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STATEMENT BY
AMBASSADOR ROBERT B. OAKLEY
ACTING AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR COUNTER TERRORISM
TO THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 28, 1986

HOUSE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

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TESTIMONY BY ROBERT B. OAKLEY
ACTING AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM

Mr. Chairman, Committee Members,

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today with my colleagues from the Treasury Department and the FBI to discuss the threat of terrorism.

Our presence here together illustrates the partnership within the U.S. government, the Congress and the American people in this combined effort to counter the modern day scourge of terrorism. Obviously there has to be a certain amount of "specialization" in this effort and as you are aware, the FBI is the primary agency on dealing with the terrorist threats at home and the State Department is the lead agency in coordinating the U.S. government's anti-terrorism effort overseas. Treasury has an important role in both. We work together, especially where the threat abroad has a potential for trouble here at home.

Mr. Webster is covering the domestic situation and I will sketch out the growing problem of overseas international terrorism which in 1985 all too frequently caught the television screens and thus the eyes and ears of

Americans. This was partly because terrorists singled out Americans for death in three of the most dramatic attacks--the prolonged TWA 847 hijacking in June, the Achille Lauro hijacking in October and the November hijacking of the Egyptian airliner in Malta. Five Americans were among the 18 killed in the December massacres at Rome and Vienna airports by the Abu Nidal group, supported by Libya. We also experienced the continuing anguish of the American hostages in Lebanon and their courageous families in this country.

A preliminary review of statistics shows that in 1985, there were more than 800 incidents of international terrorism. There were 2223 casualties of which 23 of the killed and 139 of the injured were Americans. Over the past two years, international terrorism has risen sharply (60%) from the yearly average of about 500 for the 1978-83 period.

The Terrorist Threat Abroad. There are a number of diverse reasons and causes behind this disturbing trend. Middle East-related terrorism is a major cause for the increase, with the number of incidents rising from 109 in 1983 to 378 in 1985. Within that category, there are a variety of factors and actors. The Israeli-Palestinian dispute is only one component, and it includes terrorism conducted by radical Palestinian groups trying to disrupt the peace process.

There is also the terrorism inspired by Khomeini's brand of politico-religious fanaticism, the Iran-Iraq wars, and Qadhafi's assassination campaign against Libyan dissidents.

Some terrorist acts were attempts by terrorists to obtain the release of their colleagues or relatives arrested for previous actions. The one consistent demand of the captors of the American hostages in Lebanon is the release of the 17 Iranian-inspired terrorists convicted in Kuwait for the bloody terrorist attacks there in December, 1984 which killed and wounded almost 100 people. Other terrorists, such as Abu Abbas, whose group hijacked the Achille Lauro, were trying to make an anti-U.S., anti-Israel political point and as well as obtaining release of captured colleagues.

The most deadly of the Middle East terrorist attacks came from the Abu Nidal group which shifted the locus of its operations from Iraq to Syria in 1983. In early 1985, Abu Nidal focused his attacks against Jordanian and main-stream Palestinian officials. Then, about the middle of the year, after Syria and Jordan began high-level discussions, Libya became his main backer and his targets shifted. The hijacking of the Egyptian airliner to Malta, in which women passengers--American and Israeli--were singled out for

killing for the first time, and the Rome and Vienna airport attacks were the major operations of the Abu Nidal organization after it began to receive strong Libyan support.

Western European groups also were active. The Red Army Faction attacked American and NATO-related installations in Germany, causing several American deaths, and their counterparts in France and Belgium also carried out attacks in these countries. In Italy, just this month, the Red Brigades revived after the Italians had dealt major setbacks to the group. In Spain, Basque separatists continued their campaign. An American businessman was killed last year when a car bomb blew up in Madrid, wounding over a dozen Spanish Civil Guards.

In Latin America, terrorist incidents grew from 81 in 1984 to 132 in 1985. Eighty-six of these incidents involved the United States, including the killing of four Marines and two businessmen in San Salvador.

The list is by no means complete but I cite these incidents to illustrate the variety of types of terrorists. There is a common point, however. None of them, whatever they or their backers may claim, are some kind of romantic freedom fighters whose attacks should be excused away on the ground that they are fighting for a political "just cause."

What they are conducting are criminal acts, in many cases deliberately trying to kill and wound as many innocent persons as possible, including those without any direct connection to their grievance.

International Terrorist Threat to the U.S.? We're often asked "will overseas terrorism move here?" It is difficult to give a categorical answer because there are so many varieties of overseas terrorists, but all concerned agencies of the U.S. government take the threat very seriously, particularly State, Justice and Treasury.

Most recently, Libya's Qadhafi gained additional headlines by more threats to bring terrorism to the U.S. While we consider this to be an exaggeration, it is not to be ignored. There has been a clear pattern of assassination by Libyan agents abroad of their own countrymen whom Qadhafi did not like. The new Abu Nidal connection gives Libya a greater capability. Last year the FBI successfully foiled a plot by a group of Libyans in this country and a member of Libya's mission to the United Nations was expelled because of his involvement in terrorist activities.

Sikh terrorists, who were inactive until just two years ago, suddenly emerged in the U.S. and Canada as well as in India. As Mr. Webster testified, the FBI thwarted potential

Sikh operations here. The planting of bombs last year on two civilian airliner flights from Canada however hit close to home. The Air India tragedy was the single most devastating event in 1985. The crash last June, which all evidence attributes to a bomb planted by Sikh terrorists, took 329 lives. The U.S., Canada, the U.K. and India are making a special effort to identify and preempt possible Sikh terrorism.

There are other groups which have in the past used American soil to air their grievances by action against representatives of other countries, such as Armenian terrorists who had been attacking Turkish diplomats, and the Jewish Defense League which has attacked Soviet diplomats. However, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that there were no incidents actually carried out in this country last year involving connections with groups or governments abroad.

I also wish to make a point about the differences between actual and potential threat from groups of citizens or permanent residents in this country with strong family, ethnic or religious ties abroad. While there have been a small number of incidents involving individuals from these groups, a combination of good law enforcement and pressure to cease and desist from the groups themselves has tended

to prevent the continuation or repetition of terrorist activity. These groups are composed overwhelmingly of peace loving, patriotic citizens. It would be a mistake and grossly unfair for the American public, Congress or the media to label or imply ethnic communities in this country are potential hotbeds of terrorism.

There are a number of reasons why terrorists from abroad are not more active here. One, of course, is the excellent work of the FBI, the Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire Arms Bureau of Treasury, and other law enforcement agencies. A second is the good work by the CIA and other agencies in developing intelligence abroad on possible threats to this country. Another factor is that the intellectual, political and psychological atmosphere which seems to nurture some of the European ideological terrorists is not popular here. Yet another is the good work by INS, Customs and the State Department in keeping out potential terrorists.

One result of this good work is that it is easier for terrorists who want to strike at Americans to do so overseas. There are millions of us working and traveling abroad at any given time. The buildings and cafes we work and eat in, the airports we use. It is difficult to gauge whether the situation at home would change if stronger

anti-terrorism actions were taken by the U.S. government overseas. We have taken a number of economic and political measures against Qadhafi, for example and the U.S. and Israel, have long been his targets. The U.S. is also target number one for a number of other groups in the Middle East and Latin America.

While one cannot rule out that stronger actions against Qadhafi or other terrorists might increase further their desire to do something against the U.S. at home, there are the basic obstacles mentioned above which even the most irrational terrorist needs to consider. A desire for revenge does not necessarily change the equation of the relative difficulties of terrorists getting to and operating in the U.S. or our abilities to prevent them.

In any event, this Administration has decided upon a still more vigorous campaign of counterterrorism, and will not be deterred by the risk of retaliation in this country. This is the main conclusion of the report of the Vice President's task force on Combatting Terrorism, which President Reagan has approved and which will soon be made public. It recommends measures to strengthen our anti-terrorist capabilities aboard and at home, and a continuation of the policy of no concessions, no backing down where terrorism is concerned.

Of course nothing is certain in this business and the terrorists have the advantage of surprise and shifting tactics. Thus, in considering our responses to a given situation, we try to take all factors into account. But we cannot let ourselves be immobilized into inaction for fear our actions might prompt more terrorist attacks. To the contrary, the cost of doing nothing is usually higher than the costs of doing something. Many European governments have long demurred at joining in action against Libya or terrorist groups, rejecting even seemingly simple controls upon those entering or living in their countries, because they were concerned about losing Arab world business. Belatedly, they have now come to realize that they are not being spared, and that terrorism is costing them dearly in falling tourism revenues, increased security costs, and apprehensive potential investors, as well as some loss of confidence by their own public.

International Cooperation. Dealing with terrorism overseas is complicated by such economic factors and by differing political and foreign policy viewpoints, even in the case of attacks where the primary targets are American. It should be kept in mind--and it is often overlooked by the media and public--that the primary legal and political responsibility for countering terrorism is the government of the country in which the terrorists may attack.

Our power is limited and constrained both legally and politically. For instance, we can post military guards inside the grounds of our embassies, or other installations to help protect them, but we are dependent upon the host government for the outer defense, just as it is the host government's responsibility to protect travelers at the airports, business, and other facilities within its jurisdiction.

We can mobilize our military forces to strike terrorists, but our ability to use them in friendly or neutral foreign territory is dependent upon the concurrence of the host government. Application of our legal power to pursue terrorists abroad is also heavily influenced by host government attitudes. In this connection, tightly worded extradition treaties without political loopholes subject to exploitation by terrorists are very important. The U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty pending before the Senate for ratification is an example.

We can, and do, work with many of the other countries to help improve their defense against terrorism. But, in the end the decisions--or sometimes the lack of decisions--on how to deal with the situation are up to the other sovereign governments. And it is obviously in our interest to see them take as strong and effective action as possible, dealing with the threat abroad rather than have it spread to the U.S. In countering terrorism, our efforts to obtain

international cooperation and provide international assistance are all important.

ATA PROGRAM. An important part of our cooperation with other nations is the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program for civilian law enforcement agencies of friendly foreign governments. The program is administered by the Department of State and over 1800 officials from 32 countries have participated during the nearly two years of its operation.

Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and professional police associations supply most of the instruction for the program which provides a very valuable structure for developing a better working relationship with other countries facing the same threat. The Departments of Justice and Treasury and the FAA have provided support for the program. A first phase, the Executive Seminar, enables the U.S. and the participating country to exchange ideas and insights. The second and third phases are used to identify specific needs and to provide actual training in the U.S. of officials of the recipient country.

In authorizing the ATA Program, the Congress established a requirement that participating countries be screened on the basis of their adherence to acceptable standards of human and civil rights and the Congress has the right to pass on prospective participants. The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs reviews and approves each and every country before Congress is notified by the State

Department of the intention of that country's participation in the ATA Program. Both the Department and the Congress seek to screen out those countries which have questionable human rights records. We also have the option, where U.S. interests are compelling, to limit the extent of training to those foreign agencies or specific areas of operation which are directly and immediately relevant to the safety and protection of U.S. citizens.

We make recognition and protection of human rights a dominant and pervasive theme in all instruction and we select training agencies --such as metropolitan police forces--which by word and example demonstrate to the foreign participants that ethical standards, professionalism and effective counter-terrorism must and can go hand in hand.

Actions Taken Over The Past Two Years. The pace of our cooperative international programs and other activities is quickening.

-- We have intensified our bilateral relationships with friends around the world and begun discussing common counter-terrorism efforts with countries where we have not had such close ties;

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-- We have dedicated more resources and given a still higher priority to collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence on terrorist groups and activities abroad.

- We have improved the security of our embassies and consulates and heightened the security awareness of our personnel; we have begun to cooperate more closely with the private sector in sharing information on threats abroad and how to counter them; the Inman Panel provided an important outside review of what needed to be done to enhance security and an additional boost for obtaining the necessary resources.
- As noted by President Reagan, improved intelligence collection, better security and closer international cooperation helped us deter or preempt more than 100 international terrorist actions during the past year. This is in addition to the 23 domestic potential incidents reported by Mr. Webster.
- We have begun a new, more assertive phase in combatting the state supporters of terrorism, exemplified by the President's decision to sever all economic as well as political contacts with Libya, to persuade other governments to join us, and to retain the option of more forceful unilateral action should this cooperative campaign fail to stop Qadhafi.

- We have worked hard and successfully in international organizations such as the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council establishing that terrorism is a threat to all nations and should be considered as a crime. In the specialized agencies, aviation and maritime specialists are drafting new security standards.
- We have made effective use of recent legislative tools, such as the rewards programs, the Crime Act of 1984, and the Foreign Assistance Act. We believe it is useful to have more legal tools for the anti-terrorism effort. We support, for example, S.1429, which recently passed the Senate, making it a federal crime to kill or conduct other terrorist acts against Americans overseas. We also of course strongly back passage of the U.S.-U.K. Supplemental Extradition Treaty.
- President Reagan has approved the work of the task force directed by Vice President Bush which reviewed all aspects of our counter-terrorist policies and practices, and recommended a number of improvements.

Coordination. To insure maximum coordination for the U.S. response to terrorism, lead agencies have been designated by the White House. These responsibilities, recently reaffirmed by the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, give the State Department the lead agency responsibility for all incidents which take place

outside U.S. territory. Within the State Department, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has the responsibility for providing protection to U.S. facilities and personnel overseas and the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-terrorism for the general measures of cooperation with foreign governments to combat terrorism.

The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Ambassador-at-Large, provides the forum for the major departments and agencies involved in combatting terrorism to meet regularly and share ideas, develop plans and make recommendations on policy and programs. Permanent members include representatives from the National Security Council, the Vice President's office, the Justice Department (which has the interagency lead role for domestic terrorism), The FBI, the Departments of Defense (both the JCS and the office of the Secretary) Treasury, and Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency the FAA, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. The IG/T provides a single point where the various departments and agencies can address questions and make proposals.

There are a number of specific working groups established under the auspices of the IG/T. The include one on rewards, one on improving technology such as equipment for detecting explosives, and another on coordinating anti-terrorist training by all agencies of the Executive Branch, civilian and military.

When a crisis occurs, task forces are set up in the principal agencies to look after their specific concerns-- at the State Department to consider diplomatic issues, family liaison and overall coordination; at the FAA to consider the technical aspects of a hijacking and maintain liaison with U.S. carriers; at Defense to consider the possibility of using U.S. troops in the area, etc. During a crisis where the use of American force might be considered, a special high level coordinating group convenes almost immediately at the White House where key decisions are made. Thus, with the other agencies, we at State have both a good informal working relationship and a formal structure from which flows many of the working relationships.

Some of the activities outlined above could be affected by the Gramm-Rudman Act. The FY 1986 appropriations level for the ATA program is \$7.42 million. This would be reduced by Gramm-Rudman adjustments to \$7.10 million. Following the Inman Commission's recommendations for improved physical security overseas, the Administration proposed a five-year \$4.4 billion program. The program, to be administered by the new Bureau of Diplomatic Security, is pending before Congress and could be affected by Gramm-Rudman.

Conclusion. We predict that on the international side, the terrorism threat is likely to continue to grow and be with us for at least another decade. There are too many causes, too many diverse actors, and too many political, religious.

social and nationalistic sore spots in the world which generate individuals ready to become terrorists. Too many groups think they can make a political impact favorable to their particular cause--magnified mightily by the media around the world--and there are governments which refuse to forgo the temptation of using terrorism as a cheap form of warfare. We should not be discouraged or panicked about it, but rather, keep our cool and determination. This will be a long process; there are no magic solutions or remedies. As the terrorists increase their activities however, we are increasing ours, and indeed trying harder to get ahead of them on our own and with other governments.

We can take comfort in the large number of terrorist incidents preempted abroad, at the low level of terrorism in this country. But the big increase in the number and viciousness of international terrorism incidents, and the the even sharper increase in the casualties deliberately caused by the terrorists, and the fact that the U.S. remains as the top target shows clearly that the struggle is becoming more intense and we cannot afford to be complacent.

The Reagan Administration is determined to keep at it, adding to and improving the tools we have. Strong Congressional support has been and will continue to be extremely important in this effort. I'll be happy to respond to any questions.

Testimony

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENCE
AND ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

Testimony By

Parker W. Borg
Deputy
Office of the Ambassador-at-Large
for Counter-Terrorism

February 19, 1986

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am very pleased to have this opportunity to review with you today our progress in improving security for international air travelers and to give you an overview of recent actions undertaken to combat terrorism. Let me start with the overview first.

The pace of cooperative international activity to combat terrorism is quickening, and substantial progress has been made over the past year.

--We have intensified our bilateral relationships with friends around the world and begun discussing common counter-terrorism efforts with countries where we have not had such close ties;

--As previously noted by President Reagan, efforts at improved intelligence collection, better security and closer international cooperation helped us deter or pre-empt about 100 international terrorist actions during the past year.

--We have improved the security of our embassies and consulates and heightened the security awareness of our personnel; the Inman Panel provided an important outside review of what needed to be done.

--We have made important progress through international organizations in establishing that terrorism is a threat to all nations.

--We have made effective use of recent legislative tools--the rewards programs, the Crime Act of 1984 and Public Law 99-83--to strengthen our efforts with other countries.

I think it is important to underscore that our effort and our success have been a joint ones. We have been working closely throughout the past year with all of the sections of the Executive Branch and have counted on the strong support from Congress, especially the interest of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

I would like to survey briefly first our efforts at bilateral, international and multilateral cooperation, followed by a discussion of our specific actions against Libya and conclude with a statement about our efforts to improve civil aviation security.

Our bilateral efforts to combat terrorism are becoming more complex, with better exchanges of intelligence, more frequent high-level communications, cooperative efforts in counter-terrorism technology, and better judicial and

military cooperation. More countries are establishing centralized counter-terrorism offices, able to coordinate the various parts of their bureaucracy, both on a routine operational basis and during a terrorist incident. Our bilateral cooperation to combat terrorism is already good and steadily improving.

Counter terrorism cooperation is on the agenda for every high level visit to the United States; other countries can have no doubt as to the commitment of the United States to combat terrorism by every means. Ambassador Oakley has led numerous inter-agency delegations to many nations for in depth discussions of counter-terrorism cooperation.

We have found the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program to be a very effective policy tool for stimulating general interest by other countries in general cooperation and in stimulating support for specific United States policy concerns. It has helped us strengthen our policy dialogue with such states as Turkey, Greece, Egypt, the Gulf States, Israel and Colombia. To date, 32 countries have participated in some aspect of the ATA program, with a total of over 1800 participants. The Office of Counter Terrorism and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security have cooperated closely in the administration of this program. There is no

doubt that there is a higher level of awareness in many countries of the dangers of international terrorism and a greater willingness to take effective actions against it because of the ATA program. The 1985 Annual Report of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program has just been submitted to the Congress and I offer it for the record.

--The United States has had success in international organizations in obtaining more effective agreements and stronger resolutions against international terrorism. The United Nations Security Council has issued several statements condemning international terrorism, and acted unanimously on a US proposal in December against hostage taking. Also in December, the UN General Assembly adopted a strong resolution which unequivocally condemned as criminal "all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed...." The resolution specifically called on all states to take appropriate measures as recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and as set forth in relevant international conventions to prevent terrorist attacks.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) acted upon a United States resolution, introduced at the IMO's 14th Assembly in November, 1985, to instruct the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to develop measures for the prevention of terrorist attacks against passengers and crews on board ships. A detailed US proposal was favorably received by the MSC at its meeting which ended February 5 and we expect adoption of a final text at the next MSC meeting in September. The US proposal was based on Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention and the ICAO Security Manual, with modifications necessary to make it suitable for application to the maritime situation. Although the mandates of ICAO and IMO are significantly different, we are grateful for ICAO for making available to IMO its years of experience with security measures so that IMO could accomplish in a matter of months in the maritime area what took years to accomplish in international civil aviation affairs.

As a separate matter, we have for some time been engaged in an effort to encourage more states to become parties to the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, which relate to aircraft safety, hijacking and sabotage. This effort has been going on for several years and has achieved such a

degree of success that these conventions are now among the most widely accepted internationally. The Tokyo Convention has 121 parties, the Hague 126, and Montreal 127.

These recent activities by the United States in international organizations represent a good deal of recent success. U.S. policy in multilateral organizations for combatting terrorism is directed toward: (1) increasing public understanding and awareness of the nature of terrorism; (2) encouraging the development of internationally accepted standards of behavior and responsibility for individual states in preventing, deterring and punishing terrorism; and (3) encouraging effective international cooperation to combat terrorism, including adherence to existing international counter-terrorism conventions. The above cited actions make clear that progress is possible and that the system has recently been responding favorably and with a sense of urgency to our calls, and those of others, for action.

--In contrast to these impressive developments in our bilateral relationships and with international organizations, multilateral cooperation to combat terrorism among like-minded nations has gone more slowly, ^{but there has been some} For ^{progress.}

example, European states, partly as a result of our pressing them to do more to stop Qadhafi's support for terrorism, have organized a high level EC committee to coordinate actions on the problem. We welcome this effort by European states to address collectively the problem of international terrorism and we are seeking ways to cooperate, institutionally or informally, with this group.

The Council of Europe's committee on combatting terrorism has proposed in recent days to expand the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism to additional states. We welcome the initiative and look forward to contacts with the Council of Europe to explore how we might move forward with a broader convention.

Cooperation in the Summit Seven context has been frankly less rewarding during the past year. We have sought as a first step with this group which represents some of our closest allies to revitalize the Bonn Declaration and obtain agreement to cooperate in specific other areas outlined in Summit statements at Venice, Ottawa and London, but the present political climate has not permitted the sort of multilateral cooperation which we believe is essential in this field.

The United States has raised the idea for an International Coordinating Committee privately with individual members of the Summit Seven group and collectively at the last Summit Seven experts meeting December 10, but found no support at that time for creating a more formal body. Nevertheless, we have broached the idea, and will continue to pursue the concept. We believe that we must develop a more institutionalized approach to multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation along this line.

The US has found what we believe might be a more effective forum for cooperation among five close allies -- Great Britain, Italy, West Germany, Japan and Canada -- organized through the interior ministries of the six participating countries. This forum, which participants might eventually want to expand to include other like-minded governments, holds a promise for the kind of joint or parallel actions against terrorism that are needed.

These examples illustrate that some progress has been achieved, but also illustrate the broader problems in obtaining joint international actions against terrorism along the lines foreseen in Title V of the Foreign Assistance Act. We are keeping our objectives firmly in

mind and pressing them at every opportunity where acceptance by other countries provides a reasonable prospect for success.

I would like to turn to recent events, and the United States reaction to them, to illustrate some of the topics I have just discussed.

The attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27 in which 18 people were killed -- including five Americans -- and over 80 injured, convinced the United States that we had to direct more attention against Libyan support for international terrorism. These attacks came at the end of the worst recent year for international terrorist attacks, with the number of incidents increasing from 600 to 800 and the number of casualties from 1279 to 2223. Of those, 23 killed and 139 wounded were American. Most of this increase came from Middle East terrorism, aided by state support. Over the past three years, terrorist incidents in the Middle East, or caused by Middle East groups, have gone up from 109 to 286 to 378 (for 1985).

It was this pattern of rapidly growing Middle East terrorism, with greatly increased casualties, more frequent targetting of US citizens and interests, and stronger state

support, which caused the Reagan Administration to draw the line for Qadhafi and Libya's direct involvement in terrorism. Libya is not the only state in the Middle East supporting and using terrorism: Syria and Iran remain very involved. But over the past six months Libya has become by far the most active, especially against Americans and Europeans. If Libya cannot be stopped, others can be expected to follow its lead.

The connection between Libya and the currently most active terrorist group, Abu Nidal, merits a few words. Details are contained in the State Department's Special Report 138 of January, 1986, which I request be made part of the record of this hearing. Over the last half of 1985 we know of Libyan money in the millions of dollars going to Abu Nidal, of Libya providing and buying him arms, of Abu Nidal and his top lieutenants living in Libya, of his killers being trained there and travel documents and other facilitative measures to permit Abu Nidal to carry out terrorist acts abroad being provided by Libya. Some of this evidence, such as the Tunisian passports used by the terrorists in the Vienna attack, is public. Some of it is highly classified intelligence, and to reveal it would help the terrorists beat our defenses. But there is no question

about the Libya-Abu Nidal connection or what Qadhafi hoped to accomplish. By this new terrorist resource, the fanatical Libyan leader believed his limitless ambitions and wild dreams could become true, that the West as well as the Arab world would be so intimidated that they would accept him as a major force to be reckoned with on the regional and world scene.

Against this background of escalating Libyan-sponsored attacks and the previous unwillingness of most governments to join in collective measures to stop the threat, the airport attacks were seen as a clear call for action and leadership by the United States. The President decided to take unilateral action, putting an end to the remaining US-Libyan commercial and financial relations, and called on other governments to send Qadhafi and other governments a signal to stop supporting terrorism. This was also a moral issue; we did what we felt was right regardless of the position of other governments.

There have been a number of reasons why the Europeans have been reluctant to act with us, both previously when we tried to exert pressure on Qadhafi and in the wake of the most recent attacks. These reasons, which also illustrate

the broader problems in obtaining stronger joint international action against terrorism, include: concern for the safety of their citizens in Libya or elsewhere if they were to join the US in strong action; skepticism over the effectiveness of economic sanctions; and other foreign policy interests in the region.

Thus, first reactions in Europe to measures against Libya appeared to be negative. Europeans worried that they might lose Arab links and business, or that the United States was about to take some thoughtless action which would have unforeseeable repercussions in the Middle East, just as the British and French invasion of Suez did in 1956. But they were also afraid of a major confrontation within the Western Alliance should the United States demand that they at once apply full economic sanctions, or that we might apply an extraterritorial dimension and make our own decisions binding upon US subsidiary companies in Europe.

Fortunately, our friends were reassured when the President's decisions were explained directly to them, that we were seeking collective application over time of peaceful measures rather than military action or immediate across-the-board sanctions. They also understood better our

actions when they had an opportunity to study the detailed intelligence on Libyan activities which we provided, identifying specific evidence and demonstrating the real seriousness of the threat.

Although it is of course too soon to tell what the ultimate effect will be on Libya, and not all actions taken by European states will be made public, there was a positive response, in public or in private, by almost all the governments visited by Deputy Secretary Whitehead. Almost all the Western governments have agreed to cessation of arms supply to Libya, including existing contracts, and end to government credits for exports, tighter controls on Libyan entry and movement, and a promise not to substitute for departing American companies and technicians. All governments with which we spoke said they would consider additional measures, and we will hold them to this promise.

This is a long term effort, but one we are monitoring closely. In addition to actions by European states, Arab governments, vocally supportive of Qadhafi initially, have not extended credit to Libya's faltering economy, nor taken retributive actions against the United States. The Soviet Union, despite rhetorical support and the dangerous policy

of supplying Qadhafi weapons, also show signs of unease and caution. Qadhafi has demonstrated his discomfort with US actions, both by posturing for the media and in looking for other areas, such as Chad, to show he can still exert force. However, President Reagan has made it clear to all that he is prepared to continue exercising responsible leadership by the United States, including the use of force, if necessary, to deter Qadhafi from his murderous policies.

US efforts to obtain a boycott against Libyan Arab Airways has been strongly reinforced by the sanctions announced by President Reagan January 8, and the subsequent consultations with our European allies on the mission headed by Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead. Few European states still have airline connections with Libya and we have asked each one of them to denounce their agreement. None have agreed so far, perhaps out of concern for their citizens still in Libya, but we are following the situation closely.

Our actions to isolate Qadhafi illustrate several aspects of our struggle to stop international terrorism. Qadhafi is only part of the problem, and we are not losing sight of that fact. The counter terrorism effort is a long and complicated one, which must be pursued by a combination

of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures. There are no magic solutions. Most terrorism takes place abroad where our power is limited, our friends have a slightly different set of interests than we do, and the enemy is determined and ready to die. We will be rewarded for our efforts through persistence in seeking our objectives, through sensitive cooperation with our allies and through firmness with respect to terrorists and their supporters. We must recognize that our solutions will not always be accepted, and that we must remain flexible in how we achieve our goals.

I would like to turn now to specific measures relating to the State Department's responsibilities in preventing acts of terrorism in the civil aviation context, bearing in mind that Mr. Matthew Scocozza of the Department of Transportation will also be addressing this issue in more detail, as will Mr. Jeffrey Shane, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation Affairs in the Department of State.

Improved civil aviation security has been one of our highest priorities -- and an area where we can see some results. It may be useful to review actions that have taken

place since the hijacking of TWA 847 from Athens last June. We had already been active in this field and some measures were already in place. Five months earlier a combined industry/government team had visited Athens and several other Middle Eastern airports and criticized security systems, particularly in Athens. This team carried out joint airport inspections and offered assistance to countries to improve security conditions. It also recommended specific amendments to the minimum security standards required by ICAO. The Greeks promised - seemed - to be responsive, so further action was not taken.

The TWA hijacking prompted strong reactions. We issued a travel advisory for Athens. The Greeks responded angrily, especially when tourists and the New York Philharmonic cancelled their trips. But they quickly instituted the improved airport security standards we had proposed five months earlier. At the same time, behind the leadership of Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole and her Canadian colleague, the ICAO Council expeditiously adopted a number of additional minimum security measures, and several other governments took rapid advantage of offers by State and FAA for technical assistance and training in civil aviation

security. Congress then passed legislation providing FAA and State with some leverage in their airport inspections around the world through the travel advisories and sanctions they were authorized to use.

When we look back to last June -- eight months ago -- much has changed in civil aviation security. Security standards for aircraft and airports have been markedly improved. It is worth recalling that the attacks in Rome and Vienna in December took place in the public areas of the airports, perhaps because of the increasing difficulty of introducing weapons aboard aircraft. ICAO has never operated better and is carrying out its mandate to the fullest. The international community has found a new consensus for improved aviation security measures. More remains to be done, specifically in the area of creating more binding measures, but when we look back, even over this short period of time, the institutional arrangements to prevent terrorist acts in civil aviation represent permanent progress.

In conclusion, I would like to note that we have made important progress over the past year not only in developing an improved international consensus against terrorism, but

also in taking a number of concrete steps unilaterally, bilaterally with our friends and in international organizations. I believe we will be able to pre-empt and deter a greater number of terrorist acts in 1986 than we did in 1985, but much more work needs to be done until we can eliminate this modern scourge. The task is not an easy one and there are no quick fixes. We look forward to continued close cooperation with the Congress in the critical area of U.S. policy.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Renew Reagan's 'Rambo' Lesson

Following the twin airport massacres of Dec. 27, when Arab terrorists demonstrated their manhood by shooting into crowds of women and children, the world reacted with predictable aplomb. That is to say, everybody expressed regrets — or praise, in the case of Col. Muammar Qaddafi — yawned, stretched and went back to work.

Washington, screwing up its courage, did manage to wag a finger at Qaddafi, believed to have collaborated with the gunmen. This action, regarded as unduly provocative, caused almost as much consternation among our European allies as among the waggee and his criminal associates.

For those with strong stomachs, here is a quick summary of civilization's responses to date.

- After a two-week delay, President Reagan ordered economic sanctions.

- Italy's Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, having conferred with his police and intelligence chiefs, announced that "proven and active involvement of the Libyan government in terrorist actions" would force — are you sitting down? — a review of Rome's Libyan policy. The investigation is continuing at snail speed.

- West Germany, which capitulated to Qaddafi even when eight of its own citizens were held for ransom two years ago, was predictably "unreceptive" to American pleas for economic disengagement. A spokesman said the Bonn government might collaborate in punitive measures short of economic sanctions, provided Qaddafi were implicated in terrorism. To satisfy Bonn, Qaddafi would have to be nabbed at the El Al counter with a smoking Kalashnikov.

- The U.N. Security Council took the high ground, decrying the airport massacres but, at the urging of the murderers' Third World sympathizers, imploring the survivors to show restraint.

- The Arab League, representing the conscience of Islam, was stinting in its criticism of those coreligionists who murder the innocent and are quick to discourage any kind of punishment.

- Yasser Arafat, upstaged and increasingly desperate, denounced the new wave of terrorism in the Mediterranean. Arafat is that fabled fellow, the Arab moderate. Last November in Cairo he declared that shooting women and children was to be countenanced only in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

- Brave France, high-minded Austria, principled Great Britain — everywhere it was the same. Even Israel, the real target wherever Arab terrorism strikes, appeared to bend under intensifying pressure from Washington, the temperature of whose outrage approximated the weather outside by New Year's Day. What should have been the world's response? It seems clear enough, assuming that civilized nations still believe that criminals should be punished, even at the cost of commercial inconvenience.

Libya owns 15 percent of Fiat, the Italian motor company. This property might have been confiscated as an indemnity to the victims of terrorism, or simply confiscated. If Rome resisted, Fiats and even Guccis could have been embargoed.

Oil, of course, is Libya's sustenance. Qaddafi's economy, such as it is, is kept aloft by the presence of Western technicians and oil companies. Since 1981, the United States has barred the import of Libyan oil, and now Reagan has outlawed

U.S. business in Libya — an action likely to benefit Europe more than it hurts Qaddafi. Meanwhile, it is almost a faux pas to bring up the terrorist nests to which Qaddafi gives squatter's rights. Eliminating them is the first step — not one or two of them, as a meaningless cryptogram, but all of them, simultaneously, together with similar operations elsewhere.

Finally there's the matter of Palestinian rights, to which the president alluded respectfully at his Jan. 7 news conference. Why is the subject even discussed? As long as the Palestinian cause is represented by Abu Nidal, George Habash and Arafat, decent men and women, including Arabs, ought to flee from it, as from any contamination.

True, during the creation of a homeland for the survivors of the Nazi Holocaust, the Palestinians were effectively uprooted (though the contribution made by Arab rejectionists should not be discounted). But injustice is proportional.

Whatever the Palestinian grievance, the reservoirs of compassion, increasingly drawn down by the victims of terrorism, run dry. Leon Klinghoffer, confined to a wheelchair aboard the Achille Lauro, is shot and shoved overboard; Natasha Simpson, 11 years old, is gunned down in the Rome airport; and the perspective necessarily shifts.

The Palestinians, in whose "good cause" children and cripples are murdered, can hardly expect that cause to be among the world's top priorities — even a world as numb as ours is to its affirmative responsibilities.

As for Reagan, who is not numb (however confused), the maintenance of law and order falls on him as chief magistrate of the civilized world, and plainly he needs help. Won't someone show him "Rambo" again?

Cheshire is editor of the editorial pages of The Washington Times.

GUMBO

IS BACK and IS HE MAD!

FIRST BLOOD PART IV



GARNER '86

“Peasants must be able to own their own land, their own houses and their own cattle. People must be free to practice their religions and traditions.”

black Africa know the truth. They know that Nigeria offered to replace the Cuban and Soviet-bloc troops with Nigerian troops. But the MPLA leadership refused, showing the whole world that their real fear is not the South Africans but UNITA, the Angolan people and the nationalists within the MPLA.

Yes, UNITA receives aid from the Republic of South Africa. We have also received support from China, Arab nations and other black African countries, and much of that support has been shipped across the Namibian border. But it is hypocritical of the Soviets to claim that this means we somehow endorse the Pretoria government. We oppose apartheid. Fortunately, it is a dead ideology. It cannot be exported. Even in South Africa everyone talks about how to move away from the apartheid system.

American Obligations

Angola was the first nation to begin its guerrilla war against Soviet colonialism. But we are not alone. Today the brave peoples of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Laos, Nicaragua and Ethiopia are fighting their own wars of national liberation.

We fought and carried on while the West went through a crisis of faith, wondering if

its traditions, values and civilization were worth fighting and dying for. I think that the Third World, through these struggles, has helped to give the West the courage to oppose the Soviet Union — to provide a cure for what Alexander Solzhenitsyn calls the Western disease. Our struggle in Angola, the battle of other freedom fighters, is the battle for the West and its values.

We who fight these wars of national liberation see the unity of our cause and the common enemy we face — Soviet imperialism. As a result, representatives of the freedom fighters of Angola, Laos, Afghanistan and Nicaragua met in Jamba on June 12, 1985, to sign the Jamba Accord and announce the formation of the Democratic International. We who fight the battle for Western values of democracy, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the right to own one's home and some land, have joined together. Now we ask the West to join us.

The strategic case, the self-interest of the West and America, is equally compelling. Should massive Soviet air and armor attacks succeed in defeating UNITA when the dry season begins next March, then 45,000 Cuban troops and advisers, thousands of Eastern-bloc “technicians” and an untold quantity of tanks, fighter planes,

helicopters and artillery will stand uncontested along the borders of Zaire, Zambia, Namibia and Botswana. Not UNITA alone, but all of central and southern Africa awaits the decision by the United States.

We were all encouraged by the decision of the U.S. Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment, which forbade U.S. assistance to the forces of freedom in Angola and left us for 10 years alone against the Cubans. Now the United States must take the next step and commit the military aid that will allow us to defeat the Cubans and Soviets in Angola — antiaircraft weapons, the Red-eye missile and Stinger missile, and antitank weapons.

With those arms we can protect our people from air and armor attacks and drive back the Cubans and Soviets through the continuation of the guerrilla war that we have waged for 11 years.

We need you to insist at the United Nations and other international forums that the Cubans and Soviets leave Angola and that the promised elections be held. With your military and political support, other nations will follow your lead and give us aid.

Do not underestimate the importance of your decision. For Angola is the Munich of Africa. Hesitation, the refusal to aid UNITA in its fight against the Cubans and Soviets, will be taken as a signal by all the countries in the region that the United States has abandoned them to the Soviets as the West abandoned Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe to Hitler in 1938.

Do not suppose that Zaire, Zambia, Botswana and Namibia will remain of the West when faced with an unopposed base in Angola. They will be forced to make their political accommodations with the Soviets just as most of Eastern Europe fell under Nazi political domination without a shot being fired.

The loss of the sea route around the Cape and the loss of the strategic minerals found in central and southern Africa would be a crippling blow to the economy and defense of the West. That is why I say that UNITA is the key to Angola, Angola is the key to Africa and Africa is the key to the West.

I am not alone in this assessment. The Soviets agree.




LASKI/BLACK STAR

Savimbi is founder and president of UNITA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. This article is reprinted, with permission, from the winter edition of The Heritage Foundation's Policy Review.

By establishing schools, guerrillas can win the support of the people.



CURRENT NEWS EARLY BIRD EDITION



FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1986

NEW YORK TIMES
DELAYED

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WASHINGTON TIMES
7 March 1986 Pg. 1

Air Force to spend \$45 billion to build its Stealth fighters

By Hugh Vickery
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Air Force will spend \$45 billion to develop and build 750 fighter planes to fly undetected by radar at twice the speed of sound, launch radar-guided missiles 40 miles from the target and fly away before enemy missiles can catch it.

The Advanced Tactical Fighter, or Stealth fighter, is scheduled to go into service in 1995.

To get a piece of the project, seven major defense contractors will spend millions — perhaps hundreds of millions — of dollars over the next three years developing the technology and lobbying Congress and the Air Force.

"It will be really challenging to keep the costs that low," says Air Force Col. Albert Piccirillo, the director of the project.

Last month, the contractors — which include Boeing, General Dynamics, Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop and Rockwell International — submitted voluminous technical proposals of their designs.

Earlier this week, they backed up those proposals with financial projections.

The pilot will wear a Darth Vader-like helmet, inside which vital information about his plane, the terrain and enemy planes will be projected.

To arm and fire weapons, the pilot will need only say a couple of words. On-board computers will identify his voice and the command, and order the plane to do what he said.

The only way contractors can keep within the Air Force cost projections is to take a radically different approach to production — using automated equipment to produce aircraft made of plastic composite

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WALL STREET JOURNAL
7 March 1986 Pg. 46

Report Urges Boost In U.S. Measures Against Terrorism

By ROBERT W. MERRY

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The White House released an internal study on international terrorism that recommends beefing up intelligence efforts against terrorist groups and greater coordination among government agencies to stem terrorist activity.

The study, produced by a task force headed by Vice President George Bush, concludes the nation's basic anti-terrorism program "is well-conceived and working," but Mr. Bush said at a news conference yesterday that the recommendations of his task force "will make our policies even stronger."

A classified version of the report was presented to President Reagan last December, and in January the president ordered that its recommendations be implemented by the appropriate agencies. The report released yesterday was a sanitized version of the earlier report, which was the product of a six-month study by 14 senior administration officials.

The report said public opinion polls indicate terrorism ranks along with arms control, the federal deficit and unemployment as one of Americans' major concerns. The study noted that 23 Americans were killed last year in overseas terrorist attacks, while two died at the hands of terrorists in the U.S.

James Holloway, a retired admiral who served as executive director of the task force, noted the report specifically rules out "random retaliation against groups or countries." That seemed to track with the Reagan administration's reluctance to strike back at terrorists when such retaliation could harm innocent people.

As Mr. Bush put it, "Our consensus would be retaliation where it could be surgically done but would not approve of wanton destruction of human life in order to show some muscle."

To foster greater coordination of the

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WASHINGTON POST
7 March 1986 Pg. 1

Panel Backs Reorganizing Of Military

By Fred Hiatt
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Armed Services Committee, traditionally the Defense Department's most loyal supporter in Congress, overrode strong objections from Pentagon leaders yesterday and unanimously approved a major military reorganization.

Committee leaders said the bill would encourage the four branches of military service to cooperate more and compete less. It would strengthen the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, create a vice chairman and give more authority to combat commanders in the field.

The committee also voted 19 to 0 to eliminate 17,694 jobs, trimming headquarters and administrative bureaucracies by about 10 percent. To improve weapons procurement, the bill would create an undersecretary of defense to oversee acquisition, while taking modest steps to reduce congressional interference.

Senators said that the committee's unanimous vote, combined with a similar but less far-reaching bill approved by the House last year, makes approval of a reorganization plan this year very likely.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), the committee's ranking minority member, said the "sweeping and historic" legislation would help remedy problems "that have plagued our national defense for decades." Chairman Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) called the bill "the most significant piece

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WASHINGTON POST 7 March 1986 Pg. 4

2 More House Panels Bar Contra Aid

Third Committee Backs It; Floor Vote Set for March 19

By Milton Coleman
and Edward Walsh
Washington Post Staff Writers

Two more House committees voted yesterday to disapprove President Reagan's request for \$100 million in aid to the contras in Nicaragua, while Democrats and Republicans alike warned the White House that its strident anticommunist rhetoric is hurting its own cause.

The House Appropriations Committee, on a voice vote, recommended rejection of the aid, while the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 23 to 18 against the measure.

A third panel, the House Armed Services Committee, also acting on a voice vote, recommended approval, completing preliminary House action and setting the stage for a floor vote now scheduled for March 19. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence voted 9 to 7 Wednesday for disapproval.

While the panels were voting yesterday, members of the House and the Senate complained about the tone and thrust of the administration's argument on behalf of the plan.

Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kan.) complained of "distortions" from the administration and of instances of "simplistic reasoning" that were "highly offensive."

Among the "distortions" she cited was "the suggestion that this is a purely partisan issue—a disagreement between Republicans in white hats and Democrats wrapped in red banners." Another was "the argument that this is a matter of patriotism—those who love America will support the president and those who oppose want to abandon San Diego to the Sandinistas," the Marxist government in Nicaragua.

In the House, Rep. Michael D. Barnes (D-Md.) compared the administration's tactics to those of the late Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) during the 1950s.

Accusations that opponents of the administration's policy in Nic-

aragua are "communist dupes," Barnes said, "would be laughable if they were not coming from the president of the United States and his top advisers. Frankly, I do not think we have heard such offensive nonsense from our top political leaders since the 1950s. These statements are the moral equivalent of McCarthyism." Barnes, a leading opponent of aid to the contras, added that the administration's arguments "are probably doing more to unite the Congress against his policies than anything I as an individual could do."

Responding to Kassebaum, White House communications director Patrick J. Buchanan said, "We're not questioning anyone's patriotism or motives . . . We're questioning the wisdom and judgment" of critics of the aid.

But asked yesterday whether he agrees that foes of the aid package are supporting communism, Reagan replied, "If so, inadvertently." He added that he had had enough experience with "communist subversion" when he was in the movie business "to know that a great many people are deceived and not aware that what they're doing is inimical to the interests of the United States."

Reagan himself has set much of the tone that Kassebaum and others criticized yesterday. Pressing Wednesday for the aid, he said, "If we don't want to see the map of Central America covered in a sea of red, eventually lapping at our own borders, we must act now."

Kassebaum and Sen. Daniel J. Evans (R-Wash.) met with Secretary of State George P. Shultz yesterday and complained that their concerns about the contra leadership, effectiveness of the current aid program and the goals of U.S. policy had not been addressed.

The two and other key Republican senators told Shultz that the aid proposal would not pass the Republican-controlled Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its present form so the administration is now expected to bypass that committee and take the measure straight to

WASHINGTON POST
7 March 1986 Pg. 1

President's '87 Budget Rejected

Senate Panel Vote
Underlines Reagan's
Fiscal Difficulties

By Helen Dewar
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Republican-controlled Senate Budget Committee voted 16 to 6 yesterday to reject President Reagan's fiscal 1987 budget despite protests that the committee was engaging in "president-bashing."

After the vote, committee Chairman Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.) told reporters that he is meeting privately with Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.), ranking Democrat on the panel, in hopes of coming up with a bipartisan budget resolution, possibly by the middle of next week. "We're very hopeful. . . but we're not there yet," he said.

In a further defeat for the president, a majority of House Republicans joined most of their Democratic colleagues in defying veto threats from the White House and approving a relatively small deficit-reduction measure left over from last year. The tally was 314 to 86, with Republicans voting 92 to 76 for it.

Meanwhile, the Senate began debate on a constitutional amendment to require a balanced budget that Reagan has endorsed, but the amendment would allow tax increases to achieve the balance, while Reagan wants a provision outlawing such increases. The amendment seeks to assure balanced bud-

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the Senate floor.

Staff writer Joanne Omang
contributed to this report.

The Washington Times

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 1986

A legal arsenal to fight the terrorists

JACK KEMP

Americans have overwhelmingly supported the president's decision to strike out against Libya's infrastructure of terrorism. As a nation that loves liberty and freedom, we have come to realize that we are engaged in the moral equivalent of war; that international terrorism is in reality a war against the democracies; and that we must be willing to employ all appropriate means at our disposal in our defense.

But it is not Libya alone that employs cadres of terrorists. For now, Col. Muammar Qaddafi, featured on the cover of *Time* magazine, may be in the public limelight as a mastermind of international terror — and rightly so. But in the shadows, far from passive, others are also at work in this deadly and evil endeavor. High on this list is the Palestine Liberation Organization.

By Yasser Arafat's accounting, 1985 was a good year for the PLO. It was a year in which "the Palestine revolution carried out 62 heroic operations" — by which he means armed attacks against a variety of targets, principally civilian, and many American. Yet despite this heavy toll and loss of life, he has said, "It is not enough. We must have more acts of resistance," adding, "I don't simply want, I demand, more commando operations. . . ."

And lest we in the United States misunderstand, Mr. Arafat explained in November last year, "We are on the threshold of a fierce battle — not an Israeli-Palestinian battle, but a Palestinian-U.S. battle."

I think the time has come to take Mr. Arafat at his word — and hold him accountable for his deeds. Among the means at our disposal, little utilized to date, are the instruments of legal process available against Mr. Arafat and his PLO. For among other things,

terrorist acts are crimes, and there is no earthly reason why their perpetrators should be immune from justice.

There are at least six steps worth exploration.

The first is for the Justice Department to convene a grand jury to investigate the series of criminal acts that have been committed against the United States and its citizens by Yasser Arafat's PLO. A grand jury can receive evidence in secret, and it has wide powers of subpoena. If it finds violations of U.S. laws, indictments should be issued.

The second is for the Justice Department to explore the possible prosecution of the PLO under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. This statute makes it unlawful for an organization to engage in a pattern of criminal activities, and imputes criminal liability to the leadership for the criminal acts of its functionaries. Those who train, equip, and direct terrorist organizations should be held accountable for terrorist acts. RICO may be one way of ensuring that accountability.

A third step would be to obtain a warrant for Mr. Arafat's arrest for the murder of U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel. According to press accounts, the United States has a tape recording of a telephone conversation in which the PLO leader personally orders Mr. Noel and other diplomats killed. The Justice Department obtained a warrant for the arrest of Muhammed "Abu" Abbas on substantially similar evidence. If the evidence exists against Mr. Arafat and jurisdiction obtains, then he, too, should be made to answer for his crimes.

A fourth step would be to take legal action against the PLO office in Washington, D.C. It is almost beyond

belief that a group which the president has labeled a "terrorist organization" should be allowed to operate in the middle of our capital city as if it were just another diplomatic outpost. The United States could, as an act of policy, close it down. Moreover, the PLO office in Washington has failed to register under Section 2386 of the criminal code (requiring the registration of organizations under foreign control that are engaged in "civilian military activity") and should be subject to prosecution for that violation.

A fifth step would be legal action

It's time that Yasser Arafat and other sponsors of terror come to understand that crimes against the U.S., our citizens, or our property, will not go unpunished.

against the PLO mission in New York. It enjoys no diplomatic immunity under any agreement that the United States has signed. Again, the United States could as an act of policy close it down. The N.Y. mission would also be a target for criminal justice procedures aimed at its parent organization.

Finally, we could symbolize our abhorrence for all the reprehensible deeds that Mr. Arafat represents by making it clear that, if Mr. Arafat tries once again to come to New York to use the United Nations to wave his gun, we will not grant him an entry visa. The U.S. Congress reserved in 1947 (P.L. 357, Sec. 6) the right to

deny visas to U.N. headquarters to anyone whose entrance might imperil U.S. security, and successive administrations have exercised that right on many occasions.

I suggest that Yasser Arafat has amply demonstrated his eligibility for exclusion. It is Mr. Arafat who controls the billion-dollar budget of the PLO and provides the salaries of the great majority of commandos and fedayeen. It is Mr. Arafat who controls the worldwide network of embassy-like PLO offices and missions, whose diplomatic immunity and pouches are used to move people, money, and equipment to carry out violent acts with impunity. It is Mr. Arafat who controls the assets that are used to make exchanges and alliances with the Sandinistas and the Red Brigades and the Baader Meinhof gang — indeed, as the White House reported in 1983, "with terrorist and guerrilla organizations around the world."

As we acknowledge Mr. Arafat's directorship of the PLO, so should we accord him the appropriate treatment under our laws.

Of course, action on these and other legal options will not, in itself, put an end to the threat of PLO terror. We must also consider what other actions may be necessary and be prepared to act. But these limited legal measures are eminently within the power of the United States. They can vastly complicate the operations of the PLO — particularly if supplemented by an active policy of asking our allies to surrender terrorists under indictment for extradition.

Our American tradition is grounded in the rule of law. We accept as an article of faith that no person is above the law. It is time that Yasser Arafat and other sponsors of international terror come to understand that crimes against the United States, our citizens, or our property, will not go unpunished.

Jack Kemp is a Republican member of the House of Representatives from New York.

The War Powers Resolution and Antiterrorist Operations



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is a statement by Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., April 29, 1986.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the War Powers Resolution in the context of recent events. I would like to begin by setting out some general considerations regarding the resolution and then focus on the application of the resolution to specific cases which are of particular interest to the subcommittee.

Basic Framework

The War Powers Resolution was enacted in 1973 in order to ensure congressional involvement in situations in which the United States may become engaged in hostilities with other states. To that end, the resolution contains certain requirements concerning consultation, reporting, and termination of the use of U.S. Armed Forces. Of course, this and other administrations have expressed serious doubts about the wisdom and constitutionality of various parts of the resolution.

Consultation Requirement. The consultation requirement is contained in section 3, which provides:

The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the

Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

The resolution specifies only that consultation occur "before introducing" armed forces in the situations specified, as well as "after" each such introduction until the situation ends. It does not define the nature of the consultations required, but allows the President to determine precisely how such consultations are to be carried out. Significantly, in making the requirement applicable only where consultation is "possible," the resolution expressly contemplates that consultation in a particular case will depend on the prevailing circumstances.

Over the years, both before and after the resolution was adopted, the executive branch has engaged in consultations with the Congress in a variety of circumstances involving the possible deployment of U.S. forces abroad. Consultations have occurred in cases where the resolution might have been thought to require them and in cases where it clearly would not (and the executive branch has typically been careful to preserve its position on these matters when consulting). The purpose of such consultations is to keep the Congress informed, to determine whether the Congress approves of a particular action or policy, and to give the Congress an opportunity to provide the President with its views, especially where it may disagree with the policy. Consultations are not intended to involve the Congress in reviewing the detailed plans of a military operation. The degree to which the President is implementing a policy of which the Congress is well

aware and which it has already approved in principle is one important factor to be considered in determining the nature and timing of consultations.

In practice, the form and substance of consultations have depended upon the circumstances of each case. In some instances, such as the introduction of U.S. forces into Egypt to participate in peacekeeping operations or the case of the Vietnam evacuation, the situation permitted detailed consultations well in advance of the action contemplated. In the case of the Tehran rescue mission, prior consultation was not possible because of extraordinary operational needs.

Reporting Requirement. Section 4 of the resolution requires that the President submit, within 48 hours after the introduction of U.S. forces, a written report to the Congress in three circumstances. A report must be submitted when U.S. forces are introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." In addition, a report must be submitted when U.S. forces are introduced "into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat" (with certain specified exceptions) or when such forces are introduced "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation. . . ."

Both Republican and Democratic presidents have provided written reports to the Congress with respect to U.S. deployments abroad as a means of keeping the Congress informed, while

reserving the executive branch's position on the technical applicability and constitutionality of the resolution. Reports were submitted by President Ford in connection with the Indochina evacuations and the Mayaguez incident and by President Carter in connection with the Tehran rescue mission. During the Reagan Administration, reports were submitted with respect to U.S. participation in the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai and the Multinational Force in Lebanon, the deployment of U.S. aircraft in connection with the situation in Chad, and the introduction of U.S. forces into Grenada. More recently, a report was submitted concerning the encounter with Libyan forces during U.S. military exercises in and near the Gulf of Sidra in late March, and a report was submitted with respect to the April 14 operation against Libya. Indeed, the executive branch has provided information to the Congress in many cases where no relevant statutory requirement existed.

Termination of Use of U.S. Forces.

Section 5 of the resolution provides that, within 60 days after a report is submitted or required to be submitted, the President must terminate the use of U.S. forces unless the Congress has declared war or specifically authorized the use of such forces, has extended the 60-day period, or is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack on the United States. The section also provides that the President must remove U.S. forces from engagement in hostilities abroad "if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution." The legislative veto provision of the resolution cannot stand in the face of the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in *INS v. Chadha*.

The executive branch has historically differed with the Congress over the wisdom and constitutionality of the 60-day provision of section 5. As President Reagan made clear in signing the Multinational Force in Lebanon resolution on October 12, 1983, the imposition of such arbitrary and inflexible deadlines creates unwise limitations on presidential authority to deploy U.S. forces in the interests of U.S. national security. Such deadlines can undermine foreign policy judgments and adversely affect our ability safely and effectively to deploy U.S. forces in support of those judgments.

Moreover, the President's constitutional authority cannot, in any event, be impermissibly infringed by statute. Section 8(d) of the resolution itself makes clear that the resolution was not intended to alter the constitutional authority of the President. The President has constitutional power, as Commander in Chief and as the nation's principal authority for the conduct of

foreign affairs, to direct and deploy U.S. forces in the exercise of self-defense, including the protection of American citizens from attacks abroad. From the time of Jefferson to the present, presidents have exercised their authority under the Constitution to use military force to protect American citizens abroad.

I would also mention that serious constitutional problems exist with respect to section 8(a) of the resolution, which purports to limit the manner in which the Congress may, in the future, authorize the use of U.S. forces. I do not believe that one Congress by statute can so limit the constitutional options of future Congresses. Nor can Congress control the legal consequences of its own actions. If a particular congressional action constitutes legal authority for the President to undertake a specific operation, I doubt that one Congress can change that fact for all future times by requiring a specific form of approval.

Recent Cases

The War Powers Resolution was enacted in the shadow of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war and of the so-called Watergate scandals. In more recent years, however, issues have been raised under the resolution in situations that bear no resemblance to the Vietnam war and, in fact, may not have been contemplated at the time of its adoption.

Deployment of Antiterrorist Units.

It is a regrettable reality in today's world that Americans abroad are increasingly subjected to murder, kidnappings, and other attacks by terrorists who seek to further their political ends through such means. The hijacking last year of TWA Flight 847, with the murder of Navy diver Stethem, is a well-known recent example. In that case, we had no reason to believe that the Government of Lebanon had encouraged or otherwise supported the terrorists; it was simply unable to control them. In such a situation, the President may decide to deploy specially trained antiterrorist units in an effort to secure the release of the hostages or to capture the terrorists who perpetrated the act. Does the War Powers Resolution require consultation and reporting in this kind of situation?

We have substantial doubt that the resolution should, in general, be construed to apply to the deployment of such antiterrorist units, where operations of a traditional military character are not contemplated and where no confrontation is expected between our units and forces of another state. To be sure, the language of the resolution makes no explicit exception for activities of this kind, but such units can reasonably be

distinguished from "forces equipped for combat" and their actions against terrorists differ greatly from the "hostilities" contemplated by the resolution.

Nothing in the legislative history indicates, moreover, that the Congress intended the resolution to cover deployments of such antiterrorist units. These units are not conventional military forces. A rescue effort or an effort to capture or otherwise deal with terrorists, where the forces of a foreign nation are not involved, is not a typical military mission, and our antiterrorist forces are not equipped to conduct sustained combat with foreign armed forces. Rather, these units operate in secrecy to carry out precise and limited tasks designed to liberate U.S. citizens from captivity or to attack terrorist kidnapers and killers. When used, these units are not expected to confront the military forces of a sovereign state. In a real sense, therefore, action by an antiterrorist unit constitutes a use of force that is more analogous to law enforcement activity by police in the domestic context than it is to the "hostilities" between states contemplated by the War Powers Resolution.

I might note, in this connection, that other types of cases involving military deployments—such as the movement of warships into or through foreign territorial waters, the deployment abroad of security personnel such as marine embassy guards, and transits of combat aircraft through foreign airspace—have generally been considered to be outside the scope of the resolution. The rationale for regarding the resolution inapplicable is at least as strong in the case of limited, antiterrorist deployments as it is in these other cases, absent the involvement of the armed forces of a foreign state.

Even assuming the resolution were applicable to the deployment of special antiterrorist units, the fact is that consultations may not—and generally will not—be possible in such cases. The existence and purpose of these units is well known to the Congress. The need for swiftness and secrecy inherent in the nature of those activities is so extraordinary that consultations prior to deployment might well jeopardize the lives of our units and the hostages they may seek to liberate.

Engagement During Military Exercises. Issues under the War Powers Resolution have also been raised where U.S. forces have engaged in a military exercise in conformity with international law. The incident in the Gulf of Sidra in late March illustrates the situation. Does the resolution require the President to consult and report in this kind of case?

Some factual background will help to put this question in perspective. The

United States is committed to the exercise and preservation of navigation and overflight rights and freedoms around the world. That is the purpose of the freedom of navigation program. A deliberate decision was made during the Carter Administration to discourage or negate unlawful claims to extended jurisdiction in the oceans. That policy was affirmed in 1982 under President Reagan, and in 1983 the essence of the policy became public in a statement on U.S. oceans policy. That statement made clear that the United States would continue to work with other countries to develop an acceptable oceans regime. It also made clear that the United States would protest the unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in the use of the oceans and that the United States would exercise and assert those rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis.

The exercise of our rights provides visible and powerful evidence of our refusal to accept unlawful claims. The United States has accordingly protested and exercised rights and freedoms with respect to claims of various kinds: unrecognized historic waters claims, territorial sea claims greater than 12 nautical miles, and territorial sea claims that impose impermissible restrictions on the innocent passage of any type of vessels (such as requiring prior notification or permission). Since the policy was established, the United States has exercised its rights against the objectionable claims of over 35 countries, including the Soviet Union, at a rate of about 30-40 freedom of navigation exercises per year.

The United States has followed this policy in connection with Libya. When Qadhafi came to power in Libya, it was not long before private firms saw their interests expropriated. Then, on October 9, 1973, Qadhafi broadened the scope of his interest in expropriating the rights of others and asserted his claim to ownership of the Gulf of Sidra. The United States vigorously protested that assertion on February 11, 1974, and in the years since then, we have exercised our rights in that area on numerous occasions.

The War Powers Resolution was not intended to require consultation before conducting maneuvers in international waters or airspace in the context of this global freedom of navigation program. We are aware of no previous suggestion that the resolution would require consultation in such situations.

This question was carefully considered in connection with the Sidra exercise in March, and the decision was made that the conduct of those operations did not place U.S. forces into hostilities or into a situation in which

imminent involvement in hostilities was "clearly indicated by the circumstances." The United States has conducted its exercises not only in Sidra but around the world, not only in March but for years—and, in most instances, without hostile response. We have, in fact, been in the Gulf of Sidra area 16 times since 1981, and we have crossed Qadhafi's so-called line of death seven times before the operation last March. Only once before did Qadhafi respond with military action, and, in that instance, he was singularly unsuccessful.

While we must always be aware of the risks and be prepared to deal with all contingencies, we have every right to expect that neither Libya nor any other country will take hostile action against U.S. forces while they are lawfully in and over areas of the high seas. The threat of a possible hostile response is not sufficient to trigger the consultation requirement of section 3, which refers only to actual hostilities and to situations in which imminent involvement in hostilities is "clearly indicated" by the circumstances.

Where a peaceful, lawful exercise does, in fact, result in hostile action to which U.S. forces must respond in immediate self-defense, such an isolated engagement should not normally be construed as constituting the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into a situation of actual or imminent hostilities for the purpose of the reporting requirement of section 4 of the resolution. No report was submitted in the case of the 1981 Sidra incident, in which two Libyan aircraft were shot down after they fired at U.S. aircraft. Similarly, during the period in which U.S. peacekeeping forces were deployed in the Beirut area in 1983, many incidents occurred in which hostile forces attacked and U.S. peacekeeping forces responded in immediate self-defense. Yet, no separate war powers report was submitted for each of these incidents. Of course, a different situation might be presented if U.S. forces withdrew from an area and subsequently returned for the purpose of undertaking further military action.

As a practical matter, however, this question seems academic. In the case of the March incident in the Gulf of Sidra, for example, regardless of the applicability of the War Powers Resolution, the Administration provided Congress with all the information it needed to review the incident. As soon as hostile Libyan actions occurred, the Administration took steps to ensure that Congress was informed of the situation and was kept informed throughout the remainder of the exercise. In particular, several calls were made to congressional leaders to inform them of the events; extensive briefings were conducted for the benefit of all interested members, at which ex-

perts from the Departments of State and Defense provided pertinent information and responded to all questions asked by members; and the President sent a written report to Congress describing the events of March 24 and 25, the actions taken by U.S. forces, and the legal justification for those actions.

Military Action in Self-Defense.

The third kind of situation in which war powers considerations have been raised recently is that in which U.S. forces take legitimate action in self-defense against facilities or forces of another state because of its sponsorship of terrorist attacks against Americans. In the April 14 operation against Libya, U.S. forces undertook military action in self-defense against five terrorist-related targets in order to preempt and deter Libya's unlawful aggression through terrorist force against the United States and its nationals. Does the War Powers Resolution apply to a case of this kind?

The use of U.S. forces to conduct a military strike against the facilities of a hostile, sovereign state in its own territory falls within the specific terms of the consultation requirement of section 3 of the resolution. In this context, however, a critical element is flexibility. As indicated earlier, section 3 expressly envisions the possibility that, in some instances, the President might have to act without prior consultations. In any event, he must seek to consult in a manner appropriate to the circumstances, and the need for swiftness and secrecy in carrying out a military operation is a vital factor to be weighed in determining the nature and timing of consultations that may be appropriate in a given situation.

In the case of the April 14 operation, extensive consultations occurred with congressional leaders. They were advised of the President's intention after the operational deployments had commenced but hours before military action occurred. This satisfied the resolution's requirement that consultation occur "before" the "introduction" of troops into hostilities or a situation of imminent hostilities. Congressional leaders had ample opportunity to convey their views to the President before any irrevocable actions were taken (in fact, no one who was consulted objected to the actions undertaken). The President took a serious risk in conducting these consultations. The press observed legislative leaders entering the White House for the consultations, and speculation about possible military action ensued. The press also learned immediately after the consultations that the President was to make an address later that evening, and this led to rumors of imminent military action that could have jeopardized the success of the operation.

The consultations in this case were consistent with the provisions of the War Powers Resolution. They were also consistent with and, in many respects, exceeded in scope and depth the consultations conducted on previous occasions. For example, President Ford's meeting with congressional leaders to discuss the Mayaguez operation occurred at a point in time much closer to the onset of military action than was the case here. President Carter, as I noted earlier, did not consult at all prior to the Tehran rescue mission.

Where a military action constitutes the introduction of U.S. forces into actual or imminent hostilities for the purpose of the consultation requirement of section 3 of the resolution, the action also triggers the reporting requirement of section 4. In the case of the April 14 operation, the President submitted a full report consistent with the War Powers Resolution. As the President noted in his report, the actions taken were pursuant to his authority under the Constitution, including his authority as Commander in Chief. That authority is most compelling in a situation such as this, where the use of force is essential to deter an immediate and substantial threat to the lives of Americans.

In recent weeks, the question has been raised publicly as to the President's right to take military action without the express approval of Congress. This is a question that has been addressed by executive branch officials on many occasions over the years, and their statements are well known to this committee. Without going into the specifics of those statements, it is clear that the limited actions undertaken by President Reagan in response to attacks on the United States and its citizens fall well within the President's authority under the Constitution. As noted earlier, the War Powers Resolution does not confer power on the President, but it clearly recognizes that the President has independent constitutional authority to take appropriate military action.

It is also important to note, in this regard, that the President is not simply acting alone, under his inherent constitutional authority, when taking the types of actions we are discussing today. The Congress has, over the years, learned of, considered, and effectively endorsed in principle the use of U.S. forces for a variety of purposes through its adoption of laws and other actions. Most significantly, Congress has authorized and appropriated money for the creation of forces specifically designed for antiterrorist tasks.

For example, Section 1453 of the 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Act specifically states that it is the duty of the government to safeguard the safety and security of U.S. citizens against a rapidly increasing terrorist threat and that U.S. special operations forces provide the immediate and primary capability to respond to such terrorism, and the Congress has appropriated funds for the specific purpose of improving U.S. capabilities to carry out such operations. Likewise, the Congress has appropriated considerable sums to create the naval and air forces that are needed to respond to and deter state-sponsored terrorist attacks in the manner that was done on April 14 and to carry out the exercises necessary to maintain such capabilities and to assert and protect our rights on the high seas. In this sense, Congress has participated in the creation and maintenance of the forces whose function, at least in part, is to defend Americans from terrorism through the measured use of force.

The President has openly discussed and explained the need for and propriety of these uses of force, which he has correctly assumed are widely supported by Congress and the American people. All of the actions undertaken were clearly signaled well in advance and, therefore, posed no threat to the role of Congress under the Constitution in military and foreign affairs.

Conclusion

It seems fair to say, in conclusion, that it is not clear how the War Powers Resolution, which was originally designed to provide an appropriate role for the Congress with respect to U.S. involvement in hostilities with other states, should apply to the use of U.S. forces in other kinds of situations. Some such situations—the deployment of anti-terrorist units—would seem to fall completely outside the scope of the resolution. Other situations—the conduct of peaceful, lawful exercises which result in a hostile response—do not require consultations but, some might argue, may, in special situations, require a report. Still other cases—the use of U.S. forces in a legitimate, defensive strike against another state—can clearly be said to fall within both the consultation and the reporting provisions but with the form of consultation necessarily varying with the particular circumstances.

A consideration of the application of the War Powers Resolution to situations such as these does more than raise difficult and inevitably controversial issues of interpretation. On a broader level, it also highlights some of the significant negative aspects of the War Powers Resolution, whose effects on the Congress are perhaps even more profound than on the Executive. The need that some Members of Congress feel to defend the resolution's viability, even in situations well beyond those contemplated at the time of its adoption, causes Congress to shift its concern, deliberations, and political leverage away from evaluating the merits of military actions to testing their legality and to focus on formal and institutional issues rather than on the substance of our policies. Our history amply demonstrates that Congress has adequate means, through the budgetary process and otherwise, to provide an effective check on presidential power to employ military force. But the War Powers Resolution often unwisely diverts our leaders from issues of policy to issues of law. ■

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Use of Disclosures

Administration Often Unveils Secrets, At Risk to Security, for Sake of Policy

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 1 — The Reagan Administration has been following a pattern of disclosing highly classified information to support its foreign policies, even though a number of Administration officials say these disclosures have endangered intelligence sources and methods. This fits the well-established practice of its predecessors, with two important variations: In the memory of a number of past and present officials, the Reagan team does it more often. And this Administration has been more aggressive in threatening the news media with prosecution for conveying similar intelligence information to the American people.

News Analysis

This has set off a struggle between press and government over what intelligence data should be made public and who should decide. William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, once again highlighted those issues with more threats to the press last week concerning coverage of the trial of Ronald W. Pelton, a former official of the National Security Agency who is accused of spying for the Soviet Union. By the week's end the White House had moved to soften the threat somewhat.

Today, in separate television interviews, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, while supporting the view that journalists who break the law on disclosing intelligence secrets should be prosecuted, called for voluntary restraints and appeals to journalists' sense of responsibility.

While the Administration's thrust has been to bear down on the press, with frequent warnings in recent weeks, its own role and reasons in divulging such information have received scant attention.

As Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, put it: "Every administration wants to have it both ways — to keep its secrets, and to reveal them whenever doing so is useful for their politics and policies." The Wisconsin Democrat, a former Intelligence Committee member, added that in his judgment a number of Administration disclosures have been "more damaging to our gaining necessary information than the press disclosures the Administration is complaining about."

Administration disclosures include revealing the most sensitive communications interceptions in the recent case of Libya and the Soviet Union on a number of occasions, as well as releasing satellite photographs regarding Nicaragua in 1982.

The disclosures also include an incident last year in which the Central Intelligence Agency offered the press detailed information provided by one of the highest-ranking Soviet defectors of recent times.

Testimony at Spy Trial

Last week the disclosures entailed a Federal prosecutor, for the first time using information supplied by the United States intelligence community, speaking in a spy trial of the general American capability to "exploit," "process," and "analyze" Soviet messages.

In each instance, according to Administration officials, intelligence officers and others have argued against disclosure on the ground that adversaries, knowing they were being seen and heard, could take steps to block these processes in the future.

To some Administration officials and others, these authorized disclosures have been more damaging to intelligence collection than the unauthorized press disclosures of recent weeks that have so exercised Administration leaders. These include press accounts of the details of Libyan messages after President Reagan had talked publicly about the substance of those messages regarding terrorist activities in Berlin.

Of the greatest concern to the Administration were reports that an American spy had told Moscow that United States submarines were involved in listening to Soviet communications, information presumably already in Moscow's possession.

When to Go Public?

Nonetheless, the weight of opinion expressed by officials of past and present Presidential administrations is that the one in power has the right to decide when intelligence must be compromised to advance policy.

"I've always been of the view that an administration has to be able to make the judgment when to disclose, even if intelligence people are opposed," said McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's national security adviser. He recalled Kennedy's decision to reveal satellite photographs of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1963 as a legitimate exercise of this right.

Stansfield Turner, a retired admiral who was President Carter's intelligence chief, went further, saying that "we always have to make compromises" in balancing intelligence sources with policy considerations. But, he said, it is "impossible to make this judgment from outside the Government."

Both maintained that the press had the right to publish unauthorized infor-

mation. But Admiral Turner insisted that the press then had to accept the risks of prosecution.

In 1982, the Administration made public aerial reconnaissance photographs that intelligence officials said proved Nicaragua, with Soviet and Cuban aid, was assembling the largest military force in Central America and was supplying Salvadoran guerrillas. At the time, a senior Administration official said: "It's a no-win situation. If we go public with the information, we may lose our ability to continue collecting in the field. If we don't, we may lose our chance to build public support for the policy."

As it turned out, according to officials, the Administration neither lost its intelligence access nor convinced many of the extent of the military threat. But the photographs might have been useful to Soviet intelligence.

In 1983, after the Soviet Union shot down a Korean airliner, killing 269 people aboard, Secretary Shultz revealed that American listening posts had intercepted the radio conversations between the Soviet pilot and his controllers.

The disclosure may have failed to prove his point that the Soviets knew the plane was not an intelligence aircraft and, as far as many intelligence officers were concerned, told Moscow that the United States could intercept important Soviet military communications.

The Case of the Defector

In late 1985, the Central Intelligence Agency made a determined effort to tell reporters details about their interrogation of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, a key Soviet intelligence agent who apparently defected and then slipped out of American control and returned to Moscow. The C.I.A. told its side, as some of its officials acknowledged at the time, to show that he had been a valuable informer, contrary to White House assertions of his uselessness.

A number of Administration officials at the time maintained that these C.I.A. disclosures tipped off Moscow to what Mr. Yurchenko had divulged, in the same way that Mr. Casey is seeking to prevent the press from telling Moscow and the American public about Mr. Pelton's alleged disclosures.

Earlier this year, Mr. Reagan publicly spoke of the Administration's knowledge of messages sent to and from Tripoli and its diplomatic posts. He said these proved Libyan involvement in the terrorist attack April 5 against a discothèque in West Berlin, in which two people were killed and 230 others wounded.

Several intelligence officials thought the disclosure would allow the Libyans to prevent similar interception in the future.

As to the decision to make disclosures at the Pelton trial, Edward P. Djerjian, a White House spokesman, said last week that it was "made by appropriate Government authorities after careful consideration of the demands of trial and the potential harm that release of this selected data may cause the national security."

A Marker for the Summit

LOU CANNON

Attorney General John P. Mitchell, in the heyday of the Nixon presidency, once memorably admonished critics of that administration's civil rights program to "watch what we do, not what we say."

It was good advice then, if double-edged, and it is even better advice now in assessing President Reagan's decision to renounce the SALT II arms control agreement while continuing in at least temporary compliance with its ceilings on nuclear missile launchers.

For ideologues on both sides, there was a curious cleansing quality in Reagan's statement that future U.S. decisions would be based on the Soviet military threat rather than on the requirements of SALT II. It satisfied conservatives who had waited 5½ years for Reagan to make good on his 1980 campaign promise to renounce the "fatally flawed" treaty negotiated by President Jimmy Carter. And it ratified longstanding liberal fears that Reagan would prove a militaristic president who spurned negotiations with the Soviets.

Both sides seem more influenced by Reagan's words than his deeds, while being selective about the words they quote. In the same measured statement in which he ostensibly bid farewell to SALT II, Reagan said he would not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or ballistic missiles than the Soviets. He also called upon Moscow to join in establishing an interim arms control framework of "truly mutual restraint."

While Reagan insisted he was dismantling two older Poseidon submarines for budgetary reasons, the effect of his action kept the United States within the limits of SALT II as the new Trident submarine Nevada began sea trials last week. Pentagon conservatives had wanted Reagan to dry-dock the Poseidons, rather than scrap them, pushing the United States over the SALT II ceiling of 1,200 nuclear delivery systems.

Instead, the United States will remain within SALT II limits until the 131st B52 bomber equipped with air-launched cruise missiles is put into service later this year, and could fall back under the limit a few months later if additional Poseidon subs are retired.

All in all, the Soviets have little

SUMMIT...Pg. 16

WEINBERGER...from Pg. 1

chev.

Mr. Weinberger said he had not read a new Soviet proposal reportedly made at Geneva, Switzerland, two days after the president's decision on SALT was disclosed. Mr. Reagan, returning from a Camp David weekend, brushed off reporters' questions on the subject.

Mr. Weinberger's position on the ABM treaty seemed to be in response to the Geneva offer, which reportedly said the Soviet side would start reducing strategic nuclear forces if the United States agreed to stick with the ABM agreement for 15 or 20 years.

"I'd certainly oppose anything that blocked or in any way prevented our development" of an SDI system, the defense secretary said.

He said three times that he was against anything that limited not only research but eventual deployment of such a space-based missile defense system, popularly known as "star wars." Research on SDI would be possible under the 1972 ABM treaty, but deployment would not be permitted.

Mr. Weinberger said Soviet researchers have been working on a comparable program for 17 years.

The language of the ABM treaty allows either side to abrogate it with six months' notice. Neither Mr. Weinberger nor Mr. Shultz mentioned that, but both said the Soviets have violated the agreement by building a major inward-looking radar complex at Krasnoyarsk, Siberia, apparently designed for missile defense.

Asked on NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" about the Soviet suggestion that Mr. Reagan's decision on SALT could endanger arrangements for another summit meeting, Mr. Shultz said Mr. Reagan was ready to have such a meeting and to prepare the agenda involved.

But like Mr. Weinberger, he was firm in supporting the president's decision to halt U.S. adherence to the treaty, which Washington has complied with until now despite the Senate's refusal to ratify the agreement.

Mr. Shultz said the Soviets had violated SALT II in two ways, by deploying new mobile missiles and by encrypting the telemetry that sends back results of Soviet missile tests.

In changing policy, the president is "shifting gears" away from an outdated agreement, he said. The treaty limits the number of strategic missiles but not the number of warheads, he said, so the Soviets have deployed 70 or more new SS-25 weapons with multiple warheads. That "basically doubles" the previous number of warheads, he added.

DUARTE...from Pg. 6

arms to incorporate into the democratic process—to put down their arms and end this war that has caused our country so much pain and blood."

Unionized workers and farmers have begun turning out this year for street demonstrations protesting Duarte's economic austerity program and calling for dialogue with the guerrillas.

In January, Duarte implemented an unpopular economic austerity plan supported by the United States that included currency devaluation, limits on imports and price increases. A recent government poll showed that only 24 percent of those surveyed supported Duarte's Christian Democratic administration, a percentage larger than that favoring any other political party but far below the 40 percent who said they either did not care or did not care to answer.

Duarte outlined the achievements of his first two years in office, including construction of housing and bridges and increases in public and private employment. But economists say about half of the work force is still unemployed or laboring in marginal jobs.

Right-wing opposition legislators boycotted the speech. Duarte, irked by this attempt to embarrass him, lashed back, comparing the absent legislators to leftist guerrillas throughout Latin America.

[While Duarte spoke, 60 members of a human rights group occupied the capital's cathedral to demand the release of nine human rights activists arrested last month, United Press International reported.]

Mr. Weinberger, interviewed on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation," said the United States must decide what weapons to add "for our own national security . . . not things that stay within the artificial limits of a flawed and expired treaty."

The United States is scrapping two missile submarines and thus remaining within SALT limits, Mr. Weinberger said, but only because that is "cost-effective."

"We certainly will" go over the treaty's limits later by deploying more air-launched cruise missiles aboard long-range bombers, he said.

PASSOVER AND TERROR

BY STANLEY RABINOWITZ
SERMON
FIRST DAY OF
PASSOVER
APRIL 24, 1986
THE ADAS ISRAEL
SYNAGOGUE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mah nishtana ha-Pesach hazeh mikol ha-psachim? Why is this Passover different from others?

On this Passover we endured the reverberations of the 11th Plague: the slaughter of the innocent.

Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon has held the United States responsible for the plague of "hospital beds filled with bloodied children....Streets strewn with the rubble of bombed apartment buildings....The death of Colonel Qaddafi's infant daughter."

Any sensitive person who saw the televised portrayals of broken bodies pulled from the rubble or the bandaged faces of children in hospital beds couldn't help but cringe in discomfort at the high cost exacted for "the sober satisfaction of seeing justice done" -- to quote a N.Y. Times editorial.

Perhaps the American public will now exhibit a deeper understanding of the Israeli public who have felt this painful discomfort time and time again, whenever telecast scenes of devastation depicted the savage effects of Israel's use of her air power over Lebanon. Decent people recoil at the thought of inflicting so much injury and death on innocent bystanders. ✓

Passover and its rituals are appropriately instructive. Passover received its name from the Divine command to the children of Israel to smear blood of the paschal lamb on the doorposts of their houses so that the Angel of Death could recognize and pass over Jewish homes.

A sage whose words are recorded in the Talmud observed that the Angel of Death was surely intelligent enough to recognize a Jewish household. The conclusion was that once the sword is unleashed in the land, it can no longer distinguish between the wicked and the good.

Therein lies the ^{painful} ambiguity of riot, terror and war.

^

Participants in the traditional Seder spilled a drop of wine at the recitation of each of the ten plagues to signify that our cup of celebration is diminished by our awareness of the cost in suffering inflicted on other human beings, enemies, but all the children of God, and surely innocent bystanders.

Parts of the Hallel, the Psalms of Praise, which we recite on all festivals, are omitted on the last six days of Passover in recognition of the truth in a legend which assigns to God these words at the drowning of the Egyptians in the Red Sea: "At a time when My children are drowning in the sea, it is not appropriate to sing the full measure of song."

Our Rabbis taught us: "When your enemy falls, do not rejoice."

These rituals reflect the Jew's ambivalence about the use of power, and are designed to sensitize us to the suffering we inflict on others by our efforts to survive.

The Jewish ambivalence toward the use of power is reflected in the Haftarah we select for Chanukah, a festival which celebrates the military victory of the Maccabees; the words of Zechariah which conclude, "Not by power, not by might, but by My spirit, saith the Lord of Hosts."

America's ambivalence toward the use of power ^{was} reflected in the letters to the editor which appeared in many newspapers, and in the demonstrations and counterdemonstrations in the streets of many cities, some approving, ^{MOST} ~~some~~ ^{OF} disapproving, our bombing of Tripoli. Members of Congress, columnists, and church groups reacted predictably. The National Council of Churches characterized our bombing of Libya as "morally questionable and fundamentally imprudent," criticizing "the endless chain of unrequited violence that has plagued the Middle East."

"We should have presented our case before the World Court and the United Nations," said the leader of the Presbyterian Church.

"We have failed to address the causes of terrorism," said the presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church.

These refrains reflect both the nobility and the naivete of distinguished spiritual leaders. The refrains are also familiar. Some people remain silent in the aftermath

of terrorist outrage, finding their tongue to condemn only after the victim strikes back.

In none of the public criticism could one find any expression of compassion for the victims of terror who were also innocent bystanders. There was no ambivalence about the use of power; there was instead a surrender to its use by terrorists.

One-sided expressions, when reactions to terrorist acts, receive more condemnation than ~~the~~ terrorism itself, encourage more violence, kidnapping, and even more assassination. Even our language has been terrorized, and I in the polemic, the distinction between victim and hijacker becomes blurred, terrorists become guerillas, murder squads become freedom fighters, ^{AND} car bombing becomes not murder but political expression.

A bomb in a shopping plaza, a bus, a movie house, an office building, is aimed not at a victim but at the public. It is spectacular and ruthless killing, designed to seize the imagination of a mass audience. Human beings are reduced to being props in the theatre. The purpose of terrorism is to call attention to a cause, using the victim as a means of buying space in the newspaper or time on television and radio.

Newspapers have enlarged the terrorist stage. Journalists rush to interview those who practice the art. Television has increased the visibility of violence, and may have done more for terrorism than any other single factor.

Many years ago a Chinese theorist said: Kill one, frighten ten thousand. In the age of terrorism, the axiom should be: Kill one, frighten ten million.

The difference between terrorism and ordinary crime is that the criminal usually tries to mask his deed; the terrorist gloats in it, and rushes to proclaim his responsibility for it, as did Qaddafi, when he applauded the death of twelve-year-old Natasha Simpson, one of the sixteen people who was murdered in the murderous onslaught in the airports of Rome and Vienna.

Why is terrorism so difficult to stop?

The isolationist syndrome. Most people aren't affected. The victims were in faraway places. So long as hostage-taking and terror were directed toward Israel, it didn't seem to matter to most people or even to most nations. Many of the earlier hijackers,

terrorists and assassins, whose murderous deeds were directed at Israel, including the perpetrators of the massacre of the Olympic athletes in Munich, and including the first hijackers of an El Al plane, were apprehended and even convicted, only to be abruptly released under the implied threat of more hijacking, as if to channel the terrorist outrage toward a less bothersome target: Israel. -- ~~Unitit Fekeman.~~
~~Now we are all targets~~

The Stockholm Syndrome, also recognized as The Patty Hearst Syndrome.

A minister who himself was held hostage and finally released, becomes a spokesman for the people who kidnapped him. A passenger on the ill-fated TWA flight 847 who seemed to exult in his imprisonment, emerged to praise his kidnappers for their kindness. Hijack victims feel such a sense of relief that they haven't been killed that upon release they are inclined to thank their abductors for their "humanity."

Hypocrisy. Nations that have themselves been victims of Qadaffi have also profited by doing business with him, and want to maintain their profitable business relationship, thus making economic boycott ineffectual.

We haven't tried to reach them by reason or by using diplomacy; we haven't turned to the United Nations.

The United Nations is ineffectual, as is the World Court, because the very nations that provide shelter and assistance to terror are members of those bodies.

We were excessively trigger happy, too quick to resort to force. An Israeli officer once told me, "We let one Katyusha through and say nothing. We take another Katyusha and even absorb the damage, and then another. This time there are fatalities. Eventually we say, 'Dayenu, enough.' We strike back, if only to reassure our people, and at least to put the terrorist on guard."

Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick wrote of the Indian chief who controlled his temper by putting a pebble into a pouch whenever he was goaded to anger. When the pouch was full, he went to war.

Rhetorical Confusion. "We cannot agree on what terrorism is. One man's terrorist is another's man freedom fighter."

The early American revolutionaries never shot women and children. The founding

fathers of the American Republic threw tea and not civilians into the Ocean. Israel's Irgun never advocated the destruction of Britain; they simply wanted to be free ~~of it~~. The Irgun never bombed London, only hostile British soldiers in Palestine. The Arab terrorists want to wipe out all of Israel, civilians and soldiers, young and old alike.

"Desperate people can be driven to deeds of desperation" Syndrome. We must understand motives.

"If we ^{would} provide a homeland for the Palestinians, we would put an end to their resorting to terrorism." ~~These~~ Apologists for terror forget that the closer we come to peace in the Middle East, the more do acts of terror increase. Extremists in the Middle East do not want a negotiated peace nor do they want territorial compromise. They intensify acts of terror whenever they see the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Jordan because they seek not compromise but the eradication of Israel, and even of the more moderate Arab governments in the area.

The fallacy of the false comparison. One columnist stated on the air, "For me, killing is killing. A bomb dropped from the sky is as terrifying as bombs in a shopping center. Violence is violence. There is no difference between President Reagan and a terrorist; both throw bombs." Senator Hatfield suggests our behavior in Libya is "a narrowing of the moral gulf that separates Colonel Qaddafi and the United States."

An elementary book on political science would reveal the distinction between force used by a state and force used by an individual. In a democracy, force is like the post office; it must be a monopoly of the state. In private hands, it's dangerous.

Senator Hatfield confuses power with violence. Violence is the misuse of power. Terrorism is the violent use of power. If someone states in all seriousness that the United States Air Force and the Palesatine Liberation Organization, that U.S. Army and ~~the~~ Libyan agents, the policeman and the criminal are all in the same moral boat because they ^{all} ~~both~~ use guns, then we should despair of the meaningful use of language. This is not only moral obtuseness; it is an affront to human intelligence.

In this unredeemed world, power is a necessary evil. ~~A~~ Machiavelli would deny

it's evil; ~~only~~ the naive would deny that ~~it is necessary~~^{its necessity}. But power is the difference between Anatevka and Entebbe. Anatevka could give us nostalgia and a musical, but only Entebbe could rescue the fiddler on the roof. Power is neutral; it depends on its use. Power used viciously and violently as an end in itself can be overcome only by stronger power used judiciously and responsibly. "Power is corrupting," wrote Lord Acton, ~~what is~~ even more corrupting^{is} powerlessness. It leads to capitulation.

The moral posture of the pacifist is difficult to justify after World War II. Hitler might have been stopped when he ~~had~~ first marched across the Rhine in breach of the Treaty of Versailles, but we hesitated to use force. Qaddafi could surely have been stopped in 1969. The American Wheelus Air Force Base was the strongest power in Libya at the time.

Senator Mark Hatfield warns that we may become as brutal as the terrorists, quoting Nietzsche, "whoever battles with monsters had better see that it does not turn him into a monster" -- a valid warning.

That is precisely why we are told to diminish our cup of wine when recalling the plagues inflicted on ancient Egypt: to remind ourselves that though we use power, we must not become monsters.

Jews who become monsters are to be condemned without exception. Jewish terrorists in Israel are imprisoned. In Arab lands, terrorists are heroes, their successful exploits^{are} applauded.

Our ambivalence about the use of power is genuine, but nowhere in our tradition is there the suggestion that the children of Israel should have remained slaves in Egypt so as to have reduced the possibility of inflicting harm upon the innocent children of the exploiting Egyptians.

To have spared the citizens of Berlin, should we have learned to live with Hitler? Would it have been better to allow New York to be bombed rather than to bomb Dresden?

What is necessary in order to put an end to terror?

Don't try to understand the motives of terrorists. Terrorism sullies the hands of those who practice it, however righteous their cause may appear to be. Terrorism

is like piracy or genocide; it must be regarded as a crime against humanity. A nation that provides haven for terrorists should be quarantined. This means an outrage committed against any one nation must be seen as a threat to all nations. Hijacking of aircraft, no matter by whom or for whom or which airport, or to whom directed, threatens to rip away the thin fabric that covers our civilization.

After the burning of Germany's synagogues in 1938, Chaim Weizmann, who later became the first president of Israel, warned the British, "Because you did nothing to prevent the burning of the synagogues in Berlin, someday you will be unable to prevent the bombing of Westminster Abbey and the churches of England." And so it came about.

And little was done to prevent the first hijacking of the El Al plane, or to punish the perpetrators. Suddenly there was Tehran, and now the free world is held hostage. It has been the fate or the role of the Jew to be the litmus test or the cutting edge of history. This has always been our role.

If the world assumes the posture of ^{lofty} ~~noble~~ helplessness at the continued outrages perpetrated by the Palestine Liberation Organization, Abu Nidal, Abu ~~Ab~~ass, Qadaffi, Assad and Arafat, civilization will be destroyed, as surely as civilization was destroyed in the days of Noah when the world was filled with evil, the evil of complacency.

I applaud the act of our President who said, "Enough is enough. We have found the smoking gun. They have mistaken our desire for peace for placidity." The world will be destroyed not by people who want to take action against terrorists, but by those who, out of a misguided sense of noble decency, deride those who act against the terror that comes by night or by day, with bombs labeled "To whom it may concern." Words will not deter the terrorist.

When will it all end? Must innocent children always be victim? It will end when the Arabs learn to love their children more than they hate the children of the Jews or of the Americans. If our children cannot grow up safely, neither can theirs.

Who is more precious? The unfortunate bandaged infant lying in a hospital bed in Tripoli, or that little infant who was sucked out of a TWA airplane, falling two miles to a ~~horrible, smothering~~ ^{horrifying} death? Both infants are equally sacred. But who caused

those deaths? President Reagan did not cause the death of the British hostage who was hanged in Lebanon; his kidnappers caused that death. It is the confusion of language, not the President's decision, that narrowed the gap between the President and the mad bombers of Libya.

When Qadaffi comes to love his child more than he hates the child who flew on that American plane, then his other children will be safe, and not until then. Until then, there is no alternative but to make terrorists pay the price in suffering as much as they have made us suffer.

As Golda Meir once said, "When peace comes with the Arabs, we shall forgive everything, except for one thing. We shall not forgive the Arabs for forcing us to make victims of their children."

On Passover our cup is diminished in sympathy and in horror. But we are given no alternative.

Our Rabbis asked: When will nation desist from lifting up sword against nation? When will the time come when each person may dwell in peace beneath his vine and fig tree?

Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai responded: "When the Messiah comes, Israel will live in peace."

But Rabbi Akiba, who joined Bar Kochba in resorting to force, would answer: "When Israel lives in peace, the Messiah will come."

May we have reason to recite the full Hallel in days to come, and in peaceful habitation.



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following are texts of an address by President Reagan, statements and an address by Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, Acting Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, and a statement by Ambassador Parker W. Borg, Deputy, Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism.

PRESIDENT REAGAN
APRIL 14, 1986

*Address to the nation,
the White House,
Washington, D.C.*

My fellow Americans, at 7:00 this evening eastern time, air and naval forces of the United States launched a series of strikes against the headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military assets that support Muammar Qadhafi's subversive activities. The attacks were concentrated and carefully targeted to minimize casualties among the Libyan people, with whom we have no quarrel.

From initial reports, our forces have succeeded in their mission. Several weeks ago in New Orleans, I warned Colonel Qadhafi we would hold his regime accountable for any new terrorist attacks launched against American citizens. More recently, I made it clear we would respond as soon as we determined conclusively who was responsible for such attacks.

On April 5 in West Berlin, a terrorist bomb exploded in a nightclub frequented by American servicemen. Sgt. Kenneth Ford and a young Turkish

woman were killed, and 230 others were wounded, among them some 50 American military personnel.

This monstrous brutality is but the latest act in Colonel Qadhafi's reign of terror. The evidence is now conclusive that the terrorist bombing of LaBelle discotheque was planned and executed under the direct orders of the Libyan regime. On March 25, more than a week before the attack, orders were sent from Tripoli to the Libyan People's Bureau in East Berlin to conduct a terrorist attack against Americans to cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties. Libya's agents then planted the bomb. On April 4, the People's Bureau alerted Tripoli that the attack would be carried out the following morning. The next day, they reported back to Tripoli on the great success of their mission.

***When our citizens are abused
or attacked anywhere in the
world on the direct orders of
a hostile regime, we will
respond . . . Self-defense is not
only our right, it is our duty.***

Our evidence is direct; it is precise; it is irrefutable. We have solid evidence about other attacks Qadhafi has planned against the U.S. installations and diplomats and even American tourists.

Thanks to close cooperation with our friends, some of these have been pre-

vented. With the help of French authorities, we recently aborted one such attack—a planned massacre, using grenades and small arms, of civilians waiting in line for visas at an American Embassy.

Colonel Qadhafi is not only an enemy of the United States. His record of subversion and aggression against the neighboring states in Africa is well documented and well known. He has ordered the murder of fellow Libyans in countless countries. He has sanctioned acts of terror in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, as well as the Western Hemisphere.

Today, we have done what we had to do. If necessary, we shall do it again. It gives me no pleasure to say that, and I wish it were otherwise.

Before Qadhafi seized power in 1969, the people of Libya had been friends of the United States. And I'm sure that today most Libyans are ashamed and disgusted that this man has made their country a synonym for barbarism around the world. The Libyan people are decent people caught in the grip of a tyrant.

To our friends and allies in Europe who cooperated in today's mission, I would only say you have the permanent gratitude of the American people. Europeans who remember history understand better than most that there is no security, no safety in the appeasement of evil. It must be the core of Western policy that there be no sanctuary for terror, and to sustain such a policy, free men and free nations must unite and work together.

Sometimes it is said that by imposing sanctions against Colonel Qadhafi or by striking at his terrorist installations, we only magnify the man's importance—that the proper way to deal with him is to ignore him. I do not agree. Long before I came into this office, Colonel Qadhafi had engaged in acts of international terror—acts that put him outside the company of civilized men. For years, however, he suffered no economic or political or military sanction, and the atrocities mounted in number, as did the innocent dead and wounded. And for us to ignore by inaction the slaughter of American civilians and American soldiers, whether in night-clubs or airline terminals, is simply not in the American tradition. When our citizens are abused or attacked anywhere in the world on the direct orders of a hostile regime, we will respond so long as I'm in this Oval Office. Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission undertaken tonight—a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

We believe that this preemptive action against terrorist installations will not only diminish Colonel Qadhafi's capacity to export terror, it will provide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior. I have no illusion that tonight's action will ring down the curtain on Qadhafi's reign of terror. But this mission, violent though it was, can bring closer a safer and more secure world for decent men and women. We will persevere.

This afternoon, we consulted with the leaders of Congress regarding what we were about to do and why. Tonight, I salute the skill and professionalism of the men and women of our armed forces who carried out this mission. It's an honor to be your Commander in Chief.

We Americans are slow to anger. We always seek peaceful avenues before resorting to the use of force—and we did. We tried quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, economic sanctions, and demonstrations of military force. None succeeded. Despite our repeated warnings, Qadhafi continued his reckless policy of intimidation, his relentless pursuit of terror. He counted on America to be passive. He counted wrong.

I warned that there should be no place on earth where terrorists can rest and train and practice their deadly skills. I meant it. I said that we would act with others, if possible, and alone, if necessary, to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere. Tonight, we have.

AMBASSADOR OAKLEY FEBRUARY 28, 1986

Excerpts from a statement before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, Washington, D.C.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today with my colleagues from the Treasury Department and the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] to discuss the threat of terrorism.

Our presence here together illustrates the partnership within the U.S. Government, the Congress, and the American people in this combined effort to counter the modern day scourge of terrorism. Obviously, there has to be a certain amount of "specialization" in this effort, and the FBI is the primary agency on dealing with the terrorist threats at home, and the State Department is the lead agency in coordinating the U.S. Government's antiterrorism effort overseas. Treasury has an important role in both. We work together, especially where the threat abroad has a potential for trouble here at home.

Mr. Webster [FBI Director] is covering the domestic situation, and I will sketch out the growing problem of overseas international terrorism which in 1985 all too frequently caught the television screens and, thus, the eyes and ears of Americans. This was partly because terrorists singled out Americans for death in three of the most dramatic attacks—the prolonged TWA 847 hijacking in June, the *Achille Lauro* hijacking in October, and the November hijacking of the Egyptian airliner in Malta. Five Americans were among the 19 killed in the December massacres at the Rome and Vienna airports by the Abu Nidal group, supported by Libya. We also experienced the continuing anguish of the American hostages in Lebanon and their courageous families in this country.

A preliminary review of statistics shows that in 1985 there were more than 800 incidents of international terrorism. There were 2,223 casualties, of which 23 of the killed and 139 of the injured were Americans. Over the past 2 years, international terrorism incidents have risen sharply (60%) from the yearly average of about 500 incidents for the 1978-83 period.

The Terrorist Threat Abroad

There are a number of diverse reasons and causes behind this disturbing trend. Middle East-related terrorism is a major cause for the increase, with the number

of incidents rising from 109 in 1983 to 378 in 1985. Within that category, there are a variety of factors and actors. The Israeli-Palestinian dispute is only one component, and it includes terrorism conducted by radical Palestinian groups and their state supporters trying to disrupt the peace process, plus one Palestinian group against another. There is also the terrorism inspired by Khomeini's brand of politico-religious fanaticism and the Iran-Iraq war as well as Qadhafi's assassination campaign against Libyan dissidents.


Some terrorist acts were attempts by terrorists to obtain the release of their colleagues or relatives arrested for previous actions. The one consistent demand of the captors of the American hostages in Lebanon is the release of the 17 Iranian-inspired terrorists convicted in Kuwait for the bloody terrorist attacks there in December 1984, which killed and wounded almost 100 people. Other terrorists, such as Abu Abbas whose group hijacked the *Achille Lauro*, were trying to make an anti-U.S., anti-Israel political point as well as obtain the release of captured colleagues.

The most deadly of the Middle East terrorist attacks came from the Abu Nidal group, which shifted the locus of its operations from Iraq to Syria in 1983. In early 1985, Abu Nidal focused his attacks against Jordanian and mainstream Palestinian officials. Then, about the middle of the year, after Syria and Jordan began high-level discussions, Libya became his main backer, and his targets shifted. The hijacking of the Egyptian airliner to Malta, in which women passengers—American and Israeli—were singled out for killing for the first time, and the Rome and Vienna airport attacks were the major operations of the Abu Nidal organization after it began to receive strong Libyan support.

West European groups also were active. The Red Army Faction attacked American and NATO-related installations in Germany, causing several American deaths, and their counterparts in France and Belgium also carried out attacks in these countries. In Italy, just this month, the Red Brigades revived after the Italians had dealt major setbacks to the group. In Spain, Basque separatists continued their campaign. An American businessman was killed last year when a car bomb blew up in Madrid, wounding over a dozen Spanish Civil Guards.

Casualties Resulting From International Terrorist Attacks, 1981-85¹

Number of casualties



¹ 1985 figures are preliminary and may be subject to review and revision.

In Latin America, terrorist incidents grew from 81 in 1984 to 132 in 1985, many of them by groups with Cuban and Nicaraguan support. Eighty-six of these incidents involved the United States, including the killing of four marines and two businessmen in San Salvador. Narcoterrorism was an increasingly important problem.

The list is by no means complete, but I cite these incidents to illustrate the variety of types of terrorists. There is a common point, however. The terrorists, regardless of what they or their backers may claim, are not some kind of romantic freedom fighters whose attacks should be excused away on the ground that they are fighting for a political "just cause." What they are conducting are criminal acts. In many cases they are deliberately trying to kill and wound as many innocent persons as possible, including those without any direct connection to their grievance.

International Terrorist Threat to the U.S.?

We're often asked: "Will overseas terrorism move here?" It is difficult to give a categorical answer because there are so many varieties of overseas terrorists, but all concerned agencies of the U.S. Government take the threat very seriously—particularly State, Justice, and Treasury.

Most recently, Libya's Qadhafi gained additional headlines by more threats to bring terrorism to the United States. While we consider this to be an exaggeration, it is not to be ignored. There has been a clear pattern of assassination by Libyan agents abroad of their own countrymen whom Qadhafi did not like. The new Abu Nidal connection gives Libya a greater capability. Last year the FBI successfully foiled a plot by a group of Libyans in this country, and a member of Libya's mission to the United Nations was expelled because of his involvement in terrorist activities.

Sikh terrorists, who were inactive until just 2 years ago, suddenly emerged in the United States and Canada as well as in India. The FBI thwarted potential Sikh operations here. The planting of bombs last year on two civilian airliner flights from Canada, however, hit close to home. The Air India tragedy was the single most devastating event in 1985. The crash last June, which all evidence attributes to a bomb planted by Sikh terrorists, took 329 lives. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,

and India are making a special effort to identify and preempt possible Sikh terrorism.

There are other groups which have, in the past, used American soil to air their grievances by action against representatives of other countries, such as Armenian terrorists who had been attacking Turkish diplomats and the Jewish Defense League, which has attacked Soviet diplomats. However, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that there were no incidents actually carried out in this country last year involving connections with groups or governments abroad.

I also wish to make a point about the differences between actual and potential threat from groups of citizens or permanent residents in this country with strong family, ethnic, or religious ties abroad. While there have been a small number of incidents involving individuals from these groups, a combination of good law enforcement and pressure to cease and desist from the groups themselves has tended to prevent the continuation or repetition of terrorist activity. These groups are composed overwhelmingly of peace-loving, patriotic citizens. It would be a mistake and grossly unfair for the American public, Congress, or the media to label or imply ethnic communities in this country are potential hotbeds of terrorism.

There are a number of reasons why terrorists from abroad are not more active here. One, of course, is the excellent work of the FBI, the Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire Arms Bureau of Treasury, and other law enforcement agencies. A second is the good work by the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and other agencies in developing intelligence abroad on possible threats to this country. Another factor is that the intellectual, political, and psychological atmosphere which seems to nurture some of the European ideological terrorists is not popular here. Yet another is the good work by INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service], Customs, and the State Department in keeping out potential terrorists.

One result of this good work is that it is easier for terrorists who want to strike at Americans to do so overseas. There are millions of us working and traveling abroad at any given time. The buildings we work in, the cafes we eat in, and the airports we use are much more accessible to terrorists who want to strike symbolically at Uncle Sam or

strike indiscriminately at American civilians. The security in some of the countries has not been what it should have been. It is difficult to gauge whether the situation at home would change if stronger antiterrorism actions were taken by the U.S. Government overseas. We already have taken a number of economic and political measures against Qadhafi, for example, and the United States and Israel have long been his targets. The United States is also target number one for a number of other groups in the Middle East and Latin America.

While one cannot rule out that stronger actions against Qadhafi or other terrorists might increase further their desire to do something against the United States at home, there are the basic obstacles mentioned above which even the most irrational terrorist needs to consider. A desire for revenge does not necessarily change the equation of the relative difficulties of terrorists getting to and operating in the United States or our abilities to prevent them.

In any event, this Administration has decided upon a still more vigorous campaign of counterterrorism and will not be deterred by the risk of retaliation in this country. This is the main conclusion of the report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, which President Reagan has approved. It recommends measures to strengthen our antiterrorist capabilities abroad and at home and a continuation of the policy of no concessions, no backing down where terrorism is concerned.

Of course, nothing is certain in this business, and the terrorists have the advantage of surprise and shifting tactics. Thus, in considering our responses to a given situation, we try to take all factors into account. But we cannot let ourselves be immobilized into inaction for fear our actions might prompt more terrorist attacks. To the contrary, the cost of doing nothing is usually higher than the costs of doing something.

Many European governments have long demurred at joining in action against Libya or terrorist groups, rejecting even seemingly simple controls upon those entering or living in their countries, because they were concerned about losing Arab world business. Belatedly, they have now come to realize that they are not being spared and that terrorism is costing them dearly in falling tourism revenues, increased security costs, and apprehensive potential investors, as well as some loss of confidence by their own public.

International Cooperation

Dealing with terrorism overseas is complicated by such economic factors and by differing political and foreign policy viewpoints even in the case of attacks where the primary targets are American. It should be kept in mind—and it is often overlooked by the media and public—that the primary legal and political responsibility for countering terrorism is the government of the country in which the terrorists may attack.

Our power is limited and constrained both legally and politically. For instance, we can post military guards inside the grounds of our embassies or other installations to help protect them, but we are dependent upon the host government for the outer defense, just as it is the host government's responsibility to protect travelers at the airports, businesses, and other facilities within its jurisdiction.

We can mobilize our military forces to strike terrorists, but our ability to use them in friendly or neutral foreign territory is dependent upon the concurrence of the host government. Application of our legal power to pursue terrorists abroad is also heavily influenced by host government attitudes. In this connection, tightly worded extradition treaties without political loopholes subject to exploitation by terrorists are very important. The U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty pending before the Senate for ratification is an example.

We can, and do, work with many of the other countries to help improve their defense against terrorism. But, in the end, the decisions—or sometimes the lack of decisions—on how to deal with the situation are up to the other sovereign governments. And it is obviously in our interest to see them take as strong and effective action as possible, dealing with the threat abroad rather than having it spread to the United States. In countering terrorism, our efforts to obtain international cooperation and provide international assistance are all important.

Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program

An important part of our cooperation with other nations is the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program for civilian law enforcement agencies of friendly foreign governments. The program is administered by the Department of State, and over 1,800 officials from 32 countries have participated during the nearly 2 years of its operation.

Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and professional police associations supply most of the instruction for the program, which provides a very valuable structure for developing a better working relationship with other countries facing the same threat. The Departments of Justice and Treasury and the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] have provided support for the program. A first phase, the Executive Seminar, enables the United States and the participating country to exchange ideas and insights. The second and third phases are used to identify specific needs and to provide actual training in the United States of officials of the recipient country.

In authorizing the ATA Program, the Congress established a requirement that participating countries be screened on the basis of their adherence to acceptable standards of human and civil rights, and the Congress has the right to pass on prospective participants. The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs reviews and approves each and every country before Congress is notified by the State Department of the intention of that country's participation in the ATA Program. Both the Department of State and the Congress seek to screen out those countries which have questionable human rights records. We also have the option, where U.S. interests are compelling, to limit the extent of training to those foreign agencies or specific areas of operation which are directly and immediately relevant to the safety and protection of U.S. citizens.

We make recognition and protection of human rights a dominant and pervasive theme in all instruction, and we select training agencies—such as metropolitan police forces—which, by word and example, demonstrate to the foreign participants that ethical standards, professionalism, and effective counterterrorism must and can go hand in hand.

Actions Taken Over the Past 2 Years

The pace of our cooperative international programs and other activities is quickening.

- We have intensified our bilateral relationships with friends around the world and begun discussing common counterterrorism efforts with countries where we have not had such close ties.

- We have dedicated more resources and given a still higher priority to col-

lecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence on terrorist groups and activities abroad.

- We have improved the security of our embassies and consulates and heightened the security awareness of our personnel; we have begun to cooperate more closely with the private sector in sharing information on threats abroad and how to counter them; the Inman panel [Advisory Panel on Overseas Security] provided an important outside review of what needed to be done to enhance security and an additional boost for obtaining the necessary resources.

- As noted by President Reagan, improved intelligence collection, better security, and closer international cooperation helped us deter or preempt more than 100 international terrorist actions during the past year. This is in addition to the 23 potential domestic incidents reported by Mr. Webster.

- We have begun a new, more assertive phase in combating the state supporters of terrorism, exemplified by the President's decision to sever all economic as well as political contacts with Libya, to persuade other governments to join us, and to retain the option of more forceful unilateral action should this cooperative campaign fail to stop Qadhafi.

- We have worked hard and successfully in international organizations such as the UN General Assembly and Security Council to establish that terrorism is a threat to all nations and should be considered as a crime. In the specialized agencies, aviation and maritime specialists are drafting new security standards.

- We have made effective use of recent legislative tools, such as the rewards programs, the Crime Act of 1984, and the Foreign Assistance Act. We believe it is useful to have more legal tools for the antiterrorism effort. We support, for example, S. 1429, which recently passed the Senate, making it a federal crime to kill or conduct other terrorist acts against Americans overseas. We also, of course, strongly back passage of the U.S.-U.K. Supplemental Extradition Treaty.

- President Reagan has approved the work of the task force directed by Vice President Bush which reviewed all aspects of our counterterrorist policies and practices and recommended a number of improvements.

Coordination

To ensure maximum coordination for the U.S. response to terrorism, lead agencies have been designated by the White House. These responsibilities, recently

reaffirmed by the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, give the State Department the lead agency responsibility for all incidents which take place outside U.S. territory. Within the State Department, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has the responsibility for providing protection to U.S. facilities and personnel overseas and the Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism for the general measures of cooperation with foreign governments to combat terrorism.

The Interagency Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Ambassador at Large, provides the forum for the major departments and agencies involved in combating terrorism to meet regularly and share ideas, develop plans, and make recommendations on policy and programs. Permanent members include representatives from the National Security Council; the Vice President's office; the Justice Department (which has the interagency lead role for domestic terrorism); the FBI; the Departments of Defense (both the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the office of the Secretary), Treasury, and Energy; the Central Intelligence Agency; the FAA; and the Drug Enforcement Administration. The IG/T provides a single point where the various departments and agencies can address questions and make proposals.

There are a number of specific working groups established under the auspices of the IG/T. They include one on rewards, one on improving technology such as equipment for detecting explosives, and another on coordinating antiterrorist training by all agencies of the executive branch, civilian and military.

When a crisis occurs, task forces are set up in the principal agencies to look after their specific concerns—at the State Department to consider diplomatic issues, family liaison, and overall coordination; at the FAA to consider the technical aspects of a hijacking and maintain liaison with U.S. carriers; at Defense to consider the possibility of using U.S. troops in the area; etc. During a crisis where the use of American force might be considered, a special high-level coordinating group convenes almost immediately at the White House, where key decisions are made. Thus, with the other agencies, we at State have both a good informal working relationship and a formal structure from which flows many of the working relationships. . . .

Conclusion

We predict that, on the international side, the terrorism threat is likely to continue to grow and be with us for at least another decade. There are too many causes, too many diverse actors, and too many political, religious, social, and nationalistic sore spots in the world which generate individuals ready to become terrorists. Too many groups think they can make a political impact favorable to their particular cause—magnified mightily by the media around the world—and there are governments which refuse to forgo the temptation of using terrorism as a cheap form of warfare. We should not be discouraged or panicked about it but, rather, keep our cool and determination. This will be a long process; there are no magic solutions or remedies. As the terrorists increase their activities, however, we are increasing ours and, indeed, trying harder to get ahead of them on our own and with other governments.

We can take comfort in the large number of terrorist incidents preempted abroad, at the low level of terrorism in this country. But the big increase in the number and viciousness of international terrorism incidents, the even sharper increase in the casualties deliberately caused by the terrorists, and the fact that the United States remains the top target show clearly that the struggle is becoming more intense and we cannot afford to be complacent.

The Reagan Administration is determined to keep at it, adding to and improving the tools we have. Strong congressional support has been and will continue to be extremely important in this effort.

AMBASSADOR OAKLEY FEBRUARY 19, 1986

Excerpts from a statement before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, D.C.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on our topic of mutual concern: international terrorism.

It seems that almost every day some new terrorist horror jumps at us from the screens of our televisions, the front pages of our newspapers, and the covers of our magazines.

- In Paris earlier this month, bombs were placed in popular shops and tourist centers, even in the Eiffel Tower.

Excerpt from "Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism," February 1986

U.S. POLICY AND RESPONSE TO TERRORISTS

Since no country is immune to terrorism, it is imperative that governments have the appropriate policies, intelligence and flexible response options to deal effectively with terrorist acts. Trained personnel and programs must be in place before, during and after each crisis, both to respond to the problem and to answer inevitable criticism in the event of failure. Long-term policies to achieve these objectives are costly, complicated and difficult, yet essential as a defense against the importation of terrorism from overseas.

Current Policy

The U.S. position on terrorism is unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms and wherever it takes place. Several National Security Decision Directives as well as statements by the President and senior officials confirm this policy:

- The U.S. Government is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or

unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts.

- The U.S. Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a potential threat to its national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available.

- States that practice terrorism or actively support it will not do so without consequence. If there is evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against this country, the United States will take measures to protect its citizens, property and interests.

- The U.S. Government will make no concessions to terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism. At the same time, the United States will use every available resource to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists.

- The United States will act in a strong manner against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles, and encourages other governments to take similar stands.

U.S. policy is based upon the conviction that to give in to terrorists' demands places even more Americans at risk. This no-concessions policy is the best way of ensuring the safety of the greatest number of people.

Middle East terrorists claimed responsibility for the bombs and the casualties. In Rome and Vienna on December 27, Abu Nidal's group of terrorists massacred 19 innocent people waiting at El Al and TWA ticket lines—including 5 Americans—and over 80 people were injured. Four terrorists are dead; three are being questioned.

- A month earlier, the Abu Nidal group, again supported by Libya, hijacked an Egyptian airliner and began shooting passengers one by one, starting with all the Israeli and American citizens. By the end of the incident, 60 people, including an American, had died, and 20 more were wounded; one terrorist survived and is being tried by Maltese officials.

- In October, terrorists acting under orders from Abu Abbas hijacked the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and murdered an elderly crippled American, Leon Klinghoffer. The four perpetrators

were captured by the United States and await trial in Italy. Abu Abbas is at large, with a \$250,000 reward out for his arrest and punishment.

- Last June, there was the dramatic hijacking of TWA 847 in Athens and the tragic killing of American sailor Robert Stethem when the aircraft was on the ground in Beirut. Also in Lebanon, there is the prolonged agony of the Americans held captive there. A representative of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Mr. Terry Waite, has been shuttling to Beirut, meeting with the captors, but they remain hostages of the Iranian-influenced Hizballah organization. . . .

Libyan Support for Terrorism

It was the pattern of rapidly growing Middle East terrorism, with greatly increased casualties, more frequent target-

ing of U.S. citizens and interests, and stronger state support, which caused the Reagan Administration to draw the line for Qadhafi and Libya's direct involvement in terrorism. Libya is not the only state in the Middle East supporting and using terrorism: Syria and Iran remain very much involved. But over the past 6 months, Libya has become by far the most active, especially against American and European travelers. If it cannot be stopped, others can be expected to follow its lead.

Qadhafi's general support for terrorism is not new. He long has used terrorism as one of the primary instruments of his foreign policy. He has given support to a variety of groups around the world, from the IRA [Irish Republican Army] in northern Ireland to the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines. A more detailed description of Libya's activities is in State Department Special Report No. 138, January 1986.

In summary, the most significant Palestinian groups Libya has backed are Abu Nidal; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, the PFLP; and Fatah dissidents. Abu Nidal's beneficiaries in Europe include—in addition to the IRA—the FP-25, in Portugal and anti-Turkish Armenian terrorist groups. Asian groups, aside from those in the Philippines, include Pakistan's Al-Zulfiqar group, the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front in New Caledonia, and Muslim insurgents in Thailand. In Central and South America, Qadhafi has provided training and funding to a variety of groups, including Colombia's M-19, Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left and Manuel Rodrigues Patriotic Front, and insurgent groups in Guatemala and El Salvador. More Libyans arrived just last week in Nicaragua, via Cuba, to assist the regime there and other terrorist/revolutionary groups such as those just mentioned.

Closer to home, Qadhafi has tried to undermine the governments in neighboring Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan and has invaded Chad. In Egypt, Abu Nidal operatives were caught last year trying to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. Indeed, Qadhafi's own terrorist activities have been more wishful thinking and big talk, or largely aimed at Libyan dissidents, until he joined forces with Abu Nidal toward the middle of last year. Until that time, the group in recent years had been the beneficiary of almost exclusive Syrian support. The

pattern of attack during that period focused upon mainline PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and Jordanian officials and Jordanian Air Lines offices.

There is still a connection with Syria, but for the major activities since mid-1985—Rome, Vienna, and Malta—the primary and more significant support has been Libyan. Some of the terrorists involved in the Rome and Vienna attacks may have been "trained" in the Bekka Valley of Lebanon controlled by Syria. But it doesn't take much training to fire submachine guns and throw hand grenades against civilian passengers in a crowded airliner terminal. Even in this, Abu Nidal shows his cynicism and cruelty. His group recruits young men, some of them still teenagers, for suicide attacks. They are the cannon fodder, while Abu Nidal and his lieutenants remain safely in the shadows.

During the last half of 1985, we know of Libyan money in the millions of dollars going to Abu Nidal, of Libya providing and buying arms for Abu Nidal, of Abu Nidal and his top lieutenants living in Libya, of his killers being trained there, and of travel documents and other facilitative assistance being provided by Libya for their travel to commit terrorist attacks abroad. Some of this evidence, such as the use of confiscated Tunisian passports by terrorists in the December 27 attack, is in the public domain. Some of it is highly classified intelligence, and to reveal it would help the terrorists beat our defenses. But there is no question about the Libyan-Abu Nidal connection or what Qadhafi hoped to accomplish. By this new terrorist resource, the fanatical Libyan leader believed his limitless ambitions and wild dreams could become true—that the West as well as the Arab world would be so intimidated that they would accept him as a major power on the regional and world scene.

U.S. Actions Against Libya

That is the basic reason for the strong reaction by the Reagan Administration to the massacres at Rome and Vienna. Against the background of the unmistakable imprint of Colonel Qadhafi and the Abu Nidal organization on a dozen attacks around the rim of the Mediterranean in the last half of 1985, and the previous unwillingness of most of those governments to join in collective measures to stop the threat, the airport attacks were seen as a clear call for action and leadership by the United States.

After careful deliberation, the President decided to take unilateral action against Libyan support for terrorism. He moved to terminate the remaining U.S.-Libyan commercial and financial relations and called upon other countries to join us in sending Qadhafi and other governments the signal. The decision required still further economic sacrifices for the United States, which has already given up a multibillion-dollar annual business with Libya to make clear our stand against terrorism, but if we had not taken the lead, no one else would have done so. Moreover, the moral issue was such that any administration in this country would be bound to act.

There are a number of reasons why other governments in Europe and elsewhere have been reluctant to act, both in earlier years when we previously tried to exert pressure on Qadhafi to end his support for terrorism and in the immediate wake of the Rome and Vienna airport attacks. These reasons include: concern for the safety of their citizens in Libya or elsewhere if they were to join the United States in strong action; skepticism over the effectiveness of economic sanctions; and other foreign policy interests.

In the Middle East, the initial reaction of the Islamic countries to President Reagan's decision to oppose Libyan terrorism shows just how dangerous the situation has become. A number of moderate governments, among them those who have been directly threatened by Libyan subversion and terrorism, consented to a resolution by the Organization of the Islamic Conference supporting that country and opposing the United States. This was more than an expression of solidarity toward a fellow Islamic country which the media had depicted as about to be attacked militarily by the United States, although such a sentiment has strong popular appeal. It also reflected the concern of a number of governments at the potential political power exercised upon parts of their population by Qadhafi's brand of militant political ultranationalism—particularly at a time when moderate Arab regimes are also worried by the potent religious-military-political power of Iran and agitation of the Palestinian people, present in substantial numbers in many Middle East countries. . . .

Our overall policy is to seek to obtain long-term cooperation of the world community against the use of terrorism for political ends, no matter how worthy one may consider those ends. We have also concluded that while increased

security—an essentially defensive action—is important and must be energetically pursued, there is also a need for more offensive, active measures if the spread of terrorism is to be stopped.

European Efforts Against Terrorism

Although it is, of course, too soon to tell what the ultimate effect will be on Libya, there is no question in my mind but that the other governments in Europe and elsewhere share a growing recognition of the extreme gravity of the threat and the need to take action. Although some of them were reluctant to announce what they had done, there was a positive response, in public or private, by almost all the governments which Deputy Secretary Whitehead and I visited last month. Following the visit, the EC [European Communities] foreign ministers discussed terrorism at length and issued a positive statement. They announced a decision not to export arms or other military equipment to countries which support terrorism, a pledge not to undercut steps other states have taken to deal with terrorism, and the formation of a permanent working group to make future recommendations.

Some individual governments have gone further. For example, Italy has imposed a visa requirement for all visitors from North Africa, in view of the growing number of terrorist incidents involving falsified North African travel documents. Italy also has stopped all arms supply—including deliveries on existing contracts—despite the financial losses. Italy also is reviewing its overall relationship with Libya and has intensified still further the very good work being done by its police and magistrates to fight domestic terrorism. Canada had already reduced the level of diplomatic ties with Libya, as had the United Kingdom. Canada also further agreed to stop shipping sophisticated oilfield equipment to Libya, despite the loss of sales, and to discourage any Canadian business activity there. All governments with which we spoke said they would consider additional measures, and we intend to continue our consultations with them on how best to confront the common threat posed by Libyan-sponsored terrorism.

Those who say that this type of non-military action will not work against Libya should suspend their judgment until our efforts have had time to be tested, for it is a long-term effort rather than a one-shot affair. The private signals reaching the Libyan leadership from Europe and elsewhere are mostly

negative, even if Qadhafi had an initial upsurge in public support. Despite their rhetoric, the other Arab governments do not appear willing to bail out Libya's badly faltering economy, nor have they taken any substantive economic or political actions against the United States. The Soviet Union has been stridently supportive in its rhetoric and has continued its very dangerous policy of supplying weaponry to a regime known for its erratic, reckless behavior. (We all recall the strong evidence that Soviet-supplied mines were used by Libyan ships in the Red Sea in 1984. Soviet-supplied aircraft additionally were used in bombings in Sudan in 1984 and this week in Chad.) Yet there are also signs of unease and caution by the Soviets, and they appear no more eager to bail out Libya economically than the Arab governments. (It is our guess that, if spot oil prices stay under \$20 per barrel, by the end of this year Libya's annual revenues will be in the range of \$6-7 billion, whereas 5 years ago they exceeded \$20 billion dollars, and 2 years ago they were over \$10 billion.)

... There are signs that these efforts by the United States and the Europeans are getting to Qadhafi. This is indicated by his frantic efforts to reach out to both the international media and several European and Middle East governments to try to persuade people that he isn't really such a bad guy at the same time that he strikes militaristic poses and threatens the U.S. Sixth Fleet. I don't think anyone is really being fooled—unless they want to be.

Should Qadhafi not heed the voices of reality and again unleash his agents to commit terrorist acts, or should other governments not understand the broader message warning against state support of terrorism, President Reagan has made it clear to all that he is prepared to continue exercising the responsible leadership role of the United States. Consideration of the careful use of force in such circumstances has not been ruled out, in accordance with our right of self-defense.

The Need for Congressional Support

The antiterrorism effort is a long and complicated one, to be pursued by a combination of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures. However, there are no magic weapons—most terrorism

takes place abroad where our power is fettered; the enemy is determined and clever and ready to die. Qadhafi is only a part of the problem, and we are not losing sight of that. As Secretary Shultz and others have noted, terrorism is a form of a low-intensity warfare. Nevertheless, we have achieved the national consensus called for 2 years ago by Secretary Shultz; we have completed a thorough review of security, chaired by Adm. Bobby Inman, and are implementing the recommendations; the Vice President's task force on more active counterterrorist measures has finished its work and implementation is beginning; and other governments seem to be awakening. I would like to assure you that, with your support and continued help, we will continue to be in this effort for the duration.

We welcome the support and interest of this committee and its members, for the effort to counter terrorism can only succeed if it is a partnership. Previous legislation passed by this committee is being used vigorously, such as the rewards legislation. We support new legislation which is being considered to extend and strengthen the protection afforded U.S. citizens abroad from terrorist acts. We would like to work with you on other measures—including passage of the revised U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty, which will send a strong signal to other governments in the important area of extraditing terrorists rather than allowing them to escape proper punishment.

AMBASSADOR BORG FEBRUARY 19, 1986

Excerpts from a statement before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to review with you today our progress in improving security for international air travelers and to give you an overview of recent actions undertaken to combat terrorism. . . .

U.S. Cooperative Efforts To Combat Terrorism

Bilateral Efforts. Our bilateral efforts to combat terrorism are becoming more complex, with better exchanges of intelligence, more frequent high-level com-

munications, cooperative efforts in counterterrorism technology, and better judicial and military cooperation. More countries are establishing centralized counterterrorism offices able to coordinate the various parts of their bureaucracy, both on a routine operational basis and during a terrorist incident. Our bilateral cooperation to combat terrorism is already good and steadily improving.

Counterterrorism cooperation is on the agenda for every high-level visit to the United States; other countries can have no doubt as to the commitment of the United States to combat terrorism by every means. Ambassador Oakley has led numerous interagency delegations to many nations for specific discussions of counterterrorism cooperation.

We have found the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program to be a very effective policy tool for stimulating general interest in other countries in general cooperation and in stimulating support for specific U.S. policy concerns. It has helped us strengthen our policy dialogue with such states as Turkey, Greece, Egypt, the gulf states, Israel, and Colombia. To date, 32 countries have participated in some aspect of the ATA Program, with a total of over 1,800 participants. The Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security have cooperated closely in the administration of this program. There is no doubt that there is a higher level of awareness in many countries of the dangers of international terrorism and a greater willingness to take effective actions against it because of the ATA Program. . . .

Efforts in International Organizations. The United States has had success in international organizations in obtaining more effective agreements and stronger resolutions against international terrorism. The UN Security Council has issued several statements condemning international terrorism and unanimously approved a U.S. resolution in December against hostage-taking. Also in December, the UN General Assembly adopted a strong resolution which unequivocally condemned as criminal "all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed . . ." The resolution specifically called on all states to take appropriate measures as recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and as set forth in relevant international conventions to prevent terrorist attacks.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) acted upon a U.S. resolu-

tion, introduced at the IMO's 14th assembly in November 1985, to instruct the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to develop measures for the prevention of terrorist attacks against passengers and crews on board ships. A detailed U.S. proposal was favorably received by the MSC at its meeting which ended February 5, and we expect adoption of a final text at the next MSC meeting in September. . . . Although the mandates of ICAO and IMO are significantly different, we are grateful to ICAO for making available to IMO its years of experience with security measures so that IMO could accomplish in a matter of months in the maritime area what took years to accomplish in international civil aviation affairs.

. . . the time has come for the nations that truly seek an end to terrorism to join together, in whatever forums, to take the necessary steps.

Secretary Shultz
June 24, 1984

As a separate matter, we have for some time been engaged in an effort to encourage more states to become parties to the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal conventions, which relate to aircraft safety, hijacking, and sabotage. This effort has been going on for several years and has achieved such a degree of success that these conventions are now among the most widely accepted internationally. The Tokyo convention has 121 parties; the Hague, 126; and Montreal, 127.

These activities by the United States in international organizations represent a good deal of recent success. U.S. policy in multilateral organizations for combating terrorism is directed toward:

- Increasing public understanding and awareness of the nature of terrorism;
- Encouraging the development of internationally accepted standards of behavior and responsibility for individual states in preventing, deterring, and punishing terrorism; and
- Encouraging effective international cooperation to combat terrorism, including adherence to existing international counterterrorism conventions.

The above cited actions make clear that progress is possible and that the system recently has been responding favorably and with a sense of urgency to our calls, and those of others, for action.

Multilateral Efforts. In contrast to these impressive developments in our bilateral relationships and with international organizations, multilateral cooperation to combat terrorism among like-minded nations has gone more slowly, but there has been some progress. For example, European states, partly as a result of our pressing them to do more to stop Qadhafi's support for terrorism, have organized a high-level EC committee to coordinate actions on the problem. We welcome this effort by European states to address collectively the problem of international terrorism, and we are seeking ways to cooperate, institutionally or informally, with this group.

The Council of Europe's committee on combating terrorism has proposed in recent days to expand the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism to additional states. We welcome the initiative and look forward to contacts with the Council of Europe to explore how we might move forward with a broader convention.

Cooperation in the Summit Seven¹ context has been, frankly, less rewarding during the past year. We have sought as a first step with this group, which represents some of our closest allies, to revitalize the Bonn declaration² of 1978 and obtain agreement to cooperate in specific other areas outlined in previous summit statements at Venice, Ottawa, and London, but the political climate has not permitted the sort of multilateral cooperation which we believe is essential. . . .

Conclusion

These examples illustrate that some progress has been achieved but also illustrate the broader problems in obtaining joint international actions against terrorism along the lines foreseen in Title V of the 1985 Foreign Assistance Act. We are keeping our objectives firmly in mind and pressing them at every opportunity where acceptance by other countries provides a reasonable prospect for success. . . .

¹Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.

²The 1978 Bonn declaration on civil aviation security.

**AMBASSADOR OAKLEY
FEBRUARY 13, 1986**

Excerpts from an address before the Conference on Terrorism, Tourism and Traveler Security, Washington, D.C.

... Every day, it seems we are confronted with a new terrorist incident. But let's take a longer view tonight and look at terrorist trends and how the U.S. Government is combating terrorism.

Trends and Developments

In looking at trends and developments, we note:

First, terrorism is likely to be a prominent factor on the international political landscape for the rest of this century.

- There were around 500 international terrorist incidents per year in late 1970s and early 1980s, 600 incidents in 1984, and 812 for 1985—a 60% increase in the last 2 years.

- Continued political unrest, disputes between nations, and socioeconomic problems create conditions of frustration and hatred which can easily be transferred into terrorism.

- Mass global communications assure instantaneous publicity for terrorist acts.

- Frustrated splinter groups increasingly recognize they can make their mark more easily through acts of violence than through normal political opposition.

- Travel has become much easier between different countries, and border controls have been reduced, particularly in Europe.

- A worldwide system of competitive arms sales makes weapons available more easily to terrorist groups.

- Weapons of mass destruction as well as increasingly lethal conventional armaments have made regular warfare potentially too costly, particularly against stronger adversaries, causing some governments to see terrorism as a cheap way to strike a blow at their enemies.

Second, we tend to think of terrorism as an American problem, but it is an international problem. Of a total of some 800 international terrorists incidents in 1985, none occurred in the United States, where our security and intelligence agencies have full authority and maximum capability to act.

In 1985, there were 177 incidents which involved American individuals or facilities overseas, compared with 131 for all of 1984. For both years this was slightly less than one-fifth of total incidents and less than 10% of total casualties. Twenty-three Americans were killed and 139 injured by terrorists abroad in 1985 (compared to 20,000 killed in traffic accidents in this country). In recent events, the TWA and Egypt Air hijackings, the *Achille Lauro*, and, to some extent, at the Rome airport attack, Americans were singled out as targets.

Why does it appear that the United States is being singled out?

- Because of our position as the world's number one power and the perception abroad that our policies and actions somehow are responsible for situations, policies, and actions in other countries. This makes it popular for terrorists to attack U.S. targets and for the media to play up attacks on the United States more than others. And, naturally, the U.S. media focused on attacks affecting Americans—the “hometown angle” spread over into the national networks.

- Because the United States is so present abroad: military, diplomats, foreign assistance personnel, businessmen, and tourists. There are more than a million Americans overseas for one reason or another.

- Because Americans are on the move more than other nationalities; Americans make up the majority of cruise ship passengers and a substantial plurality of airline passengers.

In terms of combating terrorism, this means that the U.S. Government and American citizens overseas are very dependent upon the protection and cooperation of other governments.

Third, terrorist attacks are increasingly violent. Trends over recent years have shown a steady increase in the number of dead and wounded—an even more rapid increase than in the number of incidents.

Fourth, state sponsorship has become an increasingly dominant factor in global terrorism. There has been an unmistakable rise in the past few years, with Iran, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and Nicaragua as the most active, determined, systematic supporters of terrorist groups. Direct government assistance in arms and explosives, communications, travel documents, money, and training combined with fanatic individuals or

groups exploited by governments for political ends make state-supported terrorist groups more deadly. They have the means and desire to shift tactics toward bombing and armed attacks which make maximum political impact. The state support enables them to operate without worrying about financing or arms.

Fifth, the Middle East has become the primary source of international terrorism (378 incidents in 1985), in past years accounting for about 35% of the incidents. In 1985 this rose to 45%. Middle East terrorist activities are taking place not only in the region but also in Europe.

There are two main categories of Middle Eastern terrorists:

- Fanatical Palestinians, most of whom have split off from—and often act in direct opposition to—the mainline PLO led by Arafat. They often have the direct support of Libya, Syria, or Iran; and

- Shia zealots from various Arab countries, especially Lebanon, who are inspired and trained, often armed and financed, and, to varying degrees, guided by Iran.

The targets of Middle East terrorism fall principally into four groups: Israel; Western governments and citizens, particularly the United States; moderate Arab governments and officials, including the mainline PLO as well as Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia; and critics of radical regimes, particularly Libyans.

Other regions where terrorism is at a high level are Western Europe (208 incidents), where there are a number of indigenous groups motivated by ideological or ethnic/separatist beliefs, and Latin America (132 incidents), where the roots from which terrorists spring are a combination of ideology, politics, economic and social grievances, and—recently—narcoterrorism. Indigenous European terrorism decreased somewhat last year, thanks to outraged public opinion and better police work in countries such as Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. In Latin America, the trend is up, and so are attacks against the United States.


As you in the industry know better than we in government, the upsurge of Middle East terrorism is having a negative effect on tourism, and especially upon tourism emanating from the United States. Three major incidents

International Terrorist Attacks, 1985 ¹


Attacks on U.S. citizens and property
 Other Attacks

Number of Attacks ² 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500


Type of Target



Type of Event



By Region



¹ Based on preliminary 1985 figures, which may be subject to review and revision.

² Number may be higher than total number of attacks because of capability of recording multiple victims and/or installations attacked.

seem to have had the greatest impact, due to a combination of the acts themselves and the wide publicity they were given:

- The hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from Athens;
- The hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*; and
- The massacres at Vienna and Rome airports.

Although we have no precise figures, the best guess of the State Department is that the European and Middle Eastern countries of the Mediterranean rim lost upwards of \$1 billion in anticipated revenue from tourism last year, and it will probably be worse this year. This is a blow to the tourist industry but an even greater blow to countries counting heavily upon revenue for their economies: Italy, Greece, Egypt, Tunisia, and others. Even Amsterdam is affected.

Dealing with Terrorism

What has been and is being done to deal with international terrorism? There are several real problems in dealing with terrorist incidents which occur outside the United States.

First, let us recall that the U.S. Government has only limited ability to influence the situation when it occurs abroad, particularly since some governments tend to shy away from cooperation with us. Some erroneously believe that because the U.S. Government is a principal target of terrorists, working with us could bring more trouble; or they have nationalistic reasons for keeping a distance.

Second, most European states have closer economic links than we do with the Middle East and, particularly, with the oil-rich states that are prime sponsors of terrorism—notably Libya and Iran.

Third, some governments believe that they can have a sort of gentleman's understanding with Middle East terrorists and those states who support them: in exchange for a pro-Arab foreign policy and virtually free entry and passage for persons from Middle East countries (even suspected terrorists), no terrorist activities will take place on their territory. (Unfortunately for the governments in question, terrorists are not gentlemen.) They also tend to believe that it will "not happen here" and, therefore, avoid the troublesome, expensive actions necessary to deter terrorist attack.

Recognizing the problems—and they're not easy ones—let's look at some of the actions we have been taking that have an effect on tourism.

Actions Affecting Tourism

Improved civil aviation security has been one of the highest priorities. It is an area where we can see some results. We had actually anticipated the danger of an increase in aircraft hijacking and airport attacks stemming from Mid-East terrorism. Over a year ago, the State Department and the FAA began a major effort with friendly governments and with the airline industry and the ICAO to draw attention to the threat and to propose measures to deal with it. . . .

Unfortunately, there was not enough concern by most other governments until after the TWA 847 hijacking in June 1985, and the State Department issued a travel advisory for Athens airport. At that time, behind the leadership of Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole and her Canadian colleague, the ICAO Council expeditiously adopted a number of additional minimum security measures; Greece implemented rapidly the improvements for Athens airport which had been in limbo since agreed upon with a U.S. team in February; and several other governments took rapid advantage of offers by the State Department and FAA for technical assistance and training in civil aviation security.

Today, the FAA is sending officials to airports around the world in order to measure their safety. If there are problems and they are not corrected, a travel advisory will be issued—as it was for Athens airport. Better intelligence has also enabled the FAA and other U.S. Government agencies to issue more frequent, timely threat alerts for airlines and airport authorities abroad. Hijackings declined sharply in the second half of 1985. However, these tighter security measures did not apply to public access areas, where both international and U.S. airports are vulnerable. Most airports were designed to facilitate, not inhibit, public access. Since the attacks at Rome and Vienna, additional armed guards are in place at most major airports in Europe, and vigilance is up.

Maritime security is a new subject. We did not anticipate passenger hijackings because there had not been any in more than 20 years—and never previously in the Middle East. Some lines established their own security measures, but these added to the cost of the tours and were not regarded universally as necessary. The tragic *Achille Lauro* incident jolted the U.S. and other governments into a much more active policy of safety standards for ships and ports, focusing upon a reinforced role for IMO and national actions. A special inter-agency working group has been set up within the U.S. Government with the Coast Guard, the Departments of Transportation and State, and other agencies to deal with this problem more effectively. New international safety standards which the United States proposed are being considered by the International Maritime Organization, which met in January and should approve them later this year—a breakthrough for international ship travel.

We recently have held informal meetings between representatives of the U.S. travel industry and the Departments of State and Commerce to develop a more effective common approach to the terrorism problem. We need to work more closely on exchanging our assessment of the terrorism situation with you for information on the impact of terrorism on tourism. Using the clout of the loss of tourism dollars, we have an added weapon to use with other governments.

Improving U.S. Ability To Act Against Terrorism

The Administration has been hard at work unilaterally to improve its ability to act against international terrorism. The antiterrorism legislation passed by Congress in late 1984 has put into practice, with arrest warrants and extradition requests issued and rewards posted for the hijackers and killers of TWA Flight 847 and the *Achille Lauro* cruise ship. The Department of Justice and the FBI have, thus, become more directly involved in investigating and preparing to prosecute terrorist crimes against Americans abroad. This also has the effect of emphasizing that terrorists are not some kind of romantic "freedom fighters" but are vicious criminals. Additional legislation along these lines is pending, as is a new U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty which would treat terrorists as criminals.

There has been a significant increase in intelligence resources being applied to the terrorist problem, and further improvements have been made in our ability to respond militarily to a terrorist attack should this situation arise. The successful interception of the *Achille Lauro* hijackers is the most spectacular manifestation of both these improvements, combining excellent intelligence with timely military action in a precise, restrained way. Less publicized is the fact that over 100 terrorist attacks planned against the United States abroad were preempted in 1985 due to better intelligence or better security.

We have beefed up substantially the protection accorded U.S. Government officials stationed abroad, both military and civilian, and improved cooperation with private American business overseas, including the creation of an Overseas Advisory Security Council composed of State Department and private business representatives.

The Diplomatic Security Bureau and the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the State Department have also increased their programs for providing information to travelers and prospective travelers, as well as businessmen. When a call comes in on whether or not it is safe to travel to a particular country, they can provide the latest evaluation based upon the view of our diplomatic posts abroad and the intelligence community here in Washington. As a general rule, the State Department and its posts abroad do not discourage foreign travel because there are terrorist incidents. If there are problems in a particular country which warrant attention but not, in our judgement, cancellation of the trip, we point this out. If the problems are very serious—as in Lebanon or Libya or, for a time last year, at Athens airport—we will issue a public travel advisory.

The Need for International Cooperation

The measures which the United States can take unilaterally to combat terrorism are limited by a variety of factors. We cannot, for example, arbitrarily land assault troops at the airport of a friendly country to storm a hijacked plane without working out arrangements with the host country. Nor can we really track suggested terrorists ourselves

in the slums of Beirut, the deserts of Libya, or the jungles of Central America. The problem is an international one, and effective responses require international cooperation.

As Secretary Shultz said in a June 24, 1984, speech, terrorism is an international problem that requires the concerted efforts of all free nations, and “. . . the time has come for the nations that truly seek an end to terrorism to join together, in whatever forums, to take the necessary steps.”

Obtaining agreement on specific international steps is a difficult and long process—going back to even before the 1984 speech. Indeed, the efforts go back to the terrorist outbreaks in the 1970s. It has not been easy, for the reasons I mentioned earlier and because there is a strong sentiment of independence, if not resentment, amongst these governments vis-a-vis leadership from the United States.

Progress is being made, however. Italy recently has been the most cooperative European country, perhaps because of the jolt of the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, perhaps because its remarkable success in reducing domestic terrorism convinced its government of the need to act sooner rather than later. The United Kingdom and West Germany also deserve special recognition for the vigorous efforts they have been making to combat terrorism in their countries and to promote greater multilateral cooperation against the common threat.

Other governments have been less vigorous and less cooperative, adhering to a practice of accommodation and outdated policies of liberal refuge and asylum for those who claim political motivation for what are really heinous criminal acts. The U.S. Government disagrees strongly with such an approach and has made its views known.

On balance, discreet but effective bilateral cooperation between the United States and most of its allies has improved substantially over the past year, just as we have been able to focus greater world attention on the issue by pushing hard for resolutions condemning terrorism in the United Nations. The General Assembly and Security Council have both approved resolutions in recent months. Effective multilateral action on specific problems or countries, however, is still not in sight.

Unfortunately, these measures, unilateral and international, have not been enough. . . . There has simply not been enough action by other governments to act against terrorists before they can strike or to arrest and punish them once a crime has been committed. . . .

There is the beginning of an awakening in Europe. Although still somewhat embarrassed politically by U.S. leadership, there was a positive response behind the scenes by most of the nine governments which Deputy Secretary Whitehead and I visited last month. Cessation of arms supply to Libya, including existing contracts; an end to government credits for exports; tighter controls on Libyan entry and movement; and a promise not to substitute for departing American companies and technicians—these have been agreed to by almost all governments. Some have gone further—notably Italy, which has imposed a visa requirement for all visitors from North Africa and is reviewing its overall relationship with Libya. Collectively, the EC has decided to establish a high-level committee to study the terrorist problem and make recommendations. We hope this will be a forum for vigorous action.

One of the motivating factors behind this sudden activity in Western Europe has probably been the loss of tourist revenues, particularly from the United States. Europeans who in the past have been reluctant to take vigorous antiterrorist actions because of commercial interest are beginning to understand there is another side of the financial ledger. Terrorism is costing them hundreds of millions of dollars in lost tourism, increased security costs, and apprehensive investors. Another is the pressure of public opinion, which in most European countries is demanding firmer action by governments and is angry at what seems to be an inadequate response. In both these areas, groups such as those represented here tonight can use your potential pressure to good effect, making clear through your own channels which governments you believe are taking seriously their responsibilities to fight terrorism and protect all persons in their countries. Combined with the efforts of the U.S. Government, this can have an important positive impact.

Chronology of Major American-related Terrorist Incidents, 1985

December 27

Rome, Italy; Vienna, Austria: Terrorists simultaneously attacked passengers at airports in Rome and Vienna with grenades and automatic weapons fire. Five Americans were among those killed in attacks on El Al and TWA passengers in Rome. Two El Al passengers were killed in Vienna. Airport guards killed three terrorists and captured another in Rome. In Vienna, one terrorist was killed and two were captured. The Abu Nidal group claimed credit for the attacks.

November 24

Frankfurt, West Germany: A car bomb exploded at a U.S. military post exchange (PX) injuring 36, including 18 U.S. military personnel and 15 U.S. civilians. The bomb was contained in a silver BMW. No group claimed credit.

November 23

Malta: An Egyptair flight carrying 96 people, including three Americans, was hijacked en route from Athens to Cairo and diverted to Malta by three Arabic-speaking gunmen. When demands for refueling were not met, two Israeli women and three Americans were shot in the head with a small caliber weapon. One Israeli and one American died. An Egyptian commando unit stormed the plane using explosives to enter a cargo hold. A fire and gun-battle ensued. In all, 59 passengers were killed. Three groups claimed responsibility: Egypt's Revolution, the Egyptian Liberation Organization, and the Arab Revolutionary Brigades (a.k.a. the Abu Nidal group).

November 6

San Juan, Puerto Rico: Two unidentified assailants on a motorcycle shot and wounded Maj. Michael Snyder, a U.S. Army recruiting officer, as he was riding a moped to his office in San Juan. A passerby was also wounded. The Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution claimed credit.

October 28

Santiago, Chile: Four people were wounded as bombs exploded at the offices of two U.S. companies and a Chilean-Arab exporting firm. The first bomb exploded at the headquarters of

International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), wounding two Chilean security guards. Shortly afterward, an explosion damaged the offices of the United Trading Company, a Chilean-Kuwaiti fruit exporter, and severely injured two employees. The third bomb went off at the offices of Freeport Chilean Exploration, a New Orleans-based mining company and subsidiary of Freeport McMoran, Inc. of New York. Damage was extensive.

October 23

Concepcion, Chile: A bomb exploded at the U.S.-Chilean Binational Center, causing extensive damage and one injury. The explosive detonated outside the center's front door where it seriously wounded a young girl who happened to be passing by. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front claimed responsibility for the attack through an anonymous telephone call to a radio station.

October 7

Port Said, Egypt: Four gunmen seized the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* off Port Said, Egypt, and took some 400 people on board hostage. Among the hostages, representing many different nationalities, were 12 Americans. The hijackers demanded the release of 50 Palestinians held in Israel. The hijackers killed Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly American confined to a wheelchair, and threw his body overboard. The ship returned to Egypt where the hijackers surrendered to PLO and Egyptian officials. Egypt released the hijackers. The U.S. Navy intercepted the hijackers' plane and forced it down in Italy where they were taken into custody.

September 16

Rome, Italy: Two Soviet-made F1 grenades were thrown into the Cafe de Paris, a popular tourist spot located 100 yards from the U.S. Embassy. One grenade exploded and injured 40 people, among them several Britons and Americans. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (a.k.a. the Abu Nidal group) claimed credit. Police arrested a Lebanese-born Palestinian.

September 9

Madrid, Spain: A car bomb exploded in central Madrid during a morning rush hour and wounded 16 civil guards in a van and two passersby. One of the wounded, U.S. businessman Eugene Ken Brown of Johnson and Johnson, died 2 days later. Brown was hit in the chest and neck by shrapnel while jogging in the area. ETA, a Basque separatist group, claimed responsibility in telephone calls.

September 3

Cali, Colombia: A large bomb exploded in the library of the U.S.-Colombian Binational Center (BNC) and three bombs were placed in front of the Coca-Cola bottling plant. Hours earlier, the U.S. Embassy had passed on to the American community advance warning that terrorist activity would be directed at U.S. interests in Colombia that evening. Two injuries and considerable damage were reported from the BNC explosion. Both the M-19 and the Ricardo Franco Front claimed responsibility for the bombings.

August 8

Frankfurt, West Germany: A car bomb exploded in a parking lot at the U.S. Rhein-Main Air Force Base, killing one U.S. airman and the wife of another. The 20 injured included 18 U.S. citizens. The bomb vehicle was a metallic green Volkswagen with forged U.S. Armed Forces license plates. The Red Army Faction (RAF) and Action Directe jointly claimed credit for the attack under the name of the "Commando George Jackson," an American member of the Black Panthers who was killed attempting to escape from a California prison in 1971.

August 7

Wiesbaden, West Germany: A U.S. serviceman, Edward Pimental, was shot, killed, and robbed of his military I.D. card after leaving a nightclub in the company of a man and a woman just before midnight. Police speculated that the stolen I.D. card might have been used by the Red Army Faction to gain entry to the U.S. Air Force base at Rhein-Main, where a car bomb exploded the day after the murder. On August 13, a copy of an RAF communique and the I.D. card were sent to a news agency.

July 22

Copenhagen, Denmark: Two bomb blasts wrecked the offices of Northwest Orient and damaged a Jewish synagogue and old people's home. At least 14 people were injured, but no deaths were reported. One bomb was thrown through the window of the airline office; it injured 10 people inside and one passerby. The other bomb exploded between the synagogue and the old people's home, injuring three or four people. An anonymous caller in Beirut claimed credit for the Islamic Jihad, saying the bombings were in retaliation for an Israeli raid on the southern Lebanon town of Kabrikha the day before.

July 19

Santiago, Chile: A powerful car bomb exploded in front of the U.S. consulate. A Chilean passerby was killed, and four other Chileans were injured. Two of the wounded were police guards posted at the consulate. Damage to the consulate consisted of broken windows. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front claimed credit.

July 14

Karachi, Pakistan: A bomb exploded near the main entrance to the Pan Am office. A man was seen placing a bag on the stairs of the office, but a passerby moved the bag away before it exploded. The blast injured the passerby and two others. No group claimed credit. On August 17, 1985, a Pakistani male who was described as strongly anti-American was arrested. He is believed to have acted alone.

July 1

Andori, Colombia: Attackers, believed to be with the leftist National Liberation Army, shot and severely wounded Douglas Brannen, a former Florida State senator, near Brannen's gold mine north of Bogota.

Madrid, Spain: Terrorists attacked a building shared by TWA and British Airways. A man ran into the British Airways ticket office below the TWA office and threw a box onto the counter. The box exploded and gutted the office. The TWA office was also damaged. One Spanish woman was killed, and at least 28 people were wounded, among them two American tourists. "The Organization of the Oppressed" and the Revolu-

tionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (a.k.a. the Abu Nidal group) claimed credit.

June 23

Air India Flight 182, flying from Toronto and Montreal to India, crashed at sea off southwest Ireland, probably as a result of a bomb blast. All 329 passengers, including four Americans, were killed. A caller to the *New York Times* claimed credit on behalf of a Sikh group. The crash appeared to be related to another incident the same day at Tokyo's Narita Airport where a bag being transferred from a Canadian airline to an Air India flight exploded and killed two airport workers.

June 19

San Salvador, El Salvador: Gunmen shot and killed 13 people, including four marine security guards and two U.S. businessmen, at an outdoor cafe. The slain marines were identified as Cpl. Patrick Kwiatkowski, Sgt. Bobby Dickson, Cpl. Gregory Webber, and Sgt. Thomas Handwork. George Viney and Robert Alvidrez, two businessmen from Wang Laboratories, were also killed. Witnesses said a pickup truck stopped at the curb, and 6-10 men dressed in military-type uniforms and armed with automatic weapons jumped out and fired at cafe patrons. The gunmen seemed to single out the marines, who were in civilian dress. The Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers claimed credit.

June 13

Beirut, Lebanon: TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Beirut was hijacked with 153 passengers on board. Two Lebanese hijackers took the plane from Beirut to Algiers, back to Beirut, to Algiers again, and finally back to Beirut. They demanded the release of 700 Lebanese Shiites held in Israel. During the second stop in Beirut, the hijackers killed passenger Robert Stethem, a U.S. Navy diver, and a number of Americans were taken off the plane when about 12 Lebanese Amal members boarded. Passengers were released until 39 American men remained. All but the three crew members were taken from the plane on June 17 and held by Amal and Hizballah for 13 days until Syria obtained their release. *Beirut Radio* has identified the two original hijackers and has announced that they will be prosecuted.

May 15

Lima, Peru: Simultaneous bombings occurred at a number of targets in the city, including the residence of the U.S. Ambassador, where an explosive device, which was thrown over a wall, detonated near the swimming pool. The blast broke windows in the residence, which was occupied by the Ambassador at the time, but there were no casualties. Police blamed Sendero Luminoso for the attacks, which came on the eve of the fifth anniversary of their war with the Peruvian Government.

April 12

Madrid, Spain: A bomb exploded in the El Descanso restaurant, which is frequented by U.S. military personnel from a nearby airbase. Eighteen Spaniards were killed, and 15 Americans were wounded. The blast was caused by a 12-pound homemade bomb. Several groups claimed responsibility, including the Islamic Jihad organization.

April 9

Santiago, Chile: Two explosive devices were almost simultaneously detonated in a small pedestrian shopping arcade where six banks, a few restaurants, and several businesses were located. The blasts caused only minor damages but wounded eight patrons of a restaurant and passersby. The Chase Manhattan Bank and the First National City Bank have branch offices at this location. On this same night, five other bombs exploded in four other cities in Chile. The targets include the U.S. Bank Moran Finance in La Serena, a supermarket, a tourist office, and a telephone booth.

February 21

Barranquilla, Colombia: A bomb exploded outside the Binational Center, killing the night watchman and causing extensive damage to the administrative offices. The bomb apparently was placed against a side wall of the center, just minutes before the explosion, by two men on a white motorcycle. The explosive, believed to have been dynamite in a metal container, blew a large hole in the exterior wall adjacent to the office of the center's director. The watchman was some distance from the blast and was killed by shrapnel. The explosion also broke windows in the surrounding neighborhood.

February 7

Medellin, Colombia: Terrorists simultaneously bombed seven establishments, most of which were U.S. firms. One policeman was killed, and another was wounded. Explosions occurred at or near the offices of Union Carbide, Xerox, IBM, GTE, Tradition Family and Property, and a Hare Krishna temple. Extensive damage was reported at some of the establishments. The Che Guevara Faction of the National Liberation Army and the Ricardo Franco Front, a dissident group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, claimed responsibility for the multiple bombings.

Guadalajara, Mexico: Enrique Camarena Salazar, a DEA agent work-

ing in Mexico, was abducted by four gunmen just after leaving the U.S. consulate. He was brutally killed, and his body was found a few weeks later. Three hours after Salazar's abduction, Alfredo Zavala Avelar, a Mexican pilot for the DEA, was also kidnaped and later killed. Among those arrested were two major Mexican drug traffickers, Rafael Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca.

February 2

Glyfada, Greece: A bomb exploded in a nightclub frequented by U.S. military personnel. Sixty-nine Americans were injured. A group called the "National Front" claimed the bombing was

in protest of U.S. support for Turkey over the Cyprus issue.

January 30

Guadalajara, Mexico: American John Walker and Cuban companion Alberto Radelat disappeared after being seen at a Guadalajara restaurant frequented by members of Mexico's drug underworld. On June 19, police found their bodies in a well north of the city. The bodies were wrapped in tablecloths and carpeting and riddled with bullets. Before the bodies were found, two drug kingpins, Rafael Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca were arraigned based on the testimony of a witness. Both have admitted killing Walker and Radelat, whom they may have mistaken for DEA agents. ■

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