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From Foreign Affairs, Summer 1982, Volume 60, No. 5.

"The Debate Over No First Use"

*The authors reply:*

Responses to our essay, in these and other comments, have demonstrated wide interest in the issue. Instead of attempting a detailed response to these thoughtful letters, we would like to address a number of the basic questions raised both in the letters and elsewhere.

First, it should be emphasized, because some critics have misunderstood our argument, that while we ourselves believe in a policy of no-first-use, our specific recommendation was for official and private studies of ways and means of moving to such a policy. Obviously the most important question for study is how to ensure a conventional force posture that will persuasively deter a Soviet conventional attack. A number of officials assert that such a posture is unattainable, but many qualified authorities disagree, including a number of senior retired military leaders, now free to speak their minds. Recently Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, a well-informed member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, made a strong public argument for modernizing conventional forces so as to create what he calls "a viable conventional defense." Senator Nunn believes that strengthened conventional forces should precede and not follow any adoption of a no-first-use policy; we think progress toward both can be made together, in a mutually reinforcing way. It is not a decisive difference.

In this very issue we now have the distinguished authority of General Bernard W. Rogers for the view that a four-percent annual rate of increased spending, maintained over a six-year period, can give NATO "a conventional posture which in and of itself constitutes a credible deterrent to Warsaw Pact conventional aggression." General Rogers would still want the first-use option in this situation, and we would not. But we find this difference less interesting than the agreement that effective conventional deterrence is attainable at acceptable cost.

On this question of the attainability of effective conventional strength we obviously differ with more than one of these correspondents, but the differences are not complete; indeed at one point Mr. Ravenal appears to argue that the Germans alone could mount an adequate conventional deterrent. We agree with General Jones that the relative strength of the Warsaw Pact is often overstated. Moreover we think the intrinsic attractiveness to Moscow of large-scale conventional aggression is low. Soviet leaders are well aware of the enormous political risks in large-scale aggression through the lands of unhappy vassals into territory where Soviet armies would find no friends. We need conventional strength to reinforce Soviet caution and to give the requisite reassurance to our European allies, not to outmatch an implacably war-bent aggressor.

Our second comment bears on what is probably the most frequent and deeply held objection to a no-first-use policy. Many critics admit that it will never be in our interest actually to initiate a nuclear war, but a number of them argue that we should nonetheless try to "keep the Russians guessing"; why give them "a free ride?" Why not, as Mr. Kober argues, base our deterrent on the maintenance of uncertainty about a possible first use? Our response, as in April, is that this threat is steadily declining in credibility, while its political costs within the Alliance are growing. A continued reliance on threats that it would be disastrous to execute strikes us as morally insupportable and empty of logic. We think that adequately deterrent conventional strength is more credible, more unifying, more civilized—and attainable. It is true, as we acknowledged in April, that as long as the weapons exist the danger that they will be fired also exists, but we think it essential to minimize that risk just as far as our own actions and decisions can do so.

By McGeorge Bundy, *et. al.*, authors of "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance", in Foreign Affairs, Spring 1982.

We should deal briefly with a few special points. Mr. Ravenal chides us for believing that the United States should continue to be ready to give a nuclear reply to a Soviet nuclear attack on the Alliance, but we cannot share his long-held view that the United States should leave Western Europe to fend for itself, and we know of no substitute for nuclear deterrence of nuclear attack. Nor can we accept Mr. Hafner's convoluted argument that a readiness to reply to nuclear attack constitutes "first use" under another name. As for Mr. Anderson's good question about West Berlin, in our view that city is defended today not by any expectation that a coup-de-main there would unleash nuclear war, but rather by full Soviet awareness of the greatly destabilizing consequences that would follow a breach of the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971, which is correctly regarded by both sides as a major landmark in East-West relations. Whatever may have been the role there of nuclear deterrence in earlier years—and the question is far from simple—we think it is clear that the freedom of West Berlin has rested, for more than a decade, on a much wider and primarily political base.

We have encountered one reaction, especially from friends in Europe, which is as understandable as it seems to us to be mistaken: that since all forms of war in Europe would be equally catastrophic, one might as well place reliance on the nuclear deterrent and hope for the best. All four of us lived through World War II, and we understand how Europeans (including Russians) must feel at the prospect of another conventional European war, but we have to insist that thermonuclear hostilities would be so entirely different, so much more terrible than all past wars put together, that the two kinds of catastrophe are not remotely comparable. It is precisely the overwhelming difference between thermonuclear warfare and any past disasters that makes the threat to resort to it at once so dangerous, so hard to believe, and therefore so unreliable as a deterrent. We earnestly plead with all who are in the habit of saying that one kind of war is as bad as another to reexamine the facts about the effects of nuclear explosions.

A surprisingly large part of our argument seems to have found acceptance. There seems to be general agreement, especially among Americans, that it is right to press for conventional strength, urgent to raise the nuclear threshold (even if not as far as no-first-use), and necessary to take account of the reality that truly enormous nuclear forces are now available on both sides. Those forces, moreover, would remain enormous even if all Mr. Reagan's recent proposals for reductions were accepted immediately by Moscow. To us the conclusion is compelling; *no one* should ever be the first to set a nuclear match to those stockpiles, and no undertaking to do so is a proper part of the defense policy of a sane government.

We are reinforced in this conclusion by the interesting fact that in all the comment and criticism our essay has received, there has not been one concrete suggestion as to just how a first use of nuclear weapons would be carried out—in what numbers and with what targets. We think there is a reason for this reticence. All the specific proposals we have encountered over the years, and they have been many, look unacceptably dangerous in the context of the forces now deployed on both sides. They all share the weakness we described in April: "a high and inescapable risk of escalation into the general nuclear war that would bring ruin to all and victory to none."

We conclude that only by refusing to face the risks it carries, and indeed only by leaving the total responsibility for any such terrible choice in the hands of others, can one be comfortable with a reliance on first-use. In a real and serious sense many of those who cling to this option must hope with one half of their minds that no President would ever fire first, and with the other half that Moscow would not be so sure. This may be a good way to push the problem to one side, especially in a period in which there is no large-scale crisis—and we have had none for 20 years. But can we rely on such precarious double-think to work every time, in every crisis, for generations? We think not, and so we continue to urge a change.

Analysis | Judith Miller

# Risky Tack on Treaties

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 30 — What kind of arms control strategies should the United States pursue, and what can they reasonably be expected to accomplish?

Those questions are the nub of an arcane but intense debate triggered by President Reagan's decision last week not to resume talks on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and not to ratify two treaties on nuclear testing that were negotiated several years ago with the Soviet Union.

Democrats and several moderate Republicans have criticized the decision, asserting that it reflects the Reagan Administration's lack of real commitment to arms control. Today 30 Senators co-sponsored a resolution urging Mr. Reagan to pursue the talks and ratify the two treaties.

But Administration officials argue that in the long run, Mr. Reagan's decision, especially his determination to try to improve monitoring provisions of the treaties before seeking Senate approval, will win support.

## Effort to Level With Public

The decision, the officials assert, reflects an effort to "level" with the American people about what arms control measures can realistically achieve. This, they say, is in the best interests of not only the nation but also of arms control.

The approach is risky, partly because the Administration has had credibility problems in this area. Many Americans have been frightened by talk by some Administration officials about "limited" nuclear wars and vast civil defense programs. Even after the Administration unveiled proposals calling for eliminating intermediate-range nuclear weapons based in Europe and reducing Soviet and American strategic arsenals by a third, several critics of the Administration saw the initiatives as merely an effort to defuse the growing nuclear disarmament movements here and in Europe.

Given this backdrop, many arms control experts do not accept the White House's assertions that the questionable effectiveness of verification techniques makes it undesirable now to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and a companion treaty, which limit weapons and peaceful nuclear testing to explosive power equal to 150,000 tons of dynamite.

Several arms specialists also suggest that the scuttling of talks aimed at a total test ban is, along with the determination to improve the treaties' monitoring provisions, a "ploy" to mask the Administration's desire to

continue testing, at an even higher level than the 150-kiloton threshold. As evidence, they cite testimony by Eugene V. Rostow, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 13.

## 'A Profound Stone Wall'

Mr. Rostow said that he had encountered "a profound stone wall," while "phalanxes and battalions" of Administration opponents to ratification.

"The stone wall," he testified, "is a feeling in many parts of the Government that, given the uncertainty of the nuclear situation, the nuclear balance and the need for new weapons and modernization, we're going to need testing, and perhaps even testing above the 150-kiloton level, for a long time to come."

In addition, Administration officials acknowledge that at a National Security Council meeting on the testing treaties last Monday, representatives of the Defense and Energy Departments argued that some testing would be needed to maintain confidence in the nuclear stockpile and in new warhead designs.

Arms control analysts generally agree that the two treaties pose serious verification problems. But, some note, President Nixon knew this when he signed the 150-kiloton limit, and the Russians agreed to provide additional data that would narrow the uncertainties, thereby convincing the Nixon Administration that the threshold treaty was, over all, in the nation's best interest.


## Threat to Threshold Treaty

Spurgeon Keeny, who was the deputy director of the arms control agency under President Carter, says he fears the increased emphasis on verification might kill the threshold treaty. Holding the accord "hostage" to improvements in monitoring, he asserts, is a "tragic mistake," because the Soviets might conclude that they cannot do serious arms control business with a country that changes its philosophy with each Administration.

Albert Carnesale, a Harvard professor and Carter Administration adviser, argues that verification appears about to become the sine qua non of arms control, rather than just one measure of a good agreement.

"If perfect, or near perfect, verification becomes a necessary condition of arms control accords, either we won't have any, or they'll be devoid of substance," he said.

In response, the Administration argues that "near perfect" verification was never at issue in the threshold treaty. On 11 occasions, they say,



Drawing by Tom Bloom

the Russians might have gone over the 150-kiloton threshold.

"We would be hooted out of the Senate if we sought approval of a treaty in which a Soviet test could be as large as 600 kilotons, or as small as 70," said one official, who asked not to be identified. "That kind of treaty, with our experience to date, would make a mockery of arms control accords."

Administration officials also assert that evidence that the Soviet Union may have violated agreements banning chemical and biological weapons has generated widespread skepticism about Soviet compliance with accords that do not have foolproof monitoring arrangements. They note, too, that even the Carter Administration, which ardently supported arms control, did not press for Senate approval of the treaty.

While arms control experts disagree over what should be done about the threshold test, deeper philosophical differences emerge in the debate over whether the nation should pursue a comprehensive test ban.


## Same Doubts on Test Ban


Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a scholar at the Brookings Institution who served in senior foreign policy posts in Republican and Democratic administrations, says that while every Administration since Eisenhower's has adopted a total test ban as its goal, "they've all shared the same doubts about its wisdom."

A comprehensive ban, he says, "reflects a view that technology is bad." Nuclear weapons of the 1950's were the "biggest, dirtiest, most accident-prone and least subject to political control," Mr. Sonnenfeldt maintains, "and we might well be worse off had new technology not been tested."

Administration officials are portraying the comprehensive test ban as a throwback to an era in which it was thought that arms control accords could eradicate nuclear weapons.

"As long as deterrence depends on nuclear weapons," said an official who requested anonymity, "both sides had better have confidence that their missiles will work."







JOHN REES' WESTERN GOALS FUND  
BOOK, 1982 (SUMMER)

# The War Called Peace

The Soviet Peace Offensive



Foreword by  
Congressman John Ashbrook  
1928-1982

Afterword by  
Helmut Sauer  
Member of the West German Bundestag



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**Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control**

(617)227-0118

P.O. Box 9171  
Boston, MA. 02114

Launched six months ago, the Lawyers Alliance has raised \$21,000 to date and has a 1982 budget of \$87,000. They have a quarterly newsletter and a membership of 400, which is growing weekly by 25 or so. Eventually they hope to be self-sustaining with contributions from lawyers and students and paralegals. For now no direct mail plans are in the works, but chapters are. There are new chapters forming in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas, the District of Columbia, and Chicago, among others.

Alan Sherr says that another effort is to send 1,000 letters to lawyers who are Vietnam veterans. They also have a law professors' Outreach Committee consisting of 10 law professors who have drafted a letter to other professors of law around the country.

On October 2, there will be a major symposium in Boston and later in October another symposium for lawyers in San Francisco. These will consist of PSR-style briefings in the morning, with afternoon sessions at which principles of negotiation will be developed for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The draft treaty and procedures will be released to the press and further refined at future symposia.

The San Francisco chapter does have plans to get into the mail, and has prepared a 12-panel folder to mail to the 10,000 lawyers in the Bay area.

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**Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR)**

(617)924-3468

P.O. Box 144  
Watertown, MA. 02172

Their unique specialty over the last year and a half has been the presentation of symposia in cities around the country on the medical consequences of nuclear war, including, in some cases, the psychological barriers to a consideration of the problem.

Such a symposium was recently held in NYC. Upcoming programs include one in Hartford on March 13, one in Portland, Oregon on April 17, one at the American College of Physicians in Philadelphia on April 19, one in Detroit and one in Iowa City on April 24, one in Washington, D.C. at G.W. School of Medicine, and one in San Diego on June 5. PSR will have presentations as well at the American Psychiatric Association meeting on May 16 in Toronto and another at the American Psychological Association meeting in August. Other symposia in the planning stage involve the following cities: Atlanta, Minneapolis, Baltimore, Chapel Hill, and San Jose. By 1983 they hope to hit Houston as well.

Tom Halstead explains that the accompanying press has been extraordinary. In addition to the lengthy profile of President Helen Caldicott in *The Washington Post* recently, the *San Jose Mercury* has completed three intensive weeks of op-ed attention; the *San Francisco Chronicle* has also devoted an enormous amount of space to the problem—among others.

PSR has attracted 10,000 members, 101 chapters (plus others in formation) in 45 out of the 48 contiguous states and has raised close to \$1,000,000. A direct mail program has been launched by Gilbert Jonas who plans to mail three quarters of a million pieces this year. A drop of 25,000 has already been made; the average response has been 2 percent with an average contribution of \$29, more than the average \$23 gift from doctors becoming members!

Halstead says the organization is going to make a major effort during the year to talk to the unconverted, and on November 11, there will be a special effort to reach the medical schools (in conjunction with the UCS work).

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# ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIBING THEMSELVES

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**Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)**  
1384 Massachusetts Avenue  
Cambridge, MA. 02238

(617)547-5552

Eric Van Loon says that plans are being firmed up right now for a meeting of scientists from other countries as well as the United States to set the groundwork for continuing cooperation. This will take place at Roosevelt University in New York City for two to three days during the second week of the Special Session on Disarmament. Out of the between 20 and 40 participants, the expenses of between 12 and 15 representatives from 8 or 9 countries would be completely paid by UCS (if funds can be raised), and a portion of the expenses of another dozen would also be picked up.

UCS views GZ, UN SSOD and Veterans Day teach-ins as building blocks for increased awareness of the nuclear threat. Therefore, another set of teach-ins is being planned for next November 11. These teach-ins will expand beyond the 150 campuses of last year. Out of last year Peter Stein has a campus network with an arms project steering committee to broaden the effort to more university people than scientists alone. UCS intends to do more outreach from the campus to the community next time, and to get more involvement outside the United States with teach-ins in European centers too.

During Ground Zero week, there will be a University Day organized with the separate campus network, and UCS will be there to step in if needed.

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John Rees' description

for her numerous meetings with Chinese Communist officials and Hanoi and for her central role in the Committee of and in a project to provide aid to Hanoi, the Friendship-Mai Hospital Fund.

and her husband, Peter Weiss, of the IPS board, are off of the Samuel Rubin Foundation which provides the major financial support to IPS/TNI, and of the Tomorrow, a smaller foundation which is apparently wholly supported by the Rubin foundation, supports many activist groups by IPS including WISE.

RCDP was formed in 1978; its current budget is \$137,000. The group sponsors a major disarmament conference each November. The most noted Soviet participants has been Yuri Kapralov, nominal counsellor at the Soviet Embassy and expert on military and disarmament affairs, who has been serving Moscow's unofficial "ambassador" to the U.S. disarmament movement is noted that the Attorney General's guidelines on FBI security regulations prohibits monitoring of "us" activities.

ing Lent, RCDP sponsored Wednesday night gatherings of disarmament activists who were "resistance, dangers of radiation [and] the European Nuclear disarmament movement." In cooperation with the MFS Religious Task Force by Paul Mayer, RCDP is co-sponsoring "Peace Sabbath" events (12-31) with CALC, FOR, Pax and Sojourners.

E—A Citizens Committee for the World—514 C Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002 [202/546-] cooperates directly with the co-sponsoring two Capitol Hill offices by WPC activists in SANE and the CNFMP are co-acting in compiling a joint coded mailing list by Congressional staffs, and in a media task force to the Reagan defense budget. E's major 1982 project, co-

sponsored with Congress Watch and FRAC, is the Fair Budget Action program which will apply pressure in Congressional districts for diverting the defense budget to social programs. The Zill report noted that SANE's 30,000 name mailing list, FRAC's big budget and Congress Watch's 100,000 members should ensure major attention.

SANE played a leading role in a 1975 Chicago National Conference to Slash Military Spending organized by the CPUSA's then head of WPC U.S. activities, Pauline Royce Rosen. The organization formed from that conference, the National Center to Slash Military Spending, joined CNFMP; but dissolved in 1980 and was superseded by the U.S. Peace Council (USPC).

SANE executive director is David Cortright, a founder of the U.S. Peace Council, former GI organizer at Fort Bliss, IPS protege of Marcus Raskin, and staffer of the Center for National Security Studies. Cortright has hired Chad Dobson of the Campaign to Stop the MX and moved him from Salt Lake City to the East Coast to help organize the June 12 demonstration.

SANE's board of directors is headed by co-chairmen Seymour Melman and William Winpisinger, president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM). Board members include Ramsey Clark, William Davidson, Jerome Frank, Rep. Tom Harkin (D-IA.), Homer Jack, David Livingston, Robert Maslow, Joseph Miller, Michael Moffitt (IPS), Robert Musil, Leon Quat, Marcus Raskin, Rep. Fred Richmond (D-N.Y.), Alex Rosenberg, Morton Stavis, Edith Tiger, Sr. Mary Luke Tobin, Kosta Tsipis, and Rep. Ted Weiss (D-N.Y.).

SANE is raising money for a TV spot in favor of the "nuclear freeze" and is in the midst of a one million piece direct mail campaign.

Stanley Foundation—420 E. Third Street, Muscatine, IA. 52761 [319/264-1500], since 1969 has been finan-

cing "educational meetings" among U.N. NGO groups and foreign policy conferences in support of detente with Soviet participation. Its meetings, once or twice yearly, have been held generally in the Church Center for the U.N., 777 U.N. Plaza, or in the offices of the Arms Control Association (ACA) in Washington, D.C. This NGO Consultation Group established a Steering Committee of 12 to 15 people for which the Zill report was compiled.

Stanley Foundation media programs include a radio program, "Common Ground," 39 programs of 30-minute broadcast over 50 National Public Radio stations. The foundation also sponsors regional news media conferences for 50 to 60 reporters in the print and electronic media based in cities with a population of 500,000 to one million.

The Zill report noted the Stanley Foundation was planning some 10 conferences this year for up to 50 people—U.N. diplomats, businessmen, labor leaders, U.S. government officials and academics—to work on recommendations for changes in U.S. foreign policy. One of these, scheduled for March 26-27, in New York, was to bring 50 "Congress people and staffs to learn about...the role of the U.N. in arms control."

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)—1384 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA. 02238 [617/547-5552], was established at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1969 in support of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT). The group claims more than 100,000 sponsors nationwide.

The UCS board of directors is chaired by Henry M. Kendall of MIT. Among the board members are Dr. James A. Fay; Dr. Kurt Gottfried; Leonard Meeher; Herbert "Pete" Scoville, former CIA deputy director; and Richard Wright. UCS executive director is Eric E. Van Loon.

In cooperation with PSR and related groups, UCS sponsored 150 campus teach-ins on November 11,

1981. UCS programs were weighted with speakers against U.S. defense and foreign policies and favoring unilateral disarmament, with a token opponent invited to lend credibility to the event. USC organizer Peter Stein has built a campus network with an "arms project steering committee" that will attempt to expand campus outreach in November.

The Zill report noted UCS intends to become more involved "outside the U.S. with teach-ins in European centers too."

UCS is planning an international meeting of 40 disarmament scientists to be held in New York at Roosevelt University during the second week of SSD-II, and is raising money to fully pay expenses for 15, plus a portion of the expenses for others.

U.S. Peace Council (USPC)—7 E. 15th Street, Room 408, New York, N.Y. 10003 [212/989-1194], was launched as the official U.S. national section of the WPC at a November 1979 conference in Philadelphia.

The CPUSA newspaper *Daily World* [November 1, 1979] credited three veteran CPUSA organizers for laying the organizational basis for the USPC by "working for years to establish local committees, organize delegations from the U.S. to international meetings of the WPC, and distribute information about the Peace Council to activists in the United States." Those named included Pauline Royce Rosen, "who coordinated all WPC activities in the U.S. for many years" and led what in effect was a CPUSA front serving as a cover for the WPC, the National Center to Slash Military Spending (NCSMS), which dissolved in 1980 and recommended to its supporters they join the USPC and CNFMP; Sylvia Kushner of the Chicago Peace Council (CPC); and Elsie Monjar of the Los Angeles Peace Council (LAPC).

Among those taking active roles in the USPC founding, speaking or listed as workshop leaders, were Mark Shanahand, CNFMP; Sarah Stagg, CPC; Connecticut Rep. Irving

World Education Fund.  
inator of the Clearinghouse  
y Kehler, a veteran activist  
inizer who conducted the suc-  
"nuclear freeze" campaign in  
Massachusetts prior to his  
n to head the coordination

uclear Weapons Freeze Cam-  
NWFC) was launched at a  
gton, D.C., meeting of the  
U.S. disarmament organiza-  
March 1981, following a call  
uclear weapons "moratorium"  
by Soviet president Brezhnev  
February 1981 26th Congress of  
munist Party of the Soviet  
AFSC, CALC, WRL and WILPF  
viding major organizational  
for "nuclear freeze" initia-  
the local and national level.  
C national executive commit-  
mber Currie Burris, national  
ator of the Clergy and Laity  
ned (CALC) "Human Security:  
and Jobs" program who last  
rticipated in a tour of Europe  
ders of U.S. disarmament  
is urging the NFC "to develop  
cloud to stop the deployment  
Pershing and cruise missiles  
pe. They're scheduled to go on  
1983 and this would be disas-  
or the Freeze Campaign." Bur-  
o has recommended that U.S.  
s take lessons from the Dutch  
the Neutron Bomb" organiza-  
hich is led by Dutch Commun-  
ty functionary Nico Schouten  
a spin-off from the World Peace  
I (WPC).

ore obvious radicalization in  
tion of the "nuclear freeze"  
ign was in evidence at its Feb-  
19-20, 1982, national confer-  
where influential WRL activist  
McReynolds, urged opposition  
aid to El Salvador be included  
eze" campaigning and criti-  
he NWFC for not challenging  
whole structure of anti-Soviet  
ces. This is something the left  
do."

VFCC is coordinating many ac-  
in connection with Ground  
Week, including coordinated

press conferences on April 26 calling  
for a "nuclear freeze."

The NWFC national executive com-  
mittee projects a 3-to-5-year cam-  
paign will be needed to obtain U.S.  
government agreement to a "freeze,"  
and members have expressed their  
belief that a change in the White  
House in 1984 would be necessary for  
victory.

**Nuclear Information and Resource  
Service (NIRS)**—1536 16th Street,  
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 [202/  
483-0045], was established by in-  
dividuals closely associated with the  
Institute for Policy Studies in the  
summer of 1978 to serve as an in-  
formation and communications  
center for environmentalist and anti-  
nuclear power activists. In 1980, NIRS  
described its main project as "build-  
ing detailed, up-to-date files on  
skilled people helpful to the anti-  
nuclear and safe energy movement."  
NIRS has played a central role in gen-  
erating support for "nuclear free Pa-  
cific" groups, and is the U.S. distri-  
bution center for WISE.

NIRS activities have included co-  
sponsoring a public speech by IPS  
"senior fellow" Richard Barnet in  
March 1980, in which he denounced  
U.S. reaction to the Soviet invasion  
of Afghanistan as an effort to start  
a "new Cold War," attacked the  
United States for developing "de-  
stabilizing weapons systems...not  
only the Trident, but the MX" and  
Pershing II and cruise missiles for  
Europe.

With funding from sources in-  
cluding the Youth Project and Cora  
and Peter Weiss, NIRS budget is  
some \$200,000.

**Physicians for Social Responsibil-  
ity (PSR)**—P.O. Box 144, Watertown,  
MA. 02172 [617/924-3468], states that  
in 1961, PSR "acted as a united med-  
ical voice in warning of the hazards  
of atmospheric nuclear testing, sig-  
nificantly contributing to the momen-  
tum that led to the Partial Test Ban  
Treaty of 1963." The present PSR,  
Inc., organized in 1978 by 10 Boston-

John Rees'  
description

area anti-nuclear health activists, is a  
"non-profit organization committed  
to public and professional education  
on the medical hazards of nuclear  
weaponry."

PSR works with a variety of groups  
backing U.S. and Western unilateral  
disarmament including IPPNW, the  
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS),  
FAS, CDI and IPS in promulgating the  
most extreme "end of the world"  
propaganda as the inevitable result  
unless the United States heeds its  
appeal to reduce tensions with the  
USSR and ban "all use of nuclear  
weapons."

Claiming a membership of 10,000  
and 101 chapters, PSR president is  
Helen Caldicott, 43, an Australian  
pediatrician and disarmament zealot  
whose shrill hysterical voice has  
frequently been heard at MFS anti-  
nuclear rallies. She claims to have  
been instrumental in persuading Aus-  
tralian trade unions to oppose min-  
ing of uranium ore, and reportedly  
has attempted to persuade top AFL-  
CIO officials to adopt anti-nuclear  
policies. In 1981 Caldicott and other  
"peace activists" visited the USSR.  
She has given up her position at Har-  
vard Medical School to devote full  
time to disarmament organizing.

PSR's presentations on the horrors  
of nuclear war are heavily salted with  
radical supporters of Soviet-backed  
Third World terrorist groups, veteran  
unilateral disarmament proponents  
and health care professionals asso-  
ciated in the past with such groups  
as the Medical Committee for Human  
Rights (MCHR), Medical Aid to Indo-  
china (MAIC), and the U.S.-Cuba  
Health Exchange (US-CHE).

A presentation on February 13,  
1982, by the New York City PSR,  
P.O. Box 411, Planetarium Station,  
New York, N.Y. 10024 [212/477-3416]  
(salaried staff coordinator is Joanne  
Pomerantz), featured Richard J. Bar-  
net, IPS; Jerome Frank, board mem-  
ber of SANE and CLW and a past  
president of FAS; Robert J. Lifton,  
IPPNW activist and US-CHE sponsor;  
Studs Terkel and Victor W. Sidel,  
M.D., Professor and Chairman of the

Department of Social Medicine, Mon-  
tefiore Hospital and Medical Center  
of the Albert Einstein College of Med-  
icine, and US-CHE sponsor.

Speakers at other New York City  
PSR meetings from August 1981 to  
January 1982 include Michio Kaku,  
physics department, City College of  
New York (CCNY), a frequent MFS  
rally speaker who links his anti-  
nuclear sentiments to the Hiroshima  
atomic bombing in which members of  
his family died; H. Jack Geiger, M.D.,  
a founding PSR member and presi-  
dent of IPPNW; Barry Commoner,  
Citizens Party; and Joe Fahey of Pax  
Christi and the Manhattan College  
Peace Studies section on the Euro-  
pean Nuclear Disarmament move-  
ment.

Among the featured speakers in na-  
tional PSR presentations have been  
Kosta Tshipis, MIT; Gene LaRocque,  
CDI; John Constable, M.D., Harvard;  
H. Jack Geiger, M.D.; Howard H. Hiatt,  
Dean, Harvard School of Public  
Health.

According to the Zill report, PSR  
has raised nearly \$1 million. On Vet-  
erans Day (November 11, 1982), PSR  
and the Union of Concerned Scien-  
tists (UCS) will attempt to duplicate  
their 1981 campus seminar suc-  
cesses. PSR has targeted some 15  
cities for its grisly presentations.

**Riverside Church Disarmament  
Program (RCDP)**—490 Riverside  
Drive, New York, N.Y. 10027 [212/  
222-5900] and its director, Cora  
Weiss, are playing leading roles in  
the June 12 Disarmament Coalition  
organizing of a mass demonstration  
during SSD-II. The Zill report cited  
Weiss as saying \$250,000 will be  
needed to organize a large, effec-  
tive protest.

Cora Weiss, formerly active with  
the Emma Lazarus Clubs and Women  
Strike for Peace (WSP), played a lead-  
ership role in the CPUSA-controlled  
anti-Vietnam coalitions [New Mobil-  
ization Committee, People's Coalition  
for Peace and Justice (PCPJ)] which  
collaborated closely with the WPC.  
She received considerable media

November 3, 1982

## THE HARD FACTS THE NUCLEAR FREEZE IGNORES

### INTRODUCTION

The outcome of the November 2 referendums on a nuclear freeze clearly demonstrates that the concept of a freeze has struck a responsive chord with a sizable portion of the U.S. electorate. What the results proclaim is that many Americans (indeed certainly most of those who voted against the freeze propositions) hope for the day when the production and deployment of nuclear weapons will end. On the other hand, public opinion surveys of the past two decades reveal that the American public consistently has opposed any nuclear arms agreement, or unilateral undertaking by the United States, which would leave the U.S. in a position of relative inferiority or which would rely upon self-enforced observance by the Soviets.

It is impossible on a ballot resolution to capture all the nuances and qualifers of a voter's full view--hopes and fears--on the nuclear freeze. Rather, the voter is faced with a black-white choice, being either "for" or "against" a halt in nuclear weapons production and deployment. Under these limited circumstances, many voters chose to utilize the vehicle of the freeze resolutions to express their general hopes for a reduction of the nuclear spectre which hangs over the world.

Among those supporting the nuclear freeze, however, also are individuals and groups who have sought to make a nuclear freeze the official public policy of the United States. Most of these demonstrate little understanding of the hard facts concerning a nuclear freeze, a public policy which, if implemented, could have dangerous implications for U.S. security. And it is such hard facts that discredit simplistic, sloganizing approaches to a nuclear freeze.

In California, voters authorized their governor to prepare and transmit a written communication to the President and other federal officials urging that "the Government of the United States propose to the Government of the Soviet Union that both countries agree to immediately halt the testing, production and further deployment of all nuclear weapons, missiles and delivery systems in a way that can be checked and verified by both sides."<sup>1</sup> In Michigan, a majority of citizens voted to urge the U.S. government to immediately propose a "Mutual Nuclear Weapons Freeze" to the Soviet government and to urge Congress to transfer the funds resulting from cancelled defense programs to "civilian use."<sup>2</sup> And in New Jersey, citizens voted to urge the Government to "immediately agree to a mutual, verifiable halt" on the further testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and to "apply the money saved to human needs and tax reduction."<sup>3</sup> Other states which passed nuclear freeze resolutions included Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Oregon, Montana, and North Dakota.<sup>4</sup>

The success of these state initiatives was due to a number of factors, including extremely efficient organizing by state and local freeze activists, the considerable publicity given to the freeze campaign by the press, and the absence of many anti-freeze organizations at the state and local level to counter pro-freeze arguments. However, one of the key selling points of the freeze movement, as a whole, has been the simplicity and apparent straightforwardness of the nuclear freeze proposals themselves.

Most of the discussion of the nuclear freeze has amounted to an exchange of slogans. Seldom has the public been given sufficient information to analyze the assumptions that lie behind the nuclear freeze proposals. Taken individually, these assumptions are readily subject to challenge.

There are essentially six assumptions which underlie the various freeze proposals. The first assumption--a moral one--is that nuclear deterrence is itself immoral. In as much as this assumption rests on an understanding of a deterrence doctrine (Mutual Assured Destruction) which is already being revised substantially and since the assumption, when carried to its ultimate conclusion, would lead to a position of unilateral nuclear disarmament, it is subject to challenge.

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<sup>1</sup> "California Bilateral Nuclear Weapons Freeze Initiative," (Californians For A Bilateral Nuclear Weapons Freeze, [1982]).

<sup>2</sup> "The Michigan Initiative November 2, 1982," ([Michigan Nuclear Weapons Freeze, 1982]).

<sup>3</sup> "It's on the Ballot! The FREEZE Because Nobody Wants A Nuclear War," (N.J. Campaign for Nuclear Weapons Freeze, [1982]).

<sup>4</sup> For extremely useful accounts of the ongoing state freeze campaigns, see the 1982 issues of Patrick B. McGuigan's Initiative And Referendum Report (Washington, D.C.: Free Congress Foundation)

A second philosophical assumption is that the superpowers are engaged in a world-endangering arms race. This assumption ignores the reality that it has been the Soviet Union which has been "racing" during the past decade, while the United States, until recently, has been cutting back on its efforts. The third assumption is that both sides have reached a point of nuclear overkill. This assumption greatly distorts reality.

A fourth assumption is that a rough balance of nuclear weapons exists on both sides. Actually, the Soviet Union possesses a definite margin of superiority in strategic and theater nuclear forces. A fifth assumption is that a freeze would be readily verifiable. Yet verifying a freeze would be highly difficult, if not impossible. The final assumption is that a nuclear freeze would actually facilitate arms reductions. This rests on the overly optimistic appraisal which freeze adherents have made about the state of the nuclear balance. Given the strategic imbalance in the Soviet Union's favor which currently exists, a freeze would actually hinder real arms reductions, since the Soviets would be unlikely to trade away their superiority in strategic systems for inferior U.S. systems.

In short, the nuclear freeze offers a false answer to the very real problems of nuclear weapons.

#### THE NUCLEAR FREEZE PROPOSALS: SOME BASIC TEXTS

Randall Forsberg, the executive director of the Massachusetts-based Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies began circulating a draft nuclear freeze proposal in 1980.<sup>5</sup> This proposal became a basic text for the various state and local freeze petitions pushed in late 1981 by the newly-formed National Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign Clearinghouse.<sup>6</sup> A representative text of this original freeze proposal states:

To improve national and international security, the United States and the Soviet Union should stop the nuclear arms race. Specifically, they should adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles and new aircraft

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<sup>5</sup> The paper was entitled "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race." For information on IDDS and Randall Forsberg, a former peace researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, see the "glossary" entry for the Institute in The War Called Peace: The Soviet Peace Offensive (Alexandria, Virginia: Western Goals, 1982), p. 162; and the description of the Institute in the so-called Anne Zill Report--"A Review of the Activities of 53 Organizations Concerned With Foreign Affairs, War and Peace, Human and Civil Liberties," 22 February 1982, copy of a typescript document, p. [36]. This report has also been reprinted in The War Called Peace.

<sup>6</sup> For information on the Clearinghouse, see the "glossary" entry in The War Called Peace, 167-168; and the Zill Report, p. [53].

designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons. This is an essential, verifiable first step toward lessening the risk of nuclear war and reducing the nuclear arsenals.<sup>7</sup>

In Spring 1982, the Congress became involved in the nuclear freeze campaign. In the Senate, Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Mark Hatfield of Oregon co-sponsored a joint resolution calling for a nuclear freeze.<sup>8</sup> This resolution recommended:

1. As an immediate strategic arms control objective, the United States and the Soviet Union should:
  - (a) pursue a complete halt to the nuclear arms race;
  - (b) decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and
  - (c) give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.
  
2. Proceeding from this freeze, the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major, mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems, through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability.<sup>9</sup>

In June 1982, a House joint resolution supporting a nuclear freeze was introduced by Congressmen Clement Zablocki of Wisconsin and Jonathan Bingham of New York, among others.<sup>10</sup> The House resolution carried the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution a bit further by tying the freeze proposal to the unratified SALT II Treaty and the new START negotiations. The resolution recommended, in part:

That the United States and the Soviet Union should immediately begin the strategic arms reduction talks (START) and those talks should have the following objectives:

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<sup>7</sup> "Petition To the Congressional Delegation of the State of Maryland For a Mutual US-Soviet Halt to the Nuclear Arms Race," The Maryland Campaign For A Nuclear Weapons Freeze, n.d.; reproduced in The Nuclear Freeze: A Study Guide for Churches Prepared by the Institute on Religion and Democracy (Washington, D.C.: The Institute on Religion and Democracy, 1982), p. 7.

<sup>8</sup> S.J. Res. 163, March 10, 1982.

<sup>9</sup> S.J. Res. 163, The Congressional Record, March 10, 1982; reproduced in The Nuclear Freeze: A Study Guide, p. 12. A counter-proposal, Senate Joint Resolution 177, was submitted on March 30, 1982, by Senators Henry Jackson of Washington and John Warner of Virginia.

<sup>10</sup> H.J. Res. 521, June 23, 1982.



(1) Pursuing a complete halt to the nuclear arms race.

(2) Deciding when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems.

(3) Giving special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.

(4) Proceeding from this mutual and verifiable freeze, pursuing substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions through numerical ceilings, annual percentages, or any other equally effective and verifiable means of strengthening strategic stability.

(5) Preserving present limitations and controls on current nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems.

(6) Incorporating ongoing negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles into the START negotiations.

. . . .

SEC. 2. The United States should promptly approve the SALT II agreement provided adequate verification capabilities are maintained.<sup>11</sup>

What becomes evident from a reading of each of these nuclear freeze proposals is the essential simplicity of their wording. Each statement suggests that a freeze on nuclear weapons is verifiable and that a freeze will somehow enhance the United States' chances of working out arms reductions with the Soviet Union. The complexities of arms control distressingly are dismissed or ignored.

#### THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE FREEZE

Support for a freeze ultimately must rest on the assumptions made about the nature of nuclear weapons, the state of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance and the efficacy of a nuclear freeze as

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<sup>11</sup> "H.J. Res. 521 Calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze on and reductions in nuclear weapons and for the approval of the SALT II agreement." June 23, 1982, 97th Congress, 2D Session; slip copy of the resolution, pp. 2-3. The Zablocki-Bingham nuclear freeze resolution was narrowly defeated on the floor of the House on August 5, 1982, when, on a vote of 204-202, the Members voted to accept the wording of a substitute, pro-Reagan Administration position resolution (H.J. Res. 538) submitted by Congressmen William Broomfield of Michigan, William Carney of New York and Samuel Stratten of New York. See Pat Towell, "House Narrowly Rejects a Nuclear Freeze," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, August 7, 1982, pp. 1883-1886.

an arms control measure. Proponents of the nuclear freeze rest their case on a variety of moral and philosophical assumptions or practical and technical assumptions.

Assumption #1: Nuclear Deterrence Is Immoral

Some influential American churchmen have attracted to the freeze movement many people who otherwise would not have committed themselves to a disarmament campaign. These church leaders not only see the use of nuclear weapons as immoral but believe that threatening to use them is immoral. They thus feel that nuclear disarmament is the only answer to a serious moral dilemma. Since the sponsors of the nuclear freeze campaign claim that a freeze will halt the arms race and spur arms reduction agreements, these churchmen happily support the nuclear freeze as a necessary first step to total nuclear disarmament.<sup>12</sup>

In 1968, U.S. Catholic Bishops publicly began reappraising war with an "entirely new attitude" in light of nuclear weapons. Eight years later, in the document To Live in Christ Jesus, the American bishops directly challenged the morality of nuclear deterrence. They began by questioning the morality of nuclear war: "[M]odern warfare, both in its technology and in its execution, is so savage that one must ask whether war as it is actually waged today can be morally justified." The bishops proceeded to limit the right of self-defense: "The right of legitimate defense is not a moral justification for unleashing every form of destruction. For example, acts of war deliberately directed against innocent noncombatants are gravely wrong, and no one may participate in such an act."

And finally, the statement by the bishops prohibited deterrence based on a threat to civil populations: "As possessors of a vast nuclear arsenal, we must also be aware that not only is it wrong to attack civilian populations but it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as part of a strategy of deterrence."<sup>13</sup> John Cardinal Krol of Philadelphia, acting as official spokesman for the U.S. Catholic Conference, went even further in his condemnation of nuclear deterrence in 1979. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, Cardinal Krol said: "The moral judgment of this statement is that not only the use of strategic nuclear weapons, but also the declared intent to use them involved in our

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<sup>12</sup> This does not mean that the majority of the people who support a nuclear freeze necessarily favor total nuclear disarmament, even though many of the freeze campaign's leaders clearly do.

<sup>13</sup> Quoted in Michael Novak, "Arms & the Church," Commentary, March 1982, p. 38. For a slightly longer quotation from the third passage, see James A. Hickey, Archbishop of Washington, "Nuclear Weapons, Moral Questions: A Pastoral Call to Peacemaking," Archdiocese of Washington, June 3, 1982, copy of a typescript document, p. 5.

deterrence policy is wrong. This explains the Catholic dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence and the urgency of the Catholic demand that the nuclear arms race be reversed."<sup>14</sup>

Other denominations in the U.S. also have moved in this direction during the past year or so. In November 1981, at an international meeting on nuclear disarmament sponsored by the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam, the Rev. William Sloan Coffin of New York's Riverside Church, a veteran of radical movements, asserted: "Christians have to say that it is a sin not only to use, not only to threaten to use, but merely to build a nuclear weapon."<sup>15</sup> He was undoubtedly voicing the sentiments of many leaders of the United Presbyterian Church--a denomination which had taken "overwhelming votes" against nuclear weapons earlier in the year.<sup>16</sup> And in December, the leaders of the American Baptist Churches (one of the nation's Baptist umbrella groups) endorsed a resolution which says in part: "The presence of nuclear weapons, and the willingness to use them, is a direct affront to our Christian beliefs and commitment."<sup>17</sup>

Just how representative these views are of American Christianity is open to question. The Catholic Church, for example, has not renounced the just war doctrine. As Terence Cardinal Cooke of New York, who, as Military Vicar, provides for the pastoral care of American Catholics in military service, wrote in a letter to Catholic chaplains on December 7, 1981:

The Church has traditionally taught and continues to teach that a government has both the right and the duty to protect its people against unjust aggression. This means that it is legitimate to develop and maintain weapons systems to try to prevent war by "detering" another nation from attacking....[A]s long as our nation is sincerely trying to work with other nations to find a better way, the Church considers the strategy of nuclear deterrence morally tolerable....

The Church does not require, nor have the Popes of the nuclear age or the Second Vatican Council recommended, unilateral disarmament.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Quoted in Novak, *op. cit.*, p. 39. This view rests on the Catholic teaching regarding "intention"--that to mean to perform an evil act is itself immoral.

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in "Church groups intensify arms race opposition," National Christian Reporter, December 11, 1981; reproduced in The Nuclear Freeze: A Study Guide, p. 27.

<sup>16</sup> See Charles Austin, "2 Major Protestant Churches Call for an End to Arms Race," The New York Times, December 18, 1981; reproduced in Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>17</sup> Quoted in Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Quoted in Novak, "Arms & the Church," p. 40.

What is ignored in most of the clergy's anti-nuclear pronouncements is the most important question of all: what policy is most likely to actually prevent the outbreak of war--either nuclear or conventional? The question that goes to the heart of the matter is whether nuclear deterrence has served and is continuing to serve to prevent war. The fact is that nuclear deterrence has been the principal factor in preventing the outbreak of war between the United States and the Soviet Union in the years since the end of the Second World War. In contrast to this period, the first four decades of the twentieth century witnessed two world wars which killed millions of people and devastated whole regions of the globe.

It should also be understood that the belief of certain Catholic Bishops and other clergymen that nuclear deterrence is immoral is predicated upon their understanding deterrence in light of the now-dated American strategic doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). This doctrine was widely understood to posit that deterrence would be maintained if both sides possessed a capability to "destroy an aggressor as a viable society even after a well-planned and executed surprise attack" on their strategic forces. In effect, mutual assured destruction envisioned that a significant portion of the population and industry of each side was to be held hostage to a nuclear fate in order to prevent nuclear war. MAD was first publicly enunciated in 1965, during the Johnson Administration, by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

Yet even at the peak of MAD, strategic planning still was predicated upon targeting sizable numbers of nuclear weapons against solely military targets. In the mid-1970s, as Soviet strategic capabilities grew alarmingly, the United States gradually began moving away from its primary reliance upon Mutual Assured Destruction toward the increased and selective targeting of Soviet strategic military targets. This was to avoid a situation where the destruction of Russian cities would be the only option available to a U.S. President in the event of a Soviet surprise attack. In fact, the Reagan Administration's present strategic weapons program is designed to ensure that options other than city-busting can be used realistically to deter a Soviet attack.

Are the advocates of a nuclear freeze against deterrence? It is hard to tell. But who could argue seriously that the U.S. can afford to renounce nuclear deterrence? Deterrence rests implicitly on the believability of a country's threat to use force to defend itself. For the United States to renounce the possible use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances would inevitably encourage the Soviet Union to take even more risks internationally. Ironically, this would increase international tension and the danger of war.

It may be appropriate for Cardinal Krol to assert that there are "other means of resistance" to Soviet military power than U.S. nuclear arms, or for Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle,

when asked about the "danger of the whole world being in a slave labor camp," to reply that we should trust in God.<sup>19</sup> But it is similarly appropriate to ask if that is a basis on which national leaders can make public policy? It would be dangerous to peace and freedom if America's leaders, pledged to provide for the common defense of all its people, adopted a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament, which is what the moral assumption of the pro-freeze clergymen really requires.

#### Assumption #2: A Nuclear Arms Race Endangers World Survival

One of the major philosophical assumptions of leaders of the freeze movement is the belief that the United States and the Soviet Union are busily engaged in a nuclear arms race that increases the planet's chances of destruction. "[T]here is an urgency, a terrible urgency, that if we do not get a freeze soon, there will indeed be a whole new generation of weapons that will make nuclear war all the more likely," claims Randy Kehler, National Coordinator of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign.<sup>20</sup> "Many believe we face an accelerating arms race and a possible drift toward destruction," declares Archbishop James Hickey of Washington.<sup>21</sup> Proclaims the American Lutheran Church: Our concern is over "the increasing sense of insecurity and peril to which our world is being led by escalation in nuclear weaponry. We see that our nation is locked with the Soviet Union in an arms race which both countries find almost impossible to stop."<sup>22</sup>

The metaphor of a "race" to depict U.S. and Soviet defense policies has been used by the peace movement for more than thirty years. It is a metaphor whose applicability, never strong, has declined appreciably over the past decade. What the world witnessed during the 1970s was a continuing Soviet strategic military buildup at a time when the United States dramatically had slowed its own defense efforts. Since 1971, the United States has deployed just three new or significantly upgraded strategic missiles.<sup>23</sup> In this same period, the Soviet Union has deployed at least nineteen.<sup>24</sup> In terms of the "race," the United States

<sup>19</sup> The quotation from Cardinal Krol comes from *ibid.*, p. 41; and the quotation concerning Archbishop Hunthausen comes from James V. Schall, "Ecclesiastical Wars Over Peace," *National Review*, June 25, 1982, p. 760.

<sup>20</sup> Quoted in an interview with Randy Kehler by editor Stephen Maikowski of *Transition* (Institute for World Order). "On the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign," *Transition*, Vol. 5 (May 1982), p. [2]. Before heading the national freeze campaign organization, Kehler had been in charge of the successful grass roots freeze campaign in western Massachusetts. Anne Zill Report, p. [53].

<sup>21</sup> Archbishop James Hickey, "Nuclear Weapons, Moral Questions," p. 3.

<sup>22</sup> Quoted in "Lutherans Ask Nuclear Ban," *The New York Times*, September 12, 1982, p. 27.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. missiles: (ICBMs) Minuteman III with the NS-20 guidance and Mk-12A warhead; (SLBMs) Trident C-4; and (Cruise Missiles) ALCM/AGM-86B.

<sup>24</sup> USSR missiles" (ICBMs) SS-11 Mod 3, SS-13 Improved Version, SS-17 and SS-17 Mod 1, SS-18, SS-18 Mod 1, SS-18 Mod 2, SS-18 Mod 3, SS-19, SS-19 Improved Version and SS-19 Mod 1; (SLBMs) SS-N-6 Mod 2, SS-N-6 Mod 3, SS-N-8, SS-N-17, SS-N-18, SS-N-18 Mod 2, SS-N-18 Mod 3, and SS-NX-20.

stopped running. The question avoided by the freeze advocates is: Why then didn't the Soviet Union stop or at least slow down?

Little complaint was heard from the peace groups in the late 1970s when the Soviet Union's strategic forces raced ahead of the United States in vitally important areas. Strangely, these groups and other nuclear freeze proponents only became distressed by military growth when it became apparent that the Reagan Administration was not going to allow America's security position to be jeopardized by letting the Soviets retain their strategic edge.

In regard to the matter of whether the "arms race" is leading the world ever closer to war, two points need to be made. One is that, as far as arms control is concerned, the technological improvements made in nuclear weapons systems over the past several decades have led the U.S. even further away from the dangers of accidental nuclear war. Because of the increased accuracy available in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and the move to multiple warheads on each missile, the average yields of nuclear warheads have dropped considerably. Gone are the days when both sides possessed many hundreds of multi-megaton warheads aboard ballistic missiles that guaranteed extensive collateral damage of civilian areas even when launched against military targets. While American ICBM warhead yields have dropped significantly, nonetheless, Soviet warhead yields have tended to remain high. For instance, the warheads on the Soviet SS-18 and SS-18 Mod 2 single-warhead ICBMs are estimated at 24 and 20 megatons, respectively. Similarly, the warheads on their smaller, single warhead SS-17 Mod 1 and SS-19 Mod 1 ICBMs are estimated to be 3.6 and 4.3 megatons, respectively. In contrast to this, the United States' operational single-warhead ICBMs have yields of 1.2 megatons (Minuteman II) and 9 megatons (the fifty-two Titan II missiles that are planned for deactivation starting in 1983).

Modern strategic systems possess many more safeguards to accidental launch than did older systems. They employ greater redundancy in safety features such as permissive action links (PAL) which allow launch of the weapons or arming of the warheads only under positive control. Nuclear weapons systems are less vulnerable to destruction in an enemy surprise attack than were their counterparts twenty-five years ago, and thus are less likely to tempt the other side into delivering a preemptive nuclear strike in an attempt to knock them out.

The other point is that the danger of nuclear war is not substantially increased by an attempt by one side to maintain or regain a nuclear balance with the other. But the danger could be increased by nuclear instability, where one side retains a discernible advantage over the other. If the United States were to concede a measurable strategic advantage to the Soviet Union, such as by agreeing to a nuclear freeze under the present circumstances, this could well lead to a permanent strategic instability favoring the Soviet Union, which would make conflict more likely.

Assumption #3: Overkill

Another assertion that is repeatedly heard from the freeze proponents is that the United States and the Soviet Union have long since reached a position of nuclear overkill. It thus is argued that the procurement of new nuclear weapons is unnecessary and the fact that one side may have more weapons than the other is irrelevant.

The term overkill is an emotional label that avoids serious discussion. It focuses attention, and defines the context of debate, in terms of a totally misleading concept. There is no certain overkill capability when taking into account some of the scenarios that must be considered when the security of the United States is at issue.

To estimate whether a country has a sufficient number of nuclear weapons, or an excess of them, as freeze proponents claim, what must be determined are the requirements the weapons are to fulfill and the restraints that are placed upon their use by national policy. The nuclear weapons which the United States maintains serve a two-fold purpose: 1) to be sufficient in number and power to deter the Soviet Union from attacking and; 2) in the event that deterrence fails, to be of sufficient remaining number, power and accuracy to destroy enemy military forces that threaten additional damage to the United States or its allies or to engage other enemy targets whose destruction or threatened destruction promises to bring the war to an early termination.

For more than twenty years, the United States has espoused a second strike strategic doctrine.<sup>25</sup> That is, the United States will not launch its nuclear missiles until after it has sustained a nuclear first strike from the other side. This means that in the event of a nuclear war, the U.S. could expect most of its ICBMs, almost half of its ballistic missile submarines and a majority of its intercontinental bombers to be destroyed before its leaders could retaliate. For this reason, the United States needs to maintain more than the minimum number of strategic warheads which the layman would think sufficient to deter the Soviets. To deter a Soviet first strike, the U.S. must be able to field enough weapons to demonstrate to Soviet military planners that it could cause unacceptable levels of damage to the Soviet Union even after sustaining the destruction of many of its strategic weapons in a nuclear surprise attack. That is why the overkill argument has so little validity when applied to U.S. strategic forces.

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<sup>25</sup> This should not be confused with the stated U.S. and NATO deterrent policy of authorizing first use of nuclear weapons in Western Europe in the event that a Warsaw Pact military invasion cannot be contained by conventional means.

Numbers can and do matter, of course. But usually it is the asymmetry of capabilities and not the asymmetry of numbers that concerns strategic planners. That is why, for instance, the Soviet Union's continuing deployment of SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in European Russia so concerns U.S. and NATO military planners--not so much the numbers of SS-20s, though this does play a part, but because of the greatly enhanced capabilities of the missile (each with three independently targetable warheads, plus greater range and vastly increased accuracy over the obsolescent Soviet SS-4s and SS-5s also deployed) and the fact that NATO has nothing yet deployed to counterbalance them.

Assumption #4: A Rough Balance in Strategic Weapons Exists

The assertion that a rough balance in strategic weapons exists on both sides is couched in practical terms by those favoring a nuclear freeze. "The freeze idea is based on the conviction that there is now rough parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in nuclear destructive power," says Congressman Jonathan Bingham, a major co-sponsor of the pro-freeze resolution in the House.<sup>26</sup> "Now is an appropriate time for a freeze because the nuclear military strengths of the U.S. and the Soviet Union are roughly equivalent--in parity....Neither side is behind so neither side has to fear being 'locked in' to an inferior position," proclaims the Peacemaking Project of the United Presbyterian Church.<sup>27</sup>

The terms "rough equivalence" or "rough balance" are so indefinite that they can mean almost anything. Yet most U.S. and Western defense analysts conclude that the Soviet Union has an advantage in most critical categories of strategic weapons.<sup>28</sup> A few comparisons are instructive. The United States has 1,052 ICBM launchers, 520 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile launchers,

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<sup>26</sup> Testimony by Congressman Jonathan Bingham before the Subcommittee on International Security & Scientific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; excerpted in "The Nuclear Freeze Proposal: Pro & Con," Congressional Digest, August-September 1982, p. 214.

<sup>27</sup> "Some Questions Often Asked About the Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," Peacemaking Project of the United Presbyterian Church; reproduced in The Nuclear Freeze: A Study Guide, p. 9.

<sup>28</sup> For one analysis of such measure, based entirely on open source material, see Measures And Trends US And USSR Strategic Force Effectiveness - Interim Report for Period May 1977-March 1978 Prepared for Director, Defense Nuclear Agency (Alexandria, Virginia: Santa Fe Corporation, March 1978). This report summarized the situation in this way: "For the general period covered by this report (1960-1982), most of the measures show a shift from a clear US advantage to a Soviet advantage....The only measure of the 41 contained in this report in which the United States will apparently maintain a clear advantage is in (1) numbers of intercontinental bombers and (2) independently targetable Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) warheads." Ibid., p. 1.



and 376 strategic bombers (counting both long-range and medium-range aircraft). The Soviet Union, however, has 1,398 ICBM launchers, 989 SLBM launchers, and 835 strategic bombers.<sup>29</sup> That corresponds to a Soviet advantage in numbers of strategic launchers of 1.63 to 1. In regard to missile throwweight--the weight of the warhead compartment and warheads on a missile--United States' ICBMs and SLBMs have an aggregate throwweight of 3,269,000 pounds. The Soviet Union, because of its much larger missiles, has an aggregate throwweight of 12,021,000 pounds.<sup>30</sup> That corresponds to a Soviet throwweight advantage of 3.68 to 1. In regard to warheads (force loadings), the United States has some 9,000. And the Soviet Union, which has been rapidly closing the gap with the U.S. as it moves to add multiple warheads to its submarine-launched ballistic missiles, has some 7,500. That corresponds to a slight U.S. advantage of 1.2 to 1. And finally, in regard to equivalent megatonage--a measure of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons against urban-industrial targets--the United States has 2107 equivalent megatons of explosive power. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has 8440 equivalent megatons.<sup>31</sup> And that corresponds to a Soviet advantage of 4 to 1.

The ratios for dozens of other strategic measures could be similarly calculated without significantly changing the results. With the exception of a few measures, such as the number of warheads discussed above, the Soviet Union has a discernible advantage across-the-board in strategic forces.

Clearly, if the Soviet Union now possesses an advantage in strategic forces, then the signing of a nuclear freeze agreement would be destabilizing rather than stabilizing, since it would solidify an obvious strategic imbalance.

Assumption #5: A Freeze Would Be Verifiable

"In many respects it is a lot easier to verify a freeze which is comprehensive in nature and which stops everything where

<sup>29</sup> These numbers, and those given in the following sentences (unless otherwise noted), have been compiled from a variety of sources, including: Report Of Secretary Of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger To The Congress On The FY 1983 Budget, FY 1984 Authorization Request And FY 1983-1987 Defense Programs February 8, 1982; Soviet Military Power (Washington, D.C.: The Department of Defense, [October 1981]); and The Military Balance 1981-1982 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

<sup>30</sup> Keith B. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.-Soviet Relations (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), Table 7.1, pp. 168-169.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. Payne used the formula  $N*Y^{2/3}$  (N = number of warheads and Y = yield of warheads) to calculate EMT. Other formulas weighted to account for whether the warheads were of greater yield than one megaton or not (since the yields greater than one megaton have lethal areas that exceed the size of most urban-industrial targets) would furnish different figures. See Measures And Trends, p. 52.

it is today...than it is to set a ceiling and allow development of some programs and not others," says Dr. Herbert Scoville, President of the Arms Control Association.<sup>32</sup> "Opponents of a nuclear freeze also claim that a freeze is not a practical idea, because it will be difficult to verify....In fact, a freeze may well be easier to verify than a complex arms reduction agreement," argues Senator Edward Kennedy.<sup>33</sup>

Verification is, at bottom, a subjective process and determining that the other side is complying with an agreement comes down to a political judgment. For example, the SALT I agreements contained specific language that not only directed each party to not interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other but also directed the setting up of a Standing Consultative Commission to adjudicate, among other things, problems with compliance.<sup>34</sup> Despite this formal mechanism, there is ample evidence that the Soviet Union violated the terms of the agreements. But when the U.S. representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission raised each probable violation with their Soviet counterparts, the USSR's representatives simply noted that the Americans were wrong in their accusations. The Americans ultimately let the matter drop.<sup>35</sup> The problem is that as long as a government perceives it to be in its interest to continue to participate in a particular arms control agreement, its tendency will be to convince itself that the other party is complying with the terms of the agreement, whether or not that is really the case.

Since the Soviets long have refused to allow effective monitoring of nuclear weapons testing and deployment by direct observations from its territory (on-site inspection), the only practical way that the United States can attempt to verify the Soviet Union's compliance with a comprehensive nuclear freeze is by the use of its national technical means (NTM), a euphemism for

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<sup>32</sup> Remarks made during a debate on the freeze; quoted in "A Heritage Roundtable: The Nuclear Freeze," The Heritage Lectures 14 (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1982), p. 17.

<sup>33</sup> Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; in "The Nuclear Freeze Proposal," Congressional Digest, p. 206.

<sup>34</sup> See "Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 26 May 1972," Articles V and VI; and "Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 26 May 1972," Article XIII.

<sup>35</sup> For the Carter Administration's official report on SALT I compliance, see "SALT One: Compliance SALT Two: Verification," Selected Documents No. 7 (Washington, D.C.: The Department of State, February 1978). For detailed accounts of Soviet SALT I violations, see Jake Garn, "The Suppression of Information Concerning Soviet SALT Violations by the U.S. Government," Policy Review, Summer 1979, pp. 11-32; and a variety of articles and monographs by former CIA analyst David S. Sullivan, including his Soviet SALT Deception (Washington, D.C.: Coalition for Peace Through Strength, December 1979).

satellite photographic and electronic reconnaissance and the use of ground-based radars and receivers stationed outside Soviet territory. Overhead reconnaissance and electronic emissions monitoring, however, cannot tell military planners whether a particular missile sitting in its silo has one or a dozen warheads or whether the missile's guidance accuracy has been dramatically improved through changes in its guidance software. These national technical means of verification also are far from infallible when it comes to detecting hidden missiles or determining whether the clandestine production of small numbers of missiles and warheads is taking place. Notes Charles Burton Marshall: "First it is easier to monitor big things than little, small quantities than large, fixed items than mobile, exterior configurations than interior details, assembled mechanisms than unassembled, long-haul processes than short-term, and outside testing than laboratory procedures."<sup>36</sup>

Some adherents of the nuclear freeze have asserted that the Soviet Union has agreed in principle to on-site inspection in connection with the Comprehensive Test Ban Talks and so would probably allow such inspection for a nuclear freeze agreement. The real question, however, is why freeze proponents have not made on-site inspection for the purposes of verification a requirement of their freeze resolutions, when such inspection is necessary to increase the reliability of any verification attempts?<sup>37</sup> Is it perhaps that enforcing a nuclear freeze using on-site inspection would have to be far more comprehensive and intrusive than that for monitoring a test ban, thus making it far less likely to be agreed to by the highly secretive Soviet leadership.

In short, verification is not certain, whether one is talking about monitoring compliance with a specific arms control treaty or a comprehensive nuclear freeze. Even when verification is crucial to the functioning of an agreement, it will be evaluated in ways that have little to do with the technical aspects of compliance. Inasmuch as a nuclear freeze encompasses the monitoring of every aspect of nuclear weapons testing, development and deployment, it will be even harder to verify than much more limited arms agreements.

#### Assumption #6: A Freeze Will Facilitate Nuclear Arms Reductions

A final assumption is that a nuclear freeze would actually increase the United States' chances of obtaining an agreement with the Soviet Union on reducing the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

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<sup>36</sup> C.B. Marshall, "The Problem of Verification in the SALT"; quoted in Amrom H. Katz, Verification And SALT: The State of the Art and the Art of the State (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1979), p. 7.

<sup>37</sup> It should be noted that even on-site inspection cannot guarantee that a party committed to evading strict compliance with an arms control agreement will be caught in the act.

This argument rests on the assumption the nuclear forces of both sides are essentially equivalent. But the Soviet strategic buildup over the past decade has enabled Moscow to move ahead of the United States in a number of important strategic categories.<sup>38</sup> An agreement imposing a freeze on "the testing, production, and further deployment" of nuclear weapons and warheads legally would bind the United States into a continuing situation of strategic disadvantage.

An analysis of past Soviet negotiating on arms control measures shows that the Soviet Union would be unlikely to give up significant strategic capabilities without a compensating tradeoff by the United States. In 1972, for instance, the USSR agreed to the ABM Treaty limiting development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to forestall the full deployment of a much more technically advanced U.S. system. Again, in early 1980, the Soviet Union agreed to talks on limiting European-based intermediate-range nuclear forces only after NATO had committed itself to the deployment of new Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in order to balance the massive Soviet SS-20 missile buildup.

A United States inferior to the USSR would be unable to offer a corresponding quid pro quo in strategic capabilities that would allow the Soviets to accept an arms reduction agreement that really mattered.<sup>39</sup> Thus, a nuclear freeze would not facilitate further arms reduction; in reality it would prevent the completion of significant arms control agreements with the Soviets.

## CONCLUSION

The very simplicity of the nuclear freeze proposals is certainly their great attraction. It is also, perhaps, their greatest weakness. In its various manifestations, the freeze is an attempt to achieve serious arms control without paying its cost--the months and years of patient negotiation over the necessarily complex issues of nuclear weaponry. In this area there is no easy way to achieve meaningful agreements. The call for a freeze also overlooks the history of the Soviet Arms buildup and the record of Moscow's compliance to arms accords. It overlooks the hard, unpleasant facts about the nature of the Soviet Union and the difficulties inherent in securing a verifiable agreement with a fundamentally duplicitous negotiating partner.

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<sup>38</sup> See the discussion on pp. 12-13.

<sup>39</sup> While there is a slight possibility that the Soviet Union would agree to an arms reduction agreement with a United States in an inferior strategic position in order to benefit from a further weakening of U.S. strength, it is obvious that such an agreement would only serve Soviet purposes.

The real danger posed by the freeze is that it offers the American public a dishonest vision of easy arms control. It raises unrealistically high expectations of early success. As such, it undermines the public's understanding and patience for the slow, careful arms negotiating process that necessary for real achievement. Rather than bring peace, the current freeze movement can reap only dangerous disillusion and--what is far worse--strategic instability.

Jeffrey G. Barlow, Ph.D.  
Policy Analyst

**HOMER E. YOUNG**

SECURITY-INVESTIGATIVE CONSULTANT  
4212 MINNECOTA DRIVE  
THOUSAND OAKS, CALIFORNIA 91360  
(805) 529-8886

*file  
Prenography*

February 25, 1983

Erika H. Scarano  
Neighborhood Action Group  
Post Office Box 69831  
Los Angeles, California 90069

Re: UNIVERSAL PRODUCTS  
8841 Exposition Boulevard  
Culver City, California 90230

Ms Scarano:

Thank you for your letter of February 22, 1983,  
addressed to Los Angeles County District Attorney Robert Philibosian.

The enclosures to your letter from the above-entitled  
concern reflects they operate through the mail, with toll-free  
telephone numbers to call to order their materials, INTERSTATE!

From my past investigative experience in the FBI in  
the Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter cases (in the  
Los Angeles area from 1955 to 1972) this concern would come under  
the prosecutive purview of:

The Honorable Stephen S. Trott  
United States Attorney  
Central District of California  
312 North Spring Street, Room 1200  
Los Angeles, California 90012

Enclosed is a copy of a Memorandum dated October 4,  
1982, from Attorney General William French Smith to All United States  
Attorneys entitled: "ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY LAWS".

United States Attorney Trott can order the investigation  
of the above concern by the FBI, Postal Inspectors and Customs, who,  
in turn, would coordinate information from the Los Angeles Police  
Department and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office. Also, District  
Attorney Philibosian can request assistance, in accordance with  
the foregoing Memorandum of October 4, 1982.

It is my opinion that The White House Conference on  
July 27, 1982, where I was one of the participants, on the failure of  
The Department of Justice to prosecute pornography cases, caused the  
issuance of the foregoing Memorandum to All United States Attorneys.

Kindly let me know what else I may do to be of assistance  
to your group.

Sincerely,

*Homer E. Young*

1 Encl.

Homer E. Young

Copies to: (See next page)

MEMBER OF SOCIETY OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INC.

Letter to Erika H. Scarano  
Re: UNIVERSAL PRODUCTS

February 25, 1983

COPIES TO:

John K. Van de Kamp - Attorney General of California  
(Perhaps you can use this case to up-date your Organized Crime in  
Pornography Report)

Stephen S. Trott - United States Attorney - Los Angeles, California

Robert Philibosian - Los Angeles County District Attorney

Sherman Block - Sheriff - Los Angeles County (Ralph Kennelly)

Daryl F. Gates, Chief of Police - Los Angeles, California  
(Joe Ganley)

Melvin L. Flohr, Supervisory Special Agent, F.B.I., Los Angeles, Calif.

Bill Anderson, Postal Inspector - Los Angeles, Calif.

Harold L. Diaz, U.S. Customs Service, Los Angeles, Calif.

Father Morton A. Hill, Morality in Media, Inc., New York.

Bruce A. Taylor, Vice President-General Counsel, Citizens for Decency  
Thourgh Law, Inc., Phoenix, Arizona

Morton C. Blackwell - Special Assistant to The President for  
Public Liaison - The White House  
Washington, D.C.



Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D. C. 20530

October 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO: All United States Attorneys

FROM: William French Smith *WFS*  
Attorney General

SUBJECT: Enforcement of Anti-Pornography Laws

President Reagan has recently stated his alarm and concern over the spread of pornography, and his determination to ensure that we effectively enforce the federal laws against trafficking in pornography. Pornography is indeed a growing problem, but it is a problem before which law enforcement officials are not helpless, as demonstrated by the success of the Department's MIPORN operation. Accordingly, I would like to take this opportunity to clarify the Department's enforcement policy in pornography cases, and to encourage their prosecution.

The U.S. Attorneys' Manual states: "Prosecutive priority should be given to cases involving large-scale distributors who realize substantial income from multi-state operations and cases in which there is evidence of involvement by known organized crime figures," and "[s]pecial priority should be given to cases involving the use of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct . . . ." § 9-75.140 (emphasis added). This passage also states that prosecution of those cases not in one of the three priority areas may nonetheless have a deterrent effect and be appropriate when especially offensive material or numerous citizen complaints are involved. Id.

The Manual also states, of course, that the "Federal role in prosecuting obscenity cases is to focus upon the major producers and interstate distributors of pornography while leaving to local jurisdictions the responsibility of dealing with local exhibitions and sales." § 9-75.130. But this section goes on to recognize that the U.S. Attorney in an area may often have greater expertise and more money than his local counterpart, and that "[i]n these circumstances the United States may provide assistance through prosecutive efforts not falling precisely within the above guidelines."

Thus, where large volume dealers, organized crime, or child pornography is involved, the U.S. Attorney should aggressively prosecute. Even in other cases, he may prosecute where pornography is a significant problem in an area, and should certainly lend any necessary assistance where local efforts are being made. While the impact of pornography may be primarily "local," its successful prosecution calls increasingly for interstate efforts and coordination which only federal officials may be able to provide. Similarly, where the district's Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee identifies pornography as an area requiring federal support, our assistance to local enforcement efforts may and should be provided, even if the dealers are not in the three "priority" categories.

While pornography is not a problem that can be solved by federal efforts alone, it is a matter of prime concern and we must enforce vigorously the existing federal anti-pornography laws, particularly in the priority areas discussed above and in those communities where it has been identified as a major law enforcement problem.



# NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE CAMPAIGN

305 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20002  
(202) 544-0880  
Reuben McCornack  
Washington Representative

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Clearinghouse  
4144 Lindell Boulevard, Suite 404  
St. Louis, MO 63108  
(314) 533-1169

## Freeze Resolution Lobbying Strategy ✓ Discussion Points

### 1. Legislation

#### a. House

- H.J. Res. 2 (Markey-Conte)
- H.J. Res. 4 (Broomfield)
- H.J. Res. 13 (Zablocki)

#### b. Senate

- S.J. Res. 2 (Kennedy-Hatfield)
- S.J. Res. (Warner-Jackson)

### 2. House Mark-up

- a. Objective: Incorporation of H.J. Res. 2 Language into the committee resolution without limitations or qualifications.
- b. Issues: Eurostrategic weapons, immediate freeze

### 3. Timeline

- a. 17 Feb - Hearings by House Foreign Affairs Committee <sup>AM</sup> / <sup>PM</sup>
- b. 22-24 Feb - National call-in to ask members to co-sponsor, or if a co-sponsor, to lobby the Foreign Affairs Committee <sup>AM</sup> / <sup>PM</sup>
- c. 2 March - Hearing for House members, mark-up
- d. 7,8 March - Citizens Lobby; national call-in to support the Foreign Affairs Committee Freeze Resolution
- e. 9 March ? - House vote

### 4. Tasks for national organizations - time line

- a. Enlist co-sponsors now
- b. Publicize the vote in newsletters, etc. now
- c. Share local ~~national~~ contacts 26 Jan
- d. Promote participation in the Citizens Lobby now
- e. Urge co-sponsors to call on the House Foreign Affairs Committee to adopt H.J. Res. 2 21 Feb to Mar 2
- f. Send a letter to all Representatives supporting Foreign Affairs Committee Freeze Resolution by Mar 3
- g. Activate local networks
- h. Lobby Representatives

### 5. Tasks for local organizations

- a. Publicize Citizens Lobby now
- b. Organize phone trees now
- c. Coordinate with other networks 1 Feb
- d. Get proxies and money now
- e. Letter-writing parties, collect money now

(over)



- f. Call in for sponsors of H.J. Res. 2 or ask sponsors to lobby the committee
- g. Citizens Lobby
- h. Call in for lobbying the Foreign Affairs Committee Resolution

22-24 Feb  
7-8 Mar  
8 Mar

## ARMS CONTROL TIMETABLE

Date	Resolution/Action
Early March.....	<p><b>Nuclear Weapons Freeze Resolution</b>            The House Foreign Affairs Committee is scheduled to hold hearings on the freeze beginning February 10, with mark-up set for March 2. A House floor vote could occur soon after, with action following in the Senate.</p>
After March 1....	<p><b>MX Approval Resolution</b>            The President's recommendation on MX basing is expected sometime after March 1, 1983. Resolutions approving that recommendation will be introduced in both House and Senate and referred to the respective Appropriations Committees. The resolutions must be reported out of Committee within 45 days, after which floor votes must occur.</p>
March/April.....	<p><b>Comprehensive Test Ban Resolutions.</b>            Resolutions calling for renewed negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty have been introduced in both houses of Congress, and will probably be the subjects of hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.</p>
March/April.....	<p><b>First Concurrent Budget Resolution</b>            The House and Senate Budget Committees will begin hearings on the Budget Resolution early in the Session. Funding levels for the continuation of the Administration's five-year defense modernization plan will be included in the resolution.</p>
Spring/Summer....	<p><b>FY84 Defense Authorization/Energy Authorization Acts.</b>            Authorization for the proposed strategic weapons build-up will be considered as part of the DOD authorization bill. Included will be such programs as the MX missile, B-1B strategic bomber, air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles, chemical weapons, Pershing II missiles and the Trident II SLBM. Authorization for warhead research, development, and production for these weapons will be considered in the Department of Energy National Security Programs Authorization Act.</p>
Summer/Fall.....	<p><b>FY84 Defense Appropriation/Energy Appropriation Acts.</b>            The actual appropriation of funds for new strategic weapons will be included in the DOD and DOE Appropriations bills.</p>

LOBBYING ASSIGNMENTS

ORGANIZATIONS:

ABC American Baptist Church  
 ADA Americans for Democratic Action  
 CNFMP Coalition New For/Mil Policy  
 CC Common Cause  
     Council for a Livable World  
 JI John Isaacs  
 KM Katherine Magraw  
 FC Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign  
 FF Nuclear Freeze Foundation  
 FOE Friends of the Earth  
 FCNL Friends Committee on National Legislation  
 GP Green Peace  
 NASW National Assn Social Workers  
 NET NETWORK  
 MX National Ctee on National Legislation  
 GP Green Peace  
 NASW National Assn Social Workers  
 NET NETWORK  
 MX National Campaign to Stop the MX  
 PSR Physicians Social Responsibility  
 SANE SANE  
 UCS Union of Concerned Scientists  
 UUA Unitarian Universalist Assn  
 UCC United Church of Christ  
 WILPF Womens Intl League Peace Freedom

✓ Membership on key committees is noted with:

AS=Armed Services  
 Ap=Appropriations  
 Bu=Budget  
 FA=Foreign Affairs (House)  
 FR=Foreign Relations (Senate)

+ = Chair of a key Committee or Subcommittee.

\* = A Member who missed a substantial number of votes, and who has a high rating only those missed votes are not included in the calculations.

@ = A Member who is not assigned to any lobbyist.

Democrats are in lower case letters.

Republicans are in UPPER CASE letters.

ORGANIZATIONAL PRIORITIES

ISSUE	ORGANIZATIONS
NUCLEAR FREEZE	CC (1), PSR (1), SANE (3), NASW (2), WILPF (3), UCS (3)
MX	CC (1), SANE (1), MX (1), NASW (4)
FIRST STRIKE WEAPONS	NETWORK (1), PSR (3), SANE (2)
MILITARY SPENDING	SANE (4), NASW (1), WILPF (2)
PERSHING II	NASW (3), WILPF (1A)
CTB	NETWORK (3), PSR (2)
ABM	UCS (2)
GLCM	WILPF (1B)
NO FIRST USE	UCS (1)
CHEMICAL WEAPONS	NETWORK (2)

PRIORITY I-A  
SWING MEMBERS. ←

ARIZONA  
2 Udall

FOE, UCS

ARKANSAS

1 Alexander Ap  
4 Anthony Bu

SANE  
SANE

CALIFORNIA

3 Matsui  
4 Fazio Ap  
11 Lantos FA  
13 Mineta Bu  
15 Coelho  
16 Panetta Bu  
23 Beilenson  
29 Hawkins  
30 Martinez  
31 Dymally  
32 Anderson  
36 Brown, G.  
38 Patterson

FC, GP  
ADA, FC, UCC, WILPF  
ADA, FC, UCS, GP  
EM, FC  
FC, WILPF, JI  
FC, GP  
FC, SANE  
FC, FOE  
FC, KM  
FC  
FC  
FC, FOE, GP, KM  
FC, UCC

COLORADO

5 Brown, H.

MX

FLORIDA

7 Gibbons  
9 Fascell FA+  
14 Mica FA  
18 Pepper

GP  
ADA, GP, UCS, KM  
ADA, GP, UCS  
GP

GEORGIA

4 FOWLER

FCNL, NASW

HAWAII

1 HEFTEL  
2 AKAKA Ap

FF, GP, UCC  
ADA, GP, NASW

ILLINOIS

8 Rostenkowski  
10 PORTER Ap  
11 Annunzio  
16 MARTIN, L. Bu  
22 Simon Bu

CNFMP  
CNFMP, NASW, UCC  
CNFMP, EM  
CNFMP, NASW  
JI, FF

INDIANA

2 Sharp  
4 COATS  
9 Hamilton FA+

FCNL  
JI  
ADA, UCS

IOWA

3 EVANS, C.

CNFMP, SANE, UCC

KANSAS

1 ROBERTS, P.  
4 Glickman  
5 WHITTAKER

FC  
FC, UCS, FCNL  
FC

2 Hatcher  
3 Mazzoli  
6 HOPKINS  
7 Perkins

AP  
ADA, NET, SANE  
KM, EM  
NET  
e

LOUISIANA

2 Boggs Ap

ADA, NASW

MAINE

2 SNOWE FA

ADA, CNFMP, UCC, UCS

MARYLAND

2 Long, C. Ap  
5 Hoyer  
8 Barnes FA+

SANE  
FCNL, NET  
ADA, JI, WILPF

MICHIGAN

10 Albosta  
14 Hertel AS  
16 Dingell

CNFMP, GP  
ADA, GP, WILPF  
FF

MINNESOTA

2 WEBER  
3 FRENZEL Bu

FOE, UCC  
FOE, SANE

MISSOURI

2 Young  
3 Gephardt Bu  
9 Volkmer  
8 EMERSON

e  
NET, WILPF  
SANE  
e

NEBRASKA

1 BEREUTER  
2 DAUB  
3 SMITH, V. Ap

UCC  
UCC  
ADA, MX, UCC

NEW HAMPSHIRE

1 DAMOURS  
2 GREGG

FF, GP, KM, UCC  
ABC, KM, UCC

NEW JERSEY

2 Hughes  
4 SMITH, C.  
5 ROUKEMA  
6 Dwyer Ap  
7 RINALDO  
8 Roe  
14 Guarini

GP  
KM  
FOE, JI, NET  
ADA  
EM  
SANE  
EM, NET

NEW YORK

9 Ferraro  
14 MOLINARI  
19 Biaggi  
29 HORTON

EM, FF  
e  
e  
ABC, CNFMP

NORTH CAROLINA

1 Jones, W.  
7 Rose

e  
FCNL

OHIO

1 Luken

CNFMP, NET

REMAINING MEMBERS OF KEY COMMITTEES

ALABAMA

1 EDWARDS Ap FCNL, UCS

ARIZONA

3 STUMP AS UCS  
4 RUDD Ap UCS

ARKANSAS

2 BETHUNE Bu JI, SANE

CALIFORNIA

19 Lagomarsino FA ADA, EM, FC  
21 FIEDLER Bu FC  
25 Roybal Ap FC, UCC  
28 Dixon Ap FC, UCC  
35 LEWIS Ap FC, UCC

COLORADO

1 Schroeder AS FF, SANE, UCS  
2 Wirth Bu FF, FOE, SANE, UCC

CONNECTICUT

2 Gejdenson FA ADA, JI, UCS  
5 Ratchford Ap UCS

FLORIDA

4 Chappell Ap GP, UCC  
8 YOUNG, C.W. AP GP, SANE  
10 Ireland FA ADA, GP  
11 Nelson Bu GP  
17 Lehman, Wm Ap GP

ILLINOIS

4 OBrien Ap CNFMP, UCS

INDIANA

7 MYERS Ap

IOWA

1 LEACH FA ADA, JI, UCC, UCS  
4 Smith, N. Ap ADA, CNFMP, UCC

KANSAS

3 WINN FA ADA, FC, UCS

LOUISIANA

1 LIVINGSTON Ap SANE, UCC

MARYLAND

1 Dyson AS ADA, SANE, UCS  
6 Byron AS ADA, KM, SANE, UCS

MASSACHUSETTS

1 CONTE Ap FF, KM, UCC, UCS  
2 Boland Ap FF, SANE, UCC  
3 Early Ap FF, NET, UCC  
6 Mavroules AS ADA, FF, JI, SANE  
9 Donnelly Bu FF, GP, UCC  
10 Studts FA ADA, FF

MASSACHUSETTS

2 PURSELL Ap CNFMP, GP, NET, UCS  
8 Traxler Ap ADA, CNFMP, GP  
13 Crockett FA ADA, GP  
18 BROOMFIELD FA ADA, UCS

MINNESOTA

5 Sabo Ap FCNL, UCC

NEW YORK

2 Downey Bu JI  
15 Green Ap ADA, JI, NET  
22 GILMAN FA ADA, SANE  
28 McHugh Ap KM, SANE, UCC

NORTH CAROLINA

8 Hefner Ap, Bu ADA, UCC  
9 MARTIN, J. Bu UCC

OHIO

5 LATTA Bu NET  
10 MILLER, C. Ap UCS  
14 Stokes Ap, Bu ADA, UCC  
16 REGULA Ap, Bu UCC, UCS

OKLAHOMA

4 MCCURDY AS ADA  
5 EDWARDS, M. Ap e

OREGON

1 AuCoin Ap GP, JI, UCC

PENNSYLVANIA

1 Foglietta FA ADA, FF, SANE, UCS  
2 Gray Ap FF, SANE, UCC  
9 SHUSTER Bu FF, UCC  
10 MCDADE Ap FF, SANE, UCC  
12 Murtha Ap ADA, FF, SANE

SOUTH CAROLINA

4 CAMPBELL Ap e

TEXAS

4 Hall, R. Ap e  
11 Leath Ap e  
12 Wright Bu e  
13 Hightower Ap MX  
21 LOEFFLER Ap e  
23 Kazen AS ADA

VIRGINIA

2 WHITEHURST AS ADA, NET  
7 ROBINSON Ap FCNL

WISCONSIN

7 Obey Ap, Bu ADA, FF, JI, UCC  
8 ROTH, T. FA ADA, UCS

5 Andrews  
26 BRADSHAW  
27 Ortiz

e  
e  
e

7 Mitchell, P.

SANE

UTAH

3 NIELSON

SANE

MASSACHUSETTS

4 Frank  
5 Shannon  
7 Markey  
8 Moakley

JI  
e  
JI, UCS  
e

VIRGINIA

1 BATEMAN  
4 Sisisky  
6 Olin  
9 Boucher

e  
e  
e  
FOE, KM

MICHIGAN

1 Conyers  
7 Kildee  
12 Bonior  
15 Ford, Wm

e  
e  
JI  
e

WASHINGTON

8 CHANDLER

GP

MINNESOTA

4 Vento  
8 Oberstar

e  
e

WEST VIRGINIA

1 Mollohan  
2 Staggers  
3 Wise

ABC  
e  
FOE, KM

MISSOURI

1 Clay\*

e

WISCONSIN

5 Moody

CNFMP, GP

MONTANA

1 Williams, P.

KM

NEW JERSEY

1 Florio  
3 Howard  
13 FORSYTHE  
10 Rodino  
11 Minish

e  
e  
e  
e  
e

PRIORITY IV-A

REMAINING ARMS CONTROL SUPPORTERS

CALIFORNIA

5 Burton  
7 Miller  
9 Stark  
10 Edwards  
24 Waxman

FC, FOE  
FC  
FC  
FC  
FC, FOE

NEW YORK

8 Scheuer  
10 Schumer  
16 Rangel  
17 Weiss  
18 Garcia  
20 Ottinger  
32 LaFalce  
33 Nowak  
34 Lundine

e  
e  
e  
SANE  
e  
FOE, UCS  
e  
e  
e

COLORADO

3 Kogovsek

e

NORTH DAKOTA

A Dorgan

e

CONNECTICUT

1 Kennelly

e

OHIO

13 Pease  
14 Seiberling

e  
JI, FOE

ILLINOIS

1 Washington  
2 Savage  
3 Russo  
7 Collins, C.

CNFMP  
e  
CNFMP  
e

OREGON

3 Wyden  
4 Weaver

e  
SANE

INDIANA

10 Jacobs

SANE

PENNSYLVANIA

7 Edgar  
14 Coyne, W.  
18 Walgren

FC, SANE  
FC  
FC

IOWA

2 TAUKE  
5 Harkin  
6 Bedell

e  
JI, SANE  
UCS

RHODE ISLAND

2 SCHNEIDER

FOE

MARYLAND

ALABAMA  
6 Erdreich

e

ARIZONA  
1 McCain  
5 McNulty

UCS  
KM,UCS

CALIFORNIA  
1 Bosco  
6 Boxer  
12 ZSCHAU  
18 Lehman, R.  
26 Berman  
27 Levine, M.  
34 Torres  
37 McCANDLESS  
43 PACKARD  
44 Bates, J.

FC, KM, SANE  
FC, FOE, KM, SANE  
FC, KM  
FC  
FC, FCNL  
FC, GP  
FC, FF, GP  
ADA, FC, JI  
FC, SANE  
FC, SANE

COLORADO  
6 SWIGERT

e

CONNECTICUT  
3 Morrison  
6 JOHNSON

KM, WILPF  
UCS

DELAWARE  
A Carper

UCC

FLORIDA  
6 MacKay  
9 BILIRAKIS  
12 LEWIS  
13 MACK  
16 Smith, L.

GP, UCC  
GP, SANE  
GP  
GP  
GP

GEORGIA  
1 Thomas, L.  
3 Ray  
8 Rowland  
9 Jenkins

e  
e  
e  
e

ILLINOIS  
5 Lipinski  
17 Evans  
20 Durbin

CNFMP  
CNFMP, FF, KM  
CNFMP

INDIANA  
1 Hall  
6 BURTON  
8 McCloskey

FOE, KM  
e  
CNFMP

KANSAS  
2 SLATTERY

ABC, FC

MAINE  
1 McKERNAN

FOE, UCC

MICHIGAN

MINNESOTA  
1 Penny  
6 Sikorski

CNFMP, KM  
CNFMP

MISSISSIPPI  
2 FRANKLIN

UCS

MISSOURI  
5 Wheat

KM

NEVADA  
1 Reid  
2 VUCANOVICH

JI, MX  
MX

NEW JERSEY  
9 Torricelli

FOE, SANE

NEW MEXICO  
3 Richardson

FF, FNCL

NEW YORK

3 Mrazek  
11 Towns  
12 Owens  
25 BOEHLERT

KM, SANE, UCS  
ABC  
KM

NORTH CAROLINA

2 Valentine  
6 Britt  
11 Clarke

CNFMP  
e  
KM

OHIO

7 DeWINE  
9 Kaptur  
12 KASICH  
19 Feighan

e  
CNFMP, FF, KM  
e  
CNFMP

OREGON

2 Smith, B.

GP

PENNSYLVANIA

3 Borski  
4 Kolter  
8 Kostmayer  
11 Harrison  
17 GEKAS  
29 RIDGE

FC, KM, SANE  
FC, KM  
FC, KM, SANE  
FC  
FC, SANE  
FC

SOUTH CAROLINA

5 Spratt  
6 Tallon

e  
KM, FF

TENNESSEE

4 Cooper  
7 SUNDQUIST

e  
e

TEXAS

3 BARTLETT  
5 Bryant

e  
CNFMP

15 WYLIE  
17 WILLIAMS, L.  
18 Applegate  
20 Oakar\*

e  
e  
CNFMP  
WILPF

ALABAMA  
3 Nichols  
4 Bevill

AS+ ADA  
Ap+ e

OKLAHOMA

1 Jones, J. Bu+  
2 Synar  
3 Watkins

e  
e  
e

CALIFORNIA  
8 Dellums

AS(+) FC, KM, NET, NASW

PENNSYLVANIA

6 Yatron FA ADA, FC  
13 COUGHLIN Ap CNFMP, FC, FOE, NET  
15 RITTER FC, UCC  
19 GOODLING FA ADA, FC  
20 Gaydos ABC, FC  
22 Murphy FC  
23 CLINGER CNFMP, FC

FLORIDA  
3 Bennett

AS+ ADA, GP

ILLINOIS

9 Yates Ap+ CNFMP, GP, NET  
21 Price AS+ ADA

MICHIGAN

3 Wolpe FA+ ADA, CNFMP, FOE, KM

RHODE ISLAND

1 St Germain NET

MISSISSIPPI

1 Whitten AS+ ADA, UCC  
3 Montgomery AS(+) ADA

SOUTH CAROLINA

3 Derrick FF, FOE, GP

NEW YORK

6 Addabbo Ap+ UCS  
7 Rosenthal FA+ ADA, GP, UCS  
13 Solarz Bu, FA+ ADA, GP, JI  
23 Stratton AS+ ADA

SOUTH DAKOTA

A Daschle FCNL, FOE, GP, JI

VIRGINIA

5 Daniel, D. AS+ ADA

TENNESSEE

6 Gore FOE, UCS

TEXAS

9 Brooks CNFMP  
10 Pickle CNFMP  
20 Gonzalez NET  
22 PAUL FCNL, KM  
24 Frost CNFMP, JI

WASHINGTON

2 Swift GP  
3 Bonker FA+ ADA, FOE, GP, UCS  
5 Foley GP, NET, UCC  
6 Dicks Ap ADA, GP, NET, UCC

WEST VIRGINIA

4 Rahall JI

WISCONSIN

1 Aspin AS+, Bu ADA, NET, UCS  
3 GUNDERSON e  
4 Zablocki FA+ ADA, JI, KM, UCS  
6 PETRI e  
9 SENSENBRENNER e



J.S. SENATE

Abdnor (R-SD)	5		Laxalt (R-NV)	5	
Andrews (R-ND)	3	UCC	Leahy (D-VT)	1	ADA, FOE, JI
Armstrong (R-CO)	5		Levin (D-MI)	1	ADA, JI, NET
Baker (R-TN)	5		Long (D-LA)	5	
Baucus (D-MT)	1	MX	Lugar (R-IN)	5	UCS
Bentsen (D-TX)	5		McClure (R-ID)	5	
Biden (D-DE)	1	JI	Mathias (R-MD)	3	ADA, JI
Binghaman (D-NM)	1N	FOE, JI, MX	Matsunaga (D-HI)	1	JI
Boren (D-OK)	3		Mattingly (R-GA)	5	
Boschwitz (R-MN)	3	FOE, NASW	Melcher (D-MT)	3	JI, MX
Bradley (D-NJ)	3	UCS	Metzenbaum (D-OH)	1	JI
Bumpers (D-AR)	1	ADA, JI	Mitchell (D-ME)	1	FOE, JI
Burdick (D-ND)	3	JI, UCC	Moynihan (D-NY)	3	ABC
Byrd (D-WV)	3	ABC, CNFMP	Murkowski (R-AK)	5	
Chafee (D-RI)	3	ADA, FOE, JI	Nickles (R-OK)	5	
Chiles (D-FL)	3	WILPF	Nunn (D-GA)	3	UCS
Cochran (R-MS)	5		Packwood (R-OR)	3	GP
Cohen (R-ME)	5		Pell (D-RI)	1	ADA, JI, UCS
Cranston (D-CA)	1	FOE, JI	Percy (R-IL)	3	ADA, CNFMP, I
D'Amato (R-NY)	5		Pressler (R-SD)	4	UCS
Danforth (R-MO)	3	ADA	Proxmire (D-WI)	2	ADA, GP, SANI
DeConcini (D-AZ)	3	UCS	Pryor (D-AR)	1	JI
Denton (R-AL)	5		Quayle (R-IN)	5	
Dixon (D-IL)	3	ADA, CNFMP, NET	Randolph (D-WV)	3	ABC
Dodd (D-CT)	1	UCS	Riegle (D-MI)	1	GP
Dole (R-KS)	5		Roth (R-DE)	5	
Domenici (R-NM)	5		Rudman (R-NH)	5	
Durenberger (R-MN)	3	ADA, JI	Sarbanes (D-MD)	3	ADA, JI
Eagleton (D-MO)	1	ADA, JI, NET	Sasser (D-TN)	3	JI
Exon (D-NB)	3	JI	Simpson (R-WY)	5	
Ford (D-KY)	2	JI	Specter (R-PA)	5	
East (R-NC)	5		Stafford (R-VT)	3	
Garn (R-UT)	5		Stennis (D-MI)	5	
Glenn (D-OH)	3	ADA, UCS, WILPF	Stevens (R-AK)	5	
Goldwater (R-AZ)	5		Symms (R-ID)	5	
Gorton (R-WA)	5		Thurmond (R-SC)	5	
Grassley (R-IA)	5		Tower (R-TX)	5	
Hart (D-CO)	1	ADA, FOE, JI, UCS	Trible (R-VA)	5N	
Hatch (R-UT)	5		Tsongas (D-MA)	1	JI, UCS
Hatfield (R-OR)	3	ADA, JI	Wallop (R-WY)	5	
Hawkins (R-FL)	5		Warner (R-VA)	5	
Hecht (R-NV)	5N	GP, UCS	Weicker (R-CT)	3	GP, UCC
Heflin (D-AL)	5		Wilson (R-VA)	3N	UCS
Heinz (R-PA)	3	JI	Zorinsky (D-NB)	3	ADA
Helms (R-NC)	5				
Hollings (D-SC)	3	ADA, UCS			
Huddleston (D-KY)	1	UCS			
Humphrey (R-NH)	5				
Inouye (D-HI)	3	GP, UCC			
Jepsen (R-IA)	5				
Jackson (D-WA)	5				
Johnston (D-LA)	3	NET			
Kassebaum (R-KS)	3	ADA, JI			
Kasten (R-WI)	5				
Kennedy (D-MA)	1	JI			
Lautenberg (D-NJ)	3N	UCS			

MISSISSIPPI  
9 Ford, H.\*

e

TEXAS

18 Leland

e

VERMONT

1 JEFFORDS

e

WASHINGTON

1 PRITCHARD

e

7 Lowry

e

WISCONSIN

2 Kastenmeier

e

PRIORITY IV-B

REMAINING ARMS CONTROL OPPONENTS

ALABAMA

2 DICKINSON

e

5 Flippo

e

7 Shelby

e

ALASKA

A YOUNG, D.

KM

ARKANSAS

3 HAMMERSCHMIDT

SANE

CALIFORNIA

2 CHAPPIE

FC

14 SHUMWAY

FC

17 PASHAYAN

FC

20 THOMAS

FC

22 MOORHEAD

FC

33 DREIER

FC

35 LEWIS

FC

39 DANNEMEYER

FC

40 BADHAM

FC

41 LOWERY

FC

42 LUNGREN

FC

45 HUNTER

FC

COLORADO

5 KRAMER

NET

FLORIDA

1 Hutto

GP

2 Fuqua

GP, UCS

5 McCOLLUM

GP

15 Shaw

GP

GEORGIA

2 Hatcher

e

3 Levitas

e

6 GINGRICH

e

7 McDonald

e

9 Jenkins

e

10 Barnard

e

IDAHO

1 CRAIG

KM, SANE

2 HANSEN, G.

e

ILLINOIS

6 HYDE

e

12 CRANE, P.

e

13 ERLBORN

e

15 MADIGAN

e

18 MICHEL

e

19 CRANE, D.

e

INDIANA

3 HILER

e

5 HILLIS

e

KENTUCKY

1 Hubbard

e

4 SNYDER

e

5 ROGERS

e

LOUISIANA

3 Tauzin

e

4 Roemer

UCS

5 Huckaby

e

6 Moore

e

7 Breaux

e

8 Long, G.

e

MARYLAND

4 HOLT

e

MICHIGAN

4 SILJANDER

e

5 SAWYER

KM

9 VANDERJAGT

UCS

11 DAVIS

e

MINNESOTA

7 STANGELAND

SANE

MISSISSIPPI

4 Dowdy

e

5 LOTT

e

MISSOURI

4 Skelton

e

6 COLEMAN

e

7 TAYLOR

e

8 EMERSON

e

MONTANA

2 MARLENEE

MX

NEW JERSEY

12 COURTER

e

NEW MEMBERS - HOUSE  
 10 January 1983

~~swing vote~~  
new members

Andrews, Mike (D-TX-25)	1039	x7508	
Bartlett, Steve (R-TX-3)	1233	x4201	
Bateman, Herbert H. (R-VA-1)	1518	x4261	
2 Bates, Jim (D-CA-44)	1632	x5452	FC, SANE
1 Berman, Howard (D-CA-26)	1022	x4695	FC, FCNL
5 Bilirakis, Michael (R-FL-9)	319	x5755	GP, SANE
Boehlert, Sherwood (R-NY-25)	1641	x3665	
1 Borski, Robert A. (D-PA-3)	314	x8251	CLW, FC, SANE
1 Bosco, Douglas H. (D-CA-1)	1330	x3311	CLW, FC, SANE
1 Boucher, Frederick (D-VA-9)	1723	x3861	CLW, FOE
1 Boxer, Barbara (D-CA-6)	1517	x5161	CLW, FC, FOE
Bradshaw, Jim (R-TX-26)		x	
Britt, Charles (D-NC-6)	327	x3065	
3 Bryant, John (D-TX-5)	506	x2231	^NFMP
Burton, Dan (D-IN-6)	120	x2276	
2 Carper, Thomas R. (D-DE-A)	1020	x4165	UCC
3 Chandler, Rodney (R-WA-8)	216	x7761	GP
3 Clarke, James M. (D-NC-11)	415	x6401	CLW
Coleman, Ronald (D-TX-16)	1017	x4831	
Cooper, Jim (D-TN-4)	425	x6831	
Corcoran, Thomas (R-IL-14)	2447	x2976	
Dewine, Michael (R-OH-7)	1407	x4324	
1 Durbin, Richard (D-IL-20)	417	x5271	CNFMP
Erdreich, Ben (D-AL-6)	512	x4921	
1 Evans, Lane (D-IL-17)	1427	x5905	CLW, CNFMP, FF
1 Feighan, Edward (D-OH-19)	1223	x5731	CNFMP
Franklin, Webb (R-MS-2)	508	x5876	
4 Gekas, George W. (R-PA-17)	1008	x4315	FC, SANE
1 Hall, Katie (D-IN-1)	132	x2461	CLW, FOE
1 Harrison, Frank (D-PA-11)	1547	x6511	FC
3 Johnson, Nancy L. (R-CT-6)	119	x4476	UUA
1 Kaptur, Marcy (D-OH-9)	1630	x4146	CLW, CNFMP, FF
Kasich, John R. (R-OH-12)	724	x5355	
2 Kolter, Joseph R. (D-PA-4)	212	x2565	CLW, FC
1 Lehman, Richard (D-CA-18)	1319	x4540	FC
1 Levin, Sander (D-MI-17)	323	x4961	GP
1 Levine, Mel (D-CA-27)	502	x6451	FC, GP
5 Lewis, Tom (R-FL-12)	1313	x5792	GP
3 Lipinski, William (D-IL-5)	1222	x5701	CNFMP
5 McCain, John (R-AZ-1)	1123	x2635	UCS
5 McCandless, Al (R-CA-37)	510	x5330	ADA, CLW, FC
2 McCloskey, Francis (D-IN-8)	116	x4636	CNFMP
3 McKernan, John R. (R-ME-1)	1428	x6116	FOE, UCC
1 McNulty, Jim (D-AZ-5)	108	x2542	UCS
5 Mack, Connie (R-FL-13)	504	x2536	GP
3 MacKay, Kenneth H. (D-FL-6)	503	x5744	GP, UCC
3 Mollohan, Alan B. (D-WV-1)	515	x4171	ABC
1 Moody, Jim (D-WI-5)	1631	x3571	CNFMP, GP
1 Morrison, Bruce (D-CT-3)	437	x3661	CLW, WILPF
1 Mrazek, Robert J. (D-NY-3)	509	x5956	CLW, SANE, UCS
5 Nielson, Howard (D-UT-3)	1229	x7751	SANE
5 Olin, James R. (R-VA-5)	1207	x5431	UIA
Ortiz, Solomon (D-TX-27)	1524	x7142	
1 Owens, Major R. (D-NY-12)	114	x6221	CLW
5 Packard, Ron (R-CA-13)	51	x3906	FC, SANE

1	Penny, Timothy J. (D-MN-1)	501	x2472	CLW, CNFMP
1	Ray, Richard (D-GA-3)	514	x5901	
3	Reid, Harry (I-NV-1)	1711	x5965	CLW, MX *
1	Richardson, Bill (D-NM-3)	1610	x6190	FF, FCNL
3	Ridge, Thomas J. (R-PA-29)	1331	x5406	FC
	Rowland, J. Roy (D-GA-8)	513	x6531	
1	Sikorski, Gerry (D-MN-6)	414	x2271	CLW, CNFMP
	Sisisky, Norman (D-VA-4)	1429	x6365	
3	Slattery, Jim (D-KS-2)	1729	x6601	ABC, FC
3	Smith, Bob (R-OR-2)	118	x6730	GP
2	Smith, Larry (D-FL-16)	113	x7931	GP
	Spratt, John (D-SC-5)	1118	x5501	
	Staggers, Harley (D-WV-2)	1504	x4331	
	Sundquist, Don (R-TN-7)	515	x2811	
3	Tallon, Robert M. (D-SC-6)	128	x3315	CLW, FF
	Thomas, Lindsay (D-GA-1)	427	x5831	
1	Torres, Estaban (D-CA-34)	1740	x5256	FC, FF, GP
1	Torricelli, Robert (D-NJ-9)	317	x5061	ABC, FOE, UCS
1	Towns, Edolphus (D-NY-11)	1009	x5936	ABC
3	Valentine, Tim (D-NC-2)	1107	x4531	CNFMP
	Vandergriff, Tom (D-TX-26)	1529	x7772	
5	Vucanovich, Barbara (R-NV-2)	507	x6155	MX *
1	Wheat, Alan (D-MO-5)	1609	x4535	CLW
1	Wise, Bob (D-WV-3)	1725	x2711	CLW, FOE
3	Zschau, Edward (R-CA-12)	429	x5411	CLW, FC

NOTE: MX was assigned Nevada reps. + Colorado + 77. Mex  
+ Wyoming.

OFFICES ASSIGNED TO THREE OR MORE ORGANIZATIONS

HOUSE

Bonker	ADA, FOE, GP, UCS
Brown, G.	FC, FOE, GP, KM
Byron	ADA, KM, SANE, UCS
CONTE	FF, KM, UCC, UCS
COUGHLIN	CNFMP, FC, FOE, NET
D'Amours	FF, GP, KM, UCC
Daschle	FNCL, FOE, GP, JI
Dellums	FC, KM, NET, NASW
Dicks	ADA, GP, NET, UCC
Fascell	ADA, GP, KM, UCS
Fazio	ADA, FC, UCC, WILPF
Foglietta	ADA, FF, SANE, UCS
Lantos	ADA, FC, GP, UCS
LEACH	ADA, JI, UCC, UCS
Mavroules	ADA, FF, JI, SANE
Obey	ADA, FF, JI, UCC
PURSELL	CNFMP, GP, NET, UCS
SNOWE	ADA, CNFMP, UCC, UCS
Wirth	FF, FOE, SANE, UCC
Wolpe	ADA, CNFMP, FOE, KM
Zablocki	ADA, JI, KM, UCS
----	
Boxer	FC, FOE, KM, SANE

SENATE

Hart	ADA, FOE, JI, UCS
Levin	ADA, JI, NET, UCS

22/83

USE WHIP LIST: NUCLEAR FREEZE RES'M

KEY  
1: For Freeze Res  
2: Leaning For  
3: Undecided/Unknown  
4: Leaning Against  
5: Against Freeze Res

1 (173)					2 (39)					3 (29)					4 (41)					5 (50)																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																													
Abbo	Dymally	Kennelly	Patterson	Waxman	Alexander	Andrews (NC)	Barnard	Sundquist	Archer	Erlenborn	Loeffler	Rudd	aka	Early	Kildee	Pease	Weaver	Annunzio	Andrews (Tex)	Whitley	Dadham	Fiedler	Lott	Sawyer	bosta	Eckart	Kogovsek	Penny	Weiss	Apple	Bouquard	Wilson	Bartlett	Fields	Lowery	Sens' bren	erson	Edgar	Kostmayer	Pepper	Wheat	Baker	Bryant	Clingen	Bateman	Flippo	Lungren	Shaw	hony	Edwards (CA)	LaFalce	Perkins	Williams (MO)	Boncr	Coleman (TX)	Coleman	Franklin	McCollom	Shuster	Coin	Evans (IA)	Lantos	Rangel	Wirth	Cooper	Corcoran	Davis	Gilman	McCurdy	Shumway	rn	Evans (Ill)	Leach	Ratchford	Wise	Davis	Davis	de la Garza	Gingrich	McDonald	Skilton	ell	Fascell	Lehman (FL)	Richardson	Wolpe	delaware	Davis	English	Hatch	McEwen	Snyder	ilenson	Fazio	Lehman (CA)	Rinaldo	Wyden	delaware	Davis	Fish	Hatch	McGrath	Solomon	rman	Feighan	Leland	Rodino	Yates	delaware	Davis	Forsythe	Hatch	McGrath	Spence	land	Ferraro	Levin	Roe	Yatron	delaware	Davis	Burton D	Hatch	McGrath	Stangelan	rior	Foglietta	Lowry	Roybal	Young (MO)	delaware	Davis	Gradison	Hatch	McGrath	Stenholm	orker	Ford (MI)	Lundine	Russo	Zablocki	delaware	Davis	Hatcher	Hatch	McGrath	Tauzin	ski	Ford (TN)	McHugh	Sabo	Ortiz	delaware	Davis	Hefner	Hatch	McGrath	Taylor	co	Fowler	McKinney	St Germain	Rowland	delaware	Davis	Hubbard	Hatch	McGrath	Thomas (CA)	cher	Frank	McNulty	Savage	Sisisky	delaware	Davis	Jones (TE)	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	er	Garcia	Markey	Scheuer	Long (OK)	delaware	Davis	Jones (NC)	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	oks	Gaydos	Martinez	Schneider	Long (LA)	delaware	Davis	Kazen	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	own (CA)	Gejdenson	Matsui	Schroeder	Spratt	delaware	Davis	Levitas	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	ton P	Glickman	Mavroules	Schumer	Staggers	delaware	Davis	Lujan	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	er	Gray	Mazzoli	Schuberling	Thomas (GA)	delaware	Davis	McDade	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	ay	Green	Mikulski	Shannon	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Nelson	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	elho	Guarini	Miller (CA)	Sikorski	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	O'Brien	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	lins	Hall (OH)	Mineta	Simon	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Patman	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	te	Hall (IN)	Minish	Smith (IA)	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Ray	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	yers	Hamilton	Mitchell (MD)	Solarz	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Roth	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	me	Harkin	Moakley	Stark	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Siljander	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	ckett	Harrison	Moody	Stokes	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Smith D (OR)	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	chle	Hawkins	Morrison	Studds	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Wright	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	lums	Mcftel	Mrazek	Swift	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Wright	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	ks	Mertel	Murphy	Tauke	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Wright	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	gell	Horton	Neal	Torres	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Wright	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	on	Howard	Nowak	Torricelli	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Wright	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	nelly	Moyer	Oakar	Towns	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Wright	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	gan	Hughes	Oberstar	Traxler	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Wright	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	dy	Jacobs	Obey	Udall	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Wright	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	ney	Jeffords	Oettinger	Vento	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Wright	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	bin	Kaptur	Owens	Walgren	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Wright	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt	er	Kast'meier	Panetta	Washington	Thomas (WA)	delaware	Davis	Wright	Hatch	McGrath	Vander Jagt

--- Co-signed. 102 (2-22-83)

173  
3  
212

Doug Walker

MONDAY LOBBYING GROUP

Code	Name	Organization	Telephone	Status
UUA	Robert Alpern	Unitarians Universalists	547-0254	
NET	Catherine Brusseau	Nuclear Network	526-4070	c (3)
	James T. Bush	Center for Defense Information	484-9490	c (3)
FF	Wally Chalmers	Nuclear Freeze Foundation	544-2596	c (3)
CNFMP	Steve Daggett	Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy	546-8400	c (3)
FF	Lucinda Ebersole	Nuclear Freeze Foundation	544-2596	c (3)
UCC	Gretchen Eick	United Church of Christ	543-1517	
GP	Eric M. Fersht	Greenpeace	462-1177	c (3)
	Anne Gorsuch	Federation for American Scientists	546-3300	
FC	Par Harmon	Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign	544-0880	
CC	Jay Hedlund	Common Cause	833-1200	
CLW(JI)	John Issacs	Council for Livable World (JI)	543-4100	
	Lucille Kenny	Women Strike for Peace	543-2660	
	Arthur Klein	Center for Defense Information	484-9490	c (3)
SANE	Charlie Kraybill	SANE	546-7100	c (3)
FC	Reuben McCornack	Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign	544-0880	
CLW(KM)	Katherine Magraw	Council for a Liveable World (KM)	543-4100	
UCS	Charles Manafort	Union of Concerned Scientists	296-5600	
SANE	Michael Mawby	SANE	546-7100	c (3)
WILPF	Jane Midgley	Women's Int. League for Peace & Freedom	543-7110	
MX	April Moore	National Campaign to Stop the MX	546-2660	
	Karen Mulhauser	Citizens Against Nuclear War	822-7483	c (3) (applied)
	Christopher Paine	Federation for American Scientists	546-3300	
UCS	Joshua Sarnoff	Union of Concerned Scientists	296-5600	c (3)
PSR	Wendy Silverman	Physicians for Social Responsibility	547-7990	c (3)
FCN	Ed Snyder	Friends Committee on Nat. Legislation	547-6000	
ABC	Robert Tiller	American Baptist Church	544-3400	
	Edith Villastrego	Women's Strike for Peace	543-2660	
	<u>Doug Waller</u>	<u>Legislative Ast. to Congr. Markey</u>	225-2836	
ADA	Greg Weaver	Americans for Democratic Action	638-6447	
FOE	Steve Wheeler	Friends of the Earth	543-4312	c (3)



# common cause

2030 M STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D C 20036 (202) 833-1200

Archibald Cox  
Chairman

Fred Wertheimer  
President

John W. Gardner  
Founding Chairman

January 7, 1983

## Schedule for Monday Group Facilitators

### January

SANE - Mike Mawby 546-7100  
Friends of the Earth - Steve Wheeler 543-4312

### February

United Church of Christ - Gretchen Eick 543-1517  
Common Cause - Jay Hedlund and Kathleen Sheekey 833-1200

### March

Union of Concerned Scientists - Charles Monfort 296-5600  
Council for a Livable World - John Isaacs 543-4100

### April

Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy - Steve Daggett 546-  
United Church of Christ - Gretchen Eick 543-1517

## SCHEDULE OF MONDAY LOBBYING MEETINGS

JANUARY 10:

100 MARYLAND AVENUE, N.E.  
CONFERENCE ROOM 3

PLEASE NOTE CHANGE !!

JANUARY 17:

MOTT HOUSE  
122 MARYLAND AVENUE, N.E.

# COALITION

## For a New Foreign and Military Policy

120 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington D.C.  
(202) 546-8400

JANUARY 24:

MOTT HOUSE  
122 MARYLAND AVENUE, N.E.

JANUARY 31:

MOTT HOUSE  
122 MARYLAND AVENUE, N.E.

Following organizations are members of the Coalition: American Baptist Churches USA, National Ministers • American Friends Service Committee • Americans for Democratic Action • ... (text is small and partially obscured)



AV-20683-82-0-0  
Ms. Barbara Laing

Grantee: INDIVIDUAL

\*\*Approved Date: 2/82

\*\*Start Date: 5/1/82

\*\*End Date: 12/31/82

Chicago, IL 60625  
CONG. DISTRICT: 11

National Endowment for the Humanities

'Approved OR: 15,000.00

'Funded OR: 15,000.00

TITLE: Women of the Hague: An Historical Documentary of the  
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS:

To support production of a film on the history of the Women's  
International League for Peace and Freedom, a group founded in  
1915 by European women and led by Jane Addams.

Americans for Democratic Action

Consumer Affairs Committee

3005 Audubon Terrace, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008

AWARDING AGENCY: Dept. of Education CONTRACT #: 300800075  
DATES OF GRANT: 01/22/80 AMOUNT: \$1,710.00  
STATED PURPOSE: Purchase order for AP00 Education research and  
development - general.

AWARDING AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission GRANT #: N1504  
DATES OF GRANT: 07/11/79 - 09/81 AMOUNT: \$560.00  
STATED PURPOSE: Public Participation in Rulemaking

AWARDING AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission GRANT #: N0051  
DATES OF GRANT: 08/08/77 - 04/80 AMOUNT: \$41,173.00  
STATED PURPOSE: Public Participation in Rulemaking

AWARDING AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission GRANT #: N0045  
DATES OF GRANT: 01/05/77 - 11/81 AMOUNT: \$24,736.26  
STATED PURPOSE: Public Participation in Rulemaking

AWARDING AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission GRANT #: N0048  
DATES OF GRANT: 06/09/77 - 09/79 AMOUNT: \$19,279.24  
STATED PURPOSE: Public Participation in Rulemaking

AWARDING AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission GRANT #: N0056  
DATES OF GRANT: 10/20/77 - 09/81 AMOUNT: \$17,445.34  
STATED PURPOSE: Public Participation in Rulemaking

AWARDING AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission GRANT #: N0029  
DATES OF GRANT: 06/14/76 - 02/77 AMOUNT: \$7,648.85  
STATED PURPOSE: Public Participation in Rulemaking

AWARDING AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission GRANT #: N0011  
DATES OF GRANT: 05/06/76 AMOUNT: \$52,23.07  
STATED PURPOSE: Public Participation in Rulemaking

Friends of the Earth *Aut Ric Pitt*  
124 Spear Street, San Francisco, Ca. 94105

See also: Environmental Coalition

AWARDING AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency GRANT #: T901313010  
DATES OF GRANT: 02/15/81 - 04/15/81 AMOUNT: \$1,345.00  
STATED PURPOSE:

AWARDING AGENCY: Dept. of Energy GRANT #: FG03-79PE70154  
DATES OF GRANT: 10/01/79 - 09/30/80 AMOUNT: \$30,000.00  
STATED PURPOSE: International soft energy project.

SANE Education Fund  
(Scientists Against Nuclear Energy)

AWARDING AGENCY: National Endowment for the Humanities GRANT #: N/A  
DATES OF GRANT: Fiscal Year 1980 AMOUNT: \$14,805.00  
STATED PURPOSE: Thirteen half-hour radio programs on 'Americans at Work' ....including treatment of values and beliefs.

AWARDING AGENCY: National Endowment for the Humanities GRANT #: N/A  
DATES OF GRANT: Fiscal Year 1980 AMOUNT: \$12,700.00  
STATED PURPOSE: Thirteen weekly radio shows on the impact of nuclear weapons on American culture.

AWARDING AGENCY: National Endowment for the Humanities GRANT #: N/A (renewal)  
DATES OF GRANT: Fiscal Year 1979 AMOUNT: \$92,751.00  
STATED PURPOSE: Thirteen weekly radio shows to examine the impact of nuclear weapons on American culture.

Union of Concerned Scientists

1725 I Street, N.W., Suite 506, Washington, D.C. 20006

AWARDING AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission GRANT #: N2011  
DATES OF GRANT: 05/11/79 - 09/81 AMOUNT: \$4,837.60  
STATED PURPOSE: Public participation in rule-making.

Dec. 25, 1982

Identified as co-sponsors of the curriculum are the Massachusetts Teachers Association, an NEA affiliate, and the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), a radical group that boasts of support from Paul Warnke, former Sen. George McGovern's disarmament adviser. Both the NEA and the UCS favor a U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze and oppose development of major weapons systems such as the MX missile.

NEA headquarters in Washington is the home base for Citizens Against Nuclear War (CAN), a new coalition of groups that supports a nuclear freeze and favors cancellation of the U.S. civil defense program. NEA Executive Director Terry Hopwood is the president of CAN.

Under the "organizations" heading, the Coalition for ~~Non-Forear~~ and Military Policy, Ground Zero, the COUNCIL FOR A Livable World, and Members of Congress for Peace Through Law (MCPL) are listed. But the American Security Council's Coalition for Peace Through Strength, which boasts more than twice as many congressional members as MCPL, is not.

→ The list of organizations even includes the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, a group that follows the Soviet line and whose parent organization has been identified by the State Department as a Soviet front.

Included with the curriculum is a document prepared for teachers by the Union of Concerned Scientists, titled, "Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War: A Study Guide."

From Human Events

The National Council of Churches of Christ, U.S.A.  
475 Riverside Drive, Room 572, New York, N.Y. 10027

The National and World Councils of Churches, according to the liberal publication Seven Days, "...has funded social change at home and liberation movements abroad (in 1980, the Council recommended recognition for the Palestine Liberation Organization)...raised bail money for activists, including American Indian Movement leaders Russell Means and Dennis Banks, and supported the Puerto Rican independence movement as well as guerilla groups in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau."

AWARDING AGENCY: Dept. of Energy                          GRANT #: FG01-79IR10832  
 DATES OF GRANT: 09/21/79 - 09/20/80                      AMOUNT: \$428,000.00  
 STATED PURPOSE: Energy education project.

AWARDING AGENCY: Dept. of Energy                          GRANT #: FG01-81CA10010  
 DATES OF GRANT: 01/08/81 - 03/01/81                      AMOUNT: \$10,000.00  
 STATED PURPOSE: Preparation of graphic materials relevant to energy planning.

AWARDING AGENCY: Dept. of Labor                          CONTRACT #: 99-8-1875-12-04  
 DATES OF GRANT: 03/10/80 - 04/10/81                      AMOUNT: \$435,775.00  
 STATED PURPOSE: CETA - National Emphasis

AWARDING AGENCY: Dept. of Labor                          CONTRACT #: 99-8-1875-12-4  
 DATES OF GRANT: 09/11/78 - 03/10/80                      AMOUNT: \$500,000.00  
 STATED PURPOSE:

AWARDING AGENCY: National Endowment                      GRANT #: 02-3411-0205  
                                 for the Arts  
 DATES OF GRANT: Fiscal Year 1980                          AMOUNT: \$15,000.00  
 STATED PURPOSE:

AMERICAN BAPTIST CHURCH

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST

} AFFILIATED WITH NCC

National Association of Social Workers  
Committee on Women's Issues  
1425 H Street, N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20005

Carol Sheffer, Senior Staff Associate

AWARDING AGENCY: Dept. of Education GRANT #: G008001008  
DATES OF GRANT: 03/27/81 AMOUNT: \$116,000.00  
STATED PURPOSE: Handicapped - personnel preparation.

AWARDING AGENCY: Adm. Children, Youth GRANT #: 90-CW-2039  
& Families (H.H.S.)  
DATES OF GRANT: 09/30/80 - 09/29/81 AMOUNT: \$190,866.00  
STATED PURPOSE: To examine status of declassification trends in  
child welfare/social service personnel employment  
in public agencies.

AWARDING AGENCY: Office of the Secretary GRANT #: 13.608  
Dept. of H.H.S.  
DATES OF GRANT: Fiscal Year 1980 AMOUNT: \$190,866.00  
STATED PURPOSE: Child welfare research and demonstration grants.

AWARDING AGENCY: Office of the Secretary GRANT #: 13.628  
Dept. of H.H.S.  
DATES OF GRANT: Fiscal Year 1980 AMOUNT: \$192,956.00  
STATED PURPOSE: Child abuse and neglect-prevention and treatment.

# URGENT



PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY  
PRESIDENT  
68 FAIRMOUNT  
ALTON, ILLINOIS 62002  
(618) 462-5415

## EAGLE FORUM

LEADING THE PRO-FAMILY MOVEMENT SINCE 1972

316 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., S.E., SUITE 203, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003. (202) 544-0353

March 10, 1983

Dear Senator,

I was shocked to discover that you personally are on a "lobbying assignment" hit list prepared by a special-interest group trying to masquerade as a spontaneous grassroots movement. This political machine is hoping that visits to your office can create the illusion that they represent the majority of your constituents back home.

This campaign of manipulation is directed by a secretive, highly-coordinated nucleus of nuclear-freeze/anti-defense groups known as the "Monday Group." It meets every Monday at Mott House, 122 Maryland Ave., N.E. Of the 18 Monday Group organizations represented on the Lobbying List, one-half are either 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organizations (which are supposed to be non-political and non-lobbying), or they have a convenient in-house (c)(3) organization which uses the same equipment and people and has the same purposes.

In addition, at least four of these organizations involved in this political-advocacy campaign have received substantial funding from federal taxes, and four others received some federal benefits. They share the same Maryland Avenue address in Washington, D.C.

Other interesting members of the Monday strategy group include Gene LaRocque's Center for Defense Information, the Women's Strike for Peace, and a legislative assistant from the office of Congressman Markey who is sponsoring a freeze bill.

The enclosed materials show how you have been identified on this secret Lobbying List, and which groups are targeting you personally. The enclosed information also includes the overall "lobby strategy," the "time line" up to now, the integrated anti-defense "organizational priorities," the on-going political agenda, and how you are classified on their "Senate Lobbying List" for the freeze resolution.

I urge you to inspect this authentic information on the upcoming resolution, which has been leaked by someone who participated in the Group and is privately disenchanted. Whether you are for or against the idea of a U.S. freeze, their tactics reveal the freeze lobbyists as part of a well-oiled, professionally-orchestrated effort, rather than a movement supported by the American people.

The Congress has the awesome responsibility to fulfill its constitutional duty to provide for the common defense. We pray that the members of Congress will not be deceived into thinking that a professionally-manipulated lobbying campaign represents the majority of Americans. We believe that the overwhelming majority of the American people are not represented by the freeze lobbyists.

Sincerely,

3-7-83

Dear Leonard,

Enclosed is a sample of our  $\frac{1}{2}$  million  
petitions and promotions.

Sincerely,  
Trist

**TELL**

P. O. Box 83, Morrisville, Pennsylvania, 19067



Would you be kind enough to lend your support in addition to our effort in behalf of strengthening President Reagan's offensive against Communism, Socialism, and One-worldism.

We have enclosed our most recent, unprofessional solicitation for signatures in favor of the president's programs.


The lack of cooperation and support given to the president by major media is noticeably poor and it is apparent that media's intention is to destroy whatever effort the president expounds for the good of America.

Please, together with us, register your desire and intent to obtain a strong America as existed in years gone by.

We, further, request you contact your associates and direct them to us so that we might enlist their help.

Thank you for your assistance and cooperation.

Sincerely,

  
Dan O'Malley

**TELL**

P. O. Box 83, Morrisville, Pennsylvania, 19067

# Group TELLing all to reject the freeze

By Jack Shandle  
*Courier Times Staff Writer*

During the long wait for results of the Coyne-Kostmayer race at Bucks County Republican headquarters on election night, more than a few observers were wondering about the group of well-groomed young people wearing black name-tags with TELL Inc. inscribed on them.

Trish Byron of Bensalem Township was spokesperson for the 20 TELL members who attended the gathering. She described the group as "pro-God and pro-American."

TELL's chief issue in recent months has been the advisability of the United States and the Soviet Union freezing the nuclear weapons race. The group is against it unless American negotiators are sure it comes at "verifiably equal levels," Miss Byron said.

During the past eight months, many young people have become actively interested in TELL because of its stand against the freeze. "Youth took right to it," she said. "It's a fact we even had little kids wanting to sign the petition we've been circulating because they think we should be armed."

In Bucks County, TELL has about 50 people actively involved in the anti-freeze movement. It has collected about 100,000 signatures nationwide, she said, and hopes to raise that number to 1 million by Christmas, when it plans to present the petition to President Reagan.

TELL, by the way, is a shorthand version of "tell the truth," she said. Although the group is ostensibly non-political, Miss Byron acknowledged that most of its support was directed toward Republican

candidates in this election, and specifically to Republican Congressman James K. Coyne.

"We support Mr. Coyne and the president on the nuclear freeze issue all the way," she said. "We got involved with Mr. Coyne because everything he stands for is pro-American."

TELL's volunteers backed up their commitment by doing traditional political chores such as literature drops. "Wherever Jim Coyne needed us, that's where we were," she said.

TELL is also emphatically pro-life as far as the the abortion issue is concerned. Although the group is not "church-based," she said, "we do believe God is at the base of this country — it doesn't matter what religion. We feel the life of an unborn child is sacred."



perfect timing for coming senate vote.

# PETITION

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
IN SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REARMAMENT PROGRAM

Whereas, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has a 55 year long history of consistently violating the treaties and agreements made between that nation and other nations of the free world, and

Whereas, qualified experts have testified that there is no sure way of preventing the U.S.S.R. from violating any Treaty or launching an atomic missile attack against the United States,

We, the undersigned citizens of this nation do hereby petition our elected members of the United States Senate to vote against any treaty, agreement or nuclear freeze in any form, and further

We petition all members of the United States Senate to use all their power and influence to protect the future sovereignty of this nation through an improved and expanded strength of all our military forces.

NAME	ADDRESS	CITY	STATE	ZIP
Christina Kovacs	118 Ripka St	Phila.	Pa.	19127
Danil Boy	2938 MONTGOMERY AVE	ASHLAND	KY	41101
Susan Singer	"	"	"	"
Jon Lucas	3608 Wheeler Ave	Louisville, Ky.		40215
Jeanne Berger	"	"	"	"
Kass Hamilton	450 Edgewood St	Hartford	CT	06112
Adel Spitzer	135 Kinsler	Athens, Ga.	Ga.	30604
Alexander Fishman	3416 Chestnut St	Phila	Pa.	19104
Joseph S. ...	7629 Broad ...	Phila	Pa.	19152
John W. ...	Route 2	...	Pa.	17552
Joseph ...	108 Tremont Rd	...	...	08012
Janet ...	283 High St.	Boston, Ma.		
Alice ...	253 High St.	Boston, Ma.		
John ...	3029 Derry Place	Phila Pa.		19154
Thomas M. ...	513 Burgess St	Phila Pa		19116

**ELL**

Post Office Box 83, Morrisville, Pennsylvania, 19067

# COULD THE PEACE MOVEMENT EXIST IN MOSCOW

"A WAR BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM IS INEVITABLE. TODAY, WE ARE TOO WEAK TO ATTACK. IN 20 TO 30 YEARS WE WILL BE READY. AT THAT TIME WE WILL LULL THE CAPITALISTS TO SLEEP BY LAUNCHING THE MOST SPECTACULAR PEACE OFFENSIVE EVER WITNESSED BY MAN. THE CAPITALISTS, BEING STUPID, WILL JUMP WITH JOY AND ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS AND CONCESSIONS OF PEACE. WE WILL THEN CRUSH THEM UNMERCIFULLY WITH OUR CLENCHED FIST." Spoken by Soviet leader, Past President of the United Nations Security Council, General Council, Dimitri Manuilski. (1959, Lenin School for Senior Communists)

**NO BUT IT WAS PLANNED  
THERE**

# 75 000 SIGN FOR REARMAMENT PRIEST-NUNS-MINISTERS REJECT RELIGIOUS PRESSURE

Dear Friend:

We feel that President Reagan's pro-american stand has not been properly presented or fostered by the communication's media.

In the space of two months fifty parents and children produced 25,000 petitions and signatures in favor of America and President Reagan's stand on rearming our country. Their effort has caused the co-operation of 7 organizations whose feelings are similar to ours.

Jointly, our children, parents and the new groups have produced to date 75,000 signatures in favor of America and President Reagan.

We are requesting your co-operation to support President Reagan's program, most emphatically his Rearmament Program which would insure the safety of our country and people against Communist Russia and its satellites.

Please sign and return the Petition to Tell.

Thank you.



Dan O'Malley


## Land of the Free

Tell, Inc., P.O. Box 83, Morrisville, Pa. 19067

# TELL

P. O. Box 83, Morrisville, Pennsylvania, 19067

# THE SOVIET UNION NEEDS YOU!



## SUPPORT A U.S. "NUCLEAR FREEZE"

ed by the Toll-free Republican National Committee

TELL, INC. P. O. BOX 83 MORRISVILLE, PA., 17067

OR

SIGN THIS PETITION FOR AMERICA

DEAR PRESIDENT REAGAN:

WE ARE AWARE OF THE PRESENT RELIGIOUS SALT II EFFORT.

PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT WE SUPPORT YOUR REARMAMENT PROGRAM.

THANK YOU.

LE- [handwritten] name  
 220 [handwritten] address  
 [handwritten] city, state, zip code

SEND POST CARD TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

## Land of the Free

Dear Friend:

Fifty school children and their parents have produced 25,000 signatures in support of President Reagan's Rearmament Program. This was accomplished at the height of the recent Communist Nuclear Freeze Movement. Considering the complete support rendered by Major Media to the World Religious Cartel, who spearheaded the communist



attempt to formulate public opinion, we feel this representation is the true and accurate sentiments of the American people.

We would continue with our non-professional poll throughout every state in our country, if you feel this support of our president's Rearmament Program is necessary. Please advise.

*Dan O'Malley*

a public service in behalf of the people of America.

**TELL**

TELL, INC.

P. O. BOX 83

MORRISVILLE, PA., 19067

# Land of the Free

WHERE IS THE CONSERVATIVE EFFORT?  
COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

10,000,000 COPIES



PROMINENT COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS HAVE DISTRIBUTED APPROXIMATELY TEN MILLION COPIES OF THE ABOVE PROPAGANDA THROUGHOUT THE PENNA. - NEW JERSEY - NEW YORK AREA CONDEMNING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REARMAMENT PROGRAM AND PROMOTING A NUCLEAR FREEZE.

The world religious cartel, using the Inter-faith people, has supported this communist attempt to have the American people accept a religious Salt II. Organized religion has distributed hundreds of thousands of copies of the above propaganda through their synagogues, churches, schools and societies. Cardinals, bishops, monsignors, priests, nuns, ministers and rabbis have publicly lectured in favor of the disarmament of America and condemned President Reagan's effort to strengthen our country.

## TELL

COUNTERATTACKS WITH  
75,000 SIGNATURES

Jointly, our children, parents and the new groups have produced to date 75,000 signatures in favor of America and President Reagan. We are requesting your co-operation to support President Reagan's program, most emphatically his Rearmament Program which would insure the safety of our country and people against Communist Russia and its satellites.

Please sign and send to our president the attached petition.  
Thank you.

Sincerely,

*Dan O'Malley*  
Dan O'Malley

For add'l information contact Tell, Inc., P.O. Box 83, Morrisville, Pa. 19067

detach

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D. C., 20500

DEAR PRESIDENT REAGAN:

WE ARE AWARE OF THE PRESENT  
EFFORT.

PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT WE SUPPORT  
REARMAMENT PROGRAM.

THANK YOU.

name Robert J. Davis  
address 1601 Terrose Ave  
city, state, zip code P.H. Terrose

SEND POST CARD TO PRESIDENT REAGAN



*Morton  
Blackwell*

# PEACEPAC

FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

100 MARYLAND AVENUE, N.E. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

Paul Warnke, Chairman

TO: Activists for the Prevention of Nuclear War

FROM: Paul Warnke, Former Chief U.S. SALT Negotiator *Paul C. Warnke*

SUBJECT: How to elect a U.S. Congress in 1982 committed to freezing and reducing nuclear arms.

This year, we have the best opportunity we have had in many years to make significant progress in controlling the menace of nuclear weapons.

All over the country millions of people -- in town and city council meetings, on college campuses, in churches, in state legislatures -- are now activated to run petition drives, ballot referenda and other citizen action programs to let our government know that we want an end to the nuclear arms race.

Yet all of this effort will be in vain unless we can elect a Congress in 1982 that shares this commitment and is willing to act on it.

We do not have such a Congress now!

- The recent key vote on a Nuclear Freeze Resolution failed by the smallest of margins, 204-202. The MX missile barely survived, 212-209.
- A clear majority of the 435 members of the House of Representatives must get behind the Nuclear Freeze Resolution -- and get it implemented -- in order to achieve meaningful arms control.
- Our current Congress has given its early approval to the Reagan Administration's request for massive increases in military spending -- including billions for the development of new nuclear weapons -- including the MX missile and sea and land-launched cruise missiles that will only escalate the arms race.

---

#### PEACE PAC Board of Directors

Ranny Cooper, Executive Director, Women's Campaign Fund · William Dodds, Former Political Director, United Auto Workers · Robert F. Drinan, Former U.S. Representative · John Kenneth Galbraith, Professor of Economics, Harvard University · Jerome Grossman, President, Council for a Livable World · William Holayter, Political Director, International Association of Machinists · John Isaacs, Legislative Director, Council for a Livable World · George Kistiakowsky, Chief Science Advisor to President Eisenhower · Admiral John M. Lee, U.S. Navy (retired) · Herbert Scoville, Jr., President, Arms Control Association · Stephen M. Thomas, Political Consultant · Paul C. Warnke, Former Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Chief U.S. SALT Negotiator · Edith Wilkie, Executive Director, Members of Congress for Peace Through Law. Affiliations for Identification Only.

Can we translate the current public interest in nuclear arms control into tangible legislative accomplishments?

We can and we must if 1982 is to be the beginning of a new era in world peace.

That is why I have joined with others to begin a new and different kind of political action committee.

We have called it PEACE PAC. It has one purpose and one purpose only -- to elect a Congress committed to the prevention of nuclear war.

This is how it will work:

- PEACE PAC was organized as an affiliate of the Council for a Livable World, founded in 1962 by nuclear scientists concerned with the menace of nuclear war. Since its inception in 1962, the Council has provided more than 2 1/2 million dollars to candidates for the U.S. Senate.

Recognizing the increasing importance of the House of Representatives on such issues as measures to freeze and reduce nuclear arms and military spending, the Council for a Livable World helped organize PEACE PAC to support candidates for the House.

To launch PEACE PAC, the Council is providing operating expenses so that maximum contributions can be made by PEACE PAC to deserving candidates in critical House campaigns.

- We are asking people like you to join with us in giving your financial support to create a political action fund that will be used to support candidates for the House, regardless of party, who will work to prevent nuclear war.
- By pooling contributions from thousands of people committed to nuclear arms control, we will be able to provide financial support to candidates -- support that will help to counter the huge political warchests of those opposed to nuclear arms control. It is no surprise that the very candidates PEACE PAC will support are those most vehemently opposed by the Right Wing political action committees.



- In addition to financial assistance, PEACE PAC will provide candidates with research support on nuclear issues and military spending and will assist selected campaigns in reaching committed individuals to act as campaign volunteers.

PEACE PAC has already announced the first group of candidates it will support in 1982. All are fighting for the nuclear freeze resolution and have demonstrated leadership on issues of international peace. They include:

1. Mike Barnes (incumbent - Maryland) Barnes is Chairman of the House subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs where he has opposed current Administration policies on military involvement and covert activities in Latin America.
2. David Bonior (incumbent - Michigan) Bonior has been a leader in the House opposing the resumption of the production of chemical weapons by the U.S.
3. George Brown, Jr. (incumbent - California) Brown is a high-ranking member of the Science and Technology Committee of the House where he has fought attempts to extend the arms race into space.
4. Bob Carr (challenger - Michigan) Carr is trying to recapture a seat he lost in the Reagan landslide. While in the House, he was an activist member of the Armed Services Committee supporting nuclear arms control and reduced military spending.
5. Tom Downey (incumbent - New York) Downey is an expert in the House on the military budget and has focused recently on eliminating the first strike Trident II missile.
6. Dennis Eckart (incumbent - Ohio) Eckart has been the leader on nuclear proliferation issues in the House of Representatives.
7. Bob Edgar (incumbent - Pennsylvania) Like all of the endorsees, Edgar is a signer of the nuclear freeze resolution in the House of Representatives. He has focused on alleviation of world hunger.
8. Frances Farley (challenger - Utah) Ms. Farley led the fight against the MX deployment in Utah.
9. Barney Frank (incumbent - Massachusetts) Frank is an eloquent spokesperson for nuclear arms control in the House of Representatives.

10. Sam Gejdenson (incumbent - Connecticut) Gejdenson is one of the sponsors and leading supporters of the bill opposing U.S. production of chemical weapons.

11. Jim Leach (incumbent - Iowa) Leach has been a leader in the opposition to U.S. chemical arms production, the MX missile, and expansion of the discredited nuclear civil defense programs.

12. Ruth McFarland (challenger - Oregon) Ms. McFarland was a co-sponsor of the nuclear freeze resolution in the Oregon legislature and is trying to unseat hawkish Denny Smith.

13. Matthew F. McHugh (incumbent - New York) McHugh has fought for international human rights and was an organizer of the nuclear freeze debate in the U.S. House of Representatives.

14. Claudine Schneider (incumbent - Rhode Island) Rep. Schneider was one of the organizers of the historic nuclear freeze debate in the House and chairs the arms control committee of the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

15. Paul Simon (incumbent - Illinois) Simon has been a consistent leader in the House in the fight against the MX missile. He was previously a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

16. Howard Wolpe (incumbent - Michigan) Wolpe is the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa.

With your support, PEACE PAC will be endorsing and assisting many other candidates in the 1982 elections. Our support will go only to candidates supporting nuclear arms control, only to those races where our support can make a difference, and only to those races where there is a clear difference between candidates.

Please join with me as an early sponsor of PEACE PAC.

We are at a very critical time in the struggle for a world safe from the threat of nuclear war.

All of our great gains in public and media interest in the nuclear issue will be lost unless we are able to translate it into concrete political action.

I urge you to join PEACE PAC by sending your contribution as soon as possible.

With your help, 1982 can be a landmark year in American politics -- the year in which we turn away from nuclear confrontation and toward a rational and safe world of the future.

Let's not miss this opportunity.

## Peace Political Action Committee

### Questionnaire For Candidates On National Security And Arms Control Issues

As a candidate for Congress in 1982, I will support efforts to develop national security and arms control policies for the United States that avoid nuclear confrontation and waste of resources.

Specifically, I will support:

\_\_\_\_\_ An immediate, verified, mutual freeze on the testing, construction and deployment of new nuclear weapons by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

\_\_\_\_\_ Continuous negotiations by the Reagan Administration with the Soviet Union to reduce existing nuclear weapons and to prevent nuclear war.

\_\_\_\_\_ The stated policy of the Reagan Administration to abide by the SALT II limits as long as the Soviet Union does.

\_\_\_\_\_ The termination of the MX missile program.

\_\_\_\_\_ The termination of the B-1 program.

\_\_\_\_\_ A continuation in force of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that limits the deployment of new ABM systems.

\_\_\_\_\_ A negotiated end to *all* nuclear testing by the United States, the Soviet Union and other nuclear powers.

\_\_\_\_\_ Efforts to limit the huge increase in military spending planned over the next five years.

## PEACE PAC Board of Directors

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Executive Director  
Women's Campaign Fund

**William Dodds**  
Former Political Director  
United Auto Workers

**Robert F. Drinan**  
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Professor of Economics  
Harvard University

**Jerome Grossman**  
President  
Council for a Livable World

**William Holayter**  
Political Director  
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**George Kistiakowsky**  
Chief Science Advisor to  
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**Admiral John M. Lee**  
U.S. Navy (retired)

**Herbert Scoville, Jr.**  
President  
Arms Control Association

**Stephen M. Thomas**  
Political Consultant

**Paul C. Warnke**  
Former Director of U.S. Arms  
Control and Disarmament  
Agency and Chief U.S.  
SALT Negotiator


**Edith Wilkie**  
Executive Director  
Members of Congress  
for Peace Through Law

*Affiliations for  
Identification Only.*

PEACE PAC is supported entirely by donations from individuals throughout the country. Your contribution is urgently needed to support candidates for Congress committed to nuclear arms control.

PEACE PAC  
100 Maryland Avenue, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20002

Paid for by PEACE PAC.  
A copy of our report is filed with, and available from, the Federal Election Commission.



100 MARYLAND AVENUE, N.E. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

# PEACEPAC



## For The Prevention Of Nuclear War...

PEACE PAC is the only grassroots political action committee supporting candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives who are committed to specific nuclear arms control measures and the prevention of nuclear war.

### How It Started

PEACE PAC is an affiliate of the Council for a Livable World, founded in 1962 by nuclear scientists concerned about the menace of nuclear war.

Since its inception in 1962, the Council has provided more than 2½ million dollars to candidates for the U.S. Senate. More than 60,000 people in 50 states support the Council.

Recognizing the increasing importance of the House of Representatives on such issues as measures to freeze nuclear arms and military spending, the Council for a Livable World helped organize PEACE PAC to support candidates for the House.

To launch PEACE PAC, the Council is providing operating expenses so that

maximum contributions can be made by PEACE PAC to deserving candidates in critical campaigns.

### How Will Candidates Be Selected?


1. PEACE PAC research staff will review Congressional races throughout the country to identify candidates deserving support, regardless of party.
2. Candidates will also be recommended by PEACE PAC contributors and by cooperating organizations.
3. Candidates will complete and sign a questionnaire on nuclear arms control and military spending.
4. To be selected for support by PEACE PAC, candidates must support measures to freeze the nuclear arms race, reduce nuclear weapons and diminish the risk of nuclear war. They must also have demonstrated leadership on the issues of arms control and military spending.
5. PEACE PAC's Board of Directors will make the final decisions for support. The Board was chosen to represent a wide range of political and scientific expertise.

### What Kind Of Support Is Provided?

Candidates selected for PEACE PAC support will receive financial contributions for their campaigns, research and speech material prepared by PEACE PAC staff, and the organizational support of PEACE PAC in reaching and organizing committed individuals in their districts.

A clear majority of the 435 members of the House of Representatives must get behind the Nuclear Freeze Resolution—and get it implemented in order to achieve meaningful arms control.

218 votes are needed





*Statement of*  
*The American Legion*

1608 K STREET, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

by

ALAN M. OLSZEWSKI, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION  
THE AMERICAN LEGION

and

HARRY E. B. SULLIVAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMISSION  
THE AMERICAN LEGION

before the

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

on

NUCLEAR FREEZE PROPOSALS

FEBRUARY 17, 1983

STATEMENT OF HARRY E.B. SULLIVAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMISSION  
THE AMERICAN LEGION  
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
FEBRUARY 17, 1983

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

The American Legion welcomes the opportunity to present its views on the vital matter of nuclear arms control. Decisions likely to be made in the next year or two on modernization of U.S. nuclear deterrent forces and on nuclear arms control measures will significantly shape future U.S.-Soviet strategic interrelationships.

As the nation's largest veterans' organization, The American Legion has taken an active interest in foreign policy and national security policy since its inception in 1919. Representing over 2.6 million veterans, who have personally experienced the dangers and horrors of warfare while defending freedom during periods of conflict, we seek a world peace that is conducive to justice, freedom, and democracy. Last spring our National Executive Committee recognized the centrality of the nuclear debate by adopting a resolution calling for the Legion to participate actively in an informed, objective, and balanced public debate on the proper role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy.

We believe any discussion of nuclear arms control must consider:

- Strategic developments over the past decade.
- Requirements for a sound nuclear arms policy.
- Shortcomings inherent in any proposal for an immediate nuclear freeze.

STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS. During the past decade, when detente largely replaced containment as the basis of U.S. policy, the United States experienced a precipitate decline in its strategic balance with the Soviet Union.

In that period, the Soviet Union developed and deployed a vast number of new strategic weapons as part of the largest military buildup in history. In real terms, the Soviets increased their military spending by 40% while American defense spending declined. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown aptly characterized this asymmetry, "When we build, they build; when we don't build, they build."

Since 1972 the United States, in addition to deploying the upgraded Minuteman III ICBM, has introduced only three new strategic weapons-- the Trident missile and submarine and the air-launched cruise missile. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has introduced three new ICBMs, the Typhoon and Delta ballistic missile submarines, several new types of submarine-launched missiles, and the Backfire bomber. Relative restraint by the United States met with an all-out buildup by the Soviet Union.

The most serious and hazardous development in the strategic balance over the last decade has been the deployment of the Soviets' SS-18 heavy missile, which has made our land-based ICBMs vulnerable to destruction in their silos. Thus, the credibility of the most reliable element of our nuclear triad has been greatly decreased if not eliminated.

Similar unfavorable developments have occurred in the area of theater nuclear missiles. Soviet deployment of the mobile, accurate SS-20 missile created a new psychological and military threat to NATO Europe. Understanding the need to offset the SS-20 threat, in 1979 NATO requested the United States to deploy Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles as a deterrent measure unless the SS-20s could be removed through negotiations. By this action, Western European leaders recognized the Soviet SS-20 deployments as a major disturbance to the balance of forces in Europe.

The massive Soviet military buildup has been accompanied by frequent Soviet direct or indirect aggression in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Poland. Furthermore, in addition to allegations that the Soviets have

violated some provisions of both the ratified SALT I agreement and the unratified SALT II proposal, there is convincing evidence that the Soviets have violated chemical and biological warfare agreements with their use of "yellow rain" in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Laos.

In addition to the foregoing developments, it is always imperative to recall that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian dictatorship tolerating no dissent. The USSR has no independent voices calling for nuclear arms control; no massive, non-governmental demonstrations; no interest groups urging a re-examination of nuclear policy.

In sum, then, after a decade of detente, the strategic situation encompassed aging U.S. nuclear forces, a Soviet first-strike capability against U.S. ICBMs, a significant new threat to NATO Europe, increasing Soviet expansionism, and numerous indicators of Soviet willingness to violate arms control agreements.

REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR ARMS POLICY. The prerequisite for effective American nuclear strategy at this time is to recognize that deterrence has worked extremely well for almost four decades. Superpower conflict has been avoided, permitting the United States, Western Europe, Japan, Korea and some other nations of the free world to achieve unparalleled economic growth, matched in some instances by the development of democracy. In order to restore and maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, while working toward reduced levels of armament, four sequential steps are required:

First, the United States must modernize its nuclear forces to restore the efficacy of its nuclear deterrent triad. This modernization will require developing an invulnerable ICBM force, upgrading the nuclear bomber fleet, and completing the Trident submarine program. To both ally and adversary, maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent across the entire spectrum of capabilities is indispensable.



Second, the United States must offset the Soviet SS-20 missile threat to NATO Europe, preferably through arms negotiations but through deployment if necessary. We prefer the zero option which is being pursued at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks because it would eliminate a new class of theater missiles on both sides. However, we realize some solution between the zero option and the Andropov offer is likely, particularly in view of developments during Vice President Bush's recent trip to Western Europe. The Soviets are employing a variety of political stratagems, including threats, public diplomacy, and enticements to prevent deployment of the Pershing II and Tomahawk I missiles. To avoid an ignominious political defeat, the United States should accept no solution leaving more SS-20s in place than existed at the onset of the INF talks.

Third, having restored a credible nuclear deterrent force and offset the Soviet SS-20 ploy, the United States would be in a sound position to negotiate significant, mutual, equitable, verifiable reductions in nuclear forces with the Soviet Union. Such reductions, as are currently proposed in the U.S. START proposals, would mark the first time that offensive nuclear weapons would actually be eliminated and not replaced.

Fourth, after achieving mutual reductions, a nuclear freeze would serve to prevent subsequent expansion of nuclear forces by either side. This nuclear freeze would be one arrived at from a position of equality between the superpowers; therefore, the likelihood of cheating by either side would be reduced.

In all arms control agreements, we urge absolute insistence on the strictest measures to ensure compliance by both sides, including the fullest consideration of on-site inspection.

DANGERS OF AN IMMEDIATE NUCLEAR FREEZE.

The American Legion is convinced that calls for an immediate nuclear freeze are unwise because they essentially advocate an over-simplified approach to the problems of arms control. We believe an immediate nuclear freeze would:

- Lock-in current Soviet advantages by preventing necessary modernization of U.S. nuclear forces. Vulnerability of U.S. ICBM's would continue.

- Undercut U.S. leadership in NATO because the huge Soviet SS-20 missile force would be left in place by a freeze without any offset. In effect, the United States would be renegeing on its 1979 adherence to NATO's "dual track" decision.

- Remove the Soviets' incentive to negotiate reductions in nuclear forces. The history of past nuclear arms negotiations shows that the Soviets only negotiate seriously when faced with an American initiative based on superior technology.

- Create opportunities for further upset of the super-powers' strategic relationship by freezing offensive weapons but not defensive systems, such as air defense and submarine detection. Technological breakthroughs in either area by the Soviets would put part of the U.S. nuclear deterrent triad at risk.

For these reasons, an immediate nuclear freeze would be harmful to U.S. national security. We were extremely pleased, therefore, by The New York Times editorial of October 24, 1982 entitled "Against the Freeze Referendums." The editorial stated that "the freeze remains a simplistic, sloganeering response to a complex issue....notwithstanding our strong commitment to arms control, we urge a vote against it....The political effect, of course, is to put relatively greater pressure on the United States than the Soviet Union, which surpresses its own freeze movements."

Although current proposals in the United States for a nuclear freeze do not advocate adoption of a unilateral freeze by the United States, they tend in that direction. After all, what could be a quicker way to end the nuclear arms race than for the United States to unilaterally freeze its nuclear arms programs? We must remember that the United States tried such an approach to a limited extent in the 1970s and met a Soviet response not of moderation but of massive military buildup.

The four-step nuclear arms strategy we advocate will be expensive, lengthy, and complicated. Nevertheless, it offers the best hope to preserve nuclear deterrence while working toward eventual reduction of nuclear armaments. Either an immediate nuclear freeze or unilateral restrictions by the United States would invite further serious deterioration of the strategic situation.

In summary, The American Legion supports a nuclear freeze only as the fourth step in the program outlined earlier. Furthermore, we believe that the U.S. arms control proposals now being pursued in the START and INF talks, coupled with the modernization of U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces, offer the best hope for continued deterrence and eventual reduction of both U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms.

I thank you.

64th NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION  
HELD IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS  
August 24-26, 1982

RESOLUTION 499

COMMITTEE: Foreign Relations

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

WHEREAS, the Soviet Union has greatly expanded its nuclear capabilities over the past decade and achieved at least rough nuclear strategic equivalence with the United States while the United States has seriously neglected modernization of its nuclear forces; and

WHEREAS, the Soviet Union continues to deploy SS-20 medium range missiles, which now number at least 315, most of which are targeted on Western Europe; and

WHEREAS, an immediate nuclear freeze would "lock in" the current Soviet lead in heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which makes U.S. ICBMs vulnerable to a Soviet first strike; would remove the Soviets' incentive to negotiate reductions; would leave NATO Europe subject to the Soviets' serious SS-20 threat; and would prevent necessary modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad and supporting activities to offset the Soviet buildup; and

WHEREAS, The American Legion has, for many years, recognized the utility of equitable arms control measures and, accordingly, has supported arms control measures which did not place the United States at a military disadvantage and did provide for effective, unalterable guarantees for compliance, including fullest consideration of on-site inspection by both sides; now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, by The American Legion in National Convention assembled in Chicago, Illinois, August 24, 25, 26, 1982, that we support:

(1) A U.S. nuclear deterrent force at least equivalent to Soviet nuclear forces in all respects and capable of deterring Soviet attack or, if deterrence fails, achieving successful conflict resolution.

(2) Deployment of U.S. intermediate range missiles to NATO Europe to offset the Soviet SS-20 threat unless a workable, verifiable "zero option" is agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union.

(3) Significant, mutual, verifiable reductions of nuclear forces by the Soviet Union and the U.S. to equal levels, resulting in mutual deterrence at lower levels of armaments and a lessened likelihood of nuclear war.

(4) A verifiable freeze of the testing and deployment of nuclear forces only after the above conditions have been achieved and as specified in Resolution 7, adopted at the May, 1982 National Executive Committee meeting.

(5) Maximum emphasis on the equality and verifiability of any nuclear arms control measures, including effective, unalterable verification procedures including measures going beyond national technical means to include fullest consideration of on-site inspection by both sides.