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# NEWS Release

Washington Memorial Building  
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.  
200 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002



"THE VOICE OF TWO AND ONE HALF MILLION MEN AND WOMEN OF THE VFW AND ITS AUXILIARY"

## FOR RELEASE:

IMMEDIATELY  
(4 MAY 1983)

VFW: CENTRAL AMERICA NOT A "PARTY LINE" ISSUE

WASHINGTON, D. C. -- James R. Currieo, National Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, today stated that "to me the most disheartening aspect of yesterday's 9 to 5 vote in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence denying the President funds for covert action in Nicaragua was the straight, party line character of the vote.

"If ever a national legislator should vote his conscience and his conviction, it is where an over-riding national security issue is on the table. This did not occur yesterday in the United States House of Representatives."

Mr. Currieo continued by noting that if "small measures, not involving U. S. troops, are denied now, larger and more painful steps may be required later.

"As Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has noted, no one -- with the examples of what happened to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia when we 'pulled the plug' -- can now honestly state they can't guess what fate would await Central America if the Marxists win.

"The Nicaraguan Sandinistas put it right up front. They proudly proclaim they are the vanguard of the 'revolution without frontiers' for all of Central America.

"It is a revolution which must never be permitted to succeed."



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"THE VOICE OF TWO AND ONE HALF MILLION MEN AND WOMEN OF THE VFW AND ITS AUXILIARY"

## FOR RELEASE:

IMMEDIATELY  
(26 MAY 1983)

VFW: WE MUST WIN IN CENTRAL AMERICA

"Although this Administration has stated that we will not allow a Marxist government to take office in El Salvador, our government as a whole and our people as a whole have not followed up that commitment with a willingness to take those steps necessary to bring that about."

-- Lt. Gen. Wallace H. Nutting, USA  
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Southern Command  
Quarry Heights, Panama

James R. Currieo, National Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, today characterized the major thrust of General Nutting's publicly expressed views on U. S. policy towards Central America as being "the carefully developed and expressed concerns of that responsible American official closest to the scene. I believe that he is right and we in the VFW will do all in our power to bring his views before those in the Executive Branch and on Capitol Hill responsible for our Central American policy."

(The heart of General Nutting's position, as reported in the Washington Post, is that stopping Marxist expansion in Central America requires a substantial, open-ended increase in U. S. military aid and military trainers on the ground in El Salvador and may ultimately require a willingness to use U. S. troops. On this last, very sensitive point, General Nutting echoed the President's pledge that use of U. S. troops "is not currently under consideration. For a whole lot of reasons, we should not want to intervene. That's another lesson of Vietnam.")

The VFW leader noted that many in the Congress seem "equally unable either to abandon El Salvador and the freedom fighters in Nicaragua or to grant President Reagan that level of support necessary to assure their success.

"General Nutting's warning ('if we give up, it may be the last time') and prescription -- a level of U. S. effort proportionate to the stakes involved -- are both timely and on target.

"We can and should rediscover how to win in our own strategic back yard. Defeat here is out of the question."

(Enclosed herewith are further views of General Nutting as reported in the Washington Post.)

SELECTED VIEWS OF GENERAL WALLACE H. NUTTING, USA  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U. S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

"From my point of view, in a military judgment," said General Nutting, "we have not done what is required."

Central America is at war, Nutting said. The United States, like it or not, "is engaged in that war." "...the alternatives... are starkly clear... If we give up, it may be the last time."

"... as long as those limits on our willingness to engage in the ultimate resolution of the problem are evident to the guerrillas, they will persist. They have the example of Vietnam to refer back to. If, as some people claim, that war was lost in Washington, they hope they can win in Washington too."

Nutting echoed Reagan's pledge that the use of U. S. troops is not currently under consideration. "When you talk about introducing U. S. combat forces in El Salvador," he noted, "you have to do it with great concern about the narrow path the United States walks in Latin America, for all the reasons of history."

"And for a whole lot of reasons, we should not want to intervene. That's another lesson of Vietnam."

But, he said, "the guerrillas are winning the psychological war." The U. S. debate must be ended and an open-ended commitment pledged, with national consensus behind a free presidential hand, if the guerrillas "are to be convinced they can't win" militarily, he added.

The longer the United States waits to make such a commitment, Nutting said, the higher the cost will be. Asked how high, short of sending U. S. troops, he said, "Nobody knows. That's part of the complexity of this form of warfare, because the ultimate cost is dependent, to a certain extent, upon the evident commitment to prevent them from taking power."

"If we make the evident commitment without limit, then the cost will go down. I can't say at this moment that 150, 200, 500 or 1,000 trainers in El Salvador is sufficient. I'm pretty sure after a couple of years of experience that 55 is not."

"... Nutting said, "If we are willing to throw \$3 billion or \$4 billion a year at the problem in Israel... -- you know we are arguing over a national security interest of the equivalent proportion -- ... we're talking about very miniscule amounts of resources."

"...The Soviets and the Cubans who have now established a beachhead in Nicaragua, he said, "understand our system better than we do... They take steps to take advantage of the difficulty we have in making decisions, establishing a consensus."

"...Our value system doesn't allow us to conduct psychological operations and use information for political purposes," Nutting said, and the United States is susceptible to those tactics when they are used by the Soviets and Cubans.

Such tactics, he said, include "impugning U. S. government officials, deriding and degrading the U. S. government and its values, attacking the armed forces and government in El Salvador as gross violators of human rights... They recognize that we are sensitive to human rights violations, therefore they work that for all

VIEWS OF GENERAL NUTTING -- PAGE 2

its worth, through the press, and get people in the United States understandably upset... then they begin to raise questions about whether or not we should support people who violate human rights."



C&P Telephone

1200 H Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005  
Phone (202) 392-2408

06/02/83

Jose G. Roig

Dear Mr. Blackwell:

Enclosed please find a copy of the translation into Spanish of the speech delivered by our dear President Reagan in Miami, on May 20 last, with the opportunity of celebrating the Cuban Independence Day.

The footnote at the end of the translation reads in English: "Translated into Spanish by José G. Roig, a member of the National Journalists' Association of Cuba in Exile and Washington, D.C. area correspondent for WRHC radio (the Blue Chain) and "IDEAL" Magazine, both of Miami, FL. Translator qualified through examinations by the Division of Language Services, U. S. Department of State, in 1972."

Very cordially yours,

TRADUCCION AL ESPAÑOL DE LA VERSION OFICIAL DEL DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL PRESIDENTE RONALD W. REAGAN EN LA FESTIVIDAD DE LA INDEPENDENCIA DE CUBA, MAYO 20 DE 1983, EN EL AUDITORIUM DEL CONDADO DADE, FLORIDA

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LA CASA BLANCA  
Oficina del Secretario de Prensa

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TEXTO DE LAS OBSERVACIONES PRONUNCIADAS POR EL PRESIDENTE EN LA FESTIVIDAD DEL DIA DE LA INDEPENDENCIA DE CUBA  
Auditorium del Condado Dade, Miami,  
Florida, Mayo 20 de 1983

Es un gran placer para mí el estar con un grupo de estadounidenses que ha demostrado cuánto puede lograrse cuando las personas son libres. Muchos de Uds. llegaron a este país con poco más que las camisas que traían puestas y el deseo de mejorar vuestro bienestar y el de vuestras familias. Vinieron con la disposición para trabajar, y sí, una pasión ardiente por la libertad. Hay un nombre para esta clase de espíritu: Se le llama el espíritu estadounidense, y no hay límite para lo que puede hacer.

Abundan los ejemplos de este espíritu. JORGE MÁS, Presidente de la Fundación Nacional Cubano-Estadounidense, vino acá hace 20 años y trabajó como lechero para mantenerse. Hoy es el propietario de una empresa de construcción que brinda empleo de significación a cientos de personas. Cuando no está administrando su empresa, se halla inmerso en actividades como ésta, tratando de proteger a la libertad que ha sido tan importante en su vida. JORGE MÁS, gracias por todo lo que ha hecho y todo lo que está haciendo.

Pero la historia de éxito de JORGE no es un ejemplo aislado. Hay muchas. Uds. las conocen. Personas como ARMANDO CODINA, que vino acá solo cuando era niño, porque sus padres no podían irse de Cuba, de modo que se le envió a un orfanatorio y de ahí a un hogar adoptivo. Este niño necesitó valor para comenzar su nueva vida. Ahora, a los 35 años, tiene una sucesión de logros en materia de negocios de los cuales se enorgullecería cualquier persona que le llevara muchos años.

El bailarín de ballet de renombre mundial, FERNANDO BUJONES, es un cubano-estadounidense.

En mi administración tenemos a JOSE MANUEL CASANOVA en calidad de Director Ejecutivo por parte de los Estados Unidos en el Banco Inter-Americano para Desarrollo.

Y la relación continúa. Personas de toda condición, de toda raza y de todo antecedente familiar, han dejado sus señales en casi todos los rincones de la sociedad estadounidense. Hace unos cuantos meses tuve el honor de dar la bienvenida en la Casa Blanca a un famoso corredor, ALBERTO SALAZAR. No sabía yo qué decir. El me dió unos zapatos para correr, pero no estoy seguro en qué clase de competencia él quería que yo corriera.

Es claro que los Estados Unidos han sido buenos para con Uds., pero también Uds. han sido buenos para los Estados Unidos y para Miami. Hace veinticinco años había personas que pensaban que Miami había llegado a su apogeo y que iba en descenso. La economía parecía haberse estancado y había poca esperanza a la vista. Hoy, Miami es un centro internacional vibrante, una puerta hacia la América Latina.

El contraste marcado entre vuestras vidas y las de los vecinos y seres queridos que dejaron atrás en Cuba, se yergue como evidencia de la relación entre la libertad y la prosperidad.

Cerca de 10 millones de personas viven aún en Cuba, en comparación con un millón de cubano-americanos - personas que tienen las mismas tradiciones y herencia cultural; sin embargo, los cubanos de los Estados Unidos, con sólo una décima parte de aquella cifra,



producen casi el doble de la riqueza que aquéllos que dejaron atrás. De modo que no dejen que nadie les engañe; lo que está ocurriendo en Cuba no es un fracaso del pueblo cubano, es un fracaso de FIDEL CASTRO y del comunismo.

La Unión Soviética, con todo su poderío militar, con sus impresionantes subvenciones a la economía cubana, no puede hacer producir al sistema otra cosa que represión y terror.

Los cubano-americanos entienden, quizás mejor que muchos de sus conciudadanos, que la libertad no es solamente la herencia del pueblo de los Estados Unidos, sino el patrimonio del hemisferio. Nosotros, en las Américas, descendemos de almas enérgicas, de precursores, hombres y mujeres con valor para abandonar lo conocido y empezar de nuevo en el "Nuevo Mundo". Somos, en gran medida, personas que compartimos los mismos valores fundamentales de Dios, la familia, el trabajo, la libertad, la democracia y la justicia.

Quizás si el nexo mayor entre nosotros pueda verse en el número increíble de catedrales e iglesias que se hallan por todo el hemisferio. Nuestros antecesores tomaban en serio el culto a Dios.

Nuestras luchas por la independencia y el fervor por la libertad desatado por estos nobles esfuerzos reúnen a los pueblos del "Nuevo Mundo." En los anales de la libertad humana, nombres como los de BOLIVAR y MARTI se sitúan en pie de igualdad con los de JEFFERSON y WASHINGTON. Estos fueron individuos de valor y dignidad. Nos dejaron un legado, un tesoro superior a toda imaginación.

Pero hoy un nuevo colonialismo amenaza a las Américas. Insurgentes armados y dirigidos por una potencia lejana tratan de imponer una filosofía que es ajena a todo aquello en que creemos y que va en contra de nuestro patrimonio. Es una filosofía que desdena a la verdad y a la libertad y que se ha declarado a sí misma enemiga del culto a Dios. Donde quiera que se ha puesto en práctica, ha llevado la represión y la privación a los seres humanos. No hay ejemplo más claro de esto que Cuba.

El pueblo de Cuba ha visto que su movimiento sindical fuerte e independiente, que existía antes de 1959, ha sido destruido por un régimen que vocea lemas sobre su preocupación por los trabajadores. La Iglesia ha sido suprimida - incluyendo el derecho de la Iglesia a transmitir e imprimir la Palabra de Dios. Es un nuevo régimen fascista, en el que la libertad de expresión y de prensa de todos los grupos de oposición han sido derribadas con ardor ideológico. Y eso no se detiene ahí. Se obliga a los jóvenes cubanos a alistarse en las fuerzas militares y se les envía a tierras lejanas, donde han muerto centenares de ellos, para cumplir las órdenes de un gobierno extranjero, manchándose las manos con la sangre de otros, no sirviendo a sus intereses propios, sino apuntalando a dirigentes que no tienen apoyo popular.

Pero los pueblos de la América Central, con nuestro apoyo, han escogido un curso distinto - el de la libertad, el pluralismo y el desarrollo económico libre. Ellos - y nosotros - estamos comprometidos con este curso y no toleraremos las gestiones del Sr. CASTRO para evitarlo. Ellos, y nosotros, queremos que la América Central sea para los centro-americanos, y así es como va a ser.

La debilitada economía de CASTRO continúa haciendo una burla grotesca de los alegatos ideológicos de que el marxismo es para el pueblo. Cerca de un cuarto de siglo después de la revolución en Cuba, el pueblo cubano sigue enfrentándose a la escasez y al racionamiento de las necesidades fundamentales. En una época uno de los países más prósperos de la América Latina, está convirtiéndose rápidamente en uno de los más atrasados económicamente en la región, gracias al sistema comunista. Y ahora hay evidencia convincente de que los funcionarios de CASTRO están involucrados en el tráfico de narcóticos, distribuyéndolos como delincuentes, aprovechándose de la miseria de los viciosos. Me gustaría usar esta oportunidad para pedir cuentas al régimen de CASTRO. ¿Es ésta

distribución de narcóticos sencillamente la acción de funcionarios descarriados, o se halla aprobada oficialmente? El mundo merece una respuesta.

En este día celebramos la independencia de Cuba, algo especial para el pueblo de los Estados Unidos, así como para Cuba. Hace ochenta y cinco años nos unimos y combatimos uno al lado del otro, derramando nuestra sangre para liberar a Cuba del yugo del colonialismo. Debemos reconocer con tristeza que Cuba ya no es independiente. Pero permitánnos asegurarles que no dejaremos que otros pueblos del hemisferio corran la misma suerte; no permitiremos que los soviéticos y sus esbirros de La Habana priven a otros de sus libertades, y algún día la misma Cuba será libre.

Los Estados Unidos se hallan en una encrucijada. No podemos ya pasar más por alto a este hemisferio y esperar que ocurra lo mejor. JOSE MARTI, el héroe de la independencia de Cuba, hombre que pasó muchos años de su vida con nosotros, en los Estados Unidos, lo dijo bien: "No es suficiente acudir a la defensa de la libertad con esfuerzos épicos e intermitentes, cuando se ve amenazada en momentos que parecen críticos. Cada momento es crítico para la conservación de la libertad."

Ahora es la hora de actuar razonable y decisivamente para prevenir una crisis y evitar que otros pueblos sufran la misma suerte de vuestros hermanos y hermanas en Cuba. Irónicamente, nuestro mayor obstáculo no lo constituyen las amenazas del extranjero, sino una falta de confianza y de comprensión. Hay demasiadas personas que tratan de hallar excusas para no hacer nada. Si nos vemos inmovilizados por el temor o la apatía de parte de aquéllos que sugieren que, puesto que nuestros amigos son imperfectos, no debiéramos ayudarlos; si tienen éxito quienes tratan de poner obstáculos en nuestro camino, y se interponen ellos mismos en una época en que puede aún prevenirse una crisis, el pueblo estadounidense sabrá quién es responsable, y lo juzgará en consecuencia.

Pero, como dije al Congreso hace unas cuantas semanas, aún tenemos tiempo y se puede hacer mucho. El Congreso puede, por ejemplo, promulgar las disposiciones de comercio y de impuestos de la Iniciativa para la Cuenca del Caribe que pondrán a funcionar el poder de la libre empresa en el Caribe. El Congreso piensa, y con razón, que no debemos dirigir nuestras gestiones por completo hacia la formación de la capacidad militar de nuestros amigos. Estoy de acuerdo. Esa es la razón por la cual el 75% de lo que hemos solicitado es ayuda económica, no ayuda militar.

Pero tenemos que darnos cuenta de que nuestros amigos no pueden quedarse desarmados contra los insurgentes que han sido armados hasta los dientes por el Eje Soviético-Cubano-Nicaraguense. Cualquier pretexto para dejar de proporcionar a nuestros amigos las armas que necesitan para defenderse, es una receta para el desastre. Y otra vez, los que abogan por pasar por alto las necesidades defensivas legítimas de quienes se hallan bajo ataque, serán hechos responsables si se pone en peligro a nuestra seguridad nacional.

Se sabe que TEODORO ROOSEVELT dijo: "Hablen con suavidad y lleven un garrote grande." Bueno, hay abundancia de personas que hablan con suavidad, pero ahí es donde termina la semejanza.

Que nadie se llame a engaño. Lo que sucede en la América Latina y el Caribe no sólo afectará a nuestra nación, sino que también dará forma a la imagen de los Estados Unidos en todo el mundo. Si no podemos actuar decisivamente tan cerca de casa, ¿quién nos creará en otros lugares? Sabiendo esto, nombré recientemente a un enviado especial, un dirigente enérgico, un individuo capacitado eminentemente para representarnos en esta región vital y para trabajar en contacto estrecho con el Congreso, a fin de asegurar la cooperación de ambos partidos políticos hasta el máximo que sea posible. El es un hombre para quien tengo la confianza y el respeto más elevados, un hombre a quien Uds. conocen bien, el ex-Senador RICHARD STONE.

Cuando el Senador STONE sea confirmado, se involucrará directamente con los que buscan soluciones regionales a los problemas de la América Central. Apoyamos por completo a

las gestiones de buena fe, como el llamado "Grupo de Contadora", que procura calmar las tensiones y evitar el conflicto. Esperamos que les sea posible lograr adelantos. Y damos la bienvenida a la participación de todas las naciones de las Américas que tengan un interés vital en la América Central.

Hay, desde luego, un asunto de prioridad máxima en el programa de trabajo, que tengo aún que mencionar. Al pueblo de Cuba, como ocurre en la mayor parte de las dictaduras comunistas, se le ha aislado de la información. Muchas de las personas que han venido a los Estados Unidos en los últimos años, por ejemplo, ni siquiera sabían que Cuba tenía decenas de miles de soldados en Africa, mucho menos acerca de las bajas que han sufrido. La mayor amenaza para los dictadores como FIDEL CASTRO es la verdad. Por éso es que estoy encareciendo al Congreso que apruebe el proyecto de ley para establecer la "Radio Martí."

Y permítanme decir algo para que conste. Se han efectuado ciertas amenazas sobre la interferencia de las frecuencias de nuestras estaciones de radio interiores, en caso de que transmitamos hacia Cuba. Dichas amenazas son evidencia de la naturaleza asustadiza y tiránica del régimen de CASTRO. Puedo garantizarles hoy que nunca permitiremos que dicho gobierno nos intimide por decir la verdad.

Los cubano-americanos desempeñan un papel único en la conservación de nuestra libertad. Su herencia hispánica les capacita para relatar nuestra buena voluntad de un modo mejor a nuestros amigos de las naciones vecinas del sur. Pero Uds. tienen igualmente una responsabilidad aquí, en casa. Creo que uno de nuestros problemas más peligrosos en los Estados Unidos es que mucha de nuestra propia gente da por sentada nuestra bendita libertad. En 1980, un cubano estudioso, nombrado HEBERTO PADILLA, vino a los Estados Unidos después de vivir 20 años bajo el régimen de CASTRO. El se maravilló de lo que vió, algo que ni siquiera había advertido durante su visita a este país veinte años antes.

Al visitar los recintos de nuestras principales universidades, él dijo: "Me impresionó algo que es evidente para todos los estadounidenses: Nadie, ya fuera funcionario gubernamental o colega, me ha preguntado qué iba yo a decir en los seminarios y cursos que voy a brindar en este otoño. Esto es nuevo para mí. Sencillo, pero cierto. Es difícil pedir a alguien que ha nacido en libertad que se dé cuenta, exactamente, de lo que posee."

El Sr. PADILLA continuó explicando que la libertad es invisible. Es la ausencia del censor gubernamental, la ausencia de la policía secreta, la ausencia de un agente de la represión.

Quizás si el mejor regalo que Uds. puedan hacer a sus conciudadanos, y Uds. ya han aportado mucho a nuestro bienestar, sea una mejor comprensión de lo que ellos no pueden ver, de la libertad que les rodea. Quizás si Uds. puedan ayudarles a entender algo que Uds. conocen por instinto, la responsabilidad impresionante que tenemos en nuestra calidad de estadounidenses. Porque, si fracasamos, no habrá lugar en que las personas libres puedan hallar refugio. Cuento con Uds. para que me ayuden a explicar las amenazas en la América Central, amenazas que Uds. reconocen con tanta claridad.

Cada generación de estadounidenses lleva esta responsabilidad. Y nos sentimos agradecidos de tenerles a Uds. con nosotros, compartiendo esta carga pesada sobre sus hombros. TEODORO ROOSEVELT, un hombre que combatió junto con vuestros antecesores por la independencia de Cuba, dijo: "Nosotros, aquí en los Estados Unidos, tenemos en nuestras manos la esperanza del mundo, la suerte de los años venideros; y nuestras serán la vergüenza y la desgracia si se apaga de nuestros ojos la luz de la resolución elevada, si arrastramos en el polvo las esperanzas doradas de los hombres."

Consagrémonos hoy a cumplir esta responsabilidad sagrada. Y consagrémonos a la libertad del noble pueblo cubano, que ha sufrido durante mucho tiempo.

(Traducido al español por José G. Roig, miembro del Colegio Nacional de Periodistas de Cuba en el Exilio y corresponsal para la zona metropolitana de Washington, D.C., de la WRHC Cadena Azul y la Revista "IDEAL", ambas de Miami, Florida. El traductor fué habilitado como tal, mediante exámenes, por la División de Servicios Idiomáticos del Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos, en 1972).



OFFICE OF  
UNITED STATES COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

May 5, 1983

*file  
Central  
Am.*

Faith:

Re: Central America

As a continuing follow-up to our conversation and in conjunction with Mort Blackwell, I have

1. Arranged for Congressman Benjamin Gilman (N.Y.), the senior Jewish Republican member of the House, to forward a Dear Colleague letter on PLO involvement in Central America (with material from the AIPAC file);

2. Met with Shoshona Bryen, Executive Director of JINSA, and provided her with the PLO material for her May article (see April 29 memo) - circulation 27,000;

3. Max Fisher, Dick Fox, George Klein and Gordon Zacks agreed to co-author a letter to the 61 members of the Republican Jewish Coalition on the involvement of the PLO in Central America and in a call for support of the President's program (I will compose the letter.).

4. Max Fisher is Chairman of the Board of United Brands (formerly United Fruit) which produces 10% of the GNP of Central America. He has suggested that we might form a select committee of high-level American business leaders who operate in Central America to work in support of the issue, i.e.: Del Monte, Alcoa, Castle Cook, etc.;

5. Jackie Tillman, a member of the Washington staff of Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, is an expert on Central America and the Caribbean. Jackie has tremendous contacts with the "type" of Central American leaders we want to see publicized, but she has little or no vehicle for this. She needs an instrumentality that can work with "these" people to make the most of their PR potential;

The Honorable  
Faith Whittlesey,  
Assistant to the President  
for Public Liaison  
The White House.

6. I am attaching an ADL report (just obtained) from Mort Rosenthal on Jews in Nicaragua. Please read it and feel free to use it.

7. AIPAC will be circulating a memorandum on PLO involvement in Central America this Tuesday or Wednesday (as previously reported to Mort).

I would also like to discuss the formation of a banking and securities group and a defense group.

Keep in touch.

Sincerely,



Richard Krieger  
Associate Coordinatoe

Office telephone: 632-9560  
Home - Area Code 301 - 963-4241

cc: Mort Blackwell

file Central  
Aker

May 11, 1983

Mr. Morton C Blackwell  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Blackwell,

It was very good to meet with you at the breakfast on the 9th. I have enclosed three publications that may be of interest to you. I look forward to meeting with you at breakfast again next week.

Sincerely,

*Frank Aker*  
Dr. Frank Aker

# Shattering the Vietnam Syndrome: A Scenario for Success in El Salvador

Lewis A. Tambs and Frank Aker

Defeat in Southeast Asia seared America's psyche. In addition, the fall of Saigon in April 1975 unleashed a tide of human misery in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Flotsam in the form of some 900,000 boat people fled seaward, while invasion of Cambodia in 1978-79 almost completed the geographical encirclement of the People's Republic of China by the Soviet Union and its allies. The Soviet Union-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty also endangered Japan, because it enabled the Russian navy, based in Camranh Bay on the South China Sea, to threaten Nippon's oil and ore Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), which run from Latin America, Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula through the South China Sea to Japan.<sup>1</sup>

The current crisis in Central America and the Caribbean has a number of similarities to the situation in Southeast Asia in the last ten years, but this time it is the United States that is being encircled, and it is America's ore and oil SLOC which is endangered. Moreover, as insurgency inches northward from Nicaragua to El Salvador, Guatemala, and into Mexico, thousands of refugees will not only flee by sea but also work their way overland toward the open, unguarded southern border of the United States. There exists the possibility that the turmoil

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in Middle America may induce a ripple effect which might inundate the United States with a destabilizing human wave.<sup>2</sup>

Several nations have already almost been swamped by mass migration stimulated by revolutionary warfare. Whether the deluge of refugees came from Communist countries by instinct, design, chance, or cunning, the result is the same for their unwilling hosts—Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore in Southeast Asia, Pakistan in Southern Asia, Somalia in the horn of Africa, and the United States in North America. The physical presence in the continental United States of an increasing number of Cubans, Vietnamese, Nicaraguans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans testifies to a long series of U.S. foreign policy failures. As of early 1982 the spongelike absorptive capacity of America's people, culture, and economy, though engorged, has not been saturated. However, if only 10 percent of the isthmus' 24 million people, along with an equal percentage of Mexico's 70 million inhabitants, flee, and only half these insurgency-driven aliens travel across the border, America may be deluged with refugees. Consequently, it is time to shake off the somnolence of the Vietnam syndrome and stem the tide at its Central American source in El Salvador.

The civil war in El Salvador has reached a critical phase. Rebel attacks on the infrastructure—on roads like the Pan-American Highway, bridges such as the Puente de Oro over the Lempa River, electrical pylons providing power, busyards and airfields serving both the labor and armed forces—as well as the insurgents' increasing boldness in seizing provincial population centers, indicate that the war has entered Phase Two: a limited war of expansion. Phase Two of the four phases of revolutionary war (organization and preparation; limited war of expansion; conventional war and exploitation; and export and support of contiguous revolution)<sup>3</sup> consists of the following:

*Guerrilla Military Activity.* Guerrilla military activity is based on the assumption that a Latin American government cannot sustain a lengthy internal war financially, psychologically, or politically. The guerrillas are to keep constant pressure on the government by maintaining the initiative. The key to controlling



initiative is knowledge of the enemy's position, strength, and intentions, obtained by a solid intelligence system set up in Phase One and constantly being expanded to the point that every civilian can be considered an agent.

Guerrillas scatter forces throughout the country and initiate disturbances and demoralizing attacks on supply lines and communications links such as railroads and bridges. Weak army columns are ambushed. Hit-and-run raids are sudden and vicious, with precise execution and rapid dispersal so that the government does not have time to reinforce its position, direct air and artillery fires, or isolate insurgents by using paratroops or helicopters. This places a strain on the government's conventional forces by a process of attrition which is both psychological and physical. Urban activity is stepped up by direct attacks on the property and wealth of those in power. Banks are of particular importance, both as symbols and as sources of funds.

The government, under pressure to maintain a world image of stability (politically, militarily, and economically), to receive foreign aid, and to have its trade and military alliances honored will disperse troops to police the threatened areas. This causes government forces to be weak at all points. The guerrillas can concentrate their forces at the government's weak points, one by one, defeating the regular troops in detail, yet preserving their own strength.

Government forces will predictably intensify repression with roadblocks, house searches, arrests of the innocent, and the closing of streets. Police terror, along with political repression, will become routine. Guerrillas will make excellent propaganda use of such repression, both on a local level and a worldwide level. To keep the time-honored class privileges, the government power will change hands within the family or party, or even be taken over by the military. Government soldiers will begin to show signs of tiring, and they will lose faith and decline in morale.

Insurgents will avoid direct confrontations while building a well-armed, mobile army through capture of arms, recruitment, and defection of government troops with this expertise.

*Terrorism.* Should the guerrilla activities fail and/or the government take steps to remove the cause, the guerrillas will have no choice but to seek power by terror and intimidation. This is done by committing atrocities not against the government but against the people on whose behalf the insurrection is instigated. It will make no difference to the local or worldwide press—they will still sympathize and call it a guerrilla action in a civil war.

Terrorism can only succeed psychologically, never militarily. It is usually given in to by appeasement on the part of the government. Appeasement is accomplished by propaganda leading to a negative governmental political approach in which it is believed that no defense against terrorism is possible. This leads to a nation's moral exhaustion and a predisposition to surrender.

In response to terrorism an archmilitary conservatism develops. This is embodied in a blind adaptation of a European pattern of warfare of ponderous armor and static, heavily fortified garrisons. The government leadership is oriented toward a war of mobility and clearly formulated objectives of attack, a strategic approach in which armor is the chosen instrument. This will fail against the guerrilla-turned-terrorist and will result in an increased feeling of defeatism on the part of the military and ultimately fatalism. All the government had to do was change tactics and be prepared for a protracted war. This military blindness and military conservatism is expensive and will put more strain on the economy than it can stand.

Terrorist victory is near when the political element's defeatist attitude infiltrates the military arm. The first sign of this is when the government seeks to negotiate a settlement. This signals the army that the government no longer has confidence in its ability to win.

*Demoralization and Dissatisfaction of the People with the Government.* The limited war of expansion also consists of demoralizing the people and making them dissatisfied with the government. Extensive propaganda campaigns are launched by the rebels. The people will judge these by what is promised, not what is provided, but the government must run on its record. As more territory is won over and absorbed, enough people will

actively commit themselves to the revolution so that "home guards" can be formed. These local vigilante groups are not combat units; they serve as police and protect guerrilla areas. It is their job to discourage loyalists, obtain information, and oblige support and contributions. In many cases, church officials will back the rebel factions, having been won over by the propaganda that the rebels are dedicated to helping the poor.

A long internal war compromises foreign relations. No country or company wishes to invest in a risky area or deal with a toppling government. Many major families will begin leaving the country with their wealth.

A long war also causes dissention among the people because the government cannot keep order in guerrilla-infested areas. Acts of terror and sabotage occur which make civilians lose confidence in the strength and authority of the government. War weariness and war frustration arises.

Demoralization and dissatisfaction of the people are also brought about when the government, by constantly increasing the troop strength to confront the guerrillas conventionally causes a labor drain and subsequent economic and political dislocation.

While Phase Two unfolds and the military situation deteriorates, as the loyalist forces react by making all the mistakes they are supposed to, the U.S. government, considering free elections to be the cornerstone of its Central American policy, finds itself confronted with a generally hostile media and saddled with the Vietnam syndrome.

Victory in El Salvador depends on winning three battles: the battle in the field, the battle in the media, and the battle in Washington within the administration. All three are ultimately wars of the minds of men, and the persistent propaganda campaign to equate Southeast Asia with Central America is an integral part of the East-West conflict. The three battles are all of equal import and are related to the defeat in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, this discussion will confine itself to the ground campaign, where there are marked dissimilarities between Southeast Asia and Central America.<sup>4</sup>

Logistically there is no comparison between Vietnam and El Salvador. The amazing thing about Vietnam was not that the United States eventually lost but that the United States was able to sustain a campaign for ten years a third of a world away, for the distance from Los Angeles to Saigon is over 8,000 air miles. San Salvador, lying less than 2,300 miles from Los Angeles, is as close to that city as it is to Washington, D.C.; in addition, sea, road, and rail routes from the United States to Central America are available. Thus, the argument that El Salvador is logistically unsupportable from the United States is fallacious.

Conversely, the Soviet Union now confronts in Central America a logistical dilemma, although of lesser dimension, since Central American insurgents do not require the vast supplies needed by the U.S. Army. Most Soviet-inspired shipments embark at Indo-Chinese or Algerian seaports and traverse the oceans to Cuba, where they are transshipped to distribution centers in Costa Rica or Nicaragua. The final destination, El Salvador, involves not only a transoceanic passage but also two transfers. The Communists thus confront a complicated communications conundrum, whereas in Southeast Asia, though the distances involved were equally extensive, they were generally able to unload their cargoes directly at Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) in Cambodia or Haiphong in North Vietnam. Clearly, the logistical leverage in Central America lies with the United States, which can supply El Salvador by land, sea, or air with facility.

The logistical liability of the United States in Southeast Asia was compounded by a major military mistake: determined dedication to a doctrine of strategic defense and tactical offense. Conversely, the salvation of El Salvador lies in conducting a campaign of strategic offense and tactical defense. The United States followed the opposite in Vietnam and failed. Constrained by the then current concept of limited war, and captivated by Karl von Clausewitz's conventional climactic battle, the United States adopted the strategic defensive and tactical offensive in Southeast Asia. Invasions of enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam were initially restricted, and even air strikes against some obvious military targets were forbidden.

While conceding the strategic initiative to the adversary, the United States and allied forces sought, in the classical Clausewitzian concept, a bruising battle that would bring military victory and political control of the ground. The United States played poker, while the foe played "Go."<sup>5</sup> In a protracted, partisan war, however, the object is not the slaying of thousands of insurgents who have been pressed into service, but interdiction, encirclement, and eventual destruction of the opponent's infrastructure and cadre. Hence, while United States and allied armies were chasing the guerrillas seeking a set-piece slaughter where U.S. technology would tell, and thus suffering heavy casualties by exposing themselves, the Viet Cong were surrounding isolated towns and hamlets and gaining not ground but adherents. The ultimate goal in revolutionary warfare is support and sympathy, or winning the hearts and minds, and these can be won either by extending adequate protection to the civilian population or by terrorizing them into submission. Consequently, the government forces must cut off the head of the snake of the guerrilla organization.

Only by destroying the revolutionaries who make the revolution can a successful conclusion to an extended insurgency campaign be completed. These key individuals are concentrated in the revolutionary's infrastructure and cadre. Trained abroad and patiently infiltrated over a long period of time into the nation's social, political, intellectual, economic, religious, and opinion-making sectors, the revolutionary infrastructure acts as the intermediary between the insurgent mass and the command post and shock troops of the cadre. The guerrillas are the body, the infrastructure serves as the nervous system, and the cadre is the brain. Hence, if the body is separated from the system, and the network of nerves, in turn, is isolated from the brain, the structure will collapse. This can be accomplished by severing the enemy's lines of communication and supply. Since the rebels tend to establish their base camps in frontier regions contiguous to sympathetic areas and/or in inaccessible tropical terrain, they are able either to flee across the border or melt away after inflicting heavy losses on the loyalist forces who have taken the tactical offensive. If the allied armies can uncover and break or

block the logistical links between guerrillas, infrastructure, and cadre, however, the rebels must break cover and attack in order to survive. Once in the open, the irregular guerrillas can be destroyed (e.g., Hue in 1968) and the infrastructure and cadre tracked down, isolated, and then allowed to self-destruct through starvation, attrition, or self-immolation as they are killed trying to break out of the double ring of troops surrounding them.

The Cuban-Sandinista cancer in the Caribbean and Central America can be removed through surgery, killed by chemotherapy, or isolated through quarantine. Armed occupation, incitement of rebellion, or air and naval blockade of Cuba and Nicaragua are the three major options. Should the maximum and secondary solutions (invasion and destabilization) be ruled out by the United States and only the minimal option (interdiction) be exercised, arms shipments from the socialist bloc can be monitored by satellite, and deliveries actively intercepted by air and sea or passively prevented by mining. Additional tracing on the ground can be ensured by tagging weapons and supplies during transfers. Satellite readings will reveal supply routes and concentrations, which then can be blocked and encircled. Shortages, exposure, counterinfiltration, bounties, and black propaganda implanting isolation psychology and mutual distrust will further rattle the rebels. Moreover, morale will plunge as malfunctioning arms and contaminated food are pumped into the partisan's pipeline. The moral initiative, and with it the tide of battle, will pass to the loyalists. Sanitizing sanctuaries and severing supplies in a strategic offensive are, however, essentially offshore and foreign operations that can be implemented only by the United States or the Organization of American States. The war must also be won on the ground in El Salvador by Salvadoreans.

Tactical defense involves more than clinging to static positions and holding on to fortified hamlets. The enemy must be induced into openly engaging by interdicting his internal supply and transport system. Since the object is to discover and destroy the cadre and infrastructure by separating them from the guerrillas and preventing provisions from reaching them, the govern-

ment troops, aided by accurate intelligence and supported by a sound police force, must practice patience and perseverance in a protracted war.

Patience is needed, for in spite of satellite guidance and informants' intelligence the insurgents will have many trails and alternate tracks leading from the base camps and boundaries to their agents, activists, and combat commands. Moreover, most of these routes will lie under jungle cover in rugged, tropical terrain. Consequently, government troops must be prepared to sit astride suspected networks and wait. Battalion size *banderas* will be airlifted into areas encompassing indicated enemy paths, and blocks facing both ways will be established. Two landing zones, one inside and one outside the perimeter, will be readied. Dug in, the *bandera* will wait and watch—no search-and-destroy missions, no movement, no pursuit, and few casualties. Two, four, seven, ten days will pass. If the enemy does not open an attack to clear the track, then the route is either redundant or unimportant. The battalion, after installing remotely monitored ground sensors, will move out by air and repeat the maneuver until a sensitive network is uncovered. The guerrillas, shorn of communications and short of supplies, will have to try to break through. The government regulars, well emplaced and armed with automatic weapons with established fields of fire, will have their killing ground. If the insurgents are overwhelming the *bandera*, however, it will either be airlifted out or slip away to reform at another preselected block position. An insurrectionist attack from both sides of the track would indicate that the trail leads to or is close to a rebel supply base or command post. Loyalist reinforcements, supported by counterinsurgency aircraft, can be helicoptered into either or both landing zones and the enemy columns engaged or perhaps even entrapped. In any event, the enemy will have to come out into the open, show himself, and take the consequences and casualties.

Identical blocking operations will be carried on by other *banderas* simultaneously on a national scale in El Salvador. Eventually, as the guerrillas fade from mounting casualties, lack of logistics, and increased desertions, the rebel command will have to commit the infrastructure and cadre to combat. As these guer-

rillas grind themselves down, the base camps will also, through trial and error, be identified. When such a base, with its Viet-Cong-like tunnels and complement of cadre is uncovered, no effort to engage should be made. Installation of double lines of encirclement, facing inward toward the base and outward toward any rebel relief force, are enough to ensure isolation. In time, starvation, lack of hygiene and supplies, and hysteria will drive the beseiged to surrender, suicide, or attempted escape through the surrounding rings. "Wait and watch" is the order of the day for the regular army.

"Wait and watch," however, can sometimes be a cover for corruption. During the campaign of Fidel Castro to overthrow Fulgencio Batista in Cuba from December 1957 to January 1959, many military authorities declined to destroy the small band of insurgents in the Sierra Maestra because of the graft gained from contracts. Even in El Salvador there are indications that some individuals are resisting reequipping the armed forces because of special interests in certain munitions suppliers. Hence, a distinction must be made between procrastination for personal profit, and patience which enables a people to endure a protracted war.<sup>6</sup>

Patience and perseverance echo down the ages of Hispanic history, for the twin traditions of protracted partisan warfare and strategic offense coupled with tactical defense are essentially Spanish. The United States must not repeat the other major error of Vietnam by imposing its military model and modus operandi on the army of El Salvador.

Victory lies in utilizing local traditions and conditions, and the elements for success are ingrained in El Salvador; Hispanics still think of themselves as warriors and are attuned to prolonged warfare, while the Anglo-Americans consider themselves soldiers and are trained for definitive campaigns. Thus in Latin America the military is a calling, while in the United States it is a profession. The pattern of protracted partisan war reaches back in the Hispanic past to Roman times. The conquest of Iberia cost Rome almost two centuries (206 B.C. to 19 B.C.), and the conflict was marked by extended guerrilla resistance led by such warriors as Viriathus (assassinated in 139 B.C.), who combined



strategic offense with tactical defense. In addition to this classic example there is the seven-hundred-year-long *Reconquista* (719–1492), in which the Christians recovered the peninsula from the Muslims. Using the “salami process,” the Christians inched southward in an extended series of little guerrilla wars, bleeding the numerically superior Moors until the invaders were weakened and ready for the coup de grace in climactic battle.

With the fall of Granada, Spanish armies reigned supreme in Europe for 150 years. Always outnumbered and fighting far from the motherland, Spanish infantry was guided by Gonzalo de Córdoba, El Gran Capitán (1453–1515), who initiated the depot system and introduced the modern military concept of strategic offense and tactical defense. While harrying his opponents with *guerrilleros*, Córdoba would maneuver his main body into an easily defendable position along a route the foe had to keep free. Obligated to assault, the enemy would expend itself on the entrenched regiments (*tercios*), which, as the foe broke, would encircle and annihilate. These *tercio* tactics proved invincible until the French overwhelmed the disciplined Spanish veterans at Rocroi in 1643.

Spanish revenge returned during the Napoleonic wars. At Bailén in 1808, General Francisco Castaños, after harassing the French columns of General Pierre Dupont de l'Étang with irregulars, interposed his army between the French Imperial Legions and their resupply and reinforcements. Castaños, deploying in a defensive position, forced Dupont to waste his regiments in futile assault and then obliged his capitulation. Thus the *tercio* technique—strategic offense and tactical defense plus partisan operations—brought the French army down for the first time at Bailén.

El Salvador is the ideal testing ground for the reintroduction of *tercio* tactics, for the armed forces of El Salvador have inherited from their Hispanic past the ingredients for victory. However, the United States must supply the instruments and aid in instructing the army and police in civil-military relations, since no national counterinsurgency campaign can be won without the support of the populace. The Salvadoran armed forces must return to their Judeo-Christian roots and treat their fellow citi-

zens with justice and respect. One of the first moves in the direction of seeking peace through justice occurred in October 1980, when a Code of Conduct was adopted and ORDEN, a white terrorist group, was outlawed. The placing of the national, treasury, frontier, and internal security police along with the civil guard under direct army control, and the dismissal or reassignment of recalcitrant officers, also aided civil-military relations. In addition, the national guard should be integrated into the army, and then the newly combined army and national guard should take over all police functions while the police are retired and retrained. Discipline and professionalism must be instilled in the police forces before they are permitted to reassume their duties in the urban and rural areas. Meanwhile, the amalgamated army and guard, using veteran guardsmen as noncommissioned officers for new formations, would be expanded to a total of 20,000 and reorganized along traditional Hispanic lines.

Command and combat structure should be reorganized into the following groups: *brigadas* (military regions), *tercios* (provincial regiments), and *banderas* (all arms battalions)—this is the suggested nomenclature. El Salvador should be divided into five military regions, each commanded by a brigadier. Every brigadier would supervise the military and police in two or more of the fourteen political provinces of the republic. Every province should raise its own regiment, which will reside in the provincial capital; thus, the number of *tercios* would amount to fourteen. An additional regiment would be stationed in the national capital, San Salvador, and retained as presidential ready reserve, for a total of fifteen regiments. Each *tercio*, in turn, will consist of one to three *banderas*. The battalion, as the basic combat unit, should be composed of eight companies of all arms, including ground and air transport.

The new military regions, *brigadas* (BG), are designed to enhance combat control and increase accountability. Each *brigada* would encompass a critical operations zone and a metropolitan area or economic region and would seek, where possible, to cover both banks of major rivers and lakes, especially the San Miguel, Lempa, Illopango, and Coatepeque, thus ensuring continuity of control over crossings and, it is hoped, preventing

insurgent penetration along previously shared unit boundaries. Utilizing the existing provinces as building blocks, the *brigadas* would be grouped as follows:

- BG-1 La Unión and Morazán
- BG-2 San Miguel, Usulután, and San Vicente
- BG-3 Cabañas and Chalatenango
- BG-4 La Paz, La Libertad, San Salvador, and Cuscatlán
- BG-5 Sonsonate, Aluachapán, and Santa Ana

The proposed reorganization initially involves the establishment of a depot in each province. Each depot, in the fashion of the Gran Capitán, will serve as the home headquarters, recruiting center, and drill and parade ground for the *tercio*. To further local loyalties and increase identification, regiments would carry the provincial colors and wear their provincial insignia. Moreover, each regiment would be autonomous, and the commanding colonel would have full responsibility and accountability for pacification of his province, since sharing with a civilian in such a small country as El Salvador would probably only lead to friction and duplication. Only a limited number of *tercios* would carry a full complement of three *banderas*, for an excess labor drain would only cause more economic difficulties. All regiments, however, would have at least one. For provinces that evidenced a minimum of insurgency, such as Sonsonate, only one battalion would be required, while others, like Chalatenango, would need a full three. Thus, though the *tercio* would serve as the basic unit for administration and identification, the *bandera* would be the fundamental fighting formation.

*Banderas* are designed for continuous combat and maximum mobility. Consisting of eight 200-man companies, each fully equipped and armed and assigned its own airlift (one medical-evacuation and two transport helicopters per company), the *bandera* is intended to exert unrelenting pressure on the enemy. Companies will work in pairs with a two-week rotation of assignments; however, the pressure of events may require a more extended tour. The cycle will be routine, reserve, engage, and furlough. Thus, while two companies are performing routine pa-

trols and roadblocks, two others (holding force) are retraining in ready reserve, two more (strike force) are in action, and the last two will be enjoying two-week passes. This spacing would ensure freshness and flexibility, guarantee rapid reenforcement, provide ample time to repair and maintain the helicopters, and, above all, enable the men physically and psychologically to sustain an extended war of endurance where courage and fortitude will prevail.

Pride and professionalism are the essential ingredients of a successful soldier, and in Latin America where machismo reigns and where the military is more than a mere career, pride may be as important as preparation. Nevertheless, the soldiers of El Salvador must have adequate training and confidence not only in their leadership but also in their weapons.

Rank restructure and weapons modernization are essential. Integration of the army and national guard will enable the military to staff new units with experienced guardsmen who can be promoted to noncommissioned officers (NCOs). However, the continuing shortage of junior officers can be met only by elevating qualified NCOs to commissioned rank. This can be done by allowing the cream to rise and introducing a system of battlefield promotions. This program will not only ensure a supply of proven platoon leaders but also tend to break down class barriers and give enlisted personnel vertical mobility, and hence more to fight for. Courage and success on the battlefield must be rewarded. Recognition through bonuses, medals, ribbons, and extra furloughs will raise morale and sustain the will to win.

Public relations can play an important role in raising morale. Enhancement of the image of the armed forces by media coverage of successful civil-military cooperation and public recognition of individuals and units that have performed outstanding acts of heroism will aid the propaganda campaign.

The troops, no matter how motivated they may be, need adequate training and modern weapons and equipment. Training for officers and men should be conducted in a safe environment in areas that are free of insurgent activity. Secure training areas are necessary, because the technical aspects of modern warfare require isolation so the recruits can concentrate all their energy in

learning a soldier's trade. Moreover, if the area is insecure the local commander will tend to call on the conscripts and commit them untried and untrained to combat. Thus they would be wasted before they were ready. Adequate pay, pensions, life insurance, and medical support for combatants and their families are essential. In addition to these support systems, the physical protection of military dependents must be assured, so that they are reasonably safe from rebel reprisals.

But the ultimate test is battle, and the troops must have confidence in their weapons. The Salvadoran armed forces are currently carrying obsolete arms into combat. The standard infantry rifle, the H & K, G-3, should be replaced with M16s. This upgrading would at least give the government forces the same firepower as the *guerrilleros*, who are equipped with Soviet small arms along with U.S. models captured in Indochina. In addition, if the *banderas* are effectively to perform their mobile blockade missions, squads must be allotted automatic weapons, backed by grenade launchers and mortars, both light 81mm and heavy 120mm. Should the U.S. Congress be reluctant to appropriate funds for refurbishing Salvadoran arms, then perhaps the U.S. could use its influence with Third World countries to promote the transfer of captured Soviet arms to El Salvador, such as the \$100 million worth of Soviet arms caches uncovered in Turkey since the military took power, or the Soviet equipment captured by the South Africans in Angola. So deployed and distributed, these weapons would be used against the surrogates of the original supplier, the Soviet Union, which would be in the best interests of all Free World nations.

Modern weaponry should be balanced by new equipment, such as tropical, rot-proof uniforms, jungle boots, and fiber helmets. Lightweight body armor made of Kevlar with chest and groin protection, and even face masks, would reduce casualties remarkably. Health would improve and mobility would be enhanced if the blockade *banderas* were provided with a two-week supply of freeze-dried campaign rations. Moreover, military medical supplies, such as morphine Syrettes, antibiotics, and intravenous solutions, are desperately needed, and air evacuation of wounded should be expanded. The current carry-out of

casualties costs an average of twelve hours, inflicting on the fighting forces needless agony, incapacitation, and death. Poor medical facilities, a shortage of supplies, obsolete arms, inadequate support systems, lack of rewards and recognition, incorrect tactics, and blind adaptation of U.S. military models are all contributing to the collapse of the morale of the military in El Salvador. The stalemate that started in July 1981 has been followed by defeatism and fatalism. Nevertheless, if the deficiencies are remedied and the Salvadorans return to their Hispanic roots and the *tercio* tradition, El Salvador can still save itself. If not, the United States may intervene and consequently commit the errors of Indochina again, for the Anglo-American, unlike the Spanish-American, is currently culturally incapable of conducting a protracted war.

Anglo-Americans are essentially poker players, who play each hand as it is dealt them. Reacting to the cards in hand and trusting to the luck of the draw, Americans tend not to plan or initiate action, but make counter moves. Moreover, as poker players, they have limited vision, since they play from deal to deal and are thus short-term in their thinking. Americans also exhibit the naive assumption that opponents will deal the cards again, but in reality, if the Soviets win, they will not only refuse to play but also take the pot and go home. This cultural liability of the United States is well reflected in the current craze for crisis management. Based on the business theory of the "exception principal," U.S. leaders confront situations as they arise. Hence, whether liberals or conservatives, they are reactionaries, with only their reflex response being different. Consequently, U.S. military and foreign policy is a series of unintegrated, isolated acts without continuity or apparent purpose. Contrasting the U.S. view of short, sharp campaigns and crisis management, the Soviets, like chess players, plan several moves ahead, as do the Orientals who are addicted to "Go" and the Hispanic Americans who are dedicated to dominoes.

Added to American poker-player mentality is the classical concept of seasonal military campaigns. Following the Roman tradition of farmers fighting from sowing to harvest time, March

to October, the U.S. military adheres to a timetable with specific objectives. In a prolonged partisan war, however, the immediate aim is not to gain ground or capture cities but to win adherents; consequently, there is no schedule, only the ultimate object of victory.

Another U.S. liability is an accountant's attitude of business as usual. Board members and bookkeepers consider a war zone a lost market, rather than the site of contending systems engaged in a long-term struggle for supremacy. Thus, as trade and tourism decline, policy is dictated by the profit-and-loss statements of private companies rather than the national interest. The U.S. propensity for short-term profits, along with the classical campaign concept and a modern poker-player mentality, have rendered America incapable of enduring either a prolonged ideological effort or a sustained military action. If massive military intervention fails to win a quick victory, which was what happened in Indochina, the U.S. reaction is to cut its losses by abandoning its allies, opting for the Zimbabwe solution and accommodating the enemy who guarantees peace and profit. Consequently, since the conflict may continue for decades, the U.S. should never consider committing field forces to any part of Central America.

Introduction of U.S. ground forces into Central America is neither necessary nor desirable. The elements of victory are already in place in the people and past of El Salvador. Foreign intrusion, be it Anglo-American or Cuban-Sandinista, will provoke a negative, nationalistic reaction, for a country can be truly conquered only by its own citizens. The United States should therefore limit itself to what it can do best: providing supplies, training, and technology. Help, and a hands-off policy, can over time solve the situation. When the opposite was practiced in Southeast Asia, the enterprise floundered.

The U.S. hands-on effort in Vietnam eventually required the introduction of large numbers of ground personnel. This presence induced overdependency on U.S. forces by the local military, disrupted the Vietnamese economy, and exposed the American populace to domestic unrest as well as an intense and

eventually successful international propaganda campaign that weakened Americans' will to win. As protests and casualties mounted, the U.S. military strove to replace men with machines.

American fascination with technology occasionally leads to dependency. In Southeast Asia the U.S. military continued to employ helicopters as counterinsurgency aircraft even after battle experience had proven their extreme vulnerability to ground fire. During the Lam Sam operation in Laos, 108 helicopters were lost and 600 were damaged between February 8 and April 9, 1971. In spite of the massive helicopter support and immense wastage, some 10,000 South Vietnamese troops were killed, wounded, or captured, and an estimated equal number of the enemy (who were without air cover) fell.<sup>7</sup> Such an expenditure of men and machines for an even trade with the adversary is unacceptable. A similar situation already exists in El Salvador, where helicopters should be limited to transport and air evacuation roles and not assigned to combat missions. An admirable substitute with a much higher survival rate would be the Brazilian-built *Xavante* or the Argentine *Pucar*, both of which are designed for brushfire wars in underdeveloped areas. The purchase price of the *Xavante* or *Pucar* includes ground crews and personnel for an extended period. Spanish-speaking volunteer pilots could be contracted to operate the aircraft in close support of the *banderas* in blockade.

The crisis in U.S. foreign and military policy is metaphysical. The situation in El Salvador is symptomatic of the shrinking of America's spirit and the contraction of U.S. space perception and strategic vision. The signals emanating from Washington indicate divided councils, for the battle within the administration is but one of the three wars being waged. The other two in the international media and on the ground in El Salvador will be won or lost only when the conflict within the U.S. government is resolved; and the continuing campaign to equate Central America with Southeast Asia is an effort to influence the decision.

But Central America is not Southeast Asia. This time the logistics are on the U.S. side, and the United States, by providing



supplies, training, and technology, can aid El Salvador in

- adopting a strategic offense and tactical defense
- inculcating Hispanic traditions and *tercio* tactics
- conducting a lengthy protracted war
- reinforcing the self-reliance of indigenous armies by refusing to commit U.S. ground forces
- utilizing helicopters for air transport and evacuation only while using other aircraft for combat roles

The United States, by emphasizing these five points, providing the instruments, and encouraging allies such as El Salvador to fight for their own countries, will in turn ensure its own survival, for the United States is the ultimate target of the enemy in Central America. The Soviet Union, by using surrogates, is conducting a low-cost, low-profile, low-risk war that not only is eroding U.S. power in the Caribbean and Central America and endangering vital oil and ore imports, but also may be successful in driving refugees from Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico north into the United States.<sup>8</sup> Should the radicalization of Central America continue, and the destabilization of the region increase, the Soviets will have taken another major step toward their ultimate objective of global hegemony without ever directly confronting the military might of the United States. Thus the salvation of El Salvador is intimately linked to the future fate of the United States.

### Notes

1. See Lewis A. Tambs, "Guatemala, Central America, and the Caribbean: A Geopolitical Glance," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, September 1, 1981, pp. 677-84, for a discussion of the strategic dimension. For Secretary of State Alexander Haig on the refugee problem, see *Arizona Republic*, February 22, 1982, p. A-1.

2. See Sol W. Sanders, "Our Mexican Time Bomb," unpublished manuscript, for an excellent discussion and analysis of the migration problem. (Write International Outlook Editor, *Business Week*, 1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10020.)

3. For a complete outline of the four phases of revolutionary warfare

in Latin America, see L. A. Tambs, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, September 1, 1981, pp. 679-81.

4. For one of the many efforts to equate El Salvador with Vietnam, refer to the film *El Salvador: Another Viet Nam*, a Catalyst Media Production produced and directed by Glenn Silber and Tete Vasconcellos (50 minutes).

5. "Go" or "Go-Bang" is an ancient Oriental table game. The board is divided into 19 horizontal and 19 vertical squares with 361 intersections on which the flat round men, 181 white and 181 black, are placed as the game proceeds. The men are placed on unoccupied intersections with the object of surrounding as many unoccupied intersections as possible. The player enclosing the greater number of vacant points is the winner.

6. For a discussion of corruption contributing to a continuation of the Cuban campaign, see Alberto Bayo, *150 Preguntas a un Guerillero* (Havana, 1961).

7. Ronald H. Cole, "The Southern Defeat on the Ho Chi Min Trail," in *The Vietnamese War*, ed. Ray Bonds (New York: Crown Publishers, 1979), p. 193.

8. For the exodus of boat people from Nicaragua, see "Washington Whispers," *U.S. News and World Report*, November 23, 1981, p. 12. See also President Ronald Reagan's speech to the Organization of American States, Washington, D.C., February 24, 1982, for the White House's concern over the Central American refugee problem.

THE THIRD WORLD WAR AND CENTRAL AMERICA:  
U.S. Strategic and Security Considerations in the Caribbean Basin

Frank Aker

## GEOPOLITICS OF WWII IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

### SOVIET GOALS-

to obtain global hegemony by defeating (not destroying) the U.S. (projected accomplishment date is 1985)

Master Plan is to attain choke point control of SLOC and ASTAR through double encirclement

encirclement of PRC almost complete

undermining of U.S.'s soft underbelly with MONGOL PHILOSOPHY

loss of Cuba, insurgencies in Central America, turn to socialism by some West Indies nations are steps to isolate U.S. and deprive it of oil and ore and balkanize it with mass migration of Hispanics

Containment, detente and double-encirclement = the 3 phases of WWII

### GUERRILLA WARFARE

is just a technique

goal is to win the hearts and minds of the people

social, political and economic issues are used as smoke screens

### COUNTER GUERRILLA WARFARE

Spanish heritage of protracted war - Tercio Tactics of strategic offense and tactical defense

need to cut off the cadre and INFRASTRUCTURE, the head of the snake

patience and perseverance are watchwords for counter guerrilla warfare

Positive results occurring in Morazan Province in El Salvador

### SUMMATION

Reinstitute the MONROE DOCTRINE

U.S. must seize the psychological, military, political and economic initiative

U.S. to supply to allies treasure, training and technology

## THE THIRD WORLD WAR AND CENTRAL AMERICA:

### U.S. Strategic and Security Considerations in the Caribbean Basin

| Frank Aker |

The climax of World War III is taking place in Central America and the Caribbean - and the Soviet Union is winning. Since 1898 the United States has depended upon a cooperative Caribbean and supportive South America for its ability to project power across the Atlantic and Pacific. But the neglect and failure of U.S. foreign policy in the region has resulted in the Soviets establishing a stronghold in Cuba, 90 miles south of the U.S. across from the Straits of Florida and sitting at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, and influencing the destabilization of the region. This strategic area is now the vulnerable "soft underbelly" of the United States.

"History passes, but geography remains" is a basic theme of geopolitics. The closed sea of the Caribbean has been the scene of strife since the emergence of Modern Europe. All of the great maritime nations - Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union - have striven for supremacy in the New World Mediterranean.

Cuba, "the pearl of the Antilles," has always been the key to the Caribbean. As the Soviet command post in the western hemisphere, it struck around the rim of the inland sea between 1959 and 1965. The Dominican Republic, Haiti, Venezuela, Columbia, Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Mexico were targeted. Local nationalism supported by United States counter-insurgency suppressed these subversive strikes. The Castroites changed their tactics and the results, aided by a loss of will and purpose by the United States and abetted by an alarming decline in Yankee shrewdness and sense of strategy, were revolutionary. Today, Nicaragua and Grenada are in the Castro camp and there is insurrection in El Salvador and Guatemala. Guyana

has moved towards Socialism. Nicaragua is the only other feasible route for a trans-isthmian canal. Nicaragua is also a Central American beachhead for the eventual Castroite conquest of the petroleum fields in Southern Mexico. A future People's Republic of Guatemala may call for the recovery of the lost provinces of Chiapas and Soconusco which were ceded to Mexico in 1882. In Panama, as in El Salvador, the question of a Castroite take over is not if, but when. Panama can nationalize the Canal under eminent domain and call upon their Socialist brethren in Nicaragua and Cuba for support. Faced with a fight, the U.S. will probably back down and withdraw leaving the contest to the Castroites and the regional powers, Venezuela, Columbia and Mexico. The Caribbean has been an American lake; now, it is increasingly a Socialist Sea.

Maritime trade is the economic lifeline of most of the nations in the Caribbean region. Over 1.1 billion tons of shipping pass through the sea lanes of the Caribbean annually. Half of this volume is intended for, or originates from, the Gulf Coast of the United States. Two of the world's fourteen choke points are located in the Caribbean: the Panama Canal and the Caribbean itself which closes the Caribbean basin. The number of entrances and exits is limited in this closed continental sea. The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the Virgin, Leeward, Windward and Grenadine Islands encircle the eastern edge. North, Central and South America ring the rest. The only Pacific passage is the Panama Canal. The center of the circle is dominated by the Greater Antilles - Puerto Rico, Hispanola, Jamaica and Cuba - which also form a barrier between North and South America. Only three channels, Mona, Windward and Yucatan cut through the Antillian island chain which lies athwart the sea lanes connecting the two continents. Only the Straits of Florida and the Santaren Passage provide an Atlantic entrance to the Gulf of Mexico. The major oil producing nations of Venezuela and Mexico also touch the waters of the Caribbean. Guatemala is also exporting oil as of 1981. Thus, the Caribbean rim and basin is a petroleum focal point.

Oil from the Middle East, Ecuador, Alaska and Venezuela must use these Caribbean channels. Most super tankers from the Middle East whose cargo is aimed for the U.S. do not dock directly in U.S. Atlantic or Gulf ports but rather transfer their cargoes to standard size tankers in the Caribbean. And those super tankers who do discharge in the New Orleans port must traverse the Caribbean. The Panama Canal also plays an important role in U.S. energy supply. Oil from Alaska and Ecuador will pass through the Pacific-Atlantic pipeline in the Republic of Panama augmenting the actual tanker route by way of the former Canal Zone. Another trans-isthmian conduit under consideration for Alaskan oil runs across Guatemala from the Pacific coast to the Gulf of Honduras. In all, three-quarters of all U.S. oil imports are either produced or transit the shore and sea of the New World Mediterranean.

The United States imports 97 percent of its manganese needs, 76 percent of its nickel needs and 93 percent of its bauxite needs. Most of the required amounts of these strategic minerals are supplied by Central America and the Caribbean basin nations. In addition to these minerals which are also imported from Southern Africa, U.S. steel mills also import significant amounts of iron ore from Venezuela and Brazil, most of which transits the Caribbean. The United States as a mineral and energy dependent nation needs secure supplies from Meso-America and the New World Mediterranean. Whoever controls the Caribbean and Central America could strangle the United States by choking off the petroleum and ore life lines.

The goal of the Soviet Union is to achieve global hegemony. After World War II, the United States followed a policy of containment, the first phase of World War III. During the twenty year period of containment, 1946 - 1975, Cuba shifted to communism. The Soviet Union, through its strategic Caribbean command post, has been exporting communism throughout the Western Hemisphere and other parts of the world. Containment closed with the collapse of South Viet Nam in 1975. The second phase of World War III, detente, began in 1960. The U.S. under the administrations of Johnson,

Nixon, Ford and Carter followed a course of peaceful co-existence with the Russians. The aim was to reduce international tensions and to socialize the Soviets by unilateral disarmament and appeasement of aggression. However, the Soviets, during this period, accelerated its nuclear and naval armaments programs. Occurring between 1964 and 1979 were the loss of Indo-China, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Ethiopia, Aden, Iran, Nicaragua, Grenada and Afghanistan and the alienation or abandonment of Taiwan, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Chile and other countries.

The Soviet scenario is to play a conventional nineteenth century colonial ground game under cover of an overwhelming atomic umbrella. As early as 1973 Leonid Brezhnev announced at a Communist conference in Prague that the USSR would achieve global economic, military and political dominance by 1985. Thus the third and final stage of World War III, double envelopment - surround the People's Republic of China and strangle the West by severing the oil and ore supplies - is timed for about twenty years, 1964 to 1985.

The Russians are applying the tactics of the Mongols to modern times. The nomadic steppes peoples from Central Asia ravaged the rim of Eur-Asia for centuries. Attila, Jenghiz Khan and others led their horsemen around the oceanic edge of Eur-Asia from the China Sea to the Indian Ocean and on to the Mediterranean and Adriatic. Stressing mobility and military might and disdaining static agriculture pursuits, these tribute-collecting tribes would coalesce into a compact mass under the disciplined, centralized command of a dynamic leader and then explode with massive but brief bursts of energy, which sent them out of Central Asia to savage the civilizations surrounding them. Masters of mobility and deceit, the nomads conquered and controlled the caravan routes and commercial cross roads which connected the advanced societies on the coasts of the continent. They lived by levying tribute, not by peaceful productivity. The Russians, heirs to this tradition, have sought to apply this same strategy of maritime mobility, choke-point control of the Seven Seas and,



since 1974, the collection of tributes from the increasingly subservient sea peoples in the form of loans, technology and food. The West is assisting in accelerating this final Finlandization. Aided by international financiers who have lent the COMICON some sixty billion dollars since 1970 and abetted by multi-national corporations who have sold the Soviets advanced, high-level technology, Soviet Russia is seizing control of the sea lanes, the Aerial Skyways of Transport and Resupply (ASTAR) and strategic areas of the globe upon which the developed nations depend.

The triumph of the communists in Indo-China and the invasion of Afghanistan have almost completed the encirclement of the People's Republic of China by the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Soviet Union-Viet Nameese Friendship Treaty, which enables the Russian Navy to be based in Cam Ranh Bay on the South China Sea, threatens Japan and its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC).

The current crisis in Central America and the Caribbean has a number of similarities to the situation in South East Asia during the last ten years. But, this time it is the United States of America which is being encircled, not the PRC, and it is America's ore and oil SLOC which is endangered, not Japan's. Moreover, as insurgency inches northward from Nicaragua, to El Salvador, to Guatemala and into Mexico, thousand of refugees will, as they did in Indo-China, not only flee by sea, but will work their way overland toward the open, unguarded and probably unguardable southern frontier of the United States. The turmoil in Meso-America may induce a ripple effect which might inundate the U.S. with a human wave which could destabilize and capsize the Republic. Consequently, to prevent this balkanization, it is time to shake off the somnolence of the Viet Nam syndrome and stem the tide at its source in Central America in El Salvador.

The civil war in El Salvador has reached a critical phase. Rebel attacks on the infrastructure, as well as the insurgents increasing boldness in seizing provincial population centers, indicate that the Revolutionary War has entered Phase

II, Limited War of Expansion. The four phases of Revolutionary War are 1) Organization and Preparation; 2) Limited War of Expansion; 3) Conventional War and Exploitation; and 3) Export and Support of Contiguous Revolution (see Appendix A).

The social, political and economic issues of a nation targeted for insurrection and take over are used as smokescreens to incite insurrection among the masses. The "Popular Front" governments will all become puppets of the Soviet regime. The techniques used for seizing and maintaining power in Ibero-America are infiltration, revolutionizing the masses and subversion.

Guerrilla warfare, as the technique for the armed struggle, is especially suited for Hispanic America. It is a method using strategic offense and tactical defense. Patience and perseverance echo down the ages of Hispanic history. These attributes are required to fight this type of protracted war. Historically, the European Spaniards used guerrilla war (little war) with much success. Gonzálo de Córdoba, El Gran Capitán (1453 - 1515), initiated the depot system and introduced the modern military concept of strategic offense and tactical defense. While harrying his opponents with guerrilleros, the Great Captain would maneuver his main body into an easily defendable position along a route the foe had to keep free. Obligated to assault, the enemy would expend himself on the entrenched regiments (tercios), which, as the foe broke, would encircle and annihilate. The Spanish and their descendants in the Americas think of themselves as warriors and the military as a calling. Unlike the Anglo-Americans, who consider themselves soldiers and are trained for definitive campaigns, they are culturally suited to guerrilla war. Victory lies in utilizing local traditions and conditions and the elements for success are ingrained in El Salvador.

The ultimate goal in revolutionary warfare is support and sympathy - winning the hearts and minds of the people. These can be won by extending adequate protection to the civilian population or by terrorizing them into submission. Consequently, the government forces must cut off the head of the snake of the

guerrilla organization, the cadre. Only by destroying the revolutionaries who make the revolution can an extended, insurgency campaign be eliminated. These key individuals are concentrated in the revolutionary's infrastructure and cadre. They are infiltrated over a long period of time into the nation's social, political, intellectual, economic, religious and opinion making sectors. This infrastructure acts as the intermediary between the insurgent mass and the command post and shock troops of the cadre. The guerrillas are the body, the infrastructure serves as the nervous system and the cadre is the brain. If the body is separated from the system, and the network of nerves, in turn, is isolated from the cerebrum (cadre), the corpse will collapse. This can be accomplished by severing the enemy's lines of communication and supply. If the allied armies can uncover and break or block the logistical links between guerrillas, infrastructure and cadre, then, the rebels, in order to survive must break cover and attack. Once in the open the guerrillas can be destroyed, the infrastructure and cadre tracked down, isolated, and then allowed to self-destruct through starvation, attrition or self-immolation as they beat themselves to death trying to break out of the double iron ring embracing them.

Tactical defense involves more than clinging to static positions and holding on to fortified hamlets. The enemy must be induced into openly engaging by interdicting his internal supply and transport system. Since the object is to discover and destroy the cadre and infrastructure by separating them from the guerrillas and preventing provisions from reaching them, the government troops, aided by accurate intelligence and supported by a sound police force, must practice patience and perseverance in a protracted war. In spite of satellite guidance and informant's intelligence, the insurgents will have many trails and alternate tracks leading from the base camps and boundaries of sympathetic states to their agents, activists and combat commands. Most of these routes will lie under jungle cover in rugged, tropical terrain. Therefore, government troops must be prepared to sit astride suspected networks and wait.

Battalion size banderas (all arms battalions) will airlift into areas encompassing indicated enemy paths. Blocks facing both ways will be established. Two landing zones, one inside and one outside the perimeter, will be readied. Dug in, the bandera will wait and watch; no search and destroy missions, no movement, no pursuit, few casualties. Perhaps two weeks will pass. If the enemy does not open an attack to clear the track, then the route is either redundant or unimportant. The battalion, after installing remotely monitored ground sensors will move out by air and repeat the maneuver until a sensitive network is uncovered. The guerrillas, shorn of communications and short of supplies will have to try and break through. The regulars, well emplaced, armed with automatic weapons with established fields of fire, will have their killing ground. If the insurgents are overwhelming the bandera in blockade, it will either be airlifted out - wounded first - or slip away to reform at another pre-selected block position. An insurrectionist attack from both sides of the track would indicate that the trail leads to or is close to a rebel supply base or command post. Loyalists reinforcements, supported by counter-insurgency aircraft can be helicoptered into either or both landing zones and the enemy columns engaged or perhaps even entrapped. In any case, the event will have to come out into the open, show itself and take the consequences and casualties.

Identical blocking operations will be carried on by other banderas simultaneously on a national scale in El Salvador. Eventually, as the guerrillas fade from mounting casualties, lack of logistics and increased desertions, the rebel command will have to commit the infrastructure and cadre to combat. As these guerrillas grind themselves down, the base camps will also, through trial and error, be found out. When such a base with its tunnels and complement of cadre is uncovered, no effort to engage in battle should be made. Installation of double lines of encirclement, facing inward toward the base and outward toward any rebel relief force, insuring isolation are enough. Hunger, lack of hygiene and hysteria will do the rest. In time, starvation,

filth and insanity will drive the beseiged to surrender, suicide or self-immolation on the surrounding ring of fire. "Wait and Watch," are the order of the day for the regular army. This strategy of counter-guerrilla warfare is now working in Morazan Province.

Victory in El Salvador depends on winning three battles - in the field, in the media and in Wahington within the administration. The wars on the ground and in the international media can only be won when the conflict within the U.S. government is resolved. The situation in El Salvador is symtomatic of the shrinking of America's spirit and the contraction of U.S. space perception and strategic vision. The signals from Washington indicate divided councils. The continuing campaign to equate Central America with South East Asia is an effort to influence the decision. But Central America is not South East Asia. This time the logisitcs are on the U.S.'s side. The U.S., by supplying treasure, training and technology, can aid its allies in:

1. Adopting the strategic offense and tactical defense.
2. Inculcating Hispanic traditions and tercio tactics.
3. Conducting a protracted war of perhaps decades duration.
4. Reinforcing the self-reliance of indigenous armies by refusing to commit U.S. ground forces.
5. Utilizing helicopters for air transport and evacuation only and supplying COIN aircraft for air support.

The U.S., by suggesting these five points, providing the instruments and encouraging allies to fight for their own countries, will, in turn, insure its own survival. The ultimate target of the enemy in Central America is the United States. The United States must seize the psychological, military, political and economic initiative. The war is for the minds of mankind. The U.S. must demonstrate that it believes in freedom, that it is willing to sacrifice, that it is ready and willing to endure a protracted war, and that it will not abandon its allies.

Nations can only be pacified by their own people. No U.S. ground forces,

besides a minimum of advisors and technicians, should be committed to either El Salvador or Guatemala. The U.S. should aid in the invoking of CODECA, the Central American Defense Council, and seek through the Organization of the American States and the Inter-American Defense Board, the cooperation of other American nations. The Monroe Doctrine must be reinstated. The U.S. must sever arms shipments to the insurgents and employ the doctrine of Revolutionary War against Nicaragua and Cuba.

The U.S. should tie economic and military aid to El Salvador and Guatemala to the conducting of open presidential and congressional campaigns and the holding of free elections as scheduled. More importantly, the U.S. must attempt to assure that the government forces in their counterinsurgency campaign conduct themselves in the Judeo-Christian tradition, that is with a combination of law and love. The government forces must obey the laws of the land. Only by acting justly with the population can the government win the hearts and minds of the people and insure their loyalty and cooperation.

Capitalism is concerned with production. Socialism deals with distribution. Even Marx understood that capitalism preceded socialism. You must have something to give away. The choice, then, is between two forms of capitalism - state and private. The record of private capitalism in producing goods and services is so superior that it is the only viable alternative. Consequently, the U.S. must encourage the supply side, promote investment in industry, agriculture and infrastructure by both public and private lending agencies. Political freedom is tied to economic freedom and personal well-being.

Central America and the Caribbean are not only America's global power perch, but also a focal point for oil and ore supplies. Unaware or oblivious to contemporary Latin American theory and practice, the U.S. abetted the introduction onto the mainland of the Americas a hostile regime in Nicaragua which, aided by the Soviet Union, Cuba and the Second International is exporting revolution to the

remainder of Central America. Mexico and the United States will follow the fall of Central America.

By using surrogates and supplying satellites, the Soviet Union is conducting a low cost, low profile, low risk war which is eroding the U.S. power perch in the Caribbean and Central America. Should radicalization of Central America continue and masses of migrants move northward, the Republic could be destabilized. The Soviets would then win their ultimate objective of absolute security - global hegemony - without ever directly confronting the military might of the United States. To be a contender in the global game of geopolitics a nation must first of all be a survivor. The hour is late. Does the United States have the will to win World War III!

# THE DOCTRINE OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR

## IN LATIN AMERICA

by Frank Aker and Lewis A. Tambs

### Background Notes

#### *Spanish Inheritance*

1. Spanish culture, temperament and history have proven to be compatible with the *concept and style* of guerrilla warfare (guerrilla means "little war").
2. The first large scale example of rural guerrilla warfare in modern times was conducted by Spaniards in 1808-1813 against the French invaders.
3. Latin America has a very high percentage of young people in its population. There is too little industry in this agricultural area to provide needed employment of excess population and to develop a solid middle class. A potentially explosive situation exists without the stabilizing influence of the U.S. as a dependable trading partner and as a source of productive and profitable investments.

#### *Lenin's Legacy*

1. Lenin provided *political application* to guerrilla warfare. He developed a Communistic doctrine of revolutionary war that pits the dissatisfied lower class against the social and government structure that is allegedly abusing it. This has provided many Latin Americans the spark and fuel (excuse) to seize political power by illegitimate and coercive means.
2. Partisan warfare is the only safe, practical means of Communist expansion in this area of the world. It provides the Soviets with a low risk, low cost, low profile approach to the isolation of the U.S. at an extended range from the Russian motherland.

#### *Art and Science of Revolutionary War*

1. The Soviets have developed for Latin America an historically and currently successful plan of action for starting, waging and winning a war of National Liberation. This will eventually lead to hegemony of all of Latin America and compromise the U.S.'s ability to be a competing power in world affairs.
2. Moscow and Havana's blueprint (to be outlined) consists of four distinct parts or phases: (a) organization and preparation; (b) limited war of expansion; (c) conventional war and exploitation; (d) exporting and support of contiguous revolution.

### PHASE I: ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATION

(Note: already accomplished in all Meso-American and some South American countries.)

#### *Target Country Selection*

- 1 Underdeveloped countries are Soviet targets of opportunity since they may be in the economic phase of capital formation and, thus, have a few wealthy families, a small middle class and a large majority of marginal rural laborers. While it was once believed that the existence of a large middle class would preclude a revolutionary situation, the concrete cases of Uruguay and Argentina, especially the former where neither deprivation nor tyrant existed have dispelled this myth. Nevertheless, in Central America where the politics of envy of the *petit bourgeoisie* can be played against the well-to-do producers, the existence of large numbers of unemployed or underemployed agricultural laborers is important. Even in these cases, as Ernesto "Che" Guevara learned to his dismay in Bolivia, other factors such as race and nationalism may prove critical.
2. A choice of terrorist target is a nation which is ruled by one man, party, or single family. *Caudillismo* and *personalismo* combined with *continuismo* facilitate focusing. The charge of corruption is an excellent emotional propaganda tool and the revolution will have an easily identifiable reference point.
3. Most Central American and Caribbean countries have societies which are unable to keep up with the dynamic changes of the world. The society is unable to absorb change allowing for breakdown of norms or traditions leaving a discontent-disoriented youthful population. Youth can easily be manipulated by taking advantage of their inherent impatience and idealism through the use of abstract themes that have broad appeal. These themes need not be realistic or attainable, just emotional. Youth are willing to risk all they have, because they do not have much.



### *Initial Establishment: Stage 1*

#### **Leadership**

1. Soviet agents have identified known discontent opinion leaders and have sent them for training in U.S.S.R. for 2 - 4 years. They have learned how to form and use the political element (infrastructure) to run a revolutionary war. As long as the infrastructure survives—the revolution survives. To this end, numerous candidates are trained.

2. The Soviets have thoroughly analyzed the social class structure identifying grievances as a “cause.” The candidates are thoroughly trained to exploit the cause to secure support of factions and people.

3. Soviet emphasis is to develop an indigenous leadership capable of carrying the momentum of Revolution to full term. They must have independent skills to compile an intelligence base needed to formulate campaign plans and to support propaganda objectives and themes.

#### **Back to Homeland**

4. Leaders are sent back to their homeland and initially act independently to form their own competitive organizations. Then, as the cream rises to the top, various leaders will merge their organizations to form coalitions under the more successful leader.

5. First major effort is to win over the Catholic Church by whatever means. This is done by supporting the Church, it works with the poor, etc. To win the Church, they win many supporters.

6. Leaders are installed with the concept that this only is the beginning and that their ultimate purpose is to overthrow the U.S. These leaders are committed to a protracted war. They are indoctrinated to fight as long as it takes to win.

#### **Guerrilla Cadres**

1. Soviets have identified initial cadre members to be trained by seasoned guerrillas in other Latin American revolutions or in special camps located in Cuba, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. They learn physical conditioning, survival, political ideology and tactics. It is not necessary for the cadre members to be Communist, only that they be dedicated to the overthrow of the U.S.

2. Cadres return to coordinate with the leadership, establish a rural base, to recruit, train, equip and indoctrinate other guerrillas.

3. Individuals of extraordinary ability may rise to positions of leadership within the infrastructure or form their own infrastructure.

4. First actions—to infiltrate members into the policy machinery of mass organizations; news media, unions, schools, cooperatives, Church, armed forces, police and government. They start a systematic destabilization and misinformation campaign.

### *Developing Support: Stage 2*

1. Bases are established by each faction in inaccessible rural terrain to disperse assets—avoiding a single catastrophic blow. Terrain selected is contiguous with a country's border in or close to a revolution. Bases in contiguous countries are most valuable in Phase I to avoid government troop encirclement.

#### **Strategic Holdings**

2. Strategic holdings in a revolutionary war are not land or space—that is a conventional concept—it is the “hearts and minds of the people.” Maps should not show ground held by forces but areas held by people loyal to the revolutionary cause. Rural areas are sparsely populated receiving little direct government protection, assistance and communication. Rural areas will be more susceptible to supporting insurgents if they provide what the government does not.

The guerrilla units dispatch agitators to spread propaganda to immediate area to gain support—provide schools, medical centers, local security, agriculture assistance in return for food, medicine, recruits and information. Hence the close cooperation between insurgents and some international relief agencies.

The concept of dual government (legitimate and revolutionary) emerges.

3. Infiltrated members in urban areas initiate strikes, riots, sabotage, black markets, rumors and agitation of minorities to cause social and administrative disorder.

This initiative will keep government troops and police tied to urban areas. It is cheap to produce, but costly for government to prevent. Best way to purchase time to change attitude.

## **PHASE II: Limited War of Expansion**

### *Guerrilla Military Activity*

1. Basic assumption—a Latin American government cannot sustain a lengthy internal war financially, psychologically or politically.

The guerrillas must keep constant pressure by maintaining the initiative. Key to controlling initiative is knowledge of enemy's position, strength and intentions done by a solid intelligence system set up in Phase I and constantly being expanded to where every civilian can be considered an agent.

### **Scatter Forces**

2. Guerrillas scatter forces throughout the country and initiate disturbances and demoralizing attacks on supply lines, communications such as railroads and bridges. Weak army columns are ambushed. Hit-and-run raids are sudden, vicious and precise execution and rapid dispersal to not allow the government to reinforce, direct air and artillery fires, or isolate insurgents by using paratroops or helicopters. This places a strain upon the government conventional forces by a process of attrition both psychological and physical. Urban activity is stepped up by directly attacking the property and wealth of those in power. Banks are of particular importance both as symbols and as sources of funds.

3. The government, under pressure to maintain world image of stability (politically, militarily and economically), to receive foreign aid, and to have its trade and military alliances honored, will disperse troops to police the threatened areas. This causes government forces to be weak at all points. The guerrillas can concentrate their forces at the government's weak points, one by one; defeating the regular troops in detail, yet preserving their own strength.

4. Government forces will predictably intensify repression with road blocks, house searches, arrests of the innocent, closing streets. Police terror will become routine along with political repression.

### **Propaganda**

Guerrillas will make excellent propaganda use of this both on a local and worldwide level. To keep the time honored class privileges, the government power will change hands within the family, part, or even be taken over by the military. Government soldiers will begin to show signs of tiring, they will lose faith and decline in morale.

5. Insurgents will avoid direct confrontations while building a well-armed, mobile army, through capture of arms, recruitment and defection of government troops with his expertise.

### *Terrorism*

1. Should for some reason the guerrilla activities fail and/or the government takes steps to remove the cause, then the guerrillas will have no other choice but to seek power by terror and intimidation. This is done by committing atrocities not against the government, but against the people on whose behalf the insurrection is instigated.

It will make no difference to the local or worldwide press—they will still sympathize and call it a guerrilla action in a civil war.

2. Terrorism can never succeed militarily, only psychologically. It is usually given into by appeasement. This is accomplished by propaganda leading to a negative governmental political approach in which it is believed no defense is possible against terrorism. This leads to a nation's moral exhaustion and a predisposition to surrender.

### **Respond to Terrorism**

3. To respond to terrorism an arch-military conservatism develops. This is embodied in a blind adaptation of a European pattern of warfare of ponderous armor and static heavily fortified garrisons. The government leadership is oriented towards war of mobility and clearly formulated objectives of attack, a strategic approach in which armor is the chosen instrument. This will fail against the guerrilla turned terrorist and will result in an increased feeling of defeatism on the part of the military and ultimately fatalism. All the government needed to have done was change tactics and to be prepared for a protracted war. This military conservatism is expensive and will put more strain on the economy than it can stand.

4. Terrorist victory is near when the political element's defeatist attitude infiltrates the military arm. The first sign of this is when the government seeks to negotiate a settlement. This signals the army that the government no longer has confidence in its ability to win.

### *Demoralization and Dissatisfaction of the People with the Government*

1. Extensive propaganda campaigns. The people will judge what is promised by the rebels not what is provided, but the government must run on its record. As more territory is won over and absorbed, enough people will actively commit themselves to the revolution so that "home guards" can be formed. These local vigilante groups are not combat units, they serve as police and protect guerrilla areas. It is their job to discourage loyalists, obtain information, and oblige support and contributions.

#### **Back the Rebels**

In many cases, Church officials will back the rebel factions, having been won over by the propaganda that the rebels are dedicated to helping the poor.

2. A long internal war compromises foreign relations: no country or company wishes to invest in a risky area or deal with a toppling government. Many major families will begin leaving the country with their wealth.

3. A long war also causes dissention among the people because the government cannot keep order in guerrilla infested areas. Acts of terror and sabotage occur which make civilians lose confidence in the strength and authority of the government. War weariness and war frustration arises.

4. The government, by constantly increasing the troop strength to confront the guerrillas conventionally, will cause a labor drain and subsequent economic and political dislocation.

### **PHASE III: CONVENTIONAL WAR AND EXPLOITATION**

#### *Guerrilla Military Activity*

1. Equalization of manpower and equipment between insurgents and government troops.

Government troops are overextended and revert to defensive posture around fortified bases in a mistaken belief that they must hold territory.

2. Guerrilla army uses positional warfare to pin and hold regular field forces, while mobile units encircle and then destroy government units. The conventional battles will break the back of the government's army and the will to win will be exhausted.

3. Insurgent's final drive will be to capture the capital. This effectively cuts the head of the government snake and without it the rest will die.

#### *Guerrilla Political Activity*

1. Negotiations will be well publicized. The press is particularly fond of this type of media event—real or not. The international media will be used to consolidate and repeat the revolution's goals, frustrate the government, and influence world public opinion. The only concessions accepted are those that aid the insurgents. (Never negotiate with a Communist).

2. Coalition government—any sign of compromise will be a sign of weakness and appeasement leading to ultimate surrender.

### **PHASE IV: EXPORTING AND SUPPORTING OF CONTIGUOUS REVOLUTION**

#### *Revolutionary Puppet Government*

1. Soviet and Cuban "advisors" will take control of the new government's operations and military. This will leave a rubber stamp government of revolutionary leaders.

2. Internal security will be tightened with any and all opposition brutally disposed of. This organized terror will be coupled with a comprehensive program to direct every aspect of an individual's life—his work and life will be dictated—application of the six principles of retaining power.

#### *Next Target*

1. The recently revolutionized country is then obliged to render assistance to all other wars of National Liberation in the area.

2. Citizens of the newly conquered country will be told it is a source of comradeship, revolutionary ideals, and repayment, and that they must provide bases and training camps, troops, arms and ammunition.

3. The best next object will be a contiguous nation—Nicaragua, El Salvador, then Guatemala.



VITAL SEA LANES – CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

"KHAN, KREMLIN AND COMMISAR:  
FROM THE PAX MONGOLICA OF 1241 TO THE PAX SOVIETICA OF 1981"

by  
Lewis A. Tambs  
and  
Frank Aker  
for

Futurable  
Buenos Aires, Argentina

May 1981

Department of History  
Arizona State University  
Tempe, AZ 85281

Time: April 9, 1241. Place: Wahlstatt, near Leignitz, Silesia. Onward stormed the nimble horsemen of Prince Batu - grandson of Jenghiz Khan - and General Subadi. By dusk the Poles and Germans were in full flight westward to Austria and their commander, Duke Henry II of Silesia, lay dead on the field. The Mongols, masters of mobile, winter warfare, stood triumphant. Two days later another Tartar force surprised and crushed King Bela IV of Hungary on the plain of Mohi. Ahead, the road to the west lay open. Behind, to the east lay death and desolation; Breslau, battered; Cracow, devastated; Kiev, gutted; the Principalities of Muroum, Yaroslavl, Moscow and Kazan, ravaged. Russia, here-to-fore an intimate part of Western Europe, was cut off from Christendom by the Mongol onslaught. An Iron Curtain rang down over Eastern Europe.

In 1981, sevenhundred and forty years after the Tartar triumph at Wahlstatt the West confronts curiously, corresponding conditions. For Batu's Tartar tribesmen would settle on the Volga, take the title of the Golden Horde, and subjugate the Slavs for over two centuries. For the Russians had failed to learn the lesson of 1223 when they were defeated by the forces of the Great Khan - "Emperor within the Seas" - at Kalka River. Continued disunity, in the face of a formidable foe, contributed to the demise of 'Old Russia.' Now, in 1241, with Eastern Europe prostrate, it was the turn of the West to tremble. But Western Europe was torn between Latin and Greek, French and German, Papacy and Empire, Scandinavian and Slav, ecclesiastical and secular, spiritual and temporal, and failed to form a united front for its own survival. Fortunately, the Mongols, after a summer interlude on the rich grasslands of Hungary, withdrew eastward to the Lower Volga, subjugating Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria en route. News of the death of the Kahan at the capital of Kara Korum in far off Mongolia and the impending struggle for power, not the martial array of an awake and resolute Western Europe, probably

triggered the retreat. Fate, not fortitude, had spared Christendom.

The horsemen turned eastward. But, the imprint of Tartar hooves remained stamped on the soil and soul of Mother Russia. For the Golden Horde held Moscow in subjugation for over two centuries, and while the Chinese, Indians, Persians and Arabs eventually absorbed their Tartar conquerors, the Russians were mongolized.

Tribute collection and choke point control are typical Tartarian techniques. Heirs of the Khans who applied these tactics to the interior of Eur-Asia, Soviet Russia aspires to strangle the western industrial democracies by seizing the two treasure houses of the world - the petroleum laden Middle East and the mineral rich region of Southern Africa.

The danger for the West is defeat not destruction. Acting under the protective parasol of nuclear superiority, Soviet Russia in a massive Mongol Sweep is pinning the military might of NATO in Western Europe while outflanking the allies by moving into the Middle East and Southern Africa. Simultaneously the modern Mongols seek to encircle the People's Republic of China and interdict the maritime and aerial choke points of the globe upon which the Western industrialized nations depend.

Tribute collection and caravan choke point control were Mongol methods. Formidable only because of their military power, they lived by levying tribute, not by peaceful productivity. Masters of mobility and deceit the Mongols conquered the caravan routes and commercial cross roads of Inner Eur-Asia which connected the advanced societies on the coasts of the continent.

Tartarian tactics swept almost all before the onrushing horde. Feigned rout, encirclement and flanking movements were standard maneuvers; cunning, intrigue and treachery, customary. Mobility, combined with the ability to deal with one foe at a time by radiating out of Central Asia before opponents

could combine were common. The employment of trade missions and diplomatic envoys as spies, rumormongers and propagandists which prepared the path of conquest through psychological warfare were traditional Tartarian techniques. Eventually establishing a Pax Mongolica, which stretched from the China Sea to the Indian Ocean and on to the Mediterranean and Adriatic, the Khans, supported by grateful merchants who were granted monopolies and guaranteed secure trade routes, sought absolute security - global hegemony.

The political domination of Russia by the Mongols would only last until 1452, when Moscow signaled its assumption of the role of successor to the Golden Horde by founding a vassal Tartarian principedom in Kasimov.

The most enduring imprint of the Mongolian conquest was on the political thought of the Russian people. The Tartar state was built upon the principle of unquestioning submission of the individual to the group, first to the clan, and through the clan to the whole state. This hive principle was thoroughly impressed upon the Russian populace and it led to a system of universal service to the state. The Mongolians introduced a new concept of the power of the Prince. The Khan was absolute and autocratic. Submission was unqualified. The Dukes of Moscow, as successors to the Khans, considered their people completely subject to their will. Lands under their rule were their sole property and were devoted to the interests of the state.

The period of Tartarian domination of Russia coincided with the rise of Muscovite power. The princes of Moscow overcame their neighbors and rivals, not by the vigor with which they had attacked the Mongol invaders, but by their success in courting the Khan's favor. Muscovite princes in the fourteenth century obtained the aid of the Tartarian armies against their Russian rivals, serving themselves as tax-gathers and police agents for the Khans. Aquisition of this lucrative, but debasing, monopoly enabled



Ivan Kalita (1325-1341) to overtake all his neighbors and rivals and establish a new central Russian principality at the juncture between the steepe and forest on the high ground between the headwaters of the Volga, Don and Dneper. Radiating east, south, west and north, Ivan Kalita initiated an advance under the shadow of Tartarian power which gained even more impetus with the moving of the Metropolitan of the Russian Church to Moscow, thus strengthening the Grand Prince's pretensions to primacy in both spiritual and temporal affairs.

Ivan the Great (1462-1505) further amplified Moscow's mystical mission. He took the title of Tsar (Ceasar) and assumed the mantle of the Byzantine emperors as well as Constantinople's claim as Protector of Orthodox Christianity. The theme "Of Romes there have been three (Rome, Constantinople and Moscow), a fourth there will never be," would reverberate down the corridors of the Kremlin which Ivan constructed. Religion - Orthodox under the Tsars and Marxist-Leninist under the Soviets - would be wielded as a weapon in foreign policy to win national objectives as well as an instrument of internal order to forge diverse peoples and cultures into one through ideology. Thus, as the Tartarian threat receded, a highly centralized, authoritarian society based on state capitalism and ideological unity began to evolve and expand from where the forest met the steepe at Muscovy.

The oceans were their objective. Like their predatory predecessors, Atila, Jenghiz Khan, Batu, Ulagu, Timur the Limper and Babar who had led their legions around the oceanic edge of Eur-Asia, the Russians struck out for the sea. The interior of Eur-Asia, like an inland ocean, offered no natural obstacles to expansion. Neither did nature provide protection. The Ural Mountains moved from south to north, but were low and easily traversed. Beyond, in Siberia, the ranges ran east and west cutting corridors like the Kansu pointing directly away or toward Muscovy. The rest was open steepe,

flat forest or taiga and tundra. Westward, it was the same, the Polish plains and the Baltic basin. Southward rose the Mongolian and Turkistan Uplands - easily reached, but difficult to breach, and the Caspian and Black Seas, both at the end of the three river roads - Volga, Don and Dneper running directly downriver from Moscow; while to the north lay the immobilized ocean of the Arctic, open only to year around exit and entrance by way of the White Sea.

Moscow's most convenient corridors for expansion lay east and west. Moreover, only space could provide the protection not endowed by nature. Russia, if weak, would, merely serve as a parade ground for alien armies. Vast distances and military might were the only defenses. Fear of oriental onslaught, Ottoman invasion and Polish or German penetration burned deep in Moscow's memory. Moreover, these three threats from the east, south and west also offered civilization, trade and technology. They lured as well as repelled. They also opened on the ocean.

Warm water beckoned. Ever seeking the sea, the Muscovites under Ivan Kalita, Ivan the Great and their successors, Ivan the Terrible (1533-1584), along with Romanovs (1613-1917) such as Peter the Great (1689-1725), Catherine the Great (1762-1796), Alexander II (1855-1881), and Alexander III (1881-1894) pushed eastward past the Urals through Siberia and on to the Pacific (1637), southward down the river roads to the Caspian and Black Seas, westward to the Baltic and northward to the Arctic. Within five centuries after Ivan Kalita the Russians had occupied almost all of inner Asia and established a trans-continental empire stretching from sea to sea.

Tsarist strategy in Inner Asia imitated the Tartars. Even tartarian tactics - winter warfare, mobility (speed and flexibility) through the use of completely mounted armies, night attacks and living off the land - prevailed until Peter the Great who introduced European military models. Russia,

radiating from nuclear Moscow, thus, succeeded in conquering the caravan choke points and contacting the advanced societies which offered trade and technology. Moved by its mission the Third Rome with its tremendous population and vast area would increasingly exert a major influence on world affairs.

Objectives did not deviate after the October Revolution of 1917. The urge to warm water went on. The desire to dominate the coastal civilizations of the continent continued. Communism replaced Orthodoxy as the cover for interventionism and imperialism. Internally, the Bolshevik revolution revitalized the centralized, autocratic political system which had decayed under the later Romanovs. Socialism signified the recapture by the government of the economic system which had started to slip toward private entrepreneurs. Thus, Nicolai Lenin (1917-1924) and Joseph Stalin (1926-1953) loom as a later day Ivan Kalita and Ivan the Great who re-established the old order - a totalitarian, centralized system of state capitalism bound together by ideological unity and impelled to expand by ancient impulses inherited from Tartarian traditions. Muscovite, Romanov and Marxist Russia pursued the same policies; protection through the acquisition of space; control of the commercial caravan routes running through Eur-Asia which, until the age of sail, connected the coastal cultures; and, since 1959, domination of the exterior Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and Aerial Skyways of Transport and Resupply (ASTAR) which serve the same purpose; and, above all containment or envelopment of the eternal threat out of the orient. So both tsar and commissar strove for sovereignty in inner Eur-Asia (Heartland), suzerainty by satellization or neutralization (Finlandization) of the coastal crescent (Rimland) including China, or isolation of China by envelopment. Thus, the USSR with its emphasis on military superiority, mobility and movement abetted

by diplomatic missions dedicated to subversion and psychological warfare is a continuum of the Mongol conquest and a rational replacement for the Golden Horde.

The cultural impact of the Mongol conquest on the Russian people - the dominant group, although a minority, in the USSR - is undeniable. This Tartar influence extended, in addition to ingrained political and strategic concepts, to techniques of subversion and submission.

An essential element of Mongol planning was its intelligence system. Operational plans were based on study and evaluation of amazingly complete and accurate information. The Mongol intelligence network spread throughout Europe and Asia; its thoroughness excelled all others of the Middle Ages. Spies generally operated under the guise of merchants or traders. In this, they found the Venetians quite willing to sacrifice the interests of Christian Europe in order to gain an advantage over their great trading rivals, the Genoese. In return for Mongol help in ousting the Genoese trade centers in the Crimea, the Venetians acted as part of the espionage service of the Mongols.

Regarding the Russians, the KGB is the world wide intelligence gathering organ of the Russian power elite. Although no specific information is available, it would follow that certain multi-international corporations might be willing to act as the Venetians to obtain monopolistic trade advantages and access to cheap, slave labor. A peaceful, profitable world, so desired by some, under a Pax Sovietica, would in reality be a tyrannical, tribute exacting Pax Mongolica.

The real war is for the minds of men. Propaganda is a weapon. The Mongols were particularly adept at psychological warfare. Tales of their ruthlessness, barbarity, and slaughter of recalcitrant foes were widely disseminated in a deliberate propaganda campaign to discourage resistance

by the next intended victim. The aim was to bring about surrender by paralyzing resistance through terror. There was considerable truth in this "carrot and stick" propaganda approach. Those who resisted were annihilated but the Mongols were equally most solicitous in their treatment of any foe who gave evidence of willingness to cooperate, particularly those who had skills of use. Today we see a unique world-wide effort by the USSR to subvert the nations of the globe with the threat of military pressure by exploiting the acts of brutality of the indigenous governments. This has lead the way for "national armies of revolution." Subversion has become a media event with the press carrying unwittingly the banner of Communism.

Deception is similar to both Mongol and Russian military nomenclature. The Mongols used any means to gain military and political ends. The word "horde" instead of army denoted a vast number - in reality the Mongol army was based on quality not quantity. In Russian the word "army" referres to a western equivalent of a corps of 2 - 3 divisions.

The exercise of hegemony over vassal states is common to both the Khans and the Kremlin. The Mongols, although small in number, positioned their capital in areas of strategic importance. They would collect tribute (usually 10% of everything) from vassal states. In return the vassal states were allowed to run their own affairs (satillitization and Finlandization). The Russians control many nations from which they extract food and consumer goods to supply their own people. Their control is indirect military clout with most nations having small Russian or Russian backed garrisons for visibility sake. Each country has its own government and allowed to pursue national objectives as long as it turns-to when the Russians say. Increasingly obvious is the taking of strategic land, air and water choke points of the world to extend its influence to other countries either directly or through

isolation such as in China, and Southern Africa and U.S.

Tartar and Russian brutality are legendary. The Mongols would kill entire populations if they did not surrender upon demand: would destroy armies - not just defeat them. Thus, the conquered territories were totally safe. To keep order, they would make periodic sweeps through vassal states and kill, loot and burn for no other reason than to remind the states who is in charge. This produced a paralyzing effect due to terror. In order to expand Russian populated lands the USSR murdered between 18 and 30 million non-Russians in surrounding territories from 1917. To remind the people who was in charge, Stalin had purges periodically. Today the KGB is continually active. In war, the Russians are not known for their mercy and use strategy to encircle and destroy a foe.

Neither the Mongol nor Russian empires are noted for their productivity. The Mongols were warriors and tax collectors - little or no agriculture or other production. The same is true for the Russians. Production is only a fraction of population and resource availability. The "curse" of Communism is, of course, the inability to grow enough food. The Soviets must rely, therefore on a mighty war machine so they can, in Tartar fashion, collect tribute in the form of food, technology and industrial goods from the former Free World. Hence, both the Mongols and the Russians have attained global power by military prowess, not productivity.

The Khans employed the churches as instruments of submission. The Mongols supported and protected the churches and religion flourished. In return, the church preached acquiescence to Tartar domination. The Soviets have also employed the churches as instruments of subversion in expanding revolutionary warfare. Latin America is the most obvious example where both the Catholic and Protestant Churches have aided the leftists by preaching

Liberation Theology. As the Soviet star rises some churches are seeking the protection of the Presidium. Rome, having learned during the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 that the alliance between American power and Catholic politics which saved Western Europe after World War II was ending, prepared to go underground and accommodate to the modern Mongols with Vatican II. Hence, Liberation Theology, which is designed to act as buffer between the Church and the Communists. Marxist-Leninism has, however, rarely succeeded unless imposed by force or the threat of force, and here again there is a striking similarity between Mongol military techniques and the tactics of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Red Army Marshal M. Tuckhachevsky reintroduced Tartarian tactics. Tuckhachevsky, hero of the Civil and Polish Wars of 1918-1920, suppressor of the Kronstat Rebellion of 1921 and re-organizer of the Red Army in 1935-36, although liquidated by Stalin in 1937, left an indelible mark on the modern Soviet military mind. Dual command, ideological and military, like Prince Batu and General Subadi at Wahlstatt in 1241, was reinstated. For a Communist Party commissar oversees the officers handling the troops. In Mongol and Tsarist times the emperor retained supreme military command, a position now held by the Chairman of the Presidium who also heads the Defense Council. The Tartars, moreover, initiated training of their youth for combat at the age of three or four years. Soviet primary schools begin preparing the students for eventual induction as Pioneers. This comparable command and training structure is implemented by detailed General Staff planning.

The modus operandi of the Mongol and Soviet staff systems are similar. The strategy, tactics and logistics for every Tartar campaign was prepared in painstaking detail in advance to attain an objective defined by the Khan or Prince. In Soviet Russia, the military is relegated to the role of

developing a strategy that guarantees victory. The generals are responsible for planning and do so in great detail, many times to the extent of thwarting individual initiative. Another tartarian technique is to pre-test the enemy, such as the great raid into Russia by Jenghiz Khan in 1223 which resulted in the Russian defeat at Kalka River. These extensive reconnaissances in force gathered information about foes, weapons, tactics and strength prior to the actual invasions of China, Russia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The Russians tend also to test an adversary's strength on foreign battlefields. For example, the Nazis in Spain prior to World War II, and the United States in Korea, Indo-China and in the various Arab-Israeli conflicts. The current proving ground in preparation for the Final Offensive of 1984-1985 is Afganistan, for the Afgans represent the U.S. in respect to war experience - independent small unit action and capabilities. Pre-testing of potential hostile forces, aided by intelligence, espionage and psychological warfare, enabled both the Khans and the Communists to employ their hordes in the most favorable fashion and to utilize one of their major advantages - mobility.

Speed and flexibility were the hallmarks of Mongol military movements. All of the horde was mounted. Approach marches were screened by an advance guard. These forward forces, though light on logistics and firepower, permitted the main body to mass, achieve local superiority, and break through. This gave the prince and field commander the geographical advantage of choosing the ground, the psychological superiority of surprise and the ability to concentrate the mass at the critical point. These three techniques - ground, surprise and local superiority - have been adopted by the Soviet General Staff through the use of rapid road march and deployment of vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC) which follow a lightly armed, flexible advance echelon. This mode is enhanced by the organization of Soviet ground forces which are smaller and lighter than Western counterpart



units and are assigned about one half of NATO frontage. Mongol mobility models are also reflected in Russian battlefield tactics.

The classic Mongol Sweep calls for holding the enemy in front by direct assault while enveloping the adversary by a flanking attack: a frontal attack to fix and a flanking sweep to enfold. Once in the rear, Tartar cavalry would strike deep, by-passing strong points for the siege train to reduce, while riding down enemy infantrymen who tended to break when outflanked. If the enemy held, then Mongols in front would feign retreat and as the adversary stormed forward, ambush the then uncoordinated main body. All of these tactics - mobility, sweep, envelopment and ambush - were ill suited for forested areas. Hence, the Tartars, like the Russians, prefer open ground and vast plains for mass movements. The Russians relearned the dangers of forested terrain in the disastrous Winter War with Finland of 1939-1940. Since 1940, then, the Soviets, except for partisan operations, have adhered to open ground offensives.

Wave attacks to pin, hold or even break through are common to the twin traditions. The Mongols moved forward with two lines of heavy cavalry backed by three ranks of light cavalry. The light horse delivered well-aimed javelin and arrow attacks prior to the charge of the heavy horse. Similarly, Soviet ground doctrine projects two echelons of assault backed by artillery. Night attacks are not unusual. Both Tartars and Russians believe in a "twenty-four hour battlefield." Be it in the assault or marching and massing, the use of darkness for cover is common, but it is in the winter offensive that the clearest continuum of Mongol methods emerges.

The Mongols found that winter enhanced their mobility especially in crossing the frozen, deep flowing rivers of Eur-Asia. Winter warfare, especially against the West which tended to hole up during the cold months,

gave the nomads increased opportunity for surprise. This was one of the major Mongol innovations, since they, like the Soviets, did not invent any new weapons, but merely, borrowed, stole or bought these systems from the more advanced societies - China, India, Persia, or Western Europe, and recently, the United States - with whom they came in contact and eventually conquered.


Time: April 9, 1241. Place: Wahlstatt, near Leignitz, Silesia.

Onward stormed the nimble horsemen of Prince Batu - grandson of Jenghiz Khan-and General Subadi. By dusk the Poles and Germans were in full flight westward to Austria and their commander, Duke Henry II of Silesia, lay dead on the field. The Mongols, masters of mobile, winter warfare, stood triumphant. Two days later another Tartar force surprised and crushed King Bela IV of Hungary on the plain of Mohi. Ahead, the road to the west lay open. But, the West, even in the face of this formidable foe, failed to unite. Only the death of the Great Khan in far-off Kara Korum triggered the withdrawal of the horde. Now, sevenhundred and forty years after the Tartar triumph at Wahlstatt the modern Mongols stand in Silesia.

The Soviet Union, in the tartarian tradition, seeks absolute security - global hegemony. Impelled by the Three Rome Theory and true to their Mongol motherland with its mission of universal empire, Russia, having subjected numerous nationalities in Eur-Asia to satellite status and seized the caravan crossroads, is reaching out to the warm waters of the world striving to seize the choke points of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and Aerial Skyways of Transport and Resupply (ASTAR) which are vital to the Western industrialized democracies. Simultaneously, the Soviets tighten their pincers of the PRC and in a grand Mongol Sweep pin NATO in Europe while moving into the two oil and ore treasure houses of the world in the Middle East and Southern Africa.




Tribute collection is the objective. Finlandization is the name and Ostpolitik has all but brought West Germany into vassal state status. For the Soviet Union, a non productive society with its super power status resting on military might alone, needs the capital, technology, food and industrial plant of the western democracies to survive, specifically the Rhur and the agricultural heartland of the United States. But the Western Alliance is in disarray, torn by fear, greed and failure of faith. The time is 1981. The place is Wahlstatt. The Mongols are moving in Silesia.

# The Mongol Empire






## GROWTH OF RUSSIA IN EUROPE TO 1725


-  MOSCOVY IN 1480
-  RUSSIA IN 1689
-  ACQUISITIONS OF PETER THE GREAT



# SOVIET MILITARY DISTRICTS AND GROUPS OF FORCES







U.S.S.R.

BLACK SEA

TURKEY

SYRIA

CASPIAN SEA

IRAQ

IRAN

AFGHANISTAN

MONGOLIAN PEOPLES  
REPUBLIC

N. KOREA

S. KOREA

JAPAN

EGYPT

CHINA

RED  
SEA

SAUDI  
ARABIA

PAKISTAN

HAT CHINA

YEMEN

S. YEMEN

INDIA

BURMA

LAOS

N. VIETNAM

PHILIPPINES

ARABIAN SEA

**SOVIET ENCIRCLEMENT  
OF THE  
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

BAY OF BENGAL

THAILAND

S. VIETNAM

CAMBODIA




CHINA SEA




# THE WORLD'S FOURTEEN MARITIME CHOKES

FIVE SEAS, SEVEN PASSAGE POINTS AND TWO INTER-OCEAN CANALS




-  PASSAGE POINTS
-  INTER-OCEAN CANALS
-  SEAS



THE WORLD AS SEEN FROM MOSCOW

# WORLD OIL CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION



CONSUMPTION  
PRODUCTION  
MOVEMENT (BY VOLUME)



The  
Conservative  
Caucus, Inc.



National Headquarters 450 Maple Avenue East, Vienna, Virginia 22180 (703) 893-1550

*Morton Blackwell*

May 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FROM HOWARD PHILLIPS *HP*

SUBJECT: Statement of Principles - Central America Strategy

Enclosed is Dave Sullivan's draft of a Statement of Principles and possible newspaper ad following up on our discussion this morning.

Any proposed modifications, deletions, substitutions, or addendums should be directed to me in writing in care of The Conservative Caucus, 450 Maple Avenue East, Vienna, Virginia 22180.

I any event, I would appreciate having any alternative language or other suggestions from you no later than our meeting this coming Tuesday at 7:30 a.m. Thank you.

HP:jbr

Enclosure

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An Open Letter To President Reagan: Central America Can Not Be Another Viet Nam, and We Must Standup to Soviet Nuclear Blackmail

Dear President Reagan:

Freedom in the Americas is indeed in grave peril. American democracy and liberty are in jeopardy. Bolstering the forces of freedom and Christianity now pitted in mortal combat with Godless Marxist revolutionaries in Central America is urgently required. But the Reagan Administration is not making its best case for countering revolution in Central America.

The Soviet Union has imposed the Brezhnev Doctrine upon Fidel Castro's Communist regime in Cuba, and it probably has already been imposed on Communist Nicaragua. Under the Brezhnev Doctrine, once any Communist regime seizes power, it will be maintained and supported in power by Soviet armed force as in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Yet Soviet imperialist intrusion as a permanent source of conflict in the Western Hemisphere is contrary to a fundamental principle of American foreign policy---the Monroe Doctrine.

Moreover, Senator Symms' Congressional reaffirmation in 1982 of the 1962 Congressional resolution on Cuba is also contradicted by Soviet and Cuban military intrusion into the Caribbean and Central America.

The Symms Amendment, identical to the 1962 Cuba resolution, were both passed by overwhelming Congressional majorities and are the law of the land on U.S. policy toward Central America. They state that: The U.S. will oppose Soviet-Cuban subversion and aggression in the Western Hemisphere, and that the U.S. will oppose the establishment of a Soviet military base in Cuba, by force if necessary.

Yet you, President Reagan, have explicitly ruled out the use of American troops in Central America. At the same time, you stated that vital U.S. national security interests are at stake in Central America.

Mr. President, your position is not consistent with the law of the land on U.S. policy toward Cuba and Central America. As a matter of law and good policy, the U.S. can not explicitly rule out the use of force in upholding the Monroe Doctrine, and opposing Soviet-Cuban subversion and aggression. Moreover, why should our enemies be allowed the certainty that we will not use force to oppose their aggression?

Mr. President, you also have mentioned in recent speeches the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and Soviet military activity in Cuba. But in May 1982, you and three other top Reagan

Administration officials explicitly stated that the Soviets had violated the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement ending the Cuban Missile Crisis. Under this agreement, the Soviets were required to halt the further introduction of and offensive weapons such as nuclear missiles, light bombers, and troops into Cuba. But the Soviets have deployed intercontinental Bear bombers, fighter-bombers (both of which can deliver nuclear weapons), nuclear missile-carrying submarines, and a nuclear weapons storage facility to Cuba. The Soviets even have a Combat Brigade in Cuba whose mission includes guarding nuclear warheads. Given the acknowledged fact that the U.S. can not rule out the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba, all the indications that they are already secretly there are persuasive. And there also are reports of a Soviet Biological Warfare storage and training facility in Cuba. Thus it is clear that your May 1982 accusation of Soviet violation of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement is well founded.

Soviet leaders have engaged in four threats to openly deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba. The late Soviet President Brezhnev himself made such a threat last year, and since then three other Soviet spokesmen have threatened to openly deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba.

It is significant that these Soviet nuclear blackmail threats came after your accusation of Soviet violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement. In fact, the timing of the Soviet nuclear blackmail threats makes them all the more provocative, because they blew in the face of your accusation of probable Soviet covert deployment of nuclear weapons in Cuba.

It is also significant that your recent references to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and to Soviet military activity in Cuba did not include a restatement of the facts regarding Soviet strategic activity in Cuba, or a reaffirmation of your accusation of Soviet violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement.

Hence it is possible to perceive that the U.S. has so far knuckled under to Soviet nuclear blackmail threats, and is now afraid to even mention either the Soviet strategic delivery vehicles in Cuba or the Soviet violation of the very agreement which brought the world back from the brink of the worst nuclear crisis in history.

Against this background, the U.S. has also ruled out the use of force in Central America, at the very time that force is mandated by law. Thus the U.S. seems to be paralyzed by Soviet nuclear blackmail, and is unable to do what is necessary to thwart revolution in Central America out of fear of Soviet nuclear blackmail. Now we can see the true

Page 3

purpose of Soviet strategic superiority---to checkmate the U.S. military capability at all levels, thereby paralyzing America until the ultimate triumph of the revolution. Even the Reagan Administration is showing signs that all it is capable of is appeasement and half-measures.

With deep respect and warm personal regards,

The Conservative Caucus