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AGING AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES CANNOT MAINTAIN DETERRENCE INDEFINITELY

SSBNs/SLBMs

- MOST AMERICAN SSBNs FACE BLOCK OBSOLESCENCE IN EARLY 1990s
- SLBM RANGE MUST BE EXTENDED BY TRIDENT II MISSILES IN ORDER TO INCREASE SURVIVABILITY OF SUBMARINES
- LARGE, VIGOROUS SOVIET ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE PROGRAM WOULD BE LARGELY UNAFFECTED BY FREEZE

ICBMs

- MINUTEMAN IS VULNERABLE AND INCAPABLE OF ATTACKING SUFFICIENT SOVIET HARD TARGETS TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE

BOMBERS

- SOVIET AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IS MASSIVE, UNAFFECTED BY FREEZE
  - 5,000 RADARS
  - 2,500 INTERCEPTORS
  - 10,000 SAMs
- ALCM NEEDED AS STANDOFF WEAPON
- B-1B NEEDED TO ESCAPE DESTRUCTION ON GROUND AND TO PENETRATE

# STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCES

UNITED STATES


Titan II  
ICBM

Minuteman II  
ICBM

Minuteman III  
ICBM

Poseidon  
SLBM

Trident  
SLBM



Polaris SSBN (1)



Trident (Ohio Class) SSBN \*

Soviet

SS-11  
ICBM

SS-N-6  
SLBM

SS-13  
ICBM

SS-18  
ICBM

SS-17  
ICBM

SS-N-18  
SLBM

SS-N-17  
SLBM

SS-NX-20  
SLBM \*\*

SS-N-8  
SLBM

SS-19  
ICBM



Yankee SSBN

Delta I SSBN

Delta II SSBN

Delta III SSBN

Typhoon SSBN \*

Year of Introduction

1960's

1970's

1980's

\* Currently undergoing sea trials

\*\* Currently undergoing flight tests

KEY:

- ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
- SLBM = Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
- SSBN = Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine

Thirty-one United States Polaris submarines were refitted to carry Poseidon missiles; twelve of these submarines are being furthermodified to carry the Trident I (C-4) missile.

UNITED STATES PROGRAMS STOPPED BY A FREEZE

CURRENT NUMBER OF SYSTEMS

• STRATEGIC

- M-X 0
- TRIDENT SSBN 2 ON SEA TRIALS
- TRIDENT II (D-5) SLBM 0
- B-1B BOMBER 0
- ATB 0
- ALCM 7 AIRCRAFT 70 ALCMs

• THEATER

- PII 0
- GLCM 0

A FREEZE WOULD PREVENT REPLACEMENT OF OBSOLESCEENT LAUNCHERS OF AMERICAN WARHEADS


- 22% OF WARHEADS ARE ON ICBMs. OF THESE, 23% ARE ON ICBMs OVER 15 YEARS OLD; NONE ON ICBMs LESS THAN 5 YEARS OLD
- 50% ARE ON SUBMARINES. OF THESE, 92% ARE ON SUBMARINES 15-20 YEARS OLD
- 28% ARE ON BOMBERS, WHICH AVERAGE ABOUT 20 YEARS OLD
- ONLY 4% OF TOTAL WARHEADS ARE ON LAUNCHERS LESS THAN 5 YEARS OLD;  
77% ARE 15 YEARS OR OLDER

SOVIET WARHEADS ARE ON MODERN LAUNCHERS

- 72% ARE ON ICBMs. OF THESE, 89% ARE ON ICBMs LESS THAN 5 YEARS OLD, AND 99% ARE ON ICBMs LESS THAN 10 YEARS OLD
- 20% ARE ON SUBMARINES. OF THESE, 99% ARE LESS THAN 10 YEARS OLD
- 8% ARE ON BOMBERS. OF THESE, 55% ARE ON BACKFIRES, WHICH AVERAGE LESS THAN 5 YEARS OLD
- FULLY 70% OF TOTAL SOVIET WARHEADS ARE ON LAUNCHERS LESS THAN 5 YEARS OLD;  
95% ARE ON LAUNCHERS LESS THAN 10 YEARS OLD.

AS A RESULT OF ITS MASSIVE BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC FORCES, THE ALREADY TREMENDOUS SOVIET ADVANTAGE WOULD INCREASE UNDER A FREEZE. MODERN, POWERFUL, AND SURVIVABLE SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE EFFECTIVE FOR MANY YEARS, WHILE A LARGE PORTION OF AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BECOME INEFFECTIVE DUE TO OBSOLESCENCE AND SOVIET DEFENSIVE MEASURES

# INVENTORY WARHEADS BY AVERAGE AGE OF LAUNCHER 1982



U.S.   
 SOVIET


ICBM
  SLBM
  BOMBER

NUCLEAR FREEZE WOULD UNDERCUT DETERRENCE OF CONVENTIONAL WAR

- SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE ENVISIONS USE OF MASSIVE MILITARY FORCE IN SURPRISE ATTACK TO CRUSH NATO WITHIN DAYS
- NUCLEAR FORCES ARE ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF NATO DETERRENT
  - SOVIET SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS DIRECTLY THREATEN WESTERN EUROPE
  - PERSHING II AND GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES ARE ESSENTIAL TO RESTORE NUCLEAR BALANCE AND DETER ATTACK--CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR
- A FREEZE WOULD ACCEPT A SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES OF 600 TO 0

# NATO-WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISON

(IN PLACE IN EUROPE)




- NOTES: 1. WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS NORMALLY CONSIST OF FEWER PERSONNEL THAN MANY NATO DIVISIONS BUT CONTAIN MORE TANKS AND ARTILLERY, THEREBY OBTAINING SIMILAR COMBAT POWER.  
 2. FORCES IN PLACE IN NATO EUROPE, WARSAW PACT FORCES AS FAR EAST AS BUT EXCLUDING THE 3 WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS IN WESTERN RUSSIA (MOSCOW, VOLGA & URAL MILITARY DISTRICTS).

FIGURE 2




# LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILE WARHEADS (GLOBAL DEPLOYMENTS)

-51-



*Includes operational SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20.  
There were no NATO deployments during this period.  
Excludes refire missiles and additional warheads.*



*NATO decided on 12 December, 1979 to deploy 572 missiles (108 Pershing IIs and 464 GLCMs) beginning at the end of 1983; implementation of this decision can be altered only by a concrete and effective arms control agreement; these deployments will be cancelled if the Soviets will dismantle all their SS-20 missiles and retire all their SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.*

FIGURE 13

NUCLEAR FREEZE - A SEDUCTIVE SLOGAN BUT BAD ARMS CONTROL

UNREALISTIC

- MASSIVELY COMPLICATED TO NEGOTIATE
- MANY GRAY AREAS (E.G. ASW, AIR DEFENSE, BMD, NUCLEAR POWER)

UNVERIFIABLE

- MUCH RDT&E UNDETECTABLE, EVEN WITH INSPECTIONS
- POTENTIAL FOR MASSIVE BREAKOUT

ACCEPTS INEQUITIES

- UNDERMINES PRINCIPLE THAT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS MUST BE BALANCED AND STABILIZING

UNDERMINES CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

- DERAILS START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS ALREADY UNDERWAY
- CODIFIES SOVIET ADVANTAGES, THUS REMOVING INCENTIVE TO REDUCE
- WOULD ENDORSE SOVIET POSITION THAT BALANCE EXISTS

POLITICALLY USEFUL TO USSR

- PROSPECT OF "IMMINENT" FREEZE WOULD REDUCE SUPPORT FOR NEEDED DEFENSE PROGRAMS
- SOVIET LEADERS COULD POSE AS PEACEFUL WHILE PURSUING MILITARY OBJECTIVES DURING PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS

FREEZE NOT VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM)

- IMPORTANT TESTS POSSIBLE WITH LITTLE OR NO RISK OF DISCOVERY, E.G. LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS
- SUBSYSTEMS NECESSARY FOR INSURING RELIABILITY AND FOR PREPARING FOR BREAKOUT COULD BE TESTED
- PRODUCTION DIFFICULT TO MONITOR BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE COVERT FACILITIES
- MONITORING UNCONVENTIONAL DEPLOYMENTS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS (E.G. ICBMs IN SOFT, CAMOUFLAGED SHELTERS) IS DIFFICULT
- MONITORING DEPLOYMENTS OF SMALLER WEAPONS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT

SOME ASPECTS OF A FREEZE COULD NOT BE VERIFIED EVEN WITH ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

## FREEZING THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

- A FREEZE WOULD PROHIBIT NUCLEAR TESTING, HENCE WOULD PREVENT IMPORTANT IMPROVEMENTS IN NUCLEAR WEAPON SAFETY AND SECURITY THAT ARE DESIGNED INTO WARHEADS
  - INSENSITIVE HIGH EXPLOSIVES TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL DETONATION
  - INTEGRAL PERMISSIVE ACTION LINKS (PAL) TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED OR ACCIDENTAL DETONATION

A FREEZE WOULD UNDERMINE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND NATO UNITY


- THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION TO DEPLOY PERSHING II AND GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES TO COUNTER BALANCE SOVIET SS-20s WAS TAKEN BY ALL MEMBERS OF NATO
- AN AMERICAN DECISION TO NEGOTIATE ON A FREEZE WOULD REPUDIATE THAT DECISION
- NATO LEADERS OPPOSE THE FREEZE BECAUSE OF THE THREAT IT WOULD POSE TO EUROPE, PARTICULARLY BY BLOCKING NATO INF MODERNIZATION WHILE PERMITTING THE SOVIET UNION TO KEEP ITS SS-20s

## SUPPORT OF FREEZE IS BASED ON MISUNDERSTANDINGS


### THE FACTS ARE:

- AMERICAN DEFENSE SPENDING HAS BEEN RELATIVELY LEVEL OVER THE YEARS, WHILE DOMESTIC SPENDING HAS INCREASED BY 3 TIMES
- OUR STRATEGIC FORCES ARE A SMALL PART OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET AND COST LESS NOW THAN IN THE 60'S
- THE SOVIET UNION HAS SPENT FAR MORE ON MILITARY FORCES THAN THE UNITED STATES
- OUR NUCLEAR STOCKPILE HAS DECLINED SIGNIFICANTLY IN NUMBERS AND TOTAL MEGATONNAGE SINCE MID 60'S
- WE HAVE FEWER NUCLEAR MISSILES AND BOMBERS THAN IN THE 60'S
- MODERNIZATION OF OUR STRATEGIC FORCES IS LONG OVERDUE
- PROGRAMS MUST BE FUNDED NOW FOR OUR DEFENSE INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

# THE FEDERAL BUDGET, NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND STRATEGIC FORCES 1950-1983




# NATIONAL DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC FORCES AS A PERCENT OF PUBLIC SPENDING 1950-1983





# THE TOTAL WEAPONS IN U.S. STOCKPILE ☆



☆ The curve is discontinuous because the actual number of weapons in the stockpile at any time beyond 1943, is classified.

## Nuclear Freeze Increases the Risk of War

A nuclear freeze would leave the United States with a vulnerable land-based missile system, an aging and deteriorating bomber force, a submarine fleet that faces block obsolescence in the 1990's, and no systems comparable to Soviet land-based missiles targeted on Western Europe.

Because we could not confidently survive a nuclear attack by the Soviets and retaliate effectively, deterrence would be undermined and the risk of war would increase, rather than decrease.

## Nuclear Freeze Detrimental to U.S. Security

- A freeze would have serious implications for US defense posture, would affect the fate of the negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms reductions, perceptions of our Allies and others around the world.

- Freeze would be detrimental to our national security and to chances for achieving genuine arms reductions. Rather than reducing risk of war, could actually increase chances of war.

- Freeze at current levels would preserve serious asymmetries in strategic balance, and prevent us from replacing aging and vulnerable nuclear systems: a freeze would:

-- leave us with an aging bomber force (B-52s over 20 years old) while Soviets have more than 250 modern supersonic intercontinental backfire bombers built after 1975, plus improved air defenses.

-- prevent replacement of Poseidon submarines that face block obsolescence in 1990's. The Soviets now have over 60 ballistic missile firing submarines in several new and improved classes.

-- prevent modernization of our ICBM force to increase effectiveness and survivability: force is now vulnerable to Soviet first strike;

-- preserve Soviet monopoly in LRINF (intermediate range missiles) vis-a-vis the US: Soviets have over 1200 LRINF warheads while US has 0.

- Soviet forces are on average newer: over three-quarters of Soviet nuclear weapons on launchers less than five years old, while same proportion of US weapons on launchers over 15 years old.

- By allowing Soviets to maintain their military advantages, while preventing us from modernizing, freeze would remove Soviet incentives to agree to reductions.

- Freeze would adversely affect our relations with our NATO allies. It would prevent us from following through on the 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCMs. This would deprive us of only bargaining leverage we have in INF negotiations.

- Freeze would therefore undercut our negotiations -- would send signal to the Soviets that there is no unity behind our arms reduction initiatives -- salutary effects of German elections would be lost.

- Freeze sounds simple, but would actually require complex negotiations to agree on elements to be frozen, counting rules, and verification measures. Time spent negotiating freeze would delay and divert us from negotiations on reductions.

- Important elements of a freeze are just not verifiable (i.e., production, some testing). Attempting to negotiate better verification measures would be very difficult.

- Freeze would be a step backward now. Could undo progress we have made in convincing Soviets of need to negotiate for reductions. In START, for example, Soviets

have now publicly indicated willingness to go beyond anything they previously were willing to agree to in reducing their strategic forces: have gone beyond SALT II.

## What's Wrong with Freeze?

Locks-in Soviet advantages: For example, Soviets have 600-0 INF (intermediate-range land-based missiles) advantage. Soviets have more ICBMs, SLBMs, delivery vehicles, megatonnage, destructive power. Rewards Soviets for their build-up.

- (Soviets endorse freeze movements in U.S. and Europe; would lock-in Soviet advantages. At same time, Soviets suppress peace demonstrators at home. -- Not a reflection on Americans in freeze movement.)

Would prevent us from improving the survivability of our forces, which have become increasingly vulnerable because of Soviet build-up, and would thus seriously diminish our ability to deter the Soviets. Couldn't fix our ICBMs. Couldn't fix our bombers. (Soviet air defenses unconstrained.) Would have highly vulnerable ICBM and bomber force.

- Subs: U.S. deployed last year first new SSBN in 15 years. Sub fleet aging (15-20 years). Project block obsolescence in 1990s. Freeze would not allow us to replace those subs with new subs. Therefore, over time we would have a seriously diminished capability and maybe no submarine force at all.

-- Moreover, Soviets have vigorous anti-submarine warfare program which would go on unrestrained.

- Put all of these together: (1) Seriously reduces our ability to survive and retaliate effectively; (2) therefore undermines deterrence; and (3) therefore increases (rather than decreases) risk of war.

Pulls the rug out from underneath our negotiators in Geneva.

Removes incentives for Soviets to negotiate seriously about reductions to lower, equal levels.

Verification. Some elements (production, small weapons) not verifiable. Cannot base our national security on trust of Soviets.

## Freeze Undercuts Deterrence

By preventing essential modernization of aging and vulnerable U.S. strategic systems, a freeze would undercut deterrence.

- Three-quarters of our strategic warheads are on systems which are 15 years of age or older; this is in contrast to the USSR, three-quarters of whose strategic systems are five years old or younger.

- U.S. restraint in strategic weapons over the last decade --coupled with the aggressive Soviet strategic buildup in the same period--has resulted in significant deficiencies in the forces which we depend on to deter nuclear war:

-- our aging B-52s will not be able to penetrate Soviet airspace for much longer, and because of their slow takeoff time, they are vulnerable to a surprise attack on their bases.

-- our Minuteman missiles are vulnerable to a first strike by the powerful Soviet ICBM force.

- If there were a freeze today, this situation would become even more serious:

-- we would not be able to convert B-52s to stand-off ALCM carriers or replace them with more survivable B-1s in the penetration role; at the same time, Soviet air defenses could increase unchecked by a freeze to insure that the air-breathing leg of our Triad is blunted;

-- we would not be able to modernize the ICBM force to provide a hard-target capability or any degree of survivability increase over Minuteman, yet the ability of the USSR's ICBMs to hold our own hostage in a crisis would be unchanged.



-- thus we would face a situation in the not-too-distant future where two of the three Triad legs could be checkmated, and while we would not be allowed to improve the survivability and effectiveness of our submarine missile force, the Soviets would be able to concentrate even more effort on ASW to counter the sole remaining leg of our forces.

- Thus the net result of a freeze would be to move us into an ever more dangerous world, because our adversary's might would be unchecked while the forces we rely on to deter Soviet aggression against us and our allies would become weaker and weaker. And history has shown that if an aggressor believes he can achieve a quick military solution to his political problems he is tempted to strike. Our deterrence policy has prevented this for 40 years because the retaliatory threat behind it was credible. If we allow that threat to become hollow we surely do so at our own risk and at the risk of the Western liberal political tradition.

-- Deterrence depends on our ability to continue to pose a credible retaliatory threat to an aggressor. To do so, our systems must not only be able to survive a first strike, they must also be able to penetrate an enemy's defenses. A freeze, however, would allow Soviet defenses to expand unchecked while it would limit severely our ability to penetrate those defenses.

-- The Soviets already possess the world's largest air defense force, consisting of over 7,000 radars, 10,000 SAM launchers and over 1,000 interceptors. They are continuing to improve this force by introducing modern, new SAMs, interceptors, and AWACs-like aircraft--and these programs would be unchecked by any freeze.

-- Within a few years, these Soviet defenses will be able to destroy most of our B-52s well before our retaliation could be carried out. This is why we are modernizing our bomber forces by equipping B-52s with ALCMs and by buying the B-1. If these programs are stopped, then the Soviets will be able, with high confidence, to checkmate our bomber forces.

-- The Soviets devote a great deal of time and effort to ASW. They have not yet produced a breakthrough which would increase dramatically the threat to our SSBNs. But they continue to work on this--work which a freeze would not halt. In fact, if a freeze were in place, the Soviets could, in a few years, shift funds from air defense to ASW to increase their efforts in this area even more.

-- The Soviets view their ICBMs as their best defense against our ICBMs. Our ICBMs are currently vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. A freeze would halt our efforts to ameliorate this situation, and it would leave the Soviets with their first strike capability.

-- Thus a freeze will enable the USSR to checkmate two legs of the Triad while allowing them to work intensively on a way which to negate our third leg. This is why, despite its proponents best hopes, a freeze will result in a far more dangerous and less stable world.

## What Does Obsolescence Mean for Strategic Forces

At the bottom line, it means declining effectiveness as the years pass. The expected number of weapons arriving on target will go down and down. The effect will be apparent to the Soviets as our open society will be quite candid about the operation and maintenance problems. As this deterioration progresses, the deterrent effect of our forces will slowly wither away.

Some portions of the strategic forces will be retired because it will be unsafe to operate them any longer. Other portions may go to the boneyard because they cannot be kept in operational service.

Systems remaining in the active forces will become increasingly difficult and expensive to support as their technology base recedes into history.

Defensive improvements (unrestrained by a nuclear freeze) will erode the effectiveness of a static strategic force.

## A Freeze would Undermine American Leadership of NATO

An American negotiation of an immediate freeze would unilaterally repudiate the NATO alliance-wide dual-track decision to deploy Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles to counterbalance Soviet SS-20s and to seek US-Soviet Arms Reductions providing equal ceilings and equal rights.

NATO leaders oppose the freeze because it would block NATO INF modernization while permitting Soviet Union to keep its SS-20s and other nuclear forces which is the basic Soviet negotiating position at Geneva.

A freeze today would increase fear in Europe that NATO would be "decoupled" from the American nuclear umbrella, the very fear which led European leaders to press for the dual track decision in the first place.

### Freeze Eliminates Possibilities for Deep Reductions

It removes any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in the substantial reductions proposed by the U.S. at the START and INF negotiations in Geneva.

It is highly unlikely that Soviets would ever agree to deep reductions to equal levels in the aftermath of a freeze.

History has taught us that success in any arms control negotiations, particularly for reductions, depends on Soviet belief that U.S. is determined to stay strong and to deploy modern systems.

Under a freeze, Soviets would have permanent advantage while the U.S. nuclear forces would be doomed to progressive decay.

Soviets then would have no reason or incentive to negotiate with us at all.

## Nuclear Freeze - Effect on Negotiations

A nuclear freeze would be a step backwards from our serious negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva, where we are seeking deep and verifiable reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear forces of both sides.

- The effect of a freeze on INF would be to preserve the Soviets' monopoly in longer-range land-based forces, with over 1,200 warheads to 0 on the NATO side. As you know, the U.S. has proposed the elimination of this entire class of missiles, with zero level on both sides.

- The effect on START would be greatly to reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate on our proposal to cut strategic ballistic missile warheads by one-third and missiles by one-half, even though the Soviets have themselves already accepted the principle of reductions, rather than a freeze.

-Since some aspects of the proposed freeze would be virtually impossible to verify and would require extensive prior negotiation on systems and numbers to be limited and on measures to help ensure effective verification and compliance, negotiation of a freeze would divert us completely from our current negotiations to achieve substantial and verifiable reductions.

-Thus, a freeze is a vote to ignore reality, since freezing current forces now would make us less, not more, secure. It would undercut our reductions negotiations and reward the Soviets for their massive buildup of the last decade, while preventing us from taking steps necessary to modernize our aging and increasingly vulnerable deterrent systems.

Impact of a Freeze on Submarine Forces

Q: What will the U.S. do when the entire fleet of Poseidon submarines reaches retirement age in the period 1993-1997?

A:

All such submarines were built in a very short period during the 1960s.

The stresses of deep submergence on long patrols cause a gradual degradation of hull strengths.

This problem is not merely theoretical. In actual practice, submarines come under safety restrictions on dive depth as they near retirement.

When physical deterioration forces these submarines into retirement, the sea-based strategic force will be reduced to the two Trident submarines already constructed. (The Ohio is deployed and the Michigan is expected to go on patrol in 1983.)

The submarine force contributes substantially to strategic stability through its high survivability. The loss of this leg of the Triad would be a critical blow to the strategic forces of the U.S.

### The Proposed Freeze is Largely Unverifiable

The freeze on testing and production, as well as deployment, poses immense verification difficulties very unlikely to be overcome through a negotiated agreement with the Soviet Union.

- The amount of on-site inspection required is extreme

-- requires permanent, round-the-clock inspectors at each and every Soviet military rear depot and deployment site to check Soviet weapons, from ICBMs to small nuclear artillery shells

-- Would require same type of presence at all civilian and military laboratories, test ranges and production facilities capable of developing, testing, or producing nuclear weapons or delivery systems to ensure that Soviets don't cheat there

-- Tens of thousands of trained inspectors could be needed

-- Even then, cheating would be possible, since some activities, such as subsystem bench tests and low yield weapons tests could be disguised or undertaken covertly.

Negotiation on the above would be extensive and time consuming, and unlikely to succeed, while diverting us from the reductions proposals and the limitations focused on deployment which we are currently negotiating in Geneva.



Assertion: Our Poseidon submarines alone could destroy all the major Soviet cities three times over.

Rebuttal:

The equation of each Poseidon warhead with a city "obliterated" is simply an enormous exaggeration.

However, the basic point is that the United States does not target civilian populations, nor do we regard a theoretical retaliatory capability against civilians an adequate deterrent. The United States always has targeted predominantly against legitimate military targets. We believe the ability to retaliate effectively against a wide range of targets and to attack those things the Soviets value most--not civilians--is the best deterrent to nuclear war. One of the principal weaknesses of our current deterrent is that the U.S. weapons that would currently survive a Soviet attack would be most effective against soft targets, and not against such critical military targets as command bunkers, ICBM silos, and other hardened military facilities.

file Nuclear Freeze

NUCLEAR ARMS DEBATE

We have been asked again and again. With the National Council of Churches and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops supporting a nuclear weapons freeze, where does NAE stand? Are we of like mind? The answer is simple: No. To be sure, at its 1982 convention NAE passed a resolution expressing "deep concern about the threat of a nuclear holocaust and urging our national leadership to rededicate their efforts to obtain a meaningful arms control agreement that will scale down the nuclear arms race." That resolution only conveys a spirit, however, and does not position-ize NAE among the competing views of how best to avoid nuclear war.

Because evangelicals comprise one of the three major segments of organized Christianity, their ultimate position is critical. NAE is being courted from both sides. Liberals want evangelicals to jump onto the nuclear freeze bandwagon. Conservatives, and perhaps even the White House itself, hope that evangelicals will become a major religious bloc supporting the President's position.

The Gallup Poll in 1981 showed that 78% of evangelicals favored higher defense expenditures while 68% of non-evangelicals did. That's one clue. Lacking specific polling data on the freeze, we nevertheless conjecture that the majority of evangelicals still lean toward maintaining peace through strength. We acknowledge that NAE has a minority among its membership who renounce any use of force as a matter of conscience. The debate provoked by the nuclear freeze campaign is far from settled for evangelicals. At its March, 1983 convention in Florida, NAE will debate defense in a "Point/Counterpoint" forum.

PEACEMAKING CONFERENCE NEXT YEAR

The first of its kind. That describes "The Church and Peacemaking in the Nuclear Age -- A Conference on Biblical Perspectives," a gathering by and for evangelicals. Believing that evangelicals ought to study seriously and dialogue openly with one another re: their biblical mandate to be peacemakers, NAE became one of the conveners of the May 25-28 conclave in Pasadena, California. The NAE board agreed to participate because the statement of purpose assured that "differing traditions" would be presented. Likewise, the Conference will not produce resolutions or a position paper, to ensure that no segment of evangelical thought runs roughshod over another. As a convening organization, NAE is doing everything possible to see that a balance of biblical viewpoints will be presented. We are thus encouraging participation and will supply you with a Peacemaking Conference brochure, if you will kindly send us a self-addressed stamped envelope with your request.

NOT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVES

The nation may not be limited to an either/or choice between a nuclear freeze or a massive nuclear build-up. As reported in July's INSIGHT, an impressive Washington "think tank" has proposed a new, totally defensive strategy called High Frontier. Relying on orbiting satellites armed with non-nuclear conventional rockets, a High Frontier defense could wipe out almost all enemy missiles making a first-strike attack against the United States, according to supportive experts. One great advantage is that

Follow-Up to the Conference

## A. The Questions About Follow-Up

1. Should there be organized follow-up to the Conference?
2. If so, what services should be offered?
3. If so, how should the follow-up efforts be organized?

## B. Models for Follow-Up

1. Materials produced at the Conference (Resource Handbook, cassette tapes, videotape or film, etc.) can be available to all Convenors and Affiliates to distribute to their constituencies.
2. Establish an office for systematic follow-up as a new function of an already-existing organization (probably a Convenor or Affiliate).
3. Develop a new organization to build a network and coordinate evangelical concern for biblical peacemaking.

## C. Making the Decision About Follow-Up

1. Responsibility: All post-Conference decisions will be the responsibility of the Board of Directors. These decisions will include the means for distributing the remaining assets (funds, educational materials, etc.) and the nature of follow-up to the Conference.
2. Information Needed to Make the Decisions: The Board will be provided with information to help in the decision-making process. Data will come from the following sources:
  - Board discussions in January
  - Registration response
  - Media response to the Conference
  - Marketing research survey
  - Director's discussions with others before Conference
  - The Conference itself
  - Research with participants at Conference

## D. Timing

A final meeting of the Board of Directors will be scheduled for late June, 1983, in Pasadena. At that time decisions regarding organized follow-up to the Conference (if any) will be made.

Marketing Survey  
First Draft

The enclosed research survey will be revised through the end of January, 1983. It will then be mailed to each Conference Registrant. Data from the returned surveys will be compiled, analyzed and made available to Speakers, Panelists, and Workshop Leaders prior to the Conference. The audience will be surveyed with this research instrument again on the final day of the Conference, and the results of the second polling will be compared to the initial research conclusions.

Questions #1-10 provide biographical information.

Questions # 11-39 measure attitudes and perceptions.

Questions #13-37 are twelve sets of paired questions, examining the same issue from opposing perspectives. For example, #17 and #30 both measure the respondent's view of the Old Testament's teaching on war. The twelve pairs measure the following areas:

The Situation:

Opinions About Hiroshima  
History of the Nuclear Arms Race  
War in the Nuclear Age  
The Nature of the Soviet Threat  
Positions in the Arms Race  
The Likelihood of Nuclear War

The Biblical Insights:

Evangelism and Social Action  
Old Testament Teachings on War and Peace  
New Testament Teachings on War and Peace  
Interpreting Matthew 5:38-48 and Romans 13:1-7  
God's View of the United States  
Eschatology and the Threat of Holocaust

Faithful Response: Questions #38,39 measure barriers and options for responding faithfully to the nuclear arms race.

Questions # 40-51 inquire about the respondent's interest in potential educational services to be offered as Conference follow-up.

Marketing Survey  
 First Draft  
 December, 1982

I. Biographical Information

1. Age

|          |         |
|----------|---------|
| Under 20 | 46-50   |
| 21-25    | 51-55   |
| 26-30    | 56-60   |
| 31-35    | 61-65   |
| 36-40    | 66-70   |
| 41-45    | Over 70 |

2. Gender

|      |        |
|------|--------|
| Male | Female |
|------|--------|

3. Marital Status

|         |
|---------|
| Married |
| Single  |

4. Number of Children

|              |
|--------------|
| None         |
| One          |
| Two          |
| Three        |
| Four         |
| Five or more |

5. Education Completed

|             |
|-------------|
| High School |
| College     |
| Masters     |
| Doctorate   |
| Other _____ |

6. Annual Income

|                |
|----------------|
| Under \$10,000 |
| 10,000-15,000  |
| 16,000-20,000  |
| 21,000-25,000  |
| 26,000-30,000  |
| 31,000-40,000  |
| Over \$40,000  |

7. Vocation

8. City

9. State

10. Zip

## II. Attitudes and Perceptions

| 11. Please describe your level of knowledge about the following:   | <u>I know nothing</u>    | <u>I'm minimally informed</u> | <u>Moderately informed</u> | <u>Well-Informed</u> | <u>Expert</u>         |
|--|--------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| a. The nuclear arms race   | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |
| b. The just war theory   | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |
| c. Christian pacifism  | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |
| d. the theory of nuclear deterrence  | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |
| 12. Which of the following statements most closely describes your view of war?   |                          |                               |                            |                      |                       |
| a. All war is wrong.   |                          |                               |                            |                      |                       |
| b. Certain wars are justifiable.   |                          |                               |                            |                      |                       |
| c. War is appropriate in order to establish democratic freedom.  |                          |                               |                            |                      |                       |
|  | <u>Strongly Disagree</u> | <u>Disagree</u>               | <u>Unsure</u>              | <u>Agree</u>         | <u>Strongly Agree</u> |
| 13. Bombing Hiroshima was necessary to stop the war with Japan.  | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |
| 14. The pursuit of peace and justice is as important as the verbal proclamation of the Gospel.                                 | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |
| 15. There is only a remote chance that a nuclear war will occur in my lifetime.  | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |
| 16. The Soviet Union is just as responsible for the escalation of the arms race as the United States, if not more so.          | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |
| 17. War is obviously validated in the Old Testament, and the use of nuclear weapons against evil is still a moral possibility. | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |
| 18. There is basic equality between the US and the USSR in the nuclear arms race.  | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |
| 19. God is involved in the life of the United States in exactly the way He is involved in the life of other nations.           | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |
| 20. War is basically the same as it always has been, except the weapons are more powerful.                                     | 1                        | 2                             | 3                          | 4                    | 5                     |

|  | <u>Strongly Disagree</u> | <u>Disagree</u> | <u>Unsure</u> | <u>Agree</u> | <u>Strongly Agree</u> |
|--|--------------------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| 21. Taken as a whole, the New Testament clearly teaches that a nuclear war could never be morally justified.   | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |
| 22. In Romans 13:1-7 Paul instructs Christians to respect government officials. Such respect requires us to share our opinions with our elected representatives and to trust them to do what is right. | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |
| 23. The USSR is more concerned with defending itself than with global domination.  | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |
| 24. The United States is ahead in the arms race.   | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |
| 25. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot be morally justified.   | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |
| 26. We will probably experience a nuclear war in the next fifty years.   | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |
| 27. The Gospel calls Christians to verbally proclaim salvation through Jesus Christ, and all types of social concern are secondary.  | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |
| 28. A loving God will not permit a nuclear war to destroy the world.   | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |
| 29. The United States has led the nuclear arms race from Hiroshima by developing almost all the weapons systems before the Russians.   | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |
| 30. No Old Testament text can be legitimately interpreted to teach that nuclear war could be moral.  | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |
| 31. Jesus taught us to love our enemies (Matt 5:38-48). This teaching applies to relations between the US and the USSR.  | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |
| 32. The Soviet Union is ahead in the arms race.  | 1                        | 2               | 3             | 4            | 5                     |

Strongly Disagree    Disagree    Unsure    Agree    Strongly Agree

- |     |  |   |   |   |   |   |
|-----|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33. | The United States is a nation specially blessed by God.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 34. | Because of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, we now live in an age that is different from any time in history.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 35. | The Soviet Union intends to dominate the world militarily and economically.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 36. | There are no New Testament texts that absolutely rule out the use of nuclear weapons.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 37. | God has allowed humankind to suffer the consequences of its actions, and He may allow a nuclear war to occur.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 38. | Please evaluate the following as barriers that keep you from studying the nuclear arms race more seriously than you have to-date.<br>I don't study the arms race more seriously because: |   |   |   |   |   |
| a.  | Even if I knew more I'd be powerless to change anything.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| b.  | The whole issue is so complex and I'm not sure I can understand it if I tried.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| c.  | I don't have the time or interest.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| d.  | I'm afraid to learn a great deal about the likelihood of nuclear war or its impact on the people and places I love.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| e.  | I don't want to find out that I might not have a future.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| f.  | The nuclear arms race poses no serious threat to humankind.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| g.  | Our government leaders know what they're doing and they can handle the problems with their combined expertise.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| h.  | I'm not sure any source of information about the arms race is trustworthy.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |



|  | Strongly<br>Disagree | Disagree | Unsure | Agree | Strongly<br>Agree |
|--|----------------------|----------|--------|-------|-------------------|
| 39. Our government should pursue the following options in response to the nuclear arms race. |                      |          |        |       |                   |
| a. Continued development of space and biological weapons.                                    | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| b. Continue START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) negotiations with the Soviet Union.      | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| c. Continued development of the MX system.   | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| d. Bilateral freeze  | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| e. Trident nuclear submarine   | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| f. Negotiations with other nuclear nations   | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| g. Cruise missiles   | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| h. Unilateral reduction of United States nuclear arsenal                                     | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| i. B-1 Bomber development  | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| j. Economic conversion away from the production of nuclear weapons                           | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| k. Develop first-strike weapons  | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| l. Convene a United Nations session on nuclear weapons control                               | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |
| m. Limit and reduce production of conventonal weapons  | 1                    | 2        | 3      | 4     | 5                 |

### III. Interest in Educational Services

- |  |     |    |
|--|-----|----|
| 40. My local church or school has a group concerned about peacemaking.   | YES | NO |
| 41. I would be interested in seeing a film on the nuclear arms race featuring evangelical Christians I trust.  | YES | NO |
| 42. I would be interested in listening to cassettes, made by evangelical Christians, on the following topics:  |     |    |
| a. Biblical views of war and peace   | Yes | No |
| b. The just war theory and nuclear weapons.  | Yes | No |
| c. Modern Christian voices on the arms race.   | Yes | No |
| d. Weapons systems: technical information for the layperson.   | Yes | No |
| e. The nature of the Soviet threat.  | Yes | No |
| f. Military spending and the poor.   | Yes | No |
| g. Parenting for peace and justice.  | Yes | No |
| h. Practical options for peacemaking in the local church.  | Yes | No |
| i. The use of spiritual gifts in peacemaking.  | Yes | No |
| 43. I would be interested in reading a journal that offers specifically Christian analysis of the arms race from a variety of political viewpoints and biblical interpretations.     | YES | NO |
| 44. I would like my local church or school to bring a speaker (or speakers) to present the nuclear issues with balance and objectivity (not arguing from any certain point of view). | YES | NO |
| 45. I would like to have access to a comprehensive annotated bibliography of literature on the arms race.  | YES | NO |
| 46. I would attend a local conference on Christian peacemaking if it provided a forum for voices from diverse political and biblical perspectives.                                   | Yes | No |

- 47. I am interested in ordering books on Christian views and other research on the arms race. Yes      No
  
- 48. My church or school should have a factual and objective curriculum for studying the nuclear war issue. Yes      No
  
- 49. I am interested in curriculum materials that expand the concept of Christian peacemaking by including conflict resolution at other levels (e.g. between and within individuals, at home and in the community). Yes      No
  
- 50. My local congregation or school would seriously study peacemaking if we had access to an objective peace education organization. Yes      No
  
- 51. I am interested in knowing more about ecumenical efforts for peace being made by Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. Yes      No

52. Comments and Suggestions:

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# Moscow and the European Peace Movement

J. A. Emerson Vermatt

*Ethics and Public Policy Center • Washington, D.C.*

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\* \* \* \* \*

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# Moscow and the European Peace Movement

by J. A. Emerson Vermaat

Over the last decade, there has occurred a marked rise in neutralist and pacifist tendencies throughout Western Europe.<sup>1</sup> Coinciding with these trends toward pacifism have been differences between various sectors of American and European opinion over the proper approach to dealing with the Soviet Union and its recent arms buildup, particularly in Europe. These differences have crystallized around the defense posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) vis à vis the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), and more especially around European strategic defenses. Against this background, the proposed deployment of new nuclear weapons on the territories of NATO member states has raised alarm over the possibility of a nuclear war in Europe and galvanized into action a number of indigenous peace movements.

During the debate within NATO over the modernization and strengthening of its forces, the Soviet Union launched a "peace" campaign aimed at preventing the deployment of improved Western nuclear weapons in Europe. In pursuit of this goal, the Soviet Union not only resorted to diplomatic contacts with governments but also sought to arouse Western public opinion and to direct it against the measures aimed at redressing the eroded European strategic balance. A major role in Moscow's strategy was played by the orchestration of a "peace offensive" through a variety of front organiza-

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*Mr. Vermaat is a Dutch journalist and commentator. He is author of two books, *Wij Nederlanders en de vrede (The Dutch and Peace)*, 1980, and *Vlucht uit de vrijheid? (Escape from Freedom?)*, 1981 and of numerous articles on politics in the Netherlands, military affairs, and international relations.*

tions as well as the utilization of the organizational skills available in some West European Communist parties.

It is the aim of this article to describe the tactics and instruments employed by the Soviet Union in this "peace" campaign and to assess its effectiveness. In so doing, it is not my intention to suggest that the West European peace movement became a mere tool for Moscow's foreign policy objectives. Rather, it is my intention to describe how Moscow sought to stimulate and control the locally-based peace movements, and to make some tentative estimates regarding where it succeeded and where it failed. In brief, Moscow succeeded reasonably well in the initial period between 1977 and 1980. Thereafter, its ability to manipulate the peace movement for its own interests became increasingly problematic, as a result, first, of the impact of the invasion of Afghanistan and, later, of Soviet conduct with respect to Poland. An analysis of how and why these changes took place requires, in the first place, a description of the concepts and organizational forms customarily used for these purposes by Moscow.

The tradition of using front organizations to promote Soviet foreign policy interests goes back to the early days of the Soviet state. Before the 1922 Genoa Conference, Lenin gave this advice to his foreign minister, Yuriy Chicherin:

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*We Communists have **our** communist program (the Third International); **but** we still consider it to be our*

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<sup>1</sup> Joris J. C. Voorhoeve, "European Neutralism," in *The Trans-Atlantic Crisis*, New York, NY, The Orwell Press, 1982, pp. 1-17. See also, Gerd Schmidinger, "The New Pacifism," *Swiss Review of World Affairs* (Zurich), a monthly publication of *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 1982, pp. 27-31.

## Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement

**duty as businessmen to support** (even if the odds are 10,000 to 1) pacifists in the other, i.e. bourgeois, camp. . . . This will both have bite and be "polite" and will help to demoralize the enemy.<sup>2</sup>

Contemporary Soviet leaders continue to take Lenin's advice seriously in this as in other matters of statecraft. Indeed, it may be more applicable today than at the time of the Genoa Conference. The Soviets today, in the words of an authoritative source, consider Lenin's advice "of enormous significance in defining the tactics of Communist parties in the struggle for peace (*mir*) and Socialism, in the cause of building a broad democratic front of democratic forces around the Communists for the struggle against imperialist reactionary forces. . . . With all the inconsistency of the pacifists, their campaign against a nuclear war constitutes an important social factor which cannot be discounted."<sup>3</sup>

Ever since the founding of NATO, it has been Moscow's publicly expressed intention to court the West European public by a variety of "peace offensives" directed at dismantling the Western defense system or splitting the Alliance. For this and other purposes the Soviets have maintained a number of front organizations. Such organizations espouse a range of purportedly nonideological goals, and they are thus under certain circumstances operationally more useful to the Soviet Union than are groups with formally avowed Communist membership and purposes. It has been estimated that the propaganda and political activities of the major front organizations cost the USSR at least US\$63 million annually.<sup>4</sup> A list of the major fronts reveals their missions in broad outline.<sup>5</sup>

Communist fronts like the World Peace Council (WPC) and the Christian Peace Conference (CPC) usually defend or justify the East European military buildup while condemning "imperialism" and "war preparation" in the West. They follow Georgi Dimitrov's dictum that "the struggle for peace is a struggle for the victory of

socialism throughout the world."<sup>6</sup> According to Dimitrov, "One sympathizer is generally worth more than a dozen militant communists. A writer of reputation, or a retired general, are worth more than five hundred poor devils who won't know any better than to get themselves beaten up by the police."<sup>7</sup>

At the same time, the Soviet attitude toward pacifism is highly one-sided. While supporting pacifists "in the other camp," Moscow and its allies vehemently denounce the slightest indication of pacifism in the countries of the "socialist commonwealth," that is, the Soviet orbit. For example, when East German students started adopting the cry "swords into plowshares" and wearing buttons with this slogan, the East German Minister of Defense, Heinz Hoffmann, made it absolutely and immediately clear that "socialism needs both swords and plowshares."<sup>8</sup> While the East German Peace Council was hosting a meeting of some leaders of the Danish Ban the Bomb movement, the East German authorities undertook a vigorous campaign to stamp out indigenous signs of pacifism in their state which explicitly refers to itself as "a state of peace" (*Friedenstaat*).<sup>9</sup> Similarly, nonofficial peace movements and Helsinki Monitor groups are vigorously suppressed in the Soviet Union. During the so-called peace march in July 1982, some Scandinavians were permitted to "march for peace" in Moscow, Minsk, and Leningrad; however, the authorities on the spot took great care not to allow them any contact with unofficial groups within the Soviet Union.

A similarly partisan policy is followed by the front organizations themselves. According to the President of the World Peace Council, the Indian Communist Romesh Chandra, the WPC "positively reacts to all Soviet initiatives in international affairs."<sup>10</sup> At a peace conference held in Moscow in 1973, Chandra asserted that those peace organizations that took an anti-Soviet stance "ceased to be genuine peace organizations."<sup>11</sup>

All major Soviet foreign initiatives, including major propaganda campaigns, are approved by the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Responsible to it are various elements of the Soviet party

<sup>2</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy* (Collected Works), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1964, Vol. 45, p. 34.

<sup>3</sup> A. S. Milovidov and V. G. Kozlov, Eds., *The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War*, a translation of *Filosofskoye naslediyе V. I. Lenina i problemy sovremennoy voyny* (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1972), Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 37.

<sup>4</sup> Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence—House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 79, 80.

<sup>5</sup> For example, the World Peace Council was founded in 1949 and has over 135 branches in different countries; the World Federation of Trade Unions, founded in 1945, claims over 200 million members; the International Organization of Journalists, founded in 1946, claims over 180,000 members. For a fuller listing, see Richard F. Staar, "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1982, pp. 71 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Georgi Dimitrov, *Selected Works*, Sofia, Sofia Press, n. d., p. 150.

<sup>7</sup> Georgi Dimitrov, as quoted by Ian Greign in *The Assault on the West*, Petersham, The Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1968, pp. 244–45.

<sup>8</sup> Heinz Hoffmann, "Defense Is a Basic Human Right," *Aussenpolitische Korrespondenz* (East Berlin), Apr. 2, 1982, p. 99.

<sup>9</sup> *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), April 2, 1982.

<sup>10</sup> *New Times* (Moscow), July 1975. See also US Department of State, *Foreign Affairs Note* (Washington, DC), April 1982.

<sup>11</sup> Chandra was quoted in a declassified study of Soviet propaganda operations by the US Central Intelligence Agency published in Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, *The CIA and the Media*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence—House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 570.



*Key figures in the Soviet apparatus for dealing with political movements in non-Communist countries seen in France at the October 1981 Congress of the French Socialist Party, from left to right: Yuriy Zhukov, head of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace; Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; and Boris Ponomarëv, assumed to be ID chief.*

Deniel Simon/Gamma-Liaison.


and government bureaucracy. Those that are likely to be engaged in a Soviet propaganda campaign are: (1) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Andrey A. Gromyko; (2) the Committee for State Security (KGB) under Vitaliy Fedorchuk (who recently succeeded Yuriy V. Andropov as KGB Chairman); (3) the CPSU's International Department (ID) under Boris N. Ponomarëv; and (4) the CPSU's International Information Department (IID) under Leonid M. Zamyatin.

The International Department has operational control of all fronts, and is responsible for relations with all non-ruling Communist parties, including those in Western Europe. The IID was created in 1978 with a view to making Soviet propaganda abroad more effective. Its creation may well have had to do with Moscow's intention to stimulate the rise of the West European peace movements in the late 1970's. Major propaganda initiatives can involve lead times comparable to those required for deployment of weapons systems. Since the groundwork

for the Soviet strategic weapons buildup against Western Europe was laid in the early 1970's, it is plausible to assume that provisions in Politburo planning were also made for the propaganda required to accompany it. The primary IID responsibility is "directing foreign propaganda." The IID controls all Soviet media directed abroad, including the external activities of two news agencies, TASS and Novosti. Before his appointment as head of the IID, Zamyatin was Director of TASS.

There is little public direct evidence on the nature of coordination of the operations of these two CPSU departments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the intelligence apparatus. The late Mikhail Suslov was reported by a number of sources to have exercised Politburo oversight of all such instruments of statecraft, and there is indirect evidence that following his death in early 1982, the brief was assumed by Politburo member Yuriy Andropov. There is probably much competition and overlapping of activity, particularly in the activities





Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department created in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1978.

—Sven Simon/Katherine Young.

of the ID and IID. There may also be frictions between the KGB and the ID, since both are involved in disinformation activities. Thus, Department A—responsible for disinformation and propaganda—within the KGB's First Chief Directorate utilizes positions in Soviet diplomatic missions to recruit journalists, writers, or clergy as "agents of influence."<sup>12</sup> In this respect the KGB performs a clandestine function corresponding to the more open activities of the IID. TASS correspondents in many cases work for the KGB directly in initiating news stories. An entire division of Novosti (the "Tenth Section") is staffed with KGB agents.<sup>13</sup> The ID, responsible for liaison with foreign CP's, assists by enlisting the organizational skills needed to run the main propaganda events such as meetings, marches, and demonstrations. The campaign in Western Europe against the neutron bomb was largely stimulated and partly organized by the ID through front organizations and Western

<sup>12</sup> John Barron, *KGB. The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents*, Reader's Digest Press, New York, NY, 1974, pp. 164 ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

Communist parties, the Dutch in particular. The IID was also deeply involved through a massive propaganda campaign mounted in Soviet and friendly Western media, and the KGB provided clandestine support.<sup>14</sup>

### Launching the Peace Offensive

At the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, a consensus was reached that popular movements in the West could play an essential role in advancing socialism and "peace." The Basic Document of the conference stated:

*In Western Europe the movement against the aggressive NATO bloc, for the normalization of relations and the development of cooperation among states and for ensuring European security is encompassing ever wider strata of the population. . . . The existing situation calls for unity of action of the Communists and all anti-imperialist forces so that maximum use can be made of all the new possibilities for launching a broader offensive against imperialism, against the forces of reaction and war.*<sup>15</sup>

The success of the anti-Vietnam war movement, when, according to one Soviet observer, "the demand to end the aggression became the universal demand of various political movements, including those in the United States,"<sup>16</sup> demonstrated to Moscow the efficacy of public opinion in the West. Plans to create a peace movement patterned after the anti-Vietnam war movement were worked out during and after the World Conference of Peace Forces in Moscow in 1973. The Soviets felt that the "correlation of forces" had never been so favorable to them. Leonid Brezhnev declared:

*One can say with confidence that the present changes in the world situation are largely the result of the activities of public forces, of the hitherto unparalleled activity of the people, who are displaying sharp intolerance of arbitrary rule and aggression and an unbending will for peace.*<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Barron, "The KGB's Magical War for 'Peace,'" *Reader's Digest* (Pleasantville, NY), October 1982, pp. 211 ff.

<sup>15</sup> See the translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Aug. 6, 1969, pp. 16, 14. All documents of the Moscow 1969 conference are published in *Internationale Beratung der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien, Moscow 1969* (International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969), Prague, Verlag Frieden und Sozialismus, 1969.

<sup>16</sup> Georgiy Shakhnazarov, "Policy of Peace and Our Time," in *Soviet Policy of Peace*, Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1979, p. 64.

<sup>17</sup> As quoted by Vitaliy Korionov, in *The Policy of Peaceful Coexistence in Action*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 52.

According to Vitaliy Korionov, a political commentator of *Pravda*, "favorable conditions enabling the peace-loving democratic forces to launch a decisive offensive against the imperialist forces of war and aggression had arisen by the beginning of the seventies."<sup>18</sup> It is evident that the Soviet side had become well aware of the impact movements for disarmament could make on the decision-making process in the West.

It was now a matter of finding a proper issue around which to mobilize public opinion in NATO countries against the military strengthening of NATO. The issue was soon found—the "enhanced radiation weapon" (ERW) or "neutron bomb," which was to be introduced by NATO as a tactical weapon to counter Soviet tank superiority. In July 1977, US President Jimmy Carter indicated that he supported production of the neutron bomb warheads but had not yet decided whether to deploy the weapon.<sup>19</sup> Initially, the ID was the main instrument used by the Soviets to conduct the campaign against the neutron bomb. After 1978, the IID, as a separate unit, became more and more involved in it.

The first shots in this war of propaganda were fired by TASS. After several initial attacks on the neutron bomb, TASS produced a major statement on July 30, 1977. Immediately, the whole front apparatus began to move. The WPC organized an "action week" during August 6–13, 1977, with a view to "launching a mass campaign aimed at achieving a ban on this weapon of mass destruction." A declaration by 28 Communist parties, published on August 8, denounced the "barbarous nature" of the new weapon, and called upon Social Democrats, Communists, and Christians to protest against its introduction.<sup>20</sup>

A key role was to be played by the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN), which had recently reestablished relations with Moscow, after years of isolation. An "initiative for a broad movement of the people" was launched by the CPN under the slogan "stop the neutron bomb."<sup>21</sup> The Dutch movement against the neutron bomb soon spread to other countries. It was led by orthodox Communists who followed instructions from the ID. (According to Dutch intelligence data, which leaked to the press in November 1982, a prominent Dutch Communist, Joop D. Wolff, regularly informed the Soviet embassy in the Hague of political developments that would be of interest to the Soviets. Wolff and other leading Dutch Communists frequently visited East Europe to discuss matters related to the Dutch peace

Movement.<sup>22</sup>) The secretary of the Stop the Neutron Bomb movement, Nico Schouten, attended a special meeting of the WPC in East Berlin in February 1979, where the United Group Against the Neutron Bomb was established.<sup>23</sup>

On March 18, 1978, an International Forum was organized in Amsterdam by the CPN, after intensive consultation and in close collaboration with East European sister parties and Communist front figures.<sup>24</sup> Romesh Chandra had paid a visit to Amsterdam in December 1977 in order to bring this initiative into line with the international campaign orchestrated by the WPC. The Dutch activists presented Chandra with a report and discussed plans for the future.<sup>25</sup> The International Forum was attended by scientists, politicians, theologians, church leaders, artists, and, last but not least, high-ranking CP members from East and West. At another convocation of the Forum, a year later, several ambassadors from East European countries were present. According to Dutch intelligence data, KGB and ID figures have been instrumental in promoting sentiments for unilateral disarmament in the Netherlands. ID official Anatoliy Popov visited Holland in January 1982 to consult with key people in the peace movement about the organization of the International Forum, which was to take place on February 13–14, 1982.<sup>26</sup>

The impact of all this began to make itself felt. Public opinion in the Netherlands and elsewhere began to shift, and with it, the attitude of governments in NATO states. From now on, any substantial proposal made by NATO to strengthen the defense of Europe would face serious opposition from large sectors of the European public led by action groups and antiwar movements. In September 1979, the Chief of the International Department of the Hungarian Communist Party, Janosz Berecz, wrote:

*The political campaign against the Neutron Bomb was one of the most significant and most successful since World War Two. . . . It was a good program that the European Communist and Workers' Parties adopted in Berlin three years ago, but we think it is in our common interest to make greater efforts than so far for the implementation of this program and for strengthening the anti-imperialist unity.*<sup>27</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>19</sup> *The New York Times*, July 13, 1977.

<sup>20</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, Aug. 9, 1977; and *Soviet News* (London), Aug. 9, 1977.

<sup>21</sup> *De Waarheid* (Amsterdam), Aug. 19, 1977.

<sup>22</sup> *De Telegraaf* (Amsterdam), Nov. 6, 1982.


<sup>23</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, Feb. 5, 1979.

<sup>24</sup> See J. A. E. Vermaat, "The East-European Relations of the Dutch Peace Movement," *Ons Leger* (Rotterdam), October 1981, pp. 95 ff.

<sup>25</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, Dec. 24–25, 1977.

<sup>26</sup> *De Telegraaf*, Nov. 13, 1982.

<sup>27</sup> Quoted in *Soviet Covert Action*, p. 75.



Nico Schouten (left) of the Stop the Neutron **Bomb** movement in the Netherlands presents a petition with 1,162,757 signatures against the enhanced-radiation weapon to Dr. Anne Vondeling (right), Moderator of the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament, on April 18, 1978.

—ANP.

The Stop the Neutron Bomb movement has cooperated with the Soviet international front apparatus from the very beginning, and it can be argued that the movement would hardly have existed without stimulation from Moscow. It is estimated that more than US\$100 million was expended on this campaign alone by the Soviets. Part of the money went to the CPN and its front Stop the Neutron Bomb.<sup>28</sup> Soviet financial support for "peace" movements and related activities in Europe has taken both clandestine and relatively open forms. In an interview with an Austrian paper in 1982, Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the Soviet ID, said quite candidly that Soviet peace groups:

*have several peace committees for European security. They are printing newspapers, and all Soviet participants in peace demonstrations here in Vienna, Amsterdam or Brussels are being paid with the money from this [Soviet Peace] Fund. I think that we do not inform the public sufficiently about our peace movement. . . .*<sup>29</sup>

### Broadening the Peace Movement

The success of the neutron bomb issue in arousing public interest in the West led to a decision in 1979 by the leaders of the Stop the Neutron Bomb movement to broaden its scope. "Stop the neutron bomb—stop the nuclear arms race" was the new slogan to be adopted everywhere. At the February 1979 WPC meeting in East Berlin, the slogan "Stop the arms race!" surfaced as "the main demand in the present stage of the struggle for peace."<sup>30</sup> The target quickly became NATO's "double-track" modernization decision finally reached in December 1979. In addition to pursuing arms control talks, NATO members agreed to deploy new interme-

<sup>28</sup> Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 76. This is also apparent from German intelligence data. See in particular *Bundesverfassungsschutzbericht* (Bonn, Ministry of the Interior), 1981, p. 3.

<sup>29</sup> *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (Vienna), May 21, 1982, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), May 24, 1982, p. CC/13.

<sup>30</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, Feb. 5, 1979.

diate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles to counter SS-20 superiority. The WPC and its affiliates immediately started to mobilize Western public opinion again. Already in December 1979, a Conference of Soviet Peace Champions, meeting in Moscow, declared that "the peace-loving public has launched a mass-scale protest campaign against NATO's militarist plans. . . ." The conference's organizer, the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, was not shy about acknowledging Soviet official sponsorship:

*The Soviet peace champions are profoundly grateful to the Party and Government for their continuous care and attention and for the vigorous and comprehensive support given to the peace-loving public forces.*<sup>31</sup>

"All forces for maintaining peace!" was the slogan issued by the World Parliament of Peoples for Peace convening in Sofia in September 1980 and sponsored by the WPC. Hundreds of speakers voiced the need for a broad antiwar movement and "for creating a world-wide antiwar front, able to materialize the anxiety of hundreds of millions of people in mass actions to prevent war."<sup>32</sup> The conference adopted the WPC's Programme of Action 1981, which stressed "the urgency of bringing together in common mass actions, people belonging to different political parties and tendencies" and pledged: "Let us make 1981 the springboard of the 80's, a year of decisive offensive of peace forces to achieve a breakthrough in curbing the arms build-up."<sup>33</sup>

The WPC began at this point to prepare plans for massive demonstrations against NATO's modernization, to be held in the second half of 1981. In doing so, the WPC and its affiliates used the traditional front strategy of involving in the demonstrations a mix of political and social groups whose views do not necessarily converge with Soviet policy in other areas. Most of the activities outlined in the Programme of Action actually occurred, which spurred Soviet émigré Vladimir Bukovsky to ask pointedly, "How on earth could the Soviets have known in 1980 about events that would take place at the end of 1981, unless they were running the whole show?"<sup>34</sup>

In August 1981, Romesh Chandra instructed the national affiliates of the WPC to accelerate the peace campaign. Peace Committees were instructed to involve trade unions, churches, and civic organizations. A

Guide of Action in the Autumn Offensive was distributed to WPC affiliates. A "call for a broad international campaign for peace" was made on the occasion of World Peace Day 1981.<sup>35</sup> At a press conference in October, Romesh Chandra announced "world-wide actions for the maintenance of peace."<sup>36</sup>

Communist parties in Western Europe were activated in support of the campaign. Numerous individual Communists promoted and participated in all major demonstrations. However, the West European Communist party organizations adopted, either for tactical reasons or out of conviction, quite flexible attitudes. Several parties criticized the Soviet SS-20's, as well as NATO weapons. Unity of action prevailed over unity of doctrine.

It must be borne in mind here that the West European peace movement had its origins in the Netherlands. The initiative to hold these demonstrations was born in Stop the Neutron Bomb circles in Holland, which were in touch with functionaries of the ID and the WPC. The idea was to "Europeanize" the movement. Similar ideas were prevalent among the leaders of the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV). Apart from

<sup>35</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, Aug. 29-30, 1981.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct 3-4, 1981.



*Romesh Chandra (right), President of the World Peace Council (WPC), presents an Amilcar Cabral banner to a representative of the Zimbabwe African People's Union during an extraordinary WPC meeting in East Berlin in February 1979.*

<sup>31</sup> *XX Century and Peace* (Moscow—official organ of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace), January 1980, p. 2.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, November-December 1980, p. 6.

<sup>33</sup> World Peace Council, *Programme of Action 1981*, Helsinki, WPC, 1981, pp. 5, 8.

<sup>34</sup> Vladimir Bukovsky, "The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union," *Commentary* (New York, NY), May 1982, p. 34.

—Eastfoto.

## Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement



Signs at the massive peace demonstrations in Bonn on October 10, 1981, support the Krefeld Appeal, call for West Germany's departure from NATO, support an atom-free zone, and propound the "Peace, Freedom, Socialism" slogan of the German Communist Party.

—Bossu/SYGMA.

these two Dutch organizations, a front organization of the pro-Moscow German Communist Party (DKP) named the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Co-operation (KFAZ) was instrumental in preparing the draft for the first major European demonstration to be held in Bonn on October 10, 1981. The final text of the call was adopted on June 19 during the West German *Kirchentag* (Conference of the West German Lutheran Church) in Hamburg. It was signed by at least 80 organizations.<sup>37</sup> A key role throughout the campaign was played by the DKP and its various fronts. Officially, the Bonn demonstration was organized by two West German peace movements, the "Action Reconciliation for Peace" (*Aktion Sühnezeichen, ASZ*) and the "Action Community for Peace" (*Aktionsgemeinschaft für den Frieden, AGDF*). ASZ and the DKP have cooperated for years. Both ASZ and AGDF were represented at the Moscow Conference of Peace Forces in 1973, and ASZ was also

represented at the 1980 World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace in Sofia. Having a religious background, ASZ closely cooperates with the Dutch IKV. A number of ASZ officials are involved in Communist organizations or Communist fronts. Volkmar Deile, who is also active in the Christian Peace Conference, is one example.

Just before the Bonn demonstration of October 1981, a series of meetings organized by what the *London Times* referred to as "the professionals behind the Moscow-orchestrated peace movements" took place. According to *The Times*, these professionals are full-time, paid officials of the movements, nominated by the ruling Communist parties.<sup>38</sup>

Particularly important was the October 3–4, 1981, meeting of the leaders of various official peace movements from the Soviet bloc at the Hungarian resort of Gardony, which discussed ways of widening cooperation among all "peace-loving" forces at both the national and international level. Attention was paid to the possibility of widening the links between the WPC and other peace movements.<sup>39</sup> The Gardony meeting was followed by a world conference of the International Federation of Democratic Women, also a pro-Soviet front organization having special links with the WPC. This conference was held in Prague and was attended by "the organizers of the big marches of recent years."<sup>40</sup> Key figures in the peace movement from 21 countries met in the Slovak city of Kosice, with consultations ending on October 6.<sup>41</sup> According to the Hungarian News Agency MTI, representatives of the West European peace movement were also present. Another Soviet front organization, the World Federation of Trade Unions, met in Bucharest at this time.

All of these meetings and conferences resulted in calls to intensify the peace campaign that was then under way. Various groups, formed along professional lines, began to organize: doctors, generals, writers, etc. A number of former NATO generals and admirals formed a Generals for Peace group. One of them, Francisco da Costa Gomes from Portugal, is a Vice President of the WPC. Other members of Generals for Peace are regularly interviewed in the East European press and attend

<sup>37</sup> For the list of all organizations involved, see Volkmar Deile, Ed., *Bonn 10.10.1981. Friedensdemonstration für Abrüstung und Entspannung in Europa* (Bonn, Oct. 10, 1981. Peace Demonstration for Disarmament and Détente in Europe), Bornheim, Lamuv Verlag, 1981, pp. 26 ff.

<sup>38</sup> *The Times* (London), Oct. 22, 1981.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, Oct. 5, 1981, refers in a very brief article to "representatives of the peace movement coming from 21 countries." It must have been an important meeting, since East European media hardly paid attention to it!

meetings of Soviet front organizations or their affiliates. Their book, *Generale für den Frieden*, was published by a German Communist publishing house. The introduction was written by Professor Gerhard Kade from the International Institute for Peace in Vienna, a pro-Soviet front closely linked to the WPC.<sup>42</sup>

In mid-October, the authoritative Soviet party ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, spoke of a "psychological war between East and West," in which Soviet ideas with respect to disarmament would be used to manipulate Western public opinion.<sup>43</sup> His words informed a Moscow meeting of party secretaries from 11 Communist countries in early November, which decided to intensify anti-war propaganda in the West and to launch an offensive aimed at neutralizing "the influence of reactionary militarist propaganda in non-socialist countries" and at demonstrating "the progressive and peaceful nature of the foreign policies of the socialist states." The communique of the meeting also stated that to concentrate all forces on the struggle for peace would result in the further strengthening of the position of socialism and contribute to the progressive development of world socialism.<sup>44</sup>

### European Peace Movements: A Survey

What was the composition of the West European peace movements on which Moscow has been showering so much attention? Several strands can be distinguished. There are environmentalists, most notably "Greens" in West Germany; there are neutralists who tend to dislike both superpowers and to advocate a "third way"; there are pacifists who oppose use of force on principle; there are religious activists,<sup>45</sup> who feel that war and nuclear weapons have to be opposed on religious grounds. The peace movement has also found support on the political spectrum from the left socialists, and smaller leftist groups. Then there are the pro-Moscow elements which invariably support Moscow's policy initiatives. Naturally, these strands are not exhaustive, and also much overlap can be found among them.

<sup>42</sup> Gerhard Kade, Ed., *Generale für den Frieden* (Generals for Peace), Köln, Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1981.

<sup>43</sup> *NRC Handelsblad* (Amsterdam/Rotterdam), Oct. 15, 1981.

<sup>44</sup> *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), Nov. 11, 1981.

<sup>45</sup> The thesis has been defended that the European peace movement is mainly a Protestant affair, since it originated in the Protestant countries. See, for example, Michel Tatu, "Pacifism in Europe," *Le Monde* (Paris), Oct. 24, 1981, p. 5. I do not agree with this thesis. Particularly after October 1981, it is clear that the peace movement has made inroads in Catholic Italy. The reason why France has not (yet) been touched so deeply by the peace movement is of a political and not of a religious nature. In France, the Social Democrats are governing and they favor the French nuclear programs.

The pro-Moscow elements have been influential in the European peace movements from the beginning. They usually have worked through Communist front organizations and in many instances through the West European Communist parties. The latter, however, are by no means uniformly well disposed toward Moscow. Therefore, the pro-Moscow elements tend to pursue a flexible "popular front" strategy within the peace movement.

The influence of the pro-Moscow and Communist elements within the peace movement rests largely on their organizational strength—they are able to organize events. This depends in large part on the organizational and financial backing provided by Soviet-bloc sources. Nevertheless, the degree to which the pro-Moscow elements are influential in the West European peace movement differs from country to country and has varied over time. For this reason, a brief survey of developments might be useful to provide a clearer picture of the complex reality that exists.

*France and Italy.* In both France and Italy (which have politically powerful local Communist parties), the involvement of Communists in the peace movement has been substantial. In the case of France, it is possible to say that the peace movement has been largely a Communist affair. The peace demonstration held in Paris on October 25, 1981, was organized primarily by the Movement for Peace (*Mouvement de la Paix*—a front organization of the French Communist Party—the PCF), by the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT), and by the Trotskyites. Although it is generally pro-Moscow, the PCF has taken care to have a balanced approach in its official position on the issue of nuclear weapons. For example, *l'Humanité*, the French party daily, has denounced the weapons development of both superpowers. Also, the major slogan of the Paris demonstration was: "Neither Pershing nor SS-20, but Disarmament."

In Italy, the major peace demonstration took place in Rome on October 24, 1981. The main forces behind it were an umbrella organization controlled by the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Committee for Disarmament, Pax Christi and the Catholic Left, environmentalists, and individual socialists (but not the Socialist Party per se).

The Italian peace movement's main target is the proposed deployment of cruise missiles in Sicily. However, the movement also criticizes the Soviet nuclear arms buildup. This is in line with the position of the PCI which favors a "third way," i.e., a Europe independent of both "superpowers." An influential figure in the Italian peace movement is former NATO general Nino Pasti, one of the Generals for Peace. Pasti has attended numerous

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Peace demonstrations in Paris: at left, an August 1981 rally against American missiles and the neutron bomb by the French Communist Party and its General Confederation of Labor (CGT); above, a scene from a massive October 25, 1981, rally showing a banner reading, "Neither Pershing nor SS 20—Disarmament!"

—Photoreporters and SYGMA.

events organized by the WPC, with which he has close ties. He was present at the WPC's Parliament of the Peoples for Peace in Sofia in September 1980, where the initiative to organize the group of former NATO generals was taken.

*Holland and Belgium.* The origins of the Dutch peace movement lie in Holland's long-standing tradition of neutrality.<sup>46</sup> Within the peace movement, the most important Dutch lobby has been the Interchurch Peace Council, to which all major Dutch denominations belong. Founded in 1967, the IKV did not have an impact on government policy until 1977, when it participated actively in the campaign against the neutron bomb. The IKV considers the denuclearization of the Netherlands to be a necessary first step toward the denuclearization of Europe. Its 1977 slogan was "Help rid the world of nuclear arms and start doing it in the Netherlands."

The political orientation of the IKV is openly left-wing. It has cooperated with the Communist-oriented Stop the Neutron Bomb movement ever since 1977. A number of local IKV chapters are dominated by Communists, members of Christians for Socialism, and other elements of the extreme Left. The IKV advised its constituency to vote for left-wing parties in the elections of

September 1982. This proved counterproductive. The IKV lost much goodwill and is now facing a serious rival movement of multilateralists who support the double-track decision taken by NATO in December 1979. This group calls itself the Interchurch Committee for Multilateral Disarmament (ICTO) and has made deep inroads among all major denominations in the Netherlands.

Recently, the IKV has become increasingly critical of Soviet policies, particularly after the suppression of the Solidarity movement by the regime in Poland in December 1981. The IKV has established official relations with underground movements in Eastern Europe, such as Solidarity and Charter 77, as well as with nonofficial peace groups in East Germany.<sup>47</sup> The IKV's main emphasis is now on a "Europe without power blocs," i.e., a policy of nonalignment.

At a meeting of the Christian Peace Conference in Holland in October 1981, IKV Chairman Ben Ter Veer had indicated that the West European peace movement would be dramatically weakened should Solidarity in Poland be suppressed by either the Soviets or the Polish authorities themselves. Military intervention by the Soviets would result in a backlash movement in Europe leading to the eventual deployment of new NATO missiles, Ter Veer argued.<sup>48</sup>

At the Moscow conference of Religious Workers for

<sup>46</sup> See J. A. Emerson Vermaat, "Neutralist Tendencies in The Netherlands," *The World Today* (London), December 1981, pp. 482 ff.

<sup>47</sup> *Kernblad* (The Hague), October 1982, p. 5.

<sup>48</sup> *Parool* (Amsterdam), Oct. 26, 1981; *Trouw-Kwartet* (Amsterdam), Oct. 26, 1981.

Saving the Sacred Gift of Life in May 1982, the International Secretary of the IKV, Wim Bartels, walked out of a meeting when—contrary to prior promises—he was not allowed to speak on such issues as the SS-20 and Solidarity. Before he left Moscow, he talked to leaders of the Soviet Peace Council, the Soviet Committee for Peace and Security, and to Metropolitan Filaret, the conference's chairman. The Soviets sought to smooth over the incident and it was agreed that relations would not be cut off. Bartels was the only person to take such a decided public stance on the handling of the Moscow conference. Not all in the Dutch peace movement agreed with the IKV stance. A Dutch member of the Generals for Peace, M. H. von Meyenfeldt, argued that the IKV was now in danger of losing credibility in Eastern Europe and could well be seen by the Soviets as being too pro-Western.<sup>49</sup>

The CPN, too, has begun to distance itself from Moscow, primarily due to developments in Poland. In April 1981, the party recalled its representative from the Czechoslovak party congress in Prague after Czech Communist leader Gustav Husak hinted at possible military intervention in Poland.<sup>50</sup> The CPN has now officially abandoned its Marxist-Leninist doctrinal rigidity in favor of a more open posture toward political alliances and a strong emphasis on feminism. Recently the traditionalists within the CPN, who advocate a return to the old

policies of loyalty to the international Communist movement, have tried to regain some ground, but they remain a minority. Nevertheless, the CPN is still seen by Moscow as a useful instrument. For example, the latest CPN party program was hailed in the East German party paper *Neues Deutschland* for its emphasis on nuclear disarmament and its involvement in the campaign against NATO's modernization program.<sup>51</sup> The Dutch wing of the Stop the Neutron Bomb movement has followed a rather flexible line so far, probably for tactical reasons. It has not severed any of its ties with the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace or other WPC affiliates.

As in Holland, the peace movement in Belgium is made up of religious and secular components. The most important religious peace organization in Belgium is Pax Christi, which, like the Dutch IKV, has declared itself in favor of a Europe without power blocs. The Belgium Communist Party (KPB) plays an important role in the peace movement. The major peace demonstration of October 25, 1981, in Brussels was organized by two umbrella organizations, the Flemish Action Committee against Nuclear Weapons (*Vlaams Aktie Comité tegen Kernwapens—VAKA*) and the National Committee for Peace and Development (*Comité National d'Action pour la Paix et le Développement—CNAPD*). Both organizations are controlled to a degree by the KPB (VAKA was in fact created on Communist initiative). Another organizer of the demonstration was the Cooperation Center for Peace (*Overlegcentrum voor de Vrede—OCV*), one of

<sup>49</sup> See *De Tijd* (Amsterdam), May 21, 1982; and *Hervormd Nederland* (The Hague), May 29, 1982. Bartels defended his attitude in an article published in the official organ of Stop the Neutron Bomb—Stop the Nuclear Arms Race, *N-Bulletin* (Amsterdam), June 1982, pp. 6–7. He indicated that the IKV would not break off relations with the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.

<sup>50</sup> *NRC Handelsblad*, Apr. 7 1981.

<sup>51</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, June 29, 1982.



Pictured at the left, a session of the May 1982 world conference of "Religious Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life" in Moscow; in the photo at the right, Wim Bartels (wearing glasses), International Secretary of the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), with IKV General Secretary Mient Jan Faber at a press conference in the Netherlands on May 13, 1982, that discussed Soviet refusal to let Bartels speak publicly to the Moscow gathering.

—TASS from Sovfoto and ANP.



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whose active constituents is Peace (*Vrede*), the official WPC affiliate in Belgium and a group considered to be the backbone of the Belgian peace movement. The chairman of Peace is André de Smet, who is also a member of the KPB and is active in Pax Christi.

More recently, the KPB has tried to be less one-sided than in 1979 when it openly criticized those who wanted the Soviet Union to dismantle its SS-20 missiles. In 1981, it fully accepted the slogan of the October demonstrations: "Neither cruise missile, nor Pershing II, nor SS-20." Yet, the KPB basically adheres to the Moscow line. André de Smet frequently has consultation with Soviet officials about the activities of the peace movement.

*Federal Republic of Germany.* In West Germany, the organizational core of the peace movement was formed by the local Moscow-oriented Communist party (the DKP). The party reportedly receives an annual sum of 50,000,000 Deutschemark from the East German Communist party (SED) to support its various fronts and peace initiatives.<sup>52</sup> Small as it is, the DKP is among the best-organized political units in Western Europe (some of its cadres have been trained in East Germany and the Soviet Union). However, its impact on the West German peace movement as a whole seems to have dwindled in 1982. The DKP's silence on the events in Afghanistan and Poland, its rigid pro-Soviet line, and its criticisms of the nonofficial East German peace movement (which has a strong base in the independent-minded East German Lutheran Church) have made the party vulnerable to attacks by other groups.

Apart from the Communists, the West German peace movement is largely made up of environmentalists, who call themselves the Greens. Toward the end of 1981, the Greens began to show their uneasiness with Communist domination over the peace movement, and during 1982, a major rift between the two groups began to manifest itself. This became obvious in the spring of 1982, when preparations were under way for a major peace demonstration in Bonn timed to coincide with President Ronald Reagan's visit to the NATO summit meeting on June 10. At a meeting of peace activists in Bad Godesberg on April 4, the Greens accused the Communists of trying to take over and of manipulating the peace movement. However, proposals to make the "call" for the Bonn demonstration more "balanced" by inserting references to events in Poland and Afghanistan were overruled by the Communists who apparently

dominated the floor.<sup>53</sup> Because of this rift, the Bonn demonstration was not as successful as the organizers had intended.

The Greens may well become an important political factor in Germany. They are now operating as a political movement which has gained more votes than one of the ruling parties, the Liberal Party. Now that the Social Democratic Party is in opposition, it is likely to shift to the left in order to prevent the Greens from appealing to too large a section of the electorate. For their part, the Greens will have to strengthen their own organizational structure if they are not to remain dependent on that of the DKP.

The Communists are concerned about the widening gap between themselves and other groups in the West German peace movement, although they still control many of them. At a party meeting in Düsseldorf in May 1982, DKP chairman Herbert Mies indicated that his party intended to remain the driving force behind the peace movement: "Unity of action is required. The worst that could happen to the Federal Republic of Germany would be the inability to prevent the deployment of new American missiles."<sup>54</sup> At another party meeting, in October 1982, Mies called for "the broadest possible front of the peace movement" to prevent the deployment of new NATO missiles in 1983 and to oppose the new "right-wing conservative" government of Helmut Kohl.<sup>55</sup>

*Scandinavia.* Neutralist tendencies are rather strong among the public of Scandinavia, providing a fertile soil for the peace movement. At the same time, the Scandinavian peace movement is not particularly dominated by the Communists. In Norway and Sweden, the local Communist parties are relatively weak and isolated. In Denmark, however, the Danish Communist Party (DKP) has been deeply involved in the movement against the European Economic Community and on behalf of anti-defense causes. It was successful in promoting the anti-neutron bomb movement, and it is now actively campaigning for a nuclear-free zone and against the new NATO missiles.

Particularly important in Scandinavia is the Women for Peace movement, which had its origins in Denmark. Ten Scandinavian women organized a peace march from Copenhagen to Paris in the summer of 1982 "to promote the idea of a nuclear-free zone." Soviet President Brezhnev gave a spur to such sentiments in June 1981, when he reiterated that the Soviet Union would

<sup>52</sup> See *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Mar. 12, 1982. It is well known that the DKP receives substantial financial support from East Berlin. See for example: Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1979*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979, p. 148.

<sup>53</sup> On the rift, see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt/Main), Jan. 18 and Feb. 13, 1982; *NRC Handelsblad*, Apr. 9, 1982; *de Volkskrant* (Amsterdam), Apr. 6, 1982.

<sup>54</sup> As quoted in *Neues Deutschland*, May 24, 1982.

<sup>55</sup> Quoted in *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1982.

not use nuclear weapons against those Nordic countries that would refuse to manufacture, acquire, or deploy nuclear weapons on their territory.<sup>56</sup> The Soviet proposal was clearly intended to prevent any future deployment of nuclear missiles in Scandinavia. This idea has wide appeal. In April 1982, an Action Week in support of a nuclear-free zone was organized by the Norwegian peace movement.

The WPC has also been active in promoting the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia. Its Presidential Committee, which met in Copenhagen in January 1982, issued a statement which called "on all peace movements and all peace workers to redouble their efforts to halt the arms race. The concerted actions of peoples must . . . create and enlarge nuclear-free zones in Europe."<sup>57</sup>

As in other NATO countries, members of Soviet Embassy staffs in the Scandinavian countries, which include NATO's critical northern flank, have been directly or indirectly involved in the promotion of peace movements. In November 1981, the Danish press reported that a Danish peace activist, Arne Herloev Petersen, had received money from undercover KGB-agent Vladimir Merkulov, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen. The money was used to finance advertisements in Danish papers favoring the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. Petersen had been active in the Cooperation Committee for Peace and Security, an umbrella organization with WPC links. Its founding in 1974 had been inspired by the WPC (the Chairman of the Committee represented it at the meeting of the WPC's Presidential Committee in January 1982).<sup>58</sup> After these disclosures, prominent members of the Danish Social Democratic Party (SDP) publicly appealed to "the more serious part of the peace movement" not to identify itself with groups that could have been infiltrated by the KGB.<sup>59</sup>

A similar case arose in Norway, when two Soviet diplomats were expelled because of their direct involvement as KGB operatives in the peace movement. One of them was the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Oslo, Stanislav Chebotok (Chebotok's first post had been Copenhagen, where he was succeeded by Vladimir Merkulov in 1977).<sup>60</sup>

The Soviets themselves have implicitly admitted that they give financial support to "the pacifists in the other

camp." The vice-president of the Soviet Peace Fund put it thus:

*The Soviet Peace Fund materially supports many international events aimed at developing friendship and cooperation between nations, prohibition of all types of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, attainment of universal and complete disarmament.*<sup>61</sup>

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## On Balance

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The relationship between Moscow and the West European peace movement appears to reflect a certain congruence but not identity of interests. This applies both to the "pacifists in the *other* camp" who may, at times, criticize Soviet policies and the "pacifists in the *same* camp" who are not actually pacifists but staunch supporters of the Communist system in its Soviet manifestation. On the West European side, there are loose coalitions of attitudinal and interest groups of varying strength and duration. They represent, or at least feed upon, a range of dissimilar opinion. On the Moscow side, there is a much more unified, permanent group of organizations which are centrally directed to achieve a coherent set of national and ideological interests. It is useless to ask who is manipulating whom. Obviously, each side is seeking to advance its own interests. More important, it seems to me, is the question: Which side is achieving its main objectives and to what effect?

Those elements in the peace movement that are direct instruments of the Soviets, such as a number of Communist parties and Communist front organizations, seek to increase Soviet influence on the affairs of Western Europe. The other elements in the peace movement argue that "it is better to be red than dead," or claim that in the end their efforts will lead to multilateral disarmament.

At this point, the Soviet side appears to be having the better of it. The net result of their activities within the peace movement has been to generate pressures which may weaken NATO's defenses at the nuclear end of the military spectrum and generate disarray in the NATO alliance. However, Moscow cannot ignore the ever-present danger of a spillover of the peace movement to the Soviet bloc itself. There are already signs that the West European peace movement is turning East, i.e., is making inroads in some East European countries, particularly the German Democratic Republic. Moreover, relations between Moscow and the greater part of the European peace movement have clearly deteriorated since the suppression of Solidarity in Poland on December 13, 1981. Until then, military juntas had been

<sup>56</sup> As quoted in an interview in *Sosiaalidemokratti* (Helsinki), June 26, 1981.

<sup>57</sup> *Security and Cooperation in Europe. Negotiations, Not Confrontation!* Helsinki, World Peace Council, 1982, p. 22.

<sup>58</sup> *Berlingsk Tidende* (Copenhagen), Nov. 4 and 5, 1981.

<sup>59</sup> *Parool*, Nov. 12, 1981.

<sup>60</sup> *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Nov. 29, 1981.

<sup>61</sup> *New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 3, 1982, p. 25.

## Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement

typical of right-wing regimes only. Now, a Communist regime has taken recourse to military repression in order to remain in power. The events in Poland came as a shock to many in the peace movement who had seen in the Solidarity movement the beginnings of a new era in Europe. In the words of one commentary,

*For many in the peace movement it seemed as though the hopes of overcoming the military division of Europe into two warring camps and establishing the basis for autonomy and self-determination had been extinguished.<sup>62</sup>*

Such disappointment soon translated itself into tensions in the peace movement between those loyal to the Moscow line and all others, as many participants came to identify their cause with the cause of East European dissidence.

The Soviets themselves have taken note of these new tendencies within the European peace movement. The chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, Yuriy Zhukov, blamed American and NATO intelligence services for "directing the peace movement headed by the World Peace Council into an anti-Soviet channel." He added:

*Taking advantage of the lack of truthful information in the West and the absence of proper experience among the new participants in the anti-war struggle, the opponents of detente are trying to spread among them the idea of the "equidistant approach to the two super-powers."<sup>63</sup>*

Similarly, a Novosti commentator in March 1982 condemned "attempts . . . being made to equate the aggressive policy pursued by the United States with the defense measures forced upon the Soviet Union. . . ."<sup>64</sup>

On balance, I am inclined to believe that Moscow still derives many benefits from its support of the peace movement. It is often overlooked that pressure groups and peace demonstrations will be much more successful and effective in a democratic state than in a totalitarian state which has all the mechanisms for suppressing popular protest. The events in Poland have made this again abundantly clear. The peace movement, therefore, is likely to result in further disparities in the East-West military balance. It will, if it prevails, result in



*An April 1982 peace march in Frankfurt, West Germany, proclaims "Solidarity with the Peace Movement in the GDR" and displays the "Swords into Plowshares" symbol of the East German movement.*

—Bossu/SYGMA.

the unilateral weakening of the democratic nations, whose leaders depend on elections and the people's will. Leaders of the totalitarian East will not listen to the "pacifists in the other camp" who may, occasionally, also raise their voice against the SS-20 or General Wojciech Jaruzelski. If the Communist regimes ignore and suppress voices of protest within their own states, how much more easily will they ignore the voices coming from people in the "imperialist West," active in a movement which the Communists, in part, helped create?

<sup>62</sup> *Disarmament Campaigns* (The Hague), April 1982, p. 3.

<sup>63</sup> *News from the USSR* (The Hague—Press Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy), Mar. 29–30, 1982, p. 4.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1982, pp. 6–7.





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