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## MISSING IN ACTION

*Six years after the fall of South Vietnam and eight  
years after the withdrawal of all U.S. forces,  
Hanoi has yet to account for almost 2,500 Americans that  
never came home. Could some still be alive? Yes*

# 'We Can Keep You . . . Forever'

THOMAS D. BOETTCHER and JOSEPH A. REHYANSKY

*If the government of North Vietnam has difficulty explaining to you what happened to your brothers, your American POWs who have not yet returned, I can explain this quite clearly on the basis of my own experience in the Gulag Archipelago. There is a law in the Archipelago that those who have been treated the most harshly and who have withstood the most bravely, who are the most honest, the most courageous, the most unbending, never again come out into the world. They are never again shown to the world because they will tell tales that the human mind can barely accept. Some of your returned POWs told you that they were tortured. This means that those who have remained were tortured even more, but did not yield an inch. These are your best people. These are your foremost heroes who, in a solitary combat, have stood the test. And today, unfortunately, they cannot take courage from our applause. They can't hear it from their solitary cells where they may either die or remain for thirty years . . .*

—Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn  
June 30, 1975

VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING one needs to know about heroism in this low, dishonest century can be summed up by reciting the names of those American prisoners who endured, resisted, and survived, and who lived to see freedom: no Fourth of July declamation could outshine a simple list that begins: Robinson Risner, Jim Stockdale, Jeremiah Denton, Bud Day, Ev Alvarez . . . These men, and nearly six hundred others who were returned to us, survived a captivity so savage as to stagger the imagination of those who contemplate it. And yet, might Solzhenitsyn be—as he so often is—right? Might there now be, at this very moment, other living American prisoners in Southeast Asia who will “never again come out into the world”?

More than eight years ago, direct American military involvement in Southeast Asia ended under the terms of the Paris Peace Accords negotiated by Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, and 591 American prisoners of war were promptly repatriated. The fighting continued in Vietnam for more than two years, but, until the fall of Saigon seemed imminent, it generally did not enjoy the front-page status it had commanded for so many years. Lost in the shuffle were 2,500 missing American servicemen, almost none of whom has been accounted for to this day. Their status has been re-

viewed periodically by their government, which has declared all but 12 of them “killed in action/body not recovered.”

Might any of these men still be alive?

Vaughan Taylor, one of the two civilian attorneys who defended Marine PFC Bobby Garwood, seems to think so. Whenever he discusses this issue, he must put himself in a moral and ethical straitjacket, and the effort shows; not only must he say nothing that might prejudice his client's case through the appellate process, he must also refrain from revealing *anything* he has learned, either from his client, or while working on the case, that might fall under the attorney-client privilege. But Taylor, who has served on active duty and is still an Army Reserve Officer, is not unaffected by the shattering emotional impact of this issue. Someone, he says, who devoted himself to trying to determine whether Americans are still there “would not be wasting his time.”

R. Emmett Tyrrell, editor of *The American Spectator*, has some acquaintances in Europe who think so. He wrote not long ago of the jibes he has taken from French journalists during trips to Paris about our do-nothing government's toleration of this outrage. Tyrrell's tone implies that it is virtually common knowledge among the French that there are Americans alive there.

The French, of course, have good reason to consider themselves experts on the subject of North Vietnamese intransigence and cruelty when it comes to the return of prisoners or of their remains. One case among many involved a Frenchman about whom the Vietnamese claimed they knew nothing. Eventually, French authorities determined with precision which cemetery he was buried in, and demanded his return. The North Vietnamese allowed as how, yes, he was there after all, but weather problems and difficult terrain would make it impossible for them to comply with French wishes. There is nothing uniquely horrible about this act of cruelty—except that the body was that of the grandson of Charles de Gaulle. Then there is the story of the POW who escaped from a Vietcong dungeon in 1968. He was picked up by American authorities, hospitalized and

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*Messrs. Boettcher and Rehyansky are both Vietnam veterans and attorneys. Mr. Boettcher is also a freelance writer based in Atlanta. Mr. Rehyansky, a frequent contributor to NR, lives in Charlottesville, Va.*

treated, debriefed, and quickly and quietly sent home—to France. He is said to have been a prisoner since 1954.

At least two high-ranking military officers do not dismiss the idea. General Louis T. Seith (USAF, Ret.), who commanded the Military Assistance Command-Thailand during the years 1967 to 1971, says: "I could believe that some are alive." Seith speaks of two possibilities: that some Americans are being held in isolated hamlets, and that others might still be fighting the war as guerrillas. With regard to the latter, Brigadier General Richard F. Abel, Director of Information for the Air Force, says it is "not inconceivable that there are people who are missing who are not even captured, who are alive." He cites the example of Japanese soldiers found on Guam as recently as 1976 still fighting World War II and, like Seith, says it is "possible in my mind that people could be there in some hamlet," though he adds that there is "not much chance of it."

The late Admiral John C. McCain, Commander-in-Chief of Pacific forces during 1968 to 1972, was more certain. McCain, whose command at that time extended to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, told Congress in 1976 that the North Vietnamese had deceived this country concerning MIAs. "I think there is no question about it," he said, "that there are some who are still alive in Southeast Asia."

Ann Mills Griffiths seems to think that some might be alive. Mrs. Griffiths is the Executive Director of the League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia. This organization was founded in 1970 to operate a network for information and contact among the affected families, and to keep the issue before the public. Mrs. Griffiths is one of three full-time employees, whose number may

soon be reduced to two because of funding problems. She is a tall, dark, attractive, intelligent woman in her late thirties who knows so much about the issue that she can barely talk fast enough to tell you everything she wants you to know. Her brother, Lieutenant Commander James Mills, launched his plane off the deck of the *U.S.S. Coral Sea* for a raid against North Vietnam in September 1966, and has been missing ever since.

Why has the issue begun to receive so much publicity?

"Because," replies Mrs. Griffiths firmly, "it can't be denied that there's increasing evidence that prisoners are still there."

What about the Woodcock Commission, formally known as the Presidential Commission on Americans Missing and Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, which went to Vietnam in 1977?

"The Commission was a success," says Mrs. Griffiths, "only in establishing Leonard Woodcock's credentials so that he could be appointed ambassador to China."

**F**ORMER Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Roger Shields agrees; he says that the Commission was intended to make the Vietnamese look cooperative and thus bury the issue. Congressman Robert K. Dornan (R., Calif.) feels even more strongly. "The Vietnamese," he says, "made fools of them." The Commission, which concluded that improved relations between the two countries held out the best hope for a full account, was "a joke." One of the distinguished members "knew nothing about this problem before she left, learned nothing there, and came home to talk about kindergarten and school training. . . . Military men at the second level of the Woodcock Commission who had to stand behind the front-page personalities told me they were ashamed to be Americans."

Why would the Vietnamese continue to hold Americans in captivity? There are a number of possible answers. Ann Griffiths and Carol Bates, the Director of Public Affairs for the League, believe that they never intended to keep them, that it was a ploy that failed. Mrs. Bates reminds us that American negotiators at the peace conferences failed to hold the line on demanding a list of prisoners *before* signing the accords. The North Vietnamese, realizing that they could get an agreement without accounting for our men, deliberately signed the accords and then turned over a partial list, a list which, they were sure, would be deemed inadequate by American authorities. Then, with the specific terms of the peace agreement itself already worked out, the North Vietnamese expected to go back to the bargaining table to negotiate a further release of prisoners in exchange for the \$3.25 billion in reparations they wanted.

Much to their surprise, our representatives accepted the list, flew home, and declared the war over. Now, eight years later, the North Vietnamese have severe economic problems, are tied down by military conflicts in Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, with China, and will not risk the loss of face involved in admitting that they held Americans back—to no avail. Yet (on this theory) they have not killed them, because the prisoners might, somehow, still turn out to be valuable to them in some future negotiations.

Colonel Laird Gutterson (USAF, Ret.), a former Vietnam

**LIFE QUESTIONS FOR A PEACE**

543 POWs: what shape are they in?

1,271 MIAs: how many are alive?

Where does it leave us?

An Ohio town talks of the war

PHOTO BY [unreadable]

SEPTEMBER 19 - 1972 - 109

POW, suggests another reason may be the personal pique of a captor "with an Eastern mind that has been contaminated by Communism." Gutterson tells of a friend captured in the Korean War who, with other Americans, was kept long after the "final" North Korean prisoner exchange. Until his release, he was unaccounted for and carried as MIA. The man told Gutterson that he was detained because he had refused to confess falsely, in writing, to having engaged in germ warfare. The commander of his POW camp became furious with him and told him that he would remain incarcerated until he signed. The pilot did sign, after his captors showed him a *New York Times* article about the repatriation of most of the 21 American POWs who had initially decided to remain in Korea. Despite the fact that they had denounced their country and defected, they were not punished upon their return. The pilot, understandably, began to doubt the wisdom of rotting away in a Chinese prison as an act of loyalty to a government that dealt so leniently with traitors. Two years after the "final" exchange of prisoners, he signed the confession, and was released through Hong Kong in a matter of days.

Other reasons are more mundane: recent reports indicate that some of our men are being used as English teachers, and as mechanics and maintenance men for the millions of dollars' worth of U.S. equipment abandoned there. Some are paying what might be called a "debt to society" as slave laborers on road gangs—rebuilding the Vietnam they, as the Vietnamese see it, helped to destroy.

**T**HERE is another rationale for keeping these men, one not immediately comprehensible to Western minds, though Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Dolgun, and Leonid Plyushch, among others, have insight into it. Plyushch, a Ukrainian dissident and the author of *History's Carnival*, has written, echoing a frequent theme of the past century, that where there is no God *nothing* is impermissible. Many of our POWs who did return could understand what he means. John G. Hubbell, in his 1976 book, *P.O.W.*, relates that some of those who endured the most bravely while being tortured were told by their interrogators: "We still have French prisoners. . . . They were not fit to return to their families, so we never released them. Don't you want to see your family again? . . . There are still Frenchmen in our prisons who did not reform their minds. We can keep you . . . forever." Another common method of taunting those who could not be broken, according to Ann Griffiths, was to tell them that if they did not "become sincere" they would be sent to "one of the camps from which no one returns."

That this cruelly bizarre rationale for retaining prisoners might actually be in effect becomes less incredible when one considers this fact: of the 591 Americans who were repatriated, *not one* was maimed. Consider it: men ejecting from flaming, exploding aircraft, under missile fire, parachuting into hostile territory: yet not one of those returned to us was missing an eye, an ear, an arm, or a leg—even a finger—and none was disfigured by burns. Common sense tells us that *some* of those captured had to be disfigured. Yet might not Vietnamese paranoia prevent them from repatriating those who had been maimed—whether during combat or torture?

Much has been made of the virtually Teutonic efficiency of the North Vietnamese in processing prisoners—rewards

were offered for their capture and delivery to collection points, meticulous records were kept, interrogation methods and the prison administration itself were highly bureaucratized. And yet, Colonel Gutterson says:

I know that two of our prisoners were kept in a village and they were right on a truck route, so they could have been taken north to Hanoi anytime. They were kept in a village for a year, primarily as far as they could figure out because the head man of the village apparently had done something nice to somebody and so they gave him as a prize a couple of American POWs to keep in a cage in his village for the people to look at. Because it gave him prestige. So there doesn't have to be a logical Western reason. . . .

Gutterson remains convinced that Americans are still held. He felt compelled, after his own release from captivity in 1973, to try to keep the issue alive. Whenever he was invited to speak in public, he invariably raised the topic of MIAs. When his Air Force superiors ordered him to stop talking about the matter publicly, Gutterson tried an evasive maneuver: his wife, who had been active in POW family organizations and knew much, began accompanying him to his speeches, and he, with a wink, would refer all questions about MIAs to her. This approach did not ease the strain in his relationship with the Air Force, and he was pressured into accepting early retirement.

In thinking about this issue, then, it is necessary to consider, at least, the possibility that we are dealing with people for whom cruelty is fun, people who, purely for revenge and not for any tangible gain, confine men under conditions so barbaric that we can barely imagine them. But once you have made this leap of imagination from the suburbs of Peoria to "The Hanoi Hilton" and "The Plantation," to "Vegas," "The Briar Patch," and "Heartbreak Hotel," it is still necessary to ask: Where is the proof?

We might begin by considering a few of the most obvious examples of North Vietnamese intransigence. According to the late Congressman Tennyson Guyer (R., Ohio), a member of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, whose sudden death in April was a great loss to the League of Families, ". . . over half of these [2,500 MIAs] are men who were either known or strongly suspected to be prisoners of the Vietnamese or Laotians. There are 138 Americans whose names, pictures, or even their voices were used by the Vietnamese for propaganda purposes. As many as 750 more were probably in their custody. Yet, we have received virtually no word as to their fate . . ." Lieutenant General Eugene Tighe, U.S. Air Force, who was, until his retirement on August 1 of this year, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and one of the men credited by the League of Families with having reinvigorated the government's quest for additional information regarding our prisoners of war and missing in action, has pointed out that the remains of forty Americans who, the North Vietnamese *admit*, died in captivity "have yet to be returned. Other men were known to be alive and in the hands of the enemy and some were even publicly named, yet we have no accounting of these men."

At a recent hearing, General Tighe was asked by Representative Stephen Solarz (D., N.Y.): "You have lived with this problem for a long time. . . . Does the weight of the evidence suggest to you, taking everything into consideration, that American servicemen are still living in Indochina?"

"Yes, sir."

"And that there are still—and this is a somewhat different question—American servicemen being held against their will in Indochina?"

"My conviction would be yes in answer to both questions, sir."

Roger Shields points out that even while members of Congressman G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery's (D., Miss.) House Select Committee on MIAs (now defunct) were "receiving assurances from Vietnamese authorities that no Americans . . . were being held captive, at least two Americans, Arlow Gay and Tucker Gouggemann, were in Vietnamese prisons . . ."

When the Woodcock Commission visited Vietnam, they were informed of the existence of Gouggemann's remains. Gay was later released. Representative Montgomery maintains that there are no MIAs still held in Southeast Asia and has delivered himself of a "Dear Colleague" letter to every member of Congress excoriating those—such as ABC News, which recently ran an examination of the issue—who would give the families of these men "false hopes."

"You cannot give us false hopes," Ann Griffiths says emphatically. "We have been at it too long."

With the exodus of the boat people from Southeast Asia the quantity and quality of "live-sighting" reports increased



dramatically. Ann Griffiths dismisses as "the State Department line" the position that the reports come from persons desperate for attention and favors from American authorities, people who therefore cannot be considered reliable. Most of the refugees making these reports, Mrs. Griffiths asserts, have already secured sponsors, jobs, and places to live, and have declined rewards offered for information. "The Americans tried to help us," is, Mrs. Griffiths says, the usual response of the refugees who are offered rewards; "this is the least we can do."

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) now investigates each live-sighting report within a matter of days. The individual making the report is interviewed and, if willing, subjected to examination by polygraph. The results of most of the examinations indicate no deception. There are currently 338 first-hand live-sighting reports on file, some placing living Americans in Vietnam as recently as the fall of 1980. Of these 338 reports, about one-third refer to persons known to have been in Vietnam after the fall of Saigon and who have since gotten out of the country.

A refugee relates that a friend of his was on a bus en route to Saigon in September 1979 when it was attacked by a squad of eight "resistance soldiers." The squad boarded the bus; three of the eight were Americans. The Americans requested that any of the passengers with access to the outside world transmit news of their situation to American authorities, saying that originally there had been five Americans in the group but two had died. They also recited their names, but the refugee's friend could not remember them.

Another refugee, who claims to be a former employee of the U.S. Agency for International Development, relates that during 1976, he was imprisoned in a cave near Viengkay, Laos with, among others, five Caucasians who were identified to him as American pilots.

A former second lieutenant in the South Vietnamese army reports that he was imprisoned, through 1975, at a camp in Tan Canh. He said that a group of Americans, led by a major, were kept in a separate compound more than a kilometer from the South Vietnamese. He had opportunities to communicate with the Americans, and did so in English; he says that the major had served in the cavalry brigade assigned to the defense of Dac To and Tan Canh, and had been captured in 1971. There were also two American sergeants and a first lieutenant there. The major was "thin, short for an American. He had a long face, a bald forehead, brown eyes, and long eyebrows. His nose is a little flattened between the eyes, a dimple in the middle of the chin, teeth distant from one another. I used to be ordered by the Communist guards to bring sweet potatoes to the 'American pirates'; they had their hands and legs tied up when they were not working . . . The exact date I saw him for the last time was during February 1975. At that time, the Americans were still building roads."

The Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs has held repeated hearings on this issue. It was before this subcommittee that the "Vietnamese mortician" appeared in June 1980 and testified that the remains of more than four hundred Americans, remains on which he had worked as late as mid-1977, were stored at 17 Ly Nam De Street, Hanoi, known to American POWs confined there as "The Plantation." The mortician also

recounted that he had observed live Americans there "up until 1974." Lieutenant General Tighe preceded the mortician before the committee that day. Concerning DIA's investigation of the report of the four hundred remains and the mortician's anticipated testimony, General Tighe stated: "The technician's personae vita has been crosschecked and independently verified. His polygraph examination conducted by DIA indicated no deception. The allegation that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is maintaining and withholding four hundred remains of U.S. personnel is judged by the Defense Intelligence Agency to be valid."

Some of the other testimony is just as disturbing, but the strategic deletions from the public record of this subcommittee's proceedings are, in some cases, more intriguing than the statements left in the record.

During a June 1979 exchange between Lieutenant General Tighe and Congressman Dornan, of 15 questions and answers regarding the possibility of live Americans' still being held in Laos, eight of the questions and answers were deleted or partially deleted.

However, this concealment is not always a matter of covering up. Ann Griffiths points out that there has been a change in the attitude of the government, especially since the avalanche of reports from the boat people began. She is grateful and does not want to jeopardize any government efforts in behalf of the men. Mrs. Griffiths, who was recently granted limited access to classified information so that she could take part in official meetings and hearings on the matter, and so that the government might exploit her own considerable institutional memory, is now discouraging private rescue attempts (there have been at least three in various stages of preparation in recent months) because of her fear that they would jeopardize the lives of more men than they might save.

"How high up in the government," we asked her, "does this belief, the belief that there are still Americans alive there, extend? Does the President believe it? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? The Secretary of State . . . ?"

"I really couldn't discuss it in specific terms," she replied.

"Now we're getting into your security clearance?"

"That's right."

One story, however, suggests the level of responsibility and authority to which interest in re-evaluating the MIA question extends. Captain John McCain (USN, Ret.), the son of Admiral McCain and himself a survivor of more than five years of captivity in North Vietnam, was until recently the Navy's liaison with the U.S. Senate. He says that during the war a state governor who had become concerned about imprisoned POWs and their waiting families invited some of the families to the state capital and held a news conference with them to demonstrate his support. During the proceedings, the small son of one of the POWs toddled forward and asked the governor to take him to the bathroom. Without hesitation or embarrassment the governor did just that. After the two returned, the press conference resumed with the boy standing near the governor. Then, a second time, the child interrupted him, tugging at his sleeve to ask, "Can you bring my daddy home?"

Longtime aides to Ronald Reagan trace his enduring interest in the matter to that moment. "He's a very sentimental guy," says McCain. "He wore that guy's bracelet [inscribed

with the name of the boy's missing father] . . . from then until after everybody came home." Since the boy's father was not among those repatriated or otherwise accounted for, it is probably safe to assume that President Reagan has not dismissed the issue from his mind, or his heart.

But what does the government plan to do, assuming that the day may soon come when it will be impossible to deny, as a matter of policy, that we believe the North Vietnamese are still detaining Americans? Ann Griffiths would like to know the answer to that question herself, and states that, to her knowledge, there is no plan for that eventuality. The League, for all that its members have suffered these long years, has strenuously opposed ransom.

**I**N WORKING on this article we encountered the number "2,500" over and over, until it began to swim before our eyes, until—despite the fact that both of us served in Vietnam—it almost began to obscure the men about whom we were writing. As an antidote, let's talk about two of them.

Navy Lieutenant Ron Dodge, a handsome, balding young man, was the only American pilot shot down on May 17, 1967 in Nghe An province, North Vietnam. He ejected safely and told his wingman, "Here they come. I'm destroying my radio." Later that day a Vietnamese broadcast boasted about capturing the "U.S. bandit pilot." To further substantiate his capture, a photograph of Dodge, his face dirty and bruised, his head in bandages, was released and later printed in *Paris Match*. He was also featured in the Communist propaganda film, *Pilots in Pajamas*. The North Vietnamese deny any knowledge of him.

On July 7, 1981, 14 years and 51 days after he was shot down, the body of Ron Dodge, along with the bodies of two other Air Force pilots, was returned by North Vietnam—without explanation, as usual.

Air Force Colonel David Hrdlicka's plane came apart over northern Laos on May 18, 1965. Peking's New China News Agency broadcast a report quoting a Pathet Lao spokesman as announcing the capture of Colonel Hrdlicka. The following year the Pathet Lao broadcast a letter which was attributed to Hrdlicka wherein he discussed the war and his eagerness to see his wife and children. Several months later, in August 1966, *Pravda* ran a photograph of him, still in his flight suit, head bowed and turned slightly away, an armed guard behind him. U.S. intelligence believes he was held in a cave near Sam Neua, Laos, and reports believed to pertain to him were monitored for several years.

Colonel Hrdlicka is an old Air Force flying buddy of Congressman Robert Dornan. "It is just absolutely sickening to think that an American could suffer such a fate," says Dornan. "Think of the mental state of someone existing alive for seven years, compounded on top of his seven . . . years of captivity before the American presence ended. . . . I just can't conceive of what an American must think of his country if he is still alive somewhere in one of those jungle camps. . . ."

Indeed. What must they think of us?

Walter Cronkite mesmerized the country during the hostage crisis by counting all the way up to 444. If by a miracle David Hrdlicka is still alive, he is approaching day six thousand. □



26 JANUARY 1982

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES  
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1808 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 (202) 223-6846

PARTICIPANTS IN THE JANUARY 26TH SEMINAR

Bob Ashworth	AMVETS
<del>Ray Bosiljevac</del>	League Regional Coordinator
Carol Bates	League's Director of Public Affairs
Max Bielke	National Association for Uniformed Services
Ruth Brellenthin	Forget-Me-Not Association
Mr. & Mrs. George Brooks	League Board of Directors and State Coordinator
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Richard Cuneo	Project Freedom
Larry De Meo	VA
Lea Dickinson	League representative from Virginia
Janis Dodge	League representative from California
Audrey Edleman	Air Force Sergeants Association Auxiliary
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✓ Deborah Marsh	League Office Staff
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Larry Moen	VA Public Affairs
Nancy Nystrom	League Coordinator: Florida
Larry O'Daniel	Concerned Citizen: New Jersey
Kathi Neal Parsels	League's Special Projects Coordinator
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Patti Sheridan	Red River Pilots Association
Peg Treadway	Concerned Citizen: Texas
Chuck Walker	POW/MIA Foundation
Molly Walsh	League representative: Minnesota

ADDITIONS TO JANUARY 26TH:

John Fales                      Blinded Veterans Association  
Colonel Lee Elwell          Joint Chiefs of Staff  
LTC John Fer                  Department of Defense

Kathy Christiansen          White House office of Public Liaison

Karen Thuermer              AFS Assoc

Debra Anderson              State

Barbara Harvey              State

Linda Fanning                Natl Human Rights





NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES  
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1608 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 (202) 223-6846

## Interviews/Media Coverage

Due to the increasing reports of captive Americans in Indochina and the growing public interest in the POW/MIA issue, it is imperative that League representatives not only seek out media coverage but are also prepared to respond to questions. Certainly, if you know that an indepth interview is scheduled, you can call the office for an up date.

Following are some points to cover in an interview and frequently asked questions with data for formulating your responses:

### Points to Cover

1. Department of Defense figures indicate there are currently 2,496 men who remain unaccounted for in Indochina. At the end of official U.S. involvement in the war, April 1973, there were approximately 1,350 listed as prisoner of war or missing in action, and another 1,150 listed as killed in action/body not recovered. Point out some of the discrepancy cases where men were known to be captured but never returned. Due to the government's systematic procedure for declaring men dead on a presumptive basis, there are currently only ten men listed as MIA and one POW.
2. The Vietnamese and Lao have been blatantly uncooperative on the accounting and in the nearly nine years since the end of the war, only 77 remains have been returned. Point out the "mortician's" testimony in Congress in June 1980, where he states that he processed or saw the remains of over 400 Americans stored in a Hanoi facility. Stress that DIA has determined this source to be valid. Note that the Vietnamese have provided data on the missing only when they felt it to be politically advantageous, for example to convince the U.S. to allow them a seat in the United Nations.
3. Be sure to highlight the recent live sighting reports. DIA is currently investigating over 350 first hand reports and several hundred additional second hand reports. This is a relatively new government effort as until two years ago the U.S. government was making little if any attempt to collect and analyze such data.

Almost three years ago the League started running ads in Vietnamese and Lao language publications, circulated in refugee communities worldwide. The ads requested information on Americans alive or dead in Indochina. As a result of these advertisements, the League has received over 125 reports. This information has been turned over to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Due to pressure from the families and Congress, the Defense Department began to follow up the reports by interviewing the sources, in many cases administering lie detector tests to establish the validity of the source and the information. Further, the U.S. government finally initiated a more serious effort to collect data from refugees emigrating from Indochina. (Refer to sample sighting reports enclosed in media packet.)

4. Some reporters will want background on the National League of Families. The League's history is included in the media packet.

5. Provide pertinent data on your missing man and others from your area.

6. The U.S. government, after many years of claiming they have no evidence of men still held in captivity, has over the past year made several changes in their official statements. See "Government Position" sheet in the media packet.

7. In June 1981, Lt. General Eugene Tighe, USAF, then director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, indicated in testimony before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee, that he personally believes Americans are captive in Indochina. Following is an excerpt from that testimony:

Chairman Solarz: You have lived with this problem for a long time. In your view, given your personal judgement as you are about to leave this assignment, does the weight of the evidence suggest to you, taking everything into consideration, that American servicemen are still living in Indochina?

General Tighe: Yes, sir.

Chairman Solarz: And there are still, and this is a somewhat different question, American servicemen being held against their will in Indochina?

General Tighe: My conviction would be "yes" in answer to both questions, sir.

## Frequently Asked Questions and Response Data

Q. How do you know the Vietnamese are withholding information? Maybe they really don't know what happened to the men. Many were lost in remote areas.

A. Mention the men who were last known to be in captivity (discrepancies or personal case). Point out that the Vietnamese said some 40 men died in captivity in communist hands in South Vietnam, but these men's remains have not been repatriated. Refer to the testimony from the "mortician."

Q. Currently the U.S. does not have relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. If we established normal relations and lifted trade restrictions, would this result in their cooperation on the accounting?

A. Probably not in any substantial way. We have normal relations with Laos, where almost 600 men are missing. Thus far, they have provided the remains of only two men and no information on those men whom we know were held in caves for a number of years.

Several years ago, the SRV implied that if the U.S. allowed them a seat in the United Nations, better cooperation on the accounting would follow. The net result was the return of ten bodies.

The League's position is that the U.S. should use normalization of relations, trade, etc., as leverage on the SRV in direct negotiations for the accounting. There is simply no reason to believe that establishing normal relations at this time would result in any substantial progress on the accounting.

Q. Why would the SRV/Lao hold prisoners this long after the war?

A. That answer lies with the Vietnamese and Lao; however, there are some logical possibilities. First, the Communists have a history of withholding POWs at the end of hostilities. More than 15 years after the end of the Vietnamese war with the French in the 1950's, the Vietnamese released French Foreign Legionnaires they had withheld.

Further, President Nixon made a secret agreement with the Vietnamese to provide \$3.25 billion in politically unconditional "reconstruction" aid following the end of the war. This aid was never given. It is possible the SRV kept some POWs to use as future bargaining chips or as insurance for obtaining the funds.

Q. How do you know the sightings of Americans in Vietnam and Laos don't refer to defectors who stayed there by choice?

A. Although there may be a small number of defectors still living in Indochina, the reports we have received refer to caucasians who are being held against their will. Some mention more formal camp systems while other reports refer to men seen tied, shackled, used for hard labor or otherwise under guard.

# GOVERNMENT POSITION

The U. S. government, after many years of claiming there was no "credible evidence" any Americans remained in captivity in Indochina, has in recent months changed its position, making more positive statements on the question of live POWs. Following are several recent U.S. government official position statements:

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"At my direction, the United States government is investigating an increasing number of reports that Americans may still be held captive in Indochina. While no report has yet been substantiated, priority effort will continue until we have achieved the fullest possible accounting from the governments involved."  
--RONALD REAGAN - April 24, 1981

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"There have been recurring reports of Americans held against their will in Southeast Asia since the exodus of Vietnamese from that area began. The Department of Defense has checked and will continue to check regularly and with great care the validity of each such report. Should any such report prove true, the DoD can be expected to take appropriate action. Meanwhile, DoD will refrain from commenting now or in the future on specific reports affecting such matters."  
--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPOKESMAN - May 21, 1981

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Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, appearing on NBC's TODAY broadcast of May 22, 1981, was questioned on the POW/MIA issue. Following are the two questions and his responses:

Q. We have heard this week that there was a mission financed by the United States to look for American, possibly American prisoners of war, who were being held in Laos. The mission returned with no evidence that they were being held there. Will you pursue that kind of mission in other areas and continue to search for Americans who possibly may be missing in that part of the world?

A. Well, obviously we're getting into very classified matters. The goal here is to rescue any Americans who might be in that part of the world and want to come home--any Americans who are being held against their will. I think the best way to phrase it, Tom, is just to say that we would continue to pursue any possibilities that seem to offer themselves to recover Americans under such circumstances. It would be, as you can tell, rather inappropriate and totally

Page 2

ineffective as far as the success of such a mission if we talked about it ahead of time or gave away anything that might be of value in pursuing any future report. We will make every effort to try to find any American who is held there against their will.

Q. Are you persuaded that there are Americans still being held?

A. I don't really know. We have all kinds of conflicting reports and we get differing ones sometimes each week. Any that appear to offer any sort of substantial hope of recovery of Americans we would pursue with all the appropriate means we could.

# SIGHTING REPORTS

Following are sample sighting reports received directly by the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia:

1) The source of this report spent 15 years in communist prisons in North Vietnam, after serving as a CIA trained special forces paratrooper. The refugee reports, "During the time I was imprisoned in Hanoi I knew of a number of American POWs. I have heard their voices and I have heard the cadres say that they were downed pilots undergoing 'reeducation.' They were held nearby, separated from me by a six meter high wall. I could not see them, but could hear their voices."

The source goes on to say that at the end of 1978, he and 130 American POWs were transferred to Thanh Hoa. While in Thanh Hoa, the former paratrooper said he saw about 30 Americans held in three separate camps about seven kilometers from each other. He adds that the Americans were divided into separate camps so that the Communists could keep closer guard.

The refugee stated that while he was doing hard labor outside the camp, he was under looser surveillance and was able to talk to the local people. From them he learned that the camps had existed about two years. He adds, "Since when we went to work, we passed by their (the Americans) place of detention, we saw them at a distance of about 20 meters; therefore, I do not know their names and addresses. Moreover, I never dreamed of being in a free country some day. If I had known that one day I would be here, I would have tried my best to come closer to take names of the prisoners."

In conclusion the source states, "The POWs I saw were very thin, they were covered with scabies; there was just skin and bones left on them. They could hardly walk, yet they were forced to carry wood from the forests distant about 500 meters. They often fell down. Sometimes they were beaten by the guards. These are things I saw with my own eyes."

2) The source of this report, a former Laotian employee of the U.S. Agency for International Development, states that in December 1975, he was stopped while driving his taxi in Thakak, Laos, and arrested when his U.S. identification card was discovered. He was transported by truck to Viengkay, Laos, and from there travelled about three and one half hours to a camp surrounded by bamboo trees. He says there was a natural cave at the mountain (the source provided explicit detail of the cave area) which was used to hold prisoners. He saw five caucasian prisoners held in the cave and was told they were American pilots.

All five men were white, and approximately six feet in height. One prisoner, who was slightly shorter than the others, had mixed white and dark hair. Three of the prisoners had light brown hair and the last prisoner also had

whitish dark hair. The source noted a gold ring on one of the prisoners who had light brown hair and also noticed that the men had a red rash around their ankles.

The refugee was held at the camp, tied up a short distance away from the cave, for one month. During this time, he said there were 12 guards, all armed with AK 47 rifles. In February 1976, he was taken to another camp where he was held until late 1978.

3) This refugee source reports, "A number of American POWs previously detained in Hanoi have been moved to Ham Tan in South Vietnam during the month of August 1980. They were transferred on the same train as other Vietnamese POWs from the grade of major and higher. When their train arrived in Da Nang, our relative, an Air Force major, was on board that train. He sent word to us... that he was being transferred to the South. Upon hearing that, my brothers and I followed up on the matter. On that train there were American prisoners; my relative saw them very clearly."

The source of the report goes on to say that he checked out the information and that the Americans are being held in Ham Tan. (Note: Although this is a second hand report, the League's source has provided DIA with the name and location of the man who actually saw the POWs.)

4) A report from another source says that after the communists took control of the Mekong Delta, he was forced to go to a "reeducation" camp at Lo Te Can Tho. The camp was the former Can To prison and held about 800 people, from lieutenants to generals, including foreigners. There were three Americans in the camp. The source saw them everyday as they worked with him in janitorial and cleaning tasks. The source did not know their names, but did know their ranks because the communists kept NCOs with NCOs, officers with officers and so on. The refugee reports that "the American major died at the camp. He was a tall, white naval officer who was stationed in Chau Doc." The source added that among the three American POWs there was a black corporal and a white master sergeant. He also provided details regarding the burial of the major and removal of the two remaining Americans to an unknown location.



NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES  
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1608 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 (202) 223-6846

POW/MIA SPEECH OUTLINE

This outline can be useful in speaking to various groups, but is specifically designed for civic organizations and high school groups who have little to no background on the POW/MIA issue.

The speaker should have a sufficient amount of literature to distribute to the audience, including brochures and flyers which are available from the League office. The speaker should also have a good grasp of the issues involved-relevant statistics, present United States government policy, League of Families positions, etc. The office will provide such data upon request.

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The speaker, if a family member, should take a few minutes to describe personal involvement in the POW/MIA issue -- incident information on the missing man, etc. If the speaker is a concerned citizen, take a few moments to explain why he/she is involved in the issue.

2. A brief description of the League will be useful in acquainting the audience with our goals and objectives. It is important to mention when and why the League was formed, what we hope to accomplish and how we hope to do it, i. e., working with Congress, working through the various government agencies such as the departments of State and Defense and by promoting a public awareness campaign.

3. For civic groups - Explain the regional/state/local branches of the League and how they work to promote public and Congressional awareness. It is important to stress the poor financial situation and how all efforts are made through private donations from concerned citizens. Without public support (including financial) the POW/MIA programs cannot continue.

4. For high school groups - Be prepared to give a brief background on the Vietnam War.

- The main years of U.S. involvement were 1964-1973.
- The fighting ranged throughout Indochina - Vietnam, Laos & Cambodia.
- The reasons for U.S. involvement were to halt international communist expansion and allow the South Vietnamese people to determine their future without fear of external pressures.
- Next to the Civil War, the Vietnam conflict was the most divisive war America has ever fought. Mention the student protests that swept the land. American political leaders were split



- on the war; it fueled much of the social unrest on the 1960's.
- Over 57,000 Americans died in Vietnam during the war; hundreds of thousands were wounded and 2,500 remain unaccounted for.
- This was the first war America lost. This fact has had a tremendous influence on American foreign policy since 1975.
- For the United States, the war officially ended in 1973 with the Paris peace accords; unofficially it ended in 1975 when North Vietnamese tanks rolled into Saigon just hours after the last American evacuation chopper left.

## B. INFORMATION

1. Emphasize that nearly 2,500 Americans are still missing and unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. The United States still lists one man as POW (Col. Charles Shelton, USAF, Laos) and ten as MIA. The others have been presumed dead based on the lack of information to the contrary. NOTE - Emphasize that the majority of the men were presumed dead because there was no recent data to prove they were alive. In short, since no one could prove the man was alive, he was presumed dead.

2. Since the end of official United States military presence in 1973, Hanoi has turned over the remains of only 77 men. The most recent turn over was this past summer (July 1981) when the remains of Navy Commander Ronald Dodge, Navy Lt. Stephen Musselman and Air Force Capt. Richard Van Dyke were returned to the United States. Stress that Dodge and Van Dyke were known to have been alive in captivity and Musselman was photographed next to the wreckage of his aircraft. Yet for over eight years the Vietnamese denied knowledge of these men. Further, although both Dodge and Van Dyke were known to have been captured alive, Hanoi claims they died in the crashes of their aircraft.

Stress that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has substantiated data that Vietnam holds the remains of over 400 Americans in Hanoi.

3. Discuss some of the specific instances of Americans known to have been captured, but for whom there has been no accounting.

4. Stress live sighting reports: DIA, as of September 1981, has over 350 first hand live sighting reports which are being analyzed. (Read excerpts of such reports which are found in League newsletters and the media packet.)

5. Emphasize Laos: Almost 600 Americans were lost or shot down in Laos. The Pathet Lao have released only two sets of remains; no prisoners were released from Laos at the end of the war, despite prior claims by communist officials in that country that they held American POWs.

C. WHY WOULD THE SRV/LAO HOLD PRISONERS THIS LONG AFTER THE END OF THE WAR?

1. That answer lies with the Vietnamese and Lao; however, there are some logical possibilities.
  - a. The Communists have a history of withholding POWs at the end of hostilities. More than 15 years after the end of the Vietnamese war with the French in the 1950's, the Vietnamese released French Foreign Legionnaires they had withheld.
  - b. President Nixon made a secret agreement with the Vietnamese to provide \$3.25 billion in politically unconditional "reconstruction" aid following the end of the war. Due primarily to communist violations of the peace accords, this aid was never given. It is possible the SRV kept some POWs to use as future bargaining chips or as insurance for eventually obtaining funds.
  - c. The SRV has steadfastly refused to admit its troops were ever fighting in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. It is plausible for them to disclaim any knowledge or responsibility for American POWs or MIAs in those areas.

D. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO GET THE PRISONERS BACK AND SECURE AN ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING?

1. The U.S. government can do a number of things to obtain the return of POWs and speed cooperation on accounting for the missing.
  - a. The options range from military rescue to outright ransom, with several possibilities in between. The U.S. government has not held high level talks with the SRV to even determine what they want in return for cooperation on this humanitarian issue. In the three years since 1973, there have only been low level "raisings of the issue" with the Vietnamese and Lao.
  - b. The government could offer either incentives or pressures on the SRV to secure their cooperation. For instance, there are no diplomatic relations between our two countries and an embargo on all trade. Currently, the Soviet Union is spending millions of dollars a day to not only boost the Vietnamese economy, but to build military installations of their own in the SRV. The Vietnamese would like to have some sort of relationship with the U.S. to off set their dependence upon the U.S.S.R.

2. There are several things the public can do to help in returning POWs and gaining an accounting. Primarily, there needs to be a massive public awareness of this important issue. Through public awareness, sufficient pressure can be brought to bear on the U.S. government to let them know the citizens care and want these men home.

- a. The League always needs funds to continue its work. School groups can hold fairs, flea markets, bake sales, etc., to help. Civic organizations can adopt a POW/MIA.
- b. Groups can sponsor a special service for POW/MIAs, such as a Christmas candlelight program at a local church, which would honor the missing men.
- c. Either distribute the "You Can Help" flyer to the group or use the information it contains to provide addresses where people can write and other ideas of how they can help.

#### E. QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

1. Unless for some reason it would be inappropriate, always leave time for a question and answer period. What may seem obvious to those who have been involved in this issue for years, may not be obvious to the audience.

2. The media packet contains some often asked questions and some information to help in answering them.

3. In the event the speaker receives questions he does not feel qualified to answer, feel free to refer the person to the League office for more information.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1982

TO: Morton

FROM: Kathy

RE: Interagency Group on POW/MIA Affairs

Our office is involved with this because they are now implementing a full scale public information program which is being coordinated by this inter-agency group so that people don't go off in all directions on this issue.

Attached is a copy of the outline of the proposed approach. In summary, they wish to incorporate whenever possible the MIA issue in speeches and statements given by USG officials, including the President. They are working to promote resolutions and articles by veterans and service organizations and to increase coverage by private industry/government contractors in their publications and other media releases. They are working for nationwide support for National POW/MIA Recognition Day in July.

The above is what applies to our office to help with.

Attached also is the Department of State's draft of the official statement. If we have anything to add or subtract, we need to let them know by the end of the week.

The National League of Families is heading the public awareness effort and Ann Griffiths has prepared a media kit which will be sent to all Congressmen and Senators and major news publications.

Also, at the meeting this morning Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Richard Armitage, reported on the recent POW/MIA Mission to Hanoi. He described the team he had assembled - all people with expertise on Vietnam - and how they had fully prepared themselves for this mission. They studied the previous eight missions and decided not to launch a heavy attack, but rather to stress Vietnamese history and culture and show understanding of the Vietnamese humanitarian nature. They showed the complete commitment of the Reagan Administration to this issue, and stressed the American people's commitment and concern of a humanitarian nature to this issue. They did not receive any agreement in writing from Hanoi, but Hanoi did agree in principle to visit the USG identification base in Honolulu and to hold discussions to initiate a joint search for remains.

GIST

POW/MIA's

The U.S. Government is strongly committed to obtaining the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing in Southeast Asia. Lack of cooperation from the governments of Vietnam and Laos has been the principal obstacle to determining the fate of these missing Americans. U.S. Government policy seeks to develop new avenues of approach that might lead to better cooperation; to investigate unflinchingly and carefully all reports of possible live POW's in Vietnam and Laos; and to hold these governments to their humanitarian obligation to provide the fullest possible accounting of missing Americans and return of all recoverable remains.

Approximately 2500 Americans killed or missing as a consequence of the Vietnam War have not been fully accounted for. Of this number, approximately 1150 are known to have been killed in action, but their remains have not been recovered.

Between February and April 1973 the Hanoi government released 591 American prisoners. An additional 68 Americans stranded in Vietnam after April 1975 left in the course of the following year. To date, the Vietnamese have returned 77 sets of remains, and have provided a list of 47 names, 40 of which were Americans, of persons reported to have died in captivity in southern Vietnam. Between 1962 and 1975, 20 Americans who had been missing in Laos were returned. In August 1978, the Lao Government returned four sets of remains, two of which were later determined to be non-American. Political and military conditions in Kampuchea have precluded obtaining an accounting for the small number of Americans lost in that country.

The United States Government has repeatedly urged the Vietnamese and Lao Governments to meet their humanitarian obligation to provide the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing in their countries. Both governments assert that no Americans are held captive, but they have done very little to substantiate that assertion by providing information on missing Americans, including a number known to have been captured alive. It is clear that the Vietnamese and Lao Governments have considerably more information on missing Americans available to them than they given to us.

In all contacts with Vietnamese and Lao authorities we stress the importance of obtaining all possible information and return of recoverable remains. Further, we seek from refugee and other sources information that pertains to the fate of missing Americans. All reports

that Americans are being held in captivity in Vietnam and Laos are thoroughly investigated. Despite persistent efforts and careful research, however, the U.S. Government has as yet been unable to prove any reports that Americans are being held against their will in Vietnam and Laos.

Of the approximately 1375 reports received since 1975 pertaining to POW/MIA matters, 403 first-hand reports mention sightings of live Americans. The remainder concern crash or grave sites. Approximately one-third of the live sighting reports correlate to Americans who have previously been accounted for and are no longer in Southeast Asia. Unverified reports are under continuing investigation.

To impress on the Vietnamese the seriousness with which this Administration regards accounting for missing Americans, a POW/MIA Mission, led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard L. Armitage, visited Hanoi, February 23-24, 1982. The Vietnamese reiterated their position that there are no live POW's in Vietnam. During this visit the Vietnamese agreed in principle to continue technical discussions between our Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Personnel, and to send a delegation of MIA experts to JCRC headquarters and the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii. No dates have been set for these visits. JCRC representatives visited Hanoi in October 1980 and May 1981, and a team of Vietnamese MIA specialists previously visited the JCRC and CIL in Hawaii in 1978.

Our Embassy in Vientiane makes repeated representations to the Lao Government on the importance of accounting for missing Americans. Although Lao Foreign Ministry officials assure us that they understand our concerns about missing Americans, they have not responded positively to our proposals for discussions between U.S. and Lao MIA experts or for cooperation in access to crash sites, including joint visits and possible removal of unexploded ordnance in the area of the crash sites.

The U.S. Government will continue to press the SRV and Lao Governments in order to obtain the fullest possible accounting and the return of all recoverable remains associated with Americans who are missing in Southeast Asia.

\* \* \* \* \*

## USG POW/MIA

### Public Information Program

The objective of a public information program on POW/MIA affairs should be two-fold: first, to aid in the resolution of the problem through obtaining the cooperation of the Vietnamese and Lao governments in accounting for missing Americans; and, second, to increase U.S. public awareness of the dimensions of the POW/MIA issue.

The program must be factually based to be credible domestically and internationally. Should it appear to be merely a propaganda exercise, or principally recriminatory, it would undermine our efforts to convince the Vietnamese and Lao governments that this is a matter of serious substantive concern which we are determined to resolve. Only a factual, unemotional and non-rhetorical program can attract international support and bring international and domestic public pressure to bear on the governments of Vietnam and Laos.

The POW/MIA public awareness program must be a coordinated effort among all concerned agencies and organizations which deal in matters associated with POW/MIA's and be integrated with ongoing U.S. diplomatic initiatives/efforts.

#### Proposed Approach:

1) Incorporate MIA issue in speeches and statements by highest level USG officials. State, Defense and NSC officials with POW/MIA responsibilities should endeavor to include the issue often, as appropriate, in speeches given by their principals, including the President and Secretaries of State and Defense.

2) Press statements and interviews on MIA issue by high and working-level USG officials. We should attempt to arrange regular interviews by a policy-level official.

3) Congressional staffers will ensure continuing Congressional attention to POW/MIA matters.

4) Issuance of GIST paper by Department of State (draft attached).

5) Raise the issue of POW/MIA accounting with the UN Human Rights Commission and other appropriate UN bodies.

6) Resolutions and articles by patriotic service organizations in their publications and other media releases.

7) USG should work to increase coverage of the POW/MIA Issue by private industry/government contractors in their industry publications.

8) Support for National POW/MIA Recognition Day.





NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES  
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1608 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 (202) 223-6846

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# POW-MIA FACT BOOK

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## GENERAL SUMMARY

The United States government, as well as various private citizens and groups, have made continual private and public appeals to the communist governments in Southeast Asia in an effort to obtain an accounting for Americans lost during the military conflict there. Although token progress has been made, in general, direct negotiations and other overtures have achieved minimal success.

Without a doubt, the present government of Vietnam holds information which could directly result in the resolution of the cases of a large number of unaccounted for Americans. Evidence of this is conclusive in many cases. The communist governments in Cambodia and Laos cannot be relied upon to possess as extensive a knowledge on Americans lost in their countries.

Although the potential for some success is real with regard to casualty resolution, the degree of success is unpredictable, even with complete communist cooperation.

### PRESENT U.S. UNACCOUNTED FOR

U.S. military:	2453
U.S. civilian:	<u>41</u>
Total:	2494

CATEGORIES OF DEGREES OF INFORMATION -  
ENEMY KNOWLEDGE ON PW/MIA PERSONNEL

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE</u>
1	Confirmed
2	Suspect
3	Doubtful
4	Unknown
5	Unrelated

CATEGORY 1 CONFIRMED KNOWLEDGE

This category includes 166 individuals who were:

- A. Identified by the enemy by name
- B. Identified by reliable information received from releasees/escapees, or
- C. Reported by highly reliable intelligence sources
- D. Identified through analysis of all-source intelligence

CATEGORY 2 SUSPECT KNOWLEDGE

This category includes 1123 individuals who were:

- A. Involved in the same incidents as individuals reported in category 1
- B. Lost in areas or under such conditions that they may reasonably be expected to be known by the enemy
- C. Connected with an incident which was discussed but not identified by name in the enemy news media, or
- D. Probably identified through analysis of all-source intelligence

CATEGORY 3 DOUBTFUL KNOWLEDGE

This category includes 342 individuals whose loss incident is such that it is doubtful that the enemy would have knowledge of the specific individuals (e.g., aircrews lost over water or remote areas).

CATEGORY 4 UNKNOWN KNOWLEDGE

This category includes 429 individuals:

- A. Whose time and place of incident are unknown (e.g., aircrew members downed at unknown locations or ground personnel separated from their unit at an unknown time or place), and
- B. Who do not meet the criteria of categories 1 through 3

CATEGORY 5 CATEGORY UNRELATED TO DEGREE OF ENEMY KNOWLEDGE

This category includes 434 individuals whose remains have been determined to be nonrecoverable as outlined in Department of the Army Technical Manual 10-286, January 1964, Section 39.

# CASUALTY DATA SUMMARY

2 APRIL 1973

PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION						
	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	US CIV	TOTAL
CAMBODIA	19	3	0	0	5	27
LAOS	56	267	14	13	10	360
NVN	3	339	26	139	0	507
SVN	286	83	68	5	14	456
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>692</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>1350</b>

KILLED IN ACTION						
	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	US CIV	TOTAL
CAMBODIA	19	11	0	0	0	30
LAOS	64	98	5	31	0	198
NVN	7	45	10	204	0	266
SVN	271	129	156	*123	5	684
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>361</b>	<b>283</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>358</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1178</b>

<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>725</b>	<b>975</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>515</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>2528</b>
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\*Includes 1 USCG Individual

AMERICANS UNACCOUNTED FOR BY STATE

Alabama - 46	Nebraska - 25
Alaska - 3	Nevada - 10
Arizona - 26	New Hampshire - 9
Arkansas - 28	New Jersey - 64
California - 255	New Mexico - 18
Colorado - 41	New York - 163
Connecticut - 40	North Carolina - 61
Delaware - 5	North Dakota - 17
District of Columbia - 9	Ohio - 130
Florida - 84	Oklahoma - 46
Georgia - 50	Oregon - 47
Hawaii - 10	Pennsylvania - 124
Idaho - 12	Rhode Island - 10
Illinois - 106	South Carolina - 31
Indiana - 70	South Dakota - 9
Iowa - 42	Tennessee - 45
Kansas - 40	Texas - 167
Kentucky - 22	Utah - 24
Louisiana - 36	Vermont - 4
Maine - 18	Virginia - 61
Maryland - 37	Washington - 59
Massachusetts - 60	West Virginia - 26
Michigan - 78	Wisconsin - 37
Minnesota - 46	Wyoming - 6
Mississippi - 17	Puerto Rico - 3
Missouri - 51	Virgin Islands - 1
Montana - 21	Other - 7

U.S. REMAINS RETURNED

NAME	SERVICE	GROUP RETURNED
Abbott, John	USN	2
Ammon, Glendon L.	USAF	8
Atterberry, Edwin L.	USAF	2
Bowling, Roy H.	USN	6
Brand, Joseph W.	USAF	7
Buckley, Jimmy L.	USN	3
Burdett, Edward B.	USAF	1
Cameron, Kenneth R.	USN	1
Capling, Elwyn R.	USAF	6
Clark, Donald E. Jr.	USAF	7
Cobeil, Earl G.	USAF	1
Connell, James J.	USN	1
Dawson, Clyde D.	USAF	7
Dennison, Terry A.	USN	1
Diamond, Stephen W.	USAF	6
Diehl, William C.	USAF	1
Doby, Herb	USAF	7
Dodge, Ronald W.	USN	10
Dodge, Ward K.	USAF	2
Ducat, Bruce C.	USAF	6
Estes, Walter O.	USN	7
Fantle, Samuel	USAF	7
Ferguson, Walter	USAF	8
Fitton, Crosley J.	USAF	4
Frederick, John W.	USMC	2
Fryer, Ben L.	USAF	7
Golberg, Lawrence H.	USAF	7
Goss, Bernard J.	USAF	8
Gougelmann, Tucker	CIV	7
Graham, Alan U.	USAF	7
Griffin, James L.	USN	2
Grubb, Wilmer N.	USAF	2
Hartman, Richard D.	USN	1
Heggen, Keith R.	USAF	2
Hockridge, James A.	USAF	7
Johnson, Guy D.	USN	6
Judge, Darwin L.	USMC	5
Klenert, William B.	USN	6
Kolstad, Thomas C.	USN	6
Lodge, Robert A.	USAF	7
McMahon, Charles Jr.	USMC	5
Mearns, Arthur S.	USAF	7
Metz, James H.	USAF	6
Monroe, Vincent D.	USN	8
Morris, Robert J. Jr.	USAF	7
Morrow, Richard D.	USN	8
Musselman, Stephen	USN	10

NAME	SERVICE	GROUP RETURNED
Nelson, William H.	USAF	7
Newsom, Benjamin B.	USAF	1
Paul, Craig A.	USAF	7
Pemberton, Gene T.	USAF	1
Perry, Ronald D.	USAF	4
Petersen, Gaylord D.	USAF	8
Pugh, Kenneth W.	USN	3
Rissi, Donald L.	USAF	8
Roark, William M.	USN	6
Schmidt, Norman	USAF	1
Sijan, Lance R.	USAF	2
Singer, Donald ,	USAF	7
Smith, Homer L.	USN	2
Spencer, Warren R.	USAF	7
Stamm, Ernest A.	USN	2
Storz, Ronald R.	USAF	1
Taylor, Jesse	USN	4
Teague, James E.	USN	7
Thomas, Robert J.	USAF	8
Thum, Richard C.	USN	7
Van Dyke, Richard	USAF	10
Walters, Jack	USN	2
Waters, Samuel E.	USAF	6
Weatherby, Jack W.	USAF	8
Weskamp, Robert L.	USAF	1
Wiggins, Wallace L.	USAF	9
Wilkinson, Dennis E.	USAF	8
Wimbrow, Nutter J.	USAF	7
Winston, Charles C.	USAF	7
Wright, James J.	USN	8
Wynne, Patrick E.	USAF	6

TOTAL: 78

\*Group Returned

1	March 6, 1974
2	March 13, 1974
3	December 16, 1975
4	December 21, 1975
5	February 22, 1976
6	March 18, 1977
7	September 30, 1977
8	August 23, 1978
9	August 24, 1978
10	July 7, 1981



UNACCOUNTED FOR U.S. PERSONNEL  
WITH EVIDENCE OF CAPTURE

ROBERT ANDERSON  
USAF  
NORTH VIETNAM

Colonel Anderson went down over North Vietnam on October 6, 1972. He and his back-seater both parachuted and talked with rescue planes. Anderson said, "I have a good parachute, am in good shape and can see no enemy forces on the ground." His back-seater was captured immediately. Radio Hanoi reported that "a number of U.S. pilots" were captured that same day, however, Anderson's plane was the only one lost that day. The back-seater has since returned.

BARTON CREED  
USN  
LAOS

Lt. Commander Creed was shot down along the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos on March 13, 1971. After ejecting from his plane he radioed from the ground to the rescue craft that he had a broken leg and arm. His last message was, "Pick me up now. Pick me up now. They are here." Rescue planes made four different attempts in the next 24 hours to rescue him, but failed. One rescue pilot reported that Creed was "most certainly alive" when they tried to pick him up.

JACK ERSKINE  
CIVILIAN  
SOUTH VIETNAM

A Filipino with Erskine escaped from the VC ambush and reported Erskine's capture. Three months later a VC rallier who had participated in Erskine's capture reported on the incident. About one year later sketches showing Erskine in captivity were captured. Not identified on any lists furnished by PRG.

SEAN FLYNN  
CIVILIAN  
CAMBODIA

Mr. Flynn, a photographer for TIME magazine, accompanied by Dana Stone, a cameraman for CBS, rented Honda motorbikes and left Phnom Penh on April 6, 1970, travelling southeast on Route One. According to reports at that time, villagers in the area said that two Westerners on motor scooters were captured by combined Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces in Svay Rieng Province. Later reports (received after January 1973) indicate Flynn and Stone were shot to death in mid-1971 in Kampong Cham Province.

RANDALL FORD  
USN  
NORTH VIETNAM

Lt. Commander Ford was downed in an A7A on June 11, 1968, while on a night reconnaissance mission. Ford maintained voice contact until morning and stated that he had a broken arm. On June 15, 1968, Ford arrived at a temporary detention area in which a U.S. returnee was being held. The returnee stated that Ford, who had a broken arm and was severely constipated, was given medicine to relieve his problem. Shortly after taking the pill, Ford became delirious. An hour later Ford was taken out of camp on a stretcher and never seen again. The returnee felt that Ford may have been dead when Ford was taken from the area.

SOLOMON GODWIN  
USMC  
SOUTH VIETNAM

A U.S. trained Vietnamese intelligence agent who was held with Godwin escaped three weeks after capture and reported on Godwin's status. U.S. returnees confirmed Godwin's capture and reported his death in captivity. Not on any lists furnished by PRG.

JOHN GRAF  
USN  
SOUTH VIETNAM

Seen ejecting safely. Intelligence reporting confirmed capture status. A U.S. returnee held with Graf reported Graf escaped several months after capture. Intelligence indicated Graf drowned in his escape attempt. The PRG has not furnished any information on Graf.

WELLES HANGEN  
CIVILIAN  
CAMBODIA

Mr. Hangen, an NBC news correspondent, was in a group of NBC and CBS newsmen when they were ambushed by communist forces in Kampot Providence. According to Hangen's Cambodian driver (who escaped and returned to Phnom Penh), Hangen and two foreign journalists in the same car were taken alive to a house about three miles from the site of the attack. Based on information provided by a Khmer Rouge rallier, and substantiated by reports from villagers, Hangen and three others were held in the house for three days before being taken out and executed.

DAVID HRDLICKA  
USAF  
LAOS

Colonel Hrdlicka's chute was observed opening and he was seen on the ground. One flight member believed he saw Hrdlicka being supported or led away by natives. A helicopter pilot landed at a nearby village and was told Hrdlicka had been picked up by the Pathet Lao. Rallier reports indicated he was a prisoner. A post capture photo of Hrdlicka was obtained from several sources. A recording allegedly made by him was broadcast in May 1966 and the text appeared in FBIS.

RICHARD REHE  
USA  
SOUTH VIETNAM

An American who was released prior to Operation Homecoming stated that Rehe and Derri Sykes were captured with him. A later U.S. returnee stated that both men died in captivity (DIC). Neither were on the PRG DIC list.

EDWARD REILLY  
USA  
SOUTH VIETNAM

E.D. Reilly's interrogation papers were captured. The PRG has never furnished any information on Reilly.

TERRY REYNOLDS  
CIVILIAN  
CAMBODIA

Reynolds, a UPI reporter, and Mr. Alan Hirons, an Australian UPI photographer, were reported missing on April 26, 1972. The automobile in which they were driving was found at the site of an enemy road block on Route 1 in Prey Veng Province, Cambodia. Their photo equipment was found in the abandoned car. According to villagers in the area,

both journalists were captured and led away by communist forces. In early May, 1972, a Viet Cong rallier reportedly observed two Caucasians, equating favorably to Reynolds and Hiron, who had recently been captured. Another report equating favorably to Reynolds indicated that he was being held in Sampan Loeu Hamlet, about 40 kilometers southeast of Phnom Penh in June 1972.

CHARLES SHELTON  
USAF  
LAOS

Voice contact was made with Shelton on the ground and he indicated he was in good condition. A villager witnessed the crash and observed the capture and arrest of Shelton by Pathet Lao forces. Rallier reports indicated he was a prisoner. Special indigenous rescue team confirmed Shelton was a prisoner.

DONALD SPARKS  
USA  
SOUTH VIETNAM

Letters written by Sparks while a POW were captured. Subsequent intelligence indicated Sparks possibly died. The PRG has not furnished information on Sparks.

PHILIP TERRILL  
USA  
SOUTH VIETNAM

High degree of correlation between VC and Hanoi radio broadcasts describing capture of two Americans and the circumstances surrounding the loss of P.B. Terrill and J. Salley. Also, several sighting reports correlated well to the two men. Statuses confirmed by U.S. returnees who said both men died after capture. Salley was on the PRG DIC list, but Terrill was not.

MILTON VESCELIUS  
USN  
NORTH VIETNAM

Captain Vescelius was shot down over Vietnam on September 21, 1967. Other pilots in the area saw him eject and reported that when he reached the ground he was surrounded by Vietnamese. Additionally, a radio Hanoi broadcast on the following day described the incident and stated that the pilot was captured.

DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGEABILITY POSSESSED  
BY THE "OTHER SIDE" REGARDING  
U.S. UNACCOUNTED FOR PERSONNEL

A. Democratic Kampuchea

The communists in Kampuchea (Cambodia) have reportedly claimed that they have no knowledge of any U.S. personnel unaccounted for in Kampuchea. There is no substantive information on which a rebuttal of the Cambodian denials can be made. Although it is known that some U.S. unaccounted for personnel were captured in Cambodia, there is no information that would indicate that their capture was reported above the level of the local unit commanders.

B. Lao People's Democratic Republic

Until recently the Pathet Lao have not provided any information on unaccounted for U.S. personnel. The nine American prisoners released by the Vietnamese in early 1973 during Operation Homecoming were not, as was claimed at the time, captured by the Pathet Lao. They were, in reality, captured by north Vietnamese forces operating in Laos and moved as expeditiously as possible to north Vietnam for detention. After the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, the Pathet Lao claimed to hold only one prisoner, Mr. Emmet Kay, a U.S. civilian, captured on 7 May 1973. He was subsequently released on 18 September 1974. A Pathet Lao official commented that the Pathet Lao Central Committee had been gathering information on U.S. missing in action personnel, but he warned that they would probably only be able to provide information on a "feeble percentage." However, on 24 August 1978, the Lao government provided the remains of four persons to a U.S. Congressional delegation. Two of these individuals were subsequently identified as indigenous

Southeast Asian natives. One of the remaining two individuals was identified as a USAF pilot who was shot down on the Lao/Vietnam border. The extent of Pathet Lao knowledgeability regarding U.S. missing in action personnel is at best open to speculation.

#### C. Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)

There is no question that the Vietnamese have knowledge concerning the fate of some unaccounted for U.S. personnel lost over north Vietnam. A wealth of information on specific aircraft downings was published in the north Vietnamese press throughout the war. A communist source interrogated during the Vietnam war stated that the SRV Ministry of Defense, Enemy Proselyting Department, maintained central listings of all U.S. PWs detained in the SRV. This source also reported that in the SRV all data pertaining to the death and/or burial of an American prisoner, whether in the north or south, was to be forwarded to Hanoi as quickly as possible together with sketches of the burial site. Based on this information, and the known communist proclivity for detailed reporting, it is believed that the SRV holds significant amounts of accurate information on former and current American MIA/KIA in Southeast Asia.

In the south, representatives of the former Provisional Revolutionary Government should have information on several unaccounted for U.S. personnel, although the extent of this information is unknown. It is apparent that the communists in the south kept some records on American battle casualties, U.S. PWs and Americans who died after capture. However, the PRG may not have promulgated directions on this subject to all levels and units, or may have been lax in efforts to maintain such records. Thus, one should not be overly optimistic with respect to PRG records on unaccounted for U.S. personnel in the south.

## PW/MIA Background Paper

### BACKGROUND:

- A. Nearly 2500 Americans remain "unaccounted for" from the Indochina conflict.
- Official figure of 2497 undoubtedly includes some lost under circumstances precluding recovery, but definitely includes a large number of individuals thought to be accountable.
  - Efforts since 1973 PW return have focused on the overall goal of obtaining the "fullest possible accounting" including the narrower aspect of the return of remains.
- B. Historically, unsuccessful U.S. actions have primarily, but not exclusively, focused on pressing the SRV to respond by attempting to portray the issue as a purely humanitarian one devoid of political overtones. Highlights include:
- Conducting low to mid-level face-to-face diplomatic contacts.
  - Sending congressional delegations to Hanoi.
  - Enlisting assistance of humanitarian agencies.
  - Raising issue in UN and soliciting Third World support.
  - Refusal to discuss war reparations in conjunction with PW/MIA issue.
  - Other tactics were also largely ineffective, such as the "soft sell" (quiet diplomacy) tactics practiced by Averell Harriman and the refusal of U.S. to exercise veto prerogative in the UN to prevent entry of SRV.
- C. The Indochinese response to date has been sparse:
- March 74: SRV returned 23 remains.
  - December 75: SRV returned 3 remains
  - February 76: SRV returned 2 remains.

- September 76: SRV reported the deaths of 12 Americans shot down over North Vietnam 1965-68 (Arlo Gay released).
- March 77: SRV returned 12 remains (1 non-American) to Woodcock Commission.
- June 77/Sept. 77: SRV returned 22 remains (1 U.S. civilian) in September 1977.
- December 77: SRV returned 3 Americans (civilians).
- August 78: SRV returned 11 remains.
- August 78: Laotians returned 4 remains (2 non-U.S.; 1 U.S. caucasian still unidentified).
- March 79: PFC Garwood requested repatriation.
- July 81: SRV returned 3 remains.

D. The U.S. experience, despite a difference in circumstances, has paralleled the French in many ways:

- The French, after more than 25 years, are still negotiating and obtaining the return of remains interred in Vietnamese cemeteries.
- Although readily available, the remains have only been doled out on a piecemeal basis and then only in response to explicit quid pro quos.
- To date, the French have repatriated only slightly more than 3,000 remains from among 77,334 KIAs/MIAs of the original French Expeditionary Corps.
  - North Vietnam did not account for MIAs.
  - All bodies recovered were buried by the French in North Vietnam.
  - France agreed to "reimburse" North Vietnam for grave site maintenance, e.g., in 1972 estimated \$6 million in '72 dollars.
  - French experience with North Vietnam may have established an undesirable precedent linking political and financial objectives to return of remains.

E. Lessons Learned: Based on both U.S. and French experience to date:

- Unilateral actions cannot resolve; Indochinese cooperation is required.
- The SRV treats the issue as part of its broader political and economic objectives, not humanitarian, and will only respond when it is perceived to be in its own interest.
- SRV actions (if not Laotian) indicate a clear understanding of the importance the U.S. places on the issue.
- U.S. government's public emphasis on the "fullest possible accounting" may be perceived by the SRV as a political statement rather than a true humanitarian motive.
- The SRV undoubtedly has a wealth of information as well as actual remains which can be made available whenever desired; Laos, on the other hand, appears to have relatively little developed information but is a potentially valuable source.
- The issue will be resolved when both parties agree on the circumstances under which accounting will proceed without interruption, in particular, when considered to be politically and economically advantageous to the SRV.

Prepared by:

COL L.R. Elwell, USMC  
Far East/South Asia Division  
Plans & Policies  
Joint Chiefs of Staff



## REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE PW/MIA ISSUE

### BACKGROUND

During the early phases of American involvement in the Vietnamese war (1961 to 1964) very few Americans were captured and detained by Communist forces. Intelligence efforts to locate the few U.S. prisoners of war (PW) and missing in action (MIA) personnel and to lay the groundwork for their rescue or release were coordinated by the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, located in Saigon. While Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense Intelligence collection directives which governed the activities of American Intelligence assets in Southeast Asia gave high priority to acquisition of information on captured or missing Americans, the intelligence collection capability through 1964 was relatively limited.

With the buildup of U.S. forces in 1964, intelligence acquisition capabilities were enhanced. A regular flow of captured documents as well as enemy PWs, ralliers, and refugee interrogation reports developed.

In April 1966, the Intelligence Community increased the emphasis on collection of information on PWs and MIAs. DoD's highest priority was assigned and CIA and DoD collectors were immediately notified, and expanded formal collection requirements were published and disseminated. U.S. Government installations and organizations worldwide were now involved in obtaining information about PWs and the missing.

Following the Hanoi announcement in June 1966 that captured airmen would be tried for war crimes, the entire system of collecting, disseminating and processing information on missing personnel was reviewed and intensified. A network of debriefing and interrogation centers were developed in liaison with local government intelligence agencies in Vietnam and Laos. Sources were debriefed or interrogated in depth on the information they possessed. Indigenous teams checked out, where possible, crash sites, detention sites, and reported sightings of Americans. The scope of the worldwide collection effort was expanded to include all overt and media coverage and photography of PWs. Communist radio broadcasts were carefully monitored for information about PW/MIAs. The major elements of the Executive Department focusing on PW/MIA problems were the DoD (Defense Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence branches of the Military Services), the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State.

At the Office of Secretary of Defense level, a DoD PW policy committee was established in July 1967 with the responsibility for providing direction and broad policy guidance to the DoD PW/MIA program. By memorandum dated 13 February 1971 the Secretary of Defense directed the establishment of a PW/MIA task group and task force under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). The task group was intended to (a) provide close and continuing coordination of all DoD PW/MIA activities, (b) recommend policy, (c) direct requirements for planning program studies and courses of action and (d) ensure integrated DoD action by all departments/offices. It was under the guidance of these aforementioned groups that the Defense Intelligence Agency, responsible for developing, maintaining and disseminating

information on PW/MIAs; the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), whose mission is the recovery of remains; and the four Military Service Casualty Offices carried out their responsibilities.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), having only been established in late 1961, was assigned a limited responsibility for PW/MIA analysis until mid-1966. After that time, DIA's role expanded. During 1967, DIA assumed chairmanship of the Interagency PW Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee. In December of 1971, DIA chaired the DoD Intelligence Task Force which was established to supervise the intelligence aspects of the PW/MIA problems and to provide more rapid and effective communication between policymakers and intelligence officials.

Following the repatriation of the PWs in 1973 the Intelligence Community efforts focused on the 2,500 Americans who remained unaccounted for. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam and the fall of Saigon in April 1975 resulted in a mammoth reduction in the level of field assets, the opportunity to access geographic locations and severely restricted access to indigenous sources.

The overall supervision of the Department's effort remains with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The staff office which supports the Assistant Secretary is that of the Principle Military Advisor for PW/MIA Affairs. At the operating level the Military Services remain responsible for individual casualty assistance programs. The JCRC activities are now limited by necessity to recovery of remains and refugee interviews. The DIA is responsible for insuring that all new information is fully developed and analyzed for purposes of correlation and usefulness in determining the fate of unaccounted for Americans.

At the present time the principal source of PW/MIA information available to the U.S. Government has been the Indochinese refugees. The continued absence of political stability in the Southeast Asian region has resulted in an unabating flow of refugees from one or more of the three countries of primary concern. Interviews have been conducted with many of these refugees by both government and private individuals. Reports of alleged sightings of Americans by these refugees continue to reach DIA from any number of different sources. The Agency has a program established and functioning whereby follow-up action is taken on each such report received.

DIA evaluates all reported PW/MIA-related sightings. Any necessary follow-up action is conducted through the Defense Attaches, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center Liaison Officer in Bangkok, and by DIA or other military assets within the United States. Due to numerous refugee movements between refugee camps, their onward settlement in other countries, their temporary accommodations provided by sponsor organizations, follow-up action for clarification or amplification of reported information consumes many manhours and can require months to complete.

PW/MIA intelligence information regardless of source has been channeled into DIA for analysis. Through close coordination with the Military Services, all correlated information relating to PWs was provided to these Branches for use

by the PW's parent Service Casualty Branch. Additionally, DIA keeps the Government decisionmakers apprised of PW/MIA intelligence information.

### EFFORTS DURING THE WAR

o Data Base - The DIA data base contains all-source intelligence obtained on U.S. personnel as well as selected third country nationals missing or captured in Southeast Asia.

o Hard copy files - DIA's PW/MIA Branch has individual files on all personnel who were initially declared PW/MIA. Each file contains all information known on the incident as well as subsequent intelligence gained.

o Detention facilities - A complete data base is maintained on all detention facilities known or suspected to have held U.S./Allied or Vietnamese prisoners. DIA's data base files includes all-source intelligence on PW camps including a complete photographic history of the detention installations known to have held U.S. prisoners.

o Intelligence reports - These reports contain information obtained from Viet Cong and North Vietnam ralliers, released and escaped South Vietnamese prisoners, indigenous civilians, released and escaped U.S. PWs and any others who professed knowledge of U.S./Allied or Vietnamese prisoners or the location of crashsites or gravesites involving U.S. personnel.

#### o Publications/studies -

-- Pre-loss Photograph Album - This publication contains pre-loss photographs of virtually all U.S. personnel and some selected foreign nationals who were captured or missing - well over 2,000 photographs.

-- Post-capture Photograph Album - This book was a compilation of selected identified photographs of U.S. personnel who had been photographed in captivity. It supplemented the pre-loss photograph album by depicting captured Americans in their most up-to-date appearance. The post-capture photographs also represents a part of the total volume of intelligence collected over the years to assure an accurate accounting of captured and missing Americans. Post-capture photographs on over 250 captured Americans are included in this DIA publication.

-- Photographs of North Vietnamese Personnel Associated with U.S. PWs - Photographs of North Vietnamese in the North Vietnam PW camp environment were contained in this publication. The information obtained on some North Vietnamese prison personnel was used in conjunction with descriptions of the known PW camps to provide aircrews some foreknowledge of what to expect should they be captured.

-- PW Camps in North Vietnam - This publication is a compilation of photographs, schematics, and information on all known and suspected PW camps in North Vietnam. It was produced as part of DIA's mission to develop, maintain, and disseminate intelligence on PW/MIA matters.

-- Unidentified Photographs of U.S. PWs - Photographs of suspected Americans in captivity who could not be identified were assembled into a publication containing each photograph with brief comments about the photograph. A total of 115 unidentified suspected U.S. PWs have been included in this DIA publication over the years. Continual efforts to identify these photographs have resulted in the identification of all but six of these photographs. Sources of identification have been released prisoners of war, next-of-kin and friends of the PWs in question.

o PW debriefs - All U.S. returnees (escaped or released prisoners of war) were debriefed on their experiences while a prisoner of war and on their knowledge of any other U.S. personnel with whom they came in contact. The information provided by the returnees provided an invaluable source of intelligence by which DIA was able to correlate numerous unidentified photographs and intelligence reports to these repatriated prisoners.

o Special Projects/Plans - DIA provided intelligence support to specialized planning conducted by the JCS (e.g., the U.S. raid on the Son Tay PW camp in North Vietnam).

o Operation Homecoming - The repatriation of U.S. prisoners of war which occurred in February-March 1973. DIA was deeply involved in the planning for Homecoming - preparing debriefing aids, providing input to the debriefing guides, analysis, evaluation and correlation of the debriefing information.

#### APRIL 1973 - APRIL 1975

o Operation Homecoming - During Operation Homecoming in 1973, North Vietnam repatriated 591 Americans who had been prisoners of war, but, more than 2,500 other Americans did not return. As of August 1981, there are still 2,496 Americans, including civilians, who are unaccounted for. Half of these 2,500 were originally categorized as Killed in Action (KIA) with the remaining ones placed in a PW/MIA category. A statistical summary of all Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia and their original classification is provided at attachment 1.

o Peace Accords - At the time of Operation Homecoming in 1973 there was a belief that the Vietnamese would live up to Article 8 of the Paris Peace Accords which states:

### Chapter III

#### THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

##### Article 8

"(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect."

o Remains of died in captivity - The North Vietnamese returned the remains of 23 U.S. personnel who they declared at the time of the Peace Accords as having died in captivity (DIC). Twelve sets of these remains were repatriated on 6 March 1974 and the remaining 11 on 13 March 1974. The Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) has never made any overtures to return the remains of the 40 U.S. personnel who they declared had died in captivity in South Vietnam. Three of the 40 U.S. personnel on the PRG DIC list had previously been accounted for. One of these individuals was never in captivity and the remains of the other two individuals had been recovered by U.S. forces.

o Returnee debriefings - Following the debriefing of all returned PWs in 1973 it was determined that all Americans known to have been in the formal PW camp system at any time during the war were accounted for. There was one exception who was in the system, Robert Garwood, who was captured in 1965 and who has since been returned and court martialed for collaboration with the North Vietnamese.

0 THE FOUR PARTY JOINT MILITARY TEAM (FPJMT)

-- The Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) was established in accordance with Article 10 (A) of the Protocol on Captured Persons to ensure joint action in implementing Article 8 (b) of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. Each of the four signatories; the United States (U.S.), the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) had participant delegations. The Agreement, stipulating the mission of the FPJMT to be solely the implementation of Article 8 (b), was signed in Paris on 27 January 1973.

-- The mission of the U.S. Delegation (U.S. DEL) was to negotiate with the other parties to obtain information about the location of graves of persons who died in captivity or were killed in action but whose bodies were not recovered, to arrange for repatriation of remains, to obtain entry rights for the search operations into areas in which remains were believed to exist, and to take such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

-- The first session of the FPJMT, on 4 April 1973, was characterized by a sense of optimism and apparent cooperation. In an attempt to resolve the status of missing U.S. military, civilians and third country nationals, the U.S. Delegation prepared and gave to the other delegations lists of persons still missing in action (MIA) and those known dead, whose bodies were not recovered (BNR). No favorable response was ever received from the PRG or DRV.

-- In August 1973, a folder program was begun. Individuals, about whom the Defense Intelligence Agency and JCRC could furnish convincing details concerning their loss, were included. In some cases the information was about one individual; in others, all persons lost in a single incident were included in one folder. Information consisted of a photograph, personal data, a map showing the last known location, physical description, and unclassified details about the incident that indicate the DRV or PRG would have knowledge of the individual's status. The material was prepared in English and Vietnamese. Follow-up letters on the folders and lists were passed to the other side, but no information about any of the requests was ever received by the U.S. Delegation.

-- To date, negotiation folders pertaining to 218 separate air and ground loss incidents involving 317 individuals have been presented to the communists governments of Indochina. Most of these have been passed on a repetitive basis, some as many as eight times. The circumstances of loss in these cases are such that the governments involved can reasonably be expected to provide an accounting. Additionally, listings containing information on all unaccounted for Americans were presented to the Vietnamese Government during nine negotiation sessions covering a two-year period.

-- The U.S. and RVN saw the FPJMT as a humanitarian organization designed solely to account for the missing and dead. The other side chose to use it as a vehicle for furthering their political gains. Upon the collapse of the Saigon government, the Four Party Joint Military Team was deactivated. The functions related to accounting for the missing were assumed by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center.

o JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC)

-- The Joint Military Task Force, later the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, was formed as an outgrowth of U.S. Government efforts to identify, document and maintain records of Americans unaccounted for as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia. The unit was established in January 1973.

-- The mission of JCRC is to assist in recovering and resolving the status of U.S. MIAs and those servicemen who were killed in action but whose bodies were not recovered.

-- The JCRC acts within the policy and guidance of higher authorities to negotiate with other governments and agencies, regarding casualty resolution matters and to initiate activities throughout Southeast Asia to recover remains of American servicemen.

-- To assist in the recovery and proper identification of remains, the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory (CIL) endeavors, through extensive examination, to positively identify the recovered remains. DIA and JCRC files are researched to determine which individuals were lost in the area from which remains are recovered. Data generated by the identification process is compared with the DIA and JCRC files to assist in identification. The critical identification process requires close coordination with physical anthropologists, forensic laboratories and related institutions.

POST-WAR PERIOD 1975

o PW/MIA efforts continue -

-- DIA continued to carry out the function of centralized processing, analysis and dissemination of new information.

-- The collection capability throughout Indochina dropped drastically after the fall of Saigon. The closing down of interrogation centers in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia dried up the most productive mechanism of collection. The volume of PW/MIA traffic had dropped to a low level.

-- In the ensuing drawdown of forces, the Military Services scaled down and disestablished their individual PW/MIA intelligence branches. DIA was left as the central point of contact relative to PW/MIA

intelligence. Liaison was conducted on a regular basis through traditional channels vice a daily exchange through specific functioning units.

-- During these same years, DIA's analytical assets were also being directed toward; development of negotiation folders concerning unaccounted for Americans; providing responses to a flood of Freedom of Information requests of PW/MIA-related materials; and support to the Military Services in connection with PW/MIA status reviews/changes.

o Refugee reports - During the resettlement of a large number of refugees from South Vietnam after the fall of Saigon, DIA participated in a screening and debriefing program for PW/MIA information. Due to the relative numbers of refugees and geographic areas from which they fled, the information which surfaced early in the period generally pertained to U.S. civilians who were not evacuated from Saigon. A number of reports about Americans, other than those known to have missed evacuation, were received but the validity of these reports could not be determined.

#### SUMMER/FALL 1979

o PW/MIA issue readdressed - During mid year 1979, DIA began to reemphasize the collection, research and analysis of potential information from Indochina. The sudden mass exodus of Indochinese refugees, coupled with a stimulated collection effort in the refugee camps, brought about a corresponding increase of PW/MIA reports. Additional personnel were assigned to the PW/MIA analysis of information and the function was elevated in the DIA organization much closer to the command element. Strong command attention was brought to focus and manpower requirements were identified to support DIA's PW/MIA role.

o Volume of reports - Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, DIA has received 1,180 reports from refugees bearing on the PW/MIA problem. Almost all of the 1,180 total reports (over 1,000) have been received by DIA since 1978. Of the total number, 350 firsthand reports mention live sightings of U.S. servicemen. Research and analysis revealed that 119 of those reports of live sightings could be correlated to Americans who have previously been accounted for and are no longer in Southeast Asia. Thirty-three of the reported live sightings occurred between 1961 and 1972 and may equate to U.S. prisoners who were released during Operation Homecoming in 1973. Nonetheless, 231 of the sighting reports of Americans held against their will in Southeast Asia remain unverified and are under continuing investigation in an attempt to confirm their veracity. The remaining refugee reports deal with crashsites and gravesites.

#### DIA'S CURRENT EFFORTS

DIA continues to emphasize the collection and analysis of information which would lead to an accounting for the Americans who are missing in Indochina. Strong command attention is being placed on this issue.



The official DIA position concerning the quality of live sighting reports was stated by General Tighe before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs on 25 June 1981. At that time, General Tighe stated that "Of all the live sighting reports DIA has evaluated, we still cannot prove that there are live Americans being detained against their will in Indochina. Based on detailed research efforts utilizing reported information, confirmed data, and all intelligence collection disciplines, we simply cannot professionally say, frustrating as it may be, that we know in fact that Americans are being held against their will there."

In the course of discussions during the Subcommittee hearing of 25 June, the Director was asked his personal judgment on the question of Americans being held against their will in Southeast Asia. General Tighe replied that, in his personal opinion, American servicemen are still alive in Indochina. There is no contradiction between these two statements nor are they mutually exclusive. They are extensions of the same basic premise. General Tighe expressed his personal belief that one or more Americans were being held against their will in Southeast Asia but that, frustrating as it was, the Defense Intelligence Agency, utilizing all intelligence collection disciplines, could not prove that Americans are indeed still detained in Indochina.

#### DIA'S FUTURE EFFORTS

When evidence becomes convincing that an American is still detained in Indochina U.S. Government decision makers will be notified in order that the next and more critical phase of action be initiated. An obvious question arising is what amount of evidence will be construed as convincing. First, it will have to satisfy certain constraints such as currency and specificity. It is unrealistic to assume that a single refugee report will justify follow on action without additional verification. One hope is that a report can be strengthened and supported through technical means. Another is that more than one report will be specific and similar as to time, place and circumstance, and hopefully, at least one source's credibility will be enhanced by polygraph examination. The simple fact is, despite the many reports we have and the technical means available, no single report or combination of reports and technical sensors has been specific enough as to be "convincing." What remains to condition our thinking and motivate our efforts is the "weight of evidence" theory: The conviction that the many reports, the known perfidiousness of the Communist governments in Southeast Asia, the logic that implies some of the many missing must have survived, all suggest that Americans may be alive in communist controlled Southeast Asia.

#### VIETNAMESE REACTION OVER THE YEARS

o SRV intransigence - The Southeast Asian communist governments were intransigent on the PW/MIA issue from the start and they continue to portray this negative attitude.

o Negotiation efforts - The United States Government, as well as various private citizens and groups, have made continual private and public

appeals to the communist governments in Southeast Asia in an effort to obtain an accounting for Americans lost during the military conflict there. Although token progress has been made, in general, direct negotiations and other overtures have achieved minimal success.

o Available information - The quantity of information that the Vietnamese have on unaccounted for Americans in Southeast Asia is impossible to determine with precision. However, without doubt, they possess sufficient knowledge to resolve the status of a multitude of cases, and they could effect the repatriation of the remains of a relatively large number of Americans. The communist governments in Cambodia and Laos cannot be relied upon to possess as extensive a knowledge on Americans lost in their countries.

o Accountability - Since Operation Homecoming in 1973, the Vietnamese Government has returned the remains of 75 Americans and the Lao Government two (one still remains unidentified). Actually, the Vietnamese have only accounted for 52 Americans who, in the true sense of the term, were unaccounted for. Twenty-three of the 75 are individuals who were held in captivity in North Vietnam and who died while imprisoned and their remains returned. These 23 individuals were identified by the Vietnamese at the time of the Paris Peace Accords. In view of the circumstances surrounding wartime casualties a complete accounting would be an unreasonable expectation. However, it would be reasonable to expect an accounting for certain individuals. There are a number of cases with evidence of capture or survivability, and others for which the Vietnamese or Lao Governments have publicly expressed knowledge.

o Remains in Hanoi - In November of 1979, information was received that the Vietnamese Government had in its possession the remains of some 400 U.S. military personnel who were lost as a result of the hostilities in Indochina. This information was furnished by a mortician who observed these remains and reported that he personally prepared the skeletal remains of many of these U.S. personnel. This individual's information is judged to be valid. The Vietnamese Government was confronted with this information in Hanoi in January 1980 and Vietnamese officials denied any knowledge of these remains; however, the return of three remains in July 1981 demonstrated how calculated and selective the SRV policy is. In 1980 four negotiation folders were presented to the Vietnamese at the UN. Two of these contained accounts of pilots photographed in the Hanoi area, one alive and one dead, and a third concerned an individual known to have died in captivity. Previously the Vietnamese had disclaimed any knowledge of these individuals, yet between the fall of 1980 and the Spring of 1981 all three bodies were "discovered." It is overly obvious that the Vietnamese have purposely demonstrated an ability to produce selected remains at will, and in this latest case these remains have been in their possession since the individual expired. The release of American PWs and each incremental return of American remains was a blatant political manipulation using human bodies and human emotions to Vietnam's perceived advantage. There certainly was no humanitarian gesture or intent associated with any of the repatriation of remains.

0 French remains issue and lesson

-- The French experience in negotiating with the North Vietnamese for repatriation of French remains is crucial to understanding basic principles which underlie current objectives toward repatriation of U.S. remains. The French learned that the repatriation of their deceased was viewed by the North Vietnamese as a method to gather intelligence, to engage in political activities in South Vietnam and to obtain substantial amounts of long-term foreign exchange. The North Vietnamese were never motivated by humanitarian concerns in dealing with the French.

-- The Vietnamese viewed the issue of French remains as a method to obtain long-term foreign exchange currency by negotiating the costs incurred in gravesite maintenance. The quarterly bill for the French cemeteries in 1972 was 1.5 million dollars.

-- The Vietnamese were able to accomplish their political and financial objectives with the French and their experience in dealing with the French set a precedent in regard to dealings with the U.S.

-- Attachment 2 provides the "Prepared Statement of Anita C. Lauve" submitted for the record in hearings before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 94th Congress, 2nd session, 7 April 1976. Ms. Lauve is an expert on the French experience concerning grave registration operations in Indochina. She is a consultant to the Rand Corporation and was at one time under contract with the Defense Department to study the implementation and supervision of the Geneva settlements of 1954 and 1962 as they pertain to French grave registrations. Her prepared statement is the best synopsis of the French experience currently available.

--Provided by DIA January 1982

## U.S. EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR MISSING AMERICANS

United States government efforts to secure the fullest possible accounting for the 2,494 Americans missing from the Vietnam War have been negligible until recently, due to a lack of high and mid-level interest demonstrated by various responsible agencies of the U.S. government.

Organized U.S. efforts to recover POWs and account for MIAs began in earnest in 1966. The issue attained a high level of priority in 1971 when Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird directed the establishment of a PW/MIA task force under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA).

This priority continued throughout the war with various military and intelligence assets collecting and correlating information concerning American prisoners and missing.

With the signing of the 1973 Paris peace agreement, the United States attempted to fulfill its obligation to account for missing Americans through the efforts of the Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT), established by relevant articles of the agreement. The early optimism of the U.S. delegation to the FPJMT soon faded as it became clear the communist parties saw the FPJMT only as a forum to propagandize against the U.S. and South Vietnam for alleged violations of the Paris accords. With the collapse of the Saigon government in 1975, the American delegation to the FPJMT was deactivated and related functions were assumed by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC).

From 1975 until 1979, accounting for missing Americans was accorded relatively low priority by the U.S. government. In 1975, the United States Congress established the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. The committee was charged with ascertaining the current status of the POW/MIA problem. In 1976, after one year of work, the committee issued its final report, declaring that there were no Americans still being held captive in Indochina and that the recovery of American remains would be a time-consuming task with little prognosis for significant success.

In early 1977, fulfilling a campaign promise, President Jimmy Carter created a blue-ribbon commission of Americans to investigate, once again, the status of POW/MIA matters. The panel, chaired by Leonard Woodcock, visited Vietnam and Laos. The commission's final report reflected the same general findings contained in the Select Committee report, adding that the Vietnamese were doing all within reason to account for missing Americans.

The Select Committee and Woodcock Commission final reports came under attack from those who held different views. The League provided analyses of both reports which statistically and objectively refuted the findings and conclusions. One half of the members of the Select Committee submitted views which differed significantly from the final report, citing little foundation for the conclusions and findings reported as the consensus of the Select Committee.

Sighting reports of American POWs and unaccounted for Americans dramatically increased with the mass exodus of Indochinese refugees. In large part due to these refugee reports, the Defense Intelligence Agency renewed efforts and assigned a higher priority to the issue starting in mid-1979. Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, DIA has received nearly 1200 reports from refugees which pertain to POW/MIAs; nearly 1000 of the reports have been received since 1978.

In 1980, spurred by greater interest in the POW/MIA issue, the U.S. government created the Interagency PW/MIA Group (IAG), comprised of representatives of agencies primarily responsible for resolving the POW/MIA issue. The IAG is a coordinating body with the goal of focusing U.S. government efforts on securing the fullest possible accounting for missing Americans.

To date, the remains of 78 Americans have been returned by the Vietnamese, the Laotians, and the Chinese. In 1980, the Defense Intelligence Agency substantiated intelligence data received from a Vietnamese defector who reported Hanoi had the remains of over 400 Americans in a warehouse in Hanoi. As anticipated, the Vietnamese denied the charge, claiming the defector was an agent of the Peking government.

Since 1973, members of private and official organizations have met periodically with representatives of the Vietnamese and Lao governments. To date, the meetings have been primarily perfunctory and have resulted in little significant progress on the question of resolving the fate of the 2,494 Americans unaccounted for in Indochina.

Although the weight of evidence indicates Americans continue to be held against their will in Indochina, the United States is as yet unable to conclusively substantiate these reports. The United States government's position is that the amount of information possessed by Vietnam on missing Americans is impossible to determine with precision; however, the Vietnamese possess sufficient knowledge to resolve the status of a multitude of cases and have the ability to effect the repatriation of a relatively large number of American remains.

In summation, no substantial progress will be made on resolving the issue of unaccounted for Americans until the governments of Indochina cooperate. To date, Hanoi has consistently adhered to a policy which utilizes the release of American remains only when perceived to be in their national self interest.

## VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR MISSING AMERICANS

Since the cessation of hostilities between the United States and Vietnam in 1973, the Indochinese governments have returned to the United States the remains of 78 Americans. Nearly 2,500 Americans remain unaccounted for in Indochina. Vietnam's efforts to account for missing Americans have been negligible and selectively accomplished when perceived to be in their national self-interest.

After the signing of the Paris peace agreement in January 1973, Vietnam reportedly established an office to seek information about American personnel missing in Vietnam. That office is charged with coordinating relevant government branches and administrative committees at all levels in order to gather information, care for the graves of the dead, exhume and care for the remains, communicate information and hand over the recovered remains to the United States. The Vietnamese contend that the Office for Seeking Missing Personnel has received and diligently used POW/MIA incident and site data supplied by the United States.

The Vietnamese claim the search for missing Americans is a difficult and time-consuming task due to negative geographic factors, passage of time, inaccuracy of U.S. supplied documents, and the "psychology" of the people in the area of the crash sites.

Concerning the "psychology" of the people, the Vietnamese contend that hostility toward the United States for the bombing during the war makes it difficult to convince villagers of the advantage in assisting with the recovery of American remains. Aside from this factor, the 1979 annual report of the Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Personnel claimed that "this year the search activities at local levels met with great psychological problems. Reports by local search teams have revealed that their work was seriously hampered when the United States was playing the 'China card' against Vietnam".

Provisions for the accounting of missing Americans were provided in the 1973 Paris peace agreement. The Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) was created and charged with carrying out the provisions of Article 8b of the peace agreement which stipulated:

"The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still missing in action."

From the outset, the meetings of the FPJMT became bogged down in communist polemics and were used by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong as propaganda forums to denounce the United States and the Republic of Vietnam. The United States and South Vietnam walked out of the FPJMT meetings in the wake of the December 1973 murder of an American serviceman of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC)

by communist forces while on a FPJMT-approved search mission. Although the U.S. and South Vietnamese delegations returned to the meetings, nothing further was accomplished in this forum regarding an accounting for missing Americans.

Since the fall of Saigon, contacts between the United States and Vietnam regarding efforts to account for missing Americans have been sporadic and generally unproductive. In response to continued American protests over the lack of progress on the issue, in 1980 the Vietnamese released a "white paper", entitled "On the Question of Americans Missing in the Vietnam War". The document, more a propaganda treatise than substantial information, stressed Hanoi's "traditional humanitarian policy and its sympathy with the American families whose loved ones were lost in the war" and contained assurances that Vietnam "has unilaterally and actively taken measures to help alleviate their (the American families) suffering".

The Vietnamese have exerted great effort to impress upon the American public their scrupulous implementation of relevant portions of the 1973 Paris agreement concerning a full accounting for missing Americans, blaming lack of progress on the United States. The Vietnamese have seized upon remarks by American officials, especially those on the Woodcock Commission, taking statements out of context to create the impression that such officials are absolving the Vietnamese of responsibility to account for missing Americans.

Hanoi claims that whenever information on remains of missing Americans are uncovered, release to the U.S. immediately follows. They claim to have released all living Americans and have no reason for withholding remains. They also contend that actions on the POW/MIA issue are undertaken in a legal, moral, humanitarian and straightforward manner.

One of the more dramatic developments in the ordeal of accounting for missing Americans was the revelation by the Defense Intelligence Agency that they had substantiated data from a reliable source reporting Hanoi is withholding the remains of over 400 Americans. In their "white paper" the Vietnamese do not directly refute the DIA charge, but instead deride the valid charge as "reminding us (Vietnam) of previous U.S. tricks on the American MIA issue".

The Vietnamese sum up their efforts to account for missing Americans by assuring visiting delegations to Hanoi that Vietnam does not hold any American POWs and is doing its utmost, given the difficulties involved and the "psychology" of the Vietnamese public, to account for American missing. The case of Navy Commander Ronald Dodge, however, points up the contradiction between Hanoi's statements and reality.

Commander Dodge was shot down in May 1967 over Nghe An Province in North Vietnam. Radio contact was established with Commander Dodge on the ground and Radio Hanoi confirmed his shoot down and capture. Dodge was subsequently shown in a North Vietnamese propaganda film and a photo of Dodge appeared in Paris-Match magazine in 1967. Commander Dodge was not among the prisoners released in 1973 and his name did not appear on any lists of communist documents as having died in captivity.

In July 1981, Hanoi returned the remains of Commander Dodge - 14 years after he was captured. Hanoi's only explanation of Commander Dodge's death is that he died in the crash of his aircraft.

In their "white paper," the Vietnamese announced that the "U.S. side has obviously run up against and distorted the humanitarian policy and goodwill and sincere efforts of the people of Vietnam...and certainly could not contribute to creating a favorable atmosphere in Vietnam for efforts to account for American MIA's, and by following such a course, the U.S. could be taken in by the insidious manoeuvres of the Beijing expansionists."



## REFUGEE REPORTS

Defense Intelligence Agency statistics as of January 22, 1982, indicate they are currently investigating 396 FIRSTHAND reports of Americans in captivity. Of these, 119 have been correlated to known individuals for whom there has been an accounting. Additionally, DIA has 272 second hand or "hearsay" reports of captive Americans. Refugees have also provided information on 529 grave sites and 73 crash sites.

Following are examples of sighting reports recently received by the National League of Families -

1) "From June 1976 to October 18, 1978, I have met and talked with at least six times, an American. He told me he was a pilot downed in Thanh Hoa at the end of 1964. He was wounded and has been treated for his wounds in Thanh Hoa, Yen Bai, Lao Cai and was cured."

The source added that the American had been taught to speak Vietnamese and had been given the name Nguyen Viet Nam. The refugee source, who was also imprisoned, said, "he was still detained until the day I left Ha Nam Ninh prison. Today he is still being kept in the Ha Son Binh area, north Vietnam. After the Chinese attack, they transferred all the POWs from the highlands down to the plains of Ha Son Binh; they kept them in a number of camps in the lowlands, from Thanh Hoa northward to Ha Son Binh and in Hanoi the main prison called Hoa Lo."

2) "I know of an American in Vietnam after 30 April 1975. When I was arrested and imprisoned in Chi Hoa prison on 26 September 1975, I saw an American imprisoned there. I was not able to make contact with him, but heard fellow prisoners say that this man was a military advisor to the 5th Infantry Division stationed in Lai Khe. During that time he was wounded in the leg. According to my knowledge, (the communists) brought him (to Chi Hoa) from somewhere else." He goes on to say that he saw the American make contact with the outside, then the communists took him away on 6 July 1976. He added that the American has somewhat dark skin and blond hair.

3) "I was an officer and Company Commander, Marines, and was captured by the Viet Cong at the Thach Han River in June 1974. I want to provide to you information on a number of American prisoners which I knew of while I was in captivity in the Khe Sanh area near the Lao border. I escaped from the Viet Cong in 1978 and crossed the border (left Vietnam) in 1980, arriving in America just five months ago..."

"For your work of good will, I can possibly give you the names of two American prisoners still alive in the Viet-Lao border area, one a Lieutenant and one a Private First Class."

4) A former ARVN soldier was taken prisoner on June 30, 1975, and sent to a reeducation camp in the Ba Vi mountain area. At that location there were five American prisoners who were held near the reeducation camp. All five were white; one of them was two meters tall.

According to the source, "Every day the communists forced those Americans to draw the plow in place of the water buffaloes in the ricefields under the very eyes of the officers of the ARVN undergoing reeducation there." The refugee also reports that a photograph of one of the men pulling the plow was printed in textbooks for school children.

5) Another refugee reports that his uncle was held by the communists for 20 years, the last several in Son Tay prison. During the time between 1975 and 1980, the uncle, who is now out of prison but still living in Vietnam, was held with 18 Americans. Apparently he knows the names of the Air Force officers with whom he was held.

6) "According to a friend of mine, a resistance fighter who operated with me in Tay Ninh province, he went to the reeducation camp at the Tan Bien Crossroad to try to contact the ARVN officers held at that camp in an effort to get them out. One day in July 1978, my friend went by the Tuyen Ngon airfield and saw a truck covered on every side with a piece of thick cloth coming out of the airport and heading in the direction of the Cambodian border. Because of the speed of the truck, a piece of dark cloth was blown by the wind, uncovering the inside of the truck. My friend saw two armed guards and about 200 (perhaps more) Americans. Their bodies were very thin and covered with scabies. They had sad, gaunt faces and their legs were shackled to a long iron bar. They were dressed in black pajamas or in the passé blue. All those details went by fast, but through the discerning eyes of an officer of the ARVN, there were no details that were not recorded. The friend who saw the Americans, unfortunately, was arrested in 1980, after our movement was uncovered; I fear for his life, but it's fate..."



NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES  
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1608 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 (202) 223-6846

INTERAGENCY GROUP

The POW/MIA Interagency Group (IAG) was established in January 1980, and is comprised of representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the National Security Council, the White House Office of Public Liaison, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the National League of Families.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Dan O'Donahue, is the current chairman. The vice chairman is Rear Admiral Donald S. Jones, USN, Director for East Asia and Pacific Region, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense. Lt. Colonel John Fer, USAF, Principal Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs, serves as the group's secretary.

The purpose of the IAG is -

- ... to review and assess current events and policies
- ... to consider future direction/policy to resolve the POW/MIA problem

The purpose was explicitly outlined by the individual who was chiefly responsible for establishing the IAG, General Richard L. Lawson, USAF, in a June 28, 1980, speech to the National League of Families. In discussing the IAG, General Lawson stated, "Our objective at this time is to develop and articulate a current policy aimed toward obtaining Vietnamese cooperation. The JCS took the lead in this regard and just yesterday approved a proposed POW/MIA policy position, developed in consultation with the Executive Director, for use as a basis for interagency addressal of U.S. government POW/MIA policy. This will be a continuing effort until a fully coordinated policy is agreed upon. We are beginning to examine alternative approaches and have begun consideration of how best to negotiate with the Vietnamese in pursuit of our objective.

"As we look to the future, I see a continued effort to get irrefutable evidence on live U.S. prisoners. I would also expect to see development of a range of options for how we might best utilize the accumulating data."

One further clarification was distributed in the "Department of Defense Policy on PW/MIA Accounting," though uncoordinated within the IAG. To quote the July 8, 1981, document, the Defense Department is involved in "active participation as a member of the ad hoc PW/MIA interagency group to coordinate and formulate initiatives designed to promote progress in PW/MIA accounting."

#### INTERAGENCY GROUP MEMBERS

##### JCS

Col. Lee Elwell, USMC  
OJCS/J5, East Asia  
Pentagon, 2E973  
Washington, D. C. 20301

MGEN Daryl Tripp, USAF  
OJCS/J5  
Pentagon, 2E996  
Washington, D. C. 20301

##### NSC

LTC Richard Childress, USA  
NSC Staff  
Old EOB, Room 392  
Washington, D. C. 20506

##### DOD

Honorable Richard Armitage  
DAS/ISA  
Pentagon, 4E817  
Washington, D. C. 20301

RADM Donald Jones, USN  
Deputy Director, OSD/ISA/EAP  
Pentagon 4C837  
Washington, D. C. 20301

LTC John Fer, USAF  
OSD/ISA, POW/MIA Affairs  
Pentagon, 2D322  
Washington, D. C. 20301

##### DIA

RADM Allan G. Paulson, USN  
DIA/DC  
Pentagon, 2D921  
Washington, D. C. 20301

##### STATE

Honorable Dan O'Donahue  
Department of State, Room 6208  
Washington, D. C. 20520

Mr. Desaix Anderson  
State Department, Room 6317  
Washington, D. C. 20520

Ms. Barbara Harvey  
State Department, Room 6317  
Washington, D. C. 20520

##### CONGRESS

Mr. Bill Barnds, Staff Director  
Asian & Pacific Affairs Subcommittee  
707 HOB Annex 1  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Mr. David Frank  
Subcommittee on Asian & Pacific Affairs  
707 HOB Annex 1  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Mr. Vance Hyndman  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
2170 Rayburn HOB  
Washington, D. C. 20515

##### LEAGUE OF FAMILIES

Ann Griffiths  
1608 K Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20006

## Committee on Foreign Affairs

### STATEMENT OF MISSION OF THE TASK FORCE ON AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 97th CONGRESS

The Task Force on Prisoners and Missing, originally established by former Chairman Lester L. Wolff, has been continued in the 97th Congress by Chairman Stephen J. Solarz of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs as an effective means to maintain oversight of the issue. The Task Force is a bipartisan group which, under the Chairmanship of the Honorable Tennyson Guyer, will assist in fulfilling the task of the Subcommittee of oversight of the POW/MIA issue.

#### Purposes:

- 1) To require the Administration to seek from the government of Vietnam a full accounting for Americans last known to be prisoners or missing in Indochina.
- 2) to require the Administration to make full disclosure of all appropriate information in the possession of the U. S. government with regard to the fate of American prisoners and missing.
- 3) to assist in further improving communication among the Administration, various departments of the Executive Branch, and the Congress, and between the U. S. government and the families of American prisoners and missing.

#### Methods:

- 1) Under the aegis of the Subcommittee on Asian & Pacific Affairs, conducting hearings with witnesses from the Depts. of Defense and State to clarify and if possible to improve administrative procedures affecting POW/MIA concerns.
- 2) recommend changes in policies and procedures on the basis of testimony by both interested persons and government witnesses.
- 3) seek available information from all reliable sources which may cast light on the fate of deceased POW/MIAs or the whereabouts of any survivors.
- 4) obtain best possible evaluation and dissemination as appropriate of such information
- 5) recommend legislation as appropriate

To achieve these purposes, and to use these methods, the Task Force welcomes comments and suggestions from any person who has an interest in this subject.

TASK FORCE ON AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Robert K. Dornan - Chairman (R-Calif.)

Staff aide - Adrienne Cordova 332 Cannon HOB 225-6451

Benjamin A. Gilman - (R-N.Y.)

Staff aide - Catherine Harnett 2160 Rayburn HOB 225-3776

Robert J. Lagomarsino - (R-Calif.)

Staff aide - Susie Gerrick 2332 Rayburn HOB 225-3601

Tom Lantos - (D-Calif.)

Staff aide - Carol Thompson 1123 Longworth HOB 225-3531

John LeBoutillier - (R-N.Y.)

Staff aide - Handles issue himself 417 Cannon HOB 225-5956

Dan Mica - (D-Fla.)

Staff aide - Hillary Frank 131 Cannon HOB 225-3001

Stephen J. Solarz - (D-N.Y.) - Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian  
and Pacific Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee

Staff aide - David Frank 707 HOB Annex 1 225-3044

Howard Wolpe - (D-Mich.)

Staff Aide - Priscilla Newman 1118 Longworth HOB 225-5011

William Hendon - (R-N.C.) - ex-officio

Staff aide - Handles issue himself 212 Cannon HOB 225-6401

Harold C. Hollenbeck - (R-N.J.) - ex-officio

Staff aide - Ken Greenberg 1526 Longworth HOB 225-5061



NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES  
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1608 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 (202) 223-6846

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Ann Mills Griffiths  
1608 K St. N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006  
202-223-6846

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

COL. Earl P. Hopper, AUS-Ret.  
14043 North 64th Dr.  
Glendale, Arizona 85306  
602-979-5651

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

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16 Cresthaven Dr.  
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914-561-9447

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1126 Oxford Rd.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30306  
404-377-0872

Mrs. Maureen A. Dunn  
210 Grove St.  
Randolph, Mass. 02368  
617-961-2110

Mrs. Sara Frances Shay  
205 Hilltop Rd.  
Linthicum, Md. 21090  
301-859-5434

Commander Ralph E. Gaither, USN  
300 6th St.  
Coronado, CA 92118  
714-435-4633

Mr. George W. Shine  
16-7 Foxwood Dr.  
Pleasantville, N.Y. 10570  
315-375-6661

LTC Walter Hartness, USAF-Ret.  
14202 Southern Pines Dr.  
Dallas, TX 75234  
214-241-8849

Colonel Charles Walker, USAF-Ret.  
1243 East 3075 North  
North Ogden, Utah 84404  
801-621-3666

REGIONAL COORDINATORS

Region I- Mr. Jerry Dennis  
1548 Illinois Ave.  
Palm Harbor, FL 33563  
813-784-3794

Region IV- Mr. Errol Q. Bond, Sr.  
3410 Egerer Place  
Fullerton, CA 92635  
714-870-4244

Region II- Edwin & Rosemary Pierce  
RD #2, Box 614  
Milford, PA 18337  
717-296-6991

Region V- Mrs. Barbara Lewis  
303 West Martindale  
Marshall, TX 75670  
214-938-1862

Region III- Mrs. Kay Bosiljevac  
4806 Bernadette Ave.  
Omaha, Nebraska 68157  
402-734-4640

Mr. Al Chapin  
308 Glenmore Dr.  
San Angelo, TX 76903  
915-653-8770

STATE COORDINATORS

ALABAMA:

no coordinator

ALASKA:

no coordinator

ARIZONA:

Mrs. Maxine Kahler  
3307 South Terrace Rd.  
Tempe, AZ 85323  
602-838-1554

Mrs. Lester Babcock  
6642 East Broadway  
Tucson, AZ 85710  
602-298-8978

ARKANSAS:

no coordinator

CALIFORNIA:

Mrs. Marian Shelton  
8813 Harlington Dr.  
San Diego, CA 92126  
714-271-5058

Mrs. Judy Taber  
1421 Brighton  
La Habra, CA 90631  
213-694-1689

COLORADO:

Mrs. Elzene Sloss  
10020 Kline Dr.  
Lakewood, Colorado 80215  
303-237-6328

CONNECTICUT:

Miss Cheryl Boyd  
32 Balmforth Ave.  
Danbury, Conn. 06810  
203-797-4569

DELAWARE:

Mrs. Jane Meder  
177 North Fairfield Dr.  
Dover, Delaware 19901  
302-679-1769

FLORIDA:

Mrs. Nancy Nystrom  
6938 Hanson Dr., North  
Jacksonville, Fl 32210  
904-781-7164

GEORGIA:

Mrs. Rudine Jackson  
3440 Old Alabama Rd.  
Alpharetta, Georgia 30201  
404-475-3662

HAWAII:

no coordinator

IDAHO:

Mrs. Peggy Staggs  
1903 North 9th St.  
Boise, Idaho 83702  
208-336-2914

ILLINOIS:

Mrs. Mary Carol Lemon  
2922 Bob-O-Link Dr.  
Flossmoor, Illinois 60422  
312-798-5626

INDIANA:

Mrs. Lester Padgett  
9 Douglas Dr.  
Washington, Indiana 47501  
812-254-1895

IOWA:

Mr. Don Lint  
RR #2  
Norwalk, Iowa 50211  
515-981-0464

KANSAS:

Mrs. Patti Sheridan  
8612 Tamarac  
Wichita, Kansas 67206  
316-685-2915



NORTH DAKOTA:

Mrs. Ethel Steen  
210 North 6th St., B-12  
Grand Forks, N.D. 58201  
701-775-8260

OHIO:

Mrs. Betty Foley  
6515 Menlo Way  
Dayton, Ohio 45424  
513-233-9254

OKLAHOMA:

no coordinator

OREGON:

no coordinator

PENNSYLVANIA:

Mrs. Shirley Estocin  
417 Stewart St.  
Turtle Creek, PA 15145  
412-824-7775

RHODE ISLAND:

see Connecticut

SOUTH CAROLINA:

see North Carolina

SOUTH DAKOTA:

see North Dakota

TENNESSEE:

Mrs. Virgie James  
2502 Jenkins Rd.  
Chatanooga, TN 37421  
615-877-1784

EASTERN TEXAS:

Mrs. Nell Johnston  
328 Olive St.  
Huntsville, TX 77340  
713-295-7272

WESTERN TEXAS:

Ms. Kimberlee Wills  
9623 Atherton  
Dallas, TX 75243  
214-343-8359

SOUTHERN TEXAS:

Mrs. Richard Castillo  
4617 Snead Rd.  
Corpus Christi, TX 78413  
512-855-0256

UTAH:

Mrs. Barbara Endicott  
402 Cameron Dr.  
Brigham City, Utah 84302  
801-723-2085

VIRGINIA:

Mrs. Sally Kennedy  
3804 South 13th St.  
Arlington, Va. 22204  
703-979-5817

Mrs. John Consolvo, Sr.  
842 Grosvenor Ct., North  
Virginia Beach, Va. 23462  
804-497-3716

WASHINGTON:

Susan Fors  
8326 Woodland Ave.  
P.O. Box 366  
Puyallup, Washington 98371  
206-841-4391

WEST VIRGINIA:

no coordinator

WISCONSIN:

Mr. William Arnold  
2415 South 65th St.  
West Allis, Wisconsin 52319  
414-543-8480

WYOMING:

see Colorado

KENTUCKY:

no coordinator

LOUISIANA:

Mrs. Laura Poole  
2106 Venus Dr.  
Bossier City, LA 71010  
318-742-3752

MAINE:

Mrs. Teresa Getchell  
84 Mayer Rd.  
Portland, Maine 04102  
207-774-9364

MARYLAND:

Mrs. Edna Hicks  
15017 Haslemere Court  
Silver Spring, Md. 20906  
301-598-5936

MASSACHUSETTS:

Mrs. Inga Hardy  
P.O. Box 1  
3 Highland Dr.  
Ipswich, Mass. 01938  
617-356-2152

MICHIGAN:

Mrs. Jean King  
2416 Harmony Dr.  
Burton, Michigan 48509  
313-742-2254

MINNESOTA:

Mrs. Sharon Walsh  
2200 Newton South  
Minneapolis, Minn. 55405  
612-377-9112

Mrs. Bette Charney  
7023 Knoll St.  
Golden Valley, Minn. 55427  
612-544-1845

MISSISSIPPI:

Mrs. Barbara White  
4903 Hallsferry Rd.  
Vicksburg, MS. 39180

MISSOURI:

Mrs. Louise VanHoozer  
Route 2, Box 15  
Savannah, Missouri 64485  
816-324-4961

MONTANA:

no coordinator

NEBRASKA:

Mrs. Carolyn Standerwick  
1409 Lawrence Lane  
Bellevue, Nebraska 68005  
402-291-3929

NEVADA:

Mrs. Mary Ward  
P.O. Box 3476  
Incline Village, Nevada 89450

NEW HAMPSHIRE:

see Massachusetts

NEW JERSEY:

Mr. Sal Mascari  
54 Oakgrove Rd.  
Caldwell, N.J. 07006  
201-226-4525

NEW MEXICO:

Mrs. Vergie Townley  
4509 Downey, N.E.  
Albuquerque, N.M. 87109  
505-884-7245

NEW YORK:

Mrs. Gladys Brooks  
16 Cresthaven Dr.  
Newburgh, N.Y. 12550  
914-561-9447

NORTH CAROLINA:

Mrs. Mildred Johnson  
221 Briarcliff Rd.  
Rocky Mount, N.C. 27801  
919-443-1862

**HE NEEDS**



**YOUR HELP!**

# Hanoi Withholds POW/MIA Information

At the end of formal U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia, over 1,400 American servicemen and civilians remained officially listed as prisoners of war (POW) or missing in action (MIA), with some 1,200 listed as killed in action, body not recovered. Since that time, due primarily to the determination of the families and a nucleus of concerned citizens and dedicated Congressmen, the Vietnamese have repatriated the remains of 78 of these men. Almost 2,500 Americans are still unaccounted for, while the communist governments of Indochina steadfastly deny holding additional prisoners and refuse to provide information on those whose fate remains unknown.

The POW/MIA families are not so unrealistic as to believe all the missing are alive or that information is available on each man, but neither are they so naive as to believe that an accounting can not be made for a substantial number. Department of Defense statistical data indicates an accounting is possible for more than half of those missing. In numerous cases, pilots were known to have successfully ejected from their planes and to have landed in populated areas. In other instances, the communists announced the capture of men who were never released.

Vietnam claims to be searching for information on the missing; however, the sincerity of their claim is dubious since substantiated intelligence data indicates they are secretly withholding the remains of over 400 Americans.

## Evidence of Live Americans

The influx of Indochinese refugees into this country over the past few years has resulted in convincing evidence that the Vietnamese and Lao continue to hold Americans in captivity. The Defense intelligence Agency (DIA) is currently investigating over 400 eyewitness reports pertaining to men still held captive; some sightings are as recent as December 1981.

As a result, U.S. government policies and attitudes are changing. Where for many years official statements claimed a lack of credible information that men were still alive, new government policy reflects the increasing evidence that some Americans are still in captivity. According to Lt. General Eugene Tighe, former director of DIA, all U.S. intelligence collection disciplines are now being brought to bear on locating POWs. In June 1981, General Tighe told a congressional subcommittee that in his personal judgement, Americans are currently held captive in Indochina.

One sighting report received by the League of Families includes information that in 1978, some 30 American POWs were held in three closely separated camps in Thanh Hoa, Vietnam. The source stated, "The POWs I saw were very thin and were covered with scabies. They were just skin and bones. The Americans were forced to carry wood from the forests and they often fell down. Sometimes they were beaten by the guards."

Another refugee provided detailed physical descriptions of five men whom he was told were American pilots. These men were held in a cave near Viengkay, Laos. The source of the report was kept tied up near the cave for over a month, in 1976, and was able to observe the captive servicemen.



Staff Sergeant Donald Sparks was captured by the Vietnamese on June 17, 1969, and was officially listed by the U.S. Army as "missing in action." That classification was later changed to "prisoner of war" when a letter from Sgt. Sparks was found on the body of a Vietnamese soldier. The letter, dated April, 1970, was addressed to his family and assured them that although he had not seen another American in his ten months of captivity, he was in good health.



Air Force Colonel David Hrdlicka's plane went down in Northern Laos on May 18, 1965. Peking's New China News Agency broadcast a report quoting a Pathet Lao spokesman announcing the capture of Col. Hrdlicka. The following year, the Pathet Lao broadcast a letter which was attributed to Hrdlicka, wherein he discussed the war and his eagerness to see his wife and children. Several months later, in August 1966, the Moscow daily newspaper, Pravda, ran this photo of David Hrdlicka.

# WRITE HANOI

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

As an American citizen I strongly urge the immediate release of all U.S. servicemen and civilians remaining in your country, both living and dead. While I am thankful for the men you have returned, I am distressed at the lack of humanitarian compassion your country has shown by its failure to cooperate in accounting for our men. Please move swiftly to end the pain and suffering of the families in this country who await word on their loved ones.

Sincerely,

**Mail your letter to:**

**Ambassador Ha Van Lau  
SRV Representative to the  
United Nations  
20 Waterside Plaza  
New York, New York 10010**

## THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES

Incorporated in the District of Columbia on May 28, 1970, the National League of Families is comprised of the wives, children, parents and other close relatives of American prisoners of war and missing in action and returned Vietnam POWs. Located in The American Legion building, the League is a non-profit, non-political, tax-exempt organization, financed by the families themselves and by contributions from concerned citizens. The organization's objectives are to obtain the release of all POWs, the fullest possible accounting for the MIAs, and the return of remains of those who died serving their country.

### YOU CAN HELP

The families of those unaccounted for have waited for many years, most for more than a decade, to receive word on their missing loved ones. The unified support of a concerned America may be the catalyst necessary to help end that uncertainty.

You can assist by contacting your elected representatives, the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense, expressing your concern over the fate of Americans missing as a result of the war in Indochina. Your help is urgently needed!

---

### ORDER FORM

I want to help the League's efforts to return the men still held captive in Indochina and gain an accounting for those missing. Enclosed is my donation for \$\_\_\_\_\_.

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ League logo pins at \$3.00 each (two for \$5.00).

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ POW/MIA bracelets at \$2.50 each.

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ bumper stickers at 50 cents each.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_

**The National League of POW/MIA Families**

1608 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

**ONLY AN OVERWHELMING CRY  
FROM A UNITED AMERICA  
CAN ENSURE AN  
ACCOUNTING FOR THESE MEN**



**YOU ARE AN AMERICAN  
YOUR VOICE CAN MAKE  
THE DIFFERENCE**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Carter  
POW/MIA  
Proclamation*

Recently, Congress passed Senate Joint Resolution 168 and on July 2, 1980, President Carter signed the Proclamation designating July 18, 1980 as "National POW-MIA Recognition Day." The President, in signing the Proclamation for this special day and in line with the Joint Resolution, called upon the people of the United States to observe this day "with appropriate ceremonies and activities."

The White House, working with the Veterans Administration and the Department of Defense, has prepared the enclosed information and materials on National POW-MIA Recognition Day. Similar information is being sent to every Member of Congress, the Governor of each State, the State Departments of Veterans' Affairs, concerned groups and organizations, and the appropriate federal installations and officials.


We know this recognition day is important to you and those you serve, as it is to the President. We are asking for your assistance in this cooperative effort, for the full significance of this day will not be realized unless there is active local participation. Therefore, we are asking for your leadership and involvement in this worthwhile recognition.

The enclosed materials contain helpful information on POW's and MIA's which can be used in planning recognition activities throughout the country. We hope that you will help initiate these activities and help us bring the significant meaning of this day throughout the communities of every State.

The White House and the Congress cannot do this important job alone. We need your involvement and leadership in this worthy effort to make National POW-MIA Recognition Day the true success it deserves to be. Thank you for your interest in this most worthwhile event. Your wholehearted support and active participation and cooperation is deeply appreciated.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Anne Wexler  
Assistant to the President

Enclosure



## National P.O.W.-M.I.A. Recognition Day, 1980

*By the President of the United States of America*

### A Proclamation

In each of America's wars our prisoners of war have been called upon to make uncommon sacrifices. Upon them has fallen the arduous responsibility of defending American ideals under the absolute control of the enemy. Extremely difficult at best, this responsibility becomes magnified almost beyond comprehension when men and women are treated inhumanely — in violation of ordinary human compassion, fundamental moral standards, and basic international obligations.

The Congress has by Joint Resolution designated July 18, 1980 as "National P.O.W.-M.I.A. Recognition Day."

All Americans should recognize the special debt we owe our fellow citizens who, as prisoners during wartime, sacrificed their freedom that we might enjoy the blessings of peace and liberty. Likewise, we must remember the unresolved casualties of war — our soldiers who are still missing. The pain and bitterness of war endures for their families, relatives, and friends.

Our Nation will continue to seek answers to the many questions that remain about their fate.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Friday, July 18, 1980, as National P.O.W.-M.I.A. Recognition Day, a day dedicated to all former American prisoners of war, to those still missing, and to their families. I call on all Americans to join in honoring those who made the uncommon sacrifice of being held captive in war, and their loved ones.

And I call on State and local officials and private organizations to observe this day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this second day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fourth.

*Jimmy Carter*



AMERICAN MILITARY PRISONERS OF WAR  
AND  
U.S. SERVICEMEN LOST IN COMBAT AND NOT RECOVERED

(Compiled from available records in July 1980)

	World War I	World War II	Korea	Vietnam	TOTAL
Captured and Interned	4,120	130,201	7,140	766	142,227
Lost in Combat and Never Recovered	3,350	78,773	8,177	2,458	92,758

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NATIONAL POW-MIA RECOGNITION DAY  
July 18, 1980  
PENTAGON CEREMONY PROGRAM

\* \* \* \* \*

MUSICAL PRELUDE The United States Army Band  
Captain Benjamin DuBose, USA, conducting

HONORS

INSPECTION OF THE HONOR GUARD

INTRODUCTION General Lew Allen, Jr., USAF  
Air Force Chief of Staff

REMARKS Rear Admiral William P. Lawrence, USN  
Superintendent, U. S. Naval Academy

PRAYER Chaplain (COL) Walter F. Wichmanowski, USA

NATIONAL ANTHEM Audience Participation Invited

MISSING MAN FLYOVER 1st TAC Fighter Wing, Langley AFB

\* \* \* \* \*

GENERAL LEW ALLEN, JR., USAF, graduated from West Point in 1946, receiving his commission and pilot wings upon graduation. He flew B-29 and B-36 aircraft in the Strategic Air Command and also served in various positions related to nuclear weaponry. His assignments as a space systems specialist include Director of Space Systems under the Secretary of the Air Force, and Deputy Commander for Satellite Programs, Space and Missile Systems Organization. He later served as Director, National Security Agency, Commander Air Force Systems Command, and Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. General Allen became Chief of Staff on July 1, 1978. As Chief of Staff he is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense.

\* \* \* \* \*

REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM P. LAWRENCE, USN, a native of Nashville, Tennessee, graduated from the Naval Academy in 1951 and was designated a Naval Aviator the following year. Subsequently, he served in various staff assignments and fighter squadrons. While Commanding Officer of Fighter Squadron 143, he was shot down over North Vietnam in June 1967 and held as a P.O.W. until March 1973. While in prison he wrote a poem later designated the official poem of his home state, Tennessee. Rear Admiral Lawrence is the recipient of the 1979 National Football Foundation and Hall of Fame Gold Medal. He became the Naval Academy's 49th Superintendent on August 28, 1978, and was recently nominated for promotion to Vice Admiral.

5

**WHITE HOUSE VETERANS FEDERAL  
COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

Washington, D.C. 20500


I trust that the information contained in the enclosed "specially" prepared materials on the National POW-MIA Recognition Day is of assistance to you.

I can only echo the importance of the President's Proclamation and Congress' Joint Resolution 168 by asking that you join with all of us in providing the kind of support and participation that contributes to the success of this "very special" day.

My sincere thanks and appreciation for your help and cooperation.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



WILLIAM E. LAWSON  
Executive Director  
White House Veterans  
Federal Coordinating  
Committee

Enclosure



VETERANS ADMINISTRATION  
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20420

July 18, 1979

TO VA's EX-POWs:

On behalf of President Carter, a grateful nation and all of us in the Veterans Administration family, I say "Thank you" on this special day.

Your service to our country included not only the dangers and hardships of combat but the rigors and privations of captivity, often under inhumane conditions, always under conditions threatening to health of mind and body and to survival. That you met this ordeal with dignity and fortitude has earned you our admiration.

Today we also honor those whose fate is yet unknown, the missing in action, and we assure their families and friends they are not forgotten. Their deeds and their sacrifice will be with us always.

For VA and for myself, I offer a salute and express the most sincere good wishes to all to whom National POW-MIA Recognition Day has been dedicated.

  
MAX CLELAND  
Administrator