Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Blackwell, Morton: Files

Folder Title: Central America Information Packet

(3 of 3)

Box: 56

To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection

Contact a reference archivist at: <u>reagan.library@nara.gov</u>

Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing

National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/

Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs

Saul I. Stern President

Herbert A. Fierst Chairman of the Board

Seymour Abensohn

Treasurer

Elliot H. Cole Vice President

Nathan Golden

Vice President

Lyle Ryter

Vice President

Stephen Rosen Secretary

Shoshana Bryen
Executive Director

Board of Advisors

Sen. Rudy Boschwitz
Lt. Gen. Devol Brett (Ret.)
Paul S. Cutter
The Hon. Jack Kemp
I. L. Kenen
Prof. Walter Laqueur
Max M. Kampelman
Ivan Novick

Ivan Novick
Prof. Eugene Rostow
Edward Sanders

Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe (Ret. Jacques Torczyner

Gen. John Vogt (Ret.) Gordon Zacks

Adm. Elmo Zumwait (Ret.)

December 6, 1983

Mr. Morton Blackwell Office of Public Liaison The White House Washington, DC

Dear Mort:

I thought pages 3 and 4 of our November <u>Newsletter</u> would be of particular interest to you.

With all good wishes

Sincerely

Shoshana Bryen Executive Director

SB/mk Encl.

NEWSLETTER

JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

1411 K Street NW, Suite 1002, Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 347-5425

Vol. III. No. 24

November 1983

NEWSBRIEFS

GCC EXERCISES: The Gulf Cooperation Council held its first joint military maneuvers in October. The exercises were held in the deserts of the United Arab Emirates. Ground forces from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman participated, along with air force units from the UAE.

PLO RIFT WIDENS: The rebellion against the leadership of Yasser Arafat among PLO factions has widened with the defection of the Syrian-backed Palestinian commando group Saiqa from the Fatah camp. The group, one of the smaller factions in the PLO, was joined by the commander of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) in Syria, in demands for a replacement for Arafat. Fatah loyalists responded to the latest defections by accusing Syria of fomenting rebellion and trying to dominate the PLO.

CHEMICAL WARFARE SCHOOL IN CUBA: According to Cuban Major Juan Ferugoriis Cruz of the Directorate of Chemical Troops of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Cuban army will establish a training school for chemical warfare. The school will be staffed with engineers and officers trained in the Soviet Union, and will teach Cuban soldiers to take charge of chemical warfare units and weapons. This announcement is opposed to the Soviet Union's declared policy of only dealing with defensive chemical warfare preparations. However, in addition to weapons training, the Cubans may have learned about two other chemicals from the Russians, including the use of defoliants and specific crop killers. The latter could be used to wipe out stable crops in areas that are mostly unresistant to Soviet control. Then, a pro-Soviet country would supply aid to combat the food shortage along with Soviet advisers. Cuba, long a surrogate of the Soviet Union, would be an ideal candidate for such tactics.

SOVIET BUILD UP IN RED SEA: The Soviet Union has significantly expanded its military presence in the Red Sea, by building up its airbase on the strategic Dahlak Islands which lifes halfway between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. The base has recently received improved naval facilities, helicopter pads, floating piers and navigational aids. Furthermore, the floating dry dock, which is capable of handling shipping of up to 8,500 tonnes, is now manned round the clock by Russian work crews. In the first half of 1983, 56 Soviet ships have docked in the islands, compared with 87 for all of last year. At nearby Eritrea, the Soviets have permanently based a squadron of IL-38 anti-submarine warfare aircraft, which are sent on frequent flights over the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, and have increased aerial surveillance flights from Asmara airfield. Two Bear long-range reconnaissance aircraft are now stationed in Asmara.

NEW NATO BASE IN TURKEY: The Turkish general staff announced that NATO has established a new base at the central Turkish city of Konya. The base is equipped with American AWACS reconnaissance planes as part of a NATO network of early-warning bases. The AWACS will be under the Turkish Air Force's control.

SOVIET BMD POWER: According to the Pentagon, the Soviet Union could increase the effectiveness of its air defenses if it constructed a ballistic missile defense system. Currently, with no BMS, the Soviets are capable of protecting 30-40% of their strategic targets, despite varying degrees of air defense effectiveness. In comparison, with a fully effective BMD, 70% of their targets would be covered with 85% effective air defense and even moderate BMD could substantially reduce the potential damage to their military value structure.

SOVIET ARMS TO INDIA: As a result of military talks last June between the Soviet Union and India, the Soviets have apparently agreed to a multibillion dollar arms deal that would cover most of the next decade. If the deal is approved, India will receive MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters planes which are just now being produced in the Soviet Union; an upgrading of the MiG-29 with a follow-up sale of MiG-31s (which are still in the development stage); the replacement of India's aging T72 tanks with the newer T80 model; and submarines, missile boats and air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles

ABOUT ARMY RECRUITMENT: The Army reported that in fiscal 1983, it has met its recruitment goal of 132,000. Of these, 88% are high school graduates \$4% scored average or above-average on the Army's intelligence tests; and the Army achieved admittance of the lowest percentage ever scoring in the lowest mental category allowed into the service. Officials contrasted these statistics with those from 1964, the last pre-Vietnam draft year, when only 67% were high school graduates and 80% scored average or above average on the tests.

NEW WEAPON TESTED IN LEBANON: According to US military sources, 33 US Army soldiers were in Beirut at the time of the headquarters bombing in order to test a new antiartillery radar weapon. The weapon, called the AN-TPQ-36 and -37 or Firefinder, "locates enemy batteries by backplotting incoming shells, even before impact."

(continued on page 6)

The Lavi: Israel's Aircraft of the 1990's

Mariene Korenstein

Ed. Note: Mrs. Korenstein is a member of the JINSA staff.

Recognizing the threats to Israel's security and the potential military scenarios in the Middle East into the 1990s, as well as quantitative and qualitative gaps in the fleet of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), the government of Israel authorized the development of an indigenous aircraft in February 1980. It was clear that an aircraft was needed which could be produced in large enough numbers to replace both the "Kfir" and the "Skyhawk" as the advanced attack plane of the IAF. Israel decided that the most viable operational and cost-effective solution was in the incountry development and production of

In the ensuing 31/2 years, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on or committed to the design and production of the Lavi, which is being developed by Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), with the cooperation of American companies such as the Grumman Corporation. Because of the coproduction scheme and fear of competition on the part of US companies, the Lavi has often been misrepresented as another F-15 type plane, designed to replace either the F-15 or F-16. In fact, however, the IAF plans a greater dependence on the F-16 in future air-to-air missions and the Israeli agreement regarding potential future purchases of F-15s, F-16s and F-18s from the US should not be adversely affected.

The Design

The sophistication of the Lavi is planned to be proportional to its limited function in the IAF. In contrast to the multi-faceted designs for USAF aircraft which fulfill global missions, the Lavi is designed specifically for close and medium-range air-to-ground missions, but may also have a minimal air support and air defense role.

Emphasis has been placed on IAF operational experience as well as adaptability to IAF structural needs. In addition, a two-seated version will be produced for training, which precludes the need to develop additional aircraft for this purpose. Many of the systems are common to other aircraft in the IAF fleet and the avionics were carefully designed to meet the Air Force's doctrine implementation.


The Lavi is primarily designed for an air-to-ground role. There is no rear stabilizer and there are maneuverable canards above the wings. According to IAI, the Lavi is basically a more sophisticated and larger A-4 (the smallest combat-tested aircraft currently in wide use, weighing only 15,000 lbs.); its maximum take-off weight is 42,000 lbs. as compared to the 55,000 lbs. of the F-4. The Lavi will initially replace the A-4; it is planned that the "Kfir" and the F-4 will eventually be superceded by a more sophisticated version in the 1990s, although the production schedule has not yet been finalized.

The engine, a new Pratt & Whitney 1120, which is an offshoot of the F-100 series, has a 60% commonality of parts with that engine, and is unchanged in hot section life. The PW-1120 has been modified to fulfill Lavi specifications, but is comprised entirely of proven technology. United Technologies has committed itself to working with Israel for the duration of the program. Currently, the engine is on schedule and within target costs.

The wings will be constructed of composite materials—in fact, they are composed of more individual parts built of composite materials than any other wing. This holds the advantage of reducing weight, without jeopardizing strength. Furthermore, the wings, which will act as fuel tanks, will be the most advanced wings of this sort. The tail will also be constructed of composite materials.

Five prototypes of the aircraft will be built and are scheduled to be ready by 1986; the first test flight is scheduled for early 1986. The Lavi is being produced against a broad background of Israeli industrial experience, including the development and production of the "Kfir" aircraft; the Gabriel missile; the Westwind business jet; the Merkava tank; and many avionics, ECM, electronics and communications systems. Many of these have met design goals, production schedules and budget targets, adding credence to the Lavi's budget forecasts.

(continued on page 5)



EDITORIALS

The Jordanian RDF

We don't mourn the recent defeat in the Senate (albeit a temporary one) of the Jordanian Rapid Deployment Force.

And we wholeheartedly agree with Sen. Moynihan that an operation of this magnitude must not be planned and funded secretly by the Administration, but rather is a subject for open and honest debate in Congress.

There may have been logic in the Administration's choice of Jordanian troops to constitute an Arab RDF. An Arab force may be more acceptable than US troops to Arab countries requiring defense of their oil fields; Jordan is basically pro-Western and its soldiers are considered to be among the best in the Arab world; the Administration has made a commitment to Jordan and has been seeking ways to provide military equipment to King Hussein with some measure of US control, which the RDF format should assure; and the RDF equipment does not include the mobile HAWK missiles to which Israel has previously objected.

But, although there may have been logic, there were many questions to be answered. Since a proposal of this nature may be resurrected in some future budget proposal, the questions should be asked and adequate answers provided by the Administration.

- 1) Have we any assurance that the Gulf States will accept the Jordanian force, which will clearly be seen as a wholly-owned American subsidiary?
- 2) Why should the Administration circumvent statements by Congress that arms sales to Jordan will not be approved until King Hussein makes a commitment to the peace process? This is really a double question. Last year, President Reagan firmly laid upon the Arab states a responsibility to recognize Israel's legitimacy, and Congress recently added muscle to the President's words by preparing to deny Jordan what it wants until the Jordanians do what the President wants. Perhaps not by design, the effect was an unusually coordinated policy. Should the President distance himself from his own demands of Arab governments, and from the intentions of the Congress?

Furthermore, arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Taiwan and others have been openly proposed and openly debated—and they are part of the Foreign Aid appropriation, not the Defense appropriation. Has the Administration elevated Jordan to the strategic status of our European allies (our NATO commitments are funded under the Defense appropriation), or was this merely an attempt to forestall Congressional debate by using a secret section of the Defense Budget to pass the money along? Should arms sales be included in the Defense Budget using Jordan as a precedent?

- 3) Have we adequately considered the ethnic composition of the Jordanian armed forces? The leadership levels are Bedouin and loyal to Hussein; however, the fighting element contains a large percentage of Palestinians, whose loyalty the King may have reason to suspect. Radical elements likely to overrun the Persian Gulf oil fields are likely to have a large Palestinian contingent. Asking Jordanian Palestinians to battle other Palestinians—or radical Iranians who have strongly supported radical Palestinians and denounced Western interests—is risky, at best.
- 4) Has the Administration adequately accounted for the fact that King Hussein has troops in Iraq, fighting against Iran? However personally and privately one might take sides in that bloody conflict, the official position of this government has been neutral. The future of US-Iranian and/or US-Iraqi relations is a very delicate matter. Arming and training a third army fighting on one side of that war compromises our stated position.

We must recognize, too, that Syria actively supports Iran and has territorial designs on Jordan. At the same time, in our official pronouncements, we still hope to influence Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, and perhaps to negotiate with Israel in the future. How

have we accounted for the further strains on potential US-Syrian diplomacy that may be engendered by our military support of Jordan?

If the proposal for an RDF using Jordanian forces is presented again, American interests would be well served by making the Administration's answers to these questions public. If there are no sufficient answers, we are well-rid of the proposal this year, and should expect not to see it reincarnated without serious restructuring.

Alone Together

The liberation of Grenada was a pre-emptive move which served a number of clear American interests: the evacuation of US citizens who, by their own account were in danger; the liberation of Grenadians who, by their own account, feel liberated; the removal of a Cuban base from a Caribbean country; an appropriate warning to other small countries about the price of Cuban "advisors" (Surinam expelled 100 such advisors, with the statement that they were not worth the risk); an appropriate demonstration to our friends in the region that we will respond to their concerns, particularly when they are prepared to provide a proportionate commitment; and an appropriate statement to unfriendly countries that there is a point beyond which one cannot threaten the interests of the United States.

Having monitored the situation in Grenada over time, the US government concluded that allowing things to move along unconstrained would eventually produce an unacceptable threat to us and our regional friends. Pre-emption was the course properly decided upon.

It is frustrating and disappointing to find ourselves standing virtually alone after having the courage to liberate Grenada. In the UN, we were supported only by those countries of the Caribbean who were threatened by Grenada; El Salvador; and Israel. Israel understood and approved because it has been in similar situations and has felt similar political isolation for its courage. In light of Grenada, and the lonely position to which the Administration exposed itself, we should reevaluate our previous hasty and illadvised criticism of Israel for its preemptive bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and for Operation Peace for Galilee for which it was similarly castigated.

The Iraqi reactor was a nuclear war waiting to happen, and one likely target was certainly Israel. The other would have been Iran. Without preemption, the reactor today would be producing bombs for the military forces of Saddam Hussein. Is there anyone who would not shudder at the spectre of a militarily desperate Iraq facing Iran with nuclear weapons?

In Lebanon, Israel had watched the PLO augment its already huge military stores and move from a guerrilla force toward a regular army—facing south. Israel had watched Syria move Soviet missiles into Lebanon. Eastern bloc advisors were with the PLO and the Syrians, and the PLO was using Lebanon as a training base for various kinds of international terrorists. The Lebanese were as hostage to the PLO as the Grenadians were to the Cubans. Recognizing the present and future threat to its citizens, Israel chose not to let things get further out of hand, and pre-empted.

Operation Peace for Galilee may not have been able to accomplish the most grandiose objectives of some Israeli planners or improvisors, but the military threat was unmistakeably greater than the one the US faced from Grenada. Israel's pre-emption was proper, and at least with hindsight based upon our own new experience, we should recognize that.

There is an uncanny similarity (although difference in scale) between the pictures of the stockpiled equipment the Israelis found in PLO tunnels, and the equipment found by the US in Grenada. There is a similarity, too, in the care taken by soldiers in both armies to avoid civilian casualties. In both cases civilians were, unfortunately, killed, but only after all possible precautions were taken. The comportment of our soldiers and Israel's is in sharp contrast to that of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, Syrians in their own city of Hamma or against the PLO in Tripoli, or Grenadian troops firing into a crowd of civilian demonstrators.

(continued on page 3)

NEWSLETTER

The Jewish Institute is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

Board of Advisors

Senator Rudy Boschwitz
Lt. Gen. Devol Brett (Ret.)
Paul S. Cutter
The Honorable Jack Kemp
I.L. Kenen
Professor Walter Laqueur
Max M. Kampelman
Ivan Novick,
Professor Eugene V. Rostow
Edward Sanders
Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe (Ret.)
Jacques Torczyner
General John Vogt (Ret.)
Gordon Zacks
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (Ret.)

Board of Directors

Saul I. Stern, President Herbert A. Fierst, Chairman of the Board Elliot H. Cole, Vice President Nathan Golden, Vice President Lyle Ryter, Vice President Seymour S. Abensohn, Treasurer Stephen Rosen, Secretary

Stanford Adelstein Rabbi Leon Adler Morris J. Amitay Phillip Aronoff, Herschel Auerbach Stanley Baruch Stanley Berenzweig Diane Blumberg Marvin Blumberg William Bryen Clement Caditz Alvin S. Cohen Melvin S. Cohen Brant Coopersmith Jerome J. Dick Howard I. Friedman Norman I. Gelman Leon Genet Dr. Leon Gerber Douglas Glant Robert Goldmann Carl Henry Harlan Hockenberg I. Samuel Kaminsky Marvin Klemow Leo Kramer Michael Ledeen Rabbi Shmuel Lefkowitz Richard Levy Bryan Littlefield Robert B. Meversburg Myron Milder Alfred H. Moses Dr. Herbert Paper Rabbi Stanley Rabinowitz Susan Rolnick Betty Sachs Richard Schifter Marvin Selig Professor Seymour Siegel Cecile Shure Samuel Stroum Dr. George Tievsky Dr. Bruno Weinschel Robert I. Widder Leonard A. Zax Marc Zell Harriet Zimmerman

Staff

Shoshana Bryen, Executive Director, Managing Editor Francis P. Hoeber, Contributing Editor Leon Sloss, Contributing Editor

EDITORIAL (continued from page 2)

The American and Israeli governments may never see eye-to-eye on the details, but both have elected to pursue policies that do not wait for their citizens to be held hostage or killed before acting. Both have limits beyond which phoney diplomacy will not be acceptable. Both understand the tangled web of Soviet involvement through surrogates in small countries and radical organizations.

There is a basis in this for coordination and cooperation between the US and Israel to advance the national interests of both countries. Having demonstrated admirable clarity of purpose in Grenada, the US should turn now to the Middle East and do the same, in concert with the only country of the region which shares our essential outlook—Israel. It is gratifying that, as we go to press, signs point in that direction.

A Remarkable Resemblance





Stockpiled Cuban-supplied weapons captured by US forces in Grenada.



Stockpiled PLO weapons captured by Israel in Lebanon.

Israeli Civil-Military Relations Analyzed at JINSA Meeting

Marlene Korenstein

Ed. Note: As part of JINSA's ongoing seminar series, our members in Washington, DC, had the oportunity to meet with Dr. Yoram Peri on 19 October. Dr. Peri, a lecturer at Tel Aviv University, was the spokesman for the Israeli Labour Party in Europe and for former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. He was also a journalist for Davar and is the author of Between Battles and Balance: Military in Israeli Politics. Dr. Peri addressed his remarks to the relationship between the military and politics in Israel.

While Israel is a militarized society due to its security situation, it is not a culture imbued with militaristic norms and mores, because of the open and egalitarian nature of Israeli society, according to Dr. Yoram Peri of Tel Aviv University.

Research on the subject began in the 1960s with the observation that the Israeli army behaved differently from the military in other countries which had attained independence in the post-World War II period. For instance, for many African nations, independence was followed by a military coup; yet in Israel, a nation in a perpetual state of war, the army was perceived to be an apolitical institution.

The resulting theory was that, although Israel is a nation under arms, the IDF is a true people's army in that it does not reflect the values of a particular class or interest group. The military elite consists of a cross-section of Israeli society; indeed, due to the three-year compulsory service, the army is involved in the life of every citizen. It was clear then to researchers, that the military could not exceed its limitations by intruding into the civilian sector, as more stratified armies had done in other new nations. The army was already an integral part of the society.

By the 1970s, it was recognized that Israel was not a Third World country, but rather a society closely linked to Western culture. But why was a nation under such a prolonged state of war not becoming a garrison state? To answer this, Dr. Peri composed an ideological portrait of an Israeli officer. He found that, compared to their counterparts in the West, who tended to stand on the conservative end of the political spectrum, Israeli officers are more heterogeneous than members of other military elites; they range from conservative to liberal, religious to anti-religious.

Furthermore, the Israeli military, unlike many others, is not separate and/or alienated from the workings of the civilian society. Officers and soldiers live, for the most part, in cities; associate with civilians; and feel attached to the general societal framework.

However, Dr. Peri found, the army is also involved in the public sphere and its role must not be underestimated. The army assumes an educational role by sending soldiers to civilian schools and by offering its own courses on non-military subjects. In the 1940s and 1950s this was particularly important as the IDF assumed responsibility for educating many of the new immigrants in its ranks.



Prof Vorom Por

Because the military is so entrenched in everyday life, it undoubtedly exerts considerable influence on society. This works in reverse as well, allowing the values and ethos of the army to remain those of the civilian culture.

Relations Between the Military and Politics

However, Dr. Peri challenged several assumptions underlying earlier conclusions that the Israeli army is apolitical. First was the assumption that the military merely executes the policies of the elected government and does not participate in the decision-making process

Peri refuted this by citing Israel's military role in southern Lebanon even before Operation Peace for Galilee. During this time, the policies governing military strategy were largely influenced by then-Chief of Staff, Rafael Eytan. Until Ezer Weizman resigned as Minister of Defense in 1980, he advocated a limited presence in Lebanon, as demonstrated by the Litani Operation, which was a pre-emptive, one-time action. Eytan favored a larger Israeli role in Lebanon, and in the interim between Weizman's resignation and Ariel Sharon's nomination as Minister of Defense in 1981, his view as a military leader prevailed.

The second misconception is that the army is disconnected from Israeli national and party politics. In fact, the military is highly politicized. When the Cabinet selects a Chief of Staff, there are usually two candidates, each tied to one of the major parties, so that party affiliations are taken into consideration. In addition, because officers must resign when they are in their mid-40s, many begin second careers in the educational, industrial and political sectors.

Third, Peri asserts that institutional, formal controls over the military are not

as strong as they are believed to be. In contrast to procedures in the US, politicians in Israel are not involved in determining the defense budget, but rather, leave it to the generals to decide what Israel's needs are. In this and other ways, the military is often free to function without political limitations. There are, however, other restraints, one being the charismatic nature of Israeli leaders. from Ben Gurion through Begin. (Since Begin's resignation, it appears this will be weakened to some extent.) Another vital factor is public opinion. Rafael Eytan and Ariel Sharon were forced to resign as Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense respectively, in part because the public believed that they used the army in Operation Peace for Galilee offensively, to achieve national aims, without a public consensus. This perception that they were waging an unjustifiable war (once they exceeded the 45-kilometer security zone) violated the civilian ethos that rules the entire society, including the army.

Conclusion

No distinction can be made between the military elite and the civilian leadership in Israel concerning political issues. The army cannot and will not determine either Israeli foreign or domestic policy because its leadership spans the political spectrum. Although the army plays a prominent role in public political debate, it represents every viewpoint on every issue and is therefore as democratic as the society itself.

Although Israeli society is necessarily militarized, the military is also "civilianized" and this balance has maintained Israel's democratic tradition and prevented the establishment of a garrison state.

Dr. Peri concluded his remarks by saying: "Israel is still Athens, not Sparta, and we will keep it this way."

JINSA is pleased to announce the appointment of Melvin Cohen to the Board of Directors. Mr. Cohen is immediate past president of the UJA of Greater Washington.

What Does the U.S. Really Get Out of the U.N.?

By Melanie Merkle

Miss Merkle is a member of The Heritage Foundation's United Nations research staff.

The United Nations, say many Americans, has failed to create a more peaceful world. In a 1983 survey, 48.8 percent of those polled indicated they do not believe that the U.N. is effective in furthering the causes of world peace and political stability among nations; only 42.8 percent believe that the U.N. furthers peace.

This belief is not without foundation. The mandate of the U.N. Charter to settle disputes by peaceful means has been ignored as the U.N. has welcomed guerrilla leaders and legitimized various organizations.

The Charter provision to "employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples" has become the New International Economic Order—the banner of the underdeveloped Third World governments' attempt to redistribute the wealth of the developed nations. United Nations' Secretariat staffing has often been consciously anti-American. And the so-called "non-aligned nations" have been organized into a pro-Soviet, anti-Western voting bloc.

Despite this, the United States continues to contribute about 25 per cent of the U.N. budget—a share far greater than that of any other nation. This amounted to \$310,838,765 in 1981 and did not include voluntary U.S. contributions to the U.N. and its specialized agencies.

In 1981, total U.S. contributions to the U.N. reached \$825 million. By contrast, the Soviet Union has pledged to contribute a mere 14 percent of the budget and remains delinquent by about \$200 million.

U.N. support for terrorist organizations first became obvious in 1974,
when the U.N. welcomed Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) leader.
Yasir Arafat. Before attaining U.N.
recognition, the PLO was viewed widely
as an unpredictable and dangerous international terrorist organization. But
since Arafat's speech at the U.N. and
the creation of two PLO-dominated
U.N. committees—the Committee for
the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of
the Palestinian People and the Special
Unit on Palestinian Rights—the PLO
can now claim legitimacy.

In 1975, PLO was invited to attend the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Geneva, Switzerland. The U.S. National District Attorneys' Association was outraged and called for the withdrawal of the invitation, but was refused.

U.N. legitimization of the PLO extends to funding. In the 1982-83 biennial budget, the Inalienable Rights Committee is to receive \$71,800. The Special Unit on Palestinian Rights has budgeted \$6,156,500 for the two-year period.

The Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), another terrorist group, was recognized by the U.N. General Assembly in 1976 as the "sole and authentic" representative of Southwest Africa, often known as Namibia. Yet SWAPO is but one of 45 political parties representing Namibia's one million people. It has a well-documented record of terrorist attacks against civilians dating from the late 1960s.

SWAPO enjoys U.N. recognition and support and is invited to the international conferences of U.N. specialized agencies. It also benefits from the free international public relations services provided by the U.N. Department of Public Information. Like the PLO, SWAPO relies heavily on the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc nations for military equipment, supplies and military training. For humanitarian aid, SWAPO turns to the U.N.

The U.N. and its specialized agencies allocated at least \$40 million in direct or indirect aid to SWAPO between 1977 and 1981 and for programs beginning and continuing during 1982-1986; the U.S. contributes about 30 percent of this

U.N. records show that, since 1975, at least \$116 million has been spent or budgeted to support such groups as the PLO and SWAPO—what the U.N. calls "national liberation movements." U.N. funding and political support for armed guerilla warfare, however, is not authorized by the U.N. Charter. The Charter, in fact, mandates that "all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered."

In addition, much effort at the U.N. goes toward establishing a New International Economic Order—a scheme devised by the Third World radicals to redistribute the wealth of developed countries. NIEO seeks to transfer to the developing states the economic resources of the industrial nations, especially the U.S., and to control the activities of Western businessmen.

The U.N. Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted in 1974, has been used by a new breed of international regulators to justify schemes for an elaborate system of redistribution, which would compel the U.S. to share its technological resources and output with the developing nations.

Another frequently ignored problem facing the United States at the U.N. is the diminishing number of Americans in top-level, decision-making posts. Though the U.S. foots 25 percent of the U.N.'s bill, Americans occupy only 17.32 per cent of the selected professional staff in the Secretariat of the U.N. system.

At first, personnel quotas mirrored the size of a nation's financial contribution to the organization. The developing countries, however, forced a reinterpretation of the U.N. Charter provision that stressed "equitable geographical distribution."

Moscow, however, continues to forge ahead unchallenged. For example, the Soviet Union has arrogantly violated Article 100 of the U.N. Charter by placing Soviet KGB agents in the Secretariat. Former U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldhelm even appointed a KGB officer as head of U.N. Personnel in Geneva.

(continued on page 6)

"As Joy Spreads in Grenada, Adoration Also for Seaga, Carib Leaders"

By Vincent Tulloch

Ed. Note: The press accounts of the liberation of Grenada found in US newspapers have, naturally, an American perspective on an international incident. We thought that the view from Jamaica, since Jamaican troops were involved, would be an important addition to the information available in this country. The following is excepted from the Jamaican Daily Gleaner, with our thanks.

Saint George's, Nov. 5

"It is Ironic," said one prominent Grenadian lady to me, that the Americans are the first to utilise the incomplete Point Salines Airport.

Her comment, against a background of sustained aviation activity at the airport, was just one more of the several observations of Grenadians as they paused to take stock of the rapid change of events in their homeland since the bloody coup of October 19, in which marxist Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, some of his Cabinet colleagues and an unknown number of locals were murdered by Peoples' Revolutionary Army troops loyal to Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard's hardline faction of the ruling New Jewel Movement.

The October 19 events set the stage for the United States led invasion which was backed by troops from Jamaica, Barbados and the organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECs).

The invasion which has drawn widespread condemnation from international organisations and a resolution of disapproval from the United Nations General Assembly has been welcomed with open arms by Grenadians at every position in the society.

Governor General Sir Paul Scoon on November 3 echoed the sentiments of his people when at a farewell ceremony for Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, commander of the invasion force said "while the foreign press and other people are talking about an invasion, my people have asked me to say for heaven sake it was a rescue operation."

Indeed, for many Grenadians it may have been a rescue mission. Even the casual visitor may come to that conclusion after a ride in from Point Salines Airport. The six-mile stretch of road that meanders into Saint Georges is strewn with evidence of war. Knocked

out Russian tanks, abandoned Cuban trucks and houses with shattered windows inflicted by bullets after Cuban fighters sought refuge in them against the will of the occupants.

Houses along the route fly white flags indicating surrender and bright eye locals assembled on curbs and other vantage points to watch the latest spectacle as equally young marines of the United States, toting machine guns waved cars down to have a good look at what they are carrying.

It is at these check-points that the cooperation of Grenadians is readily seen. As soon as a car stops, a marine or a member of the Caribbean force moves forward, but before he can say hello, the driver flies the bonnet and is out busily giving whatever assistance may be needed.

The formalities are over and Grenadians are ready to talk about the Revolutionary Military Council and the arrival of the Americans. "Thank God for Daddy Reagan" an elderly woman said, when I sought her opinion on the invasion. Sitting on the sidewalk opposite the market selling her spice, she expressed her disgust for the Trinida-dian Government. "We have been always close, I really do not think that they should treat us like that" she said, adding "you know, Miss Charles, Mr. Adams, Mr. Seaga, and others, may God bless them that they live as long as possible. God never forget his people, sir. God bless them."

There were several people who were overjoyed with the arrival of the Americans.

On a location in Saint George's, a youthful Clement and Mortimer, the latter a sales clerk, could only heap praise on the invasion force. For them, the presence of soldiers from the Eastern Caribbean and Jamaica made it even more palatable. The invading troops they say, have been very friendly. They have shown consideration for all and unlike the Cubans who would only mix with the ruling class and those close to the party, the American and Caribbean troops have been open.

At every level, praises are the order of the day. One prominent trade unionist Eric Pierre who was detained by the Bishop regime for a day along with his brother who spent over two years at Richmond Hill for editing the banned Grenadian Voice newspaper, expressed joy on the attainment of what he said was a rescue operation.

All over the country people have been turning out in hundreds to assist the troops in flushing out whatever element of the disgraced Coard/Austin network remains.

Against a background of calm in the country there is an air of excitement as the people talk openly about the future. They lavish praise and adoration on leaders such as Seaga, Charles, Adams and Reagan and the other regional leaders whose names they do not easily recall.

"Abject disappointment" that's how a doctor described the response of the British Government to events in the country. Though not expressed with such eloquence as the professionals, the man in the street feels that he has been betrayed by the British. They talked about their former mother country link as if that would have guaranteed them protection from Britain.

In the case of Trinidad, it is a sense of shock. Somehow they cannot understand how Trinidad, where there may be as many Grenadians living as those at home, could have been so indifferent to their pleas for help. Yet, in the case of President Forbes Burnham of Guyana they seem not to have expected much. It is Trinidad that baffles them.

So while the international community passes resolutions and other forms of condemnation of the invasion, Grenadians seem ready to ignore them as they face the future with confidence thanking the invaders for restoring freedom to them after rescuing them from the jaws of communism which was to be systematically applied through a brutal and murderous military-civilian clique.

So happy and thankful are they that they scoff at ideas of replacing the Caribbean and American troops with peace keepers from other countries. They do not want the Americans to go as yet as they feel that there could be a counter attack from Cuba.

For the time being, nothing better could have happened to the country. That is why on the streets of Saint George's or little villages tucked away in the hills, they talk about the rescue operation with smiles. The word "invasion" is taboo throughout the country.



LAVI (continued from page 1)

Coproduction

The Lavi design stresses the application of already-proven technology, materials and processes. The Americanlsmeli industry team utilizes a costeffective qualifications testing program and costs are controlled by several factors: Lavi hardware commonality with the F-15, F-16, F-18 and "Kfir"; an Ismeli engineering labor rate that is substantially lower than the US aircraft industry rate; close cooperation between the IAF and the domestic industrial base; a low profit margin above actual production costs; and strong maintenance and logistical support.

Currently, there are approximately 20 signed contracts with twelve different American companies for parts ranging from the engine to a flight quality simulation program. In addition, four Memoranda of Understanding have been signed and another six are under consideration. All MOUs are companyto-company, rather than between the US and Israeli governments, and are signed prior to contract negotiation. Other proposals by potential parts subcontractors are under review and it is expected that over 100 American companies will eventually be involved in the Lavi program.


The licensing process, which authorizes the sale of parts to Israel for the Lavi, has caused some delays in production. The initial license decision, which granted a "technical license", allowing American companies to make presentations to IAI, was delayed for a full year. Grumman and IAI have requested a second license to be approved to permit the composite materials to be produced in Israel.

This license is envisaged to be a combination "technical agreement" and manufacturing license. Composite technology of the sort which Israel is requesting is not currently exported from the United States. US considerations regarding technology transfer and the possible acquisition by the Soviet Union or Eastern Bloc of sensitive American military technology will make it difficult for the Department of Defense to approve the license without special safeguards. If the license is approved, Grumman will produce the wing prototype, ship the parts to Israel and Israeli technicians will work at Grumman on the project, organizing the production of the wing in Israel. If the license is denied, Grumman can produce the tail and wing, and export the finished product to Israel, or Israel can purchase composite technology from sources outside the US.

A "hardware license" will eventually

.AVI BASIC CHARACTERISTICS

•	Wing Area	350 ft ²
•	Engine: 1 x PW 1120 SLS max. a/b thrust	20 620 lb
	SFC	
•	Weights: Basic TO gross weight	
	Fuel capacity: internal	6,000 lb
•	Air combat parameters: Combat weight	



be required for shipping hardware tooling molds to Israel for the final stages of production and assembly. Authorization of this shipment should be pro forma once the technology or the parts are sold; therefore, the request has not yet been made. Other licenses will be requested when additional companies become involved in the program.

Benefits to the US

Coproduction holds economic and military benefits for the US, as well as directly for Grumman and other American companies. With a view to the current American economic situation, it should be noted that the Lavi project will generate \$1.5 billion spend-

The Lavi program is designed to answer Israel's...
needs. At the same time, the
US...will be more capable
of developing future
American aircraft programs.

ing in US industry, thus supporting at least 37,000 jobs. This may increase Congressional support for the required

Lavi licenses, particularly from the delegations of states holding the most subcontracts (Texas, Connecticut, California and New York).

Among arrangements now being discussed is allowing Israel to spend a portion of the money already allocated to Israel under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for research, development and production in Ithe US, and a portion for production in Israel. During Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger's recent trip to Jerusalem, he indicated that President Reagan is now willing to lift restrictions barring Israel from using FMS credits for R&D on the Lavi.

Spending FMS money on R&D sets a precedent, however it does not violate the principle that the money be spent in the US. Spending FMS for procurement in Israel required a special waiver, however, long-term financial benefits do accrue to the US for supporting Israeli industry. In fact, the Administration is allowing Israel to convert \$250 million of its FMS credits into shekels for procurement in Israel for the Lavi. From the Israeli standpoint, Israel's security is closely linked to a strong

economy, and the Israeli economy must rely on exports in the future to remain sound and repay US loans as well as to provide a market for US goods. Israel's aerospace industry is the country's largest single employer, and its health has a ripple effect on the rest of the economy. This, however, remains a secondary argument for the Lavi, in American eyes.

Apart from the monetary considerations, the US stands to gain technological expertise for the development of the next generation of American alreraft. Specifically, in the 49-month development period, Grumman has enhanced its previous experience in composite engineering and production and has increased its capability for future US aircraft development and production. In its Georgia plant, 100 new skilled positions have opened, while the company has been able to maintain a team of experienced engineers at its Long Island facility, due to a \$120 million contract for the development and initial production alone. In addition, Lear Siegler, which has signed a contract to build the digital flight control system as well as the emergency electrical generator for the Lavi, has retained the services of a top-level design team, which would otherwise have been disbanded due to the lack of new US development air-

Benefits to Israel

Of primary concern to Israel in the development of any new weapon system is, of course, the issue of security. Once the needs of the IAF were defined, the Lavi was determined by the government to be the least costly solution; actually 16-30% less expensive than an American alternative (such as the F-16). The least cost alternative to the Lavi, 300 F-16s, would cost \$2.079 billion more to operate over 15 years compared to the Lavi, because of lower fuel and spare parts costs. In addition, each US aircraft requires an expenditure of approximately \$1 million for modifications to meet IAF specifications. The Lavi is an aircraft designed specifically

to meet IAF combat-derived requirements.

The production of an in-country aircraft holds benefits for the Israeli economy as well. The Lavi program will maintain 12,000 jobs in Israel for the 20-year duration of the program, has reduced the need for further investment in the defense industry, and has enhanced the viability of the aerospace and technical industries as a segment of the Israeli economy.

Furthermore, the co-production mechanism will give Israel the opportunity to spend FMS credits with many American companies in approximately 20 states, thereby reducing Israel's debt load. As the percentage of Israeli-made components rises, the economic benefits to Israel will increase.

Conclusion

The Lavi appears to be the least costly method of solving the problem of enhancing Israel's security. Because it is tailored to meet only Israel's specific needs without many of the items required by US planes for USAF missions, and because its development and production are based on previously demonstrated technology, the Lavi should prove to be cost effective.

The Lavi poses no competitive threat to any existing American aircraft and the US has granted the first of the necessary licenses for development. Grumman and IA1 anticipate the approval of their pending and future requests. Israel has spent FMS funds in the US on the Lavi program, which has reduced both the FMS near-term cost to the American public as well as the Israeli need for supplementary FMS aid. Moreover, the US will retain approval for all third-country transfers involving Lavi parts or technology.

The Lavi program is designed to answer Israel's security, financial and industrial needs. At the same time, the US, by continuing to ensure Israel's ability to meet future threats, will be more capable of developing future American aircraft programs.

Subscribe

(or send a gift to someone who needs to be informed)

An annual subscription to the JINSA Newsletter is \$25.00. It is a small price to pay to better understand American defense and security needs and how a firm strategic relationship between the US and Israel can benefit both countries.

JINSA is the only Jewish organization solely devoted to explaining the link between US national security and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen both.

Name		
Address	API-101-101-101-101-101-101-101-101-101-10	

Make checks payable to JINSA and send to 1411 K Street, NW, Suite 1002, Washington, D.C. 20005. JINSA is a non-profit, tax-exempt educational organization.

SAYING ARE THEY WHAT

bassador to the United Nations, concerning UN politics): "Alliances are made among the blocs, and those alliances can be very powerful in determing outcomes. Before I went to the United Nations, I didn't understand what "Zionism is racism" meant, politically speaking inside the U.N. After I had been there for a while, I realized that obnoxious slogan symbolizes the alliance between the African bloc supports the Arabs on all matters attacking Israel and the Arabs agree to support the Arabs on all matters attacking South Africa." (22 September)

PRESIDENT REAGAN (concerning the Middle East) should fall into the hands of a power or powers hostile to the free would be addrect threat to the United States and our allies.

"We have another reason to be involved. Since 1948, our nation has recognized and accepted a moral obligation to assure the continued existence of Israel as a nation. Israel shares our democratic values and is a formidable force an invader of the Middle East would have to reckon with...

"Sixteen months ago we were watching on our TV screens the shelling and bombing of Beriout, which was being used as a fortress by PLO bands. Hundreds and hundreds of civilians were being killed and wounded in the daily batter. Syria, which makes no secret of its claim that Lebanon should be a part of a greater Syria, was occupying a large part of Lebanon. Today, Syria has become a home for 7,000. Soxiet ad-

a ÷ cluding SS-21 ground-to-ground missiles capable of reaching vital areas of Israel." (27 October) visors and technicians who man massive amount of Soviet weaponry, cluding SS-21 ground-to-grou

GENERAL PAUL X. KELLY (US Marine Commandant, concerning the bombing of Marine headquarters in Beirut): "I think we had very adquare security measures. One has to realize that if you have a determined individual who is willing to give up his life, chances are he's going to get through and do that." (25 October)

THE ISLAMIC HOLY WAR (concerning responsibility for the Marine bombing): "We are soldiers of God and we crave death. Violence will remain our only path if they (foreign forces) do not leave. We are ready to turn Lebanon into another Vietnam. We are not Iranians or Syrians, or Palestinians. We are Lebanese Moslems who follow the dicta of the Koran." (25 October)

YASSER ARAFAT (Chairman of the PLO, concerning the deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe): "We are also thankful to all nations which support us in the struggle against the aggression of imperialism. To counter this aggression means to uphold the cause of peace, which is threatened with the deployment of new American missiles, primarily in Western Europe. This will turn the European continent into a springboard in our protest against the threat of a nuclear war which looms large over the world, against the deployment of American lethal weapons in Western Europe." (29 September)

(continued from **NEWS BRIEFS**

JAPAN RAISES DEFENSE BUDGET:
The Japanese Defense Agency has filed a proposed budget for fiscal 1985 which calls for a 6.8% increase over current year levels. The budget will be reviewed by the Finance Ministry before approval. The US Administration has been requesting Japan to increase its defense spending and assume more responsibility for its own security. The Defense Agency plans to purchase21 jet fighters, 11 antisubmarine patrol planes, 75 tanks, 52 helicopters, 3 destroyers and I submarine. However, despite previous plans, Japan will not buy any new ground-to-air missiles, but may deploy Patriot missiles. fighters, 7

US SCHOOL STAYS IN PANAMA:
The US and Panama have agreed to keep the US Army's School of the Americas open for the time being. The school, which trains Latin American soldiers, is located in the former Panama Canal Zone. The Panamanian government has agreed that a modified version of the school will be allowed to operate after October 1, 1984 when the Panama Canal treaties actually stipulate that the Pentagon must close the facili-

US FAVORING IRAQ: Some State Department officials are pressing for the Administration to openly favor Iraq against Iran in the four-year old war. They feel that the time is opportune for Washington to pressure Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to cease his support of international terrorism and to expel Palestinian terrorist Abu Niela and other radicals in exchange for military support. These officials also believe that since Iranis unlikely to resume relations with the US, giving aid to Hussein could provide the US with more leverage in the Middle East. TRADING ARGENTINA TO BUY 'HEAVY WATER!: President Reagan has approved the sale of 143 tons of 'heavy water' (deuterium oxide) to Argentina to assist that country's nuclear program. The water is needed to produce nuclear energy and Argentina has stated that it will be used only for peaceful purposes. However, Argentina, which has the capability to build nuclear weapons, has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the hemispheric treaty which declared Latin America to be a nuclear-free zone. The sale was approved by the Administration becopen to international inspection.

CHINA: The

WITH

A LACK OF US MINESWEEPERS:
According to Jane's Fighting Ships, the
Soviet navy owns 338 mine-clearance
vessels, which is one-third more than
those of the NATO countries combined.
The US Navy currently possesses 21
minesweepers, three of which are active;
the other 18 are held in reserve. In the
event that the Soviets ever mine
American harbors, only two of our American harbors, only two of welve major ports could be kept

Reagan Administration has declared China to be a "nonalited friendly country", thus making a significant move toward the normalization of economic relations between Washington and Peking. As a result, China will be able to purchase most "dual use" goods, that is, those civilian products that can be modified for military purposes. The Administration will be able to help Exxon and Occidental Petroleum fulfill new contracts to drill for oil in the China Sea; the new status will also make it easier for US firms to export such goods as computer equipment and heavy construction gear.

1981 General Assembly shows overall agreement to be 84.9 per cent, compared with 25 per cent average agreement with the U.S.

from its expensive memberships, given the anti-American, anti-Western, anti-industrial, anti-capitalist majority in the General Assembly.

permis-It ap-

(continued from page S.

developed nations may have quite dif-ferent interests, but when it comes to anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist rhetoric, usually aimed at the U.S., they are one. Although the major force at the U.N. is the group of so-called 'non-aligned nations," the group is strongly pro-Soviet. The Communist bloc and less-

The result is a remarkably pro-Soviet voting pattern at the U.N. among the "nonaligned." The percentage of support for the Soviet Union during the

JINSA

Suite 1002

1411 K Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20005

The following list shows the percentage of times members of the United Nations voted with the United States during General Assembly votes taken during 1982.

_	Regional group/country %	Regional group/country %	Regional group/country %	Region
_	Western Europe and others:		Qatar20.7	Cpp
_				Nige
_				Malc
_	:			Rwa
_		1	Kuwait 20.2	Bur
_	i	-	Cyprus19.9	Zam
_	France 68.8	Panama20.0	Bhutan19.5	Nige
_	:		Yemen, North18.4	Cam
_	-	Bolivia	:	Sierr
_	Australia		India17.2	Tan
_			Iraq16.3	Gha
_		44.40	Iran14.8	Bots
_	Norway	Cuba	1.4	Con
_		Grenada9.3	Libya13.6	Guir
_				Uga
_		Asian/Mideast Group	:	Swa
_		Israel 86.2	Yemen, South12.2	Con
_	Finland43.2	Japan 67.2	Laos11.4	Sao
_	Ė		Afghanistan11.5	Mad
_	Greece33.2	:		Beni
_			Africa:	Ang
_	a/Caribbean:		Morocco31.8	Our
_		Singapore 30.8		Algo
_	1	1		Zim
		ea		Ethi
_	Honduras 36.2	Samoa30.2	Liberia29.0	Moz
_				Cap
_	Chile 35.1	:	Gabon28.1	
_		Pakistan		Easter
_	El Salvador32.9	:	÷	Han
_	-:			Bulg
_		:	:	U.S.
_	:	:	Cameroon	Byel
_	:	414 Ki		Czec
_	:			ğ
_				Rom
_	:	Bangladesh.		Yugo
_	Aniigua and Barbuda 25.0	Sri Lanka		Pola
_	÷	Jordan	÷	MOM
_	Ecuador24.8		Kenya	Alba

Non-Profit

U.S. Postage

Paid

Silver Spring, Md.

Permit No. 3397

is the U.S. getting any value for all that it is spending in resources and energy on the U.N.? These are questions that the Reagan Administration and the U.S. public must—withurgency—begin addressing. 20.8 20.6 20.6 20.5 20.5 20.1 20.1 19.4 19.0 18.3 18.3 (This article was reprinted by per sion of the Heritage Joundation. In peared in Human Events 10 Septen 1983.) ern Europe.
ungary.
ulgaria
J.S.S.R.
yelorusia
yelorusia
Ger. Democratic Romania
Poland
Mongolia ola ea-Bissau ria ra Leone. Zania.... na Swana iland How United Nations Members Voted in 1982 The previous cases are among many examples of the United Nations gone awry. For good reason, therefore, the U.N. is more suspect than at any time in its history and American support for it is plummeting. nations There are valid and pressing questions to whether the U.S. is benefitting III for how a in 1982). (See table below , voted with the U.S.

Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs



THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR THE DEFENSE OF TRADITION, FAMILY, AND PROPERTY

The Colombian Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (TFP) has recently published in leading Colombian newspapers a timely manifesto on the country's situation after the Amnesty and the ongoing guerrilla warfare. The manifesto was published in El Tiempo, Bogota, 4/29/83; El Pais, Cali, 4/29/83; El Diario del Huila, Neiva, 4/29/83; and Diario de la Costa, Cartagena, 5/6/83.

On May 3, 1983, the manifesto was also published in El Salvador's largest newspaper, El Diario de Hoy, by the Salvadoran Social Commission, "Peace: the Tranquility of Order". Following is a translation of the publication in El Salvador.

This text may be reproduced on condition that credit be given to The American TFP.

INDIFFERENCE IS THE CHIEF ALLY OF THE GUERRILLAS The TFP Calls On the Indifferent: Wake up Before It Is Too Late!

For some years now, Marxist guerrilla warfare and terrorism have kept the Salvadoran nation, as well Hispanic American countries, in a trauma designed to bring them under Red dominion. This nefarious action has been aided by different forces in politics, religion, economics, and the media, which have helped to transform subversion into an offensive able to affect not only our country but the whole continent as well.

A few days ago we received a manifesto published by the Colombian Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (TFP) in the principal newspapers of its country analyzing the tragic results of temporization with the Marxist guerrillas there. Although the guerrilla movement is much smaller in Colombia than in El Salvador, its danger is indisputable.

The similarities between the crises affecting our two nations, which share the same Faith, culture and ethnic heritage, are such that in spite of the differences in the magnitude of the guerrilla phenomenon in the two places, we could not fail to reproduce this manifesto here. If the communist tactics are indeed the same in Colombia as in El Salvador, and if the Red sect finds collaborators imbued with the same spirit in both countries, there is nothing more reasonable than for us to use a publication of this caliber as an element of our defense. This is all the more true when one considers its noble argumentation, based on the Catholic thought that is so deeply rooted in the mentality of our peoples.

Considering that the graver, more numerous and threatening are the crimes of the guerrillas, the more absurd it is to temporize with them, the <u>Social</u> <u>Commission</u>, <u>Peace</u>: The <u>Tranquility of Order makes this manifesto known to the public of El Salvador, hoping that the truths it contains will be enlightening to many of our compatriots.</u>

May the Divine Saviour, who has protected our nation throughout its history, continue to do so with special mercy at this crucial hour.

* * *

Here follows the manifesto:

Now that some months have gone by since the Government, with massive support from politicians, ecclesiastics and the media, promulgated the Law of

Amnesty, a number of questions which must be answered have been taking shape in the minds of innumerable Colombians.

Instead of the pacification that had been announced, the audacity of the guerrillas has taken on an unprecedented magnitude, making it possible to see the communist plan of taking advantage of all circumstances in order to convulse the nation. Now, since the measures of clemency for the guerrillas, far from placating them, have only stimulated them, one must ask: What should be said of this step taken by the authorities? What should be said about the period that they have thus opened in our country's history? And how can we face the subversive threat which, with the collaboration of accomplices unsuspected by the public, rather than diminishing, is by all indications moving toward setting off a civil war?

In the last few days, the full import of these serious questions has been shown by a number of events so significant that their mere enumeration speaks for itself:

- The discovery in Brazil that several large planes were loaded with tons of arms in a clandestine shipment from the Lybian tyranny to the guerrillas in our country and other Marxists in Central America; the foreign ministries of the continent naturally perceived the hand of Moscow in that shipment;
- -- Strong indications that this is an established system for supplying war materiel for the subversion of the whole continent;
- The boastful declaration of terrorist leaders that they will continue their bloody activities on a much larger scale, at the same time as many guerrillas have gone to Lybia for training;
- An instruction from the Kremlin to the various Colombian guerrilla movements to unite, as their comrades in strife-ridden Central American countries have already done, to achieve greater effectiveness in their bloody undertakings;
- -- The denunciation by military authorities of a Marxist plan to use the guerrillas to cut off and control part of our country as a step in bringing the whole nation under Red domination.

The Colombian Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (TFP) feels obliged to answer these questions which, so to speak, are surfacing all over the country. For this purpose, we consider it necessary to examine the problem with total objectivity and impartiality, and to formulate arguments and draw conclusions with indisputable clarity. This must be done regardless of

anyone's feelings, for once unconditional pardon has been granted to the guerrillas, it would be inconceivable that there be no freedom to make objections to it.

The Ideological Action of the TFP Against Revolutionary Psychological Warfare

What is an ideological point of view? As the eminent Catholic thinker Prof. Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira says, "the communist movement is fundamentally:

- an atheistic, materialistic and Hegelian philosophical sect which deduces from its erroneous principles a complete and unique conception of man, economics, society, politics, culture, and civilization;
- a worldwide subversive organization: Communism is not just a movement of a speculative nature. By the imperatives of its own doctrine, it aims to turn all men into communists and shape the life of all nations entirely according to its principles. Considered in this aspect, the Marxist sect professes integral imperialism not just because it aims at imposing the thought and will of a minority on all men, but because this imposition affects man as a whole, in all aspects of his activity" (Cf. Transbordo ideológico inadvertido y diálogo, C.I.O., S.A., Madrid, 1971, p. 6).*

Thus, communism sought for decades to achieve world conquest through its tiny, cohesive and fanatic nuclei of militants who at times tried to win the masses over to their doctrine, fill them with hatred and throw them into class struggle, and thus seize power, and at other times fomented violent disorders and revolutions for the same purpose. The period of clear confrontation between East and West was a consequence of the openly aggressive and ferocious position of communism in the violent phase.

Nevertheless, as this conquest advanced, the apathy of the multitudes toward the egalitarian promises of communism grew hand-in-hand with their well-known resistance to its collectivist and tyrannical character. So the tactics of Red expansion underwent a number of adaptations whereby revolutionary psychological warfare gradually became its principal weapon. Thanks to this, communism gained victories which mere violence would never have obtained.

What is <u>revolutionary psychological warfare?</u> It is a series of resources communism uses to make nations let themselves be led into Red domination in spite of the lack of popular support. This lack of support is obvious to anyone

who is willing to see it, and could never be admitted by a movement that claims to be the defender of the masses and interpreter of their will. Revolutionary psychological warfare causes the peoples to gradually lose their will to resist and to allow themselves to be brought under regimes which impose a socio-economic system very close to the one advocated by Marx even though not declaredly Marxist; after a while, a communist regime properly speaking is established, and with this even the nation's sovereignty is impaired exactly as it would be by losing a conventional war.

In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to produce in public opinion an impression like that which would be produced by a general and stormy protest. This can be brought about by groups which, when not large enough to produce really great agitation, must at least be very violent. Their action must be complemented by that of other groups much larger in size and above all apparently less harmful which, with a good-natured and condescending tone, will advocate that the country make concessions to the violent minority.

An indispensable condition for the success of such an operation is for the different groups to play their roles with the coordination they would have if guided by one single brain; but it is vital that telltale symptoms of this coordination not show through, lest the indignation and concern caused by the hotheads prejudice the credibility of the "moderates."

In this way, the nation will be led through successive stages in which some will threateningly demand concessions that others will benevolently favor until the situation becomes such that the violent minority will appear to be both inside and outside the law: outlawed on account of their crimes and delinquencies, but tolerated by many authorities who will not only fail to take efficacious measures against them but will eagerly seek their friendship.

Thus, the target nation will go through alternating periods of violence and of pseudo peace. These lulls, mere occasions for the subversives to calmly rebuild and perfect their organization, will often occur shortly after concessions have been won and will serve to produce in public opinion the impression that those concessions did work as effective pacifying measures. But new outbursts of violence will follow as soon as the Marxists consider them a timely and probably successful means to press for further concessions.

Roger Muchielli, the well-known French specialist in psychological warfare, makes an interesting point regarding this subject. He writes: "The classical view was that subversion and psychological warfare were a war machine like any

other, employed only during hostilities. Today's States, limited by this archaic distinction, have failed to understand that psychological warfare has blown the classic distinction between war and peace to bits. It is non conventional warfare foreign to the norms of international law and the known rules of war; it is a total war that disconcerts the jurists and pursues its objectives under the shelter of their law codes. As Megret says, from now on the classic distinction between war and peace will be challenged by psychological warfare. . .free from the barriers of time, of places and conventions, an immaterial force and hence impossible to grasp and capable of all kinds of metamorphoses" (Cf. La Subversion, Ed. Bordas, Col. Connaissance, Paris, 1972, pp. 26-27. The emphasis is ours).

Thus, it is not difficult to see how public opinion easily loses sight of the coordination among the various violent and pseudo pacifist factions active in psychological warfare, and why at times it fails to realize right away that communism is the beneficiary of these maneuvers. And this double effect on the public is precisely the purpose of the continuous attacks of the more radical Marxists on their nevertheless unflagging supporters, the less radical ones.

Tolerance Has Given the Guerrillas Much More Than They Ever Won by Violence

In spite of its difficulty in following the process, the gravity of the violence that followed the amnesty has been showing Colombian public opinion that the amnesty constituted a resounding victory of communism in and against our country: the principle of authority was shattered, the strength of the law undermined, and many crimes given impunity as long as they had been committed in order to impose a Marxist regime. As a consequence, the Red offensive goes on with even greater impetus and Colombian blood continues to be shed. An ominous precedent that may cost our country dearly has been set.

The TFP, which would have preferred not to be alone in its opposition to that disastrous measure, is nevertheless happy to have the honor of being perhaps the only exception to the generalized passivity, indolence and incomprehensible optimism with which the amnesty was received in civilian circles, and happy also that its statement strengthened the reservations of many about the amnesty.

The call published by the TFP a few days before the approval of the Law of Amnesty was not heeded by those who then had ears only for the promoters of subversion; but it was written into the annals of our history: an amnesty would bring about a transfer of the agitation "from the depths of the jungle to the centers of the major cities," in which the guerrillas would begin to promote "insurrections of worker neighborhoods against the neighborhoods of the employers." Thus, these concessions — of which the amnesty was the first — instead of placating the guerrillas "would only serve to increase their hopes of success through even more bitter, radical and violent extortions moving rapidly toward the total extortion." I

What actually happened? In a certain sense much less than that; in another sense, immensely more. Of course, it would have been unheard of rashness for the guerrillas just favored by the amnesty to have carried out, in less than one hundred days, their plan to throw our major cities into chaos as a new step toward the capitulation of the authorities, and thus to seize power. That would have fulfilled the prediction of the TFP (and to give the TFP such prestige would be precisely the opposite of what the guerrillas would want) and caused enormous alarm in public opinion, completely discrediting those who promoted the concessions and, instead of opening the road to power, would have blocked it definitively.

However, in another sense the guerrillas obtained much more: during these months, reaching agreement with them has become, for many outstanding personalities in the country, a goal without which they deemed it impossible to achieve any good and stable political formula. Those who in strict justice had been considered criminals until then, began to be treated as "heroes" and "idealists" and their friendship was sought after, as if it were an honor, by many people in government hitherto regarded as their enemies. Thus, without having to wreak havoc in the cities, they took over, so to speak, the very core of their centers, where the future of the nation is decided.

In fact, the guerrillas did not have to formulate further extortions, since they were so favored that whatever they wanted from the political standpoint was, voluntarily given to them. So, the general and unconditional amnesty — which extended to practically all guerrillas and took place without their having to surrender their weapons or free their hostages — was followed by other, even more disconcerting favors.

After the Amnesty, to Have Been a Guerrilla Entitles One to Privileges

Indeed, while honorable rural landowners are being ruthlessly and unjustly despoiled under the provisions of confiscatory socialist laws, the government distributes, to many presumably repentant guerrillas, properties that it never gave as a reward even for the most meritorious acts: the Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA) handed over tracts to them, along with generous lines of credit, often with no guarantor but the State itself.

Where did this land come from? Most news reports in the press carefully avoid giving such details. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that some of this land, like many INCORA holdings, has been wrested from its legitimate owners without adequate compensation. This is shocking not only because it means rewarding criminals with the spoils of the innocent, but also because it constitutes a sinister fabric woven of organized injustice.

When one considers that guerrilla violence has forced the rural landowners in many regions to temporarily abandon their properties and suspend their operation for fear of kidnapping and death, thus leaving their vacated properties in grave danger of being expropriated, the granting of expropriated property to former guerrillas, by paving the way to the recognition of usurpation as legal, no longer means mere impunity for crime but an official dominion of crime over law.

In other cases, the parcels came from the patrimony of the Archdiocesan Curia of Florencia, whose bishop, Msgr. José Luis Serna, not only stood out as the ecclesiastical champion of the amnesty but also flatly declared that he had repeatedly harbored guerrillas. The national press did not tell much about how those properties had been acquired by the Archdiocese. However that may have been, it is difficult to believe that the persons whose efforts and generosity made those lands available to the Archdiocese could have imagined that they would end up in blood-stained hands, let alone become a reward for crime.

There is worse: Through a suggestive coincidence, those parcels are located precisely in one of the areas most affected by the guerrillas, as though there had been an intention to keep them in the very theater of their dreadful operations. They naturally accept this "solution" since it will enable them to keep intact the subversive organization they must have established there, instead of dismantling their networks and connections which represent such a grave threat to the country. And although the gravity of this danger is obvious, many authorities seem not to notice it.

The policy of discrimination favoring amnestied subversives and the benefits lavished on them were such that, according to Army spokesmen, 2 many people tried to pose as guerrillas so as to receive benefits which they would never obtain otherwise!

Rather than preventing violence, this process of psychological surrender by some, and of conquest by others, ensured that guerrilla violence would continue. In fact, the Marxists were trying to insinuate that there is only one way to defeat their fanatic adherence to illegality, collectivism and crime: that is, by making enormous and continuous concessions inspired — since even most noble ideals can have the misfortune of being served by fanatics — by what could be called "fanaticism for peace."

This "fanaticism for peace" has had, and in fact still has, numerous and prominent people who aspire to represent it and persist on going ahead with it as if they did not see the failures of the policy of concessions.

The so-called "measure of clemency" obviously benefitted the perpetrators of most shocking crimes: burning an invalid woman religious alive; 3 assassinating captured servicemen simply because they were military; 4 and, evidently, numerous kidnapping-murders. Thus, "clemency" for the criminals has taken the place that belonged to compassion for innocent victims.

As could be expected, no sooner had the guerrillas been freed by the amnesty than some of them took arms again to continue their sinister fight. 5

Likewise, the guerrillas have again started murdering peasants 6 whom they accuse of not collaborating with them or of helping the Armed Forces; they are also continuing to kidnap rural landowners to extort large and often unavailing ransoms from their families.

In view of all this, which represents an enormous capitulation to the revolutionary psychological warfare that communist imperialism wages against our country by alternating guerrilla outbursts and false pacifications, what must be done to extricate our country from this predicament and its destructive effects?

Colombia must resolve to resist the expansion of communism at all costs, whatever tactics it may use, and adhere completely to the fundamental principles of Christian Civilization which have guided our nation since the very dawn of its history. Thus, following the rules of logic, duty and honor, our country will proudly fulfill its mission today and make progress toward fulfilling its vocation in the concert of nations in the Americas.

The TFP considers it necessary to discuss these fundamental principles in greater detail, particularly those more directly at stake in the present circumstances.

Are Landowners and Soldiers Pariahs With No Right to Life?

Since outbursts of inconceivable violence have followed these incredible concessions, and since systematic impunity in the violation of a right signifies its virtual negation, one must ask those who still defend the amnesty: Is there, or do you hold that there is, a class of men so miserable as to be denied even their very right to life? Do you place in this category the landowners, whose goods the guerrillas wish to seize, and the soldiers, without whose extermination or defeat they would not be able to do so?

First of all, what should be said of the landowners, whose very condition as owners implies the risk of death? It could be objected that only their right of property, and not their right to life, is being questioned. Now, is the right of property real or not? On the basis of traditional Catholic doctrine, the TFP affirms that the right of property is a real, sacred and inviolable right without which it is impossible to constitute a legitimate social order; and that although this right — like absolutely all other rights which inhere in men as individuals, including the right to work — has a social function, it is not any weaker or more questionable for having this social function.

Anyone who thinks that this is not so, and that as a consequence a man loses nothing by being prevented from having goods of his own, or by being deprived of them, must recognize that he opposes that which the Magisterium of the Church has taught continuously for centuries.

So, when a person runs the risk of death in order to exercise a legitimate right, he is threatened not only in that right but also in his right to life. Does it make any sense for the positive law, in accordance with Natural law, to recognize that they are owners, while on that account they are left subject to guerrilla demands whose refusal would mean kidnapping and death, and for these crimes to be left unpunished?

The outcry of the guerrillas and their propagandists against large properties is unconvincing, let alone a basis for hope that their desires stop at limiting the size of properties or fortunes by confiscation. Experience

shows that people of all social classes suffer great harm to their patrimony at the hands of the guerrillas, who do not seem to care whether or not those they rob are poor.

Furthermore, although all large properties in El Salvador were wiped out some time ago by socialist and confiscatory reforms imposed by a dictatorial government, that sister nation of ours is still torn by widespread and grave strife. It is becoming a sample of what awaits countries in which the guerrillas are not defeated. After those first reforms were carried out, the guerrillas only radicalized their offensive, seeking to put an end to all remnants of property and to establish collectivism.

As to the soldiers, more than just exercising a right, they are valiantly fulfilling their obligation to preserve order. If, when they die in the fulfillment of their duty, their murderers enjoy complete impunity in spite of their having dedicated themselves to the defense of their country, then their right to life has no guarantee whatsoever. What should be said of the offensive that struck them down? What should be said about the "understanding" and benevolent attitudes toward that offensive?

Catholic Morality Condemns Marxist Guerrilla Warfare for Many Reasons

In principle, Catholic Doctrine treats guerrilla warfare in the same way it does the other licit forms of war: there can be a just war as long as the causes that move a nation to make it and the authority that makes the decision are legitimate, and as long as it aims to do good and avoid evil.

Now, is the guerrilla warfare going on in our country licit? It is not, for many reasons: not only does it not have a just cause, but the motive of those who orient it and carry it out is intrinsically evil since it is a desire to establish a collectivist and tyrannical socio-economic regime which entails the denial of all rights, the violation of all true principles, and the suppression of all freedoms. The guerrilla war aims to impose definitively the omnipotence of those who espouse the Marxist errors through unjust, constant and general violence.

But that is not all. The guerrilla warfare is not only not led by a legitimate authority, but is in rebellion against it, aiming to establish the absolute dominion of those who, because of their objectives, cannot have any legitimacy.

Consequently, the death and destruction which occur in a just war, while lamentable, cannot be classified as crimes, but they are crimes indeed when caused by the Marxist guerrillas, whose unscrupulous methods are compounded by the intrinsic iniquity of their goals.

Why Are the "Pacifists," Who Speak So Much Against War, So Unanimously and Completely Silent About the Guerrillas?

It is extremely significant that the situation described above, so clear and indisputable once it is pointed out, is systematically covered up by many "pacifist" movements and leaders, both lay and ecclesiastic, who incessantly promote "peace" whenever war would pose a threat to the interests of communism; and, as in so many other cases, that the promoters of rapprochement are much more dedicated to making concessions supposedly aimed at pacifying, than in achieving real pacification. Interestingly enough, they frequently are understanding and sympathetic to the guerrillas and brand those who repress them as inhuman.

Consider the sad examples of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, where for some years now groups of prominent clergymen have supported and applauded the guerrillas, not to mention those who helped and participated directly in guerrilla warfare. This they do as the Sacred Hierarchy watches with utmost passivity, interrupted at best by occasional and inconsequential lamentations. This shows the direction that events may take in our country. Given the dynamism of evil, it is to be feared that what has happened to our tormented neighbors in Central America may also occur in Colombia. And if the surprising ecclesiastical complacency with the guerrillas is allowed to go unchecked, it may be followed by scandalous, open approval.

A Call of the TFP to Civil and Military Authorities

Given the overwhelming failure of concessionist measures, the TFP calls on the civil and military authorities to fulfill their obligation in accordance with the law by energetically fighting the guerrillas to completely and effectively restore order and peace so as to protect our country and ensure the security of threatened populations. Failure to do so would amount to tolerating with inhuman indifference the sufferings to which the guerrillas are subjecting large sectors of the population, which live in a state of continuous alarm and suffer outrages, losses and plunder, not to mention death and moral evils so bad that even death would almost seem preferable.

It must be recognized that timid, partial or hesitating measures only aggravate and perpetuate the problem. They not only encourage subversion but, as the experience of the last few years has clearly demonstrated, also create the erroneous impression that the guerrillas cannot be stopped.

Of course the repression should not be indiscriminate, falling on the guilty and innocent alike, nor should any exaggerated or illicit measure of coercion be employed. But, since punishment for crime is indispensable, and since those who opt for violence do so knowing that they will be opposed by force, all licit and wise measures must be taken to promptly halt this nefarious action.

Furthermore, by the enforcement of the law, Colombia will achieve two important goals: The lives of those who serve their country with idealism will no longer be excessively exposed; and, above all, it will be clear to everyone that violence and illegality are not adequate means to achieve that which is difficult to obtain by legitimate methods. It would be disastrous for the country to let Marxist violence go on with impunity, since this would give rise to a generalized conviction that any group, however small it may be, can obtain what it wants by force.

A Call of the TFP to the Population in Guerrilla-Infested Areas

The firmness of the authorities is indispensable for bringing an end to the chronic Marxist violence in our country. However, the repression they carry out, no matter how drastic, will probably not suffice without massive collaboration from the populations in guerrilla-infested areas in order to deprive the guerrillas of every element that might serve for their maintenance and growth.

Indeed, it is well known that the guerrillas depend on the help of rural populations not only for material means but also for recruitment and for protection from the law by blending in among them.

Therefore, it is evident that a population entirely opposed to the guerrillas will completely block their possibilities of action and thus eliminate them, just as a conniving population would give them means for sustenance and render their action chronic and possibly uncontrollable.

The whole country knows that the most frequent, immediate and defenseless victims of the guerrillas are the rural populations. But this is so only when guerrilla attacks target individual persons or restricted areas. When they find a general opposition of the population, the guerrillas are either defeated or simply look for a more favorable place. The only way to prevent the vengeance of subversives against those who do not collaborate with them is for everyone to continuously oppose them so that, unable to avenge themselves against a whole people, they completely abstain from any reprisals.

Thus, if necessary — and it will be necessary in many cases — the civil population should withdraw from troubled areas, not only to escape danger but so that the guerrillas will have no one to ask for help or to kidnap. This will also facilitate the action of the military, who will no longer have to distinguish between honorable but threatened civilians and the subversives who strive to blend in among them. The hardships entailed in moving may be painful, but they are a thousand times preferable to the moral devastation of connivance with the guerrillas, compounded by the destruction caused by the fighting.

In the beginning of this century, when the errors of the French Revolution were spreading all over the world and dominating large areas to the great prejudice of the glory of God and the salvation of souls, Blessed Ezequiel Moreno Diaz, Bishop of Pasto, stood out for his fiery combativity against them and in defense of the Faith. He was a faithful shepherd who won a place of exceptional honor in our history, in addition to eternal beatitude.

As it concludes this manifesto, the TFP expresses its wishes that the most worthy Colombian Episcopate will, like its venerable predecessor, take a combative attitude against the Marxist errors, natural successors of those of the French Revolution, and also against the violence of those promoting these errors; and that they will support the Armed Forces and the civil authorities and encourage the general population to repel the guerrilla aggression by all licit means.

The TFP lifts its eyes to Our Lady of Fatima, Who rebuked the world at the dawn of this century and predicted the expansion of communism, but also promised that after these storms Her Immaculate Heart would finally triumph. It

is She whom we hope will touch the hearts of the guerrillas, the authorities and all Colombians, snatching our country from the present conflagration to reestablish true peace, that is, not the apparent and precarious tranquility of capitulations, but the tranquility of order.

Notes:

- 1. "Amnesty to Guerrillas: A Pacifying Measure? Or a Transfer of the Guerrillas From the Depths of the Jungles to the Hearts of the Cities? The TFP Beseeches Our Lady to Enlighten Our Leaders" El Tiempo, Bogota, 11/9/82; El Pais, Cali, 11/11/82; El Mundo, Medellin, 11/13/82; and later on in that month in Diario de la Frontera, Cúcuta; Diario del Huila, Nieva, Diario de la Costa, Cartagena.
- * Unperceived Ideological Transshipment and Dialogue, in Crusade for a Christian Civilization, #4, 1982, P.O. Box 176, Pleasantville, New York 10570
 - 2. El Tiempo, 1/17/1983
 - 3. El Tiempo, 1/17/1983;
 - 4. El Tiempo, 1/20/1983;
 - 5. El Tiempo, 2/16/1983;
 - 6. El Tiempo, 1/4/1983, 1/19/1983, and 2/11/1983.

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON November 10, 1983 Dear Mr. Wierzbianski: Toyez, CANYOU Send lim Ga 7. Thank you for your letter of November 4th enclosing one of your publications. We are very pleased to know of your interest in our briefings and will be glad to include your name on our list to receive notices of future briefings as well as our list to receive the White House Digests on subjects of interest to you.

The White House Social Office has responsibility for preparing the guest list for various social functions. This office, however, does make recommendations, and I have asked that your name be included for consideration when future lists are composed.

Linas Kojelis is the member of our staff responsible for ethnic relations, and I have given him your letter for his information. Please do not hesitate to get in touch with him in the event you have further questions.

> Sincerely, Tain R. wante

Faith Ryan Whittlesey

Assistant to the President

for Public Liaison

Mr. Boleslaw Wierzbianski Editor and Publisher NOWY DZIENNIK 21 West 38th Street New York, New York 10018 on dist

NOWY DZIENNIK POLISH DAILY NEWS . BICENTENNIAL PUBLISHING CORP. .

21 WEST 38th STREET . NEW YORK N. Y. 10018 . (212) 354-0490-91-92

NOV 8 1983

November 4, 1983

Ms. Faith Whittlesey Assistant to the President For Public Liaison The White House Washington, DC 20500

Dear Ms. Whittlesey:

Mr. Steven Markowski, Chairman of the National Polish American Republican Clubs, sent us information that a special White House briefing on U. S. policy and actions in Grenada was held on Monday. October 31. Because we are a newspaper, we are not a member of the Republican party nor of any other political party. However, as a leading olish American daily we are naturally interested in these type of briefings. In fact, in the past some of my colleagues or I were invited to attend such occasions. They are extremely useful to our work and allow us to maintain contact with the White House and the government in general. We will greatly appreciate it if we could be placed on the list of people to whom invitations are issued.

I personally attended several meetings with the President. We also maintain a permament correspondent in Washington.

I attach some sample issues of our publications. Perhaps you could have a glance at them.

Singerely/,

Boleslaw Wierzbianski Editor & Publisher

BW:mm

BERKELEY · DAVIS · IRVINE · LOS ANGELES · RIVERSIDE · SAN DIEGO · SAN FRANCISCO

UCLA

SANTA CRUZ SANTA BARBARA .

825.4321

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

July 26, 1983

Mr. Morton C. Blackwell Special Assistant to the President The White House Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. Blackwell:

Thank you for your kind note of July 20 and the materials on Central America. I would be most grateful to be put on the mailing list for White House Digest. I expect to be writing on Central America and will send you copies of whatever I publish.

I have just returned from London, where I made arrangements for Prime Minister Thatcher to receive a proposal through my hands from a distinguished Guatemalan scholar for a settlement of the quarrel between Britain and Guatemala over Belize. also referred to intelligence sources here some information from a close source in Grenada about the possibility of a change of regime there.

Let me help on Central America in any way that I can. I have enclosed an outline of a volume of essays I am editing on "For the Republic: Essays on the American Improvidence and Vulnerability". You will note the sections on Central America and the political impact in the United States of large-scale Central American immigration. I would be grateful for your comments and advice.

Sincerely,

John Hutchinson

Professor of Industrial Relations

Morton Blackwell

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

UCLA

BERKELEY · DAVIS · IRVINE · LOS ANGELES · RIVERSIDE · SAN DIEGO · SAN FRANCISCO



SANTA BARBARA · SANTA CRUZ

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

ADDENDUM

I have just learned that I am likely soon to be invited to deliver a public address and/or scholarly paper in Guatemala City on U.S. policy toward Central America, or some such topic.

I would like to help, and would be grateful for any advice on the scope and content and timeliness of the talk you or your associates might have to offer.

FOR THE REPUBLIC:

ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN IMPROVIDENCE
AND VULNERABILITY

John Hutchinson (Editor)
Professor of Industrial Relations
Graduate School of Management
University of California at
Los Angeles

April 25, 1983

INTRODUCTION

On the decline of the American pre-eminence in productive competence, and on the contribution to that decline of inferior education and managerial displacement; on the threat to the national cohesion of the urban ghetto and porous southern borders; on the exacerbation of the menace of organized crime by the hard drug trade from Latin America; on the strategic vulnerability of the United States to nuclear pre-emption and to strangular conventional or special forces attack at the throttle points of Central Europe, the Arabian Gulf, Southern Africa and Central America; and on the prospective costs in lives and freedom and prosperity at home and abroad of an enduring American lassitude.

PART I:

THE REPUBLIC DISABLED

THE REPUBLIC DISABLED

I. THE UNTUTORED AMERICAN

On the decline of literacy and a unifying language in primary and secondary education, and on the lowering competitiveness of American research in the vital sciences.

II. THE CAPTIVE MANAGER

On the diminishing ability of American industry to compete with the major and emerging industrial powers, and on relationship between that decline and the subordinated status in the industrial hierarchy of the production manager.

III. THE GHETTO BLACK

On the durability and explosiveness of the urban black underclass, on the effect of public welfare on family size and unity, on the relationship between affirmative action and black effectiveness, and on the case histories of urban black self-regeneration.

IV. THE PROTECTED OUTLAW

On violent and organized crime in the United States, on the procedural obstacles to substantive justice in the criminal law, on the mounting power and social subversion of the traffickers in hard drugs from Latin America, and on the special interest opposition to the reform of the criminal law.

THE DANGEROUS BORDER

On the American loss of sovereign control over the Mexican border, on the bursting population of the poor in Mexico, on the prospective Marxist domination of Central America, and on the implications for American political stability and national cohesion of massive and perhaps revolutionary migration across an invalidated frontier.

PART II:

THE REPUBLIC AT RISK

. THE REPUBLIC AT RISK

VI. THE STRATEGIC IMBALANCE

On the emerging Russian capacity to mount a definitive nuclear pre-emption against the United States, on the otherwise likely nuclear and conventional stalemate, and on the derivative Soviet freedom to undermine those areas and strategic sources vital to Western security.

VII. THE UNSTABLE SAUDIS

On the eroding control of the ruling family in Saudi Arabia, on the Sunni domination of Saudi government and the Shi-ite persuasion of the work force in the oil fields, and on the parallel intent of Iran and the Soviet Union to exploit the religious divisions and strategic vulnerability of the region in search of control over Saudi oil.

VIII. THE INDISPENSABLE MINERALS

On the presence in Southern Africa of raw materials indispensable to American industrial and military strength, on the strategic requirement of a marriage of racial justice and constitutional government in Southern Africa, and on the imperative of Western help in the region toward internal stability and self-defense against the incursions of external autocracies.

IX. RUSSIA AND CENTRAL AMERICA

On the revolutionary tide in Central
America and its subvening from Cuba
and the Soviet Union, on the poverty
of the area and the comparative merits
of its regimes, on the quality of
American aid and intervention, and
on the strategic and civic consequences
to the United States of a Marxist
Central America.

THE POLISH FIRE

On the combustibility of Polish society since the rise of Solidarity, on the impatience of the Polish young, on the danger of a nationalist explosion reaching beyond the Polish borders, and on the risk that Eastern European turbulence and Western European anti-nuclear sentiment might tempt the Soviet Union to reach the Atlantic with conventional forces before the West is equippped to withstand them.

CONCLUSION

On the matter of remedies for the national improvidence and vulnerability: the elevation of standards and discipline in education, the resurrection of the production manager, the encouragement of self-reliance in the ghettoes, the reduction of the procedural deficiences in the criminal law, the registration of alien workers and the closing of the border to the illegals, the development of nuclear resources sufficient to prohibit Soviet pre-emption, the strengthening of Western conventional and special forces in the Middle East, an American commitment to constitutional government and military security in Southern Africa, the blocking of Cuban and Soviet aid to insurgence in Central America, and the devising of a strategy in Central Europe to meet the imperatives of both East-West security and the liberation of the captive states of Eastern Europe.

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1983

Dear Mr. Vermillion:

I regret the delay in responding to your letter requesting certain information about the Office of Public Liaison.

This office is chiefly concerned with explaining the President's policies across a wide range of interests.

The Office of Public Liaison schedules regular briefings on the situation in Central America and, under separate cover, I am forwarding to you several "White House Digest" papers on that area which may be of interest. One is on the Soviet/Cuban Threat and Buildup in the Caribbean." I will see that your name is added to our mailing list so that you will receive future "Digests."

Sincerely,

Faith Ryan Whittlesey Assistant to the President

Taix R. Weittes

marks 1/30

ardo.

for Public Liaison

Mr. Kenneth Joseph Vermillion 1696 Hill Rise Drive, Apt. 9 Lexington, Kentucky 40504

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1983

Dear Dr. Leonard:

Thank you for your letter of November 27th.

As you requested, I have asked that you be sent a complete set of the "White House Digest" papers and that your name be put on our mailing list to receive future papers.

We are delighted that you can put this information to such good use.

Sincerely,

Danie R. Waitlise f Faith Ryan Whittlesey

Assistant to the President for Public Liaison

Dr. Thomas M. Leonard Professor of History University of North Florida 4567 St. Johns Bluff Road, S Jacksonville, Florida 32216

WASHINGTON

December 5, 1983

Dear Mrs. Pubillones:

I want you to know how very much all of us here at the White House appreciate your strong support of the President. You can be sure that he, too, is aware of your efforts in his behalf.

I will make certain that your name is on the list to receive our White House Digest papers on current issues.

Thank you so much for taking the time to write such warm letter, and I hope that some day you will be able to visit the White House.

Faith Ryan Whittlesey Assistant to the President

for Public Liaison

Mrs. Margarita Pubillones 1247 "A" Boynton Street Glendale, California 91205

WASHINGTON

December 5, 1983

Dear Anne:

Thank you for your letter received today. Enclosed is a copy of my letter sent to your Mother. I do hope she will be able to come to some of the meetings.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Jane

Faith Ryan Whittlesey Assistant to the President for Public Liaison

Mrs. Anne Mahoney Robbins 17 Lodge Drive Rockville, Maryland 20850 115 include her

WASHINGTON

December 5, 1983

Dear Mr. Dechant:

Thank you for taking the time to write me. We are sorry that you were not able to attend the November 10th briefing but hope that you or your representative will be able to come to one of the future events.

Your name has been placed on our list to receive notices of the briefings as well as copies of the White House Digest papers which may be of interest.

Sincerely, Daira R. Wantany

Faith Ryan Whittlesey
Assistant to the President

for Public Llaison

Mr. Virgil C. Dechant Süpreme Knight Knights of Columbus New Haven, Conn. 06507 THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 2, 1983

God,

Dear Mr. Chenoweth:

I am sorry for the delay in responding to your letter of. November 1st. I do want you to know that we appreciate your taking the time to give us your frank opinions on what I know is an important issue for your organization.

I thought your letter was important enough to have the questions you raise researched by a member of my staff who is thoroughly familiar with the Administration's actions in this area. We will be back in touch with you soon.

In the meantime, I have asked that your name be placed on our mailing list for the "White House Digest" papers which may be of interest. We will also include your name on our list for future briefings.

Sincerely,

Faith Ryan Whittlesey Assistant to the President for Public Liaison

Taid R. Whites

Mr. Eric Chenoweth
Executive Director
Committee in Support of Solidarity
275 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10001

Sandinistas Ihrilled

By the PLO Misma, FL. Friday, June 3, 1983



Nicaragua's Jewish Community Fleeing Into Exile

NEW YORK - The Sandinist Government of Nicaragua has forced the country's entire Jewish community into exile, confiscating Jewish-owned property and taking over the synagogue in Managua,

according to the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

Rabbi Morton M. Rosenthal, director of the League's Latin American Affairs Department, made the disclosure in an article prepared by him for publication

in the ADL Bulletin, the agency's national publication.

Rabbi Rosenthal, who last visited Nicaragua shortly before the Sandinists came to power in 1979, said the government of Nicaragua has been unresponsive to ADL appeals to end "these human right violations" and

permit the return of the Jews their country.

THE FORCED exodus of Nicaraguan Jewish commun — numbering about 50 — to place after the Somoza regin was overthrown. Their ous was effected, the article said,

Continued on Page 7-A

Sandinistas Thrilled By the PLO

Nicaragua's Jews Fleeing Into Exile

Continued from Page 1-A subtle and direct threats or by forcible measures.

The case of Isaac Stavisky, a textile engineer, who was out of the country at the time of the Sandinist victory, was cited as an example. Stavisky, the article said, was advised that he should not return to his country "for his own safety because he and his brother-in-law were considered enemies of the revolution."

president of Nicaraguan Jewish community, Abraham Gorn, was jailed after the Sandinist victory. "Gorn, Rabbi Roesnthal wrote, "wh was then 70 years old, was falsely accused of stealing land and was forced to sweep streets during the two weeks of his confinement.

SIX MONTHS later, he went on, Sandinists summarily ousted him from his factory and took it over. The Sandinists told factory workers to threaten to bomb his car if he returned. Gorn was quoted as saying that Carlos Arguello, currently Minister of Justice, confiscated his bank account and "then kicked me out of my home."

Despite the departure of the Jewish community, Rabbi Rosenthal said, anti-Semitism still exists in the country. In July, 1982, he said that a Managua newspaper, Nuevo Diario, which often reflects government policy, published articles that were filled with

such as a reference to .
'synagogues of Satan.'' such as a

The Sandinists have also converted the synagogue Managua into a children's social club, covering exterior Stars of David with propaganda posters and adorning the inside walls with anti-Zionist propaganda.

NICARAGUAN according to the article, cite the long and close relationship between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Sandinists as a source of their problems.

The article described how the PLO has provided weapons, training, money and even fight-ing men for the Sandinist battle against the Somoza regime. It quotes Jorge Mandi, a Sandinist spokesman, in an interview in a Kuwaiti newspaper in 1979, as declaring that "there is a long standing blood unity between us and the Palestine revolution," and recalling that Sandinist troops fought alongside the PLO in Jordan during the Black September battles.

Nicaraguan Jews claim that because of the close PLO-San-dinist relationship, Nicaraguans of Arab descent have been able to remain in the country continuing business activities similar to those engaged in by the departed Jews who went to the United States, Israel or other Central American countries.

THE ARTICLE states that ADL has sought to alleviate the articles that were filled with plight of Nicaraguan Jews in virulent anti-Semitic statements ongoing discussions with Nicaraguan diplomats for two years. In New York in 1981, the League brought the problems to the attention of Nicaragua's For-eign Minister, Miguel D'Escoto, who promised to investigate the complaints.

Subsequently, Nicaraguan of-ficials promised to review confiscation cases but have not yet delivered any response, nor have they responded to ADL requests state the conditions under which Jews could return to their country.

Noting that Minister of Justice Arguello said at a recent meeting of the Human Rights Committee at the United Nations that the government would consider a request from Nicaraguan Jews that the synagogue be returned to them as a place of worship, Rabbi Rosenthal said:

"This is a meaningless promise in a country without Jews.

Salvadoran Guerrilla Aide Urges U.S. Role in Talks

By Joanne Omang Washington Post 6tail Writer

A spokesman here for the guerrilla forces in El Salvador yesterday called for direct U.S. participation in negotiations among the varring parties there, saying presidential privay Richard B. Stone would be acceptable as a participant but not as a mediator.

Ruben Zamora, North American spokesman for the joint command of the Farahundo Marti National Liberation Front and the Democratic Revolutionary Front aFMLN/FDR), reiterated at a meeting of the Disarm Educational Fund, a New York-based educational organization, that his group would not take part in any elections under existing political conditions in the

Central American nation. Instead, he listed elections as one of six points on a proposed agenda for talks aimed at "a comprehensive political settlement." The Salvadoran government and the Reagan administration have repeatedly rejected the idea of discussions over power sharing.

Zamora's visit to Washington was hurriedly arranged, apparently to coincide with the arrival here yesterday of interim Salvadoran President Alvaro Magana, who is expected to announce dates in November and December for two-stage presidential elections when he meets today with President Reagan.

Zamora called as he has in the past for direct dialogue among all "parties directly involved" in the 3-year-old conflict in El Salvador, but for the first time he included the United States in that group.

"Because of its role in providing economic, political and military support to the Salvadoran regime, as well as its increasing control over the decisions of the Salvadoran government, we consider the Reagan administration as a belligarent party directly confronting" the FMLN/FDR, said a prepared statement Zamora distributed.

"While our conflict has its roots in the injustice and repression suffered by the people, the increasingly militaristic and interventionist role of President Reagan's administration demonstrates that in El Salvador there will be no peace, no justice and no independence as long as this policy continues," the state-

ment said. Stone, Zamora said, is "a representative of one of the parties directly involved in the conflict and therefore not a mediator." Stone said during Senate hearings on his nomination that he would be willing to meet with the FMLN/FDR to help mediate a settlement to the Salvadoran conflict.

Zamora listed six points that he said the FMLN/FDR wanted on the agenda, although he said the guerrillas have no order of preference or of discussion. He indicated willingness to accept other issues. The topics would be socio-economic reforms, the future of the government and guerrilla armies, the composition of the provisional government, future elections, the international policy of El Salvador and a cease-fire.



RUBEN ZAMORA
lists six points for proposed agenda