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
21 August 1983

Ms. Thomann:

Per your telecom this a.m., and in conjunction with transmission of my study, suggest that you might wish to further establish my bona fides by contacting a Dr. Richard L. Krumm at the Central Intelligence Agency. Dr. Krumm is a former Vice President of Essex Corp. and is well acquainted with my research capabilities (and limitations!). He is a senior research type at the Agency and was chief of the Behavioral Sciences Branch (BSB) in the Agency's Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) but I think some re-organizing has since gone on and I'm not certain of his current assignment there. I suspect you have the resources to track him down.

Enjoyed talking to you and hope the attached may be of some service in addressing the problem we both perceive.

(s) John N. Coles

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "John N. Coles", written over the typed name. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

To Whom it May Concern: A copy of this report was submitted by certified mail to The Washington Times, 8/16 at approx 1200 hrs, c/o Mr. Ralph Hallow.

I wish to make it clear that the report represents my own views and efforts, and not those of any other person or organization. My sole motive in preparing it is to provide what I hope might be a service to this country!

CENTRAL AMERICA THROUGH NETWORK EYES

By

John N. Colas

16 August 83

c. 1983



(1)

Are the media guilty, as charged repeatedly by the Reagan administration, of distorting U.S. Central American policy and not informing Americans of the president's aims in that region? Or, as Paul Reynolds of the Bangor Daily News recently asserted on <sup>PBS'</sup> McNeil-Lehrer, are they doing "a commendable job in reporting both sides of the story?" At least a partial answer may be found in a two-week survey I ~~recently~~ conducted of the coverage of Central America by the ~~evening~~ three major network's evening news programs during the period August 3-15, 1983. The following <sup>findings</sup> ~~conclusions~~ may be rather startling to those television ~~defenders~~ <sup>set-news fraternity</sup> of the <sup>journalistic</sup> who continually cry sour grapes at suggestions from presidents that they may not be doing their job.

Network coverage of presidential statements concerning Central America rarely focused on the substance of such statements. Instead, the bulk of such coverage was devoted to matters largely extraneous to Central American policy considerations.

In the period August 12-15, the president made three major public speeches, a Saturday radio address, and participated in a mini-summit conference with Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid. On each of these occasions, the administration's policy vis-a-vis Central America was detailed in its various dimensions; the latter event produced a number of announcements about U.S.-Mexican relations. Yet, as the following examples demonstrate, virtually nothing of a substantive nature about these ~~issues~~ matters was presented to viewers of the network evening news.

In reporting on the president's appearance before Cuban-

CENTRAL AMERICA THROUGH THE NETWORK

BY JOHN N. COLAS - 8/16/83 BYE

Americans in Tampa, Fla., on August 12, all three networks keyed their coverage to the domestic political implications of the event. Reportage of what the president actually said in an all-encompassing elucidation of his Central American policy was limited to highlighting several rhetorical passages condemning Soviet and Cuban aggression in the region--i.e., Reagan's reference to Cuba as an "economic basket case" and Cuban youth as "Soviet cannon-fodder" were about all the American people learned of U.S. Central American policy that night from the networks.

ABC's Mike von Freund described the August 12 speech as "a stinging attack," saying the president "warned that what happened in Cuba could happen elsewhere if the U.S. does nothing to help." According to NBC's Andrea Mitchell, "Mr. Reagan found (Cuban President Fidel Castro) tougher than ever." Mr. Reagan said the real threat came from Moscow," Mitchell continued. And, on CBS, Leslie <sup>Stahl</sup> reported: "The president defended the military nature of Latin America policy, saying his critics are courting disaster."

The preceding paragraph contains the sum total of the network correspondent's contributions to informing the viewers about what Reagan said that day in Tampa.

The situation was not much different the next day in network reports about the president's speech to Mexican-American veterans in El Paso, Tex. Again, the coverage was keyed to the domestic political implications of his appearance. As to reporting what the president actually said to his audience about Central America:

Emory King (NBC): Nothing.



Insert (3)

Note that top of p. 3 is missing. It should read as follows:

Jessica Savitch (NBC): "Mr. Reagan . . . also gave a strong

*Result (3)*

Note that top of p. 3 is missing. It should read as follows:

Jessica Savitch (NBC): "Mr. Reagan . . . also gave a strong

defense of his policies in Central America."

Ann Compton (ABC): Reagan "warned today that the United States cannot just walk away from nations like Nicaragua where he says the Sandanistas have no intention of restoring democracy."

That same day, August 13, the president made another of his regular Saturday radio addresses. This was devoted entirely to explaining his Central American policies and criticizing the media for not getting his message out to the people. Appropriately in view of the latter, none of the network news programs that evening made reference to the address.

Concluding a busy weekend, the president went to La Paz, Mexico on August 14 where he spent several hours huddled with his Mexican counterpart, Miguel de la Madrid. This meeting produced a series of announcements about U.S.-Mexican relations relating to immigration, cooperation of environmental pollution, scientific exchanges, and Mexican debt restructuring. Yet the big story that day for the networks was de la Madrid's veiled criticism of U.S. military activities in Central America and--the really big story for ABC and CBS, a reported squabble between Secretary of State George *Shultz* and National Security Adviser William Clark. As to what Reagan and Shultz said and did at the meeting:

The president, Ann Compton reported for ABC, "again demanded that Nicaragua stop threatening its democratic neighbors," and he "embraced" the call of the Contadora group "for military personnel to pull out" of Central America. Bill Plante's CBS report was somewhat more informative, but not much:

"Mr Reagan came to this meeting with the Mexican president," Plante reported, "to seek at least tacit support for U.S. pressure



tactics in Central America, in return for an endorsement of the regional peace process . . . The two presidents . . . also had matters of trade policy, pollution, and immigration to discuss . . . President Reagan asserted that (respect for the principles of self-determination and non-intervention) was U.S. policy as well . . . Secretary of State Shultz, saying that the U.S. supports the efforts of Mexico and the other so-called Contadora nations to negotiate a regional peace, defended what was called the U.S. 'show of force' in Central America . . . This meeting, which left the public positions of both the U.S. and Mexico unchanged, was an effort to present U.S. foreign policy in Central America as a coherent whole" . . .

So much for the U.S.-Mexican summit!

The next chance for the networks to inform the viewing audience about Reagan's Central American policy came on August 15 when the president made another public speech dealing with that subject, this time before the New Orleans' convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Unfortunately for viewers who might have hoped to learn something about the president's views, the network reporters had something more important to communicate: the relative receptions accorded to Reagan and Democratic presidential aspirant, John Glenn, who also spoke to the assembled veterans.

*As to Central America,*  
Andrea Mitchell (NBC) said, "the president defended his foreign policy, particularly in Central America, from critics who say it is not working." ~~Apparently~~ Reagan "defended his Central American policy," ABC's new anchor Peter Jennings observed. ~~XXXXXX~~ Jennings also noted presidential criticism of the media and

others for distorting public perception of his policies, as did Bill Plante who completed the network's ~~triumphant~~ substantive coverage of the president on Central America by reporting: "And, Mr. Reagan insisted that the region needs a military security shield, which he likened to a neighborhood self-help program."

Network reportage of other domestic events bearing directly on Central American policy were similarly short on substance. A case in point was provided by the swearing-in of the president's new bi-partisan Central America Commission (the so-called "Kissinger Commission"). This took place on August 10 and provided an opportunity for the network's to inform the public about the role of the commission within the broader context of U.S. policy in the region. However, such was not to be the case as the big story this day, at least for CBS and NBC, was new commissioner member, San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros.

Cisneros, a liberal democrat, was singled out for special attention because--surprise of surprises--he held views different from the president about Central America. This was treated by the two networks as ~~the~~ a major story, and both Marvin Kalb (NBC) and Bob Schieffer (CBS) interpreted Cisneros' criticisms as undermining a White House ploy to use the commission for bolstering support for administration policy. While ABC reported the commission inauguration in relatively straight-forward fashion, that network also joined the other two in providing virtually no substantive information about the commission itself.

Network coverage of Central America tended to be preoccupied with portraying administration policy as unpopular and dangerous.

This was a theme running throughout network coverage for the period surveyed and it found expression in a number of ways.



*instance,*  
~~with~~  
 For ~~example~~, no matter what the specific subject-matter, hardly a report was made relating to Central America that did not contain a liberal sprinkling of references to words like "fears," "concerns," "criticism" or to poll results showing limited public support for administration policy. A few examples should suffice to make the point:

- Leslie Stahl (CBS-August 12): "There is some concern, however, about a possible backlash, particularly among Hispanics . . ."

- John Blackstone (CBS-August 8): "Honduran opposition political leaders are already voicing fears" about U.S. military exercises.

- Mike von Freund (ABC-August 12): "But the latest polls show that 62 percent of the American people oppose" U.S. covert action in Central America.

- Jessica Savitch (NBC-August 13): ". . . policies many Hispanics have been critical of."

- Bob Schieffer (CBS-August 13): "Do la Madrid is concerned about the increasing U.S. Military presence there."

Constant ~~continued~~ repetition of such references, of course, ultimately takes on <sup>the quality of a</sup> self-fulfilling prophecy, ~~effect~~. It is a classic propaganda technique which in this case, as with media coverage of Vietnam, creates doubts by continually hammering home the message that the administration is embarked on a course of action in Central America that cannot possibly be correct because--as reported by the media--it is so unpopular and dangerous.

This underlying theme of the unpopularity of the administration's policies found expression in other ways as well. One of these was through airing the views of administration critics while slighting those of its supporters. The most clear-cut *example*



context  
occurred in the case of the afore-mentioned Kissinger Commission swearing-in when outspoken administration critic, Mayor Henry Cisneros aired his views to millions of Americans, courtesy of CBS and NBC News' cameras. Cisneros, along <sup>with</sup> another new commission member and fellow-critic--former Democratic Party Committee Chairman Bob Strauss, were the only new commission members interviewed that night by the networks. Only if you chanced to tune into McNeil-Lehrer on PBS the same night would you learn that there were other commission members, like Boston University President John Silber and Project Hope founder Dr. William Walsh, who held quite different views.

Both Silber and Walsh, for example, found fault with media reporting on Central America. Walsh also found fault with Cisneros: "Mayor Cisneros," he said, "refers to the death squads of the right. It's strange, we never hear of the death squads of the left." For his part, Silber also voiced strong support for the president's policies. Yet the views of neither of these distinguished Americans were apparently not considered "newsworthy" by the network news organizations.

~~xxxxxxxx~~ Congressman Clarence Long (D., Md.) suddenly found himself a media celebrity when a military coup occurred in Guatamala on August 8. Long, it so happens, had a personal grudge against the deposed Guatamalan Leader, Gen. Rios-Montt, stemming from a tete-a-tete the two had during a Long ~~xxxx~~ "fact-finding" trip, and his widely-known animosity apparently was sufficient to peak the interest of network newsmen like ABC's Mike von Freund, who featured the congressman venting his spleen in an August 8 report. Again, as with Cisneros, no spokesman with another point of view was presented. Only if you stayed <sup>up</sup>

to watch ABC's Nightline might you have learned that things in Guatemala, a U.S. ally, were not all black as Long had painted.

Col. Sam Dickens (USAF, Ret.), whose background and knowledge with regard to that country far surpasses Long's, was a guest on the August 8 edition of Nightline. Among other things, he had this to say about Guatemala and its critics: "But poor Guatemala. It's the people that really are important. They were maligned under the Carter administration on human rights . . . again they continue to be maligned. They've been attempting to make improvements . . . I think there has been a concerted ~~campaign~~ attack against the countries that consider themselves anti-communist. It's been a very effective propaganda attack." As a guest, Dickens no doubt felt constrained <sup>from</sup> ~~about~~ pointing <sup>an</sup> accusing fingers. If he had, he might well <sup>have</sup> ~~point~~ it at the ABC camera.

Besides playing up domestic critics and lacing their reports with gloomy descriptive adjectives, the networks <sup>also</sup> played on public fears and doubts by interjecting not-so-subtle hints that, a-la-Vietnam, "here we go again." The theme this time was WAR!

"The military takes pains to emphasize," CBS correspondent Ned Potter tells us in an August 8 report from Ft. Campbell, Ky, that "these are 'routine' military exercises. Still, some people worry, might not this show of force turn into the use of it?" Concluding, Potter intones: "The exercises are scheduled to run until early next year . . . but some civilians wonder how soon <sup>will</sup> the troops <sup>actually</sup> get home" (Potter's emphasis).

Leslie Stahl <sup>on CBS Evening News</sup> struck the same note in her coverage of the president's August 12 speech in Tampa, Fla. Stahl noted a fear among some Hispanics that "the president's policies could lead to war and that it will be their sons who will be called upon to fight their former-countrymen in Central America."



If not war, might the president's policy nonetheless lead to a permanent U.S. military presence in Central America? Charles Gomez hinted this might be the case in an August 14 CBS report on the Big Pine II joint U.S.-Honduras maneuvers in Honduras. Gomez ended this report by citing "some top Honduran officials" who, he said, hoped that "U.S. forces stayed behind when the exercises are over" to fend off Nicaragua.

*The U.S. and the U.S.-supported governments & leaders were*  
Administration policy was consistently depicted as militaristic, <sup>ruthless</sup> reckless, and provocative whereas the "other side" in the Central American conflict was ~~described~~ portrayed as conciliatory and non-threatening.

If visual images mean anything, then anybody watching the network's evening news broadcasts in the period August 3-15 must have thought the <sup>full military might of the</sup> U.S. was descending upon Central America. Night after night, viewers were treated to scenes of U.S. Navy warships steaming off Nicaragua, of planes, men and material landing in Honduras as part of Big Pine II, and of American military advisers imparting their martial crafts to Honduran and Salvadoran troops. Only NBC's Nightly News ~~seemed immune~~ seemed ~~immune~~ largely immune to the temptation to treat its viewers to a barrage of film stories about Big Pine II which for CBS, and to a lesser degree ABC, seemed to offer yet another way to create public anxiety about administration Central American policy. These exercises are designed to bring some 5,500 American combat troops and support personnel into Honduras over a six-month period. Hardly a huge force.

Yet, from the breathless descriptions of some ABC and CBS reporters, you might get the impression that the U.S. was pulling out all the military stops. Dan Rather (CBS-August 3) referred



to the exercises as the "largest U.S. military maneuvers ever held in Central America." Ned Potter (ABC-August 8) said they were "much bigger than previous exercises." And, to the <sup>sound</sup> backdrop of roaring aircraft engines, John Blackstone (CBS-August 7) spoke of the first trickle of men and equipment" that, he continued, would "grow to what seem like flood proportions in a country as small as Honduras." Three days later, Blackstone followed up on this theme in observing: "The corners of the Honduran countryside are quickly being turned into corners of America."

As if to juxtapose this "massive" U.S. military <sup>operation</sup> against the backdrop of an otherwise tranquil Honduran countryside, ~~Blackstone on August 15~~ Blackstone on August 15 narrated a film segment about a U.S. Peace Corps volunteer which alternated shots of Big Pine II military activities with the as yet undisturbed peacefulness of the volunteer's isolated rural nursery. A not very subtle way of impressing upon viewers that bad old America <sup>was</sup> once more threatening to wreak its special brand of an unsuspecting havoc on a third world victim. To drive the point home, Blackstone concluded the report, referring to the volunteer: "He is among those in Honduras who say that peace requires more than a strong army."

The impression that ~~it was~~ the U.S. ~~that~~ was the military "heavy" in the Central American drama <sup>was communicated in other ways.</sup> The networks vied with one another to cast the president and some of his advisors as sabre-rattlers <sup>"Remember the</sup> of the bellicose and jingoistic ~~mentality~~ Maine" mentality so widely attributed to Reagan by his liberal detractors. When Reagan spoke before Cuban-Americans August 12, all three networks chose to key their coverage of his remarks to his colorful references to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Leslie Stahl (CBS-August 7) led off a story stating, "The Reagan administration is in the process of expanding U.S. involvement in three

crises."

Network correspondents sometimes cited Sandanista sources to underline the threat that the U.S. was posing to Central American ~~for~~ "peace." David Dick (CBS-August 10), reporting from Nicaragua, observed: "As little as 25 miles will separate the Big Pine II maneuvers from Sandanista encampments . . . This entire border is considered a sensitive area by Sandanistas . . . Sandanista leaders consider U.S. maneuvers to be provocative," <sup>in mind.</sup> "We are told by Jerry King (ABC-August 7) that Sandanista junta leader, Daniel Ortega, "felt threatened by the U.S. escalation of the war situation."

U.S. actions are also depicted in network coverage as not only threatening our foes, but also our friends in Central America as well. "But there are critics in Honduras who," according to John-Blackstone (CBS-August 8), "are already concerned . . . that this increasing militarization of the country under American sponsorship will pull Honduras into a regional conflict."

This image of a war-mongering American president intent upon unleashing the dogs of war on Central America stood in marked contrast to the image of the "other side" in the conflict as depicted by the networks. Whereas Reagan was continually described ~~in~~ reports with reference to terms such as "hardline," "gunboat diplomacy," and "belligerent," the spokesmen and leaders of the powers that had set the region afire in the first place were given much gentler treatment.

This contrast was made explicit in an August 12 NBC report by Andrea Mitchell: "Despite recent conciliatory statements by Fidel Castro," she observed, "Mr. Reagan found him tougher than ever." Sandanista leader Daniel Ortega, we are told by Leslie



Stahl (CBS-August 7), "has faith in the Contadora effort, but is nonetheless preparing for the worst." ~~Saxist~~ A similarly conciliatory pose <sup>was</sup> struck <sup>for network cameras on August 3</sup> by Soviet Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs Yuri Fokine in Managua. Fokine's "restraint" in the face of U.S. provocation is duly noted--the "provocation" in this case being a radio exchange between a U.S. Navy warship and Soviet transport in the seas off Nicaragua.

Indeed, it is remarkable in reviewing the transcripts, to observe how network coverage of Central America during this period so clearly seemed to turn reality on its head by continually picturing the U.S. and its allies in the region as villains while Soviet-backed elements emerge as beleaguered targets of U.S.-sponsored aggression. Several network reports are worth quoting at some length to make the point.

Jerry King from Managua (ABC-August 7): "Ortega spoke to 300 university graduates just back from their studies in Cuba. They're being sent to work in areas under attack by counter-revolutionaries who, Ortega said, have killed more than 600 Sandanista soldiers and civilians so far this year.

"This weekend," King continued, "one such student--Denis Silva, was given a hero's funeral complete with revolutionary fervor. 'They shall not pass,' chanted the mourners, a reference to the counter-revolutionaries backed by Washington and based in Honduras. There were banners which read: 'Denis, with your example we will build a new country!'

"But beyond the public martyrdom," King said as he concluded his report, "there was also private grief (shots of weeping mourners) all too often forgotten in the current diplomatic maneuvering and point-scoring."



David Dick in a film report (CBS-August 10) from the Nicaraguan border with Honduras: "Implements are primitive (shots of Sandanistas digging fortifications). Weapons here seem in short supply . . . The Nicaraguan border patrols include children as young as 13 years old . . . Morale here seems high, motivated by the political ideology of Sandino, the guiding spirit of the leftest revolution in Nicaragua."

David Dick reporting another funeral in Nicaragua (CBS-August 11): "Some of the bodies began arriving here this morning . . . A mother grieves for her 17 year old son . . . A young woman 19 years old lost her husband. He was also 19. She is pregnant. Their child will be born in December. She says that, 'this is all I have left of him' . . . they ran into an ambush set up by 100 to 200 counter-revolutionaries who, it is believed, crossed over the border from Honduras . . . In all, 15 people were killed in the massacre . . . there were only three survivors."

Robin Lloyd (NBC-August 11) narrating an "exclusive" film ~~xxx~~ "from a French TV news crew" about anti-government rebels in Guatamala: "Like the Salvador<sup>ian</sup> guerrillas, the Guatamalan rebels are strongly influenced by the Cuban revolution. They are Marxists . . . They are fighting for radical social change through revolution . . . Through communion services like this one by rebel priests, the guerrillas hope to gain more popular support with the refugees. In Guatamala, the guerrilla war appears to of only just begun."

What is striking about the preceding and other network coverage of Soviet/Cuban-backed elements in Central America during the period surveyed, is the almost complete absence of any reference

to the fundamental truths about what is going on in Central America. The role of the USSR and Cuba in building Nicaragua into the region's foremost military power is never once mentioned. The fact that Nicaragua serves as arsenal and nerve-center for on-going insurrections against ~~xxx~~ an elected government in El Salvador is also never mentioned. Instead of referring to the Sandanistas and their rebel counterparts in neighboring countries as "communists," the network reporters resort to the use of euphemisms. The victims of the violence in Central America are almost exclusively portrayed to be the victims of U.S.-supported elements.

The "Ulyanov affair" provides what is almost a case study of the apparent great reluctance of the networks to come to grips with some these realities. The "Alexander Ulyanov" was specifically named by President Reagan in a July 26 news conference as one of several Soviet ships en route to Nicaragua carrying military supplies.

On August 3, CBS, using film "purchased from sources friendly to Nicaragua," aired a report on the Ulyanov narrated by Richard Wagner. The film featured an interview with the Ulyanov's handsome English-speaking first-officer stating his ship carried only ~~general~~ "general cargo." This was followed by camera shots of Corinto harbor. Wagner said, "the Soviets have consistently denied sending military supplies to Nicaragua." Referring to the peaceful harbor scene, Wagner added, "only non-military cargo is seen. The Nicaraguan government also denies military equipment is sent here from the Soviet Union." *he added.*

While Wagner concluded his report by admitting "it is clear the Nicaraguan army has lots of military hardware," the entire thrust of the report was to discredit the Reagan claim. Two



days later, however, the White House released a partial ships' manifest showing the Ulyanov to be carrying two military helicopters and aircraft spare parts. Given all the previous publicity about this ship, one would think that the networks would give this story priority treatment on August 5 broadcasts. They did not.

CBS Evening News which led with the story discrediting the Reagan claim on August 3, did not air the manifest disclosure until midway into <sup>its</sup> August 5 broadcast. The report, read by Dan Rather, consisted of a terse four-sentence statement. NBC also did not see fit to run the story until midway into its broadcast that night. Tom Brokaw's report on the manifest matched Rather's for terseness. The story was diminished still further in the case of NBC because that network immediately preceded its Ulyanov coverage with a Robin Lloyd report from Managua featuring an interview with Sandanista Foreign Minister Miguel Descoto:

Descoto: "We do not manufacture arms and we have to get arms, so obviously we are trying to obtain as much as we can possibly obtain in order to exercise our legitimate right of defense."

Lloyd: "The Nicaraguan leadership is saying that as long as the U.S. continues its naval maneuvers in the region and its support of the rebels here, Nicaragua will continue building up its military strength." End of report.

In essence, therefore, what NBC was telling its viewing audience was: "Well Reagan might have been right after all about the Ulyanov, but so what? After all, isn't Reagan that's forced the Sandanistas to seek Soviet military aid?"

It goes almost without saying that network viewers heard

no more about either the Ulyanov or the fact that the USSR and Cuba had turned Nicaragua into an armed camp. It was a dead issue.

If the Sandanistas and their friends were pictured in benign terms, the same could not be said for network portrayals of U.S. Central <sup>American</sup> allies. It is instructive in this regard to contrast a previously cited report by NBC (August 11) about Guatemalan communist guerrillas with an August 15 Peter Collins film story about U.S.-backed anti-Sandanista forces aired on the ABC World News Tonight. Whereas the former was <sup>almost embarrassingly</sup> vague about the true allegiances of the communists and did not even speculate about the source of their arms or training, the Collins report about the "Contras" left little to the imagination in these terms.

"Who are they?," Collins asked. "The good guys, or the bad guys? These are anti-Sandanista guerrillas organized indirectly and paid for by the CIA. President Reagan has called them 'freedom fighters.' Their commander is a battle-hardened veteran of the National Guard under the <sup>ousted</sup> ~~xxxxxx~~ dictator, Anastasio Somoza." After describing them as well-armed but "nothing more than a nuisance," Collins still notes that the ~~xxxxxx~~ contras "chafe at restrictions they say are imposed by the <sup>of</sup> American masters."

If Collins couldn't make up his mind about "bad guys" and "good guys," his network colleagues seem to have already made up <sup>decided</sup> their minds on this subject: the "bad guys" in the eyes of American network television, at least during the period under review, were "our" guys. If there was evil to be found in Central America, it existed solely in the hearts and actions



of U.S.-supported leaders and regimes.

Singled out for special treatment was Guatemala, which drew the network spotlight for several days following the successful coup against Rios-Montt. As portrayed by the networks, Guatemala was the heart of darkness. The most common adjective used by network reporters in the Guatemalan context was "brutal." ABC on August 9 carried film of Clarence Long (D., Md.) declaring that, as far as human rights were concerned, the newly installed leader Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores didn't even know "what the right thing is." Bob Simon, <sup>(CBS-August 8)</sup> hit on the same bad-to-worse theme when he quoted an "official" as saying: "If you think the human rights situation is bad in Guatemala today, wait until this new crowd takes over."

In depicting Guatemala in such fashion, the networks also seemed ~~to~~ anxious to draw a direct link between this malevolent regime and the Reagan administration. The clear-cut message to viewers being: Reagan's on the side of the devil in Central America.

Simon in the same CBS report cited above, after noting Rios-Montt's brutality and eccentricity, said "But the Reagan administration was impressed." Mike von Freund (ABC August 9) noted that "the Reagan administration was quick to embrace the new regime." Concluding his report, von Freund said: "So, even though the Reagan administration continues to view Guatemala as a valuable anti-communist ally in a troubled part of the world, powerful members of Congress warn that it cannot be trusted." Reporting for CBS on August 9, Richard Wagner said, "For its part, the Reagan administration, although opposed to coups, is believed to be pleased to have a dedicated anti-communist at the helm of what it considers a strategic ally."

country."

American allies in the region were not only the sole source of human rights abuses, they were also seen to be ganging up on poor beleaguered Nicaragua. A classic example of truth being turned on its head came on August 14 when CBS' Bill Curtis announced a military pact between Guatemala and El Salvador under which the former would provide training for Salvadoran soldiers in exchange ~~for~~ for light arms. The move, according to Curtis, "would further isolate Nicaragua" leaving the impression that these two countries were ganging up on Nicaragua when the whole purpose of the agreement in the first place was to <sup>help</sup> fend-off Nicaraguan-based insurgencies.

In two weeks' of network broadcasting, only one report was ~~viewed~~ aired about the situation ~~in~~ on the ground in Central America that could be considered truly balanced and objective. This was a film story about the war in El Salvador titled "The Road to Suchitoto" which was narrated by Jay Shaydler and aired by ABC on August 10. It was also the only report which revealed the nature of the struggle in Central America in ~~ix~~ all its complexity, while describing the role of both sides in the struggle with scrupulous neutrality.

News stories that might contribute to greater public understanding of ~~Central American~~ U.S. Central American <sup>policy</sup> or, stories favorable to administration arguments--were frequently omitted from network coverage.

The preceding has dealt only with an analysis of network performance as it relates to stories actually aired. Yet sins of omission can be as devastating to public understanding of an issue like Central America as much as those of commission. To





General Conclusions.

Although this survey covered only two weeks of network news broadcasting, the findings tend to strongly support administration claims that the media "isn't playing fair" when it comes to reporting Central America. Most specifically, the following general conclusions can be noted: (1) Administration efforts to communicate the substance of U.S. Central American policy were consistently thwarted by network over-simplification and an overriding interest in essentially non-substantive issues; (2) the networks appeared to play on domestic fears of military involvement in Central America while devoting disproportionate coverage to administrative critics; (3) network coverage consistently depicted U.S. policies and actions as the primary source of conflict in the region; (4) President Reagan, the U.S., and U.S.-backed elements were consistently portrayed in a negative fashion whereas Soviet-backed elements were accorded far more sympathetic journalistic treatment; (5) the networks failed to report news stories that would have bolstered public understanding of, and support for, current U.S. policies.



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EDUCATION:

- WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, St. Louis, Missouri

Resident graduate study in Political Science under Universal Match Corporation and Washington University fellowships and two graduate teaching assistantships, 1963-1966. Awarded M.A. degree in 1965 and admitted to Ph. D. candidacy. Successfully completed Ph. D. formal course and examination requirements in 1966. Currently enrolled as non-resident Ph. D. degree candidate; dissertation research examines the efficacy of biographic data in predicting and explaining the political attitudes/behavior of non-Western military elites.

- UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, Chicago, Illinois

Research fellow in Military Sociology under grants from the University of Chicago, Russell Sage, and Carnegie Foundations, 1966-1967. Engaged in two-months' field research to investigate socio-political aspects of military intervention in Ghana and Nigeria, followed by six-month residency at the University of Chicago devoted to analysis of field research data and participation on the University's New Nations Study Committee.

- BELOIT COLLEGE, Beloit, Wisconsin

Resident undergraduate study, 1959-1963; awarded B.A. degree (cum laude) with majors in Political Science and Geography in June 1963.

OTHER TRAINING:

- U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Graduate, Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer Course, 1973

- U.S. MARINE CORPS LANDING FORCE TRAINING CENTER, Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia

Graduate, Phase I, Landing Force Planning Course, 1976

JOHN N. COLAS, continued

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE:

1973-1976 ESSEX CORPORATION, Alexandria, Virginia

Research Scientist - Responsible for the design and conduct of applied research studies in behavioral science areas related to information and command/control systems, decision making processes, simulation techniques, and human performance evaluation. Served as manager of a project for the U.S. Army Research Institute entailing the design, development and laboratory testing of "G-2 SIMTOS"--a computer-based simulation exercise which provides a test bed for generating experimental data related to decision making and information utilization in Army tactical intelligence systems. Supported additional research in areas of command/control communications for DARPA, and concerning information service support requirements of the NASA Office of Life Sciences.

1972-1973 U.S. ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND, Riverdale Maryland

Research Consultant - Engaged as a professional consultant in support of "Project CRIAF"--a comparative cross-national study of the socio-economic/political roles and capabilities of non-Western armed forces conducted for USACDC by the 354th Army Civil Affairs Group.

1969-1971 AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH, Kensington, Maryland

Research Scientist - Responsible for the preparation of applied sociological and psychological research studies for the Department of the Army requiring specialized foreign area knowledge in addition to the normal range of behavioral science skills. Served as member of an AIR research team having responsibilities for the preparation of "Intercultural Communications Guides"--country-specific analyses of indigenous target groups designed for operational utilization by U.S. Army PSYOP and military assistance advisory personnel. Provided conceptual and analytic support for attitudinal survey research being conducted to assess the effectiveness of Republic of Korea military civic action programs.



JOHN N. COLAS, continued

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE:

1967-1969 CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS, Washington, D.C.

Research Associate/Research Scientist - Responsible for the design and conduct of applied research studies for the Department of the Army related to Sub-Saharan Africa. Undertook an extensive survey designed to provide empirical data for assessing the social, political, and professional characteristics of African military leadership groups. One output of this effort was a machine-readable data file containing biographic information concerning over 2,300 individual military personalities in a total of 37 independent African countries. Authored an additional study relating to Sub-Saharan Africa for the U.S. Army War College which sought to provide War College students with a general overview of the major geographic, socio-economic, political, and military issues underlying post-independence African developments.

1966-1971 OVERSEAS RESEARCH, United Kingdom and West Africa

Have undertaken field research activities in support of Ph. D. studies on three occasions. These activities have been primarily oriented in terms of acquiring data concerning the institutional and political characteristics of West African armies and their leadership cadres. The research undertaken has entailed identification and acquisition of official unpublished documentary materials, on-site visits to military installations in Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone as well as to U.K. facilities employed for training of African officers, and frequent interaction with both indigenous and foreign personnel having direct knowledge of West African politico-military affairs.

MILITARY EXPERIENCE:

1970 to Present U.S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Received direct commission as Intelligence Officer (MOS 0202) under Specialist Officer Program in 1970. Since commissioning have served in Class II and Class III organized reserve units in the Washington, D.C. area. Have performed active duty for training as a student at the Army Intelligence School and FMFLant Landing Force Training Center and as a member of joint intelligence (J-2) and civil-military operations (J-5) staffs.

JOHN N. COLAS, continued

MILITARY EXPERIENCE:

1957-1959 U.S. MARINE CORPS

Enlisted service as infantryman (MOS 0311) assigned to Marine rifle company, 1st Marine Division, MCB Camp Pendleton, California.

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS:

- Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Fellow
- Human Factors Society, Potomac Chapter, Member
- Marine Corps Association, Member
- Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association, Member

PAPERS, REPORTS, PUBLICATIONS:

Colas, John N. An Evaluation of the G-2 SIMTOS Data Base. Essex Corporation technical report prepared for the Army Research Institute, December 1973.

Colas, John N. An Introductory Guide to the Independent States of Tropical Africa. CRESS technical report prepared for the Army War College, February 1969.

Colas, John N. Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France, Book Note. American Political Science Review, 1968 (September), 1104-1105.

Colas, John N. Military Background and Legislative Behavior--Some Indications from the 88th U.S. Congress. Unpublished paper, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, 1966 (see Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment, New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 120-121).

Colas, John N. Military Leadership in the Independent States of Black Africa. CRESS unpublished administrative report prepared under contract with USASTRICOM, January 1969.



JOHN N. COLAS, continued

PAPERS, REPORTS, PUBLICATIONS:

- Colas, John N. Report of Findings from the G-2 SIMTOS Pilot Test Program. Essex Corporation technical report prepared for the Army Research Institute, May 1975.
- Colas, John N. A Research Vehicle for the Study of Tactical Intelligence Information Processing and Decision Making. Essex Corporation technical report prepared for the Army Research Institute, July 1975.
- Colas, John N. The Social and Professional Correlates of Military Intervention in Nigeria. Unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, Illinois, 9-11 October 1969.
- Collins, John J. and Colas, John N. Human Factors in Command, Control and Communications--Program Survey and Review. Essex Corporation technical report prepared for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, August 1975.
- Kinkade, Robert G. and Colas, John N. Study of the Information Services Required to Meet the Needs of NASA Life Scientists. Essex Corporation technical report prepared for the NASA Office of Life Sciences, December 1975.
- Malone, Thomas B. and Colas, John N. Diesel Engine Emission and Human Performance--A Brief Survey. Essex Corporation report prepared for the National Bureau of Mines, February 1976.
- Spinks, Charles N., Colas, John N., et. al. Intercultural Communications Guide for Laos. American Institutes for Research technical report prepared for the Army Research Office, 1970. CONFIDENTIAL
- Spinks, Charles N., Colas, John N., et. al. Intercultural Communications Guide for the Philippines. American Institutes for Research technical report prepared for the Army Research Office, 1971. CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

8/23/83

To  
Morton Blackwell —

This starts out  
slow, but improves  
greatly, a clear  
change from the N.Y.  
Times normal coverage.

— Bruce



# Nicaragua: A Correspondent's Portrait

The writer of this article, who is the Paris bureau chief of *The Times*, has also worked as a correspondent in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

By JOHN VINOCUR  
Special to The New York Times

MANAGUA, Nicaragua, — This is a tropical revolution, sprawling in the heat and wild rain, not quite contained by ideology or plan.

Up close, Nicaragua, which President Reagan describes as part of the Soviet-Cuban axis, is more strikingly a place stumbling in its own contradictory slogans, handing out ration cards, waiting in line for gas, for beans.

The soaring promises of the 1979 Sandinista insurrection — political

pluralism, a mixed private-and-state economy and international nonalignment — are gone, replaced by opened mail, People's Tribunals, smothered debate.

Yet, at the same time, Managua does not have East Berlin's watchtowers and machine gunners or Bucharest's near catatonic despair. If evil, thuggery or the potential for sudden brutality can suffuse the air of a city like a pollen of fear, then there are other places with meaner rulers. Unlike Eastern Europe, anyone can get a passport and leave; hundreds of thousands who want to stay have learned to read and are receiving health care and land for the first time.

Nicaragua's contradictions can seem extraordinary. The Sandinista hymn proclaims, "We fight against the Yanqui, enemy of humanity," but Howard Cosell's voice filters through the Spanish commentary on the Saturday night television fight (a three-year-old tape) from Phoenix. A fifth-grade math problem starts by proclaiming, "Public health is a constant preoccupation of our People's Sandinista Revolution. How many . . . ?" but the movie houses are playing something with Joey Travolta and "The Big Red One," United States infantrymen winning the war in Europe.

For some visitors, the contradictions can be powerful, poignant enough to partially submerge the

rest. But the rest is clear enough. Each month, a small, unofficial Nicaraguan human-rights commission holdily lists new disappearances, new jailings for opinions described as counterrevolutionary because they do not agree with the Sandinistas. Although the meanness in the streets is not that of men with mirrored sunglasses and goon-squad cars on the prowl, there is a distinct tension, and it springs from block committees, the so-called revolutionary vigils, who want to know who comes to visit or stays out late or listens to the Voice of America or buys *La Prensa*, the newspaper that, censored and operating at quarterspeed, is the country's single public link to a reality beyond that of the Sandinistas.

A priest who has backed the Sandinistas, who has said that the block committees' leaders are sometimes overzealous bureaucrats, who complained that phones were tapped and who reported mail going suspiciously astray, also insisted that he would never accept his country's becoming another Cuba. The block committees, he argued, were an outgrowth of the revolution and not modeled on those in Havana.

He knew Cuba well, he said, and he seemed to think it was a sad, rigid place. He told his visitors that if Nicaragua were left alone, its good-natured tropicalness would triumph, its humanity would remain and a decent socialist state would take shape. One of the guests, a woman, replied that she had been to Cuba as well. "That's what they said there, too," she said. "You'll never regiment these people, Castro will never manage, they said. They were wrong, weren't they? It's not a very nice place."

The priest smiled. "Well, we're getting a lot of support from the Soviets," he said, changing the subject. "They're going to build some bridges and dams for us in the 21st century."

It is a strange argument to make in favor of a country, saying that things are still approximate, Latin, contradictory, confused, but in a sense this is what is offered as counterargument for the emergency laws of March 1982 that mean no dissent, no discussion, no habeas corpus, no elections.

Sandinista speeches were sometimes revised from delivery to final text, apparently for the benefit of those American and West Europeans who saw the revolution four years ago as antibureaucratic, antitotalitarian and nondoctrinaire and are troubled by its development.

Two years ago, when Defense Minister Humberto Ortega told a group of army officers in a speech that "Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doctrine that guides our revolution," the phrase was deleted from the official published version. Now, when his brother, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, coordinator of the nine-man national directorate, told the crowd attending ceremonies July 19 marking the Sandinista victory that neither "bullets nor ballots" could reverse "revolutionary power" in Nicaragua, the distributed text followed his words precisely.

The Socialist International, the worldwide body of non-Marxist Socialist parties that has supported the Sandinistas, has written the leadership expressing its concern about all the places where the revolution has been too inescapably well-organized, too transparently efficient, suggesting that elections would be a good idea. Its representatives are received with overwhelming courtesy and attention and are reassured that if the Americans ease their pressure, all will end democratically.

Some of the Europeans have heard this before. A leading European Social Democrat, who has come to Managua many times, spoke of feeling a new tension and a new control. "I am very much less comfortable here now," he said.

He accepted the idea that there were conflicting theoretical convictions in the leadership and that "there is a danger of this country developing into a new Cuba." He advanced too the idea that the Reagan Administration's policies were pushing Nicaragua in this direction, strengthening the hand, he said, of "the Marxist-Leninists here, those who wanted this from the beginning."

The man, a passionate advocate of social progress and an enemy of cant, went back to Europe before Barricada, the Sandinista newspaper, gave a mocking definition of Nicaraguan Social Democrats in a political lexicon published on the editorial page: "Currently a simple tendency presenting itself as alternative opposed to Marxism-Leninism; exploits the fallacies that imperialism has used against the Communist Party since the time of old Russia; is affiliated to the anti-Communist network of the C.I.A."

In a supermarket near McDonald's — the golden arches live on in Managua in what a Sandinista described as the revolution's most perverse anti-American joke — there are lobster-tails but no meat. The market sells meat only in the morning, it is explained, and in the mornings there are lines outside waiting to get in. Above a copy of *Readers' Digest* on the magazine stand, there is a poster showing an Uncle Sam with a very long tongue and the legend, "Fight rumors." One of the evil rumors mentioned is that all of Nicaragua's soap is going to Cuba, and this intrigues people because, indeed, soap is no easy to get.

The Sandinistas have installed a rationing system through the block committees that in theory guarantees most everyone minimum supplies: a pound of sugar, half a pound of rice per week, a roll of toilet paper per person per month. If a Nicaraguan has more money, he can buy these things in free markets at several times the price; the problem, the Sandinistas say, is "distribution," a particular ailment of planned economies and apparently one more stubborn that illiteracy.

The problem is also that flour and corn are in short supply, and there are problems, too, if you do not get along with the head of your block association, officially called a Sandinista Defense Committee. An Englishman who lives here said his landlady was not on terribly good terms with her block organizer and had been told her ration card would be forthcoming when her revolutionary attitude "made itself more precise."

There is no certain gauge of how the shortages affect enthusiasm for the revolution, but Barricada, a newspaper whose delivery staff includes three cheerful-looking 12-year-olds armed with AK-47 rifles, has given the difficulties of "distribution" considerable space. For the Sandinistas, the essential explanation is the same as that for why there is no free press or political meetings, and why elections, if they come, will not be "bourgeois democratic" ones, a phrase which signifies the "discredited" procedure of people running for office with conflicting viewpoints.

The American-supported counterrevolutionary threat has, it is said, created a special set of revolutionary priorities, and a Nicaraguan who fails to understand this is disloyal.

There are several categories of disloyalty. The official Roman Catholic Church, as represented by Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo of Managua, has been described as counterrevolutionary because it has denounced the absence of freedom of speech.

The Government, which includes two priests, has provided its own kind of people's church as a pro-Sandinista alternative, but it was attacked this spring by Pope John Paul II as "absurd and dangerous." Since then, John Paul's picture, pasted onto the wall of an office or the door of a house, has become, as in Poland, a symbol of anti-Government nonconformity.

The newspaper *La Prensa* is classified as disloyal as well, and one of its editors, Roberto Cardenal, said he supposed it was allowed to continue to print — a remarkable concession in relation to the total state domination of Eastern European or Cuban press — because "we're good for the Sandinistas' public relations with America and Western Europe."

"When they get to their 'socialist' phase," he said, "we're finished."

The newspaper publishes no critical editorials and virtually no reporting on what goes on in Nicaragua; as a collection of foreign news agency dispatches, it is submitted to censors.

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before it is distributed.

The range of things unworthy of publication escapes coherent analysis — a story from Paris quoting a French Socialist Party official as saying he knew nothing of Socialist International pressure on the Sandinistas; a dispatch about a Soviet defector in Japan, and an account quoting an editorial in The New York Times calling on President Reagan to test the sincerity of what was apparently Daniel Ortega's offer to talk about Central America on a multilateral basis and the withdrawal of foreign military advisers from the region.

The full sweep of officially defined security risks also extends to the political parties (including the Communist Party and its extreme left-wing derivatives) that were to make up Nicaraguan pluralism. Since four people sitting around together can be classified under the emergency law as an illegal political gathering, the Sandinistas, as guardians of the revolution, have granted themselves a complete monopoly on discussion.

The outrage about this is particular because the overthrow of Somoza, even in the characterizations of Marxist writers, had important support from the Nicaraguans they define as the bourgeoisie. A man like Dr. Clemente Guido, national secretary of the Democratic Christian Party, is not pushing the limits of disingenuousness when he suggests that the Sandinistas have expropriated, or at least confiscated, a revolution that four years ago was genuinely broad-based.

Hoping to sound fair, he listed the good things he felt the Sandinistas had accomplished: agrarian change, nationalization of the banks, large health, hygiene and education campaigns. "The police and the administration is not corrupt now," he says. "If you pay a traffic fine, you know it goes to the Government."

One of Dr. Guido's political friends said he felt the revolution had brought the country a sense of life closer to its real means. In teaching the country to read with such remarkable success, the revolution, he said, has unwittingly undermined those outside Nicaragua accommodating Sandinista authoritarianism with the argument that democracy in Latin America is a secondary notion.

But these men are quick to point out when the changes in the initial doctrine started — six months after Somoza's departure, and not when the "contras" emerged over the Honduran border.

By early 1980, moderates in the Government had begun to be replaced, and the Sandinista "mass organizations" took shape, giving Sandinista supporters among the workers, agricultural employees and block associations control over production and daily life.

By early 1980, the Government was also placarding its concept of international nonalignment: when the United Nations was voting to condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the delegate from Nicaragua abstained; soon he defended the Vietnamese role in Cambodia, and soon the Government felt its labor unions and women's organizations should join world federations headed by the Soviet Union.

"The mixed economy is no gag, it is no publicity trick," Tomás Borge, the Interior Minister, insisted in an interview.

"The mixed economy works like this," said Antonio Lacayo, a businessman, one of those remaining in Nicaragua and calling themselves "buffalos" — animals too dumb and stubborn to drop in their tracks when shot in the head.

"Some people put \$2.5 million in Almesa, a feed-meal company, the biggest private investment since the revolution, thinking the best way to play the game is to invest," he said. "That was May 31. On June 14, Almesa was declared a public utility. In fact, that's the mixed economy — state control, private administrators."

Although the last generally reliable statistics stop in 1981, about 60 percent of the economy is thought, nominally at least, to be in private hands. But because the Government controls all the banks, all access to foreign

currency and all jurisdiction over imports and sets production quotas and designates priorities, the businessmen are not much more than crown agents, managers whose salaries the Government does not need to pay.

Sandinista doctrine is clear about what entrepreneurs may never be: a class, or pressure group, that can place economic weight on the revolution. If there is any accuracy in Sandinista accounts of advice offered them by Fidel Castro, then one of his prime bits of counsel was "Don't nationalize too rapidly."

The Cubans are here, and reports of their numbers wax and wane. The word symbiosis often crawls into the semiofficial diction about Nicaragua's relationship with Cuba.

But the relationship may not be entirely smooth. A high Sandinista official who took a visitor for a ride in his new Japanese sedan one night, showing off his driver-seat arsenal of a Czechoslovak automatic pistol, a stockless AK-47 rifle and an American .38-caliber pistol, told a story about his "idiot cousin" who went to Cuba and came back to Nicaragua with a Cuban accent. The cousin said "perna," Cuban-style, instead of "pierna," the Spanish word for leg, as correctly pronounced in Nicaragua, and the affectation irritated the Sandinista profoundly. "Hey, we've got our own personality here," he said, "This is not Cuba."

There are other stories. A priest told of a nun trekking to Managua from a distant province to complain about a Cuban teacher who said there would be no more time off from school for catechism instruction; the account supposedly reached Daniel Ortega, who recently baptized his new child, and the Cuban was supposedly reprimanded.

Fidel Castro acknowledges the presence of about 4,000 Cubans in Nicaragua, of whom about 200 are military advisers. The American estimate of the number of Cubans in military and security positions is about 2,000 for a Sandinista army of about 80,000 troops.

Since the Cubans wear Nicaraguan uniforms, they hardly stand out; driving north on back roads from East Berlin to the Baltic Sea produces a more intense notion of the Soviet military presence in East Germany — troops squatting in the woods, field hospitals, signs in Cyrillic lettering — than trips around Managua do in terms of a palpable feeling of Cuban involvement here.

The Soviet bloc's role on the ground is described as "not overwhelming" by Western embassies. There are groups of 30 to 40 East Germans, active in intelligence, military intelligence and communications and about the same number of Bulgarians, whose tasks include counterintelligence counseling. The Soviet Embassy staff is about as big as that of the United States Embassy, 40 people. About the same number of Soviet trainers and mechanics for helicopters and armored vehicles are rotated in and out of the country on a regular basis.

Where there are intense traces of Eastern European methods are in the hourlong baggage searches, the compulsory exchange of hard currency to local money at rates one-eighth those of the black market and in the mirrored booths for passport inspection at the Managua airport.

The official pronouncements are either double-edged or confused, and the best explanation for this is the Sandinistas feel obliged to give several messages in opposite directions at once.

To American visitors, frequently from church and university groups, the revolution is described as a humanist one, a struggle against misery. To other visitors, with left-wing views, the talk is of "scientific change" with no interest in achieving "perfect democracy," but a revolution aimed at a "total social transformation." The nodding ensues.

Speaking for the historical record of the party newspaper, elections, when they come, according to Humberto Ortega, are "to consolidate revolutionary power, not to call it into question, because power is in the hands of the people through its avant-garde, the Sandinista National Liberation Front."

Agriculture Minister Jaime Wheelock Román, a member of the national directorate, speaking to an American reporter, says, "We believe in the alternation of power."

Indeed, he goes on, "the time could come when the people say the Sandinistas are not too sympathetic anymore and we might be voted out."

Mr. Wheelock, who looks a bit like a

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young Desl Arnaz, raises a finger for emphasis and talks with some affection of former President Jimmy Carter. Then he says: "We see Reagan as a decomposition of democracy. It's the conversion of democracy into fascism. It is the rebirth of Hitler in the United States."

Suppose, he is asked, that all political pressure came off the Sandinistas, then what? "The political struggle will become more civilized," he replied.

Tomás Borge, the Interior Minister, brutally tortured by the Somoza regime, has a more interesting answer to the same question. "There has never been a revolution left in peace," he said. "If that happened maybe it would mean we hadn't made a revolution at all."

Eight women are sitting on the porch of the Permanent Committee for Human Rights, and they look dirt poor, the kind of people the Sandinistas say are the essence of the revolution.

One woman is barefoot, the others in faded taffeta and muslin dresses; they are fiesta clothes, church clothes. Their complaint is simple. They have come from the town of Caterina to the commission, a private body, to plead for relatives who have gotten 10- to 14-year sentences for "logistical support and distribution of counterrevolutionary propaganda."

A member of the commission will listen and tell them nothing can be done. "Habeas corpus is just not respected in Nicaragua," Lino Fernández Higuera, a commission lawyer, says. "Once I might have been able to follow up. Not now."

He is hesitant to give an estimate of the number of people in jail on political charges because the last time a committee member did, Mr. Fernández says, he went to prison for it. Other people mention the figure of 2,500.

Mr. Fernández says instead that the quality of justice in Nicaragua is now such that the commission lists people as missing only if they have not been heard from for three or four months. This year, he figures, there have been about 70 disappearances.

"The Government has acknowledged holding one man," he said. "We think that there's the possibility that many are dead. As far as we are concerned, the Government describes us as counterrevolutionaries and reactionaries."

The courts themselves, he says, have tended to be supplanted by People's Tribunals, occasional bodies in which members of the Sandinista

"mass organizations" sit in judgment. They have handled, he believes, about 120 cases, and their existence, Mr. Fernández says, "is a violation of human rights in itself because they are separate and independent of the courts."

Mr. Fernández is methodical, a quiet man whose expression varies between serious and grave. His Spanish is that of a legal brief. He says: "I do not accept the argument that the Government's violations of human rights are the result of external pressures. They come, in fact, from a desire to retain its hegemony within Nicaragua."

It is about 8 P.M., and there is a bit of a stir in the block association headquarters, a house once owned by a Somoza colonel that is surrounded by wooden shacks and small stucco buildings. There is going to be a little parade, and Socoro Rivas de López, a grade-school principal and the local woman in charge, says everyone should come along.

They leave the headquarters, its banners and blackboard listing the names of the United States Navy vessels on maneuvers off the Nicaraguan coast, and head into the darkened streets. Children are playing catch and soccer under the street lights. A woman bangs a metal bar like a dinner bell, and the group, 20 or 30 people, march up the street slowly, chanting "Patria libre!" and "A la frontera!" and "No pasarán!"

There is a man with a bullhorn, and he directs his call to the people staying in their house. "Come to our meeting," he says. "Those of you who don't know what an invasion is, come. Those who don't believe we're under attack, get out here. Turn off the TV and come with us."

A few children and a few dogs join in. There is a speech or two under the street light, reminders of how often United States Marines have been to Nicaragua, exhortations, rallying cries that seem blocked, suspended in the heavy night air.

Is this a good turnout? a guest marcher asks. "Come tomorrow," Iván Vargas says. "Then it will be better. This is our problem, you see. There are some people who accept the benefits of the revolution but are not so eager about its responsibilities."

Mr. Vargas, a law student who has done some teaching, wanted to make sure he was being understood. He raised his arm in a gesture of beneficent instruction. "Ideological preparation takes a great deal of time," he said. "You must take the long view."

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**RIDGE MANAGEMENT, CORP.**

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21 August 1983

Mr. Dolf Drogue  
Director  
Speaker's Program  
Central America Outreach  
Room 436  
Old Executive Office Building  
Washington, DC

Dear Dolf:

I am very pleased to be able to participate as a member of your group in support of the President's initiatives in Central America. They have my fullest support, and I would like to volunteer both my time and experience in support of the President's objectives.

I am available, with reasonable notice, to speak anywhere in the USA. My firm has given me the fullest support in this matter.

While the major details of my previous speaking experience are already known to you, I am enclosing a couple of pages for your files.

As you know, I have just returned (August 6th) from a 30-day Army Reserve training project in Central America. I served as co-chairman of the Operational Planning Group for El Salvador while assigned to the J-5 Office at Southern Command Headquarters.

During my tour, I worked exclusively on the problems and projected remedies for El Salvador. I visited El Salvador and made extensive field trips, talking with both US military trainers and the Salvadorean Army personnel. I also wandered through several villages, talking to the local people about the war and the guerrillas. Needless to say, my findings were at great variance with the current press reports.

In addition, I also was selected to go to Honduras and serve as the coordinator for the civic action/humanitarian assistance aspects of our ongoing large-scale military exercise that will run until March. During this trip I visited the Regional Military Training Center where US personnel are training the El Salvador Army battalions.



By virtue of these experiences, and my previous ten-year stint in the counterinsurgency programs in Laos and Vietnam, I feel competent to speak to the following subjects:

US military training and support for El Salvador

Operations and characteristics of the El Salvador Army

Activities and operations of the Communist-directed guerrilla movement in El Salvador and Central America

The reconstruction aspects of the El Salvador National Campaign Plan (including USAID input).

Operation and function of the US-supported Regional Military Training Center in Honduras.

Purpose and operations of the large-scale joint military exercise now being conducted in Honduras and adjoining waters.

The US Army Public Affairs Office in the Pentagon has already offered to provide appropriate military briefings to keep me up to date on developments in Central America. They would also like to "borrow" me for their own speaking program from time to time, based upon your prior approval.

Looking forward to working with you, I remain

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Earl", with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Earl J. Young  
Colonel USAR

PUBLIC SPEAKING EXPERIENCE

AID member, State Department Speaking Team on Vietnam, 1965.  
Participated in lectures/debates at ten major US universities.

Will appear in two segments of a new 13-part series on the Vietnam War to be aired this fall on Public Broadcast television (WGBH).

Appeared on BBC "World Today" international radio programs explaining US policy in Laos and debating Philip Agee on issue of US intelligence gathering.

Lectured frequently at US military schools and to military reserve and active units on US and Communist activities in Southeast Asia. This was under White House auspices when I served as Special Assistant to Amb Leonhart.

Member of US Information Service "American Speakers" program during residence in London; presentations to British civic groups, schools, political organizations and a special Ministry of Defense Seminar.

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

Volunteer worker, California State Republican Committee, Los Angeles. Polled every County Sheriff and rural newspaper editor to determine political inclinations in their respective areas. 1976 Campaign.

Participated in letter-writing campaign on behalf of candidate Reagan during 1980 election. (See attached example)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Presently COLONEL, US Army Reserve (Infantry). Top Secret Clearance. Airborne, Ranger and Special Forces qualified. Reserve training tours include US Southern Command Headquarters (J-5) 1983; Special Operations Task Force, Europe (European Command Headquarters) 1982; Intelligence Directorate, EUCOM, 1981. Political-Military Division, The Army Staff, (Pentagon) 1976-1980. Special Project Officer, DAO Embassy, London. 1981-1982. 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama) 1979. Graduate, US Army Command and General Staff College; National Defense University.

Active service includes Infantry Commander, Korean War 1953.

US Government Latin American experience:

Chief, Narcotics Control Division and Embassy Narcotics Coordinator, US Dept of State; Quito, Ecuador 1978-1980. Close relationship with host nation police, INTERPOL, Customs and military intelligence agency to introduce and provide support for cocaine interdiction program funded by the US.



US Government Counterinsurgency Experience

Senior Area Coordinator (Military Region V) Kingdom of Laos 1969-1973. Conceived, planned and directed implementation of USAID-funded counterinsurgency programs in an area comprising 720 villages and 500,000 people. Integrated US military and civilian agency efforts.

Assistant Director for Military Civic Action (USAID, Region I), Republic of Vietnam. 1966-1967. Coordinated US military and US civilian agency rural development and pacification programs.

White House Special Assistant. On loan from AID, served as Special Assistant to the Special Assistant to the President for Vietnam. Coordinated AID field programs in Vietnam with all other US agencies. 1968-1969.

Provincial Representative, Republic of Vietnam . Senior US civilian representative-designed & directed US-funded pacification program in two rural provinces of Vietnam; 1963-1965.

Chief, Air Delivery Section, Air America, Inc. Kingdom of Laos 1962. Supervised and participated in aerial resupply of US Special Forces and Lao Army units behind enemy lines.

PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERIENCE

Presently Vice President, International Operations, Ridge Management Corporation of Chicago. Provide company with current and projected data on potential energy-related investments overseas.

Formerly, International Representative, Midcontinent Energy Company; a small, midwestern oil exploration and production company. Based in London, England 1980-1982.

Co-author, with Dr. George Tanham of the RAND Corporation, of WAR WITHOUT GUNS, Praeger, NY 1966. Story of civilian side of the war in Vietnam. Also author of a number of feature articles now being printed in various European media on US independent oil production; beef cattle production and illegal immigration.

## Thanks to Reagan on Vietnam

To The Editor:

I must strongly disagree with the content of your editorial criticising Ronald Reagan's view on Vietnam. If one statement during the Reagan campaign would induce me to vote for Governor Reagan, it would be his description of the Vietnam War as a "noble cause."

Conventional wisdom in news media now has it that our participation in that war was immoral, unjust, and unnecessary. I served almost five years in Vietnam in a civilian capacity, working in the countryside with Vietnamese villagers in an attempt to stop the Communist takeover. Did the Vietnamese like the Saigon government? No. They only wanted to be left alone and in peace.

But they hated and feared the Communist Viet Cong, and eventually the North Vietnamese regular forces even more. If, as was often reported in the American press, they awaited the arrival of the North Vietnamese with open arms, why are they now fleeing Vietnam by the hundreds of thousands?

President John Kennedy's decision to aid Vietnam was based on the best information we had at the time. The American people gave their money, their goods, and their

sons to help the Vietnamese. American errors in judgment are easy to criticize with hindsight, but the unselfish dedication of the thousands of young American men and women who worked with me in Vietnam will not be matched again in this generation.

We did go to Vietnam with a noble purpose, and we served a noble cause. At least Governor Reagan had the guts to speak out in defense of his country.

EARL J. YOUNG  
*American Embassy*  
*Quito, Ecuador*



ANTI-SEMITISM IN NICARAGUA  
By Shoshana Bryen

Numbering only fifty families at its peak, the Jewish community of Nicaragua lived peacefully there for nearly a century, until the Sandinista revolution. They have now been forced into exile.

While there are some who believe the actions taken against Jewish citizens was the result of severe Sandinista anti-capitalism, the death threats, the immediate confiscation of businesses and private property, the torching of Managua's synagogue (and its later confiscation) and the arrest and harassment of Nicaragua's Jews were not examples of burgeoning socialism. The Jews were singled out because the Sandinistas have been closely linked to the Palestine Liberation Organization for the past fifteen years. They have adopted the ideology and tactics of their trainers and suppliers, and of the trainers and suppliers of the PLO. The PLO is largely supported by the Soviet Union, which is currently conducting <sup>the</sup> latest in a series of intensively anti-Semitic campaigns.

When the Sandinistas came to power in 1979, they claimed their economic blueprint was a mixture of capitalism and socialism. They have, in fact, left some businesses in the hands of their owners, who vary in religion, ethnic background and country of birth. The only group whose businesses and personal property were taken en masse were the Jews. There was no economic or industrial common denominator in the confiscations.

Harassment began before the success of the revolution. In 1978, the Managua synagogue was set on fire during Sabbath services by five men shouting PLO victory slogans and anti-Jewish ones. When two worshippers tried to leave by the side door, they were forced back by men with automatic weapons. Anti-Jewish graffiti was common in Managua.

The Sandinista's clandestine radio announced that it would execute Max Najman, a Nicaraguan who served as honorary Consul of Israel. Freddy Luft, owner of a textile factory, was warned by an employee (a member of the Sandinistas) that he would be jailed after the revolution. Abraham Gorn's factory was burned and the Sandinistas collected the insurance money. Gorn left the country during the heavy fighting, and returned after the Sandinistas came to power. He was then accused of stealing land and jailed. At age 70, he spent his sentence sweeping streets.

Gorn figured prominently in the confiscation of the Managua synagogue by the Sandinistas. The building was taken for use by the Sandinistas on the grounds that it was private property of Abraham Gorn, and it is now covered with anti-Zionist posters. The Jewish community produced the notarized deed recording the

purchase of land to build a "Jewish Temple" by the "Congregacion Israelita Del Nicaragua." The document lists the officers of the congregation and describes it as a legal entity with religious, cultural and social purposes. Prompted by numerous demands for information by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, the Sandinistas now say they didn't know it was a synagogue, and will consider reopening it as a house of worship. In the absence of the Jewish community, this is a cynical gesture.

These are the revelations of Isaac Stavisky, who has his own story to tell. Stavisky and his brother-in-law, both Nicaragua-born, owned a complex of factories. In the 18 months prior to the revolution, they were subject to death threats by telephone and dry runs of abduction attempts. "In one instance, I was stopped with my son inside the car, and at gunpoint my life was threatened. I was warned that my businesses were to be taken over.

"One favorite tactic was to call around three in the morning and tell my brother-in-law that I had been shot and killed. At the same time, I would get a call claiming that my brother-in-law was shot and killed.

"In addition, there were writings on the walls inside and outside the factories: 'Death to the Jews; Isaac will be killed. Beware Sandinista justice.'"

By his own account, Stavisky never participated directly or indirectly in politics, and rejects any assertion that Nicaragua's Jews had acted as a conduit for relations between Nicaragua and Israel. "Since when do two governments need a civilian to make a deal?" he asked rhetorically.

Support for Israel by Somoza, however, was one reason the Sandinistas turned to the PLO for assistance in their revolution in 1969. Benito Escobar of the Sandinistas met that year in Mexico City with three PLO officials, resulting in the placement of 52 Sandinistas in Tyre, Lebanon for training. Others went to Fatah camps in Algeria.

In 1970, Sandinistas fought with the PLO against King Hussein of Jordan and joined a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine attempt to hijack an ElAl airliner. Both facts were disclosed by Sandinista leaders only after the success of their revolution.

In 1978, there was public confirmation of the Sandinista-Palestinian connection. On 5 February, Escobar and Issam Sli of the Marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine issued a joint communique emphasizing "the bonds of solidarity which exist between the two revolutionary organizations" and condemning US support of Israel and Nicaragua.



Cuba, Venezuela and Panama were the principal suppliers of arms to the Sandinista revolution until the final weeks. However, just before the final offensive against the Somoza government, large, vital shipments arrived from Libya and Algeria. According to at least one source, the arms came from North Korea, sent to Nicaragua on a Lebanese-registered vessel owned and operated by the PLO. It was not the first such shipment arranged by Thomas Borge, now Interior Minister of Nicaragua and previously an emissary of Fidel Castro in the Middle East.

After the revolution, the Sandinistas signed a "government-to-government agreement" with the PLO, and the PLO opened an Embassy in Managua. The PLO then loaned the government nearly \$12 million.

On the first anniversary of the revolution, Yasser Arafat received a royal welcome in Managua. Borge told him, "We say to our brother Arafat that Nicaragua is his land and the PLO cause is the cause of the Sandinistas." Arafat replied, "The links between us are not new, your comrades did not come to our country just to train, but also to fight." The last was most likely a reference to the 1970 Jordanian war.

In January 1982, Arafat announced that the PLO had sent pilots to Nicaragua and guerrilla fighters to El Salvador. The US State Department confirmed the former. In May, Managua Radio announced a PLO gift to the Sandinistas: a Boeing 707. A State Department report of May 1983 said the plane never left Tanzania, owing to a lack of Nicaraguan resources to transport it to Central America. The same report said further that PLO technicians had tried, but failed, to make Nicaragua's radar system operational.

This past April, the Nicaraguan government hosted the Latin American regional meeting as one of a series in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America prior to the International Conference on the Question of Palestine. The purpose of the meeting was to "obtain support from international public opinion for the Palestinian people's struggle for liberty and self-determination," according to a representative of the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry.

Since the war in Lebanon and the loss of their territorial base, the PLO is unable to train Sandinistas in terrorist tactics or supply arms. However, according to a Sandinista defector, PLO pilots, technicians and advisors still operate in Managua.

#### The Soviet Connection

The Sandinistas received tremendous logistical and ideological support from Cuba, Libya and the PLO, among others. All are entirely public about their commitment to international "liberation." And the chief exporter of "liberationist"

philosophy and the means to succeed is the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, in order to set conditions for their surrogates (such as the Sandinistas) have launched a tough anti-Semitic campaign in the USSR. They have now declared that Jewish culture, nationhood and religion no longer exist -- only Zionism, which is to be strenuously opposed. Their deliberate blurring of Zionism and Judaism makes it easy for surrogates in Europe and Latin America to create turmoil in the West by attacking Jewish schools, social buildings and synagogues in Paris, Brussels, Rome, Sydney and Managua while claiming no anti-Semitism.

Therefore, the demise of the Jewish community of Nicaragua should concern the United States for a number of reasons. The harassment into exile of an entire religious community, no matter how small, is a violation of human rights which we must deplore. Furthermore, the ties between the PLO and the Sandinistas are only one of a series of relationships between Soviet surrogates and revolutionaries in Latin America which espouse an anti-American and anti-democratic doctrine. Finally, other small, politically vulnerable communities in that area may suffer a fate similar to the Nicaraguan Jews, where the PLO is assisting the Soviet Union in the export of revolution and anti-Semitism.

It is disconcerting that apologists both for the Sandinistas and the PLO have failed to grasp the geopolitical significance of so small, yet so central, an event as the intimidation of the Nicaraguan Jewish community.

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Mrs. Bryen is Executive Director of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, a non-profit educational organization based in Washington, D.C.



## Rest of Third World Can Profit From Sri Lanka's Example

Recently the fickle spotlight of world attention rested briefly on Sri Lanka as a result of communal rioting between the Tamil minority and Sinhalese majority—strife that has died down and is unlikely to affect the country's future decisively.

Far more important for both groups is the success that's been achieved by Sri Lanka's experiment with economic and political freedom. In 1977 this formerly British island, once known as Ceylon, adopted the following program: a free market economy; free trade and a floating ex-

### Asia

by Devinda R. Subasinghe

change-rate system; a primary role for the private sector (foreign and local), and government use of foreign aid for infrastructure development. It replaced a socialist development strategy that resulted in a falling democracy and a disintegrating economy.

The conservative development program is popular. In October 1982 the architect of free-enterprise development, J.R. Jayewardene, was reelected president by a majority of 53%. And in a referendum last December, 55% of the voters approved the extension of the existing parliament—where Mr. Jayewardene's United National Party (UNP) has a five-sixths majority—for a second six-year term. In local elections in 1983, the UNP has maintained its dominance.

Economic activity in Sri Lanka now takes place within a virtually free market, in stark contrast to the government control and direction of before. In 1976 the government-sector share of gross national product was 70%. It has since declined, to about 35% last year.

As Sri Lankans have reacted to incen-

tives provided by free markets, the economy has responded. Real gross domestic product grew 5.1% to 6.2% per year from 1977 to 1982, more than double the 2.9% annual growth for 1970-76, the high point of socialist policies. Moreover, this rapid growth has been achieved in a period of global inflation, the second oil price shock, protectionism and recession, a time of low growth in most countries.

The private sector's new dominance in agriculture, trade, services and manufacturing is a major reason for sustained growth. Sri Lanka has achieved near self-sufficiency in rice, through a doubling of production, the result of private ownership and enterprise.

Per capita income increased from \$190 in 1977 to \$284 by 1982, while real wages and incomes have risen yearly along with labor productivity at a pace second only to Japan's in all of Asia.

Unemployment, which in 1977 stood at 26%, fell to 13% last year. The private sector has generated nearly 75% of the new jobs. Rising employment has enabled the government to cut its subsidies for food and other necessities from 8% of GDP in 1978 to 1.9% last year. Government resources diverted from the subsidies plus increased private savings give Sri Lanka an investment rate of 30% of GDP. A free-trade zone (creating 30,000 jobs) and other incentives are attracting foreign investment of more than \$40 million a year.

A supply-side tax policy reduced taxes on individuals from 70% to 55% and on business profits from 60% to 40%. Tax revenues on incomes and profits increased threefold between 1977 and 1982. Tax holidays and loopholes were eliminated so as to maximize incentives from low taxes and to broaden the tax base. The high savings, investment and growth performance in Sri Lanka points to the validity of the Laffer Curve thesis and supply-side economics in a developing country.

These successes are mixed with some drawbacks. Big budget deficits and an expansionary monetary policy have resulted in an average annual inflation rate of more than 15%. Large government outlays on the infrastructure demanded by the growing private economy, without complementary spending cuts in other areas, are the root of the problem. Budget cuts of 35% in non-priority expenditures and implementation of a restrictive monetary policy in 1981 reduced the budget deficit to 20% of GDP from 24% and inflation to 10% from 35%, without an appreciable slowing of economic growth.

Another impediment to strong economic performance is the slow pace of denationalization. The state sector (with its low value added, low productivity of labor and capital less than half that in the private sector) still accounts for 50% or more of industrial production and employment and 40% of industrial investment. Sri Lanka's success in obtaining foreign aid tends to weaken the government's incentive to dissolve uneconomic but politically popular state corporations. However, certain denationalization moves, such as some privatization of the postal services, closing a few state corporations and permitting private bus transport (the state monopoly has declined to a 65% share as a result), have been successful.

What can the rest of the Third World learn from Sri Lanka's experiment? For one thing, the implementation of free enterprise in Sri Lanka is based on a clear electoral mandate. Such popular support in a developing country is essential, especially when economic reforms and their consequences adversely affect some groups.

Also, Sri Lanka, by ensuring widespread private ownership and enterprise throughout the economy, has avoided the urban or elite-group bias favoring a privileged minority, so prevalent in developing countries. Failure, increased poverty and

revolution (witness Central America) have often been the result.

Another factor is the maintenance of assistance programs for low-income families. The government no longer provides free food irrespective of income, but a food-stamp program continues to benefit nearly half Sri Lanka's population of 15 million. Additionally, free education and free health services demonstrate the need to accommodate social realities.

Sri Lanka has been able to increase public-consumption expenditures on the social infrastructure by 21% a year between 1978 and 1982, compared with 10% between 1970 and 1977, only because of the private sector-oriented, high economic growth rate. This is a reversal of the previous socialist approach of "cart-before-the-horse" economics where the government builds the infrastructure first, in the expectation it will lead to economic growth. To finance such an approach in many Third World countries, prohibitive taxation and other measures that stifle the private sector are enacted. This causes slow growth, diminished government revenues and low public consumption.

A democratic political system has been a predominant factor in the Sri Lanka experiment. Many Third World countries sacrifice democracy for the sake of "stability" in free enterprise development, e.g., the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Chile, the Ivory Coast and Kenya, while a few remaining Third World democracies have opted for socialist development strategies to "safeguard" democracy, e.g., India. Sri Lanka gives the lie to conventional wisdom regarding Third World political, economic and social development by combining democracy with private enterprise and demonstrating the viability of democratic capitalism in the Third World.

*Mr. Subasinghe is a Ph.D. student at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.*





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## HUMAN RIGHTS

Neither Central Americans nor North Americans can benefit from the imposition and spread of modern, brutally efficient totalitarian regimes in the western hemisphere, as would happen were the Salvadoran guerrillas to assume power. To oppose these regimes—or to prevent them—is to defend human rights. As Morton Kondracke, executive editor of *The New Republic*, has put it, "Senator Dodd seems to share with many Democrats a need for instant moral gratification. If faced with a hard, long, ambiguous struggle, their counsel is, 'don't do it.' They want the killing to stop now, and they want it so badly that they are willing to hand away other people's freedom rather than help them fight."

President Reagan's policies aid the democratic forces in Central America against their enemies on both totalitarian left and the violent right. Help the embattled democrats. Support the President.

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
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# CENTRAL AMERICA



## Ballots or Bullets?



**In 1982, El Salvador had an election.**

**Nicaragua did not.**

**In late 1983, Salvadorans will elect a new president.**

**Nicaraguans will not.**

In fact, before taking power, Nicaragua's Sandinistas promised the Organization of American States—in writing—that they would promptly hold free elections once the dictator Anastasio Somoza was overthrown. There is no evidence that the elections will ever be held. As *The Washington Post* recently noted, they "aren't even in sight."

By contrast, on March 28, 1982, El Salvador held what one observer called "the most thoroughly observed elections here or maybe anywhere else." Over 500 foreign delegates inspected the voting procedure and found it to be impeccable. Most importantly, the Salvadoran people enthusiastically flocked to the polls, ignoring the guerrillas' warning to "Vote today, die tonight." Even Christopher Dodd (D-CT), chief senate opponent of the Reagan Administration, was "delighted" with the results. "All I could think," he remarked, "after having been through four elections in


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***The government in El Salvador was elected by more than 75% of the population.***

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Connecticut, is how you can get a significant drop in voting if you have a light mist on election day—let alone death threats, violence and a war raging. I hope the point is not lost on Americans."

The election burst the media-bubble of the guerrillas' popularity. While the centrist Christian Democrats won over 40% of the vote, the majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly were garnered by several conservative parties, which have now formed a governing coalition. The balloting clearly demonstrated that only a very tiny minority of the people support the guerrillas.



## **WHO ARE THE GUERRILLAS?**

The FMLN is a coalition of radical-left groups, dedicated to the violent pursuit of power. They have received political support and thousands of tons of military supplies from such despotic nations as Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, the PLO, Algeria, Ethiopia, North Korea, and the Soviet Union. On rebel leader has been likened to Cambodia's Pol Pot for his fanaticism. They are certainly not democratic; the day following the elections, a rebel spokesman stated that the elections could only prolong the war.

## **THE REAGAN POLICY**

The Reagan policy concentrates on supporting the democratic elements in Central America. In El Salvador, the democratic government is battling a leftist insurgency; in Nicaragua, the Marxists have already seized power and have transformed the country into a Castroite dictatorship.

In El Salvador, the Administration is pursuing a two-track approach: humanitarian aid to enable the government to continue economic and governmental reforms, and military assistance to provide what Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) calls "a shield behind which the people of El Salvador . . . can voice their views at the ballot box."

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***Contrary to popular perception, 77% of U.S. aid to El Salvador is humanitarian, not military.***

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The policy has been largely effective at cutting support for the guerrillas. Land reform has been a major success: 20% of the arable land, including all the largest estates, has been redistributed to more than 450,000 people—one in ten Salvadorans.

## **WHAT ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS?**

The Reagan Administration believes that where democratic processes operate, as in El Salvador, all political groups should negotiate at the ballot-box. Anything else undercuts the pursuit of democracy. The Salvadoran government has established a Peace Commission to encourage the guerrillas to join in the elections. Where democracy does not exist, as in Nicaragua, the U.S. has consistently urged that genuine and free elections be held.





## ABOUT THE SPONSORS

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, INC. of New York City is a non-partisan institution organized in 1962 to conduct educational programs in international security affairs. The organization holds the premise that an informed public opinion is vital to the protection of the nation's interests and to assist other free nations which aspire to independence and selffulfillment. The Center has organized briefings and assisted in presenting educational seminars for many colleges, universities, business, professional and labor groups.

The Center espouses no political causes. Its Directors and Officers represent a wide spectrum of responsible political opinion from liberal to conservative. What unites them, however, is the conviction that neither isolationism nor pacifism provides realistic solutions to the challenge of 20th century totalitarianism.



THE MODERATOR and coordinator for today's program is **Captain Ned K. Kulp**, who represents the National Strategy Information Center. He is President of Ned Kulp Company and Associates. He is a commissioned officer in the Coast Guard Reserve, and his special interests include the Caribbean Basin and Central American affairs. Captain Kulp is a national security specialist in military mobilization readiness with emphasis on maritime affairs. Additionally, he has lectured on Soviet naval capabilities and the geopolitics of strategic natural resources.



FREEDOMS FOUNDATION AT VALLEY FORGE is a non-profit, non-partisan, and non-sectarian organization founded in 1949. Its purpose is to carry out national programs of information and education emphasizing the principles underlying the unique freedoms enjoyed by United States citizens under their constitutional form of government.

The Foundation is not endowed and receives no financial support from any level of government. Freedoms Foundation is governed by a 24-member Board of Directors composed of nationally known Americans from industry, education, and other fields.

Freedoms Foundation offers a variety of graduate programs, special conferences, and youth workshops intended for various types of professionals and young adults from throughout the United States and abroad, dealing with citizenship education, American history, the status of free institutions throughout the world, our constitutional system of government, and many current events topics. Special programs are often given in cooperation with various sponsoring organizations and groups.

Over 6,000 men and women across the country work together to promote the programs and philosophy of Freedoms Foundation. These members of the forty-three chartered Volunteer Chapters, located in twenty-one states from Hawaii to Florida, seek out material for a National Awards program, honor local award recipients, and send qualified students and professionals to Valley Forge as participants in the educational programs. The Volunteer Chapters also support the work of the Foundation through public relations activities, informing the media and general public about national Foundation programs as well as local chapter events.

This program on Hemisphere security is offered in cooperation with the Freedoms Foundation Denver Area Chapter, founded in 1971. The membership consists of both men and women, active professionally and as volunteers concerned with national and community programs and activities.

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