THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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November 22, 1982

TEXT OF ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

November 22, 1982

The week before last was an especially moving one here in Washington. The Vietnam veterans finally came home once and for all to America's heart. They were welcomed with tears, with pride and with a monument to their great sacrifices. Many of their names, like those of our Republic's greatest citizens, are now engraved in stone in this city that belongs to all of us. On behalf of the Nation, let me again thank the Vietnam veterans from the bottom of my heart for their courageous service to America.

Seeing those moving scenes, I know mothers of a new generation must have worried about their children and about peace. And that is what I would like to talk to you about tonight -- the future of our children in a world where peace is made uneasy by the presence of nuclear weapons.

A year ago I said the time was right to move forward on arms control. I outlined several proposals and said nothing would have a higher priority in this Administration. Now, a year later I want to report on those proposals and on other efforts we are making to ensure the safety of our children's future.

The prevention of conflict and the reduction of weapons are the most important public issues of our time. Yet, on no other issue are there more misconceptions and misunderstandings. You, the American people, deserve an explanation from your Government on what our policy is on these issues. Too often the experts have been content to discuss grandiose strategies among themselves, and cloud the public debate in technicalities no one can understand. The result is that many Americans have become frightened and, let me say, fear of the unknown is entirely understandable. Unfortunately, much of the information emerging in this debate bears little semblance to the facts.

To begin, let's go back to what the world was like at the end of World War II. The U.S. was the only undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military power was at its peak, and we alone had the atomic weapon. But we did not use this wealth and this power to bully, we used it to rebuild. We raised up the war-ravaged economies, including the economies of those who had fought against us. At first, the peace of the world was unthreatened, because we alone were left with any real power, and we were using it for the good of our fellow man. Any potential enemy was deterred from aggression because the cost would have far outweighed the gain.

As the Soviets' power grew, we still managed to maintain the peace. The U.S. had established a system of alliances with NATO as the centerpiece. In addition, we grew even more respected as a world leader with a strong economy and deeply-held moral values. With our commitment to help shape a better world, the U.S. always pursued every diplomatic channel for peace. And for at least 30 years after World War II, the United States still continued to possess a large military advantage over the Soviet Union. Our strength deterred -- that is, prevented -- aggression against us.

This Nation's military objective has always been to maintain peace by preventing war. This is neither a Democratic nor a Republican policy. It is supported by our allies. And most important of all, it has worked for nearly 40 years.

What do we mean when we speak of nuclear deterrence? Certainly we do not want such weapons for their own sake. We do not desire excessive forces, or what some people have called "over-kill." Basically, it is a matter of others knowing that starting a conflict would be more costly to them than anything they might hope to gain. And, yes, it is sadly ironic that in these modern times it still takes weapons to prevent war. I wish it did not.

We desire peace, but peace is a goal not a policy. Lasting peace is what we hope for at the end of our journey; it does not describe the steps we must take, nor the paths we should follow to reach that goal. I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths -- deterrence and arms reduction. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace.

And let me say I believe that if we follow prudent policies, the risk of nuclear conflict will be reduced. Certainly the United States will never use its forces except in response to attack. Through the years, Soviet leaders have also expressed a sober view of nuclear war; and if we maintain a strong deterrent, they are exceedingly unlikely to launch an attack.

Now, while the policy of deterrence has stood the test of time, the things we must do in order to maintain deterrence have changed.

You often hear that the United States and the Soviet Union are in an arms race. The truth is that while the Soviet Union has raced, we have not. As you can see from this blue U.S. line, in constant dollars our defense spending in the 1960's went up because of Vietnam and then it went downward through much of the 1970's. Now, follow the red line, which is Soviet spending. It has gone up and up and up. In spite of a stagnating Soviet economy, Soviet leaders invest 12 to 14 percent of their country's gross national product in military spending, two to three times the level we invest.

I might add that the defense share of our United States federal budget has gone way down, too. Watch the blue line again. In 1962, when John Kennedy was President, 46 percent, almost half of the federal budget, went to our national defense. In recent years, about one-quarter of our budget has gone to defense, while the share for social programs has nearly doubled. And most of our defense budget is spent on people, not weapons.

The combination of the Soviets spending more and the U.S. spending proportionately less changed the military balance and weakened our deterrent. Today, in virtually every measure of military power the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage.

This chart shows the changes in the total number of intercontinental missiles and bombers. You will see that in 1962 and in 1972, the United States forces remained about the same, even dropping some by 1982. But take a look now at the Soviet side. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets could not compare with us in terms of strength. In 1972, when we signed the SALT I Treaty, we were nearly equal. But in 1982, well, that red Soviet bar stretching above the blue American bar tells the story.

I could show you chart after chart where there is a great deal of red and a much lesser amount of U.S. blue. For example, the Soviet Union has deployed a third more land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles than we have. Believe it or nor, we froze our number in 1965 and have deployed no additional missiles since then.

The Soviet Union put to sea 60 new ballistic missile submarines in the last 15 years. Until last year we had not commissioned one in that same period.

The Soviet Union has built over 200 modern Backfire bombers -- and is building 30 more a year. For 20 years, the United States has deployed no new strategic bombers. Many of our B-52 bombers are now older than the pilots who fly them.

The Soviet Union now has 600 of the missiles considered most threatening by both sides -- the intermediate range missiles based on land. We have none. The U.S. withdrew its intermediate range land-based missilesfrom Europe almost 20 years ago.

The world has also witnessed unprecedented growth in the area of Soviet conventional forces; the Soviets far exceed us in the number of tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft and ships they produce every year. What is more, when I arrived in this office I learned that in our own forces we had planes that could not fly and ships that could not leave port, mainly for lack of spare parts and crew members.

The Soviet military build-up must not be ignored. We have recognized the problem and together with our allies we have begun to correct the imbalance. Look at this chart of projected real defense spending for the next several years. Here's the Soviet line. Let us assume the Soviets' rate of spending remains at the level they have followed since the 1960's. The blue line is the United States. If my defense proposals are passed, it will still take five years before we come close to the Soviet level. Yet the modernization of our strategic and conventional forces will assure that deterrence works and peace prevails.

Our deployed nuclear forces were built before the age of microcircuits. It is not right to ask our young men and women in uniform to maintain and operate such antiques. Many have already given their lives in missile explosions and aircraft accidents caused by the old age of their equipment. We must replace and modernize our forces, and that is why I have decided to proceed with the production and deployment of the new ICBM known as the MX.

Three earlier Presidents worked to develop this missile. Based on the best advice I could get, I concluded that the MX is the right missile at the right time. On the other hand, when I arrived in office, I felt the proposal on where and how to base the missile simply cost too much in terms of money, and the impact on our citizens' lives.

I have concluded, howevever, it is absolutely essential that we proceed to produce this missile, and that we base it in a series of closely-based silos at Warren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, Wyoming.

This plan requires only half as many missiles as the earlier plan and will fit in an area of only 20 square miles. It is the product of around-the-clock research that has been underway since I directed a search for a better, cheaper way. I urge the Members of Congress who must pass this plan to listen and examine the facts, before they come to their own conclusion.

Some may question what modernizing our military has to do with peace. Well, as I explained earlier, a secure force keeps others from threatening us and that keeps the peace. And just as important, it also increases the prospects of reaching significant arms reductions with the Soviets, and that is what we really want. The United States wants deep cuts in the world's arsenal of weapons.

But unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength and restore the military balance, the Soviets, since they are so far ahead, have little incentive to negotiate with us. If we had not begun to modernize, the Soviet negotiators would know we had nothing to bargain with except talk. They would know we were bluffing without a good hand because they know what cards we hold -- just as we know what is in their hand.

MORE

You may recall that in 1969 the Soviets didn't want to negotiate a treaty banning anti-ballistic missiles. It was only after our Senate narrowly voted to fund an anti-ballistic missile program that the Soviets agreed to negotiate. We then reached an agreement.

We also know that one-sided arms control doesn't work. We have tried time and again to set an example by cutting our own forces in the hope that the Soviets will do likewise. The result has always been that they keep building.

I believe our strategy for peace will succeed. Never before has the U.S. proposed such a comprehensive program of nuclear arms control. Never in our history have we engaged in so many negotiations with the Soviets to reduce nuclear arms and to find a stable peace. What we are saying to them is this: We will modernize our military in order to keep the balance for peace, but wouldn't it be better if we both simply reduced our arsenals to a much lower level?

Let me begin with the negotiations on the intermediate range nuclear forces that are currently underway in Geneva. As I said earlier, the most threatening of these forces are the land-based missiles, which the Soviet Union now has aimed at Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

This chart shows the number of warheads on these Soviet missiles. In 1972, there were 600. The United States was at zero. In 1977, there were 600. The U.S. was still at zero. Then the Soviets began deploying powerful new missiles with three warheads and a reach of thousands of miles -- the SS-20. Since then the bar has gone through the roof -- the Soviets have added a missile with three warheads every week. Still you see no United States blue on the chart. Although the Soviet leaders earlier this year declared they had frozen deployment of this dangerous missile, they have in fact continued deployment.

Last year, on November 18, I proposed the total, global elimination of all these missiles. I proposed that the U.S. would deploy no comparable missiles -- which are scheduled for late 1983 -- if the Soviet Union would dismantle theirs. We would follow agreement on the land-based missiles with limits on other intermediate-range systems.

The European governments strongly support our initiative. The Soviet Union has thus far shown little inclination to take this major step to zero levels. Yet I believe and I am hoping that, as the talks proceed and as we approach the scheduled placement of our new systems in Europe, the Soviet leaders will see the benefits of such a far-reaching agreement.

This summer we also began negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions, the proposal we call START. Here we're talking about intercontinental missiles -- the weapons with a longer range than the intermediate range ones I was just discussing. We are negotiating on the basis of deep reductions. I proposed in May that we cut the number of warheads on these missiles to an equal number, roughly one-third below current levels. I also proposed that we cut the number of missiles themselves to an equal number, about half the current U.S. level. Our proposals would eliminate some 4,700 warheads and some 2,250 missiles. I think that would be quite a service to mankind.

This chart shows the current level of United States ballistic missiles, both land and sea-based. This is the Soviet level. We intend to convince the Soviets it would be in their own best interest to reduce these missiles. Look at the reduced numbers both sides would have under our proposal -- quite a dramatic change. We also seek to reduce the total destructive power of these missiles and other elements of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces.

In 1977, when the last Administration proposed more limited reductions, the Soviet Union refused even to discuss them. This time their reaction has been quite different. Their opening position is a serious one, and even though it doesn't meet our objective of deep reductions, there's no question we're heading in the right direction. One reason for this change is clear. The Soviet Union knows that we are now serious about our own strategic programs and that they must be prepared to negotiate in earnest.

We also have other important arms control efforts underway. In the talks in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, we've proposed cuts in military personnel to a far lower and equal level. And in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, we're working to develop effective limitations on nuclear testing and chemical weapons. The whole world remains outraged by the Soviets' and their allies' use of biological and chemical weapons against defenseless people in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Laos. This experience makes ironclad verification all the more essential for arms control.

There is, of course, much more that needs to be done. In an age when intercontinental missiles can span half the globe in less than half an hour, it's crucial that Soviet and American leaders have a clear understanding of each other's capabilities and intentions.

Last June in Berlin, and again at the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, I vowed that the U.S. would make every effort to reduce the risks of accident and misunderstanding and thus to strengthen mutual confidence between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Since then, we've been actively studying detailed measures to implement this Berlin initiative.

Today, I would like to announce some of the measures which I've proposed in a special letter just sent to the Soviet leadership and which I've instructed our ambassadors in Geneva to discuss with their Soviet counterparts. They include but also go beyond some of the suggestions I made in Berlin.

The first of these measures involves advance notification of all U.S. and Soviet test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles. We will also seek Soviet agreement on notification of all sea-launched ballistic missiles as well as intermediate range land-based ballistic missiles of the type we're currently negotiating. This would remove surprise and uncertainty at the sudden appearance of such missiles on the warning screens of the two countries.

In another area of potential misunderstanding, we propose to the Soviets that we provide each other with advance notification of our major military exercises. Here again, our objective is to reduce the surprise and uncertainty surrounding otherwise sudden moves by either side.

These sorts of measures are designed to deal with the immediate issues of miscalculation in time of crisis. But there are deeper, longer-term problems as well. In order to clear away some of the mutual ignorance and suspicion between our two countries, I will propose that we both engage in a broad-ranging exchange of basic data about our nuclear forces. I am instructing our ambassadors at the negotiations on both strategic and intermediate forces to seek Soviet agreement on an expanded exchange of information. The more one side knows about what the other side is doing, the less room there is for surprise and miscalculation.

Probably everyone has heard of the so-called Hotline, which enables me to communicate directly with the Soviet leadership in the event of a crisis. The existing Hotline is dependable and rapid -- with both ground and satellite links. But because it is so important, I've also directed that we carefully examine any possible improvements to the existing Hotline system.

Now, although we've begun negotiations on these many proposals, this doesn't mean we've exhausted all the initiatives that could help to reduce the risk of accidental conflict. We'll leave no opportunity unexplored, and we'll consult closely with Senators Nunn, Jackson, and Warner, and other Members of the Congress who've made important suggestions in this field.

We are also making strenuous efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. It would be tragic if we succeeded in reducing existing arsenals only to have new threats emerge in other areas of the world.

Earlier I spoke of America's contributions to peace following World War II, of all we did to promote peace and prosperity for our fellow man. Well, we are still those same people. We still seek peace above all else.

I want to remind our own citizens and those around the world of this tradition of American goodwill because I am concerned about the effects the nuclear fear is having on our people. The most upsetting letters I receive are from schoolchildren who write to me as a class assignment. It's evident they've discussed the most nightmarish aspects of a nuclear holocaust in their classrooms. Their letters are often full of terror. This should not be so.

The philosopher Spinoza said, "Peace . . . is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice." Those are the qualities we want our children to inherit, not fear. They must grow up confident if they are to meet the challenges of tomorrow, as we will meet the challenges of today.

I began these remarks speaking of our children and I want to close on the same theme. Our children should not grow up frightened. They should not fear the future. We are working to make it peaceful and free. I believe their future can be the brightest, most exciting of any generation. We must reassure them and let them know that their parents and the leaders of this world are seeking above all else to keep them safe, and at peace. I consider this to be a sacred trust.

My fellow Americans, on this Thanksgiving, when we have so much to be grateful for, let us give special thanks for our peace, our freedom, and our good people. I've always believed that this land was set aside in an uncommon way, that a Divine plan placed this great continent between the oceans to be found by a people from every corner of the earth who had a special love of faith, freedom and peace. Let us reaffirm America's destiny of goodness and goodwill. Let us work for peace, and, as we do, let us remember the lines of the famous hymn, "O God of love, O King of peace, make wars throughout the world to cease."

Thank you, good night, and God bless you.

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November 22, 1982

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON

President Nixon has been briefed on the program and supports it fully as a necessary step to prevent nuclear war and nuclear blackmail.

November 23, 1982

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

"President Reagan has faced up to some difficult choices on M-X.

None of the alternatives are simple, and some technical people will disagree as to which is best. But most of us can agree, I think, that the Soviet threat is real, that we must modernize our strategic forces, and that M-X is the right missile at the right time.

I strongly endorse President Reagan's decision to produce and deploy M-X."

November 22, 1982

STATEMENT BY FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

"As an active participant in the decision, made by President Carter in 1979, to go ahead with actual deployment of M-X, I strongly endorse President Reagan's announcement.

Given the various considerations that led him to seek an alternate deployment mode to the one we preferred, I feel he has reached a decision that is in the national interest of the United States. I support it."

M-X IN CLOSELY SPACED BASING

THE NEED FOR A NEW ICBM

- The U.S. ICBM is a key element in the U.S. strategic deterrence posture.
  - -- ICBMs provide the only Triad element with accurate and prompt counter-military capability against the most highly valued Soviet hard targets.
- A survivable ICBM provides precious decision time during a crisis, with continuing survivability and effective counter-military capability.
- Soviets have dramatically improved the survivability of their ICBMs and Command and Control structures through hardness.
  - -- Minuteman does not have a sufficient combination of accuracy and yield to effectively hit Soviet silos one-on-one.
  - -- Minuteman does not have sufficient numbers to hit them 2 or 3-on-one.

THE NEED FOR A NEW ICBM BASING MODE

- Minuteman silos can be attacked effectively, two-on-one, by Soviet SS-19s alone.
  - -- Leaves Soviets three-fourths of their ICBM capability for other missions.
- Minuteman survivability is steadily decreasing with Soviet improvements.

NEW ICBM SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

- Must be effective against Soviet ICBMs and other military targets.
- Must survive any Soviet attempt at its quick destruction.
- Must be resilient against Soviet attempts to respond.

M-X IN CLOSELY SPACED BASING MEETS THESE NEEDS

- 100 M-X missiles, in 100 superhardened capsules, close together at a cost of about $26 billion (1982 $).
  - -- The addition of M-X can force Soviets to find a survivable means of basing their entire ICBM force.
    - --- Current Soviet missiles may not be suitable for rebasing.

M-X IN CLOSELY SPACED BASING MEETS THESE NEEDS (continued)

-- The Superhard silos may be attacked only with very large warheads.

--- One warhead to an SS-18.

--- Threat of Soviet proliferation of large numbers of smaller warheads on the SS-18 is stopped.

-- Placing the capsules close together means that even these large warheads won't be very successful.

--- If Soviets attack all at once, many of their warheads destroy themselves.

--- If they attack slowly, it takes more than a hour to attempt just one attack.

---- Most of the M-X can fly out.

---- High M-X survivability even if they don't.

--- Attempt to "pin" the M-X during and between attacks to prevent launch is not practical.

---- Soviets face a battle lasting several hours.

---- May use more than entire Soviet alert submarine force.

---- A large part of the Soviet ICBM force must be held in reserve (vulnerable to destruction or disruption from other Triad forces).

---- May eventually use almost all Soviet ICBM force.

SOVIET RESPONSE

- M-X CSB will require Soviets to completely . . .

-- Change their present and future weapons development and production.

-- Change both their strategy and tactics.

--- Attempt very precise timing and coordination.

---- Massive scale: diverse elements of their Strategic Rocket Forces, and their Submarine forces.

-- Attempt to continue a highly structured attack long after U.S. retaliation has begun to strike them.

U.S. GROWTH OPTIONS

- Since M-X field is so small, Soviet development efforts can be countered with simple U.S. countermeasures.

  For example:

  -- Electronic countermeasures foil Soviet guidance systems.

  -- Layered rock effectively stops earth-penetrator weapons.

- Deception and defense are also viable.

  -- Small M-X CSB size makes it economical and effective.

  --- $2-3 B for another complete M-X array of 100 capsules.

  --- $9-12 B for a treaty-constrained (100 interceptor) ballistic missile defense.

  ---- Small M-X CSB size means any interceptor can defend any silo.

  ---- First time that small BMD would be effective.

  --- Can add either deception or defense in any order desired.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of Media Relations and Planning

For Immediate Release November 22, 1982

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

For nearly two years my Administration has examined the matter of the MX missile, the development of which has been supported by my three immediate predecessors, Presidents Carter, Ford, and Nixon. We all have strongly agreed that strengthening our land-based missile system is absolutely essential to maintain America's deterrent capability to deter war and to protect our nation.

I have sought the counsel of my predecessors, the opinion of Members of Congress, and the advice of the best technical and scientific minds in the field. My Administration, as well as the ones before it, has examined a wide variety of options, including smaller or bigger missiles, the development of one missile for common use on land or at sea, and the possibility of greater mobility. And, like the preceding administrations, we have concluded that MX is the right missile and that now is the time.

Deciding how to deploy the missile has not been that easy. A variety of basing modes has been studied by previous administrations and by ours. The concept of deceptive basing, as employed in previous planning, was a fundamentally sound one for assuring the stability of land-based ICBM forces in times of crisis.

It complied with our strategic arms control objectives. Other sensible growth options were studied as well. As these plans progressed through the two previous administrations, however, they grew enormously in cost. Not only was the financial cost high -- $40-$50 billion -- but the cost of our western citizens in terms of water, land, social disruption, and environmental damage seemed unreasonable.

For these reasons, we considered other approaches while proceeding with the development of the MX missile itself. The missile work is now nearly complete. The first test flight is scheduled for early next year. While test flights are just that -- tests -- I have no doubts about the technical success, in fact excellence, of this missile.

-More-

In re-examining how to base the missiles, we concluded that by pulling the launch sites much closer together and making them a great deal harder, we could make significant savings. We would need fewer silos, much less land, and in fact fewer missiles. We would achieve a system that could survive against the current and projected Soviet rocket inventory. Deployment of such a system would require the Soviets to make costly new technical developments if they wish to even contemplate a surprise attack. Most of the Soviet countermeasures proposed are really no more than technical dreams on which no Soviet planner or politician would bet the fate of his country. Thus, Closely Spaced Basing is a reasonable way to deter attack -- which is our objective.

Now let me outline our overall plan for our ICBM force.

First, we recognize that the best survivability, and thus the best deterrence, lies in the modernization of all three legs of the Triad: submarines, bombers, and land-based ballistic missiles. Each gains security as all are rendered less susceptible to technological or operational surprise.

Second, we are closing down our force of huge Titan missiles at the rate of one missile every month or two. Their immense warheads and antiquated fuels have no place in our current inventory.

Third, we will maintain an appropriate Minuteman force, but many of these could be removed if we reach agreement with the Soviets on strategic arms reductions.

And fourth, we plan to produce the MX missile, now named "Peacekeeper," and deploy it in superhard silos at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, near Cheyenne, Wyoming.

That seems to be the most cost-effective location, but I appreciate the enthusiastic offers by the citizens of Nevada to base the missile in their state.

We will emplace 100 of these missiles (versus the 200 in some of the earlier plans) in launch canisters which can be moved, if necessary, between closely spaced superhard silos. We plan to build only 100 such silos, but we will design the system so that we can add more silos later, again within the confines of a small land area, if the Soviets will not agree to strategic arms reductions, or if they persist in the development and production of more powerful and deadly weapons. We would prefer that the Soviets dismantle SS-18s, rather than we build more holes. But we can accomodate either and maintain stability.

As far as an active defense is concerned, we do not wish to embark on any course of action that could endanger the current ABM treaty so long as it is observed by the Soviet Union. Likewise, we do not wish to build even the minimal ABM system allowed us by the treaty, even though the Soviets have done so.

We plan to continue research on ballistic missile defense technology -- the kind of smart, highly accurate, hopefully non-nuclear, weapons that utilize the microelectronic and other advanced technologies in which we excel. The objective of this program is stability for our ICBM forces in the 90's, a hedge against Soviet breakout of the ABM treaty, and the technical competence to evaluate Soviet ABM developments. We currently have no plan to deploy any Ballistic Missile Defense system.

The entire missile and basing program will cost about $26 billion in 1982 dollars, commencing with this fiscal year. That's a reduction by half, both in cost and in numbers of missiles deployed, from the other plans on the drawing boards when I entered office. The ongoing ballistic missile defense research and development will cost about $2.5 billion. Both of these programs are already reflected in the FY 83 budget projections, but the specific decisions announced today allow us to proceed with the reductions from my February budget request for this year of a billion dollars, which we have so carefully worked out with the Congress.

Continuity of effort in national security affairs is essential. Turbulence is wasteful beyond words. These programs to increase the stability and security of our strategic nuclear forces are urgently needed. The planning by my predecessors made them possible, but it is for my successor that I make these decisions. With every effort, the Peacekeeper missile still will not be fully deployed until the late 1980's when yet another President shoulders these burdens.

I urge the Congress, and all Americans, to support this program, developed under several presidents: those in the past who conceived and urged the deployment of MX and the current President who has made these difficult decisions. It is only by such steadfastness of purpose that we can maintain the peace which every nation needs to work out the hopes and dreams of its own people.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of Media Relations and Planning

For Immediate Release **November 22, 1982**

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS

For many years, U.S. strategic forces have helped protect our Nation and the Free World by providing a capable and effective deterrent. Maintenance of these forces has historically enjoyed broad bipartisan support.

In recent years, our deterrent has become increasingly vulnerable in the face of a relentless Soviet military buildup. As part of our program to modernize the U.S. deterrent, I asked last year that you support improving the capability and survivability of the land-based component of our strategic forces by authorizing development and deployment of the MX intercontinental ballistic missile. I also agreed earlier this year to provide you with a permanent basing decision by December 1.

In response to this requirement, the Department of Defense forwarded to me a series of basing options, with associated analyses of technical, environmental, arms control, and other factors. I have also received the counsel of my senior advisers, former Presidents and Administration officials, and Members of Congress. After careful study, I have decided to emplace 100 MX missiles, now known as "Peacekeeper," in superhard silos in a closely-spaced basing mode at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, Wyoming. Given Congressional support, these missiles will have an initial operational capability late in 1986. I am prepared also to consider deception and possibly ballistic missile defense, which are options if the Soviet Union continues its military buildup.

We all hope, however, that the Soviets will join us in seeking meaningful progress in arms control negotiations. This MX decision supports and complements the U.S. approach to arms control. While the U.S. must and will improve its forces to maintain a credible deterrent, we remain fully commited to our standing proposals for significant reductions in both sides' nuclear arsenals. We seek to reduce ballistic missiles by about one-half and ballistic missile warheads by about one-third.

Under separate cover, I am sending you a copy of my full statement on the decision outlined above. I ask that you keep an open mind on this complex and important question and permit the Administration to make its case for the decision. We are prepared to respond, at your convenience, to formal and informal requests for additional information that you may desire. I look forward to receiving your counsel and assistance as we work toward our common goal of improving the security of our Nation.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

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WASHINGTON POST 11/29/82

Caspar W. Weinberger

We Need This Missile



By Powell

Sen. Ernest F. Hollings, in his Nov. 23 op-ed piece ["We Don't Need This Missile"], seems to appreciate the fact that the United States faces a serious military imbalance with the Soviet Union. However, in recommending cancellation of the MX/Peacekeeper project, he does not appear to understand one of the chief sources of that imbalance—the serious weakening of the deterrent capability of our strategic triad.

Over the last two decades, this nation has maintained a stable deterrent by means of a strong strategic triad consisting of land-based ICBMs, manned bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The unique characteristics of these triad components bolster deterrence by acting in concert to complicate Soviet attack planning, and hedge against a possible technological breakthrough that could threaten the viability of any single strategic system. Unfortunately, over the last several years, the Soviets have deployed new land-based strategic missiles of such quality and in such quantity as to seriously jeopardize the survivability of the ICBM leg of the triad. In addition to this survivability problem, dramatic improvements in the "hardness" of critical Soviet military assets also have reduced the effectiveness of our current ICBM force.

It is these fundamental weaknesses in our deterrent capability that the Peacekeeper missile, deployed in a closely spaced basing (CSB) mode, rectifies. Unlike our current Minuteman ICBM force which—contrary to Hollings' assertion—does not have an effective hard target capability, the Peacekeeper will be able to retaliate effectively against the full range of high-value Soviet strategic weaponry, including that weaponry "hardened" (to withstand blast) and requiring prompt response. In a CSB deployment, the Peacekeeper also —again, contrary to Hollings' assertion—will possess the ability to survive a Soviet first strike. Bringing these two important characteristics to the ICBM force, the Peacekeeper will reduce the current imbalance and bolster deterrence. Moving in the direction of a strategic dyad of bombers and submarines, as Hollings' article appears to suggest, is not an answer to the growing weaknesses in our deterrent capability, but a near-term prescription for a potential far-term disaster.

Hollings challenges the Peacekeeper's survivability in CSB, charging that the Soviets could avoid the effects of nuclear fratricide by means of earth-penetrating warheads, or the simultaneous detonation of large warheads. He also charges that the Soviets could prevent the Peacekeeper from retaliating by exploding

Taking Exception

nuclear weapons high above CSB field until other weapons destroy the Peacekeeper missiles (pindown) and that CSB silos cannot be hardened to the levels required to make the system effective.

A wide range of experts, both in and outside the government, examined these and many other issues in minute detail over the last several months. Contrary to the claims of Hollings, the consensus reached by these experts was that:

- The current and projected Soviet strategic force would be ineffective against the Peacekeeper in a CSB deployment;
- The Soviets could seek to improve the effectiveness of their force against CSB by the late 1980s, deploying very large-yield weapons, but attacks with such weapons would be risky and give the Soviets no confidence of success;
- The Soviets, by means of an expensive and risky technological program, might be able to develop and deploy highly accurate, earth-penetrating weapons or other advanced concepts by the mid- to late 1990s. However, a number of enhancement options (simple countermeasures, deceptive basing, ballistic missile defense, or deep underground basing) could provide an effective counter to Soviet efforts. In fact, countermeasures against earth penetrators would be relatively inexpensive and so simple that the Soviets probably would not try this approach;
- "Pindown," while theoretically possible, is not a practical or dependable challenge to the Peacekeeper in CSB because it would have to be employed continuously and flawlessly for several hours during highly stressful wartime conditions and because it would consume a large portion of the Soviet strategic force without destroying a single missile; and
- It is possible to build silos hardened to the levels necessary to make a CSB system effective, since the task does not involve the development of new technology.

As the views of these experts indicate, we have in CSB a survivable, flexible and—at nearly half the expense of the previous administration's recommendation—cost-effective means of deploying the deterrence-essential Peacekeeper missile. Some have argued that the Peacekeeper should be maintained only as a research and development program. This response to the strategic problems we face is both inadequate and unnecessary. The Peacekeeper is a thoroughly researched and fully capable deterrent system. As such, the national security requires that we waste no time in moving it from the laboratory to the field, where its full deterrence potential will be realized.

The issues we face today are highly complex. This is especially true of those issues affecting war and peace. Because the Peacekeeper is one such issue, we cannot afford to consider its merits lightly nor come to easy conclusions without a careful examination of the facts. In the weeks ahead, this administration will make available to Congress and the people of this nation the full range of facts on the Peacekeeper and closely spaced basing. I am confident that if due consideration is given to these facts, MX/CSB will receive the strong support it warrants.

The writer is secretary of defense.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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November 22, 1982

TEXT OF ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

November 22, 1982

The week before last was an especially moving one here in Washington. The Vietnam veterans finally came home once and for all to America's heart. They were welcomed with tears, with pride and with a monument to their great sacrifices. Many of their names, like those of our Republic's greatest citizens, are now engraved in stone in this city that belongs to all of us. On behalf of the Nation, let me again thank the Vietnam veterans from the bottom of my heart for their courageous service to America.

Seeing those moving scenes, I know mothers of a new generation must have worried about their children and about peace. And that is what I would like to talk to you about tonight -- the future of our children in a world where peace is made uneasy by the presence of nuclear weapons.

A year ago I said the time was right to move forward on arms control. I outlined several proposals and said nothing would have a higher priority in this Administration. Now, a year later I want to report on those proposals and on other efforts we are making to ensure the safety of our children's future.

The prevention of conflict and the reduction of weapons are the most important public issues of our time. Yet, on no other issue are there more misconceptions and misunderstandings. You, the American people, deserve an explanation from your Government on what our policy is on these issues. Too often the experts have been content to discuss grandiose strategies among themselves, and cloud the public debate in technicalities no one can understand. The result is that many Americans have become frightened and, let me say, fear of the unknown is entirely understandable. Unfortunately, much of the information emerging in this debate bears little semblance to the facts.

To begin, let's go back to what the world was like at the end of World War II. The U.S. was the only undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military power was at its peak, and we alone had the atomic weapon. But we did not use this wealth and this power to bully, we used it to rebuild. We raised up the war-ravaged economies, including the economies of those who had fought against us. At first, the peace of the world was unthreatened, because we alone were left with any real power, and we were using it for the good of our fellow man. Any potential enemy was deterred from aggression because the cost would have far outweighed the gain.

MORE

As the Soviets' power grew, we still managed to maintain the peace. The U.S. had established a system of alliances with NATO as the centerpiece. In addition, we grew even more respected as a world leader with a strong economy and deeply-held moral values. With our commitment to help shape a better world, the U.S. always pursued every diplomatic channel for peace. And for at least 30 years after World War II, the United States still continued to possess a large military advantage over the Soviet Union. Our strength deterred -- that is, prevented -- aggression against us.

This Nation's military objective has always been to maintain peace by preventing war. This is neither a Democratic nor a Republican policy. It is supported by our allies. And most important of all, it has worked for nearly 40 years.

What do we mean when we speak of nuclear deterrence? Certainly we do not want such weapons for their own sake. We do not desire excessive forces, or what some people have called "over-kill." Basically, it is a matter of others knowing that starting a conflict would be more costly to them than anything they might hope to gain. And, yes, it is sadly ironic that in these modern times it still takes weapons to prevent war. I wish it did not.

We desire peace, but peace is a goal not a policy. Lasting peace is what we hope for at the end of our journey; it does not describe the steps we must take, nor the paths we should follow to reach that goal. I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths -- deterrence and arms reduction. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace.

And let me say I believe that if we follow prudent policies, the risk of nuclear conflict will be reduced. Certainly the United States will never use its forces except in response to attack. Through the years, Soviet leaders have also expressed a sober view of nuclear war; and if we maintain a strong deterrent, they are exceedingly unlikely to launch an attack.

Now, while the policy of deterrence has stood the test of time, the things we must do in order to maintain deterrence have changed.

You often hear that the United States and the Soviet Union are in an arms race. The truth is that while the Soviet Union has raced, we have not. As you can see from this blue U.S. line, in constant dollars our defense spending in the 1960's went up because of Vietnam and then it went downward through much of the 1970's. Now, follow the red line, which is Soviet spending. It has gone up and up and up. In spite of a stagnating Soviet economy, Soviet leaders invest 12 to 14 percent of their country's gross national product in military spending, two to three times the level we invest.

I might add that the defense share of our United States federal budget has gone way down, too. Watch the blue line again. In 1962, when John Kennedy was President, 46 percent, almost-half of the federal budget, went to our national defense. In recent years, about one-quarter of our budget has gone to defense, while the share for social programs has nearly doubled. And most of our defense budget is spent on people, not weapons.

The combination of the Soviets spending more and the U.S. spending proportionately less changed the military balance and weakened our deterrent. Today, in virtually every measure of military power the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage.

This chart shows the changes in the total number of intercontinental missiles and bombers. You will see that in 1962 and in 1972, the United States forces remained about the same, even dropping some by 1982. But take a look now at the Soviet side. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets could not compare with us in terms of strength. In 1972, when we signed the SALT I Treaty, we were nearly equal. But in 1982, well, that red Soviet bar stretching above the blue American bar tells the story.

I could show you chart after chart where there is a great deal of red and a much lesser amount of U.S. blue. For example, the Soviet Union has deployed a third more land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles than we have. Believe it or nor, we froze our number in 1965 and have deployed no additional missiles since then.

The Soviet Union put to sea 60 new ballistic missile submarines in the last 15 years. Until last year we had not commissioned one in that same period.

The Soviet Union has built over 200 modern Backfire bombers -- and is building 30 more a year. For 20 years, the United States has deployed no new strategic bombers. Many of our B-52 bombers are now older than the pilots who fly them.

The Soviet Union now has 600 of the missiles considered most threatening by both sides -- the intermediate range missiles based on land. We have none. The U.S. withdrew its intermediate range land-based missilesfrom Europe almost 20 years ago.

The world has also witnessed unprecedented growth in the area of Soviet conventional forces; the Soviets far exceed us in the number of tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft and ships they produce every year. What is more, when I arrived in this office I learned that in our own forces we had planes that could not fly and ships that could not leave port, mainly for lack of spare parts and crew members.

The Soviet military build-up must not be ignored. We have recognized the problem and together with our allies we have begun to correct the imbalance. Look at this chart of projected real defense spending for the next several years. Here's the Soviet line. Let us assume the Soviets' rate of spending remains at the level they have followed since the 1960's. The blue line is the United States. If my defense proposals are passed, it will still take five years before we come close to the Soviet level. Yet the modernization of our strategic and conventional forces will assure that deterrence works and peace prevails.

Our deployed nuclear forces were built before the age of microcircuits. It is not right to ask our young men and women in uniform to maintain and operate such antiques. Many have already given their lives in missile explosions and aircraft accidents caused by the old age of their equipment. We must replace and modernize our forces, and that is why I have decided to proceed with the production and deployment of the new ICBM known as the MX.

MORE

Three earlier Presidents worked to develop this missile. Based on the best advice I could get, I concluded that the MX is the right missile at the right time. On the other hand, when I arrived in office, I felt the proposal on where and how to base the missile simply cost too much in terms of money, and the impact on our citizens' lives.

I have concluded, howevever, it is absolutely essential that we proceed to produce this missile, and that we base it in a series of closely-based silos at Warren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, Wyoming.

This plan requires only half as many missiles as the earlier plan and will fit in an area of only 20 square miles. It is the product of around-the-clock research that has been underway since I directed a search for a better, cheaper way. I urge the Members of Congress who must pass this plan to listen and examine the facts, before they come to their own conclusion.

Some may question what modernizing our military has to do with peace. Well, as I explained earlier, a secure force keeps others from threatening us and that keeps the peace. And just as important, it also increases the prospects of reaching significant arms reductions with the Soviets, and that is what we really want. The United States wants deep cuts in the world's arsenal of weapons.

But unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength and restore the military balance, the Soviets, since they are so far ahead, have little incentive to negotiate with us. If we had not begun to modernize, the Soviet negotiators would know we had nothing to bargain with except talk. They would know we were bluffing without a good hand because they know what cards we hold -- just as we know what is in their hand.

MORE

You may recall that in 1969 the Soviets didn't want to negotiate a treaty banning anti-ballistic missiles. It was only after our Senate narrowly voted to fund an anti-ballistic missile program that the Soviets agreed to negotiate. We then reached an agreement.

We also know that one-sided arms control doesn't work. We have tried time and again to set an example by cutting our own forces in the hope that the Soviets will do likewise. The result has always been that they keep building.

I believe our strategy for peace will succeed. Never before has the U.S. proposed such a comprehensive program of nuclear arms control. Never in our history have we engaged in so many negotiations with the Soviets to reduce nuclear arms and to find a stable peace. What we are saying to them is this: We will modernize our military in order to keep the balance for peace, but wouldn't it be better if we both simply reduced our arsenals to a much lower level?

Let me begin with the negotiations on the intermediate range nuclear forces that are currently underway in Geneva. As I said earlier, the most threatening of these forces are the land-based missiles, which the Soviet Union now has aimed at Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

This chart shows the number of warheads on these Soviet missiles. In 1972, there were 600. The United States was at zero. In 1977, there were 600. The U.S. was still at zero. Then the Soviets began deploying powerful new missiles with three warheads and a reach of thousands of miles -- the SS-20. Since then the bar has gone through the roof -- the Soviets have added a missile with three warheads every week. Still you see no United States blue on the chart. Although the Soviet leaders earlier this year declared they had frozen deployment of this dangerous missile, they have in fact continued deployment.

Last year, on November 18, I proposed the total, global elimination of all these missiles. I proposed that the U.S. would deploy no comparable missiles -- which are scheduled for late 1983 -- if the Soviet Union would dismantle theirs. We would follow agreement on the land-based missiles with limits on other intermediate-range systems.

The European governments strongly support our initiative. The Soviet Union has thus far shown little inclination to take this major step to zero levels. Yet I believe and I am hoping that, as the talks proceed and as we approach the scheduled placement of our new systems in Europe, the Soviet leaders will see the benefits of such a far-reaching agreement.

This summer we also began negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions, the proposal we call START. Here we're talking about intercontinental missiles -- the weapons with a longer range than the intermediate range ones I was just discussing. We are negotiating on the basis of deep reductions. I proposed in May that we cut the number of warheads on these missiles to an equal number, roughly one-third below current levels. I also proposed that we cut the number of missiles themselves to an equal number, about half the current U.S. level. Our proposals would eliminate some 4,700 warheads and some 2,250 missiles. I think that would be quite a service to mankind.

This chart shows the current level of United States ballistic missiles, both land and sea-based. This is the Soviet level. We intend to convince the Soviets it would be in their own best interest to reduce these missiles. Look at the reduced numbers both sides would have under our proposal -- quite a dramatic change. We also seek to reduce the total destructive power of these missiles and other elements of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces.

In 1977, when the last Administration proposed more limited reductions, the Soviet Union refused even to discuss them. This time their reaction has been quite different. Their opening position is a serious one, and even though it doesn't meet our objective of deep reductions, there's no question we're heading in the right direction. One reason for this change is clear. The Soviet Union knows that we are now serious about our own strategic programs and that they must be prepared to negotiate in earnest.

We also have other important arms control efforts underway. In the talks in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, we've proposed cuts in military personnel to a far lower and equal level. And in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, we're working to develop effective limitations on nuclear testing and chemical weapons. The whole world remains outraged by the Soviets' and their allies' use of biological and chemical weapons against defenseless people in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Laos. This experience makes ironclad verification all the more essential for arms control.

There is, of course, much more that needs to be done. In an age when intercontinental missiles can span half the globe in less than half an hour, it's crucial that Soviet and American leaders have a clear understanding of each other's capabilities and intentions.

Last June in Berlin, and again at the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, I vowed that the U.S. would make every effort to reduce the risks of accident and misunderstanding and thus to strengthen mutual confidence between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Since then, we've been actively studying detailed measures to implement this Berlin initiative.

Today, I would like to announce some of the measures which I've proposed in a special letter just sent to the Soviet leadership and which I've instructed our ambassadors in Geneva to discuss with their Soviet counterparts. They include but also go beyond some of the suggestions I made in Berlin.

The first of these measures involves advance notification of all U.S. and Soviet test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles. We will also seek Soviet agreement on notification of all sea-launched ballistic missiles as well as intermediate range land-based ballistic missiles of the type we're currently negotiating. This would remove surprise and uncertainty at the sudden appearance of such missiles on the warning screens of the two countries.

In another area of potential misunderstanding, we propose to the Soviets that we provide each other with advance notification of our major military exercises. Here again, our objective is to reduce the surprise and uncertainty surrounding otherwise sudden moves by either side.

These sorts of measures are designed to deal with the immediate issues of miscalculation in time of crisis. But there are deeper, longer-term problems as well. In order to clear away some of the mutual ignorance and suspicion between our two countries, I will propose that we both engage in a broad-ranging exchange of basic data about our nuclear forces. I am instructing our ambassadors at the negotiations on both strategic and intermediate forces to seek Soviet agreement on an expanded exchange of information. The more one side knows about what the other side is doing, the less room there is for surprise and miscalculation.

Probably everyone has heard of the so-called Hotline, which enables me to communicate directly with the Soviet leadership in the event of a crisis. The existing Hotline is dependable and rapid -- with both ground and satellite links. But because it is so important, I've also directed that we carefully examine any possible improvements to the existing Hotline system.

Now, although we've begun negotiations on these many proposals, this doesn't mean we've exhausted all the initiatives that could help to reduce the risk of accidental conflict. We'll leave no opportunity unexplored, and we'll consult closely with Senators Nunn, Jackson, and Warner, and other Members of the Congress who've made important suggestions in this field.

We are also making strenuous efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. It would be tragic if we succeeded in reducing existing arsenals only to have new threats emerge in other areas of the world.

Earlier I spoke of America's contributions to peace following World War II, of all we did to promote peace and prosperity for our fellow man. Well, we are still those same people. We still seek peace above all else.

I want to remind our own citizens and those around the world of this tradition of American goodwill because I am concerned about the effects the nuclear fear is having on our people. The most upsetting letters I receive are from schoolchildren who write to me as a class assignment. It's evident they've discussed the most nightmarish aspects of a nuclear holocaust in their classrooms. Their letters are often full of terror. This should not be so.

The philosopher Spinoza said, "Peace . . . is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice." Those are the qualities we want our children to inherit, not fear. They must grow up confident if they are to meet the challenges of tomorrow, as we will meet the challenges of today.

I began these remarks speaking of our children and I want to close on the same theme. Our children should not grow up frightened. They should not fear the future. We are working to make it peaceful and free. I believe their future can be the brightest, most exciting of any generation. We must reassure them and let them know that their parents and the leaders of this world are seeking above all else to keep them safe, and at peace. I consider this to be a sacred trust.

My fellow Americans, on this Thanksgiving, when we have so much to be grateful for, let us give special thanks for our peace, our freedom, and our good people. I've always believed that this land was set aside in an uncommon way, that a Divine plan placed this great continent between the oceans to be found by a people from every corner of the earth who had a special love of faith, freedom and peace. Let us reaffirm America's destiny of goodness and goodwill. Let us work for peace, and, as we do, let us remember the lines of the famous hymn, "O God of love, O King of peace, make wars throughout the world to cease."

Thank you, good night, and God bless you.

# # #

M-X/CSB SYSTEM

November 1982

M-X CSB SYSTEM

November 1982

THE NEED FOR ICBM MODERNIZATION

For over 20 years the United States has relied on a combination of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers to deter Soviet aggression. This Strategic Triad, as the combination is called, ensures that U.S. forces will be able, under all conditions, to survive a Soviet first strike and to retaliate. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) offer a unique contribution to the effective deterrent value of the Strategic Triad. They are accurate and responsive; have reliable, real-time communications with command authorities; possess short time-to-target capability; and offer alert rates approaching 100%. ICBMs make it more difficult for the Soviets to plan and execute a successful attack on all three Triad components.

Since the late 1960s the Soviet Union has engaged in a massive and destabilizing strategic arms build-up that threatens the survivability and retaliatory effectiveness of the Triad. Specifically, the Soviets have developed and deployed numerous large and highly accurate weapons capable of destroying most of the U.S. ICBM force in a first strike, while expending a relatively small proportion of their ICBM force in the process.

The Soviets have also taken steps to reduce our ability to retaliate. They have hardened their ICBM silos and critical command and control facilities to the point that Minuteman missiles have only limited capabilities against them. This imbalance in such a critical component of strategic capability seriously undermines the strength of our nuclear deterrence.

The M-X missile is designed to resolve this imbalance. Unlike the Minuteman, the M-X has the prompt, hard target capability necessary to effectively retaliate against the full range of Soviet targets. The M-X also has the necessary basing flexibility to ensure its survivability.

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MODERNIZATION PLAN

In October 1981 President Reagan announced a comprehensive plan for modernizing U.S. strategic forces. A key part of that plan was his proposal to remedy the U.S. land based ICBM deficiencies. His plan called for deployment of the M-X missile with an initial operational capability in 1986. To ensure this early deployment the President directed an aggressive research program to identify a permanent, survivable means of basing the M-X. This research work has shown that Closely Spaced Basing (CSB) is the most effective basing option.

THE M-X MISSILE

The M-X is a four-stage ICBM that carries 10 independently targetable nuclear reentry vehicles (RVs) (see Figure 1). It is 70 feet long, 92 inches in diameter, and weighs approximately 192,000 pounds. It has many advantages over missile weapon systems currently in the U.S. inventory. M-X will be more accurate, can carry more warheads, and has greater range and targeting flexibility than the Minuteman ICBMs. Its greater resistence to nuclear effects and its more capable guidance system provides the M-X with a greatly enhanced hard-target kill capability.

FIGURE 1
M-X MISSILE



The first three stages of the M-X use solid propellant and provide the thrust needed to achieve intercontinental range. The fourth stage uses liquid propellants to carry out the maneuvers that properly deploy the RVs. Along with the liquid propellant, the fourth stage carries the computers and electronic equipment that guide and control the missile from

the time of launch through the release of RVs. The M-X guidance and control system uses an advanced inertial reference sphere (AIRS) that provides the flight computer with information on missile movement during flight.

The reentry system consists of two main subsystems, the deployment module and the shroud. The deployment module, attached to the fourth stage, carries the RVs. The titanium shroud covers the deployment module and protects the RVs during the first two stages of flight.

CLOSELY SPACED BASING

Traditionally, hardness and spacing decisions for missile deployments have been based on the objective of ensuring that no more than one missile could be destroyed per attacking warhead. Greater hardness allows closer spacing because it is more difficult to damage harder targets with a given warhead.

Titan and early Minuteman launch facilities were conservatively spaced several miles apart because of the relatively low silo hardness levels. As more sophisticated hardness measurements and testing techniques were developed, they were applied in an upgrade program that hardened Minuteman silos. In mid-1981 the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) reported on a series of tests and analyses to validate silo hardness levels. The conclusion of that work was that superhard silo designs are feasible. This breakthrough permitted the development of the close spacing concept. Air Force studies, underway for some time, indicate that severe fratricide effects would occur to attacking weapons as a result of close spacing and would be a greater problem as spacing became smaller and smaller. The Townes Panel, studying M-X basing alternatives during 1981, recognized this fact and recommended serious consideration of exploiting fratricide effects to advantage in M-X basing. With new evidence in superhard design technology, an understanding of fratricide effects and the impetus provided by the President's ICBM Modernization Program, the CSB concept was defined, analyzed and is now the M-X permanent basing recommendation.

CSB involves deploying 100 M-X missiles in superhard capsules at close distances that maximize the phenomenon of fratricide while still far enough apart to prevent one weapon from destroying two capsules. The major features of the CSB concept are the superhardened capsule, close spacing, and array shape.

The superhard capsule contains the M-X missile and its canister/launcher. It protects the missile against the effects of nuclear detonations. The objective is to build a capsule so hard that airburst attacks are ineffective. This is desired because the nuclear effects (and resulting fratricide) of incoming weapons are more severe for a surface burst than for an airburst.

Another objective of hardness is to prevent the Soviets from fractionating (reducing the yield and increasing the number of) the reentry vehicles on their missiles. Since high yield and good accuracy are both required to damage hard targets, harder targets will require higher yield or better accuracy to destroy them.

The distance between capsules must be small enough to assure prompt fratricide on incoming warheads but great enough to prevent the Soviets from sucessfully targeting multiple capsules with one warhead. A spacing of 1,800 feet between the capsules is an optimum distance to assure these objectives.

An array is the term given to the CSB deployment field. Different array shapes will create different fratricide problems for the Soviets. The most promising shape, and the one now considered for CSB, is a column or segmented column arrangement.

In summary, the baseline CSB concept consists of one array of 100 M-X missiles in 100 capsules hardened to very high levels for groundbursts and providing even greater protection from airbursts, and spaced at 1800 feet. This results in a system deployable on about 20 square miles of land.

CSB CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Figure 2 shows the components of the M-X/CSB system.

The facilities for CSB are divided into three separate groups: those in the deployment area in addition to the M-X capsules, those at the Area Support Center, and those at the Main Operating Base.

The deployment area will be the array of capsules. Security police will use facilities inside the array to monitor security. Also in the array will be two underground launch control facilities to provide communications between the capsules and higher authority and command and control over the day-to-day operations in the missile field.

FIGURE 2
M-X/CSB COMPONENTS



The Area Support Center contains the Missile Assembly Facility for assembling the major missile components and support equipment. This center will be served by rail transportation for shipment of large components. At this center there will also be a Weapon Storage Area, a Site Security Center for controlling entry to the deployment area and monitoring security throughout the area and finally, a Maintenance and Support Facility for general maintenance and administrative requirements for personnel.

The Main Operating Base will make use of existing military facilities to the maximum extent possible to support the M-X system. Additional construction may be needed to support the required M-X manpower and missile requirements. Included will be an Operations Support Center for staff functions to maintain the operational readiness of the M-X weapon system, and substantial warehousing and storage areas.

For normal day-to-day operations the Launch Control Center provides command and control of the missiles. This involves monitoring the status of and issuing commands to maintain system readiness.

During and after an attack, survivable command and control would be provided by Airborne Launch Control Center (ALCC) aircraft and satellite relays. Besides mobility, the ALCC has the advantage of communicating to the M-X weapon system and attack assessment sensors through secure radio links. The ALCC will also communicate to higher authority through numerous and redundant radio links.

M-X target storage and reprogramming capability will be used to optimize the capability of the surviving force.

CSB EFFECTIVENESS

CSB is effective because the close spacing of the M-X capsules forces attacking weapons to be closely spaced. When early-arriving warheads detonate, the nuclear effects caused by the detonation destroy or deflect off-course those weapons that follow (fratricide). The Soviets do not now have, nor are they projected to have in the near-term, the capability to avoid these fratricide effects.

The major nuclear effects that combine to make an attack on CSB ineffective are both prompt and longer term. The prompt nuclear effects include radiation, airblast and fireball. These effects destroy or degrade the performance of incoming weapons and prevent the Soviets from executing a precisely-timed attack on all CSB capsules, as well as fast-paced attacks. While the Soviets might consider a slow-paced attack to avoid these prompt effects, they will find that the longer term effects, such as dust and debris, foreclose their ability to reattack after an initial wave for extended periods of time. Consequently, M-X in CSB remains survivable and can be used in retaliation as necessary.

Fratricide, then, puts a limit on the size of an attack on the capsule array and reduces the usefulness of the large numbers of warheads the Soviets possess. Since the Soviets are unable to generate an effective attack on M-X in CSB, they will see no advantage in initiating a conflict, and thus, deterrence will be enhanced.

The Soviets may choose to seek improvements to their ICBM forces in order to threaten M-X in CSB. In the near-term through the early 1990s, they could increase the yield of their reentry vehicles in an attempt to overcome the hardness level of CSB capsules, but the larger yield significantly increases the fratricide effects, therefore the CSB deployment of 100 M-X missiles in 100 capsules will remain a strong and viable deterrent against the near-term threat.

For the longer term, mid- to late-1990s, the Soviets may seek technological breakthroughs, which may allow them to deploy low yield, highly accurate, earth-penetrating weapons that could threaten the hard CSB capsules and avoid fratricide. If so, the United States would have a number of options to enhance CSB and maintain its viability. These options include straightforward countermeasures, concealment in additional capsules, ballistic missile defense, or deep basing. In all cases, expensive and risky Soviet development programs can be countered effectively by relatively simple and quickly deployable U.S. responses.