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REVIVING THE WINNING COALITION
The Strategy for Conservatives

Morton C. Blackwell
January 17, 1983

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REVIVING THE WINNING COALITION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 1984 election will be the grade given the Reagan Administration. Our major political test is going on now.

The Reagan winning coalition of 1980, for many reasons, was largely dormant in 1982, but the elements of that coalition are still available to repeat the 1980 Republican sweep in 1984. Actions taken by this Administration in 1983 and 1984 can reassemble and revive our 1980 coalition.

During the 97th Congress, the only major Reagan Administration efforts on issues of paramount importance to elements of our 1980 winning coalition were in the economic area. The President did not himself retreat from those views on essentially non-economic issues, views which attracted to his coalition millions of Americans who have not normally voted for Republicans. But his sincere words were not backed up by enough actions by the Reagan Administration.

In sum, both the Administration and the liberal Democrats chose to do battle for two years on the economic issues. The Democrats won in 1982, as they usually have won since Franklin Roosevelt put together his winning coalition. Roosevelt based his coalition on pitting the always more numerous "have-nots" in economic/political battles against the "haves".

The major sources of 1980 Reagan coalition activism missing or reduced in GOP campaigns of 1982 were these issues: gun control, right to life, union abuses, national defense, Christian schools, and the traditional morality of home and family.

Through the 1970's hundreds of organizations, large and small, grew up around these issues. Literally millions of new activists were organized into politics.

The Roosevelt coalition split in 1980 because, for a change, the demagogy of "have-not" vs. "have" did not work. One or more of a wide variety of high intensity, non-economic issues brought many normally Democratic voters to the Republicans. These voters found they could not stomach the actions and aims of the liberal Democratic leadership. The Reagan campaign and the actions of newly dynamic conservative organizations opened their eyes.

Many surely didn't want to elect liberal Democrats who would take their children away from home and neighborhood by forced busing on Soviet tanks into the clutches of counter-culture teachers who would fill their heads with pornography, abortion, and gun control, and prevent them from praying.

In 1981 and 1982 these high intensity "social" issues were not fought over in the Congress as in recent years. They were largely ignored in actions of both parties, by fearful Democrats and by disdainful Republicans. As a result, the newly activated conservative groups could not split nearly as many traditional Democrats away from the liberal Democratic leadership. The Roosevelt coalition reassembled in 1982 and won 62% of the 435 U. S. House races, 64% of the 34 U.S. Senate races, and 74% of the 35 gubernatorial races.

In my judgment, these results will be repeated in 1984, and we will probably lose the White House as well, unless we take actions promptly to renew the national attention to these non-economic issues.

A fundamental change is required. The Administration must change its attitude. We must take legislative and administrative actions in accord with the President's own views on issues the Administration has shoved into the background for the past two years.

The path toward victory must be marked by confrontations which isolate our opposition from many of their previous voters. The good old Republican issues of fiscal responsibility, capital formation, and the work ethic are necessary, even central to our coalition, but not sufficient for us to win national elections in the 1980's.

If we take the actions necessary to reactivate all the elements of the Reagan winning coalition, it can become the new, normal governing majority in American politics.

REVIVING THE WINNING COALITION

OVERVIEW

In one important respect the American political system is unique. In every other democracy, political party organizations, labor unions, and, in some countries, the Church, usually enjoy a virtual monopoly in the area of political activity.

In the United States, a wide variety of other organizations have long been sources of political activism. Perhaps it has to do with what de Tocqueville found to be our American penchant for forming organizations for every purpose. Abolition societies, the Anti-Saloon League, and the National Rifle Association show the range in time and topic of citizen groups which have had great power at the polls and in the halls of our government.

The Reagan winning coalition in 1980 was composed of three main elements:

1. The Republican Party activists.
2. The majority of the growing business and association political community, most notably the business and association political action committees (PACs).
3. The spectrum of citizen groups broadly described as conservatives.

All three groups in the 1970's grew dramatically in money, activists, and expertise. Conservative groups, the subject of this paper, have changed the most since the 1960's.

The "old Right", self-identified conservative movement activists from the Goldwater era, believed that being right, in the sense of being correct, was sufficient to win in politics. They believed in the Sir Galahad theory: "I will win because my heart is pure." Years of defeat persuaded many conservatives that victory would not fall into their hands like a ripe fruit from a tree. At different rates and to differing degrees they decided they owed it to their philosophy to study how to win. Effective political technology, not just being right, turned out to be the key to victories. Some of the significant developments were:

1. Dozens of both multi-issue and focused issue (single issue) conservative groups were formed at the national level, many with sub units at state and local levels.

2. Existing conservative groups grew rapidly. The established National Right to Work Committee, for instance, grew from 25,000 members to 1.6 million members in the past decade.
3. Most leaders of successful groups soon had clustered around them their own, related, PACs, lobbies, and foundations.
4. Conservative consultants and organizations blazed the path to effective political direct mail. Most of the income of the RNC, the NRCC, and the NRSC in the past decade was raised by people who learned direct mail while working for Richard Viguerie.
5. Conservatives developed techniques for self-funding television programming. Programs on the Panama Canal treaties and President Carter's SALT II treaty were examples, but the greatest success is the massive resources now contributed to broadcast the programs of conservative religious leaders.
6. Conservatives overcame the notion that all news media were the enemy. Many studied how to benefit from media opportunities. For example, a Phyllis Schlafly rule: Choose your spokesman for a debate so that, if the TV sound were cut off, you would win the debate on appearance alone.
7. Conservatives gathered and used youth campaign technology. Now conservative Republican candidates who have trained youth coordinators invariably dominate their liberal Democratic counterparts on campus.
8. Conservative groups of almost every description cooperated on unprecedented, thorough programs to train new political activists. It is not at all unusual for a Right to Work specialist to give a direct mail lecture to a right to life workshop or for a right-to-keep-and-bear-arms leader to discuss precinct organization at a seminar for conservative religious leaders.

The accumulated weight of these conservative citizen groups coalesced in 1980 behind Ronald Reagan and the GOP opponents of targeted liberal Democrats. Candidate Reagan was a veteran advocate of all they stood for. The increments of support each of these groups of activists brought into politics provided the winning margins in 1980 for many narrow winners in the Republican column.

After the 1980 elections, leaders of every major conservative group feared their contributors would reduce their giving. The reverse proved true. Virtually every conservative group continued to grow rapidly in income and members in 1981 and 1982. It became reasonable to expect a much better than usual mid-term election.

Unfortunately, greater resources did not translate into greater conservative group activism in the 1982 elections. In fact, most of these groups spent far less on grassroots activism in 1982 than in 1980. Such figures as long distance telephone bills, travel budgets to targeted races, and numbers of voter letters mailed tell the story.

Much of the 1980 Reagan winning coalition was largely dormant in the 1982 elections. Conservative activists did have someplace else to go. Home. The tragic defeats of many GOP candidates at every level were in large measure due to this decline in activism.

Many conservative organization leaders place the entire blame for the 1982 defeats on failures of the Reagan Administration to make good on the 1980 Reagan promises. Many in the Administration blame conservatives for carping and say that the election results prove that the conservative movement was overrated. There is plenty of blame to go around.

Because both the Administration and the liberal Democratic leadership chose deliberately to concentrate on economic battles, prior to the elections, in the 97th Congress there were:

1. No votes in either House on gun control.
2. Virtually no votes on right to life.
3. Virtually no votes on school prayer.
4. No votes on pornography.
5. No votes on the death penalty.
6. No votes on tuition tax credits.
7. No votes on busing.
8. No hard-fought up or down votes on defense preparedness.
9. No vote on eliminating Hobbs Act exemption from prosecution of union violence.
10. Virtually no votes on political use of compulsory union dues.
11. Only one, short, fight in both Houses on the Balanced Budget - Tax Limitation Amendment, too soon before the elections to have much impact.

Thus most of the conservative issues on which millions of people had been identified and activated were virtually absent from the headlines and absent from the TV news programs. For ten years the Congressional Record had been for conservatives a gold mine of record votes on most of these issues. Not in 1981 and 1982.

How could groups organized around these issues fire up their grassroots supporters to hold Democrats accountable last November for their liberal stands? They couldn't.

In the protracted fight against President Carter's Panama Canal treaties, conservative groups identified and activated hundreds of thousands of people, all the while fully expecting for their efforts to get many liberal Senators' votes or their seats. By choice of the leaders of both parties, there were no protracted fights useful in this way to conservative organizations in the 97th Congress.

Without legislative battles, there remained the possibility that administrative steps on the high intensity conservative issue agenda would motivate these groups and keep their grassroots members active. In practice, virtually every administrative decision which these groups would applaud has been taken with a view to minimizing public attention.

For example, right to life activist Dr. Everett Koop was named Surgeon General of the U.S., but he is instructed to make no public statements regarding abortion. That is as if President Carter had appointed Elly Peterson to a consumer-related post but forbidden her to speak to consumer groups.

Another typical example is a letter quietly sent in early October, 1982 by the Attorney General to all U. S. Attorneys directing them to tighten up enforcement of Federal anti-pornography laws. No public statement, no news coverage, and therefore, little chance for anti-pornography groups to excite their supporters with achievements of the Reagan Administration.

Conservative groups made their full share of mistakes in the past two years. After the 1980 election victories, many naively expected the Reagan Administration instantly to roll back all the damage done by liberals since the start of the New Deal. That was impossible.

Rather than devote their resources to attacking liberal Democrats, as in the past, the conservative groups concentrated their attention far too much on the Reagan Administration. Many talented staffers of these organizations have worked diligently for two years lobbying the Administration with detailed proposals for action in areas of keen interest to them. They pressed us, not Democrats.

Hope, while flagging, still suffices. Last fall conservative groups rolled into the Old Executive Office Building hand trucks laden with petitions urging the President, for instance, really to abolish the Department of Education. This did the liberal Democrats no damage.

And, of course, a slowly growing portion of conservative organization effort has been spent on public criticism of what they see as failures of the Administration to keep the faith with the 1980 mandate. Some conservative journals and journalists for two years have taken more shots at the Administration than at all liberal Democrats combined.

Excuses can be made on either hand. The Administration felt obliged to concentrate on solving the economic mess inherited from Jimmy Carter. Conservative groups became understandably frustrated as most of their grassroots issues got short shrift.

The fact remains that liberal Democrats got a free ride in 1982 on many, if not most, of the issues which defeated Jimmy Carter, George McGovern, Frank Church, Birch Bayh, et al.

This situation need not, must not, be repeated in 1984. The Reagan winning coalition can be revived.

From this analysis, the steps needed are obvious, but none the less difficult.

Most important, the Administration must decide to confront squarely those conservative, largely non-economic issues which divide millions of normally Democratic voters from the liberal Democratic leadership.

Yes, there are people well placed in the Reagan Administration who turn faintly green at mention of these issues. Yes, a typical staffer at the major, national Republican organizations considers it a day well spent if he has done nothing to offend either Senator Helms or Senator Weicker. Yes, on all of these issues there are well organized groups in opposition to the conservative position. Yes, the Washington Post and others will heap ridicule on any vigorous Reagan Administration actions in these areas.

But the Washington Post and many others heaped ridicule on the President while he ran and won on these very issues. And the conservative groups, certainly in aggregate if not on each issue in every area, can muster more activism on these policy questions than the respective liberal opposition groups. And leaders of the liberal groups are already certain to do all they can against us in 1984 elections. And the Democrats have proved partisan majorities can be quite stable despite internal divisions on many issues. And it is better for President Reagan to have a few green-faced staffers walking around than for liberal Democrats to repeat in 1984 their recent trouncing of us in the congressional and gubernatorial elections and, perhaps, to win the White House from us.

In the next section, this paper will discuss specific legislative and administrative actions. Here we cover general principles applicable to these conservative issues:

Record Votes.

Congressional roll call votes are needed on all these issues. Repeated votes in both Houses in each issue category. Inevitable news coverage will prove to those interested that their battles are being fought. Record votes will enable our grassroots activists to

pin the tails on the right donkeys. If we can't force the needed votes, the President should go on television and condemn the liberal Democratic leadership for not allowing the Congress to act. A flood of mail may change Tip's mind.

Discharge Petitions.

If all efforts to get record votes fail, go the discharge petition route. In the hands of an experienced grassroots organization, a Representative's failure to sign a discharge petition can be a useful issue.

Advance Notice.

Lead time is vital. The House fight on "Dense Pack" was a classic example of how not to get grassroots support. On November 22, the President announced his support for Dense Pack. We promptly held a well-attended briefing by Tom Reed for the pro-defense groups.

The time before the fight in the House was impossibly short. One half hour before the Appropriations Committee began its markup, the VFW Executive Director delivered to pro-defense Rep. Bill Chappell (D-Fla.) the hot-off-the-press news release from the VFW strongly endorsing the President's position. Chappell's reading of the press release to the committee was the sum total of pro-defense citizen organization lobbying before the committee vote.

Dense Pack survived that day on a tie vote in committee, but was promptly defeated on the House floor. Virtually none of the 1.9 million VFW members knew of their group's decision to fight for the President on this issue. Therefore, none could be organized by VFW in time to lobby their House members. The capper is that Members who voted against us on Dense Pack got off virtually scot-free because real anger at a "wrong" vote is minimal unless grassroots interest is organized beforehand.

Advance notice for a major grassroots effort should be at least three months. Six months lead time is better. Thus the Administration should decide now on a legislative agenda in each conservative issue area. Let our groups know exactly what we are committed to fight for. Turn them loose to organize grassroots activism.

Fear of Losing.

Our constitutional system is wisely designed to make it difficult to make changes. And the 1982 election results make it certain we will lose many battles in this Congress. We can help revive the Reagan winning coalition by fighting, even losing battles, provided we wisely pick our battles. King Pyrrhus beat the Romans in every battle, but the wear and tear on his forces was so great that he lost the war and had to flee Italy.

The President himself built his national coalition through two losing Presidential bids. Very often fighting the good but losing fight is far wiser than avoiding confrontations.

Congressional GOP Leadership

Whether or not confrontations in the Congress on these issues would help the President and do significant damage to liberal Democratic candidates in 1984, it is a safe bet that the GOP leaders in both Houses will prefer not to have fights on most of the high intensity conservative issues. They stand ready, typically, to do battle on any issue which hurts the Democrats, provided no Republican colleague is offended.

Since there are divided views in both parties on these conservative issues, the instinctive resistance of our congressional leadership to the idea of such confrontations must be patiently worn down or ignored.

Actions can prove the determination of the President. Grass-roots groups can be focused carefully. After some months of "heat", as Ev Dirksen once said, GOP leaders may "see the light" and resign themselves to record votes on these issues.

Bill Sponsors

To have much chance of bringing legislative vehicles to votes in both Houses, the principal sponsors of Administration bills must be enthusiastic on these issues and willing to rattle a few GOP cages on the Hill.

On tuition tax credits last year, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Dole sponsored the President's tuition tax credit bill as a favor to the President. In the critical first days after the President's bill was sent to the Hill, the broad-based coalition of groups for tuition tax credits were told, even by Senator Dole's staff, that he had introduced the bill only as a courtesy and would not lead a fight for it.

By the time the uncertainty was cleared up, much momentum was lost. The bill was mangled in committee and never reached the Senate floor.

In all cases of high intensity issues, tough, committed principal sponsors in both Houses are essential. A vigorous junior member, aided by White House persuasion of senior Republican members, will often be the best sponsor of Administration bills on these issues.

Although protracted conflicts in the Congress resulting in record votes on a wide variety of conservative issues are the most effective means available of reviving the Reagan winning coalition for the 1984 elections, Executive Branch actions can be almost as useful. Public statements and policy actions, properly chosen, can strongly motivate grassroots activists on our side.

Public Statements

Many officials of the Reagan Administration had long histories of Reagan support and of leadership in conservative organizations. Many did not. The perception among current leaders of active conservative groups is that the Administration is operating on a "lowest common denominator" basis.

Conservative leaders outside of government say many of their old friends now inside the Administration are chafing under an unspoken premise: Any policy or issue which was, is, or could be a subject of dispute in the GOP is, for them, a forbidden topic now.

The muzzling of Surgeon General Koop on abortion is often cited. So are Dick Allen's and Lyn Nofziger's experiences while on the White House staff. Supply side economists Norman Ture and Paul Craig Roberts while they were at Treasury were constrained not to speak out in support of the President's views while "leaks" were claiming that all the President's advisors were working to change his mind.

Few changes would activate conservative groups more than for the White House systematically to encourage ranking Administration officials to seek out opportunities to reaffirm the President's personal commitments to action on the issues vital to these groups. If pending conservative actions really were on the front burner, they would be stressed by high Reagan staffers in interviews to the general media, not just in communications to conservative groups.

Administrative Actions

This Administration has taken many forward steps on the sorts of issues we are discussing here, issues which at the grassroots divide millions of

Democrats from the liberal Democratic leadership. Unfortunately, these steps almost invariably have been timed and taken in such ways as to minimize possible public controversy.

"Controversial" conservative steps tend to be taken deliberately on Friday evening, considered a poor time to make news. Announcements of the steps are often made by printed statements rather than by live spokesmen. And our printed statements (for instance, noting the President's pleasure at the release from jail of fundamentalist Pastor Sileven) have often been carefully bland.

The statement regarding Pastor Sileven did not include any words directly attributable to the President, thus limiting both its newsworthiness and its good effect among Christian school activists who were later given copies of the statement by the White House.

To conservative organization leaders, this practice of minimizing the public's attention to our conservative actions is evidence that the Administration disdains these issues and considers them political liabilities.

For administrative actions to achieve the best results through grassroots activism in any conservative issue area, we must call in leaders of the supportive groups for briefings as our actions are announced. Better still, advance indications of coming decisions would enable citizens groups to plan ahead and thus get the most mileage for our actions. On the issue of parental notification, for example, we got excellent results from an OPL-organized briefing of pro-life groups by Marjorie Mecklenburg of HHS.

Personnel Decisions

Frankly, conservative citizen groups got more of their adherents in this Administration than I expected. This topic, however, for two years has been a sore spot for conservative groups.

The "Reagan Revolution" brought in a number of appointees without prior government service. It ought not be surprising that many did not find

Federal employment to their liking. However, conservative activist leaders frequently claim to see a pattern in filling openings: When a strong conservative leaves the Administration, the vacancy often is not filled by another strong conservative, but when a 'non-Reaganite' leaves, another 'non-Reaganite' almost invariably gets the slot." This observation has some validity, but there are obvious exceptions. These concerns could be quieted by filling some of the second category of vacancies with early Reagan supporters from outside or inside the Administration.

Beyond legislative initiatives and administrative actions, there is another category of activity relevant to this discussion. Statewide initiatives and referenda have not previously been a notable concern of any presidential administration. But statewide ballots on issues can have dramatic impact on voter turnout. Moreover, the types of voter most likely to vote on a given election day are affected by the nature of the issues on the ballot.

Most observers have said our narrow capture in 1982 of the California governorship was largely due to the extra voters turned out in the crushing (64%) defeat of an anti-gun ballot initiative.

Less widely noted were the 1982 referendum results in the two states where pro-gun groups fought to insert the right to keep and bear arms into their state constitutions. In Nevada the pro-gun ballot measure passed with 71% of the vote. A similar measure won 72% of the statewide vote in New Hampshire.

It is not purely coincidence that the only Democratic U.S. Senator to fail to win reelection was in Nevada. Likewise, the only Democratic governor to lose his reelection bid was in New Hampshire.

Statewide ballot issues usually are not fought out between the two party organizations. A non-partisan citizen group or a coalition of groups generally gets a proposal on the ballot and then slugs it out until election day with a rival coalition.

In 1978 and 1980, conservative groups were on the offensive with exciting tax limitation ballot initiatives such as California's Proposition 13 and Massachusetts' Proposition 2½. Tax cutting and less government became dominant issues, to the great surprise of many, including Governor Jerry Brown.

In 1982 the dominant ballot issue was the nuclear freeze, clearly useful as a voter turnout issue for liberals.

Well crafted and targeted ballot measures on tax cutting, gun control, death penalty, forced busing, school prayer, tuition tax credits, infanticide, and pornography could in 1984 drive wedges between millions of traditionally Democratic voters and liberal Democratic candidates.

Many large, conservative citizen groups are already experienced in ballot initiative battles. Other groups have massive, enthusiastic membership they could easily recruit into such battles on the right issues.

Careful political analysis and informal discussion of possible ballot measures with leaders of major conservative organizations might produce some very helpful voter turn out in 1984.

At the conclusion of this section is a table of data on eleven of the many states which have established processes to get issues on the ballot.

SOME STATES WITH PROVISION FOR BALLOT MEASURES

<u>State</u>		<u>1980 Vote %</u>	<u># of Cong. Districts</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>
California	Reagan	53%	45	47
	Carter	36%	29D	
	Anderson	9%	16R	
Colorado*	R.	55%	6	8
	C.	31%	3D	
	A.	11%	3R	
Florida	R.	56%	19	21
	C.	39%	13D	
	A.	5%	6R	
Illinois *	R.	50%	22	24
	C.	42%	12D	
	A.	7%	10R	
Ohio	R.	52%	21	23
	C.	41%	10D	
	A.	6%	11R	
Michigan *	R.	49%	18	20
	C.	42%	12D	
	A.	7%	6R	
Massachusetts*	R.	42%	11	13
	C.	42%	10D	
	A.	15%	1R	
Oklahoma *	R.	60%	6	8
	C.	35%	5D	
	A.	3%	1R	
Texas *	R.	55%	27	29
	C.	41%	21D	
	A.	2%	6R	
Washington **	R.	50%	8	10
	C.	37%	5D	
	A.	11%	3R	
Missouri**	R.	51%	9	11
	C.	44%	6D	
	A.	4%	3R	
Totals	R.		192	214
	C.		126D	
	A.		66R	

* 1984 Senate Race

** 1984 Governor's Race

POLICY INITIATIVES

The key to reviving fully the Reagan winning coalition in time for the 1984 election is Administration action on neglected elements of the President's 1980 issue agenda.

Not access, not State Dinner invitations, not advisory commission appointments, not personal friendship, not stirring written or spoken reaffirmations of principles, but action.

Many leaders of conservative organizations can rattle off lists of Members of Congress they recruited to run, Members whom they trained in politics, Members who credit them with their elections, and legislation they conceived and passed or fought and defeated. Most of their groups are relatively new or are newly large. Many of their budgets are in the millions. Their clusters of foundations, lobbys and political action committees are financially independent and politically independent of the national political parties.

Their leaders typically are pragmatic but not opportunist. They believe in the causes around which they have built their lives. Most groups are not run by committees but by the single organizers who created them. Their respective leaders are independent of each other, but they have worked in coalition for years on many endeavors, including 1980 Reagan campaign.

They share a keen disappointment in the lack of effort by the Reagan Administration on the issues central to their organizations.

In the minds of many major conservative organization leaders has crystallized the thought that the Reagan Administration is incapable of taking the actions which would renew the winning coalition of 1980. From that hypothesis springs the tentative conclusion that the Administration is largely irrelevant to them.

This line of reasoning is best expressed in a December 30, 1982 National Public Radio commentary by Connie Marshner, chairman of the main pro-family coalition, the Library Court group. Her commentary is printed as the last item in the Appendix of this paper.

Recently heads of two major conservative groups have called friends inside the Administration urging them to resign.

One well known leader says that now when he meets by chance with any of the White House "Big Three," he talks about inconsequential matters, because so many discussions of policy have availed nothing.

Another has sworn off spending time trying to affect any White House decisions whatsoever.

One conservative U. S. Senator not much in the news told a conservative organization leader this week, "Going along with those people (the Administration) against my judgment has destroyed my base back home. I'm on the verge of a press counterblast at them you wouldn't believe."

This week several activist leaders quietly discussed the possibility of a conservative U. S. Senator's mounting a 1984 challenge to the President, obtaining matching funds, running an independent presidential candidacy in the fall as John Anderson did last time, and thereafter qualifying (again similar to Anderson) for a fat Federal payment for use in 1988.

We can emulate the Franklin Roosevelt Administration or the Eisenhower Administration. FDR was, politically, the most successful president of the 20th century. He built a new governing majority which lasted through his lifetime and beyond.

President Eisenhower quickly lost his early strength in Congress. He remained personally popular, but he struggled with hostile Democratic majorities for his last six years in the White House. And his vice president lost the ensuing attempt to succeed him.

FDR retained his winning coalition by:

1. Keeping the issue initiative by launching and fighting hard for a steady stream of policy proposals, even though he knew many of them would lose in the Congress.
2. Keeping his coalition together by giving each element of it frequent, solid reasons to stay aboard.
3. Rerunning each ensuing election on the central themes of his 1932 success, particularly pitting the always more numerous "have nots" against the "haves."
4. Using legislation, his administrative powers, and the prestige of his office to build the political power of the key elements of his coalition, particularly organized labor.

5. Cheerfully using confrontation with opponents of his policies to motivate his coalition.
6. Accepting the most intense unpopularity with a minority to achieve unique popularity with the majority of Americans.

We should not forget that FDR built a stable winning coalition while the Great Depression raged all during the 1930s. Economic prosperity, or its lack, proved largely irrelevant to his success.

This Administration is at a crossroads. By shouldering the whole burden of the issues on which he ran and won and by taking unmistakable actions to confront his opponents on these issues, President Reagan could revive his winning coalition in three months.

If we fail to take decided actions on these issues early in this new Congress, the President's opportunity to systematically build a new, normal governing majority will be lost. We will come increasingly to resemble the Eisenhower Administration, if not the Carter Administration. Eisenhower, after all, began as a national hero and Carter took office as the leader of a majority party.

If the President does not revive his winning coalition, we will have to depend for reelection on the Democrats nominating a brazen McGovernite in 1984, which they are highly unlikely to do.

Before moving to consideration of specific policy initiatives some discussion of the nature of the appeal of non-economic or "social" issues is necessary. At root, they get their strength from moral outrage. Sample sentiments:

1. "They will take my gun only by prying it from my cold, dead fingers. God made man, but Winchester made men equal."
2. "Abortion is murder of tiny babies."
3. "Union goons beat up innocent workers and force people to pay them tribute for the simple right to work."
4. "I won't send my kids to drug-filled schools which denigrate God and can't even teach the three R's."
5. "Rampant pornography is stamping out all vestiges of morality in our country."

6. "The commies want to destroy America, and we've got to be strong so that won't happen."

In these and other such high-intensity issues, most of the liberal Democratic leadership is firmly locked into the wrong political position. And millions of traditional Democrats vote Republican when organized around these issues. The President states each position more graciously, and he is clearly on the right side in each case.

Unfortunately all six of the above issues and their kin are now pale shadows of their intensity in 1980. We have indulged in unilateral moral disarmament. In rhetoric and, more importantly, in action the Reagan Administration behaves as if these issues were skunks at our garden party.

But moral outrage, in my judgment the most powerful motivator in politics, is alive and well in American today. We have granted a monopoly to our opposition in the use of moral outrage. Liberal Democrats and most major, national news media are systematically and successfully directing it at us. Sample sentiments:

1. "They are spending more money on bombs and rockets while people are losing their homes and starving."
2. "The rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer. It isn't fair."
3. "They are raping the environment for private greed."
4. "They want to make your home ground zero in an insane nuclear exchange with the Soviets."
5. "They are deliberately destroying your jobs in order to increase the profits of a privileged few."

Yes, the liberal Democratic leadership understands the political use of moral outrage.

If the public sees the national political contest as primarily between those who will give help to the "have nots" and those whose policies enable capital formation so that productive businesses can make profits so that employers can offer jobs so that all who want to work can work, perhaps a solid 45% will vote Republican.

But a Republican majority forms if, as in 1980, the public sees the national political contest as primarily between

those who have a difficult-to-grasp but clearly well-meaning economic policy and those who say they want to help the poor but really want to take children away from home and neighborhood by forced busing on Soviet tanks into the clutches of counterculture teachers who would fill their heads with pornography, abortion, and gun control, and prevent them from praying.

In late October and early November, 1982, I held in the Old Executive Office Building a series of OPL meetings with seven coalitions of leading conservative activists. With the help of Bill Barr and Steve Galebach, I asked each group to discuss their most important policy requests and suggestions for the Reagan Administration.

The 153 requests and suggestions generated by participants in these seven meetings, updated by their subsequent thoughts, are contained in the Appendix to this paper.

To take action in accord with all 153 items is clearly impossible. To do none of them would be foolish. A very few are contrary to currently expressed Administration policy.

The overwhelming majority of items are right in line with the President's own strongly expressed convictions. Virtually every one of them would be controversial.

All items should be studied. Many which could not pass the Congress should be fought over anyhow.

I do not propose to rank the requests and suggestions within each category. Nor can this already lengthy paper be expanded in an attempt to evaluate the merit of each item. I suggest judging each item for potential action by the following standards:

1. Is it consistent with the President's philosophy?
2. Will it help revive the Reagan winning coalition?

At the risk of being repetitive, I add this: If it will provoke controversy, that should commend an item, provided the controversy leaves lots of their traditional voters arguing with the liberal Democratic leadership.

Finally, at the core of any action plan to revive the Reagan winning coalition should be the following items:

1. Make good on the President's pledge to fight for a pro-life constitutional amendment.
2. Fight for a statute to prohibit Federal funding of abortions. With the recent change in House rules, the former appropriations riders may prove impossible to pass.
3. Fight for prompt passage of the McClure Volkmer Bill to amend the 1968 Gun Control Act. It can pass, and votes against its provisions will end the careers of many liberal Democrats.
4. Fight to remove the Hobbs Act exemption covering union violence. This will force the union hacks in the Congress on record in a virtually indefensible position.
5. Fight to prohibit any use of compulsory union dues in politics. Another indefensible position for Big Labor's politicians.
6. Fight to remove all regulatory power from the hopelessly politicized Federal Election Commission to the Justice Department. Few achievements would more encourage conservative activists.
7. Fight to prohibit any expenditure of Federal funds for political advocacy. Conservatives don't want tax dollars for this purpose, and liberals should not get taxpayer funds for politics.
8. Veto any spending bill which funds the Legal Services Corporation. If the Congress again tries to circumvent the constitutional process by funding LSC through a continuing resolution, veto that. Liberals are making the President look impotent, unable to close down LSC.
9. Adopt and fight for the "High Frontier" strategic nuclear defense proposal.
10. Get surface to air weapons one way or another to the Afghan freedom fighters. The Soviets supported the North Vietnamese.
11. Arrange for up and down votes on many defense preparedness issues in both Houses.

12. Don't take no for an answer on Radio Marti. Bolster our other foreign broadcast agencies now and put people who think like U.S. Ambassador Kirkpatrick in charge of all our foreign broadcasting services.
13. Fight for levels of spending the President would want if he could get them. Far better to lose such fights and put the blame for deficits where it really belongs: on the liberal Democratic leadership.
14. Fight again immediately to pass the Balanced Budget - Tax Limitation Amendment in both Houses.
15. Call in the Attorney General and the anti-pornography coalition to meet with the President. Order immediate, vigorous enforcement of all Federal anti-pornography statutes. Devise and fight for passage of bills to plug current loopholes.
16. Fight for prompt passage of the President's original tuition tax credit bill introduced last year.
17. Fight promptly for passage of the President's Voluntary Prayer Amendment. Adopt and fight for Senator Denton's bill to end Federal funds to school districts which discriminate against groups of students seeking to meet during extracurricular periods for the purpose of engaging in religious activities.

As each issue for action is picked, throw the whole weight of the Administration into the effort: Meetings of outside activists with the President, briefings by high government officials, fact sheets, issue updates, public speeches, Saturday radio broadcasts, meeting with Members of Congress and so on. Discipline anyone in the Administration who sends out contrary signals. An effort limited to a handful of personal letters and phone calls from the Oval Office will not produce the needed groundswell on these issues at the grassroots.

The coalition which coalesced in the 1970's and won in 1980 is available for 1984 if the Reagan Administration chooses to revive it. If not, the conservative organizations will more and more separate their fortunes from those of the President. And their leaders will continue to recruit and build, intending to revive the winning coalition in some future year under someone else's banner.

APPENDIX

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 10, 1983

CHRISTIAN SCHOOL COALITION MEETING
October 20, 1982

PARTICIPANTS:

Bob Billings
National Christian Action Coalition

Roy Jones
The Moral Majority

Bob Baldwin
Learn, Inc.

Ed McAteer
The Religious Roundtable

Jack Clayton
American Association of Christian Schools

Forest Montgomery
National Association of Evangelicals

Larry Uzzell
Learn, Inc.

Phil Lawler
The Heritage Foundation

Bill Barr
Office of Policy Development

Steve Galebach
Office of Policy Development

CHRISTIAN SCHOOL COALITION MEETING
October 20, 1982

Requests and Suggestions

1. The Administration should in general vigorously oppose government regulation of church affiliated schools, at both the state and Federal levels, as a violation of religious liberties under the First Amendment.
2. The Administration should vigorously support the Religious Schools Act as proposed by Attorney William Ball of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
3. The Administration should revoke the 1978 and 1979 Carter Administration racial quota rules which candidate Reagan specifically attacked in 1980 and support the Ashbrook and Dornan Amendments which would block any similar regulations like IRS Ruling 79 - 99 which attempted to prohibit tax deductions for parental contributions to tuition-free church affiliated schools.
4. The Administration should strongly back Mickey Edwards' proposed Church Audit Act.
5. If Bob Jones University wins its current Supreme Court case, the Administration should not support any statutory changes in the tax code which would deprive Christian schools of the fruits of that victory. If Bob Jones loses the case, the Administration should construe the decision as narrowly as possible, and make it clear that schools accused of discrimination must not be forced to bear the burden of proving themselves innocent.
6. The Administration should direct the Department of Labor to retract its interpretation that church affiliated schools are secular institutions subject to state level unemployment taxes and labor regulations.
7. Administration should withhold all Federal aid from Nebraska State Education agency for violating the First Amendment rights of religious schools, and fire Nebraska State School Chief Anne Campbell from Secretary of Education Terrell Bell's Commission on Excellence in Education.
8. The Administration should make sure that any Federal tuition tax credit or voucher proposal follows the model of the excellent White House bill proposed in 1982, but seriously compromised by the Senate Finance Committee, in its provisions for protecting private schools from government regulation. Senate and House members solidly committed to that model (unlike Moynihan and Packwood) should be the principal sponsors of tax credits or vouchers.

9. The Administration should make sure that EEOC ends its unauthorized and unwarranted fishing expeditions targeting Southwestern Theological Seminary, and other Christian institutions of higher learning.
10. Religious civil rights should be a priority of the U. S. Civil Rights Commission equal to racial civil rights. Investigate "sweetheart law suits" like the Wright Case and the Green Case (relating to IRS regulations and Christian schools) whereby radical activist lawyers on the Federal payroll illegally and unethically conspired with radical activist lawyers outside government to manipulate the courts toward systematic erosion of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
11. The Justice Department should file amicus briefs on behalf of voluntary school prayer in the Lubbock, Texas case. This is winnable and would be a major setback for opponents of school prayer.
12. The Administration should make tuition tax credits its major education-related priority for the next two years. The President should engage the full resources of the Administration and use the same tactics, such as personal phone calls and television speeches, on behalf of this proposal as he did for high priority items like 1981's Gramm-Latta budget resolutions. This would be a political bonanza for Reagan among Catholics and the rapidly growing Christian school movement. Orthodox Jewish groups are on board, too.
13. The Administration should draft, introduce, and vigorously promote a bill to turn Chapter I of the 1982 Education Consolidation and Improvement Act into a voucher system for lower income children, thus transforming this \$3 billion program from a tool for statism into a tool for parental choice. This is another winner at the grassroots.
14. In moving to dismantle the Department of Education, the Administration must give priority to real reductions in the power of the Department, not just its symbolic status or its location on the Federal organization chart. Dismantlement legislation must include not just declarations of intent, but specific, concrete, airtight provisions.
15. Immediately and concretely gut the major regulatory powers of the Education Department, such as the enforcement of quotas, goals, and timetables based on race or gender.
16. Immediately and concretely eliminate (not transfer to other Federal agencies) the "discretionary grant" programs which by their very nature are subject to ideological abuse. The principal criterion for deciding how soon to destroy a Federal education program should not be the amount of money it spends, but rather the amount of power it gives to Federal employees to steer tax dollars toward their friends and away from their enemies.

17. Irreversibly and concretely substitute "New Federalism" mechanisms like "revenue source returning", as proposed by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the President's Advisory Panel for Elementary - Secondary School Finance, for categorical grant programs and block grant programs in education. As the social service which by its very nature is the most locally oriented, education should rank ahead of health and welfare as a candidate for fundamental decentralization.
18. The Administration should revoke, by purely administrative means without new legislation, the microscopically detailed regulations which now go far beyond the intent of Congress or the letter of the law. For example, Title IX on gender discrimination formal and informal, regulatory guidelines mandating bilingual education, and racial quotas in both schools and colleges.
19. Use the Education Department and the White House as a "bully pulpit" to press for education reforms at the state and local levels, such as repeal of state laws which bar liberal arts graduates from teaching in government (public) schools.
20. Stop justifying Federal education cuts on budgetary grounds and start justifying them on the ground that Federal activism in education is the role which is most truly anti-education. This is what millions of concerned parents expected when the President pledged to abolish the Education Department. The 16 year experiment which started with passage of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act has proved conclusively (to paraphrase a former Moynihan aide*) that Washington has very little ability to help teachers and students, but an almost unlimited capacity to foul things up. The cause of educational excellence and the cause of fundamental decentralization are one and the same.
21. Challenge the appointment of Judge Abner Mikva as unconstitutional on the ground that his office was created while he was still in Congress.
22. As long as a Federal research role in education exists, use it to study successes of Christian schools, negative effects of Federal regulations and techniques like "values clarification" whereby government schools engage in ideological indoctrination.
23. Do not fear to antagonize the teachers unions. Their massive resources will in 1984 as in 1980 be 100% against the President. The millions of parents who oppose the NEA and AFT are looking to the President for leadership and not seeing much action.

* Dr. Chester Finn of Vanderbilt University in Life Magazine in January, 1981.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 10, 1983

RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS COALITION MEETING
October 21, 1982

PARTICIPANTS:

Larry Pratt
Gun Owners of America

John Snyder
Citizens Committee for the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms

Wayne LaPierre
National Rifle Association

Bill Barr
Office of Policy Development

Morgan Norval
Citizens Committee for the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms

8. The President should open six million acres for hunting in Alaska. This is a step supported by NRA and National Wildlife Federation but opposed by the Fund for Animals and Sierra Club.
9. The Administration should encourage the revival of militia as "state defense forces". Perhaps militia members should provide their own weapons. Federal government could help set up state agencies. Militia would provide services when National Guard is called up on other business. Defense Department should open a division of civilian marksmanship.
10. Pell grants (education) are operating at cross purposes with a voluntary army by discouraging enlistment. The Administration should propose making such grants available only to National Guard members.
11. The Administration should propose lifting tax exemption from schools which either prohibit ROTC or restrict recruitment by armed services. Some schools have prohibited recruitment by employers who discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, thus excluding from campus all recruiters for the armed services.
12. The Administration should open up to private use more shooting ranges on military bases. There is a growing shortage of target ranges, particularly in metropolitan areas. Target ranges on military bases are usually very underutilized. Gun safety programs could appropriately use military facilities. User fees would be a source of some needed revenue. Such programs would facilitate military recruitment.
13. The Administration should open up more shooting ranges on public lands.
14. The Administration should reopen to the public the indoor shooting range at Quantico. It was closed by the EPA for the almost humorous reason that excessive lead was emitted.
15. The Administration should make sure that there is no repeat of the Attorney General's Task Force on Crime. This study was led by Griffin Bell and Governor Jim Thompson, both of whom are anti-gun. Thus the report was predictably anti-gun.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 10, 1983

RIGHT TO WORK COALITION MEETING
October 22, 1982

PARTICIPANTS:

Reed Larson
National Right to Work Committee

Bill Wilson
National Right to Work Committee

Dave Denholm
Public Service Research Council

Steve Antosh
Center on National Labor Policy

Steve Galebach
Office of Policy Development

Mike Avakian
Center on National Labor Policy

RIGHT TO WORK COALITION MEETING
October 22, 1982

Requests and Suggestions

1. The Labor Department has made, probably for the first time, some progress on protecting the rights of retirees in their pension funds. This represents hundreds of billions of dollars. More protection is needed to benefit the retirees. For instance, ERISA regulations are not applied equally to union pensions and to small concerns.
2. Greater protection is needed against use of union pension funds to finance projects of special benefit to union officials. Union pension funds are too often placed in non-interest-bearing accounts.
3. We must stop the growing abuse of union pension funds for "social purposes" such as lending only to union shop projects. This subsidizes union organizing and forecloses investment opportunities which would earn retirees more.
4. Changes are needed in written regulations for pension funds.
5. OMB was on the verge of issuing a revised circular A-76 but was stopped, and a study is being made. We should not have to make a new study of cost every time such clearly desirable changes are proposed.
6. OPM proposed in the Federal Register desirable regulation changes with respect to reductions in force. The Administration pulled this at the request of Congressman Wolf, a local congressman with more concern for the interests of Federal employees for job security than for the public interest in reform of government. OPM should be allowed to issue the regulations as drafted.
7. The Administration should support Senator Nickles' bill S.R. 2929 which would have raised the Davis Bacon threshold from \$2,000. to \$100,000. Nickles got 48 votes. This would not repeal Davis Bacon but would save a lot of funds for the government.
8. The Administration should support proposals by Senator Armstrong to Walsh-Healy. The proposals would permit Federal contractors to convert to ten hour days and four day weeks. From the employees' standpoint this would help a lot in child care and transportation costs. It would save the government money.

9. The Administration should fight harder for Civil service reform and stop paying travel and per diem as "official time" for union negotiators. Current system makes extended negotiations too attractive and is slowing down discussions.
10. Administration should change certain Department of Labor regulations which prohibit some kinds of work in the home. 29 CFR Section 530 was cited: Home work creates jobs in depressed employment areas, allows single parents and homemakers to care for children while working, and allows the elderly to supplement Social Security with extra income. Following agency hearings in 1981, the Labor Department opened up home work for knitted outerwear but acceded to union pressure and retained the ban in six other crafts. The Administration should amend 29 CFR part 530 by eliminating all restrictions on home work.
11. Union officials' relentless demands for artificially high wages and lowered productivity measures have brought heavy unemployment to union dominated industries. The exclusive representation privilege transfers substantial power from workers to a union elite. International union officials have used this power in refusing to accept employee votes for wage concessions, opting instead to sacrifice the workers' jobs.

Legislative priorities include lessening union immunities for federal prosecution of violence, giving increased control to local rather than to international unions, and amending the Davis Bacon Act. The Davis Bacon Act should be amended to (a) provide for a weighted average wage rather than a fixed prevailing wage; and, (b) to prohibit the importation of higher urban wage scales into rural projects.

12. The scope and power of the office of the Solicitor of Labor needs to be narrowed and the staff overhauled. Authority should be returned to program officials. The current Solicitor of Labor Tim Ryan

should be fired. Rumor has it Ryan is looking for private employment.

13. The rising power of federal sector unionism has dangerously transferred control of policy and procedure away from elected officials to union officials. Taxpayers end up financing the increased costs of bargaining and union prompted inefficiency, and bear the brunt of public employee strikes.

Budgetary and legislative reform is essential to returning control of government to elected officials. An immediate priority is to eliminate wage bargaining for the U.S. Postal Service and the Government Printing Office.

14. The Administration should get the Congress to repeal 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transit Act (UMTA). That section gives unions veto power over contracts and inflates labor costs on federally funded mass transit projects. The Administration should coopt the theme of "Workers Rights" by proposing legislation to permit local workers to approve their own contracts whether or not approved by the overall union. Repeatedly, as in the case of the Bunker Hill Mine in Idaho, national unions veto contracts approved by vote of local workers, thus shutting down work sites and permanently destroying jobs of local workers who voted in the majority to accept management contract offers. (The act was reauthorized by the "Highway User Fee" bill so it will now take separate legislation to address the problem of 13(c).
15. The Administration should take advantage of its opportunity to fill vacant positions on the NLRB with people who support workers rights as opposed to the special interests of union bosses.
16. NLRB's jurisdictional standards are outdated. 85% of regulations involve businesses with less than 100 employees. There is a good Federalism issue here. The states rather than the Federal government should have jurisdiction of essentially local matters. The NLRB should not exercise jurisdiction over businesses which have a negligible impact on interstate commerce.

17. The government is doing a poor job of enforcing Landrum-Griffin Act requirements concerning union disclosure of its donations. Tighter regs should be written.
18. Appeasing union leaders is a losing proposition, but an aggressive concern aimed at workers rights can win a significant workers vote. If the contest is seen in terms of "union versus management", we lose. If we seem to be aggressively pursuing protection of individual workers rights against the union bosses, we win.
19. The Administration has done an admirable job in cutting down the dollar volume of federal grants to unions. This success can be fortified by replacing sole source grants with competitive bidding for awards; by eliminating all provisions which expressly favor unions over other groups (such as the union preference clause found in CETA demonstration projects); and by vetoing any legislation naming (or legislation accompanied by conference reports naming) specific groups to receive the funds.
20. The current exemption granted labor unions under an interpretation of the Hobbs Act is indefensible. It is also potentially disastrous politically for Congressional puppets of organized labor. The Administration should fight hard to force repeated votes in Congress on a repeal of those provisions relating to extortion and violence which apply to everyone except unions involved in labor disputes.
21. Perhaps most important of all is legislative action against the use of compulsory union dues in politics. Again this is virtually indefensible, but union puppets in Congress have no choice but to vote against reforms which would protect the rights of union members against having their compulsory union dues used for political causes they oppose.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 10, 1983

PRO-DEFENSE COALITION MEETING

October 28, 1982

PARTICIPANTS

Henry Walther
U.S. Defense Committee

Col. Phelps Jones
Veterans of Foreign Wars

Andy Messing
The Conservative Caucus

General Al Knight
The Conservative Caucus

General Dan Graham
High Frontier

Colonel Judson Lively
Reserve Officers Association

Jeffrey Berman
National Strategy Information Center

Robert Foelber
Heritage Foundation

Henry Palau
Retired Officers Association

G. Michael Schlee
The American Legion

Kenneth Coskey
Association of Naval Aviation

Greg Mumford
Steven Winchell & Associates

Admiral Mark Hill
Association of Naval Aviation

PRO-DEFENSE COALITION MEETING
October 28, 1982

Requests and Suggestions

1. Organize an effective coalition to counteract nuclear freeze movement. Major support has been given by the Administration to coalitions supporting economic initiatives. The State Department, the Defense Department, and White House should work closely with outside groups naturally supportive of strong national defense. Leaders of coalition should be high level civilians rather than retired military.
2. The Administration should give support to specific pro-defense projects such as the American Security Council's film "Count Down for America", the Conservative Caucus's film "Can Soviet Imperialism be Halted?", and the soon-to-be released British film "Who Dares Wins". The President should, for instance, endorse these films personally.
3. The Administration should vigorously support General Graham's "High Frontier" proposal for strategic nuclear defense. It is low cost and innovative. There is no other weapons system which has as strong support in the pro-defense community. Americans can be defended by High Frontier. It is the best way to change the argument on defense away from issues where the left has preconditioned the public.
4. The President should get the Federal Communications Commission off the back of the clandestine anti-Castro exile stations which broadcast anti-communist information to Cuba. It is ridiculous for this Administration to make exertions to protect Castro's monopoly of news to the Cuban people.
5. The Administration should play hard ball in the Congress and insist on Congressional passage of the Radio Marti legislation which has been blocked in the Senate.

6. The Administration should publish the full text of the Kennedy-Kruschev agreements at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Administration should also release a detailed analysis of the many Soviet breaches of that agreement.
7. The President should initiate a complete reassessment of the 1947 National Security Act. The Joint Chiefs of Staff serve the interest of protecting every existing defense program. We have no official organization for giving the President and the Congress professional military advice. One possibility would be to make the Joint Chiefs of Staff principal advisors to the Congress as well as to the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be made advisors, under a revised law, to the Congressional committees (a) Budget; (b) Armed Services; and (c) Appropriations. Currently, the JCS, under the law, advises the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense. When they "level" with the Congress, they are properly accused of "legalized insubordination" -- Eisenhower's words. Our current system results in ridiculous delays in acquisition. Despite the famous inefficiencies of the Soviet bureaucracy, they have proved able to put on line major new weapons systems in a fraction of the time the U.S. can. A possible blue ribbon defense advisory panel, a "Team B" for the President, would be Tom Moorer, Dan Graham, Russ Dougherty, Mark Hill, and Alton Slay. The President must get ahead of the Congress in the military reform movement. Otherwise reforms will weaken rather than strengthen our defense.
8. The President must fight hard in Congress for the military budget. He must make anti-defense members of Congress vote that way repeatedly and thus make them accountable to their pro-defense constituents. He should veto insufficient military spending bills rather than make dangerous compromises to win votes of anti-defense members. At the grassroots, there is still a hard core pro-defense constituency which, if aroused, will defeat many of the anti-defense politicians.

9. The Administration should place more emphasis on developing U.S. capability in "low intensity" conflicts, i.e. insurgencies, guerilla actions, etc. Of the last 23 wars around the world, 20 were non-conventional wars. The Soviets have carefully built a massive capability for low intensity wars.
10. U.S. treatment of the Republic of China on Taiwan has been disgraceful. Free China Premier Sung should be encouraged to visit the United States and be given at least a cordial, unofficial welcome. Leaders in Taiwan expect that instead of a welcome there would be opposition through the back door by U.S. State Department officials.
11. The President should invite Alexander Solzhenitsyn to a one-on-one meeting in the White House. The last invitation was badly botched. Prior to the Solzhenitsyn visit, the President should read through Solzhenitsyn's Taiwan speech.
12. The Administration should talk more about the need for redundancy in defense. Trying to fine tune our defense preparedness is both dangerous and politically unintelligible to the public. President Kennedy didn't stress the budget when he set a national goal of getting a man on the moon.
13. The President should make use of the March 5, 1982, letter he received from Senator Goldwater, who said, "We are not just a little bit second to the Russians, we are very far behind them." The President should insist on the House and the Senate being given full briefings from DIA on the Soviet threat. The President should go on television to define the threat in unmistakable terms.
14. Pursuant to a similar letter to the President from Congressman Dornan, the President should invite the "media elite" to hear a DIA Soviet threat briefing. The President should ask the media to support his efforts to keep the Soviets from achieving superiority over us in all areas.
15. As the Soviets helped the North Vietnamese, we should now give aid directly to the Afghan freedom fighters. A good supply, for instance, of hand-held surface-to-air missiles would further destabilize Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan. The asymmetry between U.S. and

23. One solution to the problems of early voluntary retirement after twenty years of service would be to change the system as follows: Let a person retire from the military after 20 years of service but not start his pension until ten years later. Thus there would be less incentive for early retirements.
24. The Administration, particularly the OMB, should make a much more clear distinction between earned entitlements and unearned entitlements. Few things are more aggravating to military personnel than to link unfairly such programs as veterans benefits and military retirement pay with programs like food stamps. Clarifying and emphasizing the distinction between earned entitlements and unearned entitlements will ease that problem.
25. The Administration should change its emphasis on arms control. Currently we are behaving much like the Carter Administration. The pro-defense community now distrusts the Administration on this issue. Many people who opposed Carter's SALT II draft treaty with the Soviets are certain to go out and oppose any likely START agreement this Administration negotiates with the Soviets. Given the grisly record of the Soviet Union's non-compliance with past agreements, it is dangerous to hold out unrealistic hopes to our citizens that current negotiations will produce worthwhile results. The technical problems of verification are insurmountable. The President should tell the American people, "I can't give you a safe agreement with the Soviets."
26. After withdrawing the Gray and Terrell appointments from Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the President should appoint Bob Dornan or other articulate hard liners.
27. The President should explicitly change our nuclear deterrent strategy. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) simply equals a balance of terror in which the Soviets, who do not fear Russian public opinion, have a great advantage. We should change to mutually assured survival and push programs like High Frontier and civil defense.
28. The President should unclassify much intelligence data from the Soviet Union. Available pictures will dramatize to the American people the extent of the Soviet threat.

29. We should modernize Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. They need new transmitters and a crash program now instead of fiscal 1985.
30. The President should make more speeches on the themes he developed in his speech to the British Parliament.
31. The President has not made clear to the U.S. or our allies our national objectives regarding defense. One observer said, "Europeans will follow if you are going anywhere."
32. We should develop a new strategy for 20 - 35 year olds. More than other age groups, they understand technological possibilities. We should show them how and why we are in danger. The Administration should develop young spokesmen and send them out on the on the speaking circuit.
33. The President should use the Presidency to boost his friends, not enemies of his policies. He should invite more than Andy Warhol and Armand Hammer to White House State dinners.
34. The President should commend the VFW Political Action Committee, which has had a good impact overall. Other pro-defense groups should be encouraged to form political action organizations.
35. The President should send encouraging responses to people who send the White House post cards on pro-defense issues. These cards are currently discarded or filed and forgotten. This Administration had done virtually nothing to strengthen the resources of outside organizations friendly to it.
36. Encourage pro-defense Congressmen and Senators to attack the defense budget by proposing amendments to increase expenditures in key categories. It is foolish for pro-defense forces always to be on the defensive. The Reagan budget need not be perceived in a bargaining position from which defense expenditures are always compromised downward.

37. The President should strongly make the case that current Soviet military superiority is why freedom is being crushed in Poland and Afghanistan. It is why non-communist countries in Central America are in mortal danger. The Soviet military superiority creates an umbrella which makes possible the advance of Marxist insurgence and invasions. If we do not make this argument, anti-defense spokesmen will remain free to claim, falsely, that no one can use military superiority in the modern era.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 10, 1983

RIGHT TO LIFE COALITION
October 27, 1982

PARTICIPANTS:

Judie Brown
American Life Lobby

Paul Brown
Life Amendment PAC

Gary Curran
American Life Lobby

Douglas Johnson
National Right to Life Committee

Janet Carrol
National Right to Life Committee

Peter Gemma
National Pro-Life PAC

John Mackey
Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Life

Mark Gallagher
National Committee for a Human Life Amendment

Steve Galebach
Office of Policy Development

Rick Valentine
Americans United for Life

RIGHT TO LIFE COALITION MEETING
October 27, 1982

1. The ACLU is going to court to stop the California District Attorney from sharing information with HHS related to the 17,000 fetuses discovered there recently. HHS should tell the U. S. Attorney they want continued access to data. The U. S. Attorney or HHS should take possession of documents related to these abortions to check to see if fraud is involved or if Federal laws or regulations have been broken.
2. The Administration should pay more than lip service in its support of the Ashbrook Amendment which has, in continuing resolutions, limited the use of Federal employees insurance policies to pay for abortions. A strong White House statement is needed, particularly to Senators Hatfield, Abdnor, DeConcini, and Proxmire, insisting that as soon as current contracts expire, no more abortion-related insurance is to be issued through the Federal system except to save the life of a mother.
3. The Administration should strongly back a Dannemyer Amendment to the National Institute of Health authorization prohibiting fetal experimentation.
4. The Administration should support a proposal by Congressman Chris Smith to prohibit small business loans to abortion providers.
5. The Administration should insist on regulations to prohibit funding for abortion related services through HUD in community development grants. Apparently a Planned Parenthood clinic in Columbia, Pennsylvania is now being so funded.
6. The White House should insist that HHS answer its mail. For instance, eight letters to HHS since July 4 from Judie Brown and Garry Curran of American Life Lobby have not been answered except for a single form letter from the HHS Inspector General.
7. The Administration should give more than token support to Congressman Erlenborn's bill, H.R. 6492, which had 87 co-sponsors in the last Congress. This is an anti-infanticide bill to confer standing on third parties who can go to court and get quick action despite apathy of Federal prosecutors who are not screened for their agreement with the President's opposition to abortion. The Administration should help get co-sponsors or perhaps come up with a bill for the President along these lines. Surgeon General Koop did testify for H.R. 6492 but the effort is clearly a low priority for the Administration.

8. HHS should be directed to institute a thorough investigation of the Yale, New Haven hospital which is notorious for infanticide, publicly known to many in media and elsewhere.
9. The Administration is doing a poor job of screening U. S. District Court nominees with respect to right to life.
10. The Administration should stick with Robert Destro, a Reagan Democratic appointee to the U. S. Civil Rights Commission. Destro was outstanding in hearings, and is probably the best of the three Democratic nominees.
11. The Administration should rewrite regulations to tighten up Title X enforcement. We have not stopped money to programs where abortion is used as planned parenthood. There have been ten years of misapplication of legislative intent.
12. The Administration should back up Don Devine in his efforts to clean up the combined Federal Appeal. The Administration should insist on strict regulations which would knock out all advocacy groups from participating in what ought to be a charitable program.
13. Secretary Schweicker should appoint a panel of physicians to determine when fetal pain is possible. This will clearly put the pro-abortionists on the defensive. George Will wrote that an unborn infant could feel pain from 8 - 10 weeks. An Illinois statute already requires pregnant women considering abortion to be given notice of possibilities for pain by the fetus and even requires the use of analgesics for the fetus during an abortion.
14. The Administration should order those compiling government statistics on infant mortality to include abortions. The Administration should open up Food and Drug Administration hearings on Depo Provera. It appears that only previous witnesses may be allowed to testify.
15. HHS should specifically designate someone at the Department as a principal contact for right-to-life organizations, so that so many items do not continue to go unanswered.
16. The Administration should change the Peace Corps statute to ban use of Federal money for transportation for abortions. Reportedly last year the Peace Corps paid for seventy round trips to D.C. from overseas for abortions for women in the Peace Corps.
17. The Administration should require annual rather than the current biennial reports on abortion statistics from the Center for Disease Control. Pro-abortionists are now handing out the statistics.

18. The HHS grant system should be opened up to provide grants for pro-life researchers who are now almost entirely shut out by the structure of the system.
19. The White House should take steps to encourage Secretary Schweicker when he takes pro-life actions. He can't be expected to take all the heat when he tries to implement the pro-life policy expressed by the President.
20. We need to have a counter study to the Global 2000 program which was a Carter Office of Technology world-wide population study. Perhaps the White House could get Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute to conduct such a study with Federal funds.
21. More pro-lifers should get positions at HHS. The situation there is analagous to the Justice and Education Departments where a few top appointees are sympathetic to the President's views but the structure, including many political appointees, is not in agreement with, and sides against, the President's policy.
22. The Administration should direct someone in the policy area to develop data on pro-life steps already taken by the Administration. There is no reason not to get credit for what progress has been made in this area.
23. The Administration should put on a first class effort in behalf of the Hatch Amendment, to which amendment the President is committed.
24. The Administration should put on a first class effort with respect to a statutory change like the Helms Amendment to prohibit Federal funding of abortions. This is currently in place only as riders to appropriations bills, and this process is now virtually eliminated by Tip O'Neill's changes in the House rules.
25. The President himself should be involved earlier in Congressional pro-life fights. He should insist that all the resources of his Administration should actually put heat on Congressmen and Senators in pro-life debates as they do on economic issues. There is no indication that the President's well meaning personal contacts swung a single vote in the one successful fight for passage of the Helms pro-life amendment last fall.
26. The President will appoint three of sixteen members to a commission to celebrate the bicentennial of the Constitution. The President should take care to appoint the right people and to make sure the right staff are hired. Otherwise, we may wind up with a commission which will celebrate the pro-abortion Roe vs. Wade Supreme Court decision as a great constitutional achievement.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 10, 1983

CONSERVATIVE ELECTION AND LOBBYING COALITION
October 29, 1982

PARTICIPANTS:

Huck Walther
U. S. Defense Committee

Steve Antosh
Center on National Labor Policy

Paul Weyrich
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress

Bob McAdam
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress

Paul Kamenar
Washington Legal Foundation

Marshall Breger
Heritage Foundation

Terry Dolan
National Conservative Political Action Committee

Andy Messing
The Conservative Caucus

Bill Wilson
National Right to Work Committee

John Houston
The Fairness Committee

Peter Gemma
Pro-Life PAC

Pat Collins
National Association of Home Builders

Bill Anderson
Independent Petroleum Association

CONSERVATIVE ELECTION AND LOBBYING COALITION
October 29, 1982

Requests and Suggestions

1. The Administration should fight to change the Federal Election Law so that it could do nothing more than refer cases to the Justice Department for prosecution.
2. We should standardize the penalties for violations of the Federal Election Law. There is a very pronounced discrimination against conservatives by the FEC. When the mother of Jeff Bell gave him part of his inheritance from his father, the Bells were fined \$10,000. When the father of Josephine Ferraro (a liberal Democrat) gave her substantial sums, the Ferraros were fined only \$3000.
3. We should shorten the system during which the statute of limitations runs. This will prevent the Federal Election bureaucrats from harrassing political participants, particularly Members of Congress who are reluctant to move against the FEC for fear of being targets of harrassment by the liberal-dominated FEC.
4. The Administration should oppose pending legislation which purports to be protecting elderly people from mail fraud but which could be used by the bureaucracy to shut down virtually all conservative direct mail.
5. It is absolutely vital that the President appoint hard core conservatives to the FEC. Another appointment is up in April, 1983. Recommended Republicans are Bob Dornan, Bill Olson, or Bob D'Agostino. No "moderate" Democrats should be appointed either to fill Democratic vacancies; the Administration should appoint people as solid as Harry Byrd or Larry McDonald.
6. The Administration should look for opportunities to break up the liberal lobbying coalition. For instance, the President could propose to dedicate revenues from leases and royalties on Federal lands to, say, Social Security or Medicare. This would be politically attractive. This would pit the no-growth environmentalists against the old people's lobby. Almost certainly, if passed, this dedication of funds would tip the balance in favor of more job creation and economic activity by freeing up more resources for use.
7. The Federal government should resist by every means establishment of checkoffs for business or union PACs, particularly public employees union PACs. Pennsylvania had a state law against this but was preempted by the Federal government. If all contributions are voluntary, the system is truly free and the union bosses, who are the most abusive, would lose much of their political clout. Don Devine has done good work on this.

8. The Administration should abolish the teacher center programs. They are largely controlled by the NEA and AFT unions. They currently receive about \$8.9 million per year and are funded now through the Education block grants passed last year.
9. Abolish the National Institute of Education within DOE and all discretionary spending which is supporting operations such as the National Diffusion Network. Abolish WEEA in Department of Education.
10. Abolish HUD Community Development block grant 42 USC 5301, etc. which is being used to force communities to take low income housing.
11. Direct the relevant Presidential appointees to change administrative procedures to tighten up Federal grant and contract procedures in order to reduce the flow of taxpayers' funds to political advocacy organizations.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 10, 1983

TAX LIMITATION COALITION MEETING
November 1, 1982

PARTICIPANTS

John Albertine
American Business Conference

Mark Bloomfield
American Council for Capital Formation

Bill Shaker
National Tax Limitation Committee

John Lynch
Citizens Choice

Grace Ellen Rice
American Farm Bureau Federation

John Motley
National Federation of Independent Business

David Franasiak
Ron Utt
U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Tom Cook
National Cattlemen's Association

Andre Le Tendre
American Lobby for the Balanced Budget

David Keating
National Taxpayers Union

Dr. Norman Ture
David Raboy
Institute on the Research of the Economics of Taxation

Dirk Van Donegan
National Association of Wholesalers

Tom Humbert
Heritage Foundation

TAX LIMITATION COALITION MEETING
November 1, 1982

Requests and Suggestions

1. Take up Balanced Budget-Tax Limitation Amendment again. Trent Lott has filed a discharge petition in the last Congress and could do so again. Administration should work more closely with outside coalition on this.
2. Resolve Social Security as soon as possible. Don't accelerate Social Security tax increases.
3. Don't have Congress take up Social Security and the Balanced Budget-Tax Limitation at the same time.
4. Take positions based on reality. Make OMB bite bullets to come up with balanced budget with no tax increases. Propose draconian spending cuts, and go down fighting for them if necessary. Then the deficit would be clearly understood as the fault of the liberals.
5. Hold Administration discussions with leading conservative Senators. Ask them not to undermine the Administration's position by claiming that no more cuts are possible.
6. Stop talking about balancing the budget as opposed to reducing spending. Focus the whole deficit debate on expenditure issues. Discussion of balanced budget today results in more emphasis on tax increases than on expenditure reductions. Tax increases will drive the economy down.
7. Bring in leading businessmen. Ask them to concentrate their lobbying on cuts in spending across the board. They are usually too concerned about tax policy to understand that those powerful spending lobbies generate often irresistible pressure for higher taxation. If the businessmen would lobby hard against spending proposals, they would have less oppressive taxes.
8. Involve Bob Brown of the Tax Foundation to a greater extent in Administration discussions. It is a very knowledgeable group on spending cuts.

9. Push state legislatures for additional calls for a Constitutional Convention to provide for a balanced budget-tax limitation amendment. A little more success in state legislatures would force the Congress to submit an amendment to the states.
10. Stop playing Orwellian word games. Accelerated taxes are clearly tax increases. Revenue enhancements are clearly tax increases. User fees are clearly tax increases. The Administration is fooling no one and making a laughing stock of itself.
11. All agree there should be no tax increases. If we have to raise revenues, the Administration should go toward a flat tax, but should describe it as "the least bad way to raise revenue." Don't try to disguise it as more loophole closing or "due to other considerations." Trying to sell a flat rate tax as a simplification and not as a revenue raiser would destroy the credibility of the Administration. Describing it as the least bad way to raise revenue would permit the issue to be honestly joined without hiding behind subterfuge.
12. Push Congress to adopt rules to govern a constitutional convention called by the states. Just urging the Congress to devise those rules would move us closer to eventual passage of a Balanced Budget-Tax Limitation Amendment. Passage of these rules is clearly doable in the Senate early in the session.
13. The Administration must develop better techniques with respect to proposing spending reductions. Propose a substitute rather than have the beneficiaries feel as though they have been cut off at the knees. With social security, rather than increase taxes or cut payments to current beneficiaries, it is far more politically palatable to alter materially benefits for future beneficiaries. We should point out that the private sector ought to be able to provide better benefits. This may require tax incentives. Any private sector substitute for any element of social security would have to be more than voluntary. Peter Ferrara of the Office of Policy Development has the most promising long-term solution.

14. The FCC fairness doctrine inhibited national tax limitation ads. Tax limitation message is somewhat more difficult to get out because broadcasters are afraid they will be held responsible under the fairness doctrine. Better to do away with the fairness doctrine.
15. Funding by Health and Human Services of state health care planning bodies prevents private group entry into the health care area. These state central planning groups are anti-competition and anti-free enterprise.
16. Some thought the President should get behind a Constitutional Amendment to give him a line item veto. This would be highly consequential. The appropriation process is currently a balled up mess in which spending interests have most of the cards. The line item veto is badly needed.
17. The President should insist on a serious rethinking of the 1974 Budget Reform Act, which has turned out to be the ultimate fiscal hocus. Congress is not equipped to make fiscal policy. Currently the President gives his idea of a budget. Then it is ignored by the Congress. Congress begins de novo. This clearly unworkable process came from an effort to keep Richard Nixon from impounding funds. It must be revised.
18. Taxpayers need increased protection from IRS. IRS must be made to specify which regulations are appropriate to implement last fall's tax bill. Unfortunately, it now paralyzes much economic activity. With respect to financial accounts of the poor and the elderly, many exemption certificates will not be filed because the situation is unclear. That is good news only for the IRS.
19. Administration is not doing enough to push enterprise zones. The original concept has already been badly diluted. Enterprise zones would set examples of prosperity as the tax burden is reduced. This would give the Administration a badly needed urban policy.

Initial success would be followed by establishment of more enterprise zones or by extending some benefits nationally.

20. There was unanimous opposition to any additional tax increases! Spending must be brought down to match existing revenues.

NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO COMMENTARY BY: CONNIE MARSHNER

TOPIC: 1982 Wrap Up

TAPED: December 30, 1982

1982, for the conservative movement known as the New Right, was a mixture of theoretical pleasure and real displeasure. The year began with lots of conservatives still believing in Ronald Reagan. The signs were not good as 1981 petered out, but the desire to hope was still stronger than the incipient awareness of reality. That hope was nurtured by such things as Secretary of Health and Human Services Richard Schweiker's regulation to require parental notification before teenagers receive federally-funded contraceptives -- contraceptives to protect them from their own promiscuity. But the reality of the unbalanced budget proposed by Reagan and the sheer trauma, to conservatives, of Reagan's tax increases and sellout of Taiwan finally outweighed the theoretical pleasure of hope.

For a while then in 1982, the conservative movement wandered in a desert: frustration and disappointment were all there was to show for the past year and a half. The November elections came on relentlessly. The results were not good for conservatives. But even the most brutal analyst had to admit that - somehow -- for some reason -- the results weren't as bad as they could have, or, some argued, should have been. Something had saved conservatism from utter repudiation. It gradually became clear: we had not been building conservatism during 1981 and 1982 -- we had been too busy trying to futilely influence an Administration which did not want our help, thank you very much. But despite our neglect of our primary task, the American people had clung to some of what we had proselytised back before we had caught White House fever.

As 1982 ends, there is a sense of new direction just barely emerging among the collective intuition of the New Right. The consensus has been reached that in 1983 we must return to doing what we can: making the case to the American public that our system needs reform. We must return our energies to building our conservative movement. Let Jim Baker run the White House how he wishes; we have our own fish to fry. The task remains to design the reforms that the country needs, and to build anew the political coalition that might make those reforms possible.

1982 will not be a golden year in any New Right leader's diary. It began sour and it ends somber. But 1983 begins with a tentatively positive note: we are renewing our sense of our own identity. Knowing who we are, is essential to discern the path we must follow. Now in 1983, we can begin to feel our way along that path.

In Washington, this is Connie Marshner.