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United States Department of State

Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984


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
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International Terrorist Incidents, 1980-84



Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1984

Percent



Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984

Introduction

The Year in Review

The pace of international terrorist activity around the world continued unabated during 1984. We recorded nearly 600 international terrorist attacks involving personal injury or property damage, representing an increase over each of the previous four years. Deaths in 1984 exceeded 300. These numbers, when viewed in the context of the past 15 years, suggest that the overall threat may again be increasing.

US citizens and interests remained a prime target of foreign terrorists around the world, followed by those of France and Israel. More than 20 percent of international terrorist incidents in 1984 involved US targets. This notwithstanding, in 1984 the United States was the victim of fewer attacks than in each of the four preceding years and suffered substantially fewer casualties than in 1983. The year 1983 was anomalous, however, because of the extraordinarily high death toll of 241 in the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon in October.

The major trend apparent in 1984 was the growing dominance of the Middle East as the crucible of terrorism. In 1984, nearly half of all international terrorist attacks either occurred in the Middle East or were committed elsewhere by Middle Easterners. Indeed, of the eight

1 Our tallies of terrorist incidents are not comprehensive and, in some ways, represent only the tip of the iceberg with regard to terrorist violence of all types in all countries. While the statistics cited cover only international terrorist incidents (as defined on the inside front cover), the text and chronology include references to indigenous terrorism and other types of political violence. For illustrative purposes, consider the following: if a member of the French terrorist group Action Directe attacks a Frenchman in France, the incident is classified as an instance of indigenous terrorism. Should that same terrorist attack a US or other foreign national in France-or an individual or facility belonging to any nationality located outside France—the event is recorded as international in nature. Thus, the annual statistics we cite would include the latter, but not the former, incident. Our information base on indigenous terrorism, while sizable, is not comprehensive enough to permit us to provide statistical data with the same degree of confidence as we do on international terrorism. As a result, only international terrorist incidents are included in the statistical sections.

incidents that resulted in US fatalities last year, four occurred in the Middle East, and a fifth had a Middle Eastern connection. Among the major incidents were the truck bombing of the US Embassy Annex in East Beirut, which killed two US citizens in September, and the hijacking of a Kuwaiti Airlines flight from Kuwait to Tehran in December. Two US AID employees were murdered by the radical Lebanese Shia hijackers before the latter incident ended.

Many of the attacks of Middle Eastern origin in 1984 were the work of groups or agents who frequently work at the behest of one of three radical states: Iran, Syria, or Libya. Indeed, sponsorship or support of terrorism by these three countries became the most salient characteristic of international terrorism in 1984—one that has been largely responsible for the increased violence of attacks and the proliferation of Middle Eastern terrorist operations in Western Europe. Resurgent Palestinian terrorism also drove up the level of attacks of Middle Eastern origin.

Western Europe experienced an outbreak of what became known as Euroterrorism—a campaign of seemingly coordinated attacks against NATO and defense-related targets primarily in West Germany, France, and Belgium. The Belgian participants belonged to a new terrorist group, the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), which carried out its first attack in October 1984. In Latin America, as in past years, indigenous terrorist violence associated with the Communist-backed insurgencies in El Salvador and Colombia far exceeded the number of international terrorist attacks. In Asia the most spectacular terrorist incident—the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Sikh members of her security force—was in fact an instance of indigenous, rather than international, terrorism.

Prospects for a slowdown in international terrorist activity are dim. We expect terrorism of indigenous origin in Western Europe to continue at the current level and most Latin American violence to continue to vary according to the success of local governments in dealing with insurgent

problems. Moreover, terrorism emanating from the Middle East is unlikely to slacken its pace: Iran, Syria, and Libya have thus far enjoyed relative success in pursuing their individual foreign policy objectives through the use of terrorism.

Statistical Review of 1984


In 1984 we counted 597 international terrorist incidents.² Roughly one-third of them resulted in casualties. Altogether, more than 300 persons were killed in these incidents, and some 1,000 were wounded. The number of incidents recorded in 1984 was higher than in any of the preceding four years and represented a 20-percent increase over the average of the preceding four years.

In 1984, as in recent years, more international terrorist incidents—over 230—were recorded in Western Europe than in any other part of the world. As a venue of international terrorism, the Middle East ran a close second, with more than 200 incidents. Considering, however, that more than 60 attacks in Western Europe last year were conducted by Middle Eastern terrorists, the Middle East generated the most international terrorism in 1984. In addition, whereas most attacks by West European terrorists were designed to avoid casualties, most of those by Middle Eastern terrorists were intended to cause casualties.

In 1984 citizens of at least 76 countries were victims of international terrorist attacks. International terrorist incidents took place in at least 72 countries last year, compared to 78 in 1983. In 1984 most victims were private parties, such as tourists or passers-by. Last year, attacks against business persons increased over the previous year, while attacks against diplomats and military

² In 1984, the international terrorist incident data base was refined to make it more complete, accurate, and reliable. For example, political demonstrations; nonpolitical violence; conspiracies never activated; and nonviolent, unpremeditated, or defensive attacks are no longer coded as terrorism. Also, in contrast to previous years, we now code terrorist acts by Palestinians against civilian Israeli targets in Israel and the occupied territories. Moreover, terrorist acts by rural insurgent groups in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are coded with greater thoroughness. The apparent increase in the number of international terrorist incidents in 1984 is at least partially the result of these refinements. However, a comparison of the 1984 data with that of previous years in regions such as Western Europe and the Middle East-for which recordkeeping has been more complete-reveals an actual increase in the level of international terrorist activity in those locales.

Casualties Resulting From International Terrorism, 1984



personnel declined. We recorded marked increases in certain categories of attacks: armed attacks increased from 75 in 1983 to 139 in 1984; bombings increased from 255 to 302; skyjackings increased from five to 10; and the number of kidnapings increased from 40 to 46. While attacks against US citizens dropped to 52 in 1984 from the previous year's total of 79, the number of attacks against Israelis, Palestinians, Libyans (primarily dissidents), Spaniards, and citizens of the United Kingdom increased by eight incidents or more.

A comparison of the data for 1984 with those of the previous year reveals increased levels of international terrorism in some places and substantial declines elsewhere. Last year saw:


 A substantial increase in terrorism of Middle Eastern origin in Western Europe. In 1984 we recorded 62 acts of terrorism by Middle Eastern terrorists (excluding Armenians) in Western Europe, compared with


International Terrorist Incidents by Type of Target/Victim, 1984

International Terrorist Incidents by Type of Target/Victim, 1980-84

Percent

Percent





- 31 the previous year. Palestinian terrorists and Libyan Government agents (attacking emigres) were the most active.
- An increase in international terrorism in Israel and the occupied territories. We recorded 75 such international incidents in 1984—47 of which were bombings or attempted bombings—compared with only five the previous year. While the increase is partially attributable to revisions in coding criteria, other factors were also at play. Part of the increase was due to the activity of Jewish extremists against West Bank Palestinian targets. In addition, various Palestinian groups, both inside and outside the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), also increased their terrorist pressure on Israel—partly in competition with each other and partly to demonstrate that they still constitute a force to be feared, despite having been uprooted from their bases in Lebanon.
- An increase in terrorism connected with the "Dirty War" in Spain and France. The Spanish Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) responded to a French Government crackdown on ETA activities in France with a terrorist campaign against French interests that resulted in considerable material damage, particularly to French commercial properties. We recorded 36 such attacks in 1984, compared with none the previous year. In addition, in 1984 we recorded 11 attacks against accused ETA operatives in France by the Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL), which surfaced in late 1983.
- A major decrease in international terrorism in Latin America. We recorded only 81 incidents there in 1984—the lowest annual total of the 1980s—down more than a third from the 125 incidents of 1983, although there was an active amount of political violence related to internal insurgencies.

The State Support Issue

In large measure, the range and lethality of terrorism derive from the increasingly active role played by sovereign states—most notably Iran, Syria, and Libya. These three Muslim radical states have actively supported a variety of ethnic and religious terrorist and guerrilla groups. Indeed, Iran, Syria, and Libya have set a new—and alarming—style in state-supported terrorism, one unique among the nations facilitating the spread of anti-US attacks. The unprecedented degree of backing and, in some cases, active participation by these states in terrorist operations, helped make terrorism in 1984 very much a problem of the Middle East.

Iran. Currently the world's leading supporter of terrorism, Iran has been most active in Lebanon. At the same time, Tehran still intends to punish the United States for its support of the late Shah and France for its role in helping Iraq's war effort. Iran's fundamentalist regime, which ultimately hopes to drive US and Western influence from the Islamic world, has championed some of the most viciously anti-Western groups in the region—such as the Hizballah in Lebanon.

Tehran's long-term goal is to spread its revolution by using terrorism to help create like-minded fundamentalist Islamic republics in Middle East and Persian Gulf states with large Shia populations. To that end, Iran continues to train Shia dissidents and to establish a terrorist infrastructure in the region. Nevertheless, in 1984 we recorded no Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks in the Persian Gulf.

Syria. Damascus uses terrorism to raise the costs to states whose policies are inimical to its interests. It has used Lebanese groups to influence the Lebanese political process. Syria has also sought to weaken political support for the Jordan-PLO Middle East peace initiative. In this regard, Syria uses the various Palestinian groups and Jordanian dissidents to actively wage war against the Israelis and against moderate Arab states, such as Jordan, that appear willing to seek accommodation with Tel Aviv.

Libya. Tripoli uses terrorism to advance Colonel Qadhafi's vision of himself as the natural leader of the Arab world. Qadhafi's world view has prompted him to intervene in the affairs of a number of Third World nations, particularly in

Africa, whenever he perceives a regime to be too closely aligned with, or drifting toward, the West. Libya has used its own personnel, as well as mercenaries, in attempts to assassinate heads of state and Libyan dissidents who Qadhafi believes threaten his ambitions and his very survival.

South Yemen. While the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen has not participated directly in international terrorist attacks, it has supported international terrorism since the late 1960s by providing camps and other facilities for a number of leftist terrorist groups. In 1984, however, the level of support was limited to the provision of safehaven for Palestinian groups.


Role of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union clearly supports international terrorism, although—in contrast to Iran, Syria, and Libya—we have no evidence of the Soviets directly planning or orchestrating terrorist acts by Middle Eastern, West European, or Latin American groups. However:

- The Soviets have a long history of maintaining relations with groups that participate in or are linked to terrorism.
 They provide political backing, funding, and, in some cases, conventional arms and military training.
- Moscow, at least indirectly, has given materiel support to groups that have committed terrorist acts, particularly in the Middle East and Latin America.
- The Soviets have trained personnel linked to or belonging to national liberation groups, and they openly sell large quantities of arms to Palestinian terrorists, states that support terrorism (with Libya a leading customer), and gray market arms dealers. Absence of end-user restrictions means that such weapons often make their way into the hands of terrorists.
- The Soviets also support certain Palestinian groups, East European states, South Yemen, and Cuba, all of whom support terrorist organizations or groups that commit terrorist acts. Bulgaria's state trading organization—KINTEX—and Czechoslovakia's comparable organization—OMNIPOL—are among the most prominent companies whose weapons eventually have appeared in terrorist hands.

Casualties Resulting From International Terrorist Incidents, 1980-84

Number of casualties

1.500




Patterns of Lethality

Of the nearly 600 international terrorist incidents last year, 195—almost a third—resulted in casualties. Ten incidents—four in South Asia, four in southern Africa, and one each in Costa Rica and Lebanon—produced about half of the year's 312 fatalities. Eight of the 10 incidents involved bombings—some were commanddetonated or suicide bombings, but most used timedelay detonating mechanisms. The perpetrators of six of the 10 incidents were insurgents rather than pure terrorist groups. Thus, although more than two-thirds of all international terrorist incidents we recorded for 1984 took place in Western Europe or the Middle East, the most lethal ones occurred in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where there are active insurgencies.

US Casualties Resulting From International Terrorist Incidents, 1980-84

Number of casualties

300



The East Europeans, almost certainly with Soviet knowledge and support, provide safehaven, grant transit privileges, and allow the movement of weapons and bombs for terrorists such as Carlos, Abu Nidal, and others.

In backing revolutionary causes against established governments, the Soviets seem to be largely indifferent to whether terrorist tactics are used. As long as groups committing terrorist acts are ideologically aligned with the Soviet Union and continue to attack non-Soviet and non-Bloc targets, the Soviets benefit from the disruptive and destabilizing effects of terrorism, which partly explains why they have not supported international efforts to combat it.

Target USA

Of the nearly 600 international terrorist incidents last year, 131 involved US victims or property—fewer than in any other year since the beginning of the decade.³

Consequences and Key Offenders

Casualties. Nineteen of the 131 incidents resulted in US casualties, eight in fatalities. Altogether, 11 US citizens were killed, and 31 others were wounded. Three of the US dead and five of the US wounded appear to have been incidental casualties—unlucky bystanders at incidents in which persons or facilities of other nationalities were the targets. In 1983 we recorded an unusually high number of US fatalities at the hands of international terrorists—because of such mass-casualty-producing incidents as the April bombing of the US Embassy and the October bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon. Consequently, the 1984 total of 11 dead represents a substantial decline—a return, in fact, to the levels of the several years preceding 1983.

The following eight incidents resulted in US fatalities in 1984:

- Lebanon, 8 January. Three men believed to be radical Lebanese Shia directed rocket-propelled grenade and small-arms fire at a US Marine Corps helicopter bringing a working party to the US Embassy near East Beirut.
 One Marine was killed.
- Lebanon, 18 January. Dr. Malcolm Kerr, President of the American University of Beirut, was shot to death outside his office by a lone assailant using a pistol equipped with a silencer. Radical Shia claimed credit in the name of Islamic Jihad.
- Italy, 15 February. Leamon Hunt, Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, was shot to death with an assault rifle outside his home in Rome.
 Both the Italian Red Brigades and the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) claimed responsibility.
- Namibia, 15 April. Two officials from the US Liaison
 Office were killed (along with a Namibian) when a time




Body of assassinated US diplomat Leamon Hunt being removed from hospital, 15 February 1984.

bomb exploded at a gas station at which they had stopped. The bomb is believed to have been planted by elements of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) who probably had no idea any US officials would be around when it exploded.

- Costa Rica, 31 May. A US correspondent was among the eight persons killed in a bomb explosion at a news conference held by Nicaraguan antigovernment guerrilla leader Eden Pastora. Neither the perpetrators nor their sponsor have been identified. The death of the US citizen probably was not intended.
- Lebanon, 20 September. Two US citizens were among the 23 persons killed when a car bomb driven by a radical Lebanese Shia exploded in front of the US Embassy Annex in East Beirut. The Islamic Jihad claimed credit; the Hizballah is believed responsible.
- United States, 5 October. Chinese-American writer
 Henry Liu was shot to death in front of his home outside
 San Francisco. Senior officials of the intelligence service
 of the Government of Talwan were subsequently tried
 and convicted of having ordered the assassination
 because Liu had published material critical of the
 government.

³ While there does appear to have been an actual decline in such incidents over previous years, we believe that the overall figure, in part, reflects our growing capability to keep track of terrorist incidents not involving US victims or property.

International Terrorist Attacks Against US Citizens and Property, 1984



a These numbers are higher than the total number of incidents because of the capability of recording multiple victims and/or installations attacked.

Table 1 International Terrorist Incidents Against US Citizens and Property, 1980-84

Number of incidents

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	Total
Total	163	159	208	199	131	860
Armed attack	33	27	17	25	19	121
Armed occupation and barricade	4		2	6		12
Arson	23	25	58	34	9	149
Assault, intimidation, extortion					3	3
Bombing	62	71	109	93	70	405
Hostagetaking and barricade	4	1	1	2	3	11
Kidnaping	10	10	8	9	14	51
Skyjacking	1	9	1	1	6	18
Other	26	16	12	29	7	90

^a Incidents involving US targets or victims. In some of these incidents, US involvement was unintentional.

Table 2 International Terrorist Incidents Against US Citizens and Property, 1984 a

Number of incidents

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Middle East	Sub- Saharan Africa	Asia/ Pacific	Total
Total	2	45	48		23	8	5	131
Armed attack	1	8	5		4	1		19
Armed occupation and barricade	id							
Arson		2	7					9
Bombing	1	29	28		11	1		70
Hostagetaking and barricade		2					1	3
Kidnaping		1			6	4	3	14
Skyjacking		1	1		2	1	1	6
Other		2	7			1		10

^a Incidents involving US targets or victims. In some of these incidents, US involvement was unintentional.

 Iran, 5-6 December. Radical Lebanese Shia who had hijacked a Kuwaiti Airlines flight from Kuwait to Tehran singled out and murdered two US AID employees who were passengers on the plane.

Hostages. In 23 incidents, 37 US citizens were kidnaped, hijacked, or otherwise taken hostage. By year's end, five US citizens were still being held hostage—four in Lebanon, and one in the Philippines.

The Worst Offenders. In 1984 the most serious international terrorist incidents involving US citizens occurred in Lebanon or at the hands of Lebanese terrorists, particularly radical Shia supported by the Iranian Government. Nearly 20 non-casualty-producing incidents against US interests in West Germany were conducted by the West German Red Army Faction (RAF), its supporters, or similar indigenous leftwing extremists. Another 20 or so were conducted by other West European leftist groups in a half-dozen countries. About 30 attacks were carried out against US targets by leftwing groups in various Latin American countries, primarily Chile, Peru, and Colombia.

Regional Patterns

The Middle East

In some respects, Middle Eastern terrorism became more of a problem in 1984 than it was in 1983. The number of international terrorist incidents in the region increased dramatically, as did the proportion of incidents causing casualties or intended to cause casualties. Moreover, Middle Eastern terrorists became more active outside the region—especially in Western Europe where their activity accelerated strikingly. About half of all international terrorist attacks either occurred in the Middle East or were Middle Eastern in origin. Furthermore, the proportion of incidents in which the hand of a state sponsor—Iran, Syria, or Libya—was evident reached an alltime high.

Lebanon and Iran. Lebanon remains at the center of Middle Eastern terrorism, having been the venue for 82 international terrorist attacks in 1984. For the third year in a row, more international terrorist attacks occurred there than in any other country. The suicide car bombing of the US Embassy Annex in East Beirut in September was the most spectacular of the international terrorist attacks in Lebanon in 1984. Two US Government personnel were killed and 20 were wounded in this incident, along with 12 Lebanese killed and over 50 wounded. Throughout 1984,




The US Embassy Annex after suicidal car bombing on 20 September 1984.


officials or private citizens of US, French, Saudi Arabian, or Kuwaiti nationality were the targets of numerous armed attacks and kidnapings. By the end of 1984, four of the six US citizens who had been kidnaped in Lebanon during the course of the year—including a US diplomat—were still being held.

Many of the incidents that occurred in Lebanon, and a number of other armed attacks and smaller bombings that occurred elsewhere, were claimed by anonymous phone callers in the name of Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War). Not a formal organization, Islamic Jihad is merely a covername used by pro-Iranian radical Lebanese Shia whose objective is to rid Lebanon of all US—and eventually all Western—influence and to create an Iranian-style Islamic republic there.

Comparison of Worldwide and Middle East Terrorist Incidents, 1984



Comparison of Worldwide and Middle East Casualties Resulting From Terrorist Incidents, 1984



Hizballah, or the Party of God, is the generic name used by the Iranians and their supporters to distinguish their movement from other Muslim groups in Lebanon. Small groups of terrorists within the Hizballah movement-some little more than street gangs in West Beirut-were responsible for many of the numerous attacks last year. Many of these Hizballah elements continue to receive political indoctrination, training, and financial and materiel support from Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen based in the Syrian-controlled at Biga (Bekaa) Valley of eastern Lebanon. While this Iranian assistance has been instrumental in the continuing success of Hizballah terrorists, the radical Shia forces have become strong enough to operate independently in many cases. In fact, increasingly they have developed into a highly structured, cooperative network.

Tehran last year continued to indoctrinate and train disaffected Shia from Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia at camps inside Iran. Some of these trainees almost certainly have reinfiltrated their countries and remain available for future operations. Nevertheless, we recorded no Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks in the Persian Gulf region during 1984.

Libya. Libya returned to the international terrorism scene after a year of relative inactivity in 1983. Early in 1984, Qadhafi clearly felt jeopardized by increasingly vocal opponents to his regime and so, in February, ordered Libyan Revolutionary Committees to threaten exiles with death if they did not return home. This action constitutes the third time in four years that he has made such threats. In 1984, nearly 30 terrorist attacks—mostly against Libyan exiles in Europe and the Middle East—were linked directly to Libyan agents or surrogates.

Libya's adversaries in Chad and opponents of Qadhafi's policies there—France and a number of African countries—were a second focus for Qadhafi's terrorism. On 10 March, a major tragedy was narrowly averted when a bomb in the baggage compartment of a French airliner exploded shortly after the plane landed in Bangui, Central African Republic.


Another target of Libya's wave of terrorism has been moderate Arab governments in the Middle East and Africa. Qadhafi has accused these governments of betraying the Palestinian cause and serving as "lackeys" of the United States. Persistent rumors of assassination plots against such Arab leaders as President Mubarak of Egypt

and former President Nimeiri of Sudan gained credence when Egypt arrested four Libyan-hired mercenaries in November for plotting to kill a prominent Libyan exile. The arrestees stated that Libya's target list for assassinations included President Mubarak as well as prominent Libyan exiles in Egypt. In July 1984, Egypt almost certainly was the target of mines laid in the Red Sea near the entrance to the Suez Canal. A Libyan ship most likely planted the devices, which damaged 18 vessels registered to many nations.

Syria. Syrian support for Middle Eastern terrorism increased last year. As in 1983, Syria's tolerance of Iranian Revolutionary Guards and radical Shia bases in the Bekaa Valley contributed to the rampant terrorism in Lebanon. Similarly, Syria's more direct support for the numerous radical Palestinian groups—most notably the Abu Nidal Group, which is headquartered in Damascus—helped those groups stage an increased number of attacks on civilian targets inside Israel and the West Bank. Most alarming, however, was the rash of attacks inside Jordan and against Jordanian interests in Europe. These attacks occurred as Jordan began its effort to spark movement in the moribund Middle Eastern peace talks, a development strongly opposed by the Syrian Government and its radical Palestinian allies such as Abu Nidal.

Five of the 14 attacks in Jordan in 1984 were directed against American targets. The most dangerous one occurred on 24 March, when a bomb exploded in the parking lot of the Intercontinental Hotel across the street from the US Embassy in Amman. A US AID employee and his daughter were injured by the blast, and more casualties were narrowly averted when a second bomb in the same location was defused. The Syrian-backed Abu Nidal Group claimed credit for this attack, as well as for two other bombs found and defused the same day near British facilities. In August 1984, a bomb damaged a US Embassy warehouse in Amman, and later in the year bombs were defused near the homes of US officials and at buildings containing nonofficial US facilities. In 1984, the Abu Nidal Group was believed responsible for attacks against PLO officials, including the assassination in December in Amman of a member of the PLO Executive Committee.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Terrorism involving Israelis and Palestinians increased significantly in 1984. More than 50 attacks on unarmed or civilian Israeli targets




A terrorist descends from an Air France 737 hijacked on 31 July 1984—to ask for food and water for passengers and to demand that newsmen stay clear.

occurred inside Israel or the occupied territories. Nearly every Palestinian group claimed credit for at least one attack, as they competed for visibility and influence in the fragmented Palestinian movement.

Significantly, the decade-old declared PLO ban on terrorism outside Israel and the occupied terrorities began to break down in 1984. Non-PLO groups, like Abu Nidal and the 15 May Organization, have always rejected such restraint, but anti-Arafat groups still part of the PLO almost certainly were responsible for some of the increase in Middle Eastern terrorism outside Israel. Beyond the attacks on Jordanian interests in Europe, Israeli targets there were hit six times in 1984. In October, for example, Fatah rebels led by Abu Musa claimed credit for a car bomb that damaged the Israeli Embassy in Cyprus.

Terrorism by Jewish extremists against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank, which began in late 1983, continued in 1984. One of the most serious incidents occurred on 27 January, when two men attempted to place explosives at the Dome of the Rock Mosque in Jerusalem, one of Islam's holiest sites. Alert Arab guards spotted the terrorists before they could complete the job. Several small groups of Jewish extremists, including one calling itself Terror Against Terror, were broken up by Israeli authorities, but violent attacks against Arab targets continued to occur throughout the year in the West Bank, although at a reduced level.

Terrorist Incidents of Middle Eastern Origin in Western Europe, 1980-84



Western Europe

West European states continue to rank high on the list of those afflicted by terrorism. Overall, 232 international terrorist incidents took place in Western Europe last year, more than in any other region of the world. Occasional terrorist acts take place in Communist Bloc countries, but the strong and repressive security establishments and the limited observance of civil rights in those countries tend to deter would-be terrorists.

Terrorist Spillover From the Middle East

Terrorist attacks outside the Middle East conducted by Middle Eastern groups continued to rise in 1984, nearly doubling the level of the previous year. Most of the increase occurred in Western Europe against Middle Eastern targets—including diplomatic personnel and facilities of the relatively moderate states such as Jordan, officials of various Palestinian groups, and emigre opponents of certain Middle Eastern regimes.

Iran. There was an alarming spread to Western Europe of operations by Iranian-supported groups. Throughout 1984, plots to assassinate anti-Khomeini exiles were detected in the United Kingdom and several other West European nations; in February, an exiled Iranian general from the deposed Shah's regime and his brother were killed in Paris. In July, an Air France flight was hijacked from Frankfurt to Tehran, and Iranian-backed groups were implicated in two other hijacking attempts, including the December hijacking of a Kuwaiti Airlines flight in which two Americans were killed. In November 1984, seven Lebanese Shia were arrested near Rome in an apparent plot to attack the US Embassy. Another was arrested in Switzerland as a conspirator.

Libya. The great majority of attacks by Libyan agents against Libyan exiles have occurred in Western Europe—in the United Kingdom, Italy, Cyprus, Greece, Austria, and West Germany. In early March 1984 in the United Kingdom, 30 persons-mostly non-Libyanswere injured by four bombs detonated near homes of Libyan exiles or businesses frequented by them. Nine suspected Libyan agents were arrested. Despite British warnings against further violence, on 17 April gunmen in the Libyan People's Bureau in London opened fire on a peaceful anti-Qadhafi demonstration outside their building. A British policewoman was killed and 11 demonstrators were wounded. Three days later, a bomb believed to be Libyan planted injured 25 passers-by at London's Heathrow Airport. After Britain lay siege to the People's Bureau in London, Qadhafi responded by detaining a number of British nationals on trumped-up charges. The incidents prompted London to break relations.

Syria. The anti-Jordanian campaign expanded to Europe last November with the attempted shooting of a Jordanian diplomat in Athens. The following month, the deputy chief of the Jordanian mission was murdered in Bucharest. A Palestinian student was arrested for the crime, later claimed by anonymous phone callers in the name of "Black September," a name associated with a

number of notorious terrorist events in the early 1970s. Syrian-backed radical Palestinian groups probably have resurrected the name, both as a cover and for the publicity it garners.

Palestinians. The intra-Palestinian dispute has also spilled over into Europe. At least three Palestinians were gunned down in 1984, including an officer of a Palestinian splinter group, who was killed by his own faction after defecting to the pro-Arafat forces in Cyprus last May, and Ismail Darwish, a leading pro-Arafat figure gunned down in Rome in December 1984. The Abu Nidal Group apparently was responsible for the December attack.

Although currently based in Syria and in Syrian-controlled Lebanese territory, the Abu Nidal Group is believed to be a semi-independent actor in the Middle Eastern morass. As the most experienced, lethal arm of Palestinian terrorism, it has a long record of attacking officials of moderate Arab governments, as well as Palestinian groups, and has mounted attacks in more than 25 countries—usually with Syrian foreknowledge, if not complicity.

The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction. By mid-1984 the Marxist-Leninist LARF had become one of the most lethal organizations operating in Western Europe. Between 1981 and 1984 the LARF was responsible for at least six attacks against US and Israeli diplomats in France, in which four persons were killed and four wounded. The group also claimed credit for the February 1984 assassination in Rome of US citizen Leamon Hunt, Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai—an act for which the Italian Red Brigades also claimed credit.

In early August 1984, however, Italian police set in motion a series of significant counterterrorism successes against the group. They arrested a man identified as Abdallah Mohammad al-Mansuri, who was in possession of some 8 kilograms of plastic explosives. Mansuri's arrest led to the October arrest in France of George Ibrahim Abdallah, the leader of the group. Then, in December, Italian police apprehended a third LARF member, Josephine Abdu, as she was transiting the Rome airport en route to Madrid. Following these arrests, other members of the LARF returned to their native Lebanon, effectively ending the activity of the LARF in Europe.

Firemen battle blaze after explosion on NATO pipeline, 11 December 1984.



Most of the terrorists operating in Western Europe are indigenous in origin and are either leftwing extremists or separatists. Foreigners, however, particularly from the Middle East, foment an ever-increasing number of terrorist attacks in Western Europe. More than one-fourth of the incidents in Europe in 1984 were perpetrated by citizens of the Middle East, most frequently Palestinians and Libyans.

Leftwing terrorist groups in France and West Germany rebounded from government counterterrorism successes and demonstrated violently in 1984 that predictions of their imminent demise had been premature. Established leftist groups in Spain, Portugal, and Greece continued their terrorist campaigns, while a new group surfaced in Belgium, a country hitherto relatively free from terrorism. There were disturbing indications that leftwing terrorists of several nationalities were beginning to cooperate and perhaps even coordinate their attacks.


Spanish Basque separatists suffered severe blows at the hands of the governments with which they have been warring but demonstrated their staying power by continuing to engage in terrorist acts. Armenian and Irish terrorism also continued, although at a lower level than in previous years.

Leftwing Terrorism: The Nascent "Euroterrorist Alliance." In France, in mid-1984 the leftwing extremist group Action Directe (AD) deviated from its traditional targeting of French Government facilities by conducting a

number of bombings against targets that it declared to be involved with NATO and the Western defense effort. Among them were the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs and the European Space Agency. An attempt to bomb the Western European Union failed because of a defective detonator. Two more AD bombings against defense-related industrial firms followed in October.

In Belgium, a new leftwing extremist group, the Communist Combatant Cells, announced its arrival in October 1984, with a number of bombings in Brussels against facilities of Litton Data Systems, the West German truck manufacturer MAN, and Honeywell-Europe. In communiques claiming credit for the actions, the CCC linked the targets to NATO and particularly to the deployment of cruise missiles in Western Europe. Subsequently, the CCC also carried out two attacks on Belgian political party offices, alleged to be part of the support structure for NATO "imperialism." The following month, the CCC bombed an antenna tower and a communications station at Bierset Military Airfield near Liege, where aircraft assigned to NATO are based. Finally, in December, the group conducted a half-dozen attacks against the pipeline bringing fuel from West Germany for NATO forces.

Two rockets of a bazooka were pointed at the US Embassy in Lisbon on 27 October 1984.



In West Germany, the Red Army Faction suffered a temporary setback in July 1984 when West German authorities arrested six members in a Frankfurt apartment and seized a large quantity of material that allowed police to piece together the RAF's strategic plan. Nevertheless, on 4 December, the opening day of their trial, leading RAF members Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Christian Klar announced the beginning of a hunger strike by RAF prisoners in support of demands for political prisoner status. Shortly thereafter, a violent phase began. On 17 December, RAF supporters firebombed a Siemens Company warehouse in Frankfurt. The next day, the RAF hard core attempted a spectacular attack: a man dressed in a US Marine Corps uniform parked a car rigged with explosives on the grounds of the NATO officers training school in Oberammergau, and then ran off. Only a faulty timing mechanism prevented a potentially devastating explosion. By the end of December, members of the RAF hard core, along with supporters and sympathizers, had conducted about a dozen incidents of violence in West Germany, including an incendiary attack against the residence of the US Consul General in Frankfurt and the bombing of a French Embassy Annex in Bonn-Bad Godesberg.

The timing of the attacks in France, Belgium, and West Germany and the similarity of the targets suggest that the three principal groups of "Euroterrorists" were collaborating in a campaign that has continued into the new year. Furthermore:

- Examination of the RAF's Oberammergau device revealed that it contained explosives stolen in June 1984 from a Belgian quarry. Explosive devices used in separate bombing attempts in France and West Germany were found to have used this material.
- The CCC indicated that its attack on a communications antenna at Bierset Airfield was in commemoration of the 1981 bombing by the RAF of facilities at the US airbase in Ramstein, West Germany.

Other Leftwing Terrorism. In Portugal, the Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) was temporarily disabled following an extensive police crackdown in mid-1984 that resulted in the arrest of several dozen members, including the group's political leaders. Within a few months, however, FP-25 rebounded with a round of terrorist attacks against landowners, business leaders, and government interests. In October 1984, it began to attack foreign targets for the first time since 1981, lashing out at French business targets to demonstrate solidarity with the Spanish separatist group ETA. The FP-25 then conducted several operations against US and NATO interests in Portugal. On 27 October, for example, it attempted to launch two rocket grenades against the US Embassy, but both misfired. A month later, the group fired mortar rounds at the Embassy compound. In claiming

responsibility for this action, FP-25 condemned alleged US involvement in suppressing the 1975 coup attempt and demanded that Portugal withdraw from NATO. On 9 December, the group emphasized the seriousness of its intentions by firing mortar shells at NATO's Iberian head-quarters in Oeiras. These attacks caused only slight damage and no injuries.

In **Spain**, the October First Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) continued to conduct sporadic attacks against government, military, and business targets, as well as against interests of foreign countries it considers "imperialistic." GRAPO also conducted some attacks against French businesses in Spain to show support for the ETA and to protest a French crackdown on ETA operations and personnel in southern France. In 1984, the group was responsible for a number of bank robberies; it also launched an extortion campaign to raise funds.

In *Italy*, the Red Brigades—torn by a serious factional struggle and weakened by government counterterrorist successes of previous years—did not participate in the anti-NATO campaign, despite their known "anti-imperialist" and anti-NATO sentiments. However, in addition to the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction they did claim responsibility for the murder in Rome of Leamon Hunt, US head of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai.

In **Greece**, the virulently anti-US Revolutionary Organization 17 November shot and wounded a US Army master sergeant in Athens in April 1984. This group killed a US Navy captain the previous November and a US Embassy official in Athens nine years earlier. Following the April assassination attempt, the group pledged to continue its attacks against US military personnel in Greece, but the threat did not materialize during the remainder of the year. In fact, most of the significant terrorist attacks that occurred in Greece in 1984 were Middle Eastern in origin.

Separatist Terrorism. Of the **Armenian** groups, the leftist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) —previously extremely active in Western Europe—was relatively inactive there in 1984, although it did conduct some attacks in the Middle East. The group's relative quietude was probably a result of serious internal division over the use of indiscriminate violence. Meanwhile,

the rightist Armenian group—the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) —conducted several major attacks last year. In June 1984 in Vienna, for example, an ARA car bomb killed the Turkish labor attache and injured five other persons.

In *Spain*, the ETA suffered a series of stiff blows in 1984. Tougher antiterrorism laws were proposed and counterterrorism forces were bolstered, permitting Spanish authorities to adopt more aggressive tactics within the country. Further, in response to continuing Spanish diplomatic pressure, French security forces began arresting accused Basque terrorists, who had long enjoyed sanctuary in southern France and who were believed to be using the region to stage terrorist operations into Spain. Some were forcibly resettled in northern France, others were deported.

Not the least of ETA's problems in France was the activity of the Antiterrorist Liberation Group, which surfaced in December 1983 with a number of attacks on ETA members in France.⁵ In 1984 GAL attackers killed eight persons accused of being members or supporters of ETA and wounded at least 23 others. Anonymous spokesmen explicitly identified most of these attacks as retaliation for specific ETA attacks against Spanish officials and police.

In *Northern Ireland*, 1984 produced the fewest casualties of any year in the 15-year terrorist struggle. Undoubtedly this was in part a consequence of the "supergrass" program, by which the government has offered immunity to terrorists who turn state's evidence. Nevertheless, on 12 October the Provisional Irish Republican Army came very close to pulling off one of the most spectacular terrorist attacks in its history by bombing the hotel housing Prime Minister Thatcher and her Cabinet while they were attending the Conservative Party conference in Brighton. Although Mrs. Thatcher and most of the members of the Cabinet escaped injury, four persons—including a member of Parliament—were killed, and more than 30 others were wounded.

⁴ In the past, expatriate Italian terrorists in France have been connected with Action Directe, and it is possible that some Italians were involved in the anti-NATO campaign as AD members.

⁶ Because both the GAL attacks in France and the ETA responses in Spain cut across national boundaries, they were included in our count of international incidents. They were, in fact, a leading cause of the recorded increase in international terrorist incidents in Western Europe in 1984.

⁶ "Grass," short for "snake in the grass," is the London underworld term for informer; thus, a supergrass is an informer who turns in a large number of people.



Aftermath of Provisional Irish Republican Army bombing of the Grand Hotel on 12 October 1984.

Latin America

The pattern and level of terrorism and other forms of political violence in Latin America in 1984 resembled those of recent years. Terrorism continued to be an indigenous problem—usually springing from a local insurgency. In El Salvador, the leftwing insurgency persisted in using terrorism, as did insurgents in Peru. In Colombia, there was a temporary respite from terrorism after most of the Communist insurgent groups signed truces with the government. Leftwing urban terrorist groups were active last year in Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and El Salvador. Rightwing terrorist groups were also active in a number of countries, including Chile and El Salvador. Anti-US terrorism comprised nearly half of all

the international terrorist activity in Latin America in 1984, yet only a small portion of the total number of incidents of political violence in the region.

El Salvador. The death toll from political violence was much lower in 1984 than in previous years.

Most leftwing Salvadoran insurgent groups belong to an umbrella organization called the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The FMLN, which fields thousands of armed combatants, has received ideological and materiel support from Cuba and Nicaragua, where many insurgent leaders are based. Although FMLN querrilla groups have engaged mainly in paramilitary conflict with the Salvadoran Army, they have also conducted kidnapings, sabotage, and other terrorist actions, and most of them have "metropolitan" components to carry the conflict to the cities. In the spring of 1984, for example, the Mardoqueo Cruz Urban Commando Group, a part of the FMLN's Central American Revolutionary Worker's Party, began to conduct terrorist operations in the San Salvador area—mainly against transportation and communication facilities.

One of the most dangerous of the leftwing urban guerrilla groups was the Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front (CERF). The CERF, apparently a dissident faction of the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces, came to public attention in mid-1983 when it murdered US Navy Lieutenant Commander Schaufelberger. In 1984, CERF operatives murdered at least two Salvadoran employees of the US Embassy, and in November raked the US Embassy with machinegun fire.

Rightwing terrorism was reduced in 1984, probably, at least in part, because of Salvadoran Government efforts—in response to warnings from Washington—to make violent rightists more accountable for their actions. Nevertheless, rightwing violence—carried out by a variety of extremist elements, including political parties, rural vigilantes, and military factions—persisted in El Salvador. Most of these rightwing terrorists appear not to be affiliated with specific organizations but rather with ad hoc groups formed for specific missions.

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Middle East	Sub- Saharan Africa	Asia/ Pacific	Total
Total	5	81	232	1	205	45	28	597
Armed attack	1	18	41	1	62	12	4	139
Armed occupation and barricade			2					2
Arson		3	39		14		1	57
Bombing	3	47	124		103	13	12	302
Hostagetaking and barricade		4			1		1	6
Kidnaping		5	. 2		16	17	6	46
Skyjacking		1	2		4		2	10
Other	1	3	22		5	2	2	35

Peru. The Sendero Luminoso (SL) or Shining Path, a brutal Maoist insurgent group composed mainly of Andean Indians, has operated with near impunity in Ayacucho Department in south-central Peru since 1980. Unique in its insularity, the SL has continued to refuse assistance from all foreign governments. Throughout 1984 SL guerrillas were implicated in the slaughter of uncooperative peasants and the murder of village officials who collaborated with the government. In addition, the group bombed electoral offices and government buildings. It was also responsible for periodic electrical blackouts in Lima last year.

A lesser terrorist threat came from the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru, a group of leftwing activists in the Lima and Cusco areas. The group surfaced in September 1984, when it claimed responsibility for minor terrorist attacks that had been occurring in Lima since 1983, including a bomb explosion outside the residence of the US Marine security guard detachment in November 1983.

Chile. A large proportion of the bombings that occurred in 1984 were conducted by the radical leftist Manuel Rodriquez Patriotic Front and were directed at Chilean targets—mainly public utilities and police and security facilities. On 2 November, for example, a national police unit near Valparaiso was hit by a bomb that killed four carabineros and injured 12. Mormon churches and US

businesses were also bombed. The steady growth of leftist terrorism throughout the year contributed to the decision by the Pinochet regime to declare a state of siege in November; it remained in effect for seven months.

The imposition of the state of siege was a factor in the continuing occurrence of rightwing terrorism in Chile. It resulted in numerous violations of internationally recognized human rights practices, primarily by the security services, which, throughout 1984, were implicated in instances of brutality, torture, and the mysterious deaths of suspects.

Colombia. The Colombian Government signed a cease-fire agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) —the largest of the four major insurgent groups—in 1984. The FARC promised to refrain from conducting terrorist attacks in return both for permission to organize politically and for government pledges to institute political and agrarian reforms. Similar truce agreements were subsequently concluded with the guerrilla organization 19th of April Movement and the People's Liberation Army. The National Liberation Army (ELN), a fourth group, refused, however, to deal with the government.

Despite the refusal of the ELN and dissident rebels associated with newer groups, such as the Ricardo Franco Front, to conclude cease-fire agreements, there was a continuing decline in the number of armed confrontations between insurgent forces and government troops in 1984. Nevertheless, a number of bombings occurred in Bogota throughout the year—mainly against government and military installations.

Ecuador. A new subversive, leftist group calling itself Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC) appeared in Ecuador in 1983 and became increasingly active in 1984. The AVC espouses many of the standard antioligarchy, anti-US, and "anti-imperialist" views held by radical leftist groups in many Latin American countries. In 1984, most AVC operations were bloodless and geared to obtaining media attention rather than to causing damage per se. One such incident occurred when a leaflet bomb was thrown into the US Embassy compound in Quito.

Role of Nicaragua. Nicaragua furthers its objectives of preserving its revolutionary gains and destabilizing non-Marxist regimes in the area by promoting and supporting subversive activities throughout Central America. Members of many current and former subversive and terrorist organizations—including Palestinian groups, the Argentine Montoneros, the Uruguayan Tupamaros, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Spanish Basque ETA—are resident in Nicaragua.

Beyond hosting these groups, the Sandinista regime also provides advice, training, and safehaven and channels arms and ammunition to members of various Latin American insurgent groups that engage in terrorist acts. The Salvadoran FMLN insurgent forces have been the primary recipient of Nicaraguan aid: FMLN political leaders are based in Nicaragua, where they maintain contact with other foreign supporters.

Role of Cuba. The Castro regime maintains a large and complex subversion support apparatus that provides backing for all types of leftist revolutionaries and terrorists. This support includes everything from guns and funding to asylum and training in the entire range of skills needed by terrorists. Cuba has trained a large number of insurgents from El Salvador, as well as many of the guerrillas infiltrated into Honduras in recent years.

Sub-Saharan Africa

International terrorism was not a serious problem in most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1984. The number of international terrorist incidents did increase, however, due to the apparent decision by insurgent groups in several countries to target foreign missionaries, aid workers, and employees of multinational corporations. The United States was not a priority target in these cases; the few US casualties from terrorism in Africa in 1984 were incidental to local conflicts. Indigenous terrorism continues to be largely the byproduct of ongoing insurgencies, which find civilian targets easy to attack.

Libyan Activity. Terrorism in Central Africa last year was due primarily to increased Libyan activity. Tripoli provided arms, training, and money to insurgents in a number of African nations and encouraged some of them to conduct terrorist attacks:

- In Sudan, the pro-Western government, then headed by Gaafar Nimeiri, was the primary target of Libyan-sponsored activity. Qadhafi also backed violence by Sudanese dissidents in their homeland because of Sudanese support for Libyan exiles.
- In Chad, President Habre was the intended victim of a Libyan-directed assassination plot aimed at facilitating Tripoli's goal of installing a pro-Qadhafi government in N'Djamena. Chadian dissidents, backed by Libya, targeted establishments frequented by French forces elsewhere in Central Africa as Qadhafi hoped to dissuade the French from interfering with his goal.

In conjunction with its campaign to replace French influence in Chad, Libya has also backed local and foreign terrorists in the *Central African Republic* and *Zaire*.

South Africa. The black nationalist African National Congress (ANC) mounted more than three dozen terrorist attacks in 1984. The ANC's primary tactic is bombing, usually of government offices, transportation lines, electrical power transformers, and other infrastructural facilities. It designs its operations to maximize their symbolic effect and normally has tried to avoid causing indiscriminate casualties.

The ANC has operated from exile since the mid-1960s. South Africa's military and economic prowess in the region, however, has increasingly discouraged neighboring black states from openly supporting the ANC's terrorist campaign. Mozambique expelled most ANC guerrillas in early 1984 after signing a nonaggression pact with Pretoria. Maputo had been the planning and staging center for most ANC attacks against South Africa. The ANC has subsequently built up a clandestine support network in Botswana, despite that country's vigorous efforts to circumscribe the group's activities.

Unlike most African groups, the ANC has conducted some of its attacks outside the borders of its own country. In December 1984 in Swaziland, for example, ANC operatives assassinated a high-level police officer who they believed was collaborating with the South Africans.

Sudan. Terrorism in Sudan arises primarily from a guerrilla war. The Libyan-supported Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), a powerful force in the south, concentrates on military targets, but civilians have been victims of its operations. In December 1984, for example, the SPLA sank a steamer in the Nile to block water traffic and cut off a Sudanese military supply line. Subsequently, the SPLA killed some of the many civilian passengers it had taken hostage. The SPLA last year also deliberately targeted foreigners—usually Westerners—more often than in earlier years.

Namibia. The South-West Africa People's Organization constitutes the main organized, indigenous opposition to South African plans to retain control over Namibia. Most of its bombings are directed against indigenous targets, such as government offices, stores, and service stations. In contrast to previous years, when most of its bombs were set to go off in unoccupied buildings at night, in 1984 SWAPO exploded a number of antipersonnel bombs in crowded stores in the middle of the day. SWAPO does not deliberately target foreigners, but sometimes foreigners become incidental casualties. In April 1984, for example, two US diplomats were killed when a SWAPO bomb exploded at the service station where they happened to be buying gas.

Mozambique. The insurgent group in Mozambique— RENAMO—is composed mainly of minority tribal and political elements not represented in the government. With the signing of the Nkomati Accord in March 1984, South Africa and Mozambique agreed to end support for one another's dissidents. RENAMO's terrorist capability remained surprisingly intact throughout 1984, however, despite the cessation of South African support. Unlike other African insurgent groups, RENAMO appears to go out of its way to cause casualties among noncombatants. Among its favored tactics are ambushes of civilian vehicles and public transportation. Consequently, foreigners and Mozambican civilians alike are in danger of being abducted, injured, or even killed. RENAMO is believed to target Communist Bloc technicians specifically, however, in hopes of forcing those countries to reduce or halt their aid programs in Mozambique.

Angola. Angola is the site of a longstanding and increasingly virulent insurgency. Supported by the South African Government and by sympathizers in a number of Western countries, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has continued to wage war against the Marxist-leaning government, which is in turn supported by the Soviet Union and its allies, especially Cuba. In attempting to expand its control beyond the southern third of the country over which it has long held sway, UNITA Insurgent forces continued to mount attacks against government military forces.

Occasionally—and with increasing frequency in 1984—UNITA's tactics have verged on terrorism. After separate attacks against the mining town of Cafunfo in February and December 1984, for example, UNITA took a total of 98 foreigners hostage. Generally UNITA did its Western hostages no harm. Most were marched to a rebel stronghold in another part of the country and eventually released to the International Red Cross or another intermediary. UNITA has deliberately attacked foreign targets—especially Eastern Bloc technicians and advisers—in hopes of intimidating their home governments into reducing aid to the government.

Asia

Insurgents or ethnic groups with grievances against their own governments accounted for the major share of terrorist violence in Asia last year; outside agitators were largely absent. US citizens and facilities faced only a few threats in the region as a whole.

Japan. The most serious continuing threat to Americans in Asia came in Japan at the hands of the leftist terrorist group Chukaku-ha or Nucleus Faction, a group that has been in existence since 1963. Chukaku-ha numbers perhaps 150 terrorists but claims to have thousands of supporters. It has long opposed the construction (and now expansion) of Narita Airport, the "militarization" of Japan, the US-Japanese security relationship, the presence of US bases, and visits by US nuclear-powered ships.

Before 1984 the group limited its activity to minor fire-bombings of empty offices and construction sites. Since then, however, it has used a more lethal weapon: a truck-mounted flamethrower figured in a half-dozen Chukaku-ha attacks last year. One of those, a September attack against the Tokyo headquarters of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, resulted in more than \$2 million in damage. Chukaku-ha has yet to use the truck device against US facilities, but in June 1984 the group caused minor damage to two US military communications sites using conventional firebombs. US targets are likely to remain high on the group's list.

Philippines. Insurgents in the Philippines continued to engage sporadically in terrorism in 1984. The New People's Army (NPA) of the Communist Party of the Philippines regularly attacked military and police forces and extorted funds from businessmen. Philippine authorities have suspected that the NPA was responsible for several urban terrorist attacks, but the group has not attacked US targets since the early 1970s. The Moro National Liberation Front, a Muslim separatist group, has been holding three foreigners—one a US citizen—hostage in the Philippines since late 1984.

Sri Lanka. The bloodiest campaign of terrorism in Asia in 1984 was conducted by separatist Tamil insurgents against the Sinhalese central government in Sri Lanka. In 1984, for the first time, Sri Lankan Tamil groups attacked US targets:


- In May, the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front kidnaped a US AID employee and his wife. Following appeals from Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the couple was released unharmed five days later.
- In June, unidentified Tamils set off a bomb in the downtown Colombo hotel that housed the Israeli Interests Section of the US Embassy. Later that month, other

Tamils attempted to bribe a Tamil guard to take a package, suspected of being a bomb, into the AID offices

India. India was the scene of most of the other serious terrorist activity in Asia—the worst incident occurring on 31 October when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards. The subsequent killing of some 2,000 Sikhs in retaliatory rioting appeared to dampen, at least temporarily, the willingness of Sikh extremists to continue to engage in terrorism.

The threat from indigenous terrorist groups to foreigners in India last year was relatively low. Nevertheless, on 27 November in Bombay, the deputy British high commissioner was shot to death by two attackers as he was being driven to work. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims claimed credit. There is no evidence that US personnel in the country were targeted last year.

Role of North Korea. P'yongyang almost certainly continues to provide training, funds, and weapons to various foreign extremist groups, although we did not record any North Korean—sponsored terrorist incidents in 1984. North Korea continues to seek weapons on the gray arms market, which are probably intended for use by North Korean agents, saboteurs, and infiltrators. In addition, P'yongyang sells large quantities of ordnance to Iran, a country supporting international terrorism. There is no evidence to date, however, that these weapons are acquired and used by those who engage in terrorism.



Appendix A

Chronology of Significant Terrorist Events in 1984

2 January	Spain In Madrid, October First Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) claimed responsibility for the murder of two policemen. The killings were in retaliation for the death of GRAPO's leader, who had been killed by police in a gun battle in Barcelona in December.
9 J a nuary	Northern Ireland Two Royal Ulster Constabulary officers were injured when a remote-controlled bomb exploded in Londonderry. Although no group claimed responsibility, police believed the Provisional Irish Republican Army was responsible.
8 February	West Germany The Revolutionary Cells claimed responsibility for a bombing at the Turkish Consulate in Cologne. The bombing shattered windows and caused other damage, but no injuries.
11 February	Lebanon Frank Regier, a US professor at American University of Beirut, was kidnaped at gunpoint while walking along a Beirut street.
15 February	Italy Leamon Hunt, US head of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, was shot to death in Rome. The Italian Red Brigades and the Lebanese Armed Revolution- ary Faction have claimed responsibility.
7 March	Lebanon US journalist Jeremy Levin was kidnaped in West Beirut. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.
10 March	Central African Republic A bomb exploded aboard a French airliner in N'Djamena, Chad, injuring 28 passengers.
16 March	Lebanon US Embassy Political Officer William Buckley was kidnaped in West Beirut by Islamic Jihad.

Sudan

A Libyan TU-22 bomber dropped bombs on Omdurman, Sudan, site of a radio transmitter used by anti-Qadhafi dissidents.

26 March

France

US Consul General Robert Homme was shot and wounded in Strasbourg by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction.

28 March

Greece

British diplomat Kenneth Whitty and a Greek employee of the British Council were both killed when an assassin fired shots into the diplomat's car. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims claimed credit.

30 March

Chile

A bus carrying 25 national policemen in Santiago was badly damaged by a remote-controlled shrapnel bomb. One policeman was killed, and 11 policemen and four bystanders were injured. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front claimed responsibility for the attack. The incident marks the first use of such a device in bombing incidents in Chile.

3 April

Greece

US Army M. Sgt. Robert Judd was shot and wounded by two men on a motorcycle. The Revolutionary Organization 17 November claimed responsibility for the murder attempt.

15 April

Namibia

Two US diplomats, monitoring the disengagement of Angolan and South African troops from Namibia, and two local residents were killed and four injured in a gas station explosion. The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) had targeted this station in the past and was blamed for the attack. The SWAPO, however, denied responsibility.

17 April

United Kingdom

A British policewoman was killed, and 11 anti-Qadhafi demonstrators wounded by gunfire from the London Libyan People's Bureau. After a siege, British authorities found weapons and spent shell casings in the vacated embassy.

3 May Cyprus

A lone gunman shot and killed a Palestinian journalist and wounded his secretary as they drove along a city street.

No one claimed credit.

8 May Lebanon

US clergyman Benjamin Weir was kidnaped in Beirut.

Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

11 May Sri Lanka

A US AID contract employee and his wife were kidnaped by members of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Front.

They were released unharmed five days later.

22 May Colombia

The Ricardo Franco Front of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia claimed responsibility for bombings at the US Embassy, the Ambassador's residence, a binational center, two IBM installations, and the ITT offices in Bogota, as well as the binational center and a Texaco

warehouse in Cali. No injuries were reported.

30 May Nicaragua

Anti-Sandinista leader Eden Pastora was wounded by an assassin's bomb at a Contra base camp. The blast killed five and wounded some 30 persons. No group claimed

responsibility for the attack.

20 June Austria

A car bomb killed the Turkish labor attache and seriously injured other persons. The Armenian Revolutionary Army

claimed responsibility.

July Red Sea

Libya mined the Red Sea, damaging more than 18 merchant ships registered to various countries.

12 July France

Action Directe began a terrorist offensive by bombing the

Atlantic Institute.

17 July Peru

Shining Path terrorists conducted coordinated bombing attacks against high-tension towers, Peru's main hydroelectric plant, and commercial targets. The group also bombed the Lima offices of the Soviet airline Aeroflot, the Novosti News Agency, and the Soviet-Peruvian Cultural

Institute in Arequipa.

31 July

Iran

Three Arab hijackers diverted an Air France flight from Frankfurt to Tehran. The hijackers released the passengers unharmed and surrendered to Iranian authorities on 2 August.

2 August

India

A bomb exploded at the Madras airport in southern India, leaving at least 29 dead and more than 30 wounded. Sri Lanka separatists of the Tamil Eelam Army were probably responsible. The bomb was probably meant to be loaded aboard an Air Lanka flight to the capital that left Madras about two hours before the blast.

France

Action Directe bombed the European Space Agency.

22 August

France

Action Directe attempted a car bomb attack outside the Western European Union building in Paris.

24 August

India

Sikhs hijacked an Indian airliner to Lahore. They demanded to be allowed to go on to the United States, but later gave up after protracted negotiations in Dubayy.

11 September

Spain

In Madrid, two gunmen carrying Lebanese passports wounded a Libyan Embassy employee. In Beirut, an anonymous telephone caller told a foreign news agency that the Lebanese Shia group Musa Sadr Brigade was responsible. Another caller in London claimed credit in the name of the little-known Libyan exile group Al Burkan (Volcano).

20 September

Lebanon

A car bomb exploded at the main entrance of the US Embassy Annex in East Beirut. Fourteen persons were killed—including two US persons. As many as 70 other persons—including 20 US citizens, among them Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew—were injured. An anonymous caller claimed credit in the name of Islamic Jihad.

2-8 October

Belgium

The Communist Combatant Cells conducted three bombings against firms it claimed were associated with INF deployment: Litton Data Systems, the West German truck manufacturer MAN, and Honeywell-Europe.

12 October

United Kingdom

In Brighton, Prime Minister Thatcher escaped injury when a bomb planted by the Provisional Irish Republican Army exploded at her hotel, killing at least four persons and injuring 34.

29 October

Portugal

In Lisbon, two rocket-propelled grenades mounted on improvised launchers and aimed at the new US Embassy were discovered in a field about 65 meters away. They had failed to fire because of a malfunction.

31 October

India

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was shot to death by two Sikh members of her security force. One of the two attackers was killed and the other seriously wounded by other guards.

17 November

Egypt

President Mubarak announced that four assassins sent to Egypt by Libya to kill former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush had been arrested and forced to send fake pictures to the Libyan Embassy in Malta showing Bakoush apparently dead. Official Libyan press sources then claimed Bakoush had been executed by suicide squads sent abroad "to liquidate enemies of the revolution."

El Salvador

A Salvadoran guard of the US Embassy was fatally shot while walking along a city street near the Embassy. The Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front claimed credit.

20 November

Philippines

The Moro National Liberation Front claimed responsibility for the kidnaping in Jolo of John Rabinow, an American expatriate.

25 November

Portugal

In Lisbon the US Embassy was hit by four 60-mm mortar rounds fired by the Popular Forces of 25 April on the ninth anniversary of the abortive leftwing coup against the Portuguese democratic government installed after the revolution in 1974. There were no injuries, and damage was slight.

26 November

Belgium

At Beirset Military Airfield near Liege, two bombs damaged an antenna tower and a communications station. The Communist Combatant Cells claimed credit.

27 November

India

The deputy British high commissioner was shot to death as he was being driven to work. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims claimed credit.

30 November

Lebanon

American University of Beirut librarian Peter Kilburn, an American, was kidnaped in West Beirut by Islamic Jihad.

4 December

Kuwait

A Kuwaiti Airlines jet bound for Karachi was hijacked to Tehran. The hijackers demanded that Kuwait release the prisoners convicted for December 1983 bombings there. On 9 December the Iranian news agency IRNA reported that Iranian security forces had "stormed" the plane. Two US AID employees were killed before the incident came to an end.

6 December

Mozambique

Seven East Germans and one Yugoslav, along with five Mozambicans, were killed and two East Germans were wounded in an attack in Niassa Province. RENAMO. which often targets foreign agricultural and technical advisers to the Mozambican Government, is believed

responsible.

9 December

Portugal

Members of the Popular Forces of 25 April claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on NATO's Iberian

headquarters in Oeiras.

11 December

Belgium

Six bombs were detonated on the NATO pipeline by the Communist Combatant Cells.

18 December

West Germany

The Red Army Faction attempted a bombing of the NATO officers school in Oberammergau.

Appendix B International Terrorist Incidents, 1984

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Collections

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Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
Interviewed on ABC-TV "This Week With David Brinkley"
by Mr. David Brinkley, ABC News
Mr. George F. Will, ABC News Analyst
Mr. Sam Donaldson, ABC News
Sunday, January 12, 1985

BRINKLEY: You've heard our two previous guests. Mr. Townsend in London said that he didn't think sanctions against Qaddafi would work. Instead, we should wait for the King Hussein peace initiative to get at the real problems in the Middle East, and so on. Does that make any sense to you?

A: Well, we need to get the peace initiative in the Mid-East, the President has been working on that and hoping to get support that since, I think, October of 1982. That's as vital now as it ever was then, but that is not an excuse for not doing anything about the terrorism or about the acts that Libya has been involved in.

BRINKLEY: Since we began hearing and talking about King Hussein's peace initiative -- I don't have a figure here -- but a great number of Americans have been killed in airports and other kinds of terorists acts. So how long are we willing to wait?

A: Well, we aren't willing to wait, and we haven't been waiting. We've been taking, I think, some very important steps. We've had a number of things that we have done and been prepared to do. We've vastly increased our intelligence and have been able to thwart, as the President said the other night, over 120 other kinds of terrorist acs that could have taken, many, many more lives. These are suicide missions — the people involved in them who have done them, have for the most part been killed in them or are in the hospital now or are in jail, as they are in Italy. So there are actions being taken.

I suppost the most effective thing you can do is to improve your intelligence so you know when they're going to happen to the greatest extent you can, and take preemptive action. That we have done, but we haven't finished, nor have we completed any — nor is this whole episods over. We continually work on it, and we're continually working on this one. I think we have had some reasonably good response from some of our allies about the economic sanctions. We have to do what we think is right. The President said that the other night and I think that was the best thing to come out of the news conference.

DONALDSON: Mrs. Thatcher told western reporters that you have to use legal means, and that sanctions were not a legal means against Qaddafi. Do you agree?

A: No, I think they're a legal means, and I think we're applying them legally. I think we're entitled to do this in defense of American citizens, and I think we're entitled to act on the evidence we have. So yes, I think they're legal.

DONALDSON: Is your view then that Mrs. Thatcher is simply putting Britain's economic interest shead of the fight against terrorism?

A: No, they have their own reasons. They have a great many Britians in Libya, they have a lot of trade with them. We have about 1,000 Americans there, we have some trade. But each country has to do what it thinks is right.

DONALDSON: Well, that's economic interests, is it not?

A: We think what is right is to impose sanctions as a step toward convincing Libya that this kind of behavior doesn't pay.

DONALDSON: You just outlined Britain's economic interest.
A: Britain has economic interests...

DONALDSON: That's why Mrs. Thatcher doesn't want to impose sanctions. A: Not Necessarily.

DONALDSON: What are the other reasons as you see them?

A: Well, because they're worried about retaliation on their own British citizens who are living in Libya.

DONALDSON: Well, aren't we worried about retaliation...

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A: We certainly are. The President has said many times that those citizens should get out of Libya; the second warning they've had. We will assist them to get out. But we have to do what we think is right. We have to try to persuade others to help us, and we're doing both...

DONALDSON: Are they coming out, the American nationals? What are the figures as you have them?

A: I have not seen any recent figures. We have about 1,000-1,100 still in, and many of them want to stay. They are virtually Libyans. They have been there for many, mnay years and that's where they want to be. That is their choice. But they should know that it's a very dangerous place to be, a very bad neighborhood. Under our government determination, they should leave.

WILL: You said this episode isn't over. I guess the President said to the European journalists yesterday, that the removal of the Americans there, or at least the instructions for them to leave, would untie our hands. He said at his press conference that he could promise that if the sanctions didn't work there would be other steps. It seems reasonable to suppose that sanctions are not going to work. What can the next steps be? Are you specifically ruling out, as the reports say you particularly have been a voice in ruling out the use of military power?

A: Well, you and I have discussed the value or lack of value of reports as opposed to direct testimony. I think the important thing to bear in mind is what the President said. We have certainly the means, we have the capabilities of doing other things. We have the strong desire to take legal measures and not to reply to terrorist acts with terrorist acts. We want to work in conjunction with our allies. I don't think that we have any reason to conclude that economic sanctions won't do a lot of damage to Libya, and despite the bluff and bluster coming out of Tripoli that they won't cause some realization in Libya that they can't serve as host for this sort of terrorist activity.

WILL: Then this episode is over, pending evidence that Qaddafi changes his behavior?

A: No, I don't think that's the propoer way to phrase it. I think the proper way to phrase it is that the United States is ready and capable to take very strong measures. We have taken strong measuress. We have initially now taken very strong economic measures and we're going to see how those work. But obviously, I'm not going to discuss in any detail any other things that could be done or might be done.

DONALDSON: Well, the White House Press Secretary said the other day, and I think I quote him exactly, "I can assure you that if other attacks are made" and here I paraphrase, against Americans from Qaddafi, the United States will take action. Is that a fair representation of our position?

A: Well, the United States is ready and our forces are much stronger than they were four years ago. We're capable of taking many different kinds of actions, and the determination is the President's. The determination will be made, to the best of my knowledge, on an examination of each of the facts of each of the mituations. Thus far, I think, what we've done has been basically correct and

WILL: In the paper this morning, Mr. Brzezinski, says one criterion for use of force against Libya would be evidence that the Soviet deployments, manned perhaps by Libyans, are compromising the freedom of maneuver of the United States in the Mediterranean. Are they getting close to that threshold?

A: I don't think they are. We have long taken the position, I guess for 100 years and more, that the Mediterranean is international waters, that we're entitled to be there. We have to be there to protect our interests and those of our allies, and we will stay there.

DONALDSON: There's a Kuwaiti report today that an American plane was shot down by a Libyan missile last week. Is that not correct?

A: That's absurd, absolutely absurd. There's nothing to that at all.

DONALDSON: So in othe words, the plane was lost in a storm, I think is...
A: No, we had an exercise, a naval exercise in the Mediterranean, as we do practically every two or three weeks and a plane was lost in that way up off France, off the coast of France.

DONALDSON: In a storm?

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A: Yes, but there was nothing remotely resembling any Libyan action or anything of that kind. Their missiles don't go that far even if they had that degree of accuracy.

BRINKLEY: Mr. Secretary, we put sanctions in Libya, no one else does. Do we wind up isolating Libya or isolating ourselves?

A: I think we hurt Libya quite a bit by these sanctions even if no one else joins. But I do suggest that three or four other countries have either joined or have taken very helpful actions. Canada, Australia, Italy and Britain have said that they will not do anything that undermines the sanction. In other words, they won't rush in with British firms to fill the void left when American firms come out. I think that you'll find a lot of people arguing that if America leaves, Libya can get anything they want from anybody else. The thing that always interests me is why does Libya want a lot of these American things, oil techniques for example, oil skills in extraction and production and marketing of oil. Why do they want this in the first place? They want it in the first place because we have very good techniques and very good capabilities, and when we withdraw those that hurts Libya.

(Break)

BRINKLEY: Mr. Secretary, George (Will) was just saying that Gramm and Rudman of Gramm-Rudman, the bill, which may wind up costing the Defense Department a lot of money in the future, you don't see them as domestic terrorists exactly. How do you see them?

A: No, I don't want to go that far. I do think that very serious damage can be done to the Defense budget by a rigid application of this bill, in the event Congress doesn't act responsibly and pass the President's budget. Let me give you just one example. If we hadn't had the flexibility that we had this year, and this year only under that bill, to exempt military personnel, we would have had to discharge and dismiss from the service over 200,000 people from our force —— right away, within a matter of just weeks. We had that flexibility this year. We don't have it next year.

WILL: Isn't that's about the size of the Marine Corps?

A: It's a very large chunk out of the too small force that we have now, and that would have been required. Now the way to avoid all this is for Congress to a reappositive and adopt the President's bedget it which came the Cross Relation

BRINKLEY: You will certain agree that a deficit as big as ours is harmful, must be dealt with. You do not wish to cut the Defense Department. Where do you think the cuts should come?

A: Well, the President has proposed budgets now for four years that would have enable major deficit reduction to take place and keep Defense with the necessary rearmament program we have to do after we let our defenses go in the '70s and went down some 20 percent during that whole decade. If the Congress would enact these budgets instead of saying they are dead on arrival before they arrive, then I think we would have an opportunity to do what we need to do and that is have the economy expand with the tax cuts that the President has put into effect; regain the necessary strength we need for defense, and at the same time, cut back some of these programs that have simply been in effect far beyond the time when they're needed.

BRINKLEY: Well, Congress in the act of voting for Gramm-Rudman was as good as admitting that it didn't have the courage to do all this.

A: They were, indeed, yes.

WILL: You say if Congress would make thes cuts. If lobsters grew on trees we'd all have lobster this noon.

A: And a good thing It would be for all of us.

WILL: Wonderful. But almost everything in the President's forthcoming budget has been proposed before and emphatically rejected before, except for those things that will be proposed for the first time because everyone knew they'd be laughed out of Congress.

A: Well, you've got to bear in mind that when Congress laughs them out, or when they're emphatically rejected this is not necessarily a right decision. The President, I think, has an obligation and a duty which he fulfilled to tell the Congress how you can make these reductions even though they aren't popular. Bear in mind that defense spending is not very popular, and a lot of these domestic programs that the President urges be cut back, or a lot of these unjustified subsidies that the President urged be stopped, those are very popular things. That doesn't mean that the President should turn his back on what is right and responsible, and he's never done that. I remember in California when he was governor, he would take steps that people said, if you do that, Governor, you will never be reelected governor. I wish that some in the Congress and others would pay attention to the fact that we have to do what is right whether it is popular or not.

WILL: Well, you're taking ethics and other people are talking probabilities. A: Right.

WILL: The probability is that Congress won't do it. Therefore, the President has endorsed a mechanism which if, in all probability it is triggered, will mean the third largest defense cut in history, third only to that after Korea and World War ii. Do you oppose this?

A: Well, the advice and the recommendations and the discussions I have with the President I never discuss. I treat them as confidentially as I did any conversations with clients in the days when I was earning a living. But the point is that none of this need happen. If the Congress will adopt the President's budgets and the President's plans as to how we can have balanced budgets within the time provided by Gramm-Rudman, a modest but necessary increase in defense, and no increase in taxes.

WILL: I understand. Let's just suppose Congress doesn't do this radical departure that your're hoping they will make. Then the President will be faced with the following: he can either accept a tax increase, or he can accept the repeal, in effect, of five years of military buildup. Which do you think he would choose?

A: I think he will appeal to the Congress and the American people not to allow the necessary rearmsment which has brought the Soviets to the negotiating table and enabled us to have summit meetings, and given us the best prospect of arms reduction that we've had in years. I don't think he'll allow that to be dissipated by any of the cuts that Congress is talking about, such as taking 200,000 people out of the force that would be required under this Act.

WILL: To prevent that he would take a tax increase?

A: I think that the President correctly perceives the fact that a tax increase is going to do nothing but harm this economy. You know, we've talked about how dangerous this deficit is. What's happened? You have had an enormous increase in productivity; a big increase in tax revenues despite the cut. You've had unemployment going down; inflation going down and you've had a great many things very good happening to the encomony, largely because the President had the wisdom to insist on a tax cut that unleashed the energies of this encomony.

BRINKLEY: Mr. Secretary, are you saying if we had even bigger deficit business would be even better?

A: No, sir, I'm not. I don't think anybody likes the deficit, but I think that you should not get so preoccupied with the size of the deficit that you assume the threat to our security is going down as the deficit goes up. It doesn't work that way.

DONALDSON: Mr. Secretary, you were once a budget chief. A: Yes.

DONALDSON: You saw the snapshot that the government took yesterday, the Budget Office.

A: Yes.

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DONALDSON: \$220 billion deficit for fiscal '86, not \$194, which would mean triggering Gramm-Rudman in fiscal '87 without the discretionary ability that you pointed out you had for this one year, it would mean the President would have to get \$70 billion out of a budget. If you proposed that he can do it without raising taxes and having a three percent defense increase, not touching social security or certain other trust funds, and paying interest of the antional debt, and then, sir, I say respectfully, you have forgotten how to figure.

A: Well, I don't believe I've forgotten how to figure, and you'll ---

DONALDSON: Now does he do it then?

A: Well, you'll see a presidential budget that comes up February 3rd, I think it is, that takes into consideration all of these points you've made, makes very proper recommendations about selling off a lot of uncessary government assets.

DONALDSON: Including the naval petroleum reverves, you're for that?

A: The necessary ---

DONALDSON: Are you for that, sir?

A: You're assuming someting is in the budget that I'm not going to agree is in the budget. But what I'm revine to any in without aster into anadition of

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all dead on arrival and it's got too many unpopular things in it, I may lose reelection if I vote for it, if Congress would adopt that budget they would find out first of all it's not all that unpopular, and secondly, that you wouldn't have to use Gramm-Rudman at all.

DONALDSON: Okay, let me as you another question. It is said that you want to retire two submarines in order to say within the SALT II limits, but not dismantle them, which in fact would not be within the SALT II framework. Is that correct?

A: Well, I'm interested when you say they say. You're again quoting a lot of reports that haven't been confirmed.

DONALDSON: Well, you dodged George's question previously by saying you discussed with him often the accuracy of reports, I'm asking you directly, is that the case?

A: I'm not able to respond to that question as you very well known, because that involves a discussion...

DONALDSON: Well, then don't blame the reports, sir.

A: Well, I'm certainly am going to at least not blame the reports, but I'm not going to be beguiled into discussing on the air, what I discuss with the President. Those things I think I should keep confidential.

DONALDSON: All right.

A: On the basic subject matter, however, we have to look at the fact that the SALT II treaty did not reduce arms at all. It was the Soviets' kind of treaty that allowed an increase in arms up to the extent that they wanted to make at that time, and the treaty itself expired December 31st, and...

DONALDSON: The President is abiding by it.

A: And we're now considering the various steps that may or may not have to be taken to respond to Soviet violations of that treaty, which took palce repeatedly, and which are going on every day as they deploy now over 40 of that new SS-25 missile.

DONALDSON: Well, are you telling us you believe the President will not continue to abide by it?

A: I'm not making any guesses at all about what the President will do.

DONALDSON: What do you think he's...

A: He's better able to say about that than anybody I know.

DONALDSON: Well, what do you think ...

A: But I maght make recommendations to him based on his requests to me, and those recommendations remain confidential. But 1 have told you my view of the SALT II Treaty.

DONALDSON: Which is that it's not going to be abided by.

A: Which is that it should not have been entered into in the first place.

BRINKLEY: When might we expect the Defense Department to say, okay, folks, we got enough money, we don't need any more? Don't any more increase?

A: The day the Soviets reduce in a verifiable way the armaments that they have that threaten the world and threaten us and our interests all over the world, and reduce them down to a level that's on parity with us and tell us how we will be able to verify that they're keeping promises which unfortunately they have violated time and again in the past. That would be a day I'd look fordward to.

the county we all. While we swait that day, Hr. Secretary, thank

THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM (U)

The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism has completed an in-depth review of our current policies, capabilities, and resources for dealing with the terrorist threat. I have reviewed the Task Force Report and accompanying recommendations and concluded that our strategy is sound. I have determined that we must enhance our ability to confront this threat and to do so without compromising our basic democratic and human values. (U)

Terrorists undertake criminal acts that involve the use or threat of violence against innocent persons. These acts are premeditated, intended to achieve a political objective through coercion or intimidation of an audience beyond the immediate victims. U.S. citizens and installations, especially abroad, are increasingly being targeted for terrorist acts. Our policy, programs and responses must be effective in ameliorating this threat to our people, property and interests. (U)

Policy

U.S. policy on terrorism is unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms whether it is domestic terrorism perpetrated within U.S. territory, or international terrorism conducted inside or outside U.S. territory by foreign nationals or groups. The policy is based upon the conviction that to accede to terrorist demands places more American citizens at risk. This no-concessions policy is the best way of protecting the greatest number of people and ensuring their safety. At the same time, every available resource will be used to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists. (U)

The U.S. Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a potential threat to our national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available. The United States is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts. (U)

States that practice terrorism or actively support it, will not be allowed to do so without consequence. Whenever we have evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take measures to protect our citizens, property, and interests. The USG will pay no ransoms, nor permit releases of prisoners or agree to other conditions that could serve to encourage additional terrorism. We will make no changes in our policy because of The United States is determined to terrorist threats or acts. act against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles. We oppose asylum, sanctuary, or safehaven for terrorists and will make every legal effort to extradite and prosecute terrorists. The USG encourages other governments to take similar strong stands against terrorism.

The National Program

The national program to combat terrorism is designed to provide coordinated action before, during, and after terrorist incidents. Our program includes measures to deter, resolve and, when necessary, respond proportionately to terrorist attacks. The implementation of this strategy requires an organization compatible with the overall structure of the U.S. Government, and relies on the authorities and responsibilities of the various departments and agencies. (U)

The coordination of the Federal response to terrorist incidents will normally be the responsibility of the Lead Agency. The Lead Agency will be that agency with the most direct operational role in and responsibility for dealing with the particular terrorist incident at hand. The Lead Agency will coordinate all operational aspects of the incident, including press and intelligence. The Lead Agency will normally be designated as follows:

- -- The Department of State for international terrorist incidents that take place outside of U.S. territory. (U)
- -- The Department of Justice for terrorist incidents that take place within U.S. territory. Unless otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the FBI will be the Lead Agency within the Department of Justice for operational response to such incidents. (U)
- -- The FAA for aircraft hijackings within the special juris-diction of the United States. (U)

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will resolve any uncertainity on the designation of the Lead Agency or on agency responsibilities. (U)

Press Guidance re Vice President's Task Force Public Report on Combatting Terrorism

Per Ollie, the following is press guidance for use before the NSDD is signed (currently with Pres for signature):

- Q: Would you comment on reports that the President is implementing a recommendation of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism that the NSC's role in coordinating the government response to terrorism should be expanded?
 - -- The Vice President delivered the classified report of the Task Force on Combatting Terrorism to the President on December 20, 1985.
 - -- The public report of the Task Force is currently being prepared and will be released in late February 1986.
 - -- I will defer discussion on the substance of the report until that public report is released.
- FYI: It is felt that incremental discussion of the substance of the public report before its release in February will detract from the impact of that report.

The following is press guidance for use "after" the NSDD is signed:

- -- The Task Force found that the overall government policy and organization to deal with terrorism was sound.
- -- The Task Force recommends that the existing organization, which uses the Lead Agency concept of interagency coordination, be retained.
- -- The Department of State is (and will continue to be) the Lead Agency for coordinating the government's response to terrorist incidents occuring outside U.S. territory.
- The State Department's Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism will continue to chair the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, the principal interagency group for developing government policy for dealing with terrorism.
- -- The National Security Council staff will continue to perform its function of coordinating national security policy and actions.
- -- In order to increase the continuity and coordination ability of the NSC with regard to the "increasing" problem of terrorism, the NSC staff dedicated to combatting terrorism will be increased slightly.
- -- The precise details of this increase have not yet been fully worked out, but to give you an idea of the order of magnitude of the slight increase that is being considered, we are only talking about a couple of staff positions.
- cc: Bill Martin/Bob Pearson/Ed Djerejian/Karna Small

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1985

'An Apologist' (Cont'd.)

Rabbi Balfour Brickner claims ["The Walls Are Not Smeared With Anti-Semitic Graffiti," Free for All, Sept. 21] that the Jews who left Nicaragua were not driven out by anti-Semitism. Rather, as he wrote last year, the worst that can be said of the Sandinista regime is that it "sometimes expels those who . . . conduct counter-revolutionary activity"

Never mind the fact that the Sandinista-approved newspaper, Nuevo Diario, has referred to Jewish places of worship as "synagogues of Satan" and denounced Jews "who... used the myth of God's chosen people to massacre the Palestinian people without mercy." Never mind that the same paper revived the ancient calumny that "world money, the banks and finance are in the hands of descendants of Jews, the eternal protectors of Zion." Never mind that in 1978 Sandinista gunmen threw a firebomb at the Managua synagogue while Jews were at prayer and forced those who tried to escape back into the burning building.

To Rabbi Brickner this is not anti-Semitism. To him, it represents, at worst, the actions "of a small gang of excited supporters of the revolution out on their own . . . caught up in the mob frenzy of the moment."

Never mind that the PLO—a terrorist organization and not (lest anyone doubt it) a sovereign government—is allowed by the Sandinistas to maintain a fully accredited "embassy" in Managua. Never mind that the Sandinistas provide PLO members with Nicaraguan passports with which to travel freely around the world as they plan and execute terrorist attacks. Never mind that Sandinista gummen participated in PLO terrorist attacks against Jews in Israel and Europe during the 1970s, Rabbi Brickner believes that such actions are, well, somehow excusable.

Why does Rabbi Brickner choose to take the word of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, who (understandably) denies allegations of anti-Semitism, rather than that of the many Jewish victims of Sandinista persecution who have fled Nicaragua? He does so because he has dedicated himself to causes of the radical left rather than to Judaism and the Jewish people. He has cast off his Jewish mantle, donning, instead, that of an apologist for the overt and irrefutable anti-Semitism of a regime which he admires but which most other Jews have learned to fear.

-Richard J. Fox

The writer is chairman of the National Jewish Coalition.