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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 24, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY
THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond, II
FROM: Morton C. Blackwell
SUBJECT: First Vigalante Edit Job

Here, promptly back from West Virginia is Richard Vigalante's editing of the second piece by Jackie Tillman.

I think it is a very fine job.

I hope that you can, today, submit it to Dick Darman for clearances per our arrangement in time to be published for next Wednesday's meeting.

MCB:jet

1 Attachment a/s

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 24, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: Faith Ryan Whittlesey

SUBJECT: White House Digest Paper

Attached is another paper in our series prepared by our Outreach Working Group on Central America.

This draft has been prepared by Jacqueline Tillman of Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's office.

I would appreciate your getting it cleared so that it can be printed and distributed at our Outreach Working Group Meeting On Central America which meets at 2:30 p.m. next Wednesday afternoon.

Thank you for your assistance.

1 Attachment a/s

CENTRAL AMERICA: FACTS NOT WIDELY KNOWN

May + June
RECENT MONTHS IN NICARAGUA

The first step in figuring out what is at stake in Central America is understanding the Sandinista regime. Are the Sandinistas merely "leftwing" reformers whose tilt towards Marxism is balanced by an equally strong commitment to ~~religious freedom~~? *Catholicism?*

Or, are the present rulers of Nicaragua dedicated Communists, enemies even of democratic socialism, and Soviet allies intent on subverting Central America into the Soviet bloc?

Knowing the answer is essential to understanding the threat, if any, to El Salvador and the rest of the region.

Unfortunately, it is increasingly clear that the present Sandinista government is a Communist one, ready and willing to bring the region into the Soviet orbit. The evidence has been mounting for several years, but even a brief selection of events from the past ~~few~~ *two* months, which we give here, is revealing.

TRUE DEMOCRATS ABANDON SANDINISTAS

Much evidence comes from former allies and supporters of the Sandinista revolution. The case of Eden Pastora, Commander Zero, has been well known for some time. But only a month ago, on May 19, 1983 Misael Brennes, Nicaraguan counsel to Choluteca, Honduras, defected to that country, requesting political asylum. When the Sandinistas charged that Brennes had been kidnapped, he called a public press conference to refute the charge. He explained that he had abandoned the Sandinistas because he was "convinced that Communism has advanced in Nicaragua to the point where there is no other path than armed struggle to detain it." He added:

I am not the first and I won't be the last of the officials in the Nicaraguan foreign service to break with the regime of the nine Sandinista commandantes; I am just one more. I assert that presently Nicaragua is a colony of the Communist countries where the Russians and the Cubans are the owners of the Nicaraguan people.

Brennes claimed that there are 10,000 to 15,000 foreign military advisors in Nicaragua and that, counting advisors in other fields, such as education, and politics, the "occupying army" reaches nearly 30,000.^{1/}

REVOLUTION FOR EXPORT

One former Sandinista ally who is not a Nicaraguan recently gave even stronger testimony. Efraim Duarte Salgado had been chief of the most active cell of a Honduran terrorist group, the Popular Revolutionary Forces (FPR). He disappeared suddenly in May, then surfaced at a May 27, press conference in Guatemala. He not only called upon his former colleagues to give up armed struggle and pursue democratic means to power, he also detailed the history of foreign influence over his group.

The Sandinistas started providing economic support to his cell soon after it was founded in 1980. But the Nicaraguan aid "was always conditional in the sense that we had to undertake different violent acts to destabilize the Honduran government and try to create a Marxist-Leninist regime."

He also explained that training in subversion was easily available from Cuba, and that while in Cuba he had established contact with the Armed People's Revolutionary Organization (ORPA), a Guatemalan terrorist group. He claimed responsibility for the armed attack against the American embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras in 1980, and for placing explosives in the offices of IBM and the Salvadoran airline, TACA, in 1982.^{2/}

Among Central Americans, there is little doubt about the Sandinistas' willingness to export the revolution. One recent example is a poll, taken in April by the United States Information Agency of Costa Rican citizens. In this peaceful, democratic country 70 percent of the people see Nicaragua as a military threat and 56 percent say Nicaragua is trying to weaken the Costa Rican government. Interestingly, 50 percent see Cuba as responsible for conditions that could lead to war in the region and 40 percent say the same of the Soviet Union.^{3/}

ELECTIONS?

If the Sandinists seem eager to export Communism, their treatment of their own people is far more typical of Communists than of democratic socialists.

The Sandinistas came to power in 1979 promising elections that have yet to be held. Recently, they have been promised for 1985. But just last month, according to the official Radio Sandino, Interior Minister Thomas Borge threatened to postpone them again, blaming the threatened delay on American "aggression."^{4/} It should be noted that during the first year and a half after the revolution the American government fully supported the Sandinistas with \$118 million in aid, yet there was no move to hold elections.

INTERNAL REPRESSION

Elections aside, the Nicaraguans have increasingly denied their people basic liberties, substituting Communist attitudes towards rights for Western ones.

On May 26, the Council of State extended the state of emergency for one year, until May 30, 1984, permitting the government to continue prior censorship of the media and to hold political^{5/} prisoners indefinitely without recourse to habeas corpus. The state of emergency has now been in effect for over a year.

On May 18, Nicaraguan immigration authorities refused to allow Luis Rivas Levia, president of the opposition Social Democratic Party to leave the country. They stopped him at the airport as he was about to leave for a trip to Costa Rica.^{6/}

In late May, the Sandinistas expropriated a banana plantation belonging to Ramiro Guardian, president of an agricultural private sector organization, for political reasons. Commenting, in an interview in La Preense, on American restrictions on Nicaraguan sugar, Guardian had said, "the United States and Nicaragua are both sovereign and independent countries and each has the right to buy and sell as they see fit."^{7/} The junta responded by taking his farm. Junta member Sergio Ramirez explained that "we think that this gentleman cannot be associated with the revolutionary state because we need proprietors that are clear about the dangers represented by measures from the United States."^{8/}

SOLIDARITY?

Finally, the Sandinistas have fallen into the contradiction that afflicts all Communist governments -- the workers' state has been persecuting free trade unions.

Again, there have been many examples, but the most recent involves the stevedores union of the Pacific port of

Corinto. After the 1979 revolution, the union affiliated with the Sandinista Workers Central (CST), a Sandinista-controlled union. But many dissatisfied union members wish to switch to the Confederation for Labor Unification (CUS), an independent organization that belongs to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and has strong ties to the AFL-CIO.

The Sandinistas have used arrests, mob action, threats, and other forms of intimidation to keep the union allied with the CST. Some union leaders have been forced to flee Nicaragua, and one, Zacarias Hernandez, has become a leader in the exile labor movement. Amnesty International has adopted two of the arrested stevedores as cases of special interest.

In mid-March, when the union's executive board attempted to switch from CST to CUS the Sandinistas responded by having militiamen occupy union headquarters. And the Ministry of Labor disallowed the executive board's decision, ruling that only a two-thirds vote of the membership could effect the switch.

The Ministry, however, prevented a vote by initiating an audit of the union's books, forbidding it to hold a congress until the audit was completed. Turning up nothing of substance, the Ministry allowed the union to schedule a congress for June.

But on May 21, when leading CUS officials, including Secretary General Bayardo Lopez, traveled to Corinto to meet with several hundred stevedores, they found the entrance to the meeting place blocked by a Sandinista mob. Some were armed and wearing militia uniforms. The mob attacked the CUS leaders with fists and sticks and forced them to flee.^{9/} Since then, a total of nine union leaders have been arrested.^{10/}

Even this brief selection of incidents, all taken from a period of only a few months, illustrates the character of the Sandinista junta. It is not a collection of "leftists," or democratic socialists, or "Christian Marxists," but of totalitarians, dependent on the Soviets and eager to bring Central America into the totalitarian world.

N O T E S

1. Unclassified State Department cable, Tegucipala 5746.
2. Unclassified State Department cable, Tegucipala 5570.
3. United States Information Agency poll, April 11, 1983.
4. Radio Sandino, May 16, 1983.
5. State Department cable, Managua 2320, unclassified paragraph 1.
6. Panama City radio station ACAN, May 18, 1983.
7. La Prensa, May 12, 1983.
8. Barricada, May 26, 1983.
9. State Department cable, Managua 2268, unclassified paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.
10. Press release, 13 June 1983 from the Confederation of Central American Workers, San Jose, Costa Rica.1.

6/20/83

Memo to Morton Blackwell

From Richard Vigilante

Re; Tillman paper and future Tillman papers

Here is a version of the Tillman paper, rewritten to suit White House Digest.

This differs radically in format from what I was given, even though I very much like the structure Tillman used. In fact, given the contents of the Tillman paper, her original structure would have been preferable except for two considerations.

1. It differed so much from the one finished WHD and the other potential WHDs I saw. For a whole list of reasons we should maintain consistent presentation.
2. The Tillman structure was right for a series of fresh, newsy items. By the time I got it they were getting old. I put them into a structure that allowed for their slight unfreshness, but also accounted for their being selected from recent months. I looked upon this merely as a rescue operation.

Nevertheless, the structure I used is all wrong for future Tillman papers, which I understand will come out every two weeks. IN FACT WHD IS THE WRONG FORMAT FOR ALL FUTURE TILLMAN PAPERS. THEY SERVE A DIFFERENT PURPOSE AND WILL BE MORE USEFUL IF NOT ALLOWED TO FADE IN WITH OTHER WHDs.

We should issue Tillmans, and perhaps others in that style, as a separate publication, using Central America: Facts Not Widely Known as the series title, the various issues to be dated and numbered. The material would be set up as a series of newsy items with little attempt at cohesion or adornment, similar to Tillman's original. Updates would be referenced to previous stories. Tillman's copy should be edited the day it comes in and be released and printed by the next day.

Why separate publications? WHD states the coherent views of the Administration. Facts should be used as a continuous parade of shockers for neutrals and as a source of small arms ammo for friendlies. I know that as a journalist I would read the two for different reasons and would want them separate. Tillman papers would suffer from coherence -- they are for people who want to make their own selection of facts. Also administrative requirements differ -- Facts is more time sensitive.

I used notes because we needed something more than in-text references for credibility, but Tillman's approach, good for Facts, didn't seem suited to WHD

Rob V. L. H.

CENTRAL AMERICA: FACTS NOT WIDELY KNOWN

I. RECENT MONTHS IN NICARAGUA

The first step in figuring out what is at stake in Central America is understanding the Sandinista regime. Are the Sandinistas merely "'leftwing'" reformers whose tilt towards Marxism is balanced by an equally strong commitment to Christianity?

Or are the present rulers of Nicaragua dedicated Communists, enemies even of democratic socialism, and Soviet allies intent on subverting Central America into the Soviet Bloc?

Knowing the answer is essential to understanding the threat, if any, to El Salvador and the rest of the region.

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← a total of

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2:00 p.m.
Clas Bergstrom
Lutheran Church
USA
Marseille

NOTES

1. Unclassified State Department cable, Tegucipala 5746
2. Unclassified State Department cable, Tegucipala 5570
3. USIA poll, April 11, 1983
4. Radio Sandino, May 16, 1983
5. State Department cable, Managua 2320, unclassified paragraph one
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10.

10: Press release 13 June 1983 from the
Confederation of Central American Workers,
San Jose, Costa Rica.

Martin -

Please get this
~~classified~~ classified as

I have noted ~~it~~ -
then I will get it to
Derwan. ~~Do it~~

Please check, does it contain
all the facts we can

~~use~~ use right now?!
We want to make it as
persuasive & factual
& specific as possible.

Thanks,
F.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

We have 25 more
people here than
last week.

[Faint, mostly illegible handwritten text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]

ATI

THE PLO AND CENTRAL AMERICA

"Palestinian combatants are fighting in the same trench as the Central American people."

Fidel Castro, 6 September 1982

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has maintained contact with various revolutionary groups, mainly leftist in political orientation, for many years. Among other objectives, the PLO has sought thereby to reinforce its own revolutionary credentials, to strike at Western governments sympathetic to Israel, and to guarantee continued political and military support from radical states such as the USSR and Cuba by occasionally acting as their proxy. All three objectives have been served through PLO involvement with Central American revolutionaries, particularly the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrilla groups.

Nicaragua

PLO collaboration with the Sandinistas stemmed from Palestinian antipathy to the Nicaraguan government under the Somozas, which had been a firm ally of Israel. It was also a natural outgrowth of Cuban military training and intelligence support for the PLO which began shortly after the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana. Inasmuch as the Cubans were also assisting the Sandinistas it was only logical that these two beneficiaries would aid each other on occasion.

The Sandinistas have admitted their association with the PLO. In early June 1979, six weeks before Somoza was overthrown, Sandinista spokesman Jorge Mandi described the association in these terms:

"There is a longstanding blood unity between us and the Palestinian revolution. Many of the cadres belonging to the Sandinista movements were at Palestinian revolutionary bases in Jordan. In the early 1970s, Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood was spilled together in Amman and in other places during the Black September battles."

"A number of Sandinistas took part in the operation to divert four aircraft which the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) seized and landed at a desert airfield in Jordan. One of our comrades was also wounded in another hijack operation in which Leila Khaled was involved. She was in command of the operation and our comrades helped her carry it out. It is natural, therefore, that in our war against Somoza, we received Palestinian aid for our revolution in various forms."

Proposed White House Digest Article

Various sources indicate that ~~perhaps~~ several dozen Sandinistas received PLO training during the 1970s, often in addition to Cuban training. A case in point was that of Pedro Arauz Palacios, who hijacked a Nicaraguan airliner in November 1969 and received sanctuary in Cuba. Sandinistas later captured by Somoza's security forces testified that Arauz received guerrilla training in Cuba during 1970 and then travelled to the Middle East for training at a camp run by the largest PLO group, Fatah. Arauz later became a principal Sandinista leader and was killed in combat in 1977. The present Nicaraguan Interior Minister, Tomas Borge, ~~apparently~~ also received training from Fatah as well as the Cubans.

In early 1978 the PLO, along with the Cubans and Soviets, began to sense that the Sandinistas were nearing victory and accordingly became more bold in acknowledging mutual interests and mutual enemies. Thus, in March 1978 representatives of the Sandinistas met in Havana with counterparts from the most pro-Soviet element of the PLO, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and signed a declaration denouncing "Yankee imperialism, the racist regime of Israel and the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza."

Later the PLO began to supply arms to the Sandinistas. This became public knowledge in early 1979 when a PLO air shipment--disguised as medical supplies like the cargo of the Libyan aircraft stopped in Brazil in April 1983--was intercepted by Tunisian authorities and never arrived in Nicaragua.

Shortly after the Sandinistas took power in July 1979, official Sandinista contacts with the PLO were established through a mission to Beirut led by the brother of Junta member Sergio Ramirez. In mid-May 1980, representatives of the PLO mission to the United Nations and the Sandinistas signed a protocol on relations. This paved the way for Yasir Arafat's visit to Managua in July 1980 to celebrate the first anniversary of the Sandinista victory and to open a PLO "Embassy." Nicaragua is the only country in the world where the PLO mission is officially designated as an Embassy and the ranking PLO official is referred to as Ambassador--a testimony to the importance the Sandinistas attach to their PLO connections.

In August 1980 a bilateral military cooperation agreement was reportedly signed, and since then the military dimension to the relationship has become more evident. In addition to the Embassy staff, the PLO has maintained an average of about three dozen advisers in Nicaragua, although the number has fluctuated considerably from time to time. Their primary roles have been in the field of aviation: training Sandinista pilots; maintaining aircraft; attempting to make Nicaragua's Somoza-vintage radar system operational; and sometimes piloting the aircraft. A few PLO advisers have been active with Nicaragua's national airline and the PLO has even donated a Boeing 707 commercial aircraft.

Where they PLO pilots?

El Salvador

PLO contacts with Salvadoran guerrillas are of more recent vintage than those with the Sandinistas. Evidence of mutual sympathy emerged with the November 1979 kidnapping and subsequent murder of the South African Ambassador in El Salvador by the largest of the leftist guerrilla groups, the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL). Among the FPL's demands in the kidnapping was that El Salvador break relations with Israel and officially recognize the PLO. Moreover, those responsible for planting a bomb at the Israeli Embassy in El Salvador in December 1979 announced that the act was to show "solidarity with the Palestinian people."

Yasir Arafat and other PLO leaders have furnished some arms and training to the Salvadoran guerrillas largely as a result of Salvadoran Communist Party leader Shafik Handal's mid-1980 trip abroad to seek aid for the guerrillas. Handal made a special visit to Beirut in March 1981 to meet Arafat and DFLP leader Nayif Hawatmah to seek additional aid. Such aid has been forthcoming, and evidently is not confined to the provision of materiel: in January 1982 Arafat himself publicly announced to a group of journalists in Beirut that not only were there PLO pilots in Nicaragua, but also PLO combatants in El Salvador. In March 1982, the late FPL leader and overall commander of the Salvadoran guerrillas, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, held talks with PLO leaders in Lebanon.

PLO leaders may have found it ^{what is his background?} easy to cooperate with Salvadoran revolutionaries for particular reasons--notably the Palestinian background of Shafik Handal--but they also understand the Salvadoran struggle in regional terms. This was made clear in an interview with a Salvadoran guerrilla leader published in the March 1981 bulletin of the second largest PLO group, the Marxist-led Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The interviewer stated the issue concisely for his Palestinian readers:

"We have the brilliant revolutionary example of Nicaragua. . . The struggle in El Salvador is very advanced; the same in Guatemala, and Honduras is developing quickly. . . .Very soon Central America will be one revolutionary entity."

And indeed the PLO apparently ^{what does this mean?} has extended at least political and in some cases material support to other revolutionaries in the region, not only in Central America but elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean including, among others near our borders, Puerto Rican separatists. Nicaragua and El Salvador do not delimit the PLO's interests in aiding leftist groups in this hemisphere.



PFLP Bulletin, March 1981

Upper left: Castro and Arafat affirm "one goal" according to 1978 issue of Information Bulletin.

Above: Another issue of the same journal, covering Arafat's trip to Managua in July 1980, shows Arafat and Daniel Ortega proclaiming that Nicaragua and Palestine follow "one strategy".

Lower left: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) journal containing an interview with a Salvadoran guerrilla leader depicts a Palestinian fighter side by side with a Salvadoran guerrilla.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/21/83

Memo for Record:

Attached sent to FRW
via memo with "talking points,"
for processing as W.H. Digest
paper.

THE PLO AND CENTRAL AMERICA

"Palestinian combatants are fighting in the same trench as the Central American people."

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In August 1980 a bilateral military cooperation agreement was reportedly signed, and since then the military dimension to the relationship has become more evident. In addition to the Embassy staff, the PLO has maintained an average of about three dozen advisers in Nicaragua, although the number has fluctuated considerably from time to time. Their primary roles have been in the field of aviation: training Sandinista pilots; maintaining aircraft; attempting to make Nicaragua's Somoza-vintage radar system operational; and sometimes piloting the aircraft. A few PLO advisers have been active with Nicaragua's national airline and the PLO has even donated a Boeing 707 commercial aircraft.

El Salvador



PLO contacts with Salvadoran guerrillas are of more recent vintage than those with the Sandinistas. Evidence of mutual sympathy emerged with the November 1979 kidnapping and subsequent murder of the South African Ambassador in El Salvador by the largest of the leftist guerrilla groups, the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL). Among the FPL's demands in the kidnapping was that El Salvador break relations with Israel and officially recognize the PLO. Moreover, those responsible for planting a bomb at the Israeli Embassy in El Salvador in December 1979 announced that the act was to show "solidarity with the Palestinian people."

Yasir Arafat and other PLO leaders have furnished some arms and training to the Salvadoran guerrillas largely as a result of Salvadoran Communist Party leader Shafik Handal's mid-1980 trip abroad to seek aid for the guerrillas. Handal made a special visit to Beirut in March 1981 to meet Arafat and DFLP leader Nayif Hawatmah to seek additional aid. Such aid has been forthcoming, and evidently is not confined to the provision of materiel: in January 1982 Arafat himself publicly announced to a group of journalists in Beirut that not only were there PLO pilots in Nicaragua, but also PLO combatants in El Salvador. In March 1982, the late FPL leader and overall commander of the Salvadoran guerrillas, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, held talks with PLO leaders in Lebanon.

PLO leaders may have found it easy to cooperate with Salvadoran revolutionaries for particular reasons--notably the Palestinian background of Shafik Handal--but they also understand the Salvadoran struggle in regional terms. This was made clear in an interview with a Salvadoran guerrilla leader published in the March 1981 bulletin of the second largest PLO group, the Marxist-led Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The interviewer stated the issue concisely for his Palestinian readers:

"We have the brilliant revolutionary example of Nicaragua. . . The struggle in El Salvador is very advanced; the same in Guatemala, and Honduras is developing quickly. . . .Very soon Central America will be one revolutionary entity."

And indeed the PLO apparently has extended at least political and in some cases material support to other revolutionaries in the region, not only in Central America but elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean including, among others near our borders, Puerto Rican separatists. Nicaragua and El Salvador do not delimit the PLO's interests in aiding leftist groups in this hemisphere.



PFLP Bulletin, March 1981

Upper left: Castro and Arafat affirm "one goal" according to 1978 issue of Information Bulletin.

Above: Another issue of the same journal, covering Arafat's trip to Managua in July 1980, shows Arafat and Daniel Ortega proclaiming that Nicaragua and Palestine follow "one strategy".

Lower left: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) journal containing an interview with a Salvadoran guerrilla leader depicts a Palestinian fighter side by side with a Salvadoran guerrilla.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
June 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond

FROM: Morton C. Blackwell *MB*

SUBJECT: Fourth White House Digest Paper from
the Outreach Working Group on Central
America

Richard Vigalante has agreed to do a little work for us ahead of time and I gave him a copy of the paper, "Central America: Information Not Widely Known" which we have proposed be issued as a White House Digest paper. Vigalante agreed to edit it for us.

He was quite thrilled after he read it and said he had gleaned enough material from this one paper to do four editorials!

MCB:jet

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: John Lenczowski

FROM: Morton C. Blackwell *MCB*

SUBJECT: White House Working Group Paper

Attached is the draft of a paper prepared by Nestor Sanchez at Mrs. Whittlesey's request. We want to issue a paper on this topic as a "White House Digest" paper through our White House Outreach Working Group on Central America.

Mrs. Whittlesey is concerned that this paper is not written in such a way as to have the maximum impact on laymen. The notes on the draft are hers. She specifically wants more comparisons of the United States' versus the Soviets' efforts in the Caribbean area.

She asked me to ask you to try to handle a quick re-write of this paper so that it would be a more useful and persuasive version.

Can you help?

MCB:jet

1 Attachment a/s

Soviet/Cuban Threat and Buildup in the Caribbean

Since 1978 we have seen an ever increasing Soviet presence in the Caribbean Region. The USSR through its surrogate--Cuba--has been able to establish a permanent presence in the Western Hemisphere.

The Characteristics of the Soviet/Cuban Build-up: Men, Money, Materiel

- The Soviet Union maintains and reinforces its presence by:
 - Deploying its long range Bear Bombers to the region on an almost back-to-back basis. *nobody understands this!*
 - Deploying its naval combatants for joint training exercises with Cuba.
 - Providing a palace guard of approximately 3,000 men of its Soviet Brigade near Havana and an additional presence of 2,500 military advisors.
 - Providing Cuba with 8,000 civilian advisors.
- what's that?*

- In 1982, the Soviets and Cubans had 50 times as many military advisors in Latin America as did the US. Last year the Soviets increased their military advisors in Cuba by 500.

- The USSR has also provided a steady stream of military equipment to Cuba. In 1981 alone, Moscow provided 66,000 metric tons in military assistance valued at \$600 million. Deliveries in 1982 exceeded 1981 by 2,000 metric tons and amounted to over \$1 billion in military assistance in the last two years.

U.S. assistance comparison?

- Cuban armed forces have grown to a size disproportionate for defensive needs:
 - Cuba possesses an Army of over 225,000; a Navy of 11,000 and air and air defense forces of 16,000 not including hundreds of thousands of paramilitary.
 - Cubans have well over 200 MIG fighter aircraft.
 - Castro has about 65,000 Cubans serving overseas, 40,000 military (25,000 troops in Angola, about 12,000 in Ethiopia) and 25,000 civilian technicians.
 - Cuba has 2.3% of its population in the regular armed forces, one of every 20 Cubans participates in some security mission.


- Moscow underwrites the activities of its Cuban surrogate at a cost exceeding \$4 billion annually (1/4 of Cuba's GNP) and supports efforts to collect funds, arms, and supplies from the communist bloc for guerrilla activities in Central America and the Caribbean.

- The number of Soviet Bloc academic grants offered annually to Latin American students jumped from 400 in the 1960's to about 7,000 now. In 1979 Moscow admitted to sponsoring 7,000 Cubans for studies in the Soviet Union. Last year 700 Nicaraguans were reported studying there and an additional 300 scholarships were being provided. Scholarships include free room, board, tuition, transportation, medical care and a small stipend.

- About 3,000 Latin American students, including 1,600 Nicaraguans are studying in Cuba. Cuba has constructed 17 schools for foreigners each costing about \$2 million to build and \$600,000 to operate annually.

not clear

SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO CUBA



Spreading Soviet/Cuban Intervention Throughout The Region

- The implication of the Soviet/Cuban buildup is that it provides a platform for spreading subversion and supporting guerrillas throughout the region.

- It was Cuba that acted as the catalyst to organize and unify the far-left groups in El Salvador, assisted in developing the military strategy and encouraged the guerrillas to launch the ill-fated "final" offensive in January 1981. Cuba continues to be vital in training and supporting continuing offensives in El Salvador by funneling weapons and supplies via Nicaragua to rebel forces in El Salvador.

- Castro is actively engaged in converting Nicaragua into another Cuba. There are approximately 5,500 Cuban civilian advisors and more than 2,000 Cuban military and security advisors in Nicaragua.


- The Sandinistas themselves have boasted they have 138,000 men under arms in their active armed forces, reserves, militia, police and security forces. At its present strength the Sandinista Army represents the largest military force in the history of Central America. The Sandinistas have built 36 new military garrisons since Somoza's downfall.

- Approximately 70 Nicaraguans were sent to Bulgaria for training as pilots and mechanics. Existing landing strips in Nicaragua are being lengthened and will be able to accommodate the most sophisticated Soviet jet aircraft. MIGs could be flown in quickly from Cuba.

- In Grenada, the Cubans are constructing air facilities that exceed the requirements of that tiny island. The Grenadian Minister of Mobilization, Selwyn Strachan, has boasted publicly that Cuba will eventually use the new airport to supply troops in Angola, and because of its strategic location it will also be used by the Soviet Union. Over the past 2 years, Cuba's presence has been aimed at ensuring the viability of the Bishop government. Cuba has constructed a battalion size military base, including barracks and training areas; and it is building additional training facilities at Calivigny Point and Point Egmont.

- In Suriname, the Cuban Ambassador is a senior intelligence officer who was formerly Chief of the Caribbean Section of the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party. The Americas department is responsible for Cuban covert activities. The Cuban Ambassador maintains a very close relationship with LTC Desire Bouterse, Suriname's military leader, and has continuous access to key leaders.

RADIUS OF ACTION FOR MIG AIRCRAFT STATIONED IN CUBA, NICARAGUA AND GRENADA



This is too bland & general!

needs more comparison of U.S. + Soviet effort

The Threat Posed by Soviet Expansionism

- Such communist expansion could lead to an extensive and permanent Soviet presence, and an increased Soviet strategic capability in the region which would create significant military consequences for the US.


- It could place hostile forces and weapons systems within striking distance of targets in the US. - *This should be stronger*
- It could provide air and naval bases, such as those in Nicaragua and Grenada, for recovery of Soviet aircraft after strategic missions.
- It would furnish missile sites for launching attacks against the US with short and intermediate range missiles.
- It could provide bases for use in covert operations against the US and our neighbors.
- It could provide for prepositioning of Soviet equipment, supplies and ammunition in our hemisphere.
- It could allow the Soviet Pacific and Atlantic fleets to operate near our shores without having to return to the USSR for maintenance.
- It could threaten our Caribbean Sea Lines of Communication through which a large volume of our goods pass; thus endangering the economic well-being of our nation. *how much - The Pres. said 23*
- And finally, it could cause the US to divert scarce resources in manpower and materiel from other areas of the world to protect an area previously considered militarily secure. *Such as Europe + the Pacific basin?*

We must respond to the question: Haven't we had this with us (i.e. w/ Cuba) for 20 yrs. + lived w/ it?

MILLIONS OF
U.S. DOLLARS

1000
(1B)


SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA (\$ IN MILLIONS)



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
June 10, 1983

file copy

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY
THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond
FROM: Morton C. Blackwell 
SUBJECT: Proposed White House Digest Papers

The report received yesterday from Dick Darman regarding our two pending Outreach Working Group papers is disappointing.

I suppose the Sanchez paper will be forthcoming in some form. From our discussions, I presume that paper will be available for our meeting next Wednesday.

I presume that Fred Fielding was not aware of the procedure by which the White House Digest papers are issued by the White House Communications Office -- not by the Office of Public Liaison.

The dropping of the Piedra paper produced by Ambassador Middendorf, is too bad. It is a good paper. Yes, it is controversial. But it seems unlikely we can produce any useful papers which are not controversial. If that is the standard we must meet, we should disband the Working Group.

Piedra's effort is not designed to defend the Pope or the Catholic Church. It is intended to defend the interests of the United States. Liberation theology is a weapon being used by our enemies to attack the interests of our country. Is a religious cloak to be allowed to shield some of the most effective Marxist attacks on the United States?

It is standard communist doctrine to attack from sanctuaries. Time and again we let them use this tactic to tie our hands. Are we, as a government, required to sit quietly under this ideological attack? Why not at least defend ourselves? Must we expect the Pope to defend us? He has enough problems on his hands, including no doubt advisors who say he shouldn't "carry the brunt of the battle" on issues which largely concern U.S. national interests.

You will recall there was strong agreement in our Working Group when Ambassador Middendorf pointed out the urgent need for a paper on liberation theology and volunteered to prepare one for us.

I suggest you and Ambassador Middendorf take up this matter with Judge Clark and then Fred Fielding. Certainly Ambassador Middendorf would be happy to handle media questions relating to this paper if we issue it. Perhaps we could issue the White House Digest paper on Liberation Theology signed by him. Or perhaps the paper could be edited in some way so as to pass muster.


MCB:jet

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 9, 1983

*Comments
6/9*

NOTE FOR: FAITH R. WHITTLESEY
FROM: RICHARD G. DARMAN 
SUBJECT: Clearance of Central American Papers

Attached please find the comments of the Counsel's Office and NSC. You will note that they both recommend that the Piedra paper be dropped. The Sanchez paper is still in the process of being cleared. I will be keep you posted.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

URGENTDATE: June 6, 1983 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ASAPSUBJECT: POTENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS RELEASE RE: CENTRAL AMERICA

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HARPER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MEESE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HERRINGTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	JENKINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	McMANUS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MURPHY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CLARK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROLLINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DUBERSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	VERSTANDIG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FELDSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WHITTLESEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	BRADY/SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FULLER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GERGEN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

The attached two papers have been forwarded to my office this evening for clearances prior to their possible release. Would you please examine them this evening. Tomorrow morning we may wish to discuss the timing of their review and possible clearance.

RESPONSE: We suggest that proposals such as these be sent by the Whittlesey group to the NSC for interagency clearance before they are staffed to your office. In this case, the NSC has sent the Sanchez paper to State for comment and, we recommend that the liberation theology paper be dropped in its present form.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt

Richard G. Darman

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DEPUTY TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: FRED F. FIELDING
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Communications Releases
Concerning Central America Issues

After reviewing the above-referenced proposed "White House Digest" papers dealing with Central America issues, I would strongly recommend (1) that the paper dealing with "liberation theology" not be issued, and (2) that the paper dealing with Soviet influence in the area be released, if at all, only by NSC, and only after NSC has reviewed, edited and approved it (a process that should include such consultation with the State Department as Judge Clark's office may think necessary and appropriate).

Though I do not personally quarrel with the thrust of the substantive arguments presented in the "liberation theology" piece, it is evident that any lengthy treatment of this subject requires detailed argument that is inevitably and inextricably rooted in the concepts and vocabulary of Christian theology. It would be unprecedented for any President, qua President, to become involved in a religious controversy of this nature in any way that even approaches the level of detail presented in this proposed release. The seemliness and propriety of his doing so would be loudly and widely challenged (whether fairly or not); the resulting controversy would likely obscure the substantive points being made.

This is not to say that the President could not, in an appropriate speech to an appropriate audience, note his disapproval of attempts to use religion to foster revolutionary purposes in Central America -- perhaps by quoting Pope John Paul II. But detailed and direct immersion in the "liberation theology" debate -- a debate that is very controversial in Christian (and especially Roman Catholic) circles -- would be unwise and counterproductive. The Pope, who has been an effective and outspoken critic of "liberation theology," strikes me as being in a far more appropriate position to carry the brunt of the battle on this matter. I would also note that even the Pope's acts and statements in this field have been challenged, both from within and without the Church; one can easily imagine the reaction to the President or the

White House jumping into this debate to the extent that the release of this paper would plainly entail.

Release of a paper on Soviet involvement in Central America obviously does not raise the same objections. For a number of reasons, however, it seems virtually self-evident that any such paper is more appropriately released by the NSC than by the Office of Public Liaison. The factual data presented need to be checked thoroughly for accuracy, as well as to ensure that their release neither compromises classified information and sources, nor would be inconsistent with advancing overall United States foreign policy in this (and perhaps other) arenas. Accordingly, I strongly recommend deferring to Judge Clark's office on the scope, content and timing of release of any paper of this sort.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY
THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond
FROM: Morton C. Blackwell *MCB*
SUBJECT: Fourth Paper from the White House Outreach
Working Group on Central America

Here is the fourth paper, typed for submission to
Dick Darman for clearance processing

I have prepared a transmittal memorandum to Darman
for you.

MCB:jet

Attachments a/s

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: Faith Ryan Whittlesey

SUBJECT: Fourth White House Digest Paper

Attached is the fourth paper in our series prepared by our Outreach Working Group on Central America.

I would appreciate your getting it cleared so that it can be printed and distributed at our meeting next Wednesday afternoon.

This draft is by Jacqueline Tillman (632-8344) of Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's staff. She would appreciate the opportunity to proof the "corrected and cleared" copy before it is printed.

Thank you for your assistance.

1 Attachment a/s

CENTRAL AMERICA: INFORMATION NOT WIDELY KNOWN

NICARAGUA:

--ON ELECTIONS: "The interior minister (Tomas Borge) warned that if the Reagan Administration's aggression against Nicaragua increases, the elections scheduled for 1985 will not be held even though the government is working not only for the country's defense but also for its democratization* . . . Either Reagan takes the counter-revolutionaries out of Nicaragua or we exterminate them." "The interior minister spoke with journalists yesterday about the current aggressions during the visit he made to the open detention system farm (emphasis added) for the Miskitos with Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski, vice president of the FRG Social Democratic Party." *The Sandinista regime came to power in July 1979 publicly promising elections. They have yet to be held.
SOURCE: Radio Sandino, 16 May 1983.

--HONDURAN TERRORIST REVEALS SANDINISTA SUPPORT. A "missing person" surfaced at a May 27 press conference in Guatemala. Efraim Duarte Salgado, the admitted chief of the most active ^{cell of a} Honduran terrorist group, the Popular Revolutionary Forces (FPR) had reportedly "disappeared" on May 1. His case had become a "cause celebre" of human rights groups. Duarte said he had sought asylum in Guatemala because he feared that his former compatriots would try to kill him in Honduras.

He called on them to abandon armed struggle and to "search for other means, like the democratic way, to attain power."

Detailing foreign influence over his group, Duarte said:

- He formed the FPR cell called "Lorenzo Zelaya" in 1980 and at first it was a hard struggle because they had no outside support.
- The Sandinistas began to provide limited economic support soon afterward. "The Nicaraguan aid was always conditional in the sense that we had to undertake different violent acts to destabilize the Honduran government and try to create a Marxist-Leninist regime."
- Training in subversion was not difficult because colaboration from Cuba could be counted on. He was in Cuba himself, and established contact with leaders of ORPA, a Guatemalan terrorist group.

He acknowledged his responsibility for the following terrorist acts:

- The armed attack against the American Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras in 1980.
- Placing explosives in the offices of IBM and the Salvadorian airline, TACA, in 1982.

SOURCE: Unclassified State Department cable, Tegucigalpa 5570.

-- AT THE UNITED NATIONS: Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto: "If the Security Council does not assert its

authority, Nicaragua cannot be asked to relinquish indefinitely the use of its right to legitimate defense."

SOURCE: Radio Sandino, 17 May 1983.

-- DEFECTION OF NICARAGUAN COUNSUL IN CHOLUTECA, HONDURAS:

The following statement by the Nicaraguan counsul assigned to Choluteca, Honduras was released to the media by the Honduran National Security Police Forces (FUSEP) at 10:00 local time on May 19, 1983:

Misael Brennes, Nicaraguan citizen, accredited before the government of Honduras makes it known to national and international public opinion:

1. That in full control of my mental and physical faculties I have decided on this day to request political asylum and protection from the government of Honduras;
2. That the fundamental reason for my decision is my disagreement with the manner in which the National Directorate of the Nicaraguan Sandinista Liberation Front is managing internal and external affairs of my beloved country;
3. That I make this declaration and petition for asylum without having been subject to any type of pressure or coercion whatsoever. Signed: Misael Brennes.

At a press conference in late May, in Honduras, Brennes, responding to Nicaraguan charges that he had been "kidnapped," said, what had "kidnapped" him were the ideals and principles of democracy. "I defected from the Sandinista regime because I am convinced that communism has advanced in Nicaragua to the point where there is no other path than armed struggle to detain it."

Brennes said, "I am not the first and I won't be the last of the officials in the Nicaraguan foreign service to break with the regime of the nine Sandinista commandantes; I am just one more. I assert that presently Nicaragua is a colony of the communist countries where the Russians and Cubans are the owners and rulers of the Nicaraguan people." Brennes claimed there are 10,000 to 15,000 military advisors in Nicaragua, and that when you count the advisors in other fields, like education and politics, the "occupying army" reaches nearly 30,000. "It is the presence of this occupying army which adds to the poverty of the Nicaraguan people because this large army must be fed well, but they produce nothing." Brennes has requested political asylum in Honduras. SOURCE: Unclassified State Department cable, Tegucigalpa 5746.

-- SPANISH PRIEST EXPELLED: Spanish priest Tjimoteo Merino was accused of being the primary organizer of a support network for ARDE in Rio San Juan Department. (ARDE is the anti-Sandinista group operating in southern Nicaragua near the border with Costa Rica. It is headed by Eden Pastora, a

former Sandinista commander who was a hero of the revolution against Somoza.) A Ministry of Interior communique, dated May 11, gave him 72-hours to leave the country.

Merino's involvement in "counterrevolutionary activities" and contravention of the prohibition against the involvement of foreigners in Nicaraguan internal political affairs were given as the reason for his expulsion.

In a May 5 letter, nine of the eleven priests working in that southern area, including the Bishop, denied Barricada's (a state run newspaper) allegations against Merino and stated that Merino was willing to answer any concrete charges brought against him. The letter stated that Merino's work in the area had always been of a pastoral nature and that he enjoyed the support of his parishioners. The clergymen called upon the faithful not to be fooled by the GRN's smear campaign against Merino and his parishioners.

SOURCE: ~~Unclassified~~ State Department cable, Managua 2024,

Unclassified para 5. Let 3

-- STATE OF EMERGENCY EXTENDED: The Council of State in its May 26 session extended the State of Emergency for one year, until May 30, 1984. The State of Emergency allows the Government of National Reconstruction (GRN) to continue prior censorship and to hold political prisoners indefinitely without recourse to habeas corpus.

SOURCE: ~~Unclassified~~ State Department cable, Managua 2320.

Unclassified para 1

-- OPPOSITION LEADER DETAINED FROM LEAVING COUNTRY:

Nicaraguan immigration authorities did not allow Luis Rivas Levia, Social Democratic Party President, to leave the country today. The opposition leader told ACAN-EFE at Managua's Augusto Cesar Sandino Airport that an immigration officer told him he could not leave the country as he was about to board the plane for Costa Rica.

SOURCE: Panama City radio station ACAN, 18 May 1983.

-- COSTA RICANS WARY OF NICARAGUA: Seven in 10 Costa Ricans see Nicaragua as a military threat (70%), and six in 10 say Nicaragua is trying to weaken the Costa Rican government (56%). Further, Nicaragua (32%) ranks third after Cuba (50%) and the U.S.S.R. (40%) as responsible for conditions that could lead to war in the region. (The United States is ranked at 29%.)

SOURCE: USIA poll, April 11, 1983.

-- LIBYAN OFFICE ON SUPPORT FOR NICARAGUA: "The position of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya clearly favors the causes of liberation and supports the Latin American peoples. Libya's support for the Sandinist revolution and the Nicaraguan people has been clear from the outset. Commander Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi has declared that Libya will support the Nicaraguan people and the Sandinist revolution against U.S. aggression and against the Somozist bands, just as it supports the Salvadoran people's struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression and against the military dictatorships in Central America."

SOURCE: Press communique issued by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya people's office in Panama, Panama City, La Republica, 29 April 1983.

-- SANDINISTA PRESSURE ON STEVEDORES UNION IN CORINTO: The Sandinistas have become embroiled in a labor union controversy involving the stevedores in the Pacific port of Corinto. The Corinto Union, which contains over 1,300 workers, affiliated with the Sandinista Workers Central, a Sandinista

controlled union, (CST) after the 1979 revolution. Many union members are now dissatisfied with the CST and wish to switch to the Confederation for Labor Unification (CUS), an independent organization which belongs to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (IFCTU) and has strong ties with the AFL-CIO. The port of Corinto is of strategic importance to the FSLN since it handled much of Nicaragua's foreign commerce as well as incoming military materiel. The Sandinistas have employed a variety of means including arrests, mob action, threats, etc., to intimidate the union and keep it aligned with the CST. Some union leaders have been forced to flee Nicaragua, and one, Zacarias Hernandez, has become a leader in the exile labor movement. The FSLN's heavy handed tactics have caused some international criticism. The ICFTU has submitted a complaint about the Corinto view to the International Labor Organization, and Amnesty International has adopted two of the arrested stevedores as cases of special interest.

In mid-March, the situation came to a head when the executive board of the union attempted to switch from the CST to CUS. The Sandinistas responded by having militiamen occupy the union headquarters. The Ministry of Labor, asserting that the militiamen were also members of the union, chose to view the incident as an internal union matter. It took no action to dislodge the occupiers, although their actions were blatantly illegal under existing Nicaraguan law. The

Ministry also disallowed the executive board's decision to join CUS, arguing that this could only be done by a two-thirds vote of the full union membership. The Ministry concurrently initiated an audit of the union's books to determine if some of the union's funds had been diverted to counter-revolutionaries. While this audit was in progress, the Ministry would not permit the union to hold a Congress to vote on the switch to CUS. When the Ministry of Labor's audit could find a shortage of only approximately 40,000 cordobas (barely \$1500 US dollars at the current blackmarket rate), the Sandinistas concluded that they had no justification to continue delaying a vote on CUS affiliation, and allowed the union to schedule a Congress for June.

On May 21, 11 CUS officials, including Secretary General Bayardo Lopez, Jose Espinoza and Alvin Guthrie, traveled to Corinto to discuss affiliation with 300-400 of the stevedores. When they arrived at the theatre where the union members were assembled, they found the entrance blocked by a Sandinista mob composed of approximately 100 men, some armed and wearing militia uniforms. An ugly incident ensued, with the members of the mob shouting obscenities at the CUS leaders and denouncing them as tools of the United States and the contras. The mob then physically attacked the CUS leaders with fists and sticks and forced them to flee.

SOURCE: ~~Unclassified~~ State Department cable, Managua 2268, paragraphs 2, 3, & 4.

unclassified

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SOURCE: La Prensa, May 12, 1983; Barricada, May 26, 1983.

CENTRAL AMERICA: INFORMATION NOT WIDELY KNOWN

NICARAGUA:

--ON ELECTIONS: "The interior minister (Tomas Borge) warned that if the Reagan Administration's aggression against Nicaragua increases, the elections scheduled for 1985 will not be held even though the government is working not only for the country's defense but also for its democratization* . . . Either Reagan takes the counter-revolutionaries out of Nicaragua or we exterminate them." "The interior minister spoke with journalists yesterday about the current aggressions during the visit he made to the open detention system farm (emphasis added) for the Miskitos with Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski, vice president of the FRG Social Democratic Party." *The Sandinista regime came to power in July 1979 publicly promising elections. They have yet to be held.
SOURCE: Radio Sandino, 16 May 1983.

--HONDURAN TERRORIST REVEALS SANDINISTA SUPPORT. A "missing person" surfaced at a May 27 press conference in Guatemala, Efrain Duarte Salgado, the admitted chief of the most active Honduran terrorist group, the Popular Revolutionary Forces (FPR) had reportedly "disappeared" on May 1. His case had become a "cause celebre" of human rights groups. Duarte said he had sought asylum in Guatemala because he feared that his former compatriots would try to kill him in Honduras.

He called on them to abandon armed struggle and to "search for other means, like the democratic way, to attain power."

Detailing foreign influence over his group, Duarte said:

- He formed the FPR cell called "Lorenzo Zelaya" in 1980 and at first it was a hard struggle because they had no outside support.
- The Sandinistas began to provide limited economic support soon afterward. "The Nicaraguan aid was always conditional in the sense that we had to undertake different violent acts to destabilize the Honduran government and try to create a Marxist-Leninist regime."
- Training in subversion was not difficult because colaboration from Cuba could be counted on. He was in Cuba himself, and established contact with leaders of ORPA, a Guatemalan terrorist group.

He acknowledged his responsibility for the following terrorist acts:

- The armed attack against the American Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras in 1980.
- Placing explosives in the offices of IBM and the Salvadorian airline, TACA, in 1982.

SOURCE: Unclassified State Department cable, Tegucigalpa 5570.

-- AT THE UNITED NATIONS: Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto: "If the Security Council does not assert its

authority, Nicaragua cannot be asked to relinquish indefinitely the use of its right to legitimate defense."

SOURCE: Radio Sandino, 17 May 1983.

-- DEFECTION OF NICARAGUAN COUNSUL IN CHOLUTECA, HONDURAS:

The following statement by the Nicaraguan counsul assigned to Choluteca, Honduras was released to the media by the Honduran National Security Police Forces (FUSEP) at 10:00 local time on May 19, 1983:

Misael Brennes, Nicaraguan citizen, accredited before the government of Honduras makes it known to national and international public opinion:

1. That in full control of my mental and physical faculties I have decided on this day to request political asylum and protection from the government of Honduras;

2. That the fundamental reason for my decision is my disagreement with the manner in which the National Directorate of the Nicaraguan Sandinista Liberation Front is managing internal and external affairs of my beloved country;

3. That I make this declaration and petition for asylum without having been subject to any type of pressure or coercion whatsoever. Signed: Misael Brennes.

At a press conference in late May, in Honduras, Brennes, responding to Nicaraguan charges that he had been "kidnapped," said, what had "kidnapped" him were the ideals and principles of democracy. "I defected from the Sandinista regime because I am convinced that communism has advanced in Nicaragua to the point where there is no other path than armed struggle to detain it."

Brennes said, "I am not the first and I won't be the last of the officials in the Nicaraguan foreign service to break with the regime of the nine Sandinista commandantes; I am just one more. I assert that presently Nicaragua is a colony of the communist countries where the Russians and Cubans are the owners and rulers of the Nicaraguan people." Brennes claimed there are 10,000 to 15,000 military advisors in Nicaragua, and that when you count the advisors in other fields, like education and politics, the "occupying army" reaches nearly 30,000. "It is the presence of this occupying army which adds to the poverty of the Nicaraguan people because this large army must be fed well, but they produce nothing." Brennes has requested political asylum in Honduras. SOURCE: Unclassified State Department cable, Tegucigalpa 5746.

-- SPANISH PRIEST EXPELLED: Spanish priest Timoteo Merino was accused of being the primary organizer of a support network for ARDE in Rio San Juan Department. (ARDE is the anti-Sandinista group operating in southern Nicaragua near the border with Costa Rica. It is headed by Eden Pastora, a

former Sandinista commander who was a hero of the revolution against Somoza.) A Ministry of Interior communique, dated May 11, gave him 72-hours to leave the country.

Merino's involvement in "counterrevolutionary activities" and contravention of the prohibition against the involvement of foreigners in Nicaraguan internal political affairs were given as the reason for his expulsion.

In a May 5 letter, nine of the eleven priests working in that southern area, including the Bishop, denied Barricada's (a state run newspaper) allegations against Merino and stated that Merino was willing to answer any concrete charges brought against him. The letter stated that Merino's work in the area had always been of a pastoral nature and that he enjoyed the support of his parishioners. The clergymen called upon the faithful not to be fooled by the GRN's smear campaign against Merino and his parishioners.
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SOURCE: Unclassified State Department cable, Managua 2320.

-- OPPOSITION LEADER DETAINED FROM LEAVING COUNTRY: Nicaraguan immigration authorities did not allow Luis Rivas Levia, Social Democratic Party President, to leave the country today. The opposition leader told ACAN-EFE at Managua's Augusto Cesar Sandino Airport that an immigration officer told him he could not leave the country as he was about to board the plane for Costa Rica.

SOURCE: Panama City radio station ACAN, 18 May 1983.

-- COSTA RICANS WARY OF NICARAGUA: Seven in 10 Costa Ricans see Nicaragua as a military threat (70%), and six in 10 say Nicaragua is trying to weaken the Costa Rican government (56%). Further, Nicaragua (32%) ranks third after Cuba (50%) and the U.S.S.R. (40%) as responsible for conditions that could lead to war in the region. (The United States is ranked at 29%.)

SOURCE: USIA poll, April 11, 1983.

-- LIBYAN OFFICE ON SUPPORT FOR NICARAGUA: "The position of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah clearly favors the causes of liberation and supports the Latin American peoples. Libya's support for the Sandinist revolution and the Nicaraguan people has been clear from the outset. Commander Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi has declared that Libya will support the Nicaraguan people and the Sandinist revolution against U.S. aggression and against the Somozist bands, just as it supports the Salvadoran people's struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression and against the military dictatorships in Central America."

SOURCE: Press communique issued by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah people's office in Panama, Panama City, La Republica, 29 April 1983.

-- SANDINISTA PRESSURE ON STEVEDORES UNION IN CORINTO: The Sandinistas have become embroiled in a labor union controversy involving the stevedores in the Pacific port of Corinto. The Corinto Union, which contains over 1,300 workers, affiliated with the Sandinista Workers Central. a Sandinista

controlled union, (CST) after the 1979 revolution. Many union members are now dissatisfied with the CST and wish to switch to the Confederation for Labor Unification (CUS), an independent organization which belongs to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (IFCTU) and has strong ties with the AFL-CIO. The port of Corinto is of strategic importance to the FSLN since it handled much of Nicaragua's foreign commerce as well as incoming military materiel. The Sandinistas have employed a variety of means including arrests, mob action, threats, etc., to intimidate the union and keep it aligned with the CST. Some union leaders have been forced to flee Nicaragua, and one, Zacarias Hernandez, has become a leader in the exile labor movement. The FSLN's heavy handed tactics have caused some international criticism. The ICFTU has submitted a complaint about the Corinto view to the International Labor Organization, and Amnesty International has adopted two of the arrested stevedores as cases of special interest.

In mid-March, the situation came to a head when the executive board of the union attempted to switch from the CST to CUS. The Sandinistas responded by having militiamen occupy the union headquarters. The Ministry of Labor, asserting that the militiamen were also members of the union, chose to view the incident as an internal union matter. It took no action to dislodge the occupiers, although their actions were blatantly illegal under existing Nicaraguan law. The

Ministry also disallowed the executive board's decision to join CUS, arguing that this could only be done by a two-thirds vote of the full union membership. The Ministry concurrently initiated an audit of the union's books to determine if some of the union's funds had been diverted to counter-revolutionaries. While this audit was in progress, the Ministry would not permit the union to hold a Congress to vote on the switch to CUS. When the Ministry of Labor's audit could find a shortage of only approximately 40,000 cordobas (barely \$1500 US dollars at the current blackmarket rate), the Sandinistas concluded that they had no justification to continue delaying a vote on CUS affiliation, and allowed the union to schedule a Congress for June.

On May 21, 11 CUS officials, including Secretary General Bayardo Lopez, Jose Espinoza and Alvin Guthrie, traveled to Corinto to discuss affiliation with 300-400 of the stevedores. When they arrived at the theatre where the union members were assembled, they found the entrance blocked by a Sandinista mob composed of approximately 100 men, some armed and wearing militia uniforms. An ugly incident ensued, with the members of the mob shouting obscenities at the CUS leaders and denouncing them as tools of the United States and the contras. The mob then physically attacked the CUS leaders with fists and sticks and forced them to flee.

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UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

June 3, 1983

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

TO: Mort Blackwell

FR: Jackie Tillman *JT*

Enclosed is the first cut for the Central America update. For this first one, I have included items only about Nicaragua and Cuba. I intend to cover the rest of Central America in the future ones, but to get one off the press by next Wed., I'll leave it at that. I, again, want to stress with you that since Ambassador Kirkpatrick (and consequently, I) does not have formal responsibility for Central America policy, it is really important that the NSC clear on these items as to content, accuracy, etc. I have indicated with each item the source of information. As you can see, some of the items come from unclassified paragraphs of otherwise classified cables, the rest are taken from FBIS (the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service), which is also unclassified.

It would be very helpful for me to have a schedule from you indicating how many times a month you desire to put out the updates, when you need the information in order to make your publication deadlines, etc.

I have not attempted to address the "bias" question with this update, but I do think it ought to be considered. My feeling is that the US press covers all the "bad news" coming from El Salvador, Guatemala, etc., but has not touched most of the items in this update that tend to bolster the Administration's case. So, for example, if the military, or someone, in El Salvador has committed an atrocity, I have not mentioned it here. Perhaps someone needs to decide our policy regarding balance, preferably before this series is issued, so it can be explained at the beginning of the process.

retype, double spaced

INFORMATION NOT WIDELY KNOWN

CENTRAL AMERICA UPDATE: ~~INFORMAL BRIEFING NOTES~~

NICARAGUA

At the United Nations: Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto: "If the Security Council does not assert its authority, Nicaragua cannot be asked to relinquish indefinitely the use of its right to legitimate defense."

Source: Radio Sandino, 17 May 83

On Elections: "The interior minister (Tomas Borge) warned that if the Reagan Administration's aggression against Nicaragua increases, the elections scheduled for 1985 will not be held even though the government is working not only for the country's defense but also for its democratization*.....'Either Reagan takes the counterrevolutionaries out of Nicaragua or we exterminate them.' The interior minister spoke with journalists yesterday about the current aggressions during the visit he made to the open dentention system farm

(emphasis added) for the Miskitos with Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski, vice president of the FRG Social Democratic Party. *The Sandinista regime came to power in July 1979 publicly promising elections. They have yet to be held.

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Misael Brennes, Nicaraguan citizen, accredited before the government of Honduras by the government of Nicaragua, as counsul in the city of Choluteca, makes it known to national and international public opinion:

1. That in full control of my mental and physical faculties I have decided on this day to request political asylum and protection from the government of Honduras;
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all press conference statement

Spanish Priest Expelled: Spanish priest Timoteo Merino was accused of being the primary organizer of a support network for ARDE in Rio San Juan Department.

A Ministry of Interior communique, dated May 11, gave him 72 hours to leave the country. His involvement in "counterrevolutionary activities" and contravention of the prohibition against the involvement of foreigners in Nicaraguan internal political affairs were given as the reason for his expulsion. In a May 5 letter, nine of the eleven priests working in that southern area, including the Bishop, denied Barricada's allegations against Merino and stated that Merino was willing to answer any concrete charges brought against him. The letter stated that Merino's work in the area had always been of a pastoral nature and that he enjoyed the support of his parishoners. The clergymen called upon the faithful not to be fooled by the GRN's smear campaign against Merino and his parishoners. Managua 2024, unclassified p. 2 & 3. Source: unclassified state Dept. wire cable, Managua 2024.

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La Prensa, May 12, 1983; Barricada, May 26, 1983.

source:
unclassified
text
Paragraph
Cable

Sources:

CUBA

ICFTU Complaint against Cuba: From the Brussels Daily Le Soir
of May 7-8, 1983 article by Jean-Paul Marthoz.

Cuba: Emulators of the Solidarity Trade Union?

Has there been an attempt to create an independent trade union in Cuba? For several weeks, a controversy punctuated by the dispatch of telegrams, letters and communiques has pitted the Castro authorities against the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and Amnesty International.

The international trade union organization, which is based in Brussels and represents among others, the most powerful trade unions in the Western world like the West German DGB, the American AFL-CIO and the British TUC, affirms as fact that 50 workers were arrested in October 1982 at Havana for having attempted to organize with their colleagues an independent trade union. It concerns a group of workers, employed by the state construction enterprise headquartered at Havana, who were working at the "Lenin Park" recreation center located in Havana.

On January 25, five of them were sentenced to death and twelve others received sentences of imprisonment up to 80 years. After an appeal lodged with the Council of State, the five death penalties were commuted to 30 year terms of imprisonment. ICFTU sources in Cuba nonetheless indicate that, for the Cuban authorities, the file remains open and the danger of application of the death sentences is not totally excluded.

On Friday, the ICFTU moreover, announced that it had received confirmation from reliable sources within Cuba of the arrest of the four lawyers who defended the five workers condemned to death as well as the arrest of a judge of the Peoples' Court at Havana, Nicasio Hernandez, who objected to the death sentences.

Moreover, the ICFTU continues to investigate information concerning the arrest of 200 persons who protested against the confiscation of their crops at Sancti Spiritus. Eleven of them are supposed to have been condemned to death. Trade union militants of the Pedro Moriero brewery, the Havana Bus Company and an electricity distributing company are also supposed to be under prosecution. Thirty workers are supposed to have been arrested at the sugar plant at Chaparra, where they tried to organize the truck drivers. These reports, however, have not been confirmed.

On Wednesday, at a press conference organized in Cuba for French journalists, Vice-president Carlos Rafael Rodriguez acknowledged that five persons had been condemned "for acts of sabotage having nothing in common with any trade union organization. "Among the five persons mentioned by the international press," the number two Cuban said, "one was a small peasant, the other four had no occupation. They were engaged in speculation on the black market."

In an interview given to the correspondent of the French Communist newspaper L'Humanite, Rodriguez accused them "of having set fire to fishing plants, sabotaging means of transportation, and attempting unsuccessfully means of transportation, and attempting unsuccessfully

Cuba

to destroy important enterprises in Havana." "They were even preparing to assassinate certain leaders," the Communist leader specified, in emphasizing "their ties with counter-revolutionary organizations installed abroad and with official agencies of the United States."

Even if, as Rodriguez affirmed, the five "saboterus" have not been shot, this affair has raised uneasy feelings even within the trade union organizations affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions (based in Prague). The French CGT, which sent a delegation for May 1 to Cuba, is supposed to receive a report from the Cubans Workers' Central.

The complaint filed officially by the ICFTU with the international labor office at Geneva also poses certain diplomatic problems, since for the first time since his accession to power at Havana, Fidel Castro will make an official visit to Western Europe at the end of this year. He is supposed to visit Madria, Paris and Stockholm, three capitals that are politically very close to the Social Democratic circles of the ICFTU.

B

A "missing person" surfaced at

HONDURAN TERRORIST REVEALS SANDINISTA SUPPORT. At a May 27 press conference in Guatemala, Efraim Duarte Salgado, the admitted chief of the most active Honduran terrorist group, the Popular Revolutionary Forces (FPR), ~~Zelaya~~ ^{Lorenzo} Duarte had reportedly "disappeared" on May 1, and his case had become a "cause celebre" of human rights groups. Duarte said he had sought asylum in Guatemala because he feared that his former compatriots would try to kill him in Honduras. He called on them to abandon armed struggle and to "search for other means, like the democratic way, to attain power." Detailing foreign influence over his group, Duarte said:

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Source: ^{State Department} unclassified cable, Tegucigalpa 5570

~~Mort: To add to piece about defecting Nicaraguan counsel from Choluteca, Honduras:~~

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A

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NICARAGUA

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Opposition leader detained from leaving country: Nicaraguan immigration authorities did not allow Luis Rivas Leiva, Social Democratic Party president, to leave the country today. The opposition leader told ACAN-EFE at Managua's Augusto Cesar Sandino Airport that an immigration officer told him he could not leave the country as he was about to board the plane for Costa Rica.
Panama City ACAN, 18 May 83

Costa Ricans Wary of Nicaragua: Seven in 10 Costa Ricans see Nicaragua as a military threat (70%), and six in 10 say Nicaragua is trying to weaken the Costa Rican government (56%). Further, Nicaragua (32%) ranks third after Cuba (50%) and the USSR (40%) as responsible for conditions that could lead to war in the region (the US is mentioned by 29%).
USIA poll, April 11, 1983

Libyan Office on Support for Nicaragua: "The position of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya clearly favors the causes of liberation and supports the Latin American peoples. Libya's support for the Sandinist revolution and the Nicaraguan people has been clear from the outset. Commander Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi has declared that Libya will support the Nicaraguan people and the Sandinist revolution against U.S. aggression and against the Somozist bands, just as it supports the Salvadoran people's struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression and against the military dictatorships in Central America."
Press communique issued by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya people's office in Panama, Panama City, La Republica, 29 April 83

Sandinista Pressure on Stevedores Union in Corinto. The Sandinistas have become embroiled in a labor union controversy involving the stevedores in the Pacific port of Corinto. The Corinto Union, which contains over 1300 workers, affiliated with the Sandinista Workers Central (CST) after the 1979 revolution. Many union members are now dissatisfied with the CST and wish to switch to the Confederation for Labor Unification (CUS), an independent organization which belongs to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and has strong ties with the AFL-CIO. The port of Corinto is of strategic importance to the FSLN since it handled much of Nicaragua's foreign commerce as well as incoming military material. The Sandinistas have employed a variety of means including arrests, mob (turba) action, threats, etc., to intimidate the union and keep it aligned with the CST. Some union leaders have been forced to flee Nicaragua, and one, Zacarias Hernandez, has become a leader in the exile labor movement. The FSLN's heavy handed tactics have caused some international criticism. The ICFTU has submitted a complaint about the Corinto view to the International Labor Organization, and Amnesty International has adopted two of the arrested stevedores as cases of special interest.

In mid-March, the situation came to a head when the executive board of the union attempted to switch from the CST to CUS. The Sandinistas responded by having militiamen occupy the union headquarters. The Ministry of Labor, asserting that the militiamen were also members of the union, chose to view the incident as an internal union matter. It took no action to dislodge the occupiers, although their actions were blatantly illegal under existing Nicaraguan law. The Ministry also disallowed the executive board's decision to join CUS, arguing that this could only be done by a two-thirds vote of the full union membership. The Ministry concurrently initiated an audit of the union's books to determine if some of the union's funds had been diverted to counterrevolutionaries. While this audit was in progress, the Ministry would not permit the union to hold

a Congress to vote on the switch to CUS. When the Ministry of Labor's audit could find a shortage of only approximately 40,000 cordobas (barely \$1500 US dollars at the current blackmarket rate), the Sandinistas concluded that they had no justification to continue delaying a vote on CUS affiliation, and allowed the union to schedule a Congress for June.

On May 21, 11 CUS officials, including Secretary General Bayardo Lopez, Jose Espinoza and Alvin Guthrie, traveled to Corinto to discuss affiliation with 300 - 400 of the stevedores. When they arrived at the threer where the union members were assembled, they found the entrance blocked by a Sandinista mob composed of approximately 100 men, some armed and wearing militia uniforms. An ugly incident ensued, with the members of the mob shouting obscenities at the CUS leaders and denouncing them as tools of the US and the contras. The turba members then physically attacked the CUS leaders with fists and sticks and forced them to flee. Managua 2268, unclassified p. 2, 3, 4.

The banana plantation belonging to Private Sector Leader's Farm Expropriated. Ramiro Gurdian, president of the UPANIC, an agricultural private sector organization, was expropriated by the Sandinistas in late May. The justification for the expropriation was explained by Sergio Rameriz, member of the Sandinista junta: "The problem is that there are some who call themselves Nicaraguans and think like yanquis.....We think that this gentleman cannot be associated with the revolutionary State because we need proprietors that are clear about the danger represented by measures from the United States." Dr. Gurdian had stated publicly in an interview of May 12 in La Prensa that while Nicaragua would probably lose approximately 12 million dollars because of the reduction in their sugar quota, he went on to explain that, "the United States, and Nicaragua, are both sovereign and independent nations and each has the right to buy and sell to countries as they see fit."

La Prensa, May 12, 1983; Barricada, May 26, 1983.

CUBA

ICFTU Complaint against Cuba: From the Brussels Daily Le Soir of May 7-8, 1983 article by Jean-Paul Marthoz.

Cuba: Emulators of the Solidarity Trade Union?

Has there been an attempt to create an independent trade union in Cuba? For several weeks, a controversy punctuated by the dispatch of telegrams, letters and communiques has pitted the Castro authorities against the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and Amnesty International.

The international trade union organization, which is based in Brussels and represents among others, the most powerful trade unions in the Western world like the West German DGB, the American AFL-CIO and the British TUC, affirms as fact that 50 workers were arrested in October 1982 at Havana for having attempted to organize with their colleagues an independent trade union. It concerns a group of workers, employed by the state construction enterprise headquartered at Havana, who were working at the "Lenin Park" recreation center located in Havana.

On January 25, five of them were sentenced to death and twelve others received sentences of imprisonment up to 80 years. After an appeal lodged with the Council of State, the five death penalties were commuted to 30 year terms of imprisonment. ICFTU sources in Cuba nonetheless indicate that, for the Cuban authorities, the file remains open and the danger of application of the death sentences is not totally excluded.

On Friday, the ICFTU moreover, announced that it had received confirmation from reliable sources within Cuba of the arrest of the four lawyers who defended the five workers condemned to death as well as the arrest of a judge of the Peoples' Court at Havana, Nicasio Hernandez, who objected to the death sentences.

Moreover, the ICFTU continues to investigate information concerning the arrest of 200 persons who protested against the confiscation of their crops at Sancti Spiritus. Eleven of them are supposed to have been condemned to death. Trade union militants of the Pedro Moriero brewery, the Havana Bus Company and an electricity distributing company are also supposed to be under prosecution. Thirty workers are supposed to have been arrested at the sugar plant at Chaparra, where they tried to organize the truck drivers. These reports, however, have not been confirmed.

On Wednesday, at a press conference organized in Cuba for French journalists, Vice-president Carlos Rafael Rodriguez acknowledged that five persons had been condemned "for acts of sabotage having nothing in common with any trade union organization. "Among the five persons mentioned by the international press," the number two Cuban said, "one was a small peasant, the other four had no occupation. They were engaged in speculation on the black market."

In an interview given to the correspondent of the French Communist newspaper L'Humanite, Rodriguez accused them "of having set fire to fishing plants, sabotaging means of transportation, and attempting unsuccessfully means of transportation, and attempting unsuccessfully

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to destroy important enterprises in Havana." "They were even preparing to assassinate certain leaders," the Communist leader specified, in emphasizing "their ties with counter-revolutionary organizations installed abroad and with official agencies of the United States."

Even if, as Rodriguez affirmed, the five "saboterus" have not been shot, this affair has raised uneasy feelings even within the trade union organizations affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions (based in Prague). The French CGT, which sent a delegation for May 1 to Cuba, is supposed to receive a report from the Cubans Workers' Central.

The complaint filed officially by the ICFTU with the international labor office at Geneva also poses certain diplomatic problems, since for the first time since his accession to power at Havana, Fidel Castro will make an official visit to Western Europe at the end of this year. He is supposed to visit Madria, Paris and Stockholm, three capitals that are politically very close to the Social Democratic circles of the ICFTU.