sparked debate concerning the techniques by which intelligence is collected, evaluated, disseminated and acted upon. Considering the sensitive sources and methods involved in the collection of intelligence, there are questions about what information can be made public in order to justify U.S. actions, overt or covert.

Terrorist groups, like most criminal organizations, are highly cellular. They enforce strict security and discipline and compartmentalize the flow of information within their own organizations.

In the same vein, extremely accurate and timely intelligence is required to build a case upon which a preemptive or retaliatory strike can be justified to the Congress and to the American people. To be sure, there are always uncertainties in evaluating and assessing the reliability of our intelligence collection, but they are dramatically increased when clandestine activities are the focus of the collection effort.

The penetration of a terrorist group is one of the most difficult assignments that an intelligence agency may be called upon to undertake.

If we obtain "inside information" ahead of time, we can preempt the terrorist act, or at least guard against it successfully. But how does one penetrate a terrorist organization? With another terrorist, or at least an individual who will be accepted and assimilated into the groups. That is not a job for gentlemen. We must deal with some pretty unsavory people, and should something go wrong, the political costs could be extremely high. It takes years to develop agents. They must be recruited from among the indigenous population, fluent in the lan-

guages and customs. The nature of their relationships with the intelligence agency must be scrupulously protected. That of course raises another question: Can we keep a secret? One has only to pick up a copy of *The New York Times* or *The Washington Post*, and the answer is obvious. The news leak has become a highly developed art form in Washington.

There are also legal problems. For example, the intelligence agencies are accountable to the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence. That presents a delicate problem of compliance, while trying not to release information that would jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. Many members of Congress oppose the concept of active defense against terrorists using military or paramilitary force. Some fear that such strikes might lead to deeper involvement in the affairs of other countries and would necessarily involve the question of compliance with the War Powers Resolution.

A policy of preemptive attacks could involve intervention in the affairs of another state, flying into its air space or incursions upon its territory, presumably in advance of an overt terrorist action by the suspected state or its nationals. Such interventions or incursions might be vigorously criticized by the international community, and might well be violations of international law. Criticisms of that nature can be expected in case of retaliatory actions as well. The Israeli/Tunisian example is a case in point.

Counter-measures taken as reprisals for state-sponsored terrorist action appear to be on firmer legal ground. Reprisals in the form of military occupation, naval bombardment, attacks on commerce, embargoes, boycotts, quarantines and blockades may be possible against states supporting terrorism.

If there is criticism of the legality of U.S. anti-terrorist strikes, it is likely to be part of a broader political critique. If raids across the border of an offending state were to be undertaken, or if people who had previously been identified as terrorists were killed, some hostile political fallout would be inevitable, particularly in the Third World. There some countries see terrorism — if state-sponsored — as a legitimate form of protest against what they call colonialism or Western imperialism. The Soviet bloc would undoubtedly be critical, and our allies may offer lukewarm support at best.

By way of example, almost a year ago the South Africa Defense Forces launched a strike against African National Congress safehouses in Gaborone, Botswana. Although the ANC and its military wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe, had for years killed black and white South Africans during terrorist attacks, and destroyed property worth

hundreds of millions of Rand, the South African government was condemned in the world press and in the United Nations for its actions. The U.S. joined in that criticism.

One of the areas in which a greater measure of cooperation would seem attainable is in the sharing of intelligence. Well-founded fears in Europe that intelligence passed to our country can be easily compromised would, however, have to be overcome. Greater cooperation would be useful and important, whether the United States engages in preemptive anti-terrorism strikes or not. I would add parenthetically that Senator Denton's bill, S.276, would deny requesters under the Freedom of Information Act access to government documents regarding terrorism and foreign counterintelligence.

In the view of many experts, successful international collaboration against terrorists can be effected only when the West is ready to put aside its internal differences on how to deal with terrorism, and can mount effective common effort, in organization and resources, to get it under control.

Everyone shares a measure of anger and frustration when terrorist acts occur, and everyone wants to "do something." But whatever we do must be directed at the actual guilty parties and ought not, insofar as reasonably possible, to bring harm to innocent people. In the dark world inhabited by terrorists, that is easier said than done. We still have American citizens being held hostage somewhere in Lebanon, and recent reports and photographic evidence indicate that one of them, Mr. William Buckley, a political officer in our Embassy in Beirut, may have been murdered.

Legislative Initiatives

On the legislative front, I believe, we are moving effectively. In October 1984 Congress passed three of the four administrative bills on terrorism.

1. Enabling legislation for the Montreal Convention on Aircraft Sabotage.
2. Enabling legislation for the U.S. Convention against hostage taking.
3. An Act to authorize the payment of rewards for information about specific terrorists of terrorist incidents.

Finally, although the administration lost on the issue of giving the Secretary of State the authority to designate certain states or foreign political organizations as terrorists and thereby prohibit training or

services to them, the State Department took up some of the shortfall by amending the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations to require those providing military or related training to foreign nationals in the U.S. to have their contracts submitted to the Department of State for approval prior to undertaking such training. Moreover, on 13 December 1985, Senator Denton introduced a number of new pieces of legislation, one of which, S.1940, the International Terrorist Control Act, has among its several provisions one that makes it a crime for Americans or American businesses to serve in or provide training to the armed forces or intelligence agencies of international terrorist groups of the governments which support them.

In October the Senate, by voice vote, passed Senator Denton's bill, S.274, which will require the operators of nuclear power plants to submit the fingerprints of employees with unescorted access to the facilities to the FBI for a criminal history record check. This will go a long way to preventing employee sabotage at these facilities by uncovering unsuitable employees.

He has also introduced the following new legislation:

S.1941-International Terrorism Deterrence Act.

The bill would accomplish the following:

- * Require the Secretary of State to designate those foreign states that provide support, including material aid, training or sanctuary, for international acts of terrorism.
- * The list would be subject to annual review, and a designated state could only be removed by a certification that it had ceased its support.
- * The president would be required to impose sanctions against designated states. All or a portion of the required sanctions could be waived if the President determines a waiver would be in our national security interests.
- * The required sanctions are: Termination of any preferential trade treatment, prohibition on foreign aid, required U.S. opposition to loans from multilateral lending institutions, termination of access to Export-Import bank loans, and either the imposition of additional duties on imports from the designated country or a blanket prohibition on the imports.
- * The President may also suspend the foreign air carrier permit issued to an airline of a designated state.
- * The bill requires the President to negotiate with our allies to get them to impose similar sanctions; and
- * It establishes an Anti-Terrorism Trust Fund to be used to com-

pensate the victims of terrorist acts or to combat terrorism. In addition to any amounts that might be appropriated, revenue from any anti-terrorism import duties would be deposited in the Trust Fund.

S. 1942-Military Installation Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1985

* Introduced December 13, 1985.

* Military installations must be secured from access by terrorists and those who would engage in espionage.

* History indicates that a large number of espionage cases involve defense contractors and their employees.

* Bill would require the conducting of a criminal history record check on defense contractors and their employees when they are to perform contract on a military installation.

* Bill allows the federal government to obtain access to local criminal justice records (states and cities) when conducting check, only where person under investigation consents in writing.

* Information contained records protected by Privacy Act.

In addition to the service and training prohibition contained in S.1940 (above) the bill also provides as follows:

* Creates crime of "international terrorism" for violent terrorist acts occurring outside U.S. and directed against Americans or U.S. government.

* Punishes terrorist acts occurring inside U.S. if directed against U.S. government.

* Criminal Penalties: Imprisonment for any term of years to life or by death, if death results from the terrorist act.

* Improves U.S. extradition statutes.

* Authorizes U.S. government to assist in foreign detection and prosecution of terrorists.

* Authorizes President, with Congress' consent, to use a broad range of powers to deal with countries supporting terrorism, including military force to protect American lives and economic and other sanctions.

He has also introduced S. Con Res. 94 which would express the sense of Congress that the President should declare a state of national emergency with respect to terrorist acts committed against nationals of the United States. Specifically, the resolution states:

That it is the sense of the Congress that the President should:

(1) Declare a national emergency with respect to acts of terrorism directed against the nationals, property and interests of the United States;

(2) Investigate and determine the nature and extent of those assets and holdings in the United States of the groups, organizations or factions responsible for committing acts of terrorism; and

(3) Prohibit transactions involving such assets and holdings in accordance with, and to the extent specified by, the authority granted by section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702).

The purpose of this resolution is simple: If this country can't apprehend the individuals responsible for terrorist acts, we can at least enjoin the terrorists from earning money in this country.

As I have said earlier, we have had more than 60 hearings in the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. Among the most significant were those dealing with Cuba and its role in promoting terrorism in Latin America and Puerto Rico. Also its role in facilitating drug traffic into the United States.

Our hearings on communist support and manipulation of Southern African so-called national liberation organizations won international acclaim. In the aftermath of those hearings, Bartholomew Hlapane, a key witness, a former African National Congress official, was murdered for telling the truth about the ANC and its relationship with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the South African Communist Party and its plans for violent revolution in South Africa.

Finally, for the first time in the history of the two committees we held three days of joint hearings between the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The purpose of the hearings was threefold:

First, we wanted to make progress toward developing a more cohesive policy on terrorism. I believe we made significant progress toward that goal. In light of testimony presented by a cadre of outstanding witnesses, we now realize that U.S. policy is only partially developed, perhaps even fragmented — as it always is when a nation is confronted with a new problem. It is clear that the threats to our interest, the nature and degree of these threats, will determine our needs. From these we set our goals and objectives and develop our policy. From there we can explain the rationale of our policy so that we can build a consensus which will permit us to persevere over the long haul. We can not waiver in our resolve in the face of terrorism. The goal of terrorism is destabilization and many governments have fallen to it already.

Second, we wanted to further inform the American people on the

significance of the terrorist threat to start on consensus formation. Many of our witnesses referred to the naive attitude that Americans have toward terrorism. The excellent testimony, as well as comments made by Senator Denton and his colleagues, has brought a significant body of information before a public forum.

Third, we wanted to establish the fact and make known the wedding of illegal drug traffickers and terrorists. Almost every witness referred to this relationship and resultant problems. The relationship is mutually rewarding, one side providing protection, the other arms and money. Both partners deal in death and human misery. I think the committees established here, for the first time, a clear consensus among all who attended the hearings that drug traffickers and terrorists are increasingly working hand-in-hand.

Vice President's Task Force

Senator Denton and I have personally worked with the Vice-President's Task Force to give them the benefit of what we on the subcommittee have uncovered over the past five years.

Recently we were briefed in some detail by Task Force representatives on their analysis and conclusions. Frankly, I believe Senator Denton is encouraged over the Task Force's progress in a number of vital areas.

He would like to see their function institutionalized in the National Security Council because he believes this issue is of great importance and requires full time staff work. Moreover, he believes the President should have an in-house authority upon whom he can rely to keep him current as need requires on any terrorist situation and on development of policy. From the time it was first established I was directed by Senator Denton to maintain close liaison with the Vice-President's Task Force to augment on a day to day basis his own efforts in this regard.

I appreciate your attention and I look forward to our discussions. Thank you.

Joel Lisker is Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism.

EUROTERRORISM: THREAT AND RESPONSE

Dr. John C. Loulis

Putting aside the case of PLO activities in Europe and the state terrorists' assassination squads, it is quite clear that European terrorists are hardly on their own when launching their "ultimate war". Though one can accept the argument that the Soviet Union, its clients and allies do not coordinate a tightly knit and totally controlled terrorist network, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, one way or another, they support terrorism in Europe. The aim of such support can only be to destabilize Western democracies and open for them more "fronts" that will ultimately weaken them even further. Although the Euroterrorists' goals and those of their supporters might differ in details, they are identical within the wider confrontation between totalitarianism and liberal democracy. In effect, it is rather natural that countries which practice state terrorism in their internal affairs, would support individualistic terrorism—which is ideologically akin to their views—in other countries.

Of course, Euroterrorism has not been created by its non-indigenous sponsors. However, such sponsors have helped European terrorists to become much more effective and dangerous in their activities. The coordination between European terrorist groups—apparent in the past and reinforced recently— together with the various forms of support they receive from abroad, make the Euroterrorists even more so a force to be reckoned with.

European Responses to Terrorism

European response to terror has been a mixed one. Although certain steps in the right direction have been taken, they have remained incomplete. However, the recent wave of "Euroterrorism" appears to have stirred the Europeans to some sort of coordinated action.

There are a series of factors which hinder a common, systematic and decisive European response to terrorism:

a. West European governments have different foreign policies. Consequently, depending on the narrower national "interests" they try to serve, or the broader elements of their foreign policy, they develop different responses to terrorism, thus failing to create a common front. Example, if they maintain close ties with Arab countries, they tend to be softer vis-a-vis Palestinian terrorism or Arab sponsor states (example, Libya).

b. European governments have differing views on the threat of terrorism, the measures needed to deal with it, and the force behind it, depending on their national experience and their ideology. Example, the French socialist Government was initially quite "soft" on terrorism. The case was similar — if not much more extreme — in socialist Greece, where Mr. Papandreou, particularly during his third-worldist phase, was ideologically sympathetic to "national liberation movements" and socialist third-worldist regimes.

c. Finally, different governments react in a different way when negotiating with terrorists. Essentially, few of them show the determination needed in order not to capitulate. In many cases European reactions to terrorist blackmail depend on these governments' ideologies and their overall approach towards specific terrorist organizations (example, those governments more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause tend more easily to capitulate to the demands of Arab terrorists).

It is exactly because of all these difficulties that although a bilateral European cooperation has proved to be fairly effective, a multilateral common approach has become elusive. However, the need for common European action against terrorism is becoming more and more urgent with rising terrorist activity in Europe. Exactly because terrorists internationalize their actions, an international response (and in the case of Western Europe, a European response) is needed. As one analyst has correctly observed:

...modern terrorism is essentially a transnational phenomenon, with groups mounting attacks across state boundaries or against foreign targets in their states of origin. To internationalize operations gives the terrorists tremendous advantages of surprise and choice of targets — and far more scope for evading justice and finding safe havens and active assistance from sponsor regimes. Because there is no single system of law enforcement in international relations, terrorists find again and again that they can get away with murder and make murder pay. ...

It is of course impossible to imagine that on a broader international

level — for example, the United Nations — a common struggle can be devised. As Paul Johnson correctly points out: "the U.N. is useless-terrorist states are among its honored members." On the other hand, a much closer cooperation between Western European countries and NATO countries should be easy to achieve since common values unite them and they all represent common targets of terrorism.

Summarizing the European response to terrorism Paul Wilkinson notes:

...The European democracies have developed a more comprehensive regional system of police and intelligence cooperation against terrorism than any other part of the world (although political and judicial cooperation is at a far more primitive stage: the recent anti-NATO terrorist campaign by left-wing extremists, a loose alliance including the RAF, Direct Action and the CCC, has revealed severe limitations in counter-terrorist cooperation). But beyond this, the will and capacity for international action against terrorism can hardly be said to exist. ...

— In essence what seems to be lacking more than anything else in Europe is a common will, which rises from a shared set of principles guiding anti-terrorist responses.

Let us however, now examine very briefly some of the practical European responses to terrorism:

— In December 1979 the nine E.C. countries signed an anti-terrorist agreement designed to prevent terrorists, who seek refuge by fleeing across European frontiers, from being able to claim political immunity for their crimes. This agreement laid down a list of offenses that would not be regarded as "political" for the purposes of extradition. The crimes listed included:

- * Seizing aircraft
- * Taking hostages
- * Attacking diplomats
- * Using a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm, letter, or parcel bomb to endanger people
- * Or attempting to do any of these things or being an accomplice in such an attempt.

— In September 1984 EEC Foreign Ministers agreed to create an anti-terrorist blacklist to bar people with suspected terrorist links from all ten-member states.

— The same month the French socialist government took a bold

step in the direction of fighting against international terrorism, and particularly in the area of bilateral cooperation with Spain as it decided to extradite three Basque terrorists to Madrid.

— In February 1985 Britain and Italy announced a new extradition treaty; as part of a common front against terrorism.

— The same month the French and German governments announced the creation of a common security group which would:

“coordinate investigations of concrete cases of terrorism by Direct Action and the Red Army Faction.”

This group would also work closely with other European countries. Within the context of this group an anti-terrorist hotline between Paris and Bonn interior ministries was established. Such a move followed a meeting between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and M. Laurent Fabius, the French Prime Minister, visiting Bonn for the first time.

However, in spite of such a development — and this merely illustrates existing problems of cooperation in Europe — Italians accused the French of “sheltering a terrorist headquarters” and claimed that more than one hundred supporters of the Red Brigades live unmolested in France.

— In June 1985 UK Home Secretary Leon Brittan put forward a six-point plan to combat terrorism to the European ministers of Justice, which is worth mentioning:

- * closer cooperation in exchanging information about terrorists and threatened acts of terrorism;

- * the exclusion of known terrorists, including diplomats suspected of terrorist involvement;

- * strict enforcement of the Vienna convention covering diplomat status and immunity;

- * a review of the rules of the Vienna convention to examine whether international terrorism made any changes necessary;

- * a review by every member-state of the Council of Europe to check whether its own laws provided loopholes for terrorists;

- * a review by every member-state of arms sales to see if any were sold to states supporting terrorism.

— Though terrorism was discussed in a June E.C. summit, as a senior French official noted, there were serious doubts as to “whether the European summit was the place to tackle the problem. He said that bilateral negotiations and a tough stand by individual governments was more likely to produce results.”

Thus, once again, it became clear that it is essentially only on a level of bilateral agreements that European countries can reach some type of broad lines of common action.

What is to be Done?

The above enumeration of some European responses to terrorism and the mentioning of difficulties which obstruct a common action, leads however to the obvious questions: How can Europeans become more effective in their struggle against the new wave of terrorism launched in their countries?

There is an initial and hardly surprising reply: They should firstly reexamine their past policies, that is, in the seventies and early eighties, when they seemed to have almost crushed terrorist organizations (particularly in Italy and Germany) and draw the appropriate conclusions for the future.

The measures and approaches that European governments should pursue include:

(a) European governments should lead public opinion in the direction of an uncompromising stance vis-a-vis terrorism. Such a public climate is needed if tough action has to be taken against terrorists. But this of course can hardly be achieved if a distinction is made between “bad” and “good” terrorists. Also, governments which go into fits of indignation only when their own nationals happen to become terrorist targets, will definitely prove to be the weakest links in a common struggle against terrorism.

In essence, this solidarity has to be based on a strict moral code and non-qualified condemnation of any terrorist act. It is in this domain that certain European governments appear to be faltering, thus finally losing the will to fight against terrorism.

(b) The more a government tends to respond vis-a-vis terrorism on the basis of a moral code and the less it relies on some type of cynical “realpolitik”, the smaller is the possibility that such a government will give in to terrorist blackmail. Interestingly enough such a “tough” response is not only justifiable, on moral grounds, but also on purely pragmatic grounds. As *The Economist* noted recently:

...Most sensible governments have learned that quick concessions to terrorism simply multiply the chances of more terrorism. Most terrorists now know they are less likely to reap the political rewards they once thought could be wrung out of governments frightened by panicky public opinion. ...

In effect if the experience of the seventies proves anything it is that capitulation encourages terrorism and that the country that easily gives in to violence becomes, logically, the primary target of more of this violence. A Control Risks Ltd. text notes more specifically states that:

...not to pay ransoms or to release prisoners no matter what the cost to the victim, has been the most effective of deterrents. Between 1968 and 1974 twenty-seven U.S. officials with diplomatic status were kidnapped. The U.S. government resolutely refused to pay ransoms or to make any concessions whatever to political blackmail. As a direct result of this hard line, ten of the twenty-seven were killed and twelve wounded. If the U.S. government had given way it is possible that the number kidnapped would have greatly increased and the number killed would have been far more than ten. ...

Of course many suggestions have been made on how to negotiate with terrorists and existing experience on the issue is considerable. It will thus suffice to say here that governments should not show signs of panic but indicate their firmness. It is obvious that the weaker such governments appear, the more pressure will be applied to them.

(c) International cooperation and intelligence gathering should be strengthened. As an analyst notes "good intelligence has always been the best way to beat terrorists." It was mainly through effective intelligence operations that many terrorist organizations in Europe (mainly in Italy and Germany) have been dismantled, and terrorist attacks thwarted (recently in the U.K.). However, the more effectively a national intelligence network becomes transnational, the better it can deal with a transnational phenomenon like terrorism. As *The Economist* noted recently:

...There will doubtless have to be safeguards to make sure that an internationally-computerized Big Brother cannot poke about in the whole world's private life; but stamping out terrorism more efficiently will be universally applauded. Shared intelligence—about stolen or false passports, for example—can enable cross-checks to be made in seconds about a possibly murderous passenger. The clever terrorist exploits high-tech. It should be even better at countering him...

Furthermore, bilateral or European agreements (some already mentioned) that facilitate a rapid extradition procedure should be concluded, closing all legal loopholes that favor the terrorists. It is about time liberal societies become more concerned with the victims' rather than the terrorists' rights. Also, laws should be toughly enforced concerning crimes of terrorism, and the re-enstatement of the death penalty for terrorist killings should be examined. Finally, the U.S. proposal for an international task force to combat terrorism should be seriously

examined, and the creation of an E.C. task force of this nature should be considered.

(d) Security, should be tightened, particularly in airports, and those not abiding to heightened security measures should be boycotted without exception. Many ideas have been put forward in connection to such a strengthened security operation.

(e) What is finally needed is a coordinated aggressive response to terrorism. Europeans should work closely with all societies which are willing to combat international terrorism (and who do not practice state terrorism of any type) and not hesitate to take bold diplomatic, economic and military measures against those (usually of the state-terrorist type) which support international terrorism. Diplomatic measures should include severance of diplomatic relations. In connection with economic measures, as it has been correctly pointed out:

...most of the states responsible for terrorism desperately need Western goods, weapons and credit. Such benefits should be denied. The democracies should neither buy oil from Libya nor sell weapons to South Yemen. Planes used to ferry terrorists and their weapons must not be allowed to land in the West. If the democracies were to use but a fraction of their economic clout, states sponsoring terrorism would have to rethink their activities and quickly...

Finally, various types of military operations against terrorists should not be ruled out. As Israel's UN Ambassador Benjamin Netanyahu notes...

...coordination among the democracies for military and intelligence purposes is both possible and necessary, especially in emergencies involving hostages. The rescue operation at Entebbe, Uganda, would have been impossible if Israeli planes had been unable to refuel in a friendly African country. Arrangements for such coordination should be formalized in advance among any democracies wishing to join. In concert, they could deny terrorists the certain military immunity they now so often enjoy. Of course, military action is not always feasible or appropriate, but the more credible it were, the less often it would have to be considered...

It is about time that the Europeans respond in a coordinated, unified and forceful manner vis-a-vis terrorism. By now, being a prime target of terrorism for many years they should have learned many lessons and should have devised a number of effective strategies. Instead, they remain largely divided, particularly when having to respond vis-a-vis

“imported” terrorism. At times they do reach some basic level of coordination, mainly when a dramatic crisis arises. However, when the crisis is over, they, relapse into their usual complacent attitude, opting for the easy and soft solutions, which of course, can hardly deal with a phenomenon like terrorism.

Recently, Mr. Oreja, a former Spanish foreign minister and governor-general of the Basque country, declared: “To combat terrorism credibly, Europe’s democracies, which are all committed to human rights and the rule of law, must speak with one voice and act in concert...” Europeans — as recent events keep reminding us — have a long way to go in this direction.

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TERRORISM IN SOVIET THOUGHT

William Mazzocco

Terrorism has become a growth industry. Less than seventy years ago, one band of terrorists took over Russia by first terrorizing Petrograd and later the entire country. Lenin could boast that he and his Bolsheviks were able to assume power with only one Bolshevik terrorist for every six hundred Russians. Today there are approximately fifty terrorist entities, linked together by an “understanding” of their common objective of terrorizing and subverting the nations which rely on parliamentary forms of government and on private enterprise for their social and economic welfare.

The emergence of the “Radical Entente” — the network of states and facilities which develop and sustain terrorism — is akin to the replacement of the Comintern by a more effective instrument of Soviet foreign operations. In the meantime, state-sponsored international terrorism has evolved into a major “weapons system” of sub-conventional warfare. No one should mistake terrorist acts as mere crimes or random killing of innocent unarmed civilians. Its purpose is singular: to undermine and facilitate the disappearance of the nation-state system in the Free World.

In this regard, terrorism by its “progressive” practitioners is fully integrated into their central policy goals. It has its own ethical foundations. The societies it attacks are illegitimate; the unarmed defenseless people it kills are not innocent. In fact, under this code, the democracies and their citizens are the root causes of the conflict situation; only their disappearance or subjugation can solve the issue. In addition, those states or individuals willing to negotiate the issue (even for tactical advantage) are enemies. In the meantime, the intended victims have no counter-terrorism weapons system, Until they do, they will be exposed to “the death of a thousand cuts.”

To the eternal verities — death and taxes — a third is being added: terrorism. The most recent of these murderous events, the gunning down of defenseless, unarmed and innocent people in the Rome and

Vienna airports, has momentarily highlighted the seeming permanence of this threat to the civilized world. It also underlines in a most forceful manner the confidence the terrorists have that they can strike down innocent people with relative impunity. Most of all, the media treatment of these nefarious acts emphasizes the extent of the opposition within the targeted world against both the use of force and economic sanctions as a punitive measure. The argument posed by our European allies in the Western press was that the multi-trillion dollar Western economy would suffer more than the miniscule and weak Libyan economy by such sanctions. A more "compelling" proposition advanced was that American responses to Libyan state-sponsored terrorism would spur other Muslim states to close ranks with Qaddafi. This position ignores the fact that two Arab states (the United Arab Emirates and Oman) recently established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union notwithstanding Soviet butchering in Afghanistan.

It should not be surprising that terrorism waged by the enemies of America and Israel is a growth industry. Why should terrorists be deterred when Western governments victimized by terrorists allow its practitioners to slip through their nets? The release by Italy of the terrorist Abu Abbas, despite overwhelming evidence linking him to the Achille Lauro hijacking, regrettably is more the rule than the exception. A similar situation was the release by the French of Abu Daoud, suspected of plotting the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich 1972 Olympics. Arrested by French counter-intelligence agents, who were apparently convinced that Daoud's associates in France had been responsible for the killing of French police officials, Daoud expressed astonishment that his clandestine presence in France should be interrupted so unceremoniously. As was the case with recent events, Western nations were divided on the "correctness" of the arrest. Meanwhile, Israel and Germany requested Daoud's extradition. The issue was submitted to a French court which ordered his release. The official reason given was that the German extradition request was "technically deficient."

Terrorism is not only a growth industry; the nature and "combat" efficiency of this form of violence has been greatly enhanced, as have its economic and psychological dimensions. In fact, terrorism has evolved in the past decade to the point that it has become an appendage of subconventional warfare. Nor is this development an accident. The theoretical and empirical bases of modern day terrorism have a long and rich, history. The exaltation of violence and terror can be gleaned from the literature of the ancient Greeks, Roman history and the Middle Ages. In a more modern setting, Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his work

The State of War, formulated arguments which are today favorable to the justification for terrorism. It was probably Karl Marx who opened the flood gates giving terrorism its modern day rationale when he wrote, in *Das Kapital*, that "force is the midwife present at the death of every old society pregnant with a new one." He had earlier written an article in which he pioneered the emergence of modern Marxist "morality" by asserting: "we will not excuse our terrorism when our time comes, but royal terrorists we will regard as brutal, contemptible and vulgar in their theory; and in both respects entirely without honor."

While Marx provided the theoretical foundations for the use and glorification of terrorism, it was Lenin who gave terrorism its strategic and tactical underpinnings. Unlike Marx, who exhorted revolutionaries with words, Lenin was constrained to "slug it out" with his Bolshevik and radical opponents in order to establish terrorism as a fundamental reserve for world revolution and the irreconcilable struggle against the bourgeoisie.

Support for terrorism against "bourgeoisie" strongholds has an attraction to certain intellectual circles. One of the most eminent of the leftist philosophers was the French writer whose following burgeoned in the immediate postwar period in Paris — Jean Paul Sartre. In his "Critique of Dialectic Reason" Sartre depicts terrorism as "the cement of fraternity and both the justification and the mover of history; terrorism should therefore be eternal — like revolution ..." In many of his plays and novels, there is a recurring theme which celebrates violence, the necessity for violence, and the purifying of creative crime.

The Soviet counterpart of such views are to be found regularly in Soviet media, literature and art forms. In 1977, Party Secretary Boris N. Ponomarev, responsible for relations with foreign communist parties, conveyed the message to visiting groups by declaring "Violence in itself is not evil. It depends upon what its purpose is. In the hands of Socialists it is a progressive force." Yuri Andropov, in 1982 when he had become General Secretary, reminded his comrades in the Politburo that "Revolution is destructive but without destruction it is impossible to create a new Socialist world." Minister of Defense Marshal A. Grechko emphasized the irreconcilability of the matter by stating "No compromise is possible between the Communist and Bourgeois ideologies, and conflict between the two is inevitable".

Sartre's success in popularizing violence and terrorism among French philosophers moved one Bernard Gross to write that,

The philosophy of tomorrow will be the terrorist. Not philos-

ophy of terrorism but terrorist philosophy, allied with terrorist political practices. Philosophy ... will rediscover its pure theoretical intent and ... political "engagement" will no longer arise from the art of the word, because the society in which we live is condemned to refuse ... to listen to reason. Thus we are being led slowly but surely to the necessity of pure violence, since nothing but terror can now make the bourgeoisie retreat.

The foregoing is but an attempt to remove some of the confusion about the nature of present-day terrorism by demonstrating historical factors which have conditioned and sought to condone, legitimize or acquiesce in its use. Lenin fashioned terrorism into a political instrument. Indeed, it was he who ushered in the era known as the Red Terror. To consolidate his personal power he established the CHEKA (forerunner to the KGB) to enhance the use of terror to thwart counter-revolutionaries and to carry out subversive operations in foreign countries. His successor, Stalin, was no less vigilant in wielding the terrorist weapon. During the tenure of these two dictators, millions of Russians succumbed to the Red Terror, but many more millions were terrorized. "The purpose of terror," Lenin is said to have asserted, "is to terrorize." For every victim that was killed, hundreds were intimidated. Lenin is said to have boasted that with the skillful application of terror, the Bolsheviks "who represented one-six hundredths of the population) were able to take and hold power. Far from concentration only on the "bourgeoisie", Lenin and Stalin turned the Red Terror against thousands of their own most intimate comrades and once worthy supporters. Stalin could boast that he never recoiled from doing that which was necessary for the revolution, whether it was the terrorizing of the Kulaks or the Politburo. Six of the original seven members of his first Politburo were "liquidated"; and in 1937 the entire senior staff of the Soviet military command was found guilty of treason and executed. Stalin was consequently assured of a more pliant Politburo and a more responsive General Staff.

A regime which has no compunction for murdering its own people can hardly be expected to deal less severely with its intended foreign victims. There was never any delay encountered by the Bolsheviks in legitimizing terror at home or in preparing for its use abroad. Indeed in 1922, when the Russian Criminal Code was being drafted, Lenin regarded terrorism to be so vital to Soviet goals that he wrote to the Commissioner for Justice, advising him that:

The Law should not abolish terror: to promise that would be self-delusion or deception; it should be substantiated and legalized

in principle, clearly, without evasion or embellishment. ... only revolutionary conscience can determine the conditions of its application in practice.

Training for guerrilla action and terrorism in Soviet camps was established as early as 1919 in Tashkent in preparation for the Baku Conference of the Toilers of the East held in 1920. The Third Communist International (Comintern) was created in March 1919 for the purpose of systematically utilizing the resources and people of foreign nations in a world-wide program of inciting revolution. Soviet diplomatic pouches carried weapons, dynamite, currency, disinformation, propaganda, diamonds, gold, etc., to terrorists abroad to promote destabilization and underwrite subversion.

Where Marx provided the doctrine that rendered capitalist societies illegitimate, establishing the socialist "imperative" for the revolutionary overthrow of such societies, Lenin set out to define the program of action for the unavoidable struggle. Nor was economic warfare ignored. Soviet use of economics as a tool of subversion began with the 1917 Revolution. Lenin had always been partisan to the deployment of psychological warfare but, probably because of his disdain for revolutionary economists, he originally downgraded economics as a revolutionary instrument. Nonetheless, after testing with Parvus (Alexander Helphand) the subversive qualities of import-export operations, Lenin was overwhelmed with the potential for undermining not only the Czar but the world as well by manipulating commercial transactions.

The Parvus "conversation" took place in Zurich in 1915. (Later, it would be Parvus who would convince the German General Staff to smuggle Lenin and 32 of his associates into Russia by transporting them by sealed train to the frontier.) During the period preceding the Bolshevik victory, Lenin almost reveled in the joy of raising money through trade, using fictitious invoicing as a means of delivering money to revolutionaries as far away as Siberia, obtaining equipment for his revolutionaries from "neutral" sources, and generally engaging officials and businessmen in clandestine transactions.

Not the least of the advantages used by subversive economic warfare was the means — material and financial — for funding terrorism. In the years since, Soviet economic specialists improved the instrument to increase the political leverage of foreign communist parties in their own countries. A case in point is Libyan-Italian relations.

The Soviet Union in 1976 was anxious to have FIAT, the Italian automotive and manufacturing giant, construct a large capital facility in the USSR. The project required extensive cash in the hands of the

operators, the FIAT conglomerate. The USSR was not able to assure the cash flows, and the Italian government had already overextended its credit to support Soviet commercial and investment transactions. The project seemed doomed until a prospective investor showed at the FIAT headquarters one day offering to buy into the company. The Libyans purchased 9.1% of FIAT's stock, which was raised to 13.4% in two years and possibly higher since; acquired approximately \$100 million worth of FIAT bonds, later convertible into stock; and loaned FIAT \$415 million. The stock was purchased at four times the market value, certainly a favor for FIAT. The Libyan loan was at only one-quarter percentage point above LIBOR (London rate) also a bargain for FIAT relative to prevailing practice. The Libyan government got five seats on the Board and one seat on the special five-man committee.

Immediately following the transaction, the Italian Communist Party gleefully announced that FIAT was now in a stronger position to take on labor-creating projects with the Soviet Union. A pro-Communist newspaper, *Paese Sera*, was more explicit: "The triangular agreement — FIAT, the Soviet Union and Libya...appears to have provided the means for the concrete realization of projects."

Everybody was happy — almost. The Soviet Union got its much-desired turnkey capital plant. FIAT got a drawerful of cash. Libya got a "commanding heights position" in a prestigious capitalist firm. The Italian Communist Party, which earns millions of dollars annually as a result of its monopoly hold over all import-export trade with the entire Soviet bloc receives additional revenue from the monopoly.

Nevertheless, some Italian newspapers questioned the transaction. The chairman of FIAT, Mr. Giovanni Agnelli, conceded that the deal had raised some questions. But, he said, an even stronger adverse reaction would have resulted had there been a deal with the United States.

Within a few years, with the assistance of the Italian Communist Party, as well as with the cooperation of Italian commercial interests, Libya's commercial and investment position in Italy grew. So did the number of Italians working in Libya on a series of Italian commercial and capital projects. When President Reagan asked his allies to close ranks with him in applying economic sanctions on Libya in early 1986, Italy was foremost among the nations that would not. Although American-Italian trade is several multiples of the Libyan import-export currents, the Italian economy turned out to be hostage to Libya's leverage over Italy. Parvus had told Lenin that day in Zurich that trade could be a powerful weapon in the struggle with capitalism. In 1986 it provided an umbrella of immunity against reprisals for terrorism.

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WORKING GROUP REPORTS

Working Group 1: Character and Extent of The Threat. Chairman: Ambassador William Kintner. Rapporteur: Colonel Richard Lawrence, USAF (Ret).

The global international terrorist network—spearheaded by Libya, Syria, Iran, North Korea and Cuba—receives its essential support from an extensive combination of states, worldwide. Where some, like the USSR are sponsors, others provide ancillary life-support systems. Still others by their silence or their attempt to buy off the terrorists, lend legitimacy to them and prevent concerted and effective international counter-action.

Recent intensification of terrorist activities around the world reflects the emergence of the “Radical Entente” which is dedicated to the expulsion of the United States from key regions of the world where freedom is at stake. The outlines of this growing threat reveal the following novel elements:

(1) At the coordinating level there is a growing interest in collaborating strategically and operationally among the five states of Libya, Syria, Iran, North Korea and Cuba, collectively identified as the “Radical Entente.”

(2) Motivation is exceptionally high with the onslaught against the United States characterized by revolutionary ideology and strategic interest.

(3) Its range of activity goes beyond terrorism *per se* to include efforts at stretching U.S. forces thin: ideological propaganda and economic subversion of the industrial democracies.

Terrorism could be called slow motion disease. It is like malaria which seldom kills the patient on its own but so weakens the body that it falls victim to other ailments. Lebanon has become the tragic model of what terrorism can ultimately do.

Terrorism has become a form of modern warfare that has now spread from one end of the globe to the other. Although individual acts of terrorism may appear to be random because of the opportunistic nature of each event, much of the evidence points to an alarming degree of coordination among the perpetrators with a set of well defined goals. With almost no exceptions, the main target of the terrorists is the Western democracies and their allies and friends. Although the Soviets may not fully control each outbreak of terrorism, their guidance and influence can be found behind almost all acts of international terrorism. The terrorist does not act on his or her own but with the support and backing of a state or a political entity such as the PLO.

One of the earliest terrorist groups, the PLO, with its stated aim of destroying the nation of Israel, was initiated, financed, armed, trained and given diplomatic facilities by many Arab states, and was subsequently drawn by the Soviet Union into the scope of its destabilizing activities directed primarily against the U.S. and its interests. The assault on Israel, the United States and the Western democracies by the Radical Entente and the PLO continues to be financed and encouraged by a number of Arab states.

The alarming combination of five radical nations working in concert with one another (Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea and Libya) have targeted the West, principally and ultimately the U.S., to drive its presence and power back to the shores of North America. Their repeated demonstration of the capability to foment well-timed terrorist attacks over wide ranges of the globe clearly show their intent to stretch thin the forces and response capability of the United States so as to emasculate it as the ultimate defender of Western goals and values.

Although there is a radical, ideological core to the objectives of the revolutionary Islamic and communist states, the ultimate winner, should they succeed, will not be the Islamic world but the Soviet Union. Moscow on more than one occasion has openly and broadly stated its willingness to protect these radical states from any U.S. response. This issuance of insurance by the Soviet Union thereby gains for them added standing in the Third World with little or no expense. Any failure of the U.S. to defend itself or its allies from this modern form of warfare — terrorism — further weakens U.S. credibility.

The Soviet Union, since its inception, recognized the value of terrorism. It has long maintained recruitment and training centers; in the seventies it stepped into active training of the PLO terrorist cadres. Over time, however, it has taken considerable steps to not appear in the foreground of terrorist support, allowing its surrogates to set up

the training camps, logistic and support apparatus needed to sustain active terrorist movements.

The new "characteristics" of international terrorism is when the fervor and dedication of ideologies, religions and nationalities are made into effective use by the expertise and diversified support of a super-power — the USSR.

As subversion of the West (and its allies) becomes a critical component of the global strategy of the USSR, the Soviets intensify their support of diversified terrorist groups and radical states, giving some of the more dedicated and effective a certain level of operational autonomy. Yet, as far as areas which the Soviets consider critical to their strategic war-fighting capabilities (such as Western Europe) the Soviets maintain tight control over the support and command and control nets, providing services to the various terrorist organizations who want to use them. While there are indigenous, nationalistic terrorist groups in Western Europe, it is virtually impossible for any terrorist group to carry out major coordinated attacks in Western Europe without the active support of the USSR. There is no question that the terrorist is state-supported, for without the extensive support network now in place in Cuba, South Yemen, Syria, Libya, Nicaragua and elsewhere, the terrorist would, at best, be a minor irritant and a short-lived phenomenon.

Extensive efforts have been undertaken by the Soviet Union to disguise its objective, goals, and support apparatus for state terrorists most commonly by building a facade which labels the combatant as a legitimate fighter in a war of national liberation. A careful reading of the many United Nations resolutions dealing with active aggression, defense of sovereignty, and terrorism will show that these resolutions have been carefully constructed to provide the legal loophole through which an aggressor can walk under such guise as a fighter in a national liberation movement. The latest unanimous U.N. resolution condemning terrorism, mistakenly heralded by the world's uninformed, contains wordings which effectively render this latest high act of diplomatic word-smithing meaningless. It will do nothing to stop terrorism as we move into the future.

Working Group II: Options for Actions. Chairman: Robert Morris. Rapporteur: Captain Eugene McDaniel, USN (Ret).

Working Group II considered a broad range of options for action in an effort to distill them into a cohesive set of operative mechanisms that could be wielded effectively in the struggle against state-sponsored terrorism.

Some of the issues explored included whether actions should be directed against the perpetrator or the sponsoring state; the radical entente (Libya, Syria, North Korea, Iran and Cuba) or the patron of the entente, the Soviet Union. Should such actions be primarily economic or military in nature? Should nations act unilaterally or in concert? Is the U.N., NATO or some specialized international agency, extant or to be organized, an appropriate sponsor of anti-terrorist planning and action? Should action be preemptive or retaliatory, selective or wide-ranging, surgical or broadly-directed?

After thorough examination of these issues the working group concluded current *ad hoc* mechanisms for dealing with the problem of state-sponsored terrorism were fundamentally inadequate for the task and should be replaced by a permanent multidisciplinary structure at the national level, most particularly in the United States but among its allies as well. The proposed structure would constitute an ongoing operational coordinating mechanism for bringing together components of the national military, diplomatic, intelligence, psychological warfare, social and economic agencies of government essential for dealing with state-sponsored terrorism in a comprehensive and integrated manner. The primary tasks of this coordinating mechanism would include:

1. Strategic planning; including the development of a national strategy and appropriate directives to provide for interdepartmental planning and cooperation and allocation of necessary resources.

2. Intelligence; The new structure would have responsibility and assets for the collection, analysis, exchange and sharing of terrorist-related data and information.

3. Enforcement; Its power to include standby authority to implement a range of activities at its discretion, including preemptive police actions as well as the imposition of sanctions and embargoes.

4. Public Information; Implementation of a program of public education with regard to the character and extent of the threat of state-sponsored terrorism. To prepare the public for possible assaults on its institutions and citizens as well as to inform it with regard to the necessity for actions to be taken by the government in the public interest.

5. International Cooperation; Designed to undertake an intense effort to develop close coordinating linkages with allied governments and other international institutions concerned with the problem of and struggle against state-sponsored terrorism.

In addition to the above, the working group considered a proposal for an Alliance to Combat Terrorism (ACT) submitted by Ambassadors Gideon Rafael and Shaul Ramati of Israel, which is appended to this report.

JOINT PROPOSAL OF AMBASSADORS GIDEON RAFAEL AND SHAUL RAMATI OF ISRAEL Alliance to Combat Terrorism (ACT)

International terrorism has been outlawed by the U.N. Declaration of Principles of International Law of 24 Oct. 1970 and the U.N. Definition of Aggression of 14 Dec. 1974 as well as by a number of international conventions dealing with hijacking, hostage taking, etc.

Outlawed acts, such as piracy and terrorism, place their perpetrators and their supporting nations outside the protection of laws.

To coordinate and enforce anti-terrorist action by like-minded states determined to defend their democratic liberties an Alliance to Combat Terrorism (ACT) should be established.

The alliance can be set up in existing structures such as NATO, the Organization of Latin American States, the European Community, etc., and should establish specialized organs for the collection and exchange of intelligence, a clearinghouse for conducting a campaign to enlighten the public on the nature of terrorism and the danger it presents to our democratic freedoms, the forces behind terrorism and

their aims etc. The Alliance should encourage an international protest citizens' movement, to resist the tyranny of terrorism.

The Alliance's functions and *modus operandi* would reflect the experience in crime detection and suppression gained by bodies such as Interpol and the International Narcotics Agency. It would coordinate measures against states sheltering, financing, training and aiding terrorism in any manner, and abusing diplomatic privileges.

It would identify, and outlaw front organizations which pursue their aims by international terror and expose their fraudulent propaganda, counterfeit ideologies and misleading terminologies.

The Alliance would coordinate legal procedures and determine punishments to be enforced for terrorist crimes. An international penal institution where terrorists would serve out their sentences in some distant and isolated location might also be considered to prevent blackmail actions against individual countries aimed at releasing terrorists.

The Alliance would have at its disposal for immediate action an International Anti-Terrorist Task Force specifically trained to intervene without delay in emergency situations arising out of terrorist actions.

Statement of Purpose

The International Security Council is an independent voluntary association whose membership is open to statesmen, former senior military officers, diplomats, government officials, political scientists, economists and historians.

The Council provides the public with a responsible and expert voice on international security affairs unencumbered by the political and diplomatic constraints that inhibit the open discussion of such matters by active government and military officials. The Council, through the aggregate knowledge and experience of its distinguished membership, thus represents an unparalleled resource for the critical examination of vital international security issues before the bar of free world public opinion.

The Council engages in a range of educational activities to raise and deepen public awareness and understanding of the dangers confronting free societies everywhere, most particularly the multifaceted drive for global hegemony being pursued by the Soviet Union and its surrogates throughout the world.

The Council provides a forum for public discussion of critical issues through seminars, conferences and publications, and invites reasoned debate on all matters affecting the security of the international community.

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Publications

- The Soviet Union and the Middle East*. Proceedings of the conference held Sept. 23, 1984 in New York included: Prof. Leon Goure, Soviet Specialist, Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr., USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Air Force Intelligence; William Mazzocco, Center for International Security.
- The Geopolitics of Southwestern Africa*. Proceedings of the conference held Nov. 4, 1984 in New York included: Duncan Sellars, Editor, *African Intelligence Digest* and Holden Roberto, Founder, National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FLNA).
- The Soviet Challenge in East Asia*. ISC background paper: "The Soviet Union is undertaking an extensive military and industrial buildup in East Asia with the goal of achieving hegemony in the Pacific basin."
- Nuclear Balance: Challenge and Response*. Proceedings of the conference held Dec. 9, 1984 in Washington, D.C. included: Dr. Robert Jastrow, Founder, Goddard Institute; Dr. William

Van Cleave, Director, Defense and Strategic Studies Program, University of Southern California; Dr. Joseph Churba, President, Center for International Security and Dr. Marcelo Alonso, Executive Director, Florida Institute of Technology, Research and Engineering.

- The Geopolitics of South Arabia and The Horn of Africa*. Proceedings of the conference held Jan. 8, 1985 included: Paul Henze, Resident Consultant, Rand Corp; Dr. Assad Homayoun, Professorial Lecturer, George Washington University. Dr. Martin Sicker, Center for International Security was the moderator.
- The Soviet Challenge in Central America and the Caribbean*. ISC background paper: "From a national security standpoint, unhampered access to the sea lanes that traverse the Caribbean and adjacent waters is essential."
- The Caribbean Basin and Global Security: Strategic Implications of the Soviet Threat*. Proceedings of the conference held Feb. 17-22, 1985 in Paris, France. Contents include papers by: Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner, Jr., USA (Ret); Gen. Alvaro Valencia-Tovar, Colombian Army (Ret); Gen. Michael S. Davison, USA (Ret); Lt. Gen. Heinz von zur Gathen, Federal Republic of Germany (Ret) and Pedro Chamorro, former editor of *La Prensa* in Nicaragua.
- The Brezhnev Doctrine and the Challenge of Soviet Imperialism*. ISC background paper: "The United States must posit and pursue a set of clear and unequivocal objectives that are proactive rather than reactive, objectives that go beyond containment or detente or other status quo formulations."
- Negotiating with Marxists in Central America*. Proceedings of the conference held March 21, 1985 in Washington, D.C. included: Ernesto Rivas-Gallont, Former Ambassador of El Salvador to United States; Lt. Gen. Robert L. Schweitzer, USA, Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board; Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner, Jr., USA (Ret), Former Chairman of Inter-American Defense Board and Dr. Joseph Churba, President, Center for International Security.
- The Soviet Union and the Security of East Asia*. Proceedings of the conference held May 21-25, 1985 in Seoul, Korea. Contents include papers by: Adm. George E.R. Kinnear II, USN (Ret); Gen. Osamu Namatame, Japan Air Self Defense Force (Ret); Dr. Arnold Beichman, Visiting Scholar, Hoover Institution; Rear Adm. James W. Nance, USN (Ret); Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, Royal Thai Army; Prof. A. James Gregor, University of California, Berkeley and Maria Hsia Chang, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Maj. Gen. John R.D. Cleland, USA (Ret); Owen Harries, Editor of *The National Interest* and Dr. William R. Kintner, University of Pennsylvania.
- Collective Security in the Western Hemisphere*. ISC background paper: "The great oceans no longer serve as a formidable barrier to intervention from non-hemispheric states, and it is anachronistic to pursue the issue of collective security as though one could simply opt out of the process and go into splendid isolation. The states of the hemisphere can elect to work together to provide the security necessary for democracy to flourish, or can decide to pretend that the threat does not exist and engage endlessly in argument upholding the now sacrosanct doctrine of nonintervention at all costs."
- International Security and the Brezhnev Doctrine*. Proceedings of the conference held June 9-11, 1985 in Brussels, Belgium. Contents include papers by: Dr. William R. Van Cleave, UCLA; Brig. Gen. Albert Merglen, French Army (Ret); Senator Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyoming; Dr. Eugene V. Rostow, National Defense University; Arnaud de Borchgrave, editor-in-chief, *The Washington Times*; Prof. John Norton Moore, American Bar Association; Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner, Jr., USA (Ret); Prof. William H. Lewis, George Washington University.
- NATO's Southern Flank and Security of the Middle East*. Proceedings of the conference held Sept. 8-10, 1985 in Lisbon, Portugal. Contents include papers by: Gen. Michael S. Davison, USA (Ret), Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe, 1971-75; Gen. William A. Knowlton, USA (Ret), Former Member NATO Military Committee; Adm. Worth H. Bagley, USA (Ret); Leopold Labetz, editor, "Survey;" Dr. Steven Spiegel, UCLA; Jillian Becker; Norman Polmar; Prof. Josef Rom, The Wilson Center; and "The Lisbon Declaration."

The Strategic Stakes in Sudan. ISC background paper: "Contrary to the conventional estimate that the civil war in Sudan will be resolved by agreement between Sudan and Ethiopia, this paper presents an alternative view. It is suggested that de facto partition of Sudan may be sought by the Soviet Union in order to construct an axis running from Ethiopia through southern Sudan to Angola, which will precipitate the collapse of Zaire which is precariously positioned between the latter two countries."

The London Declaration. On Nov. 25, 1985, a panel of strategic affairs experts convened in London to consider the implications of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva. Guests included: Gen. Michael S. Davison, USA (Ret.); Dr. Joseph Luns, Former Secretary-General of NATO (Netherlands); Sen. Frank H. Murkowski, R-Alaska, (USA); Amb. Charles Lichenstein, Former Deputy U.S. Representative to the UN (USA); Dr. Fritz Kraemer, Former Strategy Advisor to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, (USA); Leopold Labedz, "Survey," (U.K.); Melvin J. Lasky, "Encounter" (USA); James T. Hackett, The Heritage Foundation, (USA); John C. Loulis, Center of Research and Information, (Greece); Air Vice Marshal S.W.B. Menaul (Ret.), (U.K.); and Howard Phillips, The Conservative Caucus, (USA).

State-Sponsored Terrorism and the Threat to International Security. ISC background paper: "Any significant response to the rapidly escalating challenge of state-sponsored terrorism can only come from the United States and its industrial democratic allies acting in concert. It is indeed liberal democracy that is under attack, even though most skirmishes may be on its periphery at the moment."

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