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DOC NO	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	NOTE	MARGUERITE TO FAITH WHITTLESEY	1	10/25/1983	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Camara de Comercio Iberoamericana

*Miss Lucy
(445)
Approve
M. BLACKWELL*

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Dr. Luis H. Vidana
Attorney at Law

December 19, 1983

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

It gives me great pleasure to have the occasion to bring to your attention the very excellent work being performed by the Office of Public Liason, under the direction of Mrs. Faith Ryan Whittlesey, with respect to the organization of public briefings on Central America and other current foreign policy issues.

Those of us who participate in the briefings benefit from a program in which the selection of topics is timely, the issue presentations thorough, and the casting of speakers superb. We commend the efforts of Morton Blackwell, Joyce Thomann and all staff members of the Office of Public Liason involved in this endeavour.

May you have a most blessed holiday season in union with your loved ones, and may the good Lord ensure your health for many more years to come.

Respectfully yours,

JAF
Jose Antonio Font
President

JAF/ko

#027



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
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Jose Antonio Font
President

JAF/ko

#027

CONSTANTINE MENGES

Guest columnist

With adequate aid, democracy possible

WASHINGTON — The positive opportunity for democracy in Central America is illustrated by the fact that 19 Latin American countries are democratic, six are liberalizing, and these 25 account for about 80 percent of the 380 million people in the region.

Soviet bloc and Cuban support for Marxist-Leninist terrorists and guerrillas threatened about 11 countries during the 1960s, declined in the early 1970s while Cuba sent 70,000 military and civilian personnel to support three dictatorships in Africa, and then, after 1978, increased sharply with a focus on Central America.

These actions threaten Central America with the repression and poverty that communism inevitably brings. Unless stopped, the momentum of communist-initiated violence and destabilization could reach our southern border.

Costa Rica is a functioning democracy, and Honduras has made a peaceful transition to democracy. They each have a border with Nicaragua where genuine democrats and Marxist-Leninist Sandinistas joined against Somoza. In 1979 a political solution led to Somoza's departure in exchange for written promises that the Sandinistas would hold elections in a few months and permit labor unions and media.

Instead, just as Castro did in 1959, the Sandinistas moved to establish their communist dictatorship, persecuted the genuine democrats, and began working with Cuba and the Soviet bloc to export subversion.

Three groups are competing for the destiny of El Salvador: A small violent right, which

Constantine Menges is senior director for Latin American affairs for the National Security Council.

seeks to roll back the land reform program and overturn the current government; the externally supported guerrillas, now estimated at about 7,000, who seek a Marxist-Leninist regime and refuse to participate in elections; and third, a broad coalition of political parties from democratic left to conservative, democratic unions, and most of the military, religious and civic institutions.

This third coalition supports the Salvadoran government — it has opposed both the violent right and the communist left, it supported the democratic elections of 1982, and it supports the coming March 25 elections and the existing land reform, which has benefited about 500,000 peasants.

President Reagan has adopted a balanced policy with four main elements: Support for democratization; improvement in economic conditions through increases in economic assistance, the Caribbean Basin initiative, and help with the regional debt crisis; dialogue for peaceful resolution of disputes through democratic elections and verified international agreements; and, security assistance to help our neighbors meet the threat posed by the violent extremes.

With adequate support from the United States and other friendly countries, there is every possibility that the positive opportunities for Central America can be realized.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

A Q U E S T I O N N A I R E

Please take a few moments to complete this questionnaire and return it to: The Office of Public Liaison, Room #191-OEOB, The White House, Washington, D.C. 20500. Thank you.

-
1. How many Wednesday Central America briefings, approximately, have you attended?
 2. Please comment on the usefulness of the briefings you have attended. Meetings with many of the principals active in the U. S. foreign policy arena have brought life and color, but most important, credibility, to the talks and presentations which I make to my "constituents." Much of the information which I have gathered at the briefings is simply not available elsewhere.
 3. What topics would be of interest to you for future speakers to address? U. S. foreign policy vis a vis the Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East, Persian Gulf Area.
 4. Who would be of particular interest to you as a speaker? Principals in charge of the foreign policy formulation.
 5. Would you recommend changing the format of the briefings? If so, how? Some of the briefings were burdened by too ambitious an agenda. Perhaps fewer speakers, per meeting, examining their subject in depth, would resolve the difficulty.
 6. Have the materials which have been distributed to date been useful to you? Very !!! More materials, please !
 7. What additional types of materials/information would be useful to you? Non-argumentative presentation of facts, supported by charts, graphs and maps. Audio transcripts, on cassettes, of each briefing.
 8. Has your organization engaged in any outreach activities? For example: speakers/programs on Central America, op-ed pieces, newsletters, articles in publications of your organization, etc. Please specify.

9. As a part of the White House Outreach program, we have established a Central America Speakers Bureau. Have you/your organization already used our Central America Speakers Bureau?

NO

10. Would your group need a speaker for one of its future meetings?

Not at the present time.

11. Are there groups you believe should be invited to the White House to receive a special briefing on Central America? If so, please identify.

12. Please use this space for any additional remarks/comments/suggestions you would like to make.

Thank you for your time and interest.

Optional: If you wish, please identify yourself and your organization.

Name: Marek L. Laas

ORGANIZATION: Support of Solidarity; Pomost

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 16, 1983

Mr. James E. Andrews
Mr. William P. Thompson,
Interim Co-Stated Clerks
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.)
341 Ponce de Leon Avenue, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30365

Dear Sirs:

This is in response to your thoughtful letter to the President of August 18, 1983.

Pursuant to your suggestion, we have circulated your policy statement on Central America to the members of the White House Outreach Working Group on Central America. The Working Group includes policy staff from all the major departments and agencies concerned with Central America.

The statement is very interesting and remarkably consistent. Perhaps because I went more than forty years without knowing a Presbyterian adhering to this viewpoint with such purity, I found the document particularly illuminating.

Thank you for providing us with these views.

Sincerely,



Morton C. Blackwell
Special Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE-
FOR POLICY

12 Sept 1983

TO: Ms. Faith Whittlesey

I plan to develop and elaborate on some of these themes for future speeches. Let me know of any suggestions you might have.



Fred C. Ikle

✓cc: Morton Blackwell



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

HOLD FOR RELEASE UNTIL
6 P.M., MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983

HIGHLIGHTS OF REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE FRED C. IKLE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
TO THE BALTIMORE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983

"The President's policy for Central America has not yet been given a chance to work," Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle told the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs. "Congress has denied the President the means to succeed." Yet, Dr. Ikle said, "Congress has involved itself in the management of US policy for Central America more than for any other region of the world."

Referring to the accusation that the Reagan Administration was seeking a military solution for Central America, Dr. Ikle recalled the predominance of economic aid, and said "We do not seek a military defeat for our friends. We do not seek a military stalemate. We seek victory for the forces of democracy."

He stressed that "the resources needed to succeed are small compared to our investment for security in other regions of the world. Once Congress gives us the means to succeed, the capability and determination of the United States will become clear." This will help deter the Soviet Union.

Dr. Ikle stated that the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua is in the process of becoming a "second Cuba" -- "more dangerous than Castro's Cuba since it shares hard-to-defend borders with Honduras and Costa Rica."

"Congressional legislation to deny US support to the democratic resistance forces in Nicaragua would turn Nicaragua into a sanctuary from which the nations of Central America could be safely attacked," Under Secretary Ikle stressed. "This would enable the promoters of totalitarianism--while being supplied and replenished by Cuba and the Soviet bloc--to attack neighboring countries indefinitely, and always with impunity." Thus the Sandinista regime would be consolidated and "would become an arsenal for insurgency, a safehaven for the export of violence.... If we cannot prevent that, we have to anticipate the partition of Central America. Such a development would then force us to man a new military front-line of the East-West conflict, right here on our continent."



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

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TO THE BALTIMORE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983

Our Policy for Central America -- Will Congress Let Us Succeed?

I am delighted to be here this evening and to have the opportunity to speak to you on this issue of such importance to us all.

Central America is closer to Baltimore than is California-- in terms of geographic distance, that is. But the intellectual distance between here and Central America is enormous. Most of the American people are not well informed about Central America; many are misinformed; and some are outright disdainful about the cultural and social importance of this region.

You all have an obligation to remedy this situation, so that you and your representatives in Congress can engage in constructive support--or constructive criticism--of the Administration's policy.

To begin with, you should know that the President's policy for Central America has not yet been given a chance to work: Congress has denied the President the means to succeed.

Indeed, Congress has involved itself in the management of US policy for Central America more than for any other region of the world.

- While Congress has quickly and easily approved some four and a half billion dollars in Security Assistance for nations in the Mediterranean region, it slashed nearly in half the much smaller allocation for nations in the Caribbean region--so much closer to home.
- While Congress has been generally supportive of the deployment of some 1200 U.S. Marines to Lebanon, it fought fiercely to limit the number of US trainers in El Salvador to 55.

- While Congress has not objected to large military exercises in the faraway Indian Ocean region, it heavily criticized the recent military exercises in the Caribbean region.
- While Congress has for a long time supported Radio Free Europe, the fine radio program that brings the truth to the people of Eastern Europe, Congress has delayed for two years President Reagan's request for Radio Marti, a new radio station that would bring the truth to the people in Cuba.

As we consult with members of Congress on these issues, we are often told that, you, their constituents, are pressing such positions on them. But as we review the public opinion polls, we discover an extraordinary lack of information. For example, in a recent New York Times/CBS poll, only 8 percent of the respondents knew, both for El Salvador and Nicaragua, whether the US was supporting the government or the insurgents.

You must help us overcome not only a lack of information, but also a great deal of misinformation. This misinformation is not accidental; it is the result of a well-organized and well-orchestrated effort. A fabric of fiction has been tightly woven to conceal the essential facts. Let me review with you some of these fictions:

Fiction has it that US influence in Central and Latin America has prevented democratic development, that the spread of Leninist regimes is the tide of history, a natural process of social reform that we should not oppose. The fact is that the trend toward democratization has continued: among the 32 independent states of Latin America and the Caribbean, 17 are now democratic. Since 1978, five countries have made a peaceful transition from military regimes to elected democratic governments. It is the much criticized military regimes that are often transformed into a democracy; but there has never yet been a Marxist-Leninist regime that was succeeded by democracy.

Another bit of fiction: that the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua would have developed into a pluralistic democracy, had it not been for the US intervention. The fact is that the Sandinistas, only a few weeks after they came into power, reneged on their promise for early elections, began to attack the democratic trade unions, and invited Cuban military and security personnel in steadily growing numbers. Yet, during the first 18 months of the Sandinista regime, the United States provided more than \$120 million in direct aid and endorsed over \$220 million in Inter-American Development Bank aid -- more than the previous Somoza regime in Nicaragua had received from the United States in twenty years! Clearly, it was not US interference that drove the Sandinistas to link up with Fidel Castro -- unless economic aid is regarded as "interference."

Another piece of fiction is the charge that the Reagan Administration is "militarizing" the problems of Central America and is bringing the East-West conflict to the region. Well, the East is already here. The Soviets are giving ten times as much military assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua as we are providing to all of Latin America. And Soviet military advisors in Cuba and Nicaragua outnumber US military advisors in the Caribbean region twenty to one.

* * *

Since Congress is so deeply involved in our day-to-day policy towards Central America, our key objectives need to be clear to the American people. Moreover, Congress must share with the Administration an understanding of our basic strategy.

On one thing we can all agree: We do not want the United States to fail. We must succeed.

But what is it we would like to see happen, and what do we want to prevent? We have wide agreement, I believe, that the United States favors a continuation and strengthening of the trend toward open, genuine democracy. And we favor social and economic betterment for the people in Central America, a region so close to us.

Equally important is what we want to prevent. We want to prevent the expansion of totalitarian regimes -- particularly Leninist ones, since they will import Stalinist police systems, bring in Soviet arms, and even invite Soviet military bases. There are two more reasons why Leninist regimes are particularly dangerous: once entrenched, they tend to become irreversible, and they usually seek to export their totalitarianism to other nations.

Given these objectives, what should be our strategy?

I.

First, we want to help build the road toward democracy and economic development. In the end, the people in each country will have to make their own choices. They can succeed only through their own dedicated effort. But we can help, through advice and influence, by facilitating trade, and by giving aid. The Caribbean Basin Initiative of the Reagan Administration (to which Congress has now agreed) is right on target. So are our efforts in El Salvador in behalf of elections and for improvements in the judicial system.

Also, we are using diplomacy to help the government of El Salvador win over those who are willing to abandon violence and compete in elections, provided they can be assured of safe and fair participation. But we must not underestimate our adversaries. The hard core among the insurgents will never settle for a fair democratic process. We can no more negotiate an acceptable political solution

with these people then the social democrats in revolutionary Russia could have talked Lenin into giving up totalitarian Bolshevism.

II.

This leads us to the second requirement. As Secretary Shultz recently explained, the guerillas in El Salvador have used a "rule or ruin" strategy: they seek to destroy economic assets faster than our aid can restore them. You cannot have economic development in a nation, if guerilla forces keep blowing up bridges, power lines, school buldings, buses ... You have to defeat these "rule or ruin" forces militarily. This is the purpose for our military assistance.

Every so often the critics of the Administration proclaim -- with accusatory connotation -- that we seek a "military solution" in El Salvador. If a "military solution" means putting primary emphasis on military assistance and military means, then it is more factual to accuse the Reagan Administration of seeking an "economic solution," since three dollars out of four in the requested assistance programs are for economic aid.

What we seek to do is to open the doors to democracy and close the doors to violence. But we have to use military means against those who insist--till they have imposed their rule--on using violence.

Let me make this clear to you:

- We do not seek a military defeat for our friends.
- We do not seek a military stalemate.
- We seek victory for the forces of democracy.

And that victory has two components:

One: Defeating militarily those organized forces of violence that refuse to accept the democratic will of the people.

Two: establishing an adequate internal system for justice and personal security.

At this point, let us recall our first agreed principle: We do not want the United States to fail. Hence, we must allocate sufficient means so that we can succeed. As long as Congress keeps crippling the President's military assistance program, we will have a policy always shy of success. We will remain locked into a protracted failure.

This the American people should not tolerate. If we are merely involved to fail, then we should not be involved at all.

The resources needed to succeed are small compared to our investment for security in other regions of the world. Once Congress gives us the means to succeed, the capability and determination of the United States will become clear. This will make the Soviet Union more cautious, which in turn will help our success. On the other hand, if we signal that we are afraid of victory over the forces of violence, if we signal that we have opted for protracted failure, we will only encourage the Soviets to redouble their effort. We will be inviting ever-increasing difficulties.

III.

The third requirement of US strategy for Central America is least well understood. We should seek to prevent the partition of Central America, a division of this region into two spheres, one linked to the Soviet bloc and one linked to the United States. Such a partition would inexorably lead to a hostile confrontation of large military forces, a confrontation that could last for decades.

We can see how such a confrontation works, as we look at Cuba. During the 24 years of the Castro dictatorship, while the standard of living deteriorated and human rights were widely violated, Cuba built up a large military establishment. It has the second largest army in Latin America (second only to Brazil), it has some 200 MIG fighter aircraft, submarines, 6000 to 8000 Soviet advisors, and several Soviet intelligence installations. In addition, Castro has sent some 30 to 40 thousand troops abroad to provide the mercenary forces to protect the Soviet imperial outposts. As a result of the militarization of Cuba, our sealines to NATO are now seriously threatened.

The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua is determined to create a "second Cuba" in Central America. Ever since they seized power, the Sandinistas embarked on a major military buildup. Today, they have a much larger army than Somoza ever had, and they have expressed the intention to build the largest force in Central America. Nicaragua is building new military airfields, and is importing Soviet tanks, helicopters, armored vehicles, and other equipment.

This "second Cuba" in Nicaragua would be more dangerous than Castro's Cuba since it shares hard to defend borders with Honduras and Costa Rica. The Sandinistas have already started terrorist activities in both these countries. In addition, Nicaragua provides essential support for the insurgency in El Salvador.

Even after the insurgency in El Salvador has been brought under control, Nicaragua--if it continued on its present course--would be the bridgehead and arsenal for insurgency for Central America. And once the Sandinistas have acquired the military strength that they have long been planning for, they might well

use that strength for direct attacks on their neighbors to help speed up the "revolution without frontiers" that they promised us.

At that time, the only way to help protect the democracies might be for the United States to place forward deployed forces in these countries, as in Korea or West Germany. Clearly, we must prevent such a partition of Central America.

Yet, Congress has so far failed to give the President the means he requires to succeed. In the Democrats' response to President Reagan's April 27 address on Central America to a Joint Session of Congress, Senator Dodd said: "We will oppose the establishment of Marxist states in Central America." Yet, the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives has done exactly the opposite. It voted to oppose US assistance to those who oppose the establishment of a Marxist state in Nicaragua. That is to say, the House, in effect, voted to establish a sanctuary for the Sandinistas.

Congressional legislation to deny US support to the democratic resistance forces in Nicaragua would turn Nicaragua into a sanctuary from which the nations of Central America could be safely attacked, but in which US supported forces could not operate. This would enable the promoters of totalitarianism--while being supplied and replenished by Cuba and the Soviet bloc--to attack neighboring countries indefinitely, and always with impunity. Hence, it would deprive the Marxist groups in El Salvador of any incentive to compromise. Indeed, if such legislation were passed, the Sandinistas and Cubans might well find it safe to increase their assistance to the insurgents in El Salvador and to step up the destabilization of Honduras and Costa Rica. This, after all, would be fully consistent with their presently declared objectives; and the guaranteed sanctuary would render such escalation almost risk-free.

The psychological impact from cutting off US assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance forces fighting for democracy in their native land would be severe. Such a cut off would signal throughout the region that the totalitarian Leninist forces represent the winning side. The democratic forces would have cause to despair. They would see that terrorist and insurgent attacks against them are being generously supported by Cuba and the Soviet bloc, and that these attacks can be conducted from safe havens that are protected by the US Congress, in effect, from all counter-interference. Conversely, the totalitarian Leninist force would know that as soon as they seize control of a country, they will be secure: Cuba and the Soviet bloc will help them maintain an efficient police machinery to repress the people; and should any group arise to fight for freedom, the United States Congress would deny it all support.

* * *

Let me recapitulate.

Our basic objectives for Central America are clear: we want to strengthen democracy; we want to prevent in this hemisphere the expansion of totalitarian regimes, especially those linked to the Soviet Union.

To this end, we extend economic support and promote democratic development. But given forces of violence that will not accept the democratic will of the people, we also have to provide military assistance--enough to succeed. In addition, we must prevent consolidation of a Sandinista regime in Nicaragua that would become an arsenal for insurgency, a safe haven for the export of violence. If we cannot prevent that, we have to anticipate the partition of Central America. Such a development would then force us to man a new military front-line of the East-West conflict, right here on our continent.

To prevent such an outcome, the Administration and Congress must work together with a strategy that can succeed.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Valley - Please send copy to Morton & file in log

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

THROUGH: Mary Ann Meloy

FROM: Morton C. Blackwell

SUBJECT: ~~Press Request~~** (Although this is NOT a press request per se, because it has potential press implications, we are promoting it as a "Press Request.")

STUDENTS

RESPONDENT NAME: Ms. Carol Naifek

INSTITUTION: Vanderbilt University

TELEPHONE NUMBER: 966-2714

TOPIC OF INTERVIEW: Ms. Naifek is working on her Masters Thesis which will be devoted to media coverage of recent happenings in Central America. She has worked with the McNeil-Leher Report this summer and has been able to see media from that vantage point. She has already interviewed high-level officials from various Central American countries; media personnel/personalities, and would now like to interview some Administration people to get their opinions. (She has interviewed members of Congress as well.)

REQUESTED/~~INVESTIGATED~~ INTERVIEW DATE: ASAP

HOW: In Person Yes Telephone Yes (either)
Tape Live

FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY: Approve: ✓ 10-4-83
Disapprove: ✓

Press Office: Called in 10-4-83 :
Cleared 10-5-83 : 10:58A
Not Cleared :

BY

Marian Walker

To Joyce
Date 10.4.83 Time 11:04

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M Carolyn Naifeh
of _____

Phone (A 615) 383-6618
Area Code Number Extension

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RETURNED YOUR CALL

Message In her Master's
thesis she is doing
a report on media
coverage of Central
America. She has
worked with Joyce
McNeal-Leibig
Operator Repat

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sent you a
copy yesterday
9/5/83 - Approved
per MAM.

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY
THROUGH: Mary Ann Meloy
FROM: Morton C. Blackwell
SUBJECT: Press Request** (Although this is NOT a press request per se, because it has potential press implications, we are processing it as a "Press Request.")
DATE: August 19, 1983

STUDENTS
~~REPORTERS~~ NAME: Ms. Carolyn Naifek
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ SUBJECT: Vanderbilt University

TELEPHONE NUMBER: 966-2714

TOPIC OF INTERVIEW: Ms. Naifek is working on her Masters Thesis which will be devoted to media coverage of recent happenings in Central America. She has worked with the McNeil-Leher Report this summer and has been able to see media from that vantage point. She has already interviewed high-level officials from various Central American countries; media personnel/personalities, and would now like to interview some Administration people to get their opinions. (She has interviewed members of Congress as well.)

REQUESTED/~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ INTERVIEW DATE: ASAP

HOW: In Person Yes Telephone Yes (either)
Tape _____ Live _____

FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY: Approve: _____
Disapprove: _____

Press Office: Called in _____ : _____
Cleared _____ : _____
Not Cleared _____ : _____

By _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY
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HOW: In Person Yes Telephone Yes (either)
Tape Live

FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY: Approve:

Disapprove: ✓

Press Office: Called in :
Cleared :
Not Cleared :

By

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YA



Valley
Forge
Military Academy
and
Junior College

WAYNE, PENNSYLVANIA 19087
(215) 688-1800

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Southern Pines, NC.
(919) 692-4168 28387
AUG 22 1983

14 Aug '83

file MB

Dear Faith:

Sorry I missed seeing you at the last meeting of the Outreach Group. I wanted to complement your office staff for responding promptly to my call for current information I needed for an appearance on the McNeil/Dehner report that evening. I had been called at the Forge to appear on the program to support the President's plan for maneuvers which was being opposed by Stanfield Turner. It worked out well, McNeil said "You do have firm convictions!" and I was called by Channel 6 and Cable TV in Atlanta to appear on subsequent programs. Unfortunately I was moving. As you can see from XEROXED excerpts I did "hit the party line."

I have a suggestion which I feel may improve your Outreach program. That is pattern your program on that used by Pres. Carter when he was "selling" the Panama Canal Treaty. Visits by groups from all over the country to the White House, lunch + an indoctrination on how to support in your local community (complete with brochure). If you are interested I could explain it in more detail when I visit the White House with the

(26 Aug.)

American Security Council on Friday/afternoon for a
briefing.

SS 20

Warm Regards

Ted MATAXIS

14 Aug 68
5/17/68



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Central America: Maneuvers and Covert Aid

In New York

ROBERT MacNEIL Executive Editor
Gen. THEODORE MATAxis Valley Forge Military Academy

In Washington

CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT Correspondent
Adm. STANSFIELD TURNER Former CIA Director
Sen. CHRISTOPHER DODD Democrat, Connecticut
Sen. TED STEVENS Republican, Alaska
Producer KENNETH WITTY, LEWIS SILVERMAN
Reporter MAURA LERNER

[Tease]

Pres. RONALD REAGAN [July 26, 1983]: We're not planning a war, and we don't think that that's going to happen at all.

Admiral Turner gives his views against the action in Central America - calls it "dangerous."

MacNEIL: For another view we turn to Retired Brigadier General Theodore Mataxis, a combat officer in World War II, Korea and Vietnam, and assistant to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff in the early '60s. General Mataxis is now assistant superintendent and commandant of cadets at Valley Forge Military Academy in Pennsylvania. General Mataxis, Admiral Turner says, as much as he admires the President's exhibition of strength, he feels that these moves are dangerous. They could possibly lead to greater and greater commitment. What is your view of it?

Gen. THEODORE MATAxis: Well, I think the Admiral and I agree 100% on admiring the President for his moves. Now, where we differ is the Admiral feels it may lead us down the road to more trouble. But, on the other hand, if we did nothing and watched the countries topple— Nicaragua has gone, Honduras is under pressure from guerrillas supplied from Nicaragua with the arms from Cuba and Russia, so I think it is best for the President to take a stand at this time and let the people know what he intends to do, and show his hand in Central America. I differ on the possibility of shooting at a French ship or any other ships going through. The pronouncements from the Pentagon have been very clear; that we will not do that. And I'm sure the Admiral remembers in the early '60s where we sat at the end of the tables and listened to what was going on in the Caribbean, where the ships were monitored step by step. Now, this is not—

MacNEIL: During the Cuban missile crisis?

Gen. MATAxis: During the Cuban missile crisis. This doesn't even approach that.

MacNEIL: What do you see as the purpose of these maneuvers?

Gen. MATAxis: I would say the purpose of the maneuvers are like you're in a certain confrontation here that we have said, "We are going to do this. We want you to stop sending arms into Central America, into Nicaragua, into El Salvador so that the people have a chance down there for democracy and vote, as they did vote in El Salvador." The guerrilla bands are tearing us up. We said we will not stand for this. We are sending advisers to help the El Salvadoran troops and train them, and I think this gives us another card that we're playing — the naval power and the naval air power that we have to show what we do have in the area and back up what the President's saying.

MacNEIL: What happens if the maneuvers go on for the length of time projected for them, and the Sandinistas haven't changed any of their behavior and all that U.S. prestige has been laid on the line and the ante has been upped that far. What happens then?

Gen. MATAxis: That's a question the President and the National Security Council are going to have to ask — to answer. However, I would pose the question, if we did nothing now, wouldn't we be in much worse shape than taking some action, which hopefully will bring them to the — to negotiation table.

MacNEIL: General?

Gen. MATAxis: I agree, that is a very difficult problem. And as I rode down to Washington the other day to a presidential conference that he had for an outreach group, I was listening to the radio. On one side they mentioned the damage being done by the guerrillas to Nicaragua. Then they talked about El Salvador, and I thought we'd have a balanced reporting there, that they'd talk about what the guerrillas were doing in El Salvador. But no. They talked about the atrocities of the government troops. And that was one of the things the President covered at this outreach group. He's having a hard time getting through the media blocks, this Chicken Little approach, where we're running in circles screaming and yelling, "The sky is falling." I think the President has been voted in as a leader for us, and at this time it's up to him to take the moves as you said you admire him for, taking these very moves, he should take these moves. I believe that's the part of the leader, taking the moves and seeing what happens down the road rather than to just waiting and letting things happen to us.

MacNEIL: Can I just ask you, do you agree with Admiral Turner that the American military is very chummy about getting out in front of public opinion in a situation like this?

Gen. MATAxis: This has been noted in the newspapers and so forth. They have talked and said they don't want to get out ahead of the public. But they are talking through the National Security Council and so forth, not something like I saw in the paper where some majors and colonels go in to the senators and representatives' office and tell them they think this is a bad thing. I personally think that's absolutely atrocious and horrible.

MacNEIL: Do you have a final word, General Mataxis?

Gen. MATAxis: Well, I think it is a dynamic new program, and I think that's what we need is some action from the President as a leader. As the Admiral mentioned, a lot of this is economic aid. The economic aid is to go to the population to try and help them with the infrastructure — build the infrastructure that they have. And one of the problems, that the President mentioned the other day, on Wednesday, that what he's trying to do is get a climate down there so democracy can flourish. They've had an election in El Salvador. They haven't had one in Nicaragua, and we want to make sure that we can keep it that way.

MacNeil asked Admiral a question on whether the President could get support of people for his Central American program. Admiral answered he did not feel it an area of high concern which the Americans would support.

Foreign Press Center

National Press Building
Room 202
Washington, D.C. 20045



Bob,

Attached a copy of report
as requested.

Frank D. Gomez

^{6/8/10 EOTB}
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United States Information Agency

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

THROUGH: C - John L. Hedges

FROM: P - W. Scott Thompson

SUBJECT: Report on Foreign Correspondent Tour of
Central America

SUMMARY

The Washington Foreign Press Center's October 2-16 tour of Central America for 12 top foreign correspondents exceeded all expectations in influencing understanding of and reporting on U.S. policy in the region. Besides altering considerably the perceptions of the correspondents themselves, the program produced a still continuing stream of highly positive coverage and a new awareness of realities in the region. These will bring further benefits in the near and distant future. Close inter-Agency cooperation and coordination with field posts helped to assure the success of the project.

BACKGROUND

The Washington Foreign Press Center-conducted tour of Central America October 2-16 for twelve top foreign correspondents was eminently successful in dispelling doubt and skepticism about U.S. policies and motives in the region.

The tour was designed to address European public opinion, in particular, the erroneous impression that American policy 1) is misguided and its main focus is security rather than democracy, human rights and development; 2) is responsible for introducing East-West conflict into a purely regional matter; 3) is backing reactionary, non-democratic forces which do not represent the will of the people; and 4) that El Salvadoran guerrillas and Nicaragua's Sandinistas seek fundamental social changes, greater equality and social justice.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

6/8/60 WDS

First conceived by P/F in August and closely coordinated with the Reich group at the State Department, the program gained converts to American policy and exposed media leaders to realities which have aided their understanding of a complex and troubled region.

Program Preparation

Careful planning and the cooperation of field posts and others in Washington helped to assure the success of this program. P/F's early August cable outlining the proposal was warmly received by USIS posts in Central America, Europe and Japan. P/F drew up a list of preferred participants asking each post for its views. Judicious selection produced a group whose more liberal and critical members, it was hoped, would be favorably influenced by the more moderate, conservative and better informed participants. The attached list of correspondents, their media organizations and their political inclinations gives a clearer idea of the mix achieved (Attachment A).

P/F Director Frank Gomez made an advance trip to the area in early September to confer with PAOs, Chiefs of Mission and others on both substantive and logistical aspects of the program. Meanwhile, P/F contacted the correspondents, began securing visas and plane tickets and pinned down other details.

In addition to providing abundant background materials, P/F scheduled pre-departure briefings for the group with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nestor Sanchez, Ambassador Otto Reich and Deputy Assistant Secretary Craig Johnstone at State, and El Salvadoran Ambassador Ernesto Rivas-Gallont. The P/F staff also briefed participants on the itinerary, filing facilities, accommodations, transportation and other matters.

Program Execution

USIS-scheduled activities served three basic purposes: 1) to expose correspondents to U.S. policy in each country and the region; 2) to acquaint them first hand with the political, economic and social realities of each country; and 3) to give them access to the full spectrum of public opinion in order to assure U.S. credibility and objectivity. That each objective was fully met testifies to each post's planning ability, good judgment, political instincts, excellent working relationships with local officials and cooperation from other mission elements. Appointments included heads of government, foreign ministers, other senior officials, opposition party leaders, human rights and church representatives, the military, the media, the private sector and representatives of two major groups fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

Cables on each leg of the trip were sent from the field. Among the highlights for each country were:

Guatemala: The perception of the U.S. as the close ally of a military dictatorship and as the manipulator of all events in the country was shattered. Participants flew by plane and helicopter to Huehuetenango Department, the center of recent guerrilla activity, where the army swore in 4,000 armed rural Self-Defense Patrolmen, part of the government's highly successful "Beans and Rifles" counter-insurgency effort. The display of affection between the military and the peasants left a deep and lasting impression on the correspondents. Head of Government Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, who refuses to be called "president", echoed sentiments heard elsewhere about the determination of the Guatemalan people to find the path toward democratic government. Given steps he has taken thus far and the free, open debate on the future of the country, his remarks were very well received.

Honduras: Rather than an armed camp controlled by the defense minister, as portrayed abroad, correspondents saw a country struggling to strengthen democratic institutions while at the same time resisting subversion and military threat from Nicaragua. Rather than a massive U.S. military build-up, they saw a relatively modest, well-intentioned and badly needed American assistance program in proportion with Honduran and El Salvadoran realities and the challenges in the region.

El Salvador: Despite renewed death-squad activity (reported by the group), correspondents saw a country struggling to contain guerrilla warfare on the left and violent extremism on the right. They discovered a broadly-based desire to develop a democratic system and continue basic reforms. As elsewhere, they learned that the U.S. does not determine events but seeks to find a moderate, reformist alternative to extremism. In the San Vicente Re-Development Program, in agrarian reform and in institution building, the correspondents saw stories which much of the international press has ignored.

Nicaragua: Having already heard much about Nicaragua, the group was prepared to believe the worst. And that is what they got, beginning with an hour-long airport search of their bags (the only one on the trip) and a GON-proposed program which they complained "was merely designed to keep us busy." A superb USIS-arranged schedule included a briefing by Ambassador Quainton and meetings with Archbishop Obando y Bravo, the head of the Human Rights Commission, the Editor of "opposition" La Prensa and private sector leaders. A government-encouraged visit to see sabotaged oil tanks was poorly received. In short, the reporters left Managua embittered, disillusioned and highly critical of what they regard as a Cuban-inspired Marxist-Leninist dictatorship bent on consolidating its power and subverting its neighbors.

Costa Rica: As only it can, democratic Costa Rica contrasted so greatly with Nicaragua that its psychological impact on the correspondents was greater than trip planners anticipated. A traditional home for exiles, Costa Rica supported the Sandinista revolution only to see it stolen by communists. With their sovereignty violated frequently by Sandinista forces, Costa Ricans not only condemn the GON but are also strongly critical of Western democratic governments and the Socialist International for supporting a morally bankrupt Nicaraguan regime. They criticize Mexico for disregarding internal human conditions in the interest of preserving its freedom from Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan subversion. Correspondents heard views of highly credible Costa Ricans which largely echo official U.S. perceptions. A meeting with ARDE political director Alfonso Robelo helped to convince the group of weakening international support for the GON and the desirability of toppling the FSLN regime.

Program Benefits

As is evident from the foregoing, the tour significantly altered correspondent attitudes. This first-hand experience has already produced valuable, more positive coverage in numerous capitals and portends more accurate, balanced and favorable reporting for the long term. While all the benefits may not be discernable now, we can point to several specific facts which illustrate the impact of the program on the correspondents:

A. The tour produced new converts to U.S. policy in general. While some correspondents may question American tactics, they no longer question U.S. objectives. The U.S. economic, political and military presence is now viewed as reasonable and in the best interests of the region and the western democracies.

B. Correspondents gained a new understanding of the uniqueness of each country of the region and of the complexities of the area itself. Consequently, they should be wary of generalizations.

C. There is increased recognition that today's turmoil, while growing out of centuries of injustice, is being exploited directly by Moscow and Havana, through Managua, to serve Soviet aims.

D. Correspondents acquired an awareness of Mexico's pivotal role in the peaceful resolution of the conflicts. In the Contadora process and in its general approach to the region, they see Mexico as turning a blind eye to external subversion in an effort to assure its own freedom from Soviet or Cuban-inspired trouble-making at home. There is new interest in exploring and reporting on the Mexican connection in the resolution of the conflicts, an interest which the Agency may wish to exploit in the near future.

E. Participants learned that, contrary to the popular image, the U.S. does not determine events in Central America but, rather, that it seeks democracy, development and the moderation of actions of the extreme right and the extreme left.

F. The tour illustrated graphically the extent to which international coverage of the various countries has been incomplete, biased, distorted and, at times, inaccurate. As a result, they are now inclined not to accept news accounts at face value but rather to question and analyze what they hear about the region. They now have a frame of reference to interpret events.

G. The visit gave both correspondents and the Foreign Press Center valuable contacts in the region which can be used to good advantage when these persons visit Washington or New York in the future.

While these and other benefits are highly positive, they do not mean that negative or biased reporting will cease. Several participants, greatly impressed by what they saw, expressed concern about their ability to convince their editors and readers of the realities they observed. Also, the correspondents do not see any quick fix for the region. While they agree that the U.S. is well-intentioned and believe other democratic nations should assist in defending democracy, they also recognize the dangers of polarization within and among the countries. With renewed death squad activity and some public opposition to continuing land reform, the situation in El Salvador remains troubled indeed. And Nicaragua's internal crisis, they believe, is not likely to be resolved through negotiation. The correspondents foresee a civil war there, perhaps involving some of that country's neighbors. While they are generally sympathetic to U.S. motives and objectives, the journalists question some American tactics and want to know more about alleged covert assistance to anti-FSLN forces.

Follow-Up and Momentum

The Foreign Press Center, other Agency elements, field posts and the foreign affairs community in Washington must continue to work with and expand this core of informed, sympathetic interpreters of our policies and the realities of the region. Failure to carry out a well conceived, systematic and sustained follow-up effort will mean allowing tendentious, unfavorable reporting to weaken the positive impressions developed recently. P/F will work closely with AR in coordinating future programs.

In addition to a similar tour for television journalists and another print tour in the next few months, P/F plans to facilitate coverage of the Fourth Annual Conference on the Caribbean in Miami November 30-December 2. A tour by journalists based in Europe is also

contemplated. A request has been renewed for a special, classified DOD briefing on the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan arms build-up and support for external subversion. P/F will also arrange for foreign press participation in a Florida International University seminar on Central America for editors and journalists in February 1984.

Conclusion

The P/F-sponsored tour was remarkably successful in advancing U.S. foreign policy interests in Central America. Changed perceptions among key correspondents, we hope, will result in more positive attitudes on the part of publics and governments in Europe and Japan. These can contribute not only to greater support for U.S. policy in Central America but also reduce an irritant in European perceptions which helps to fuel opposition to INF deployment.

The first foreign journalist tour ever conducted abroad, this program illustrates the potential value such efforts can have in addressing other foreign policy issues. Although the tour imposed great demands on already over-burdened posts, the relatively low financial cost and the great pay-off argue for more tours in the future.

PARTICIPANTS IN FOREIGN PRESS CENTER TOUR OF CENTRAL AMERICA

OCTOBER 2-15

AUSTRIA	Georg Possaner (Die Presse)
BELGIUM	Yve. Laudy (La Libre Belgique)
DENMARK	Bent Albrechtsen (Berlingske Tidende)
FRANCE	Michel Faure (Liberation)
WEST GERMANY	Lutz Krusche (Frankfurter Rundschau, Stuttgarter Zeitung and Hannoversche Allgemeine)
UNITED KINGDOM	Christopher Thomas (The Times)
ITALY	Ennio Caretto (La Stampa)
JAPAN	Takehiko Kiyohara (Sankei Shimbun)
NETHERLANDS	Marc de Koninck (Z.O.P.)
NORWAY	Lars Hellberg (Aftenposten)
SPAIN	Jose Maria Carrascal (ABC Newspapers)
LATIN AMERICA	Adolfo Aleman (ANSA Latin Wire)

MEDIA REACTION EXCERPTS

Ennio Caretto, in "La Stampa" (Turin) — (Reporting from Managua on "The Difficult U.S. - Nicaragua Dialogue,") "Some wonder whether it was Reagan who caused this change with CIA covert activities, or whether this is the unavoidable product of the Marxism-Leninism of the Ortega brothers, of Borge and the other members of the Nicaragua politburo. But this is a sterile dispute. After the Pope's visit, whose portrait is now a sign of dissent, the regime is in full involution..."

Lars Hellberg, in "Aftenposten" (Oslo) — (Under the heading, "Tough Censorship, Tight Standardization in Nicaragua") "To all opposition groups which are still active, the uncertainty and the regime's unpredictability are the worst... (Those) in opposition try to conceal their fear of what tomorrow may bring. Today, however, the Sandinistas are facing a well articulated and — considering the circumstances — vociferous opposition."

Lutz Krusche, in "Frankfurter Rundschau" (Frankfurt) — (Reporting from Managua) "Press Censorship is rigorous. Seven (formally independent) minor parties exist, but actually are under the tutelage of the omnipresent FSLN (Government party). Gross violations of human rights, including torture and vanishing of persons, are prevalent, Xavier Zavala, Chairman of the Nicaraguan Human Rights Commission says... Archbishop Obando y Bravo complains that even sermons are subjected to censorship... (and that the Sandinistas try) 'to seize control of youth and, with the help of over 2,000 Cuban teachers, to indoctrinate children and split families. . .'"

Assorted commentaries filed by the correspondents during the Central American trip included:

Georg Possaner, in "Die Presse" (Vienna) — (Reporting impressions of the Regional Military Center near Trujillo, Honduras) "Lessons about human rights are also getting their fair share. How to treat prisoners in compliance with the Law of War is being taught (to the Salvadoran and Honduran troops) the same way as how to treat the civilian population. A Salvadoran Colonel is the lecturer..."

Bent Albrechtsen, in "Berlingske Tidende" (Copenhagen) — (Analyzing Central American developments) "Diplomatic, economic and military means are employed (by the U.S.) in order to influence developments. A closer analysis of motives can only lead to the conclusion that the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua and the fear that El Salvador shall go the same way, are the most important reasons for these measures..."

Christopher Thomas, in "The Times" (London) — (Reporting on the "Beans and Rifles" program in Guatemala) "This correspondent witnessed a demonstration by as least 4,000 Indians in the mountains north of Huehuetenango to celebrate the first anniversary of the formation of local civil defense forces. . ."

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PAGE 01

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INDEPENDENT, CONSERVATIVE DAILY (CIRCULATION: ABOVE TWO
MILLION FOR MORNING EDITION, ONE MILLION FOR EVENING) WHICH
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RUESMG/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 0636

RUEHNS/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE PRIORITY 1213

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USIA 55713

USIA

EO 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: TOUR OF CENTRAL AMERICA BY PRESIDENT. PRINT MEDIA
CORRESPONDENTS

REFERENCE: USIA 52057

1. FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE MEDIA
ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED BY THE 12 PARTIES ON SUBJECT
TOUR.

A. AUSTRIA (VIENNA) -- "DIE PRESSE" (GERMAN) IN GERMANY IS
AN INDEPENDENT/CONSERVATIVE DAILY (AVERAGE CIRCULATION:
75,000) WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED AS AUSTRIA'S MOST PRESTIGIOUS
NEWSPAPER.

B. BELGIUM (BRUSSELS) -- "LA LIBRE BELGEE" (FRENCH) IS AN
INDEPENDENT CONSERVATIVE CATHOLIC DAILY (CIRCULATION:
125,000) WHICH FAVORS THE SOCIAL-CHRISTIAN PARTY AND IS
CALLED THE VOICE OF THE BELGIAN CATHOLIC MIDDLE CLASS.

C. DENMARK (COPENHAGEN) -- "BERLINGSKE TIDENDE" (DANISH) IS
THE OLDEST DANISH DAILY (FOUNDED IN 1749) AND IS NOW
DENMARK'S FOURTH-RANKING PAPER (CIRCULATION: ABOUT 125,000).
CONSIDERED ONE OF DENMARK'S MOST INFLUENTIAL PAPERS, WHILE
REPRESENTING THE CONSERVATIVES, "BERLINGSKE TIDENDE" IS
ESPECIALLY NOTABLE FOR ITS EMPHASIS ON FOREIGN NEWS.

D. FRANCE (PARIS) -- "LIBERATION" (FRENCH) IS A LEFTIST,
SATIRICAL, ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT DAILY (CIRCULATION: 70,000)
WHICH STRESSES INFORMATION AND CULTURE, AND CLAIMS TO BE FREE
OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

E. WEST GERMANY (FRANKFURT) -- "FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU"
(GERMAN) IS THE MOST DISTINCT LEFT-LIBERAL OF THE LEADING
WEST-GERMAN DAILIES (CIRCULATION: MORE THAN 200,000) WHICH IS
OFTEN AND FREELY CRITICAL OF U.S. SOCIETY AND FOREIGN POLICY,
BUT FIRMLY SUPPORTS ALLIANCE WITH THE U.S. AND NATO.

F. UNITED KINGDOM (LONDON) -- "THE TIMES OF LONDON"
(ENGLISH) IS AN INDEPENDENT, NON-PARTISAN, INTELLECTUAL PAPER
WHICH HAS LONG BEEN REGARDED AS BRITAIN'S MOST INFLUENTIAL
DAILY (CIRCULATION: ABOUT 300,000). PAPER COVERS U.S. ISSUES
FULLY AND OBJECTIVELY, AND IS GENERALLY WELL DISPOSED TOWARD
THE U.S. SINCE PAPER WAS SOLD IN 1981 TO PUBLISHER RUPERT
MURDOCH, HOWEVER, IT HAS ADOPTED A MORE CONSERVATIVE TONE.

G. ITALY (TURIN) -- "LA STAMPA" (ITALIAN) IS A LIBERAL,
CENTRIST DAILY WHICH IS INDEPENDENT IN THE TRADITIONAL
TRADITION. OWNED BY FIAT, WHICH REPRESENTS A BALANCED
BUSINESS FORCES, PAPER IS RESPECTED FOR ITS OBJECTIVITY AND
IS ITALY'S SECOND LARGEST DAILY (CIRCULATION: ABOVE 350,000).
COVERAGE IS GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE U.S. AND SUPPORTS A
STRONG NATO.

H. JAPAN (TOKYO, OSAKA) -- "SANKEI SHIMBUN" (JAPANESE) IS AN

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PAGE 01

025135 HIA479
29/0323Z

ORIGIN OFFICE PFW-02
INFO ACO-01 PFL-01 PGMF-02 PFN-01 AR-03 PGMG-01 /011 A5 10

DRAFTED BY P/FW RSANDIN
APPROVED BY P/F EDGOMEZ
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RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 0730
RUESMG/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 0637
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE PRIORITY 1214
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USIA 55713

USIA

EO 12356 N/A

CONSERVATIVE AND MODERATELY LIBERAL AUDIENCES. PAPER SUPPORTS JAPAN'S INCREASED DEFENSE EFFORT FOR ITS OWN SECURITY COMMENSURATE WITH THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC STRENGTH.

I. NETHERLANDS (THE HAGUE) -- "ZUID-OOST-PERS" (DUTCH) IS AN ASSOCIATION OF REGIONAL AND SMALL- TO MEDIUM-SIZE CITY NEWSPAPERS IN THE SOUTH OF THE NETHERLANDS, WHICH GENERALLY HAVE A RIGHT OF CENTER FOCUS. "Z. O. P." PRESS AGENCY ALSO SHARES SERVICES WITH "PERS UNIE NETHERLANDS," A SIMILAR PRESS ASSOCIATION OPERATING IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES AND INCLUDING ONE PAPER IN BELGIUM. ALTOGETHER "Z. O. P." CONSTITUTES THE BIGGEST DUTCH GROUP (19) OF NEWSPAPERS (TOTAL CIRCULATION MORE THAN THREE MILLION)

J. NORWAY (OSLO) -- "AFTENPOSTEN" (NORWEGIAN) IS AN INDEPENDENT-CONSERVATIVE DAILY (CIRCULATION: 225,000 FOR MORNING EDITION, 150,000 FOR EVENING) WHICH IS REGARDED AS NORWAY'S MOST INFLUENTIAL NEWSPAPER. PAPER COMMENTS ON ALL MAJOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE U. S., NATO AND THE WEST.

K. SPAIN (MADRID) -- "ABC NEWSPAPERS" (SPANISH) IS A MAJOR CONSERVATIVE DAILY (CIRCULATION: ABOVE 130,000, PLUS ADDITIONAL 60,000 FROM SEVILLE EDITION) WHICH IS OWNED BY PRENSA ESPANOLA. TRADITIONALLY CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF SPAIN'S MOST INFLUENTIAL PAPERS, "ABC OF MADRID" IN RECENT YEARS HAS ACHIEVED AN INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION FOR QUALITY.

L. LATIN AMERICA (BUENOS AIRES) -- "ANSA LATIN AMERICA WIRE SERVICE" IS AN INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCY AFFILIATED WITH THE OFFICIAL ITALIAN NEWS AGENCY, "ANSA," BUT IS OWNED AND OPERATED BY ARGENTINE INTERESTS. ANSA NOW HAS 18 BUREAUS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA, AND IS ESPECIALLY INFLUENTIAL, AND COMPETITIVE WITH THE U. S. NEWS AGENCIES THROUGH ITS SPANISH LANGUAGE SERVICES. P/FW

WICK
BT
*5713

UNCLASSIFIED

SCHEDULE FOR VISITING FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS,
COSTA RICA - OCTOBER 14 - 16, 1983

Friday, October 14

- 0935 Arrival. Group's luggage will be brought directly to Hotel Cariari.
- 1000 Interview with President Luis Alberto Monge, at his residence in Santa Ana.
- 1200 Working lunch with Carlos Manuel Castillo, President of the Central Bank, and Rodolfo Silva, Minister for External Debt Negotiations, VIP Room, Hotel Cariari.
- 1400 Interview with Rafael Angel Calderon, head of UNIDAD opposition coalition, and Bernd Niehaus, former Foreign Minister, law office of Lic. Calderon.
- 1530 Briefing by Ambassador Winsor and principal Embassy officers, USIS Information Section.
- 1930 Reception offered by Ambassador Winsor at his residence in Escazu.

Saturday, October 15

- 0800 Breakfast meeting with ARDE leaders, VIP Room, Hotel Cariari.
- 1000 Interview with Dr. Samuel Stone, Dr. Rodolfo Cerdas and Lic. Rafael Villegas, of CIAPA (Costa Rican "think tank"), VIP Room, Hotel Cariari.

1200

Working lunch with private sector leaders of CINDE (Coalicion Costarricense de Iniciativas de Desarrollo).

1400

Meeting with Monseñor Roman Arrieta, Archbishop of San Jose and President of Central American Council of Bishops (SELAM), at his residence in San Antonio de Belen.

1500

Meeting with Minister of Justice Carlos Jose Gutierrez, site to be determined.

Sunday, October 16


0530

Pick-up for trip to airport

PEACE · AND · FREEDOM · IN · LATIN · AMERICA

**STOP U.S.
INTERVENTION
IN
CENTRAL AMERICA**

*file
Central
America*



**LONDON
DAY OF ACTION
August 12th**

**NATIONAL DAY OF ACTION
September 11th**

Organised by No Intervention in Central America (NICA)

In July the United States Government sent 2 fleets of warships to patrol the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Nicaragua; the US also announced that it would hold joint military manoeuvres with the Honduran Army lasting six months along the Nicaraguan border. This is the first time that United States combat troops have been deployed in Central America during the present conflict.

These moves are an open act of aggression against the Nicaraguan people. The Nicaraguan Government has reiterated its intention to seek a peaceful settlement, and has put forward a 6-point peace plan for discussion.

Despite these conciliatory gestures, and diplomatic initiatives put forward by other Latin American Governments, the United States has continued its military escalation in Central America. The EEC Foreign Ministers have criticised the US actions, but in Britain, the Government continues to give its support to the Reagan Administration.

STOP US INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA END BRITAIN'S SUPPORT FOR US AGGRESSION

No Intervention in Central America (NICA), a co-ordinating body of organisations concerned about the threat to peace in the region has organised a series of activities for August and September:

August 5th: Start of a vigil outside the US Embassy in London. The vigil will continue until September 11th. Trade unions, CND groups, Church groups, women's groups, etc. are invited to get involved.

Vigil: 9.00am-7.30pm (initially)

US Embassy, Grosvenor Square, London W1.

Contact: Silvia Beales, 01-226 6747.

August 12th: Day of Action against Intervention (300 volunteers needed). Signatures will be collected all day for a petition to the Government calling for an end to intervention. (These petitions will continue to be circulated throughout August, and will be delivered on September 12.) A delegation will visit the Foreign Office and the US Embassy. Contact: CARILA, 01-359 2270.

September 11: National Demonstration for Peace and Freedom in Latin America.

Assemble 12.30 at Clerkenwell Green, London EC1.

Contact: Chile Solidarity Campaign, 01-272 4298.

For further details of all events, and local contacts, write/phone: NICA, c/o Compton Terrace, London N1. 01-226 6747.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 16, 1983

Mr. James E. Andrews
Mr. William P. Thompson,
Interim Co-Stated Clerks
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.)
341 Ponce de Leon Avenue, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30365

Dear Sirs:

This is in response to your thoughtful letter to the President of August 18, 1983.

Pursuant to your suggestion, we have circulated your policy statement on Central America to the members of the White House Outreach Working Group on Central America. The Working Group includes policy staff from all the major departments and agencies concerned with Central America.

The statement is very interesting and remarkably consistent. Perhaps because I went more than forty years without knowing a Presbyterian adhering to this viewpoint with such purity, I found the document particularly illuminating.

Thank you for providing us with these views.

Sincerely,



Morton C. Blackwell
Special Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 16, 1983

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Mr. William P. Thompson,
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PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.)
341 Ponce de Leon Avenue, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30365

Dear Sirs:


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Sincerely,



Morton C. Blackwell
Special Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison

Max Hugel Enterprises, Inc.
1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1125
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 429-1984 Telex 90-4175

Copy Sent 10 Jan 84
Anything else
need to be done
on this? No - file

Send Copy to FW
1/10/84

FW 12/7

December 6, 1983

DEC 7 - 1983

JT.


Ms. Faith Ryan Whittlesey
Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Faith:

I very much appreciate your kind letter inviting me to speak to the White House Outreach Working Group on the subject of Central America. I would be very please to speak on any Wednesday in February. Please call my office to let my secretary know the Wednesday you have decided on.

Best personal regards,

Sincerely,


Max Hugel

12/15/83 -
Max Hugel accepted
for 2/8/83

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 1, 1983

Dear Max:

The President sent me a copy of your thoughtful letter to him and your hard-hitting speech on Central America. Bill Casey has spoken of you to me on several occasions and, of course, I remember meeting you before I went out as Ambassador to Switzerland.

Please keep speaking out on this topic. We know your views will be persuasive to many key Americans.

I have sent a copy of your letter and speech to Dolf Droge, who is in charge of our Speakers Bureau for the White House Outreach Working Group on Central America. By the way, I am so pleased that you are a member of that group.

I hope that we will be able to schedule you as a speaker for one of our Wednesday meetings. I believe your message on the Soviet global strategy particularly as it relates to their interest in Central and South America is a very important one. Please let me know if you would be able to speak some Wednesday in January or February of 1984.

Sincerely,



Faith Ryan Whittlesey,
Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison

Mr. Max Hugel
MAX HUGEL ENTERPRISES, INC.
Suite #1125
1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

July 13, 1983

Dear Max:

It was good to see you at that recent luncheon. I am very grateful to you for outlining your thoughts on ways to develop broad-based awareness of the great issues at stake in the Central American struggle. The speech you enclosed is a real winner!

I'm taking the liberty of sending along copies of your letter and speech to Faith Whittlesey, who heads a special White House Task Force on Central America and to Ambassador-Designate Otto Reich.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

Mr. Max Hugel
Suite 1125
1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

cc RR letter plus copies of incmg to
Faith Whittlesey.

WHcc Ambassador-Designate Otto J. Reich.

RR/PN/RCH/AVH/cm--

150007

Max Hugel Enterprises, Inc.
1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1125
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 429-1984 Telex 90-4175

A.H.

June 30, 1983

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

It was truly a pleasure to see and lunch with you last Friday. As you may recall, I served as your National Director of Voters Groups, and served for a period at the CIA under Bill Casey, my last post being Deputy Director of Operations. It was a privilege to make such a contribution to the nation.

In our luncheon discussion, we spoke about the El Salvador situation, and it was agreed that our main problem is in communicating to the American people the danger posed by the situation there to the western hemisphere goal of free government for all the people of that area.

It seems to me that we are offering explanations for our role there, concentrating solely on Central America, without setting that situation against the backdrop of Soviet global strategy . . . strategy consistent with goals they have sought for many years. By generating or supporting wars of national liberation . . . by training and arming Marxist guerillas . . . particularly in those nations which can be considered strategic choke points . . . they seek to be in a position to cut off the many strategic raw materials upon which the U.S. and our allies have become dependent in recent years.

Success for them in Central America will certainly lead to destabilization of Mexico, creating an Iran-like situation in that vital nation. In case of such a success, they will have disrupted our Mexican oil supply, would generate millions of Mexican refugees and create a series of border problems for us that would make existing difficulties seem mild by comparison. We would, of course, be compelled to turn our attention there, diverting our energies and resources from other, vital areas of the world, such as the Middle East. The Soviets would then have a free hand there.

Further, strategically placed Marxist regimes could make it difficult if not impossible for strategic raw materials to reach the U.S. in case of any emergency. Denying us the security of such supplies, while creating chaos around the Panama Canal, while disrupting any menacing other Latin American raw materials routes would create a situation tailor made for Soviet advantage, strategically and politically.

President Ronald Reagan
June 30, 1983
Page Two

By bringing in, again and again, the Cuban presence, Cuban ties, Soviet contributions, Soviet plans and Soviet geopolitical goals . . . all aimed at destabilizing the U.S. itself, we would bring home to the mass of American citizens what the stakes really are . . . what our enemies really seek. In this manner, it would make it that much more difficult for well-meaning but wrong-headed citizens and political figures to cast doubts upon the Administration's policies and undertakings. I have faith that the people of this country, approached in just such a manner, would draw the appropriate conclusions, and back the policies you have thus far advanced with both courage and foresight. Once they realize the peril these events pose in a place they do not presently associate with their own personal self interest, they will increasingly sympathize and support your policies and initiatives. Once they associate the Soviets and their Cuban surrogates with the Central American situation, your task will be made easier.

I have made these points in several speeches around the country, one of which I am enclosing herewith. Again, Mr. President, it was gratifying and most enjoyable to meet with you again. As always, I am ready to serve in any capacity if you feel that I can be of service.

Sincerely,


Max Hugel

Enclosure

I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR INVITATION ASKING ME TO SPEAK TO YOU TONIGHT. MY CHOICE OF SUBJECTS DEALS WITH AN ISSUE OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST: CENTRAL AMERICA AND MARXIST REVOLUTION. RECENT ACTIVITY IN NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR HAS COMMANDED SO MUCH MEDIA ATTENTION THAT I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THAT UNFOLDING SITUATION. WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING IN BOTH COUNTRIES AND WHERE DO CUBA AND RUSSIA FIT IN?

AS A FORMER MEMBER OF THE CIA, NOTHING SAID HERE TO NIGHT WILL BE CLASSIFIED OR CONSTITUTE ANY REVELATION ABOUT MY FORMER JOB. RATHER, IT WILL REFLECT ON MY CONCERN OVER THE TURMOIL AND UNREST NOW BESETTING CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN, AND MY ONGOING INTEREST IN SOVIET INTENTIONS AND MODES OF OPERATION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

BEFORE I GET INTO MY MAIN TOPIC, NAMELY CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN, I WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY GIVE YOU A GLOBAL SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST ENCROACHMENTS AROUND THE WORLD.

THE SOVIET GLOBAL PLAN IS PLAIN AND SIMPLE -- TO MAKE THE WORLD A COMMUNIST ATHEIST SOCIETY UNDER THEIR RULE -- THE FINAL STEP IS UNDER WAY, NAMELY, TO SUBVERT THE U.S. INTO SUBMISSION.

THEY HAVE SYSTEMATICALLY PLANNED OUR DESTRUCTION NOT THROUGH NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL WAR, BUT BY TAKING OVER STRATEGIC AREAS THROUGH NATIONAL WARS OF LIBERATION. THESE ARE DESIGNED TO CHOKE OFF

OUR ACCESS TO STRATEGIC MATERIALS, AND THEN TO BLACKMAIL US INTO SUBMISSION.

WHAT ABOUT THESE CURRENT, SERIOUS THREATS TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY NOW TAKING PLACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN? ARE THEY REAL OR IMAGINARY?

YOU HAVE BEEN READING AND LISTENING TO THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN TRYING TO CONVINCING YOU THAT OUR ACTIONS CAN LEAD TO ANOTHER VIETNAM: THAT THOSE WE ARE HELPING ARE ONLY RIGHT-WING REACTIONARIES WHO ARE KILLING AND HAVE KILLED MANY INNOCENT PEOPLE. SUCH CRIES COME FROM MANY FAMILIAR QUARTERS. FROM UNSYMPATHETIC MEDIA. FROM CERTAIN GROUPS IN THE U.S., INCLUDING THE VERY POLITICAL ARMS OF SOME FEW RELIGIOUS BODIES WHO FEEL THEIR MINISTRY MUST INCLUDE POLITICAL ACTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS.

THESE SOURCES ARE INDEED VERY FORMIDABLE. I AM NOT INFERRING THAT THEY ARE ALL DISLOYAL. THEY MAKE A FEW CRUCIAL POINTS. WE CAN ALL BE PROUD THAT IN THE U.S. WE MAINTAIN OPEN FORUMS WHERE EVERYONE CAN SPEAK OUT AND BE HEARD. SUCH DIALOGUE IS BOTH HEALTHY AND IMPORTANT IN SHAPING OUR POLICIES AND MUTUAL DESTINY. BUT WE ALSO HAVE TO FEAR THE OTHER SIDE.

IT IS ALSO VITAL TO UNDERSTAND OUR RISKS, WHAT IS HAPPENING AND WHY. WE MUST ENSURE THAT OUR ESSENTIAL NATIONAL POLICY IS NOT SHAPED BY TINY BUT ACTIVE INTEREST GROUPS WHO HAPPEN TO SHOUT LOUDEST AND

THAT WANT YOU TO BELIEVE THAT RUSSIA AND CUBA'S COMMUNIST REGIMES ARE MERELY AGRARIAN REFORMERS THAT WE CAN COEXIST WITH THE COMMUNIST.

WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS? THE SOVIET UNION, THROUGH SATELLITE COUNTRIES, MAINLY CUBA AND LIBYA, IS WORKING HARD TO DISRUPT AN AREA LOCATED NEXT DOOR TO US. THEIR GOAL IS TO REPLACE GOVERNMENTS EITHER NEUTRAL OR FRIENDLY TO THE U.S. WITH ANTI-U.S., MARXIST-ORIENTED REGIMES. CAN WE ALLOW THAT TO HAPPEN? THIS IS NOT VIETNAM. THIS IS CENTRAL AMERICA. IT IS OUR BACK YARD. THESE ARE OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS.

WHY IS GUERRILLA WARFARE SO ATTRACTIVE TO COUNTRIES LIKE RUSSIA AND CUBA? AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY THIS TYPE OF WARFARE CONTAINS LITTLE OR NO DANGER OF ESCALATION. THE COSTS ARE FAR LESS THAN CONVENTIONAL WAR AND THE PARTICIPANTS ARE USUALLY SURROGATES. THE SOVIETS CALL THESE, "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION", AND THEY ARE AFLAME IN COUNTRIES LIKE PERU, COLUMBIA, BOLIVIA, VENEZUELA, EL SALVADOR, AND GUATEMALA, TO NAME A FEW IN THIS HEMISPHERE. MEXICO AND PANAMA ARE BEING AGITATED. NONE TRULY ENVISION A BETTER LIFE FOR THE HAVE-NOTS OF THOSE COUNTRIES. RATHER, THEY SEEK TO PUT IN POWER COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIPS.

WHY THE SUDDEN FOCUS ON THIS AREA? SUCCESS IN THE COUNTRIES I HAVE NAMED WOULD PLACE CUBA IN DE FACTO CONTROL OF BOTH THE PANAMA CANAL AND VENEZUELAN AND MEXICAN OIL. THEY WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF MAKING THE CARIBBEAN A CUBAN LAKE. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THIS

AREA IS THAT TWO-THIRDS OF ALL OUR FOREIGN TRADE AND PETROLEUM PASS THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE CARIBBEAN. IN A EUROPEAN CRISIS, HALF OUR SUPPLIES FOR NATO WOULD PASS THROUGH THESE AREAS BY SEA.

IF YOU BELIEVE THAT WARS OF NATURAL LIBERATION JUST HAPPEN, LET ME TELL YOU WHAT HAPPENED IN EL SALVADOR! FIRST THERE WAS AN ELEMENT OF ITS POPULATION SEEKING CHANGE AND VERY WILLING TO TAKE VIOLENT ACTION AGAINST THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT. IN 1978, WHEN THIS BEGAN, THERE WERE ABOUT 1,000 ACTIVE GUERRILLA/TERRORISTS IN VARIOUS SPLINTER GROUPS. IT WASN'T UNTIL EARLY 1980 THAT THE FOUR MAIN GUERRILLA GROUPS - FARN, THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY FORCES, THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARM, AND THE CPES- AGREED TO FORM AN UMBRELLA GROUP, THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COORDINATING COMMITTEE.

ORIGINALLY, CUBAN INTELLIGENCE WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY, EVALUATE, AND RECRUIT ENOUGH ASSETS TO FORM A REVOLUTIONARY CADRE. DURING 1978 AND 1979 THIS CADRE WAS TRAINED IN CUBA AND VARIOUS EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES. HOW THIS CADRE WAS TRANSPORTED TO CUBA IS INTRIGUING. A REASON TO TRAVEL TO PARIS WAS FABRICATED. SECOND, WHEN THE BUDDING REVOLUTIONARY ARRIVED IN PARIS HE WOULD BE MET BY CUBAN INTELLIGENCE AND PROVIDED WITH FALSE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS REAL PASSPORT. TRAVEL WOULD THEN BE BY AIR TO AN EASTERN BLOC CAPITAL, THEN BY SOVIET AEROFLOT TO HAVANA.

AFTER A SIX OR SEVEN MONTH TRAINING PERIOD, THE NOW HARD CORE CADRE MEMBER WOULD RETRACE THE ROUTE JUST DESCRIBED, AND BEGIN THE

BASIC CHORE OF THE REVOLUTION, ORGANIZING THE EFFORT. THROUGHOUT 1978 AND 1979 ARMS AND AMMUNITION WERE CACHED. A COMMAND STRUCTURE WAS ESTABLISHED AND LOCATED IN NICARAGUA ALONG WITH A RADIO STATION CALLED "VENCEREMOS". AN EVEN GREATER TASK WAS TO ORGANIZE CIVILIAN SUPPORT FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY AND WARNING, LOGISTICS, AND MEDICAL SERVICES. OPERATIONS DURING 1978 AND 1979 WERE DESIGNED TO CAUSE THE GOVERNMENT TO OVER-REACT, AND THROUGH OVER-REACTION TO SHOW THAT GOVERNMENT HAD LOST CONTROL. OVER-REACTING WAS EASY FOR THE NERVOUS MILITARY JUNTA IN EL SALVADOR.

EVERYTHING WAS READY BY 1980. BY A CURIOUS COINCIDENCE, CUBA OPENED ITS PORT OF MARIEL TO ALL WHO WANTED TO LEAVE. AMERICAN ATTENTION WAS CENTERED ON AN INFLUX OF SOME 125,000 CUBANS IN THE SPRING OF 1980. WHILE OUR ATTENTION DIVERTED, THE GUERRILLAS STRUCK IN EL SALVADOR. OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS, THEY CAUSED OVER \$600 MILLION IN DAMAGE TO FARMS, FACTORIES, AND UTILITIES.

OPERATIONS ARE NOW DESIGNED TO GAIN CONTROL OVER SPECIFIC AREAS OF THAT COUNTRY. FORTUNATELY THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (LEFTIST GUERRILLAS) HAVE RECENTLY HAD AN INTERNAL DISPUTE WHICH LEFT TWO OF ITS KEY LEADERS DEAD.

CAN THIS GUERRILLA EFFORT BE DEFEATED? YES, AND A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THAT ANSWER MAY BE FOUND IN NICARAGUA.

LEST ANY OF US THINK THAT THE REVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA BENEFITTED THE ORDINARY PEOPLE OF THAT POOR COUNTRY, REMEMBER THE ACTION OF THE FORMER NICARAGUAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES. AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO FIALLOS NAVARRO HAD BEEN A FIRM SANDINISTA AND SUPPORTER OF THEIR REVOLUTION. HE FINALLY RESIGNED IN PROTEST AT THE WAY IN WHICH DEMOCRATIC VALUES FOR WHICH HE FOUGHT IN NICARAGUA HAD BEEN TOTALLY AND RUTHLESSLY STRIPPED AWAY BY THE MARXIST RADICALS NOW IN POWER. HE CANNOT RETURN TO HIS OWN COUNTRY, EXCEPT TO FACE DEATH OR IMPRISONMENT. HE KNOWS OF THE EXTENT OF SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN HIS COUNTRY, AND IS AWARE NICARAGUA IS NOW MUCH LESS FREE THAN BEFORE THAT SO-CALLED REVOLUTION TO FREE ITS PEOPLE.

IN 1979, THE SANDINISTAS OVERTHREW THE SOMOZAN GOVERNMENT. THE HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT SHOWS THAT ITS FOUNDER, CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR, WAS TRAINED AT FRIENDSHIP UNIVERSITY IN MOSCOW. ACCORDING TO WHAT CUBANS TOLD THE PRESENT LEADER, THOMAS BORGE MARTINEZ, THE ORIGINAL SANDINISTAS WERE THE FIRST LATIN AMERICAN GROUP TO RECEIVE MILITARY TRAINING IN CUBA. BORGE, INCIDENTALLY, WAS CAPTURED BY THE SOMOZA FORCES. IT IS HIS TESTIMONY THAT REVEALS CUBA'S FULL INVOLVEMENT. IN 1978, CUBAN MATERIAL SUPPORT INCREASED, WITH AT LEAST TWO SHIPMENTS OF ARMS ROUTED THROUGH PANAMA. A LATER SHIPMENT INCLUDED AK-47 RIFLES, 50. CALIBER MACHINEGUNS AND MORTARS. IN APRIL, 1979, THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SANDINISTAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT 300 OF ITS COMBATANTS HAD RECEIVED TRAINING IN CUBA.

THERE ARE NOW OVER 8,000 CUBAN ADVISORS IN NICARAGUA. OF THIS NUMBER, APPROXIMATELY 3500 ARE MILITARY AND SECURITY SPECIALISTS. CUBAN PERSONNEL HAVE ASSUMED CONTROL OF ALL NICARAGUAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE POSITIONS OF IMPORTANCE. IN LATE MARCH, 1980, A SANDINISTA DELEGATION TO MOSCOW MET WITH SOVIET LEADERS A.P. KIRILENKO AND BORIS N. PONOMAREV. THIS LED TO SIGNING OF THE SOVIET-NICARAGUAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT THAT REQUIRED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, STATIONING OF 300 SOVIET AGENTS IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MANAGUA.

BUT SOMETHING WENT WRONG.

THE PEOPLE OF NICARAGUA ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING. ONE OF JACK ANDERSON'S REPORTERS RECENTLY TRAVELED WITH A GUERRILLA BAND INTO NORTHERN NICARAGUA. IN ANDERSON'S COLUMN ON 8 MAY HE WROTE, "IT QUICKLY BECAME OBVIOUS THAT THE GUERRILLAS HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULACE. THEY WERE FED AND PROTECTED BY LOCAL PEASANTS AT EVERY STEP. TRAVELING ON FOOT, AND ONLY AT NIGHT, TO AVOID DETECTION BY GOVERNMENT TROOPS, THE GUERRILLAS SPENT THE DAYS HIDING OUT IN SAFE HOUSES, OFTEN WITHIN SHOUTING DISTANCE OF GOVERNMENT-HELD TOWNS. IF THE PEASANTS HAD WANTED TO BETRAY THEM, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A SIMPLE MATTER TO TIP OFF THE SANDINISTA MILITIA TO THEIR HIDING PLACES."

THE STORY OF OUR OWN INVOLVEMENT BEGAN WITH A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IN NOVEMBER, 1981, WHERE IT WAS DECIDED TO TRAIN A GROUP OF 500 GUERRILLAS IN AN ATTEMPT TO STOP THE ARMS FLOW FROM

NICARAGUA INTO EL SALVADOR. THIS INCIDENTALLY INCLUDED U.S. M-16 RIFLES LAST SEEN IN VIETNAM. HAS THIS EFFORT BEEN SUCCESSFUL?

YES, BOTH IN STOPPING THE ARMS FLOW AND RECRUITS FOR THE PROGRAM. WHEN WE WERE WILLING TO TRAIN 500, OVER 7,000 MEN TOOK UP ARMS AND WERE READY TO CONDUCT A GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SANDINISTAS. THIS IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE NICARAGUA IS THE MAIN SUPPORT BASE FOR THE ENTIRE SUBVERSIVE EFFORT IN EL SALVADOR. MONITORED RADIO TRAFFIC BETWEEN GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR AND A RADIO IN NICARAGUA REVEAL THAT ALL SUPPLY REQUESTS ARE SENT BY RADIO TO NICARAGUA. NICARAGUAN EXILE SOURCES ESTIMATED THAT IF MEN AND ARMS GOING INTO EL SALVADOR FROM NICARAGUA COULD BE CUT OFF, FIGHTING WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE AFTER MONTH WITHOUT SUPPLIES. THOSE LIBYAN PLANES STOPPED IN BRAZIL WERE CARRYING SUCH SUPPLIES.

DOES IT SEEM STRANGE THAT THE KEY TO MILITARY ACTION IN EL SALVADOR RESTS WITH GUERRILLA SUPPORT ACTIVITY IN NICARAGUA? DOES IT SEEM ODD THAT ONCE CONTRA-GUERRILLA ACTIVITY BEGAN IN NICARAGUA, CUBAN ADVISORS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM EL SALVADOR? THE TRUE NATURE OF THE GUERRILLA WAR IN NICARAGUA IS BEST EXPRESSED BY PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AND QUOTED IN THE ANDERSON COLUMN: "WE DON'T WANT TO FIGHT OUR NICARAGUAN BROTHERS," THEY SAID. THE ONES THEY'RE AFTER ARE THE SANDINISTA LEADERS AND THEIR CUBAN, EAST GERMAN, BULGARIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN ADVISERS.

LET'S FOCUS NOW ON THE CUBANS.

BY 1978, CUBA ZEROED IN ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN-AS PART OF AN OVERALL SOVIET STRATEGY OF REVOLUTION. SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO CUBA IN 1981 WERE 66,000 TONS AND HAVE CONTINUED AT THE SAME PACE EACH YEAR SINCE. IN MONETARY FIGURES THE AID IS ABOUT \$4 BILLION PER YEAR, OR OVER HALF THE USSR'S GLOBAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

NO STATE IN THE HEMISPHERE IS IMMUNE FROM SUBVERSION AND ATTEMPTED REVOLUTION. CASTRO FOLLOWS A "HIGH-LOW" TRACK. HE IS TALKING TO GOVERNMENTS AND TO REVOLUTIONARIES IN THE SAME COUNTRY.

MORE OMINOUS IS THE GROWING ALLIANCE BETWEEN CUBA AND LATIN AMERICAN DRUG GROWERS AND PROCESSORS. TO HELP SUPPORT THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN BOLIVIA AND COLUMBIA, ARMS MAY BE PURCHASED BY DRUG DEALERS IN EXCHANGE FOR ASSISTANCE IN GETTING DRUGS TO MARKETS IN THE STATES. VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH, IN THE MAY 10 ISSUE OF THE WASHINGTON POST, COVERED THE INVOLVEMENT OF CUBA MORE SPECIFICALLY.

THE SOVIET STRATEGY OF REVOLUTION, CONDUCTED IN THIS HEMISPHERE BY THE CUBANS IS A REALISTIC ONE AND SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE THIS COUNTRY. THEIR GOAL? WESTERN ACCESS TO VITALLY NECESSARY NATURAL RESOURCES WILL BE DENIED BY THE VICTORY OR OPERATIONS OF TERRORIST MOVEMENTS, INSURGENCIES, AND THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORTERS, WE ARE FACED WITH A CHOICE. WE CAN DO NOTHING AND BE BLACKMAILED INTO SUBMISSION OR WE CAN TAKE COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST THIS STRATEGY OF REVOLUTION AND KEEP OUR COUNTRY STRONG.

ONE NECESSARY INGREDIENT OF THESE COUNTER-MEASURES IS OUR CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT COVERT ACTION. MUCH OF WHAT WE'VE SAID TODAY REVOLVES AROUND COVERT ACTION AS A MEANS TO STOP A HOSTILE COUNTRY'S DIRECTION AND SUPPLY OF A GUERRILLA WAR IN EL SALVADOR. CUBA CAN BE STOPPED. NICARAGUA CAN BE STOPPED. EL SALVADOR CAN BE SAVED AND OTHER COUNTRIES NOW UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL CAN BE REVERSED. BUT WHAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT THIS TYPE OF ACTION IN THE FUTURE? WE CAN HAVE SUCH A VALUABLE TOOL TO USE IF THREE CONDITIONS ARE MET.

FIRST, COVERT ACTION MUST BE PART OF AN OVERALL POLICY SET BY THE PRESIDENT. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A QUICK FIX OR SOMETHING TO BE THROWN INTO THE BREACH IN AN EMERGENCY.

SECOND, COVERT ACTION MUST INVOLVE ALL RELEVANT PARTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS REQUIRES OVERALL DIRECTION AND GOVERNMENT WIDE COORDINATION. THE ALTERNATIVE IS BUREAUCRATIC HAGGLING, AS WAS SEEN IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ANGOLAN AND CHILEAN SITUATIONS IN THE EARLY 1970'S.

THIRD, THE PRESIDENT HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR BUILDING SUPPORT FOR HIS FOREIGN POLICY GOALS. CONSENSUS ON GOALS WOULD OBIVIATE MANY OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLES WE SEE TODAY.

WE HAVE NO CHOICE IN TODAY'S WORLD. WE IGNORE COVERT ACTION AND SUDDENLY DISCOVER WE HAVE TO SEND IN THE MARINES. IF WE HESITATE TO SEND IN THE MARINES WE WILL SEE THE CARIBBEAN A CUBAN LAKE AND THE

U.S. IN MORTAL DANGER. COVERT ACTION HOWEVER, WHEN USED AS PART OF AN OVER-ALL ORCHESTRATED EFFORT, CAN HELP THIS COUNTRY FIGHT THAT SOVIET STRATEGY OF REVOLUTION WITHOUT GREAT EXPENSE, WITH LITTLE OR NO CHANCE OF ESCALATION, AND HELP PROTECT THE WATERWAYS AND NATURAL RESOURCES THAT GIVE YOU AND ALL FREE PEOPLE THEIR WAY OF LIFE.

IF WE FAIL TO TAKE ACTION, I FEEL WE CAN BE ISOLATED OR CHOKED OFF IN 1 TO 5 YEARS. ONLY YOU CAN MAKE SOMETHING HAPPEN TO CHANGE THIS, ONLY YOU CAN DEMAND WE DO SOMETHING BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE.

LET US REMEMBER THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S APPEASEMENT OF ADOLF HITLER. 50 MILLION PEOPLE DIED BECAUSE THE WORLDS' DEMOCRACIES LACKED THE WILL TO STOP HIM EARLY ON. SANTAYANA HAS SAID THAT THOSE WHO DO NOT LEARN FROM THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST ARE DOOMED TO REPEAT THEM. KEEP THAT IN MIND.

THANK YOU AND GOODNIGHT.