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
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BRIEFING
FOR
THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON
CENTRAL AMERICA



(The "Kissinger Commission.")

by
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Department of State
Washington, D.C.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
INTERESTS IN THE
CARIBBEAN BASIN

----- The situation today, the implications for the United States, and how we
got there. -----

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U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS
IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

Thomas Jefferson was the first of our founding fathers to recognize the strategic importance of the Caribbean Basin when he observed that whoever controlled the island of Cuba controlled all shipping bound for, or leaving New Orleans. Jefferson taught law to James Monroe at William and Mary and became a great influence over his thinking. That influence and Monroe's diplomatic experience in Great Britain, France and Spain led to the successful Louisiana Purchase and broadened his horizons.

President James Monroe's December 1823 message to Congress extended a mantle of security for the new independent states in the Americas which our military strength was ill prepared to provide. Only forty years had passed since the signing of the Treaty of Paris and recognition of United States independence and now this young nation was telling the world, that the U.S. would oppose, "(1) any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American States under any guise, and (2) the acquisition in any manner of control of additional territory in the western hemisphere by any non-American power." Certainly it did not imply, or countenance, a policy of aggression. It does not infringe upon the independence and sovereignty of other American States.

President Monroe's concern was real. Czarist imperialism was moving southward from Alaska and operating fishing fleets from what are now the states of Washington and California. There were reports that Spain was seriously considering reconquering lost territories from the nations which so recently had won their independence throughout all Latin America.

Over the years there were several efforts to achieve greater cooperation and security through interdependent action. In 1947 the Rio Treaty was

approved, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This mutual security treaty predates the NATO treaty by three years and stipulates that an attack on one government will be considered as an attack on all, requiring collective resistance. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1935, during the early efforts of the Pan American nations to provide security for the hemisphere expressed the view that these collective efforts had made the Monroe Doctrine a "joint concern of all the American republics."

As the threat of international Communism increased in the post-war era, the Inter-American system responded, first with the Caracas Declaration of Solidarity of 1954, which condemns in words reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine, "The activities of the international Communist movement as constituting intervention in American affairs . . . The domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international Communist movement extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States . . ."

Later, Western Hemisphere allies passed the Declaration of San Jose in 1960. Point two of this document rejects, "The attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers to make use of the political, economic, or social situation of any American State, inasmuch as that attempt is capable of destroying hemispheric unity and endangering the peace and security of the hemisphere."

There are those who say that the Rio Treaty was designed to be used to resist extra-continental armed aggression and is not applicable to today's form of terrorism, infiltration and subversion. It would be well to note that during the Dominican Republic crisis the Rio Treaty was invoked and effectively supported. Brazil played a particularly strong leadership role.

Both the before mentioned Caracas and San Jose declarations specifically address international communism as a threat to hemispheric unity.

1959 and 1962 became critical bench marks for the Western Hemisphere. Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba and then stated to a shocked America that he had been a communist and would remain one. 1962 was the watershed year however, when President Kennedy faced down the Soviet's Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Soviets withdrew their offensive weapons systems. The missiles and the IL-28s bombers came out. But Kennedy promised the Soviets not to invade Cuba and to restrain Latin American countries from overthrowing Castro.

This seemed like a victory at the time but when the euphoria wore off Americans discovered we had a communist country ninety miles off our shores and a flood of refugees. Now there was a giant crack in the Monroe Doctrine and the Rio Treaty and as events later proved, the Soviets had a foot hold in the Western Hemisphere. (During the Cuban missile crisis quarantine both Argentina and Brazil deployed naval ships towards the Caribbean to assist United States efforts.)

Looked at strategically - the United States was not concerned. U.S. military did not look at Cuba as any military threat. The missile and bombers were gone and if needs be the developing military power of Cuba could be knocked out by U.S. military forces overnight. The United States had other priorities in the world. All of Latin America was a backwater. Yes trade was important, but there was no threat to the United States coming from the region.

Unfortunately this was not true for Latin America. Though Cuba was ostracized by the Organization of American States Castro started his campaign of terrorism, infiltration, and subversion. He exported revolution, he

trained dissident leaders and provided the core discipline and headquarters for communist activities throughout the hemisphere. The United States military provided training in counter-insurgency to grapple with the new threat. The CIA assisted friendly countries in intelligence operations. But the threat was subtle, it undermined local institutions, ate away from within and could not be pinned down as "external aggression," coming from Cuba. The aggression was always internally instigated, or so interpreted and thus a civil problem, a "civil war." When one country had problems, other countries looked on sympathetically. They might help . . . but there were always "root" causes derived from internal problems, self created. The countries had not responded to necessary change. It didn't seem to matter to those observers that the situations did not always fit the mold. Not all the countries were run by military leaders. Some countries had long democratic traditions and dedication to social reforms. Uruguay, "the Switzerland of South America" fought to survive a dirty, internal fight. Long a democracy it was always identified as an example to other countries longing for democracy.

The Organization of American States struggled with the problems. It seemed that almost all the countries could agree on just two things, the right of "self determination," and "non-interference" by other countries in internal affairs.

Two factors have worked against the United States and its Rio Treaty allies in taking any active, collective role. One, the United States has not believed its security interests have been threatened, and collectively within the Organization of American States, each country feels a certain vulnerability from its neighbors so cloaks itself with the two fundamental principles of "self determination" and "non-interference" in internal affairs.

As always when a problem is not effectively resolved it comes back to haunt you. The Cuban problem won't go away. The Soviets, always adroit chess players, probe U.S. weaknesses. Though Cuba is a financial drain receiving an annual subsidy of \$4 Billion from the Soviets it has played its role effectively. Not only has Cuba 40 thousand troops in Angola and Ethiopia supporting Soviet expansionism but Cuba has also served as the center for Soviet ambitions in the Western Hemisphere. From Cuba the Soviet Union is establishing its base of operations for ship and submarine force projection, intelligence collection, espionage, and communications networks.

Each time the U.S. military expressed concern to the Soviets over possible violations of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, based on the introduction of "offensive weapons systems," the U.S. rationalized the Soviet's response and accepted it. No situation is ever clear cut . . . or rarely so . . . and the "smoking gun" situation eluded us. So the United States accepted the presence of Soviet submarine facilities, then the introduction of MIG - 23 fighters, some models being fighter bombers and having a greater capability than the IL-28 bombers which President Kennedy had insisted be removed in 1962. Now there is a Soviet brigade of 3,000 men in Cuba and 2,500 Soviet military advisors. Soviet deployment of TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft to Cuba is now so frequent that deployments are back to back. Recently an Anti-submarine warfare version of the Bear bomber has started to operate from Cuban bases, the TU-142, which has operable bomb bays and is capable of carrying the heaviest Soviet air-to-surface supersonic, nuclear armed missiles. The Soviet presence in the hemisphere is an established fact. In the last ten years the Soviet blue water navy has increased its presence in the Caribbean and South Atlantic by 1300% now reaching 2600 ship days. The Soviet navy operated a task force in the

Caribbean from November 1982 through February 1983 cruising also in the Gulf of Mexico off New Orleans.

Meanwhile Soviet military supplies to Cuba have been stepped up to the highest levels since the Cuban missile crisis. In 1981 66,000 metric tons of military equipment were delivered to Cuba and in 1982, 68,000 metric tons. (The average weight of a MIG-23 fighter aircraft is 14.29 metric tons. If the 68,000 metric tons only represented the shipment of MIG-23s to Cuba they would total over 4,700 aircraft.) These are, on the whole, modern, effective armaments which fulfill basic objectives providing air defense capabilities and more recently the ability to control sea lines of communication. One would expect the Soviet Union to provide Cuba with equipment for its own defense but now Cuban acquisitions include 1 Koni-class frigate, 2 foxtrot attack submarines and 50 torpedo and cruise missile attack boats (including the modern Turya torpedo boat). Their MIG-23 fighter strength totals three squadrons and an overall combat capability of over 200 MIG fighters. Ninety helicopters (including MI-24 HIND attack helicopters) provide an effective attack, or offensive capability. Their 650 armored tanks add to their own internal security and defense. Their GOA surface-to-air missiles provide effective defense to 50,000 feet. Recent operational training with their newly acquired amphibious assault ships raises additional concerns of future projections of Cuban power in the Caribbean Basin.

But why is all this such a concern? Is not this effort puny when measured against U.S. military capabilities? Before answering that question, let us look at other areas in the region. Maurice Bishop of Grenada is firmly in the communist camp. He openly expressed his revolutionary ardor in Managua, Nicaragua in 1980 during Sandinista, one year later, victory celebrations attended by Fidel Castro and other Communist supporters. Bishop

proclaimed that soon there would be more revolutionary countries such as El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.

The new 10,000 foot runway in Grenada will be a useful stopover for long overwater flights of bombers, reconnaissance and fighters of Soviet and Cuban flags. The Soviet Ambassador, a four star general who served in Argentina during the height of their guerrilla terrorism identifies Soviet emphasis of this strategic plum. The country sits astride the strategic waterways entering the inland sea of the Caribbean. Nearby, on the South American continent, two countries are now in communist hands. One is Guyana and the other Suriname. Though lightly populated with low per capita incomes they play roles in Soviet plans for the Western Hemisphere. Guyana is rich in bauxite, the aluminum ore. Its rice production is capable of feeding scores of Caribbean nations.

I have seen aerial photography taken by a foreign country of Guyana's borders with Brazil and Venezuela. There are literally scores of small airfields in the Essequibo area, many of them asphalted. But though a number can be tied to mineral and oil exploration and other airfields provide access to private holdings of individuals and corporations, there are others with military barracks and training facilities interconnected with microwave telecommunications and extensive petroleum storage facilities. The big surprise are the number of hard surface runways over 6 to 8,000 feet long. These are at least ten. While the smaller ones will provide access to light aircraft and small cargo and troop carrying aircraft, the 8,000 foot long runways will take most jet fighters, commercial aircraft and long range jet bombers and transports. Incidentally, the authoritative Janes All The World Aircraft publication lists nine privately owned light aircraft and six helicopters as the entire inventory of aircraft in the country of Guyana.

Some reports are that these facilities were constructed by the Soviets, others say the Cubans, but we can only speculate about their purpose and their modern communication network. Could Soviet SS-20 missiles be emplaced in Guyana; with bombers and reconnaissance aircraft? Will there be Cuban training facilities for guerrillas being prepared to takeover their home countries?

Let us move over to the the Western end of the Caribbean basin.

Nicaragua is firmly in the communist camp. They consolidated their revolution as quickly as they could, rapidly bringing in tanks, anti-aircraft weapons, trucks, and small arms. By June of 1983 the Sandinista army had 138,000 men in uniform including 25,000 in the full time active force, 25,000 in the reserves, 80,000 in the militia and 8,000 police and security forces. Of a population of 3.5 million, 39% of males over 18 are in uniform. The Sandinistas say they will build an active force of 50,000 with 250,000 more in the Reserve and the militia.

The rapid arrival of Cuban military advisors following the Sandinista victory over Somoza and immediate construction work to extend and harden four runways were obvious indicators of what was in store. The Sandinistas had their plan, followed it and took U.S. money, \$142.6 million, an amount which in an eighteen month period was almost double what Somoza had received in the preceding 20 years. Two parallel 11,000 foot runways are being built at Punta Huete, near Managua; the longest runways in all of Central America. No one can come to any conclusion other than they are preparing to operate jet fighters, reconnaissance, transport, and most likely Bear bomber and other aircraft from those runways.

Let us take an overall look now at the Caribbean Basin. We have the airfields in Cuba, those in Nicaragua and those in Guyana and Grenada. This inland sea, the Caribbean, is much like the Mediterranean; it can be bottled

up by airpower, which can effectively crisscross the strategic sea lines of communication.

The Caribbean provides the arteries to our survival. Three-fourths of all our imported oil transits the Caribbean. It comes in super tankers around Cape Horn, through the South Atlantic and by Grenada on the way to oil refineries in Curacao and Aruba. Other super tankers deliver the crude oil to the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico where it is refined and then moved by smaller tankers to East and Southern Gulf ports. There are nine transshipment points within the Caribbean basin to offload oil from super tankers to smaller tankers since the United States has no deep water ports on our entire eastern shore which can handle super tankers. This is done also in the Bahamas and Trinidad. Super tankers from Alaska off-load oil to smaller tankers which transit the Panama Canal and go on their way to U.S. ports. Other tankers now off-load to the newly constructed pipeline across Panama to be loaded on smaller tankers in the Caribbean.

There are also the extensive oil production facilities and oil reserves of Venezuela, and Mexico in the Caribbean. Mexican and off-shore United States oil facilities are in the Gulf of Mexico.

In addition to our oil life lines passing through the Caribbean, the United States relies on foreign sources for over half of thirty-two minerals essential for industrial and military use. Over half of our exports and imports flow through the Caribbean.

Now a possible scenario. There is heightened political tension in Europe. There are advanced warnings that the Soviet Union might attack across the broad central plains of Europe. (Our plans are predicated on some early warnings.) Many years ago we realized it was impossible to station overseas in Europe the necessary forces to adequately confront a Soviet attack with our

allies because of financial and political realities. Many Army and Air Force units are "ear-marked" for early deployment to Europe to reinforce our own forces and our allies. Airfields, cantonments are waiting and ready. Forward deployed logistical requirements ease support needs for the first combat missions.

Tactical Fighter Wings including our most modern F-15, F-16 and older but reliable F-4 Phantoms are located in our southern states. These wings have virtually automatic deployment orders to reinforce Europe. These assets belong to Tactical Air Command with headquarters in Langley Air Force Base. Some fighter wings are located at Langley, Seymour Johnson, North Carolina, Homestead and Eglin AFB, Florida. A rapid decision must be made. Can we afford to deploy these aircraft?

We have to ask the question. What is the Cubans role? What is Fidel Castro going to do? If the Soviets move their armor, is Castro going to interdict shipping in the Caribbean? We have many U.S. naval ships requiring transit of the Panama Canal for reinforcement of the Commander-In-Chief, Atlantic. Are Soviet Bear Anti-submarine Warfare aircraft to undertake missions in the Caribbean and off our coasts? The Soviets have submarine overhaul and refueling facilities in Cuba. Will they be operating in the Caribbean? What is the role of the fast, missile carrying hydro-foil ships Castro has?

Clearly several fighter wings have to forgo deployment to Europe with a new mission to take out Cuba if they start playing a supportive role to Soviet movements in Europe. How much havoc can the Cubans wreck with their fighter aircraft operating across the Caribbean from Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua? How much shipping will the Cubans be able to destroy before the Cubans themselves are defeated? What number of U.S. Air Force, Navy and Army units will be

needed to effectively neutralize Cuba in the event of Soviet advances on the plains of Europe?

Will Cuba be able to buy with their sacrifice sufficient time for the Soviet Union to seize several thousand square miles of territory? How many days, weeks, will it take the United States to eliminate the threat of Cuba to our vital lifeline through the Caribbean? We don't know the answers, but we do know that the force deployments by the Soviet Union, the arms build up provided to the Cubans, gives them this capability. Even if the Cubans don't move, their threat ties down our forces.

We recall during the first eight months of World War II the United States lost 183 ships in the Caribbean. German submarines sunk these, shelled refineries in Aruba and lay in waiting for ships to transit the Panama Canal and enter the Caribbean.

United States forces are stretched thin with heavy commitments in Europe and NATO, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, the Philippines, Korea and the Pacific. Our ability to project force and power to Europe, the Middle East and the Far East has been dependent upon having a secure southern flank. Now it is no longer secure.

The NATO scenario is a possibility and of course one which is taken seriously by us and our allies. There is another scenario which is in progress now in this hemisphere. The Soviets and Cubans have supplied such large quantities of armaments to Nicaragua and the Sandinistas have developed such a large army that now only the United States has the capability to challenge their strength. Last year the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs announced that the Sandinistas had expressed to him a fear we would overthrow their regime. His response was to offer them a treaty of non-aggression. If this proposal had been accepted by the Sandinistas they

would have enjoyed the same status as Cuba; protected by the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, but posing a threat to their neighbors. Obviously at this point in time, Nicaragua is no threat to the United States. But it is decidedly a threat to her Central American neighbors.

Communist nations, highly skilled in the negotiating process, can be expected to enter into extensive negotiations to buy time. The validity of such negotiations will have about as much value as the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, which last week President Reagan stated, had been unilaterally abrogated on several occasions by the Soviets through their introduction of offensive weapons.

The United States can expect the communist nations to play our electoral process with the skill of accomplished violinists. Negotiations will be a temporary pause in their forward movements.

Our current policy in El Salvador, encouraging the Army to provide a shield to the populace, while economic reforms progress lacks validity. Foreign Minister Chavez Mena told me in July that he did not know how long the country could survive with the deteriorating economy. He added that the country needed a victory over the guerrillas. Although the Army is proud of their new initiatives and a role providing security in certain populated and farming areas, the Army's size is insufficient to provide this defense as well as defeat the guerrillas. The shield is useful for defense but a sword is needed to achieve victory. An army is quickly demoralized if its troops believe defeating the enemy is not the primary objective. Communist guerrilla tactics fully exploit prolonged warfare through demoralizing strikes against a country's infrastructure. The El Salvadoran guerrillas effectively wage war against the people by destroying the electrical grid, telecommunications,

bridges, buses, crops and while killing and terrorizing people, collecting "war taxes."

Though the total number of guerrillas in El Salvador has remained at a level ranging from 5-7,000 over the last few years, there has been a tremendous loss of life for a small country of under 5,000,000 people. It is not only demoralizing to Salvadorans but to U.S. allies to realize that when a small country is in the vanguard of a fight against spreading communism the United States stands almost impotent in an ability to help the army bring a speedy conclusion to the war.

A visit to El Salvador, the so called "cooperatives," the refugee camps, hospitals, towns and army units makes one understand two things. There is no popular support for the guerrillas and communist propaganda has been successful in making El Salvador a pariah nation. There is very little international support for refugees or medical assistance and supplies for Salvadorans. A pattern has developed which can be expected to be repeated should El Salvador fall. Propaganda will convince Americans that a nation is undeserving of help.

Every bit of aid is contested in our Congress. Our aid is piddling. It is not commensurate with the nature of the growing threat to the United States. Our military assistance is based on a formula for peacetime assistance and in no way meets wartime requirements. The Salvadoran Army must pace its efforts on the doubtful receipt of ammunition and supplies from the United States. A two hour interview with the Salvadoran Air Force commander made me ashamed of United States assistance. Restrictions placed on weapons employment and tactics were far more limiting than I experienced as a fighter squadron commander flying close combat support to the United States Army in South Vietnam, and we were carefully controlled in our operations.

The Salvadorans are pouring as much money as they can muster in paying for our military assistance, but this goes unreported in our press and Americans consider we have a give away program. The September issue of "Soldier of Fortune" this year, accurately depicts the sorry state of military assistance to ground forces in El Salvador. I have spent hours with these reporters and have confidence in their experienced analysis. The primary reason for our inadequate support is due to congressional restrictions, but administration handling of this crisis situation is primarily through the normal bureaucratic channels based on peacetime aid and assistance to countries.

The United States is going to have to face up to what are called the "root" problems. When talking about social injustices and poverty, little is said about the extensive influence of Marxist/Leninist teaching in Latin American Universities. Soviet Bloc academic grants annually to Latin American students jumped from 400 in the 1960s to around 7,000 now, and this does not include Cubans. The guerrilla leadership invariably comes from the University ranks and Latin American Universities are notorious centers for communist influence and subversion. Rather than jumping to conclusions over poverty as the primary root cause it would be useful to study other factors. World Bank figures in the mid-seventies placed El Salvador in the middle of all countries in the world on the basis of fair distribution of income. Before 1979 El Salvador had a highly productive agricultural economy with no food shortages for her population and strong exports in coffee, sugar and cotton. There was a rapidly growing middle class and new industries.

If the United States and her Latin American allies refuse to recognize that these countries are being targeted by communist interests, we will rationalize all of our present strengths and advantages away until Mexico is

in communist hands. Mexico today is in a very weak position. Its agrarian reform programs have been a failure and their population growth is staggering. The people are rapidly losing confidence in their single party "revolutionary" effort. Many Mexican economists estimate that 85% of the economy is in the hands of the central government.

Americans must understand that a psychological war is being waged. We have become susceptible to extensive communist disinformation efforts designed to render us incapable of taking decisive actions. The guerrillas understand that the war is either won or lost in Washington. Frequently, all of us who have close relationships with Latin American high ranking officials, have been told that the United States should play a stronger leadership role and take decisive actions. They quickly add that they can take no public stand to manifest support for this idea because of political realities.

During the first three months of 1983 immigration authorities estimated over half a million illegal immigrants entered the United States from Mexico. That tide will swell as more countries fall to communism. The Soviet Union may well achieve one of their major objectives, to break up the NATO alliance, while only employing surrogate forces in the Caribbean Basin. When Mexico struggles with communist takeover attempts, an aroused American public may well demand the return of our deployed Army forces to ensure the security of our own borders. We face a greater danger in being defeated through a piecemeal loss of our allies to communism in this hemisphere than by being destroyed in nuclear war.

Today we hear a great deal about military and political solutions. Use of these words is invariably tied to political rhetoric to discredit the Salvadoran government's efforts or United States' objectives in Central America. The words are never analyzed and their purpose is only to discredit

with psychological impact. To seek a "political solution" implies negotiating with those who are attempting to defeat, or overthrow the government.

Negotiations which would give guerrillas in El Salvador an opportunity to participate in free elections, with safeguards provided by international Latin American peace keeping forces and international observers, is one thing; but, to allow guerrillas to achieve some shared form of power in a coalition or broad front government, would repeat the mistakes of countless post World War II experiences resulting in communist takeovers.

An accusation of seeking a "military solution" implies a lack of desire to participate in dialogue, discussions or negotiations. To some it spells carnage. In fact "protracted war," the communist method for demoralizing a people through seemingly endless misery, hunger and death, is a far worse fate. There is no such thing as a purely "military solution" anymore than a purely "political solution."

A military victory can pave the way for the solution to a country's problems which involves many factors. A victory provides that opportunity for peace, through which personal security and reduced tensions create an atmosphere conducive to work and private and foreign investment. If the guerrillas continue to destroy the nation's infrastructure and kill, maim and terrorize people the Salvadoran economy will continue to deteriorate and the will, of a now courageous people, will falter and fail. The people need hope and that hope will continue to exist when seeking victory.

A military victory is not a solution, but it is a necessary ingredient to provide other factors an opportunity to coalesce and provide solutions.

I have pictured a grim and ominous, but not improbable prospect. How did this develop? I have touched on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Organization

of American States response to the Dominican Republic crisis. Guatemala in 1954 would be another key benchmark. Lack of purpose and consistency in our approach to Latin America, from administration to administration, is an underlying theme.

But rather than an historical approach, I would like to focus on a recent period beginning in 1975 when, on a daily basis, I was responsible for providing political-military advice to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.

Two issues dominated inter-agency activities pertaining to Latin America. One was the developing fight over the Panama Canal Treaties and the other was the curtailment of U.S. military presence throughout Latin America.

Putting the Panama Canal Treaties and negotiations aside for now, I'll focus on reduction of our military presence in Latin America. Prior to World War II the United States had developed close, bilateral military ties, with military groups in several Latin American nations. During World War II these efforts were greatly expanded. The wisdom of this policy was evident. Hemisphere unity in the face of external aggression was an ambitious ideal. In our military groups we trained, advised, and worked closely with other countries throughout the Americas. This, in fact, directly countered the influence of Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Italy in whose countries many Latin American military officers attended staff courses. In one country at least, Argentina, it caused a significant rift in attitudes among officers as their Naval officers had British training, their Army officers German and Italian training and their Air Force officers, U.S. Army Air Corps training.

In less than one year in 1975 this program was deliberately destroyed by a coalition of Congressional staffers and Department of State careerists over the resistance of the Defense Department, leaving only a remnant of

representation of one officer from each Service serving at our Embassies for the primary purpose of handling paperwork related to military sales to those countries. One of our U.S. Ambassadors, serving in Venezuela, stated that seldom in history has a major power unilaterally relinquished so much influence in foreign countries.

It is interesting to note that this action took place at a time when a leftist military government controlled Peru and there were over 200 Soviet military advisors in the country. (Today there are approximately 300 Soviet military advisors in Peru). The Soviet Union today, in the Western Hemisphere has six times the number of military advisors in Latin America that do we. They have over 100 in Nicaragua.)

Directly related to this reduction of military advisors was the withdrawal of U.S. flag rank officers from Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, clearly indicating to these key countries our attitudes regarding their country's significance in the strategic equation. Almost paralleling these actions U.S. naval activities were virtually closed down in Key West, Florida, while being reduced at Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico. The Strategic Air Command had already departed Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico. Those actions and our determination to turn over the Canal to Panama were obvious indicators that the little military presence we had in Latin America was being wound down further.

Not only had the Latin American region become a backwater of military and foreign policy planning but during the Carter Administration it became the focal point for Human Rights experimentation. Human Rights was used as a club rather than as a fundamental element of U.S. policy woven into a fabric of other significant elements to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. Two standards were developed. One for non-communist developing nations with

special emphasis on Latin America and one for the rest of the world. We quickly eliminated our ability to influence countries and many Latin American nations recoiled as they made adjustments in their foreign policy and strategic objectives.

Throughout this period we practiced paternalism. We knew what was right for each country. When a country wanted to buy supersonic jet fighters from us, we said no. We didn't think supersonic fighters were needed in any country in Latin America. However good our reasons were, they did not satisfy the nationalistic interests and the perceptions of their needs. They turned to other sources and our European allies were quick to respond. In one case, Peru, they turned to the Soviets.

The perceptions that the United States was turning away from Latin America, militarily, were obvious. The Defense Department had to share the blame with the Department of State. Our military strategists had forgotten that our ability to project power to Europe and the Far East depended upon a secure southern flank. Our southern flank, already weak, was further weakened and rapidly became our soft underbelly. Our military still believed that Cuba was not a threat and being outflanked by the Soviet Union in our own hemisphere was an unimaginable thought. Now that we were out of Vietnam, all military strategists redoubled their efforts on the NATO scene. Anything else was inconsequential, even the Middle East.

The U.S. military had a final fight in their withdrawal from the Latin American scene over the Panama Canal Treaties. Instinctively most strategists knew that giving up control of the Canal and the ability to defend it from Panama would weaken U.S. strategic planning in the hemisphere. The Service staffs resisted though each Joint Chiefs of Staff position was compromised in the ensuing governmental process of negotiations, time and time again. One

day at a prayer breakfast the Joint Chiefs collapsed and agreed to the State Department negotiators positions, which became the two treaties. To my knowledge unprecedented in modern U.S. military decision making over a major issue, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a series of negotiating points which were unsupported by their Service staffs or the joint staff.

During the Carter administration there was no decision memorandum on Latin American policy approved by the National Security Council and the President for internal government guidance. This would suggest an ad hoc approach to foreign policy in the region. That would be a mistaken assumption. An analysis of actions taken by the Carter administration reveals they closely followed a Sol Linowitz report prepared privately by a group of specialists.

When in 1978 the Department of State pressured the Mexicans to withdraw their request for the purchase of American F-5 fighters, the military Services were not asked to express an opinion leading to this U.S. government decision. A spokesman from the Defense Department in International Security Affairs, a political appointee, stated that there were no security interests involved in the F-5 fighter turn down. The Mexican Defense Minister expressed to me his contempt for this decision and the crude pressures his government was subjected to in persuading them to withdraw their request.

Meanwhile, the United States entered into negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce the sale of military equipment in Latin America. The Defense Department did not participate in these negotiations in Mexico City nor were our Latin American/Rio Treaty allies informed of our actions. Our signals to the Soviets were obvious. We were accepting the legitimacy of Soviet presence and actions in the hemisphere. Though less than 2% of worldwide U.S. Military Assistance was being provided to Latin American countries, we had a desire to

reduce it to zero. Little is understood in the United States how proliferation of nuclear weapons can be directly tied to perceptions of a United States desire and ability to provide a nuclear umbrella. Our actions spelled out clearly our indifference to Latin American security interests.

As 1979 came on the horizon, Somoza struggled with the opposition. U.S. intelligence knew and reported on Sandinista leadership ties with Fidel Castro, their training by him, and the flow of weapons to Panama, then by Panamanian military flow to Costa Rica for Sandinista use in their guerrilla war against Nicaragua's Somoza. Specialists in Inter-American Affairs at the Department of State spoke about our needing to support, "the forces of change." There was no help to a beleaguered Somoza to speed a transition through elections to democracy. It was considered too late for that. The U.S. helped a different transition to Sandinista power by seeing that Israeli weapon supplies and ammunition were cut off. U.S. Ambassadors applied the final pressure. The government fell. What we have today in Nicaragua was predictable at the time. The Sandinista's success duplicates other communist take-overs of united front efforts since World War II. Many government intelligence and policy analysts predicted the results accurately.

Of fundamental interest, the Defense Department and the Armed Services were not players in these events. Apparently U.S. security interests were not involved.

The United States has never sought to introduce East-West rivalries into the new world. The Monroe Doctrine rejected old world rivalries, colonization and alien ideas introduced to the Western Hemisphere. The Inter-American system has consistently rejected communism as alien to the democratic ideals aspired to by the Western Hemisphere family of nations. The Organization of American States could be made more effective by regional participation in the

resolution of security problems. CONDECA, The Central American Defense Committee should be revitalized to address mutual defense concerns.

In the final analysis the U.S. must decide whether recent military developments sufficiently jeopardize our security to take unilateral actions to roll back Soviet and Cuban backed communist expansion. These actions do not necessarily mean military engagements. But the U.S. cannot continue to ignore the unilateral movements of Soviet chess pieces across the Caribbean Basin chess board. The right moves by the United States now could influence a Soviet pull back and if planned properly the U.S. should be able to "check-mate" the Soviet Union and Cuba in the Western Hemisphere before they make another move.

August 16, 1983

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THE KHRUSHCHEV DOCTRINE AND EL SALVADOR

OR

(EL SALVADOR - ANOTHER WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION)

By Elbridge Durbrow*

U.S. Ambassador (Ret.)

Most of the press, and therefore, the American public, Congress and several Administrations, except perhaps President Reagan's, have never understood and thus never realized that the "civil wars" in Cuba, Nicaragua and El Salvador were and are just part of a long series, including Vietnam, of Soviet initiated, orchestrated, supported and run "Wars of National Liberation" (WNL).

Recently, several commentators have suggested that the Soviet-Cuban stepped up resistance to our efforts to bring peace, freedoms and democracy to Central America or to invoke the semi-abandoned Monroe Doctrine, represents another Soviet attempt to apply the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine.

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The policy dubbed "Brezhnev" by the West, not Moscow, calls for the full use of all the Soviet bloc military force necessary to prevent any of the full-fledged and controlled Soviet satellites along its borders from breaking out of Moscow's firm grip (e.g. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afganistan).

Instead of trying to invoke the not applicable Brezhnev Doctrine, commentators and others should examine and expose the other long-standing quite successful Peaceful Coexistence* cum Wars of National Liberation Policy proposed in a 1956 speech by Nikita Khrushchev, outlining a new strategy of deception including stepped up use of WNL's. One might dub this proven successful formula "The Khrushchev Doctrine," which, under the peaceful coexistence smoke screen, calls for various strategems, particularly the use of surrogate forces to do the fighting for the Kremlin to help extend its influence and control over lucrative (strategic or mineral rich) targets in the "Third World".

Five years later on June 6, 1961, Khrushchev went into detail about the WNL ploy and discussed, "How to prevent a world thermonuclear war and attain lasting peace." He then proceeded to describe three other kinds of war:

- 1) World wars (non-nuclear)
- 2) Local wars waged among "imperialist" states such as, "The Britain, France and Israel war against Egypt."
- 3) "Wars of National Liberation"

*The West prefers to use "Detente" instead of "Peaceful Coexistence."

He went on to call WNLs "revolutionary wars...[being] not only admissible but inevitable." He declared Wars of National Liberation as the only "just" kind of war, citing three successful examples: Algeria against France, the war in Vietnam, and emphasized Castro's WNL victory in Cuba. He stressed that "The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front ranks with peoples waging liberation struggles."

Although the Vietnam and El Salvador WNL's occurred years apart, on opposite sides of the world and involved peoples of quite different races and cultures, they both follow the same Kremlin formula (more later). While they are all from the same Moscow mold, each WNL is tailored by the Soviet KGB (Secret Police) to fit local circumstances and conditions, and each is made to appear to be a purely indigenous local "civil war."

There are many real and some unreal reasons for this lack of understanding of the true nature of what a WNL is all about, who is behind them, how they are run, supported and why the Kremlin wins most of them.

However, one of the principal but little realized reasons is the finely tuned deep cover, effective and widespread Soviet "Dezinformatsiya" (disinformation) program which is much broader and more complex than the mere use of deception, misinformation or propaganda. It is in effect, a sharply honed, all-embracing, worldwide, patiently waged, psychological warfare operation. A fuller description of this covert system is:

"Dezinformatsiya" is the effective operation of a primarily

long range policy carried out through covert KGB channels so concealed as virtually not to be subject to exposure. It spreads deliberately chosen, plausible misinformation so designed as to mold, divide and mislead other governments, leaders, and public opinions by causing them to adopt policies, attitudes, and undertakings which are usually advantageous only to the Soviet bloc. The operation's aim is to blind victims to a realization of their own best interests."

These subversive operations have been carried on with increasing subtlety for almost a quarter of a century by a large army of deep-cover KGB operatives throughout the world who have been since 1967 under the competent command of the new Soviet leader Yuri Andropov. He apparently did such a fine job in that role, that the Soviet communist party members elected him their leader.

Among other things the KGB has perfected, is how to plant "disturbing" stories, as they now are doing in their broadcasts and news items for foreign consumption by spreading running spurious accounts to influence the U.S. public and others about the alleged White House plans to use U.S. combat troops in Central America and thus repeat the Vietnam debacle. They also use well executed, realistic forgeries, rumors, or half-truths designed and aimed so that they are innocently picked up and disseminated by hard-headed, sophisticated, Free World media correspondents who are however, usually unschooled in KGB ways. These seemingly authentic but contrived stories and other techniques help to confuse basic issues, distract attention from the main problems by raising doubts among the non-communist public as well as officials about whether their basic

interests are really involved, raise questions about the morals, motives, civil rights records and so forth of the governments and forces fighting on our side.

These tricks are detailed in a 1978 unclassified study of over 600 pages done basically by the CIA entitled, The CIA and the Media, which examined Soviet propaganda in detail. In transmitting this report to the requesting House committee, President Carter's CIA Director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, stated that it deals "only superficially with certain aspects of Soviet propaganda, most particularly with the covert activities of the KGB." The Director adds, "I believe, however, that it will provide a useful primer on the scope and magnitude of the Soviet propaganda apparatus as well as the cynical disregard for truth which characterizes Soviet propaganda operations." He then warns that it "covers Soviet propaganda directed against American interests from abroad, but does not concern itself with Soviet propaganda operations conducted within the United States." The Admiral suggested that such a study be prepared. None has so far been made public. He concludes his letter by saying, "There are indications that Soviet propaganda activities will increase in the future." That was five years ago!

A 1980 follow-up CIA study in depth, for the same House committee entitled, Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive) gives details of some 150 Soviet forgeries aimed at the U.S. since WWII, which helped to confuse many of us and our friends on various scores.

These fine CIA studies received basically one day, back page, media coverage if any, and are now virtually forgotten.

Therefore, most of our press were very skeptical or disbelieved the "White Paper" put out by the Reagan Administration in February 1981, giving among other things, first-hand, written evidence of the sources of the large quantities of American made arms being sent with Moscow's connivance via Havana and Nicaragua to the El Salvador guerrilla-terrorists. However, few if any commentators have pointed out, or maybe didn't realize, that behind the some 25 year smoke screen of Moscow's self-proclaimed "deep desire" to live in "peaceful coexistence" with the Free World, that the Cold War has never ceased and still continues in various manifestations. This is particulary so through Moscow-approved, supported and usually bloody but successful Wars of National Liberation, such as those in Algiers, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Namibia, South Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada and more. In other words, behind all the peaceful coexistence Moscow smiles, many Soviet instigated full-fledged mini-wars were waged in which thousands and thousands were killed.

That Moscow did not try to hide Wars of National Liberation behind their facade of peaceful coexistence, is clear from the following quote, among others, from Pravda, on August 22, 1973, shortly after Nixon and Brezhnev had signed the 1972 and 1973 Summit Agreements in which we pledged to carry on our relations with each other on the basis of the principals of peaceful coexistence, which stated:

"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union regards it as its supreme duty to extend aid to the working class and working masses in their liberation struggle against imperialism ... peaceful coexistence is far from meaning the end of opposition of the two world social systems."

Fortunately, however, the Leninists* do not win all WNLs, such as the attempts in Iranian Azerbaijan in 1945, in Greece and Turkey, thwarted by the Truman Doctrine and those in Indonesia, Zaire, Egypt, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia,(the latter three instigated by Castro's protege, "Che" Guevera), Somalia, Oman, to name a few. But the fact remains, they tried in all these to extend their spheres of influence or domination, thus killing many more thousands of people.

In spite of all the fighting in this large number of Wars of National Liberation, it is revealing and frightening to calculate the low cost to Moscow in human resources in these mini-wars, all of which were fought by surrogates. The record shows that except for the few times the Kremlin has had to use the Soviet Army (Brezhnev Doctrine) to surpress uprisings in bordering Soviet satellite states - East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the bloody clashes with their fellow Chinese Leninists in the 1960's, and finally in Afganistan which became a full Soviet border satellite in a Moscow-sponsored coup d'etat in April 1978, plus a few random combat missions flown by Soviet advisers or their firing of SAM anti-aircraft missiles and similar unplanned military actions in Korea, Vietnam, Ethiopia, etc.:

NO SOVIET SOLDIER HAS FIRED A SHOT IN ANGER SINCE WWII

*Leninists are the breed of Marxists who have applied Karl Marx's theories in such a way as to create a tight secret police state dictatorship which abolishes all freedoms, human rights and civil rights.

Given the foregoing account, it is disheartening that The 1981 "White Paper" on El Salvador drew almost instant negative reaction from diverse media outlets across the spectrum, which probably reflected the breadth and effectiveness of the confuse-the-issue KGB disinformation technique.

This media skepticism was so widespread that the real facts in that "White Paper", brought out by the excerpts from rare, almost "smoking gun" insights into KGB supported operations, were soon forgotten. Therefore, the deep significance of that long planned and worldwide Moscow follow-on WNL in Central America is not realized today in the Free World.

It is the KGB disinformation apparat which helps to encourage the "no more Vietnam" slogans today, plants horrible atrocity and human rights violation stories - some true, some not - about those countries we support. For example, in 1982, the KGB's leftist surrogates in El Salvador arranged a two week "fact finding" trip for Free World reporters behind Salvadoran guerrilla lines where they got supposedly "first hand, eye witness" accounts from "local inhabitants" about some 900 women, old men and children massacred nearby by government troops a short time before. While it is possible that there was some truth to some of the second hand stories, it seems almost impossible, as was noted at the time, that in a town of some 300 permanent inhabitants, over 900 could have been murdered. The reporters seemed to have relied on long accounts each from the "eye witness" assigned to him, who could have been a well drilled guerrilla disinformation spokesmam. Wide coverage was given to these and many other gruesome "eye witness" accounts which helped to confuse issues, cast doubt on our policies and thus influence some of our public and Congress to

demand we withdraw support from our friends.

This disinformation campaign makes it doubly difficult to convince the U.S. and Free World public as well as many members of Congress that a large number of the left-wing guerrillas operating in Central America are trained abroad in KGB camps, supplied, supported and directed through the Kremlin's far flung KGB covert networks as were the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front the KGB established in South Vietnam.

Perhaps it was because of this continuing blindness to the reality of Central American developments by so many, that the State and Defense Departments decided again to review the evidence by releasing, on May 27, 1983, a detailed follow-on "White Paper" entitled, Background Paper; Central America. This 17 page report with 14 additional pages of maps and pictures, erroneously, as should be clear from the foregoing, for some reason, gives Castro almost full credit for developing the techniques to train and support the various Leninist guerrilla groups in Central America. The report, in fact, correctly outlines the complex types of methods used for decades by Moscow not Havana, to wage all such WNLs. Since this sound expose received only passing attention from the media, perhaps its important highlights should be recalled, and compared to those earlier WNLs in South East Asia, where I had a front row observation seat to report on the beginning of the WNL in Vietnam in the 50's and 60's.

The Paper repeats some facts from the 1981 "White Paper," and releases further new official evidence of the principal time-honored Moscow WNL pattern of operations and ruses used by Castro in the 50's, and later in Vietnam and are still being employed by the Kremlin, or its faithful surrogates in Central America. In effect, this latest official release

gives the sequential details and thus exposes the long rarely understood, camouflaged "local civil war" game called "national liberation."

Perhaps the reason for the erroneous Castro credit line might be that the authorities did not, because of the widespread cry of no more Vietnams, want, for domestic political reasons, to emphasize the direct parallel between our defeat in Vietnam and our difficulties in El Salvador.

Despite this reluctance on our part to attribute WNL techniques to the Kremlin, the Moscow Politburo continually boasts of its current Wars of National Liberation operations in Central America and relates them to those in Vietnam.

One example in Izvestiya, on May 31, 1983, confirmed the full Soviet connection with the world-wide WNL operations by declaring:

"The liberation movement in the Latin American countries is gathering strength and.... is growing daily despite the fierce opposition of the United States and... [in] precisely the same way that in their time the specially trained bands of cutthroats in Vietnam and North Korea were unable to help the Americans when the peoples of those countries rose in defense of their sovereignty..."

The following are some of the main points in the 1983 report which accurately outlines the usual steps of mini-wars of national liberation:

<*> First, the unification of the extreme left elements in the targeted country into a "local" liberation front, e.g. the creation in 1960 of the

"National Liberation Front" in Vietnam, a group of "progressive" anti-establishment organizations brought under Viet Cong control as was done in mineral rich Angola in the the early 1960s under the Soviet controlled "Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola," (MPLA) and the Namibian "Southwest African Peoples Organization," SWAPO. In El Salvador, the Moscow created and controlled front is the "Farabundo Marti Liberation Front" (FMLN).

<*> These "supposedly" indigenous "progressive" leftist coalitions are then schooled to make solemn promises to create broad based, freedom loving, popular governments after victory. These promises are never kept.

<*> On these high-sounding propaganda promises, the rebels are taught to seek outside international support as well as sympathetic backing from domestic liberals in the Free World, such as those received from our anti-Vietnam war protesters in the 60's and 70's (e.g. The U.S. Cuban trained Weather Underground terrorists). The same kind of support is being sought by Central American rebels among human rights and anti-military activists here today.

<*> The Leninist guerrillas "finally" publicly go through the motions of pleading to get Soviet bloc military and other support, much of which is either in place or programmed for, well before the outside world knows of the conflict. For instance, North Vietnamese troops were secretly left behind in South Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Peace Accords. Likewise, Cuba, Moscow's surrogate, fully supported the Sandinista rebels in overthrowing Somoza in Nicaragua and joined with the Sandinistas later to support the Salvadoran "liberation" fighters after their 1979 revolt.

<*> The "White Paper" confirms that the same techniques are now being used to prepare Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica, for a WNL takeover. Laos and Cambodia were the comparable victims in Asia.

<*> In all these Wars of National Liberation, selected local forces are given intensive training abroad in Soviet bloc camps, where they are taught guerrilla and particularly terrorist tactics in order, hopefully, to intimidate and undermine the will and morale of the population. The Viet Cong initially terrorized by assassination, or maiming of rural officials, blowing up bridges, raiding outposts for military and medical supplies. The same types of operations are being carried out in Central America. Of course, in both wars large quantities of Kremlin bloc military supplies are continually smuggled secretly into the target area - over the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos and Cambodia to Vietnam and as both "White Papers", and other hard evidence confirm for any reasonable person to see, arms shipments of all kinds are taking place by sea, air and land to El Salvador - recently directly in Soviet cargo ships to Nicaragua.

<*> The Soviets and Cubans, taking advantage of the many real and serious shortcomings in all the Central American area, early on launched an all-out international disinformation campaign to cover their own subversive operations there (of course ignoring the serious suppression in Soviet subjugated nations, e.g. as now in Vietnam), by projecting a very heart-rending image of poverty-stricken peoples fighting against oppression and for freedom from "imperialist" interference. This effective Soviet campaign was possible because the West would be so blinded by the smooth disinformation operation that we could not find "legal" proof of the Leninist interference. Therefore, we could not convince our public that the insurrections were anything but truly spontaneous local civil wars.

Earlier on, we could not "prove" to Congress and our public that Hanoi was using Laos and Cambodia as sanctuaries, depots and as supply routes to carry the main brunt of the Soviet supported operations against South Vietnam. Because of this lack of proof, President Nixon's fully justified 1970 invasion and bombing of the extensive communist bases in eastern Cambodia was never understood in the Free World. Although our operation was quite successful in destroying most of the depots, no matter how justified and essential the action was to protect our forces, Nixon was immediately and widely denounced by the well organized, KGB assisted, anti-war forces in the U.S. for unjustified interference in the internal affairs of "neutral" Cambodia. The fact is that eastern Cambodia was by then a Leninist occupied area. The demonstrations against this essential military action were so strong and widespread that Nixon was forced to pull our troops out well before they could do a fully effective job. The same kind of "no more Vietnams" pressure is again plaguing President Reagan in his efforts to alert all of us to the serious communist takeover effort in El Salvador.

<*> The latest Paper also gives credible evidence of other disinformation activities such as urging the rebel groups to try to induce sympathetic American organizations to seek support from U.S. politicians and public to call for a policy of dialogue between the opposing sides and thus seek a lasting "peace" with "justice." This same strategem was used by Hanoi in the Vietnam peace negotiations to work out a sharing of power, with no semblance of free elections. We know, too late, the sad results of this appealing "compromise" in Vietnam and elsewhere. More on this old play later.

Despite the fact that the 1983 "White Paper" tied together and exposed all the principal disinformation and Kremlin "liberation" tactics, most of our media paid little attention to it. The Washington Post this time instead of trying to denigrate the evidence, buried it in two paragraphs on page 25 at the end of an unenthusiastic front page account of plans to send 100 U.S. military advisers to Honduras to train Salvadorans in guerrilla warfare. The New York Times did print an inadequate excerpt of the report, but its article reporting the briefing played down its significance.

Despite the unexplained reason for not calling the mini-wars what they are, Soviet Wars of National Liberation, there are the many other firm official pronouncements such as the detailed 1981 and 1983 White Papers; the President's April 27, 1983 address to the Congress on the threat to Central America; Secretary Shultz's comprehensive statements on June 15, 1983 and August 4, 1983 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee outlining the world-wide, multi-pronged Soviet threat, and justification for our show of military force in Central America, together with the President's many forthright warnings on the need to help El Salvador defend itself, all make it abundantly clear that finally a national administration is well aware of the complete nature of the global threat from Khrushchev's Doctrine of peaceful coexistence cum War of National Liberation strategems, and is trying to expose and thwart this global Soviet effort.

If these efforts do not achieve a bipartisan treatment of the problem, it appears, alas, that the lessons of Vietnam, a war we lost, may be repeated again because of among other reasons, the apparent inability of too many to see through the Kremlin's effective confuse-all-issues, cast-deep-doubts disinformation and other effective deceptive activities.

This accounts in part for the fact that a large segment of the American press, public and Congress do not believe, nor perhaps want to believe, the repeated Administration statements that these various Moscow conceived, supported and run operations are anything but indigenous "civil wars" by downtrodden peoples fighting against right-wing oppressive military dictatorships. That many of these regimes are tough, somewhat cruel, brutal and authoritarian is true, but alas, too many learn too late, as millions of Germans, Hungarians, South Vietnamese and many others can attest, that once the Leninists finally take over, a very cruel unforgiving secret police dictatorship is installed, and all semblance of human rights, civil rights, freedoms or popularly elected governments vanish.

In addition to the other evidence of Moscow's bloc support operations, our press and Congress paid little attention to the long and significant May 13, 1983, communique on the Salvadoran Rebels' Radio Venceremos. Although this broadcast denied getting any direct Soviet military help, it boasted that the Salvadoran guerrilla have:

"Conducted important logistic operations in clandestinity which have served to provide our forces with arms and ammunition for long periods of time...[by] using all the means available and therefore, have used the entire Central American region and other countries."

The communique added that the guerrillas meet "material and political needs of this war with international help." and boasted:

"We are and will continue to be friends of the peoples and governments of Cuba and Nicaragua and we are not ashamed of this."

This official rebel communique is, in my opinion, confirmation of the Administration's 1981 and 1983 White Papers exposes, about foreign military aid, as is the further evidence in the April 16, 1983, Brazilian announcement that it had detained four large Lybian cargo planes carrying tons of arms, explosives and ammunition all marked "medical supplies" from Libya to Nicaragua. Both these reports constitute the "smoking gun" evidence we need to open the eyes of many skeptics, but few want to listen.

That this Soviet WNL game is paying off is clear from recent officially confirmed reports from Nicaragua that a member of the ruling junta had signed an agreement last year in Moscow to allow the Soviets to develop a ship repair facility for Soviet tuna fishing boats with a floating 7000 ton dry dock and floating pier due to arrive this summer in the Nicaraguan Pacific port of San Juan del Sur. One can't help but speculate that submarines, although much larger, resemble tuna!

Another long time firm Kremlin policy referred to earlier, is never to agree to free, secret, pluralistic elections. But instead they try to get their free world adversaries to negotiate power sharing agreements which without any sort of an election, put the Leninist faction in important positions in contrived local coalition governments.

The communists want this in El Salvador, did it in Nicaragua and have done it in many countries since WWII. We have usually agreed to such

"reasonable" sounding but responsibility-dodging arrangements to help promote "unity" governments in Leninist infested states, always of course, with initial communist promises to grant all freedoms and hold free, secret elections within a "short time." These promises in Nicaragua and elsewhere, never seem to materialize.

One must recall, in this connection, that we and our Western allies have naively agreed to many other such "unity" arrangements since the Yalta agreement on Poland in 1945, and in Czechoslovakia at the same time. Other of the arranged Left- Wing coalitions (LWC) we agreed to in the hope of working out "unity" coalitions were: those between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung in China and North and South Korea after WWII; between the Lao centerists and Pathet Lao communist party in 1962; in Vietnam in 1968-1972 and many others. Experience tells us that these contrived combinations never end up with anything resembling truly popular broad based democratic governments. We tried unsuccessfully for more than three years of concentrated efforts to work out a "unity" all-German government after Hitler's defeat. The tens of thousands of Germans who fled to West Germany until, on Moscow's orders, the Berlin Wall was erected in 1961, further confirm the lack of popular support for Leninist type governments.

These failures to achieve really free democratic governments happen because Leninists are firm, well organized, highly disciplined, have patience and know that no matter how long it might take, eventually we will lose patience and interest and start to pull out as we did in South Korea in 1950 which led to the Korean War. Furthermore, the Kremlin continues to maintain its support and control of the "unity" government well after the West has signed "equitable" agreements and gone home. We also lost interest in Vietnam after 1972, and then were ignominiously driven out in 1975. It

took the Leninists 30 years of patient perseverance from 1945-1975 to get Indo-China, which they had hoped to take right after WWII under the direction of Moscow trained Ho Chi Minh.

We seem to be running true to form by being forced by Congress and lack of public understanding to try half-heartedly and on the cheap to curb the well planned and fully supported Moscow Wars of National Liberation in Central America. Our stingy efforts won't work. To stop the Leninists we must obtain full public understanding of the threat and approval for more support to be able to do all it takes in manpower, including if necessary our own forces, to prevent a communist takeover. Our public must recognize that the WNL technique initially calls for thorough prior training of local guerrilla-terrorists to use them to apply unconventional force in effective ways to undermine the morale and economy of the local government establishment. Moscow doesn't, except as a deceptive ploy, ever expect to carry out any social, democratic, economic or land reforms called for by local inhabitants. Their policies basically are to destabilize then nationalize, collectivize and terrorize in order to maintain control. Therefore, we must be prepared initially to meet those kinds of tactics with effective nonconventional force and plenty of advisers to train the local defenders in that type of warfare and not initially insist on the institution of needed social, land and other economic reforms. Reforms are most difficult to make effective under any circumstances, almost impossible to carry out in a WNL situation, when one of the Leninist tactics is to disrupt the economy by destroying bridges, electric pylons, trucks, busses and burning crops. Once the situation is basically stable only then can you follow through with economic, political and other appropriate reforms.

A distinguished group of high-ranking U.S. Army Generals, all of whom served in Vietnam, including the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John W. Vessey, and General William C. Westmorland former Commander in Vietnam, recalling the nickle and dime approach in Vietnam, have recently expressed the same opinion of the need, before we send combat troops to Central America, to muster a majority of the public and a Congressional concensus to do all that is necessary to use our forces effectively with full backstopping in men, materiel and moral support. The generals, on the other hand, seem to have been taken in by the mistaken "need" first to institute economic and other reforms before we send troops in. Again Soviet disinformation seems to have worked.

Our lack of perception of the real nature of these now world-wide KGB operations, are causing the same kinds of reactions here as we had during the Vietnam War. Such as thoughts along these lines: "Since we don't have irrefutable evidence that Moscow through Havana and Nicaragua has trained the guerrillas and is allegedly supplying them with all the arms they need as Moscow maybe did in Vietnam and elsewhere, this does not justify our getting entangled in Central America anymore than in Vietnam!"

This general line of possible thinking is borne out by the replies given in the Washington Post-ABC Poll published on May 24, 1983. The results show that, "A sizeable majority of Americans see entanglement in Central America as a greater danger to the United States than the spread of Communism..." and "...by a ratio of 2 to 1, the public says that it feels poverty and human rights are a greater cause of unrest in Central America than is subversion by those nations [Soviet Union, Cuba, Nicaragua]." These replies seem to reflect how misinformed or ill-advised and consequently naive much of the public understanding is as to the real nature of the

problem and the extent of the serious Soviet threat not only in Central America but elsewhere. The KGB "Dezinformatsiya" network seems to be functioning quite well at confusing the issues and diverting attention from the main target. There also seems to be quite a bit of escapism from reality and lack of patriotic courage involved. A later Washington Post-ABC Poll on August 4, 1983 showed almost identical results.

The Kremlin must again be more and more pleased by their gains. They have arranged to add to and upgrade the Nicaraguan airfields so they can accommodate the most advanced military aircraft, and are seeing the creation in Nicaragua of by far the largest army in Central America, greater than the total of all others in the area. This new modern force is being trained by thousands of advisers from Moscow's trusted surrogates - Cuba, East Germany, Lybia, the PLO, Bulgaria and the USSR itself, while our Congress is demanding we limit our American advisers in El Salvador only to 55. As we've seen, the Soviets are developing their own "tuna fishing boat" repair facility on the Nicaraguan Pacific Coast to match their long established full naval facilities at Cienfuegos in Cuba.

What is perhaps very heartening to Moscow is that we are again, as during the Vietnam War, fighting among ourselves about whether it's in our interests to block Soviet expansion through their WNL technique or drop all support to the "unimportant" little countries on our door step, who are always annoying us with their revolutions, human rights violations and chronic wars.

Even more encouraging to the Politburo is the spectacle of a good part of the Congress on both sides of the aisle vying with each other to put the

President in a tighter and tighter straight jacket to prevent him from taking almost any kind of effective action, overt or covert, needed to defend our interests in this very threatening struggle going on nearby.

Given these Kremlin gains and the threatening pace at which the Soviets through their many surrogates are continuing to use, build, consolidate and improve upon their political and military base in Nicaragua and El Salvador, it is imperative that we convince the Congress and public that we must make an all-out effort to eliminate this cancerous growth in our hemisphere. This calls for us, with or without the support of all other concerned Latin American governments, to try to eliminate the growing Soviet military, economic and political bases in our area, by making a full political and military effort, overtly and covertly, to free the Nicaraguan and El Salvadoran peoples from falling into the trap being prepared for them which will entail the loss of their freedom, human and other civil rights. We would thus help them to become masters in their own countries without the "assistance" of thousands of Soviet surrogates.

While in this general connection, we correctly should be concerned about civil rights violations anywhere, and should try to discourage them, we should not be so diligent in our efforts to correct any and all abuses by passing laws which make the defense of our vital interests subject to rumors, allegations, true or false reports of alleged human rights violations by our friends. This would give the KGB's disinformation apparatus another golden opportunity for dirty tricks "active measures" by staging a series of horrible contrived civil rights violations which would force the President to abandon El Salvador to the tender mercies of Moscow.

Of course we "don't want any more Vietnams," we lost that one with

some unseen KGB disinformation help in confusing our public. It happened basically because we thought we could win it by a piece meal approach, a so called "graduated response". For obvious reasons we surely cannot afford to lose this one so very close to home. Therefore, instead of limiting all the options the President may feel are necessary, thus preventing another defeat, we should free his hands to do everything within reason to stop this classic Kremlin operation, including covert actions and the use of adequate U.S. forces if necessary. Thereby preventing the Soviet Union from maintaining its Nicaraguan base and forcing nearby El Salvador to become yet another victim of Khrushchev's Peaceful Coexistence cum War of National Liberation Doctrine. We must always remember that in the Soviet lexicon a country like El Salvador is not at peace until the USSR wins that War of National Liberation.

We have seen many of the facets of the pervasive KGB activities abroad, which, as the former CIA Director, Admiral Turner warned, have grown and are more widespread and effective. This is attested to by the large increase in the number of worldwide press reports of Soviet agents apprehended.

Not only are these KGB covert operations well concealed, but even when exposed, few believe or seem to want to believe the evidence without hard to come by irrefutable proof.

We must therefore, mount an all-out indoctrination campaign to convince the press, Congress and public, not only of the KGB operations reality, but how they help to confuse our thinking and do other permanent damage to us and our allies.

A public understanding of this threat is vital. It would deter us from continually trying to legislate further curbs on the legitimate activities of the CIA and FBI, and instead give them still greater flexibility and leeway, particularly in the counterintelligence field to reduce, if not eliminate, the dangerous, often crippling KGB operations in our country and abroad.

We must remember that the only things Moscow fears, understands and respects, are firmness, force and a will to use it if necessary. So, the sooner we take full and decisive, not piece meal action, the quicker the Soviet threat will be quashed. We can then try to help our friends to solve their other problems - poverty, civil rights excesses - and begin to take the basic steps firmly to plant, nurture, and try to help democratic principles and rules to grow in the not too fertile soil throughout the southern half of our hemisphere. This is impossible to do during a cruel war. It takes patience and generations to establish firm viable democratic roots.

In the meantime, we must recall that the SS-20 mobile nuclear missiles we are trying to eliminate from Europe have a range of 3000 miles. They could be overtly or clandestinely deployed in Central America, to put most of our country under an almost instantaneous nuclear or nuclear blackmail threat. Earlier this year high Soviet and Nicaraguan officials have warned that they may choose to deploy nuclear missiles in Nicaragua if the U.S. deploys the intermediate nuclear missiles in NATO. This same threat is implied in statements on July 30, 1983, by Dmitri Ustinov, Soviet Defense Minister and Politburo member. So, as the President has said over and over, the threats from the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua to El Salvador and other states in the area are real and most serious.

The problem now is to get this complex and seemingly confusing "strange" reality understood by the press, public and Congress. It must be divorced from partisan politics which the KGB is undoubtedly working overtime to prevent. Unfortunately a unified national approach is made most difficult by the unreasoned blind acceptance of the catch phrase "no more Vietnams." This has become a roadblock to reality through the easy way out clamor for the short-range "peace through dialogue" settlement by creating a left-wing coalition. Experience proves this will, in the long run, only lock El Salvador solidly behind the Iron Curtain.

Developments in Central America have become a fundamental, rock bottom, long range national survival issue and must be faced and solved as such. It is later than we realize.

SPEAKERS

FOR THE

WHITE HOUSE OUTREACH WORKING GROUP ON CENTRAL AMERICA

WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 1983:

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman, Executive Assistant to
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick - "The Sandinistas"
Mr. Roger Fontaine, Senior Staff Member,
National Security Council - "El Salvador"

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 1983:

Ambassador H. Eugene Douglas, U.S. Coordinator
for Refugee Affairs - "The Refugee Problem and
Its Potential"
Assistant Secretary of State, Richard McCormack,
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs - "The
Economic Implications of Central America to the
United States"
Senor Adolfo Calero, Member, National Directorate, FDN -
"Nicaragua Under Communism"
Senor Stedman Fagoth-Muller, Leader, Miskito Indians -
"The Treatment of the Miskito Indians by the
Sandinistas"

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 1983:

Mr. John Lenczowski, Staff Member, National Security
Council - "The Soviet Effort in Central America"
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American
Affairs, Nestor Sanchez - "The CONTRA Offensive
in Nicaragua"

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 1983:

Ambassador Richard Stone - "The United States' Effort in
Central America"
Mr. Walter Raymond, Special Assistant to the President,
National Security Council - "The Cuban Effort in
Nicaragua"

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 1983:

Senor Miguel Bolanos Hunter, former Nicaraguan
Intelligence Officer - "Training Under the
Sandinistas"
Ambassador Vernon L. Walters - "U.S. Policy in Latin
America and Why"

WEDNESDAY, JULY 6, 1983:

Mr. Roger Fontaine, Senior Staff Member,
National Security Council - "A Central American
Up-date"

Dr. Richard Wirthlin, President,
Decision Making Information, Inc. - "How The
American Public Views Central America"

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 1983:

Ambassador J. William Middendorf, II, United States
Permanent Representative to the Organization of
American States - "Central America's Importance
to the United States"

WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 1983:

Rabbi Morton Rosenthal, Director of Latin American
Affairs, Anti-Defamation League - "Persecution
of the Jewish People in Central America"

Mr. Isaac Stavisky, Nicaraguan Jewish Refugee -
"The Sandinistas Against the Jews"

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman, Executive Assistant to
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick - "PLO and
Libyan Activities in Central America"

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Ronald W. Reagan

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 1983:

Congressman Thomas Hartnett and Congressman Mark D.
Siljander - "Central America Visited"

Congressman Vin Weber - "Central America, A View
From the Congress"

Ambassador Langhorne Motley, "Central American Policy,
Where Do We Go From Here?"

Senor Juan Vincente Maldonado, Executive Director
National Association for Private Enterprise in
El Salvador - "Central America From the Businessman's
Point of View"

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1983:

The Honorable John F. Lehman, Jr., Secretary of the Navy -
"The Strategic Importance of the Caribbean Sea Lanes"

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1983:

Mr. Dennis Suit, former ABC Cameraman - "Nicaragua From
The Other Side of the Lens"

Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy -
"Prospects for Central America"

Dr. Roger Fontaine, Senior Staff Member, National Security
Council - "An Up-date on Guatemala"

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 17, 1983:

Mr. M. Peter McPherson, Administrator, Agency for
International Development - "U.S. Economic
Assistance to Central America"
Colonel (Ret.) Samuel T. Dickens, Director,
New World Dynamics - "El Salvador Today"

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 24, 1983:

Ambassador Vernon A. Walters, Ambassador-at-Large -
"Central America: Background and Prospects"
"Central America, The Real Issue", Segment of a
video tape prepared by: WVCY-TV, TV-30,
featuring Ambassador H. Eugene Douglas, U.S.
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, filmed during
the briefing for the National Religious Broad-
casters by the White House Outreach Working Group
on Central America.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1983:

The Honorable John O. Marsh, Secretary of the Army -
"Soviet and Cuban Influences in Latin America"

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1983:

Lieutenant General James A. Williams, USA,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
"Central America Today"

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1983:

The Honorable Madam Monique Garnier-Lancon, Deputy
Mayor of Paris - "A European Looks at Central
America"
His Excellency Ernesto Rivas-Gallont, Ambassador of
the Government of El Salvador to the United
States - "El Salvador"