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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 18, 1981

ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB  
ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The National Press Club

10:00 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Officers, ladies and gentlemen of the National Press Club and, as of a very short time ago, fellow members, -- (applause)-- back in April while in a hospital I had, as you can readily understand, a lot of time for reflection. And one day I decided to send a personal handwritten letter to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev reminding him that we had met about ten years ago in San Clemente, California as he and President Nixon were concluding a series of meetings that had brought hope to all the world. Never had peace and good will seem closer at hand.

I'd like to read you a few paragraphs from that letter. "Mr. President, when we met, I asked if you were aware that the hopes and aspirations of millions of people throughout the world were dependent on the decisions that would be reached in those meetings. You took my hand in both of yours and assured me that you were aware of that and that you were dedicated with all your heart and soul and mind to fulfilling those hopes and dreams."

I went on in my letter to say, "The people of the world still share that hope. Indeed, the peoples of the world despite differences in racial and ethnic origin have very much in common. They want the dignity of having some control over their individual lives -- their destiny. They want to work at the craft or trade of their own choosing and to be fairly rewarded. They want to raise their families in peace without harming anyone or suffering harm themselves. Government exists for their convenience, not the other way around.

"If they are incapable, as some would have us believe, of self-government, then where among them do we find any who are capable of governing others?

"Is it possible that we have permitted ideology, political and economic philosophies and governmental policies to keep us from considering the very real everyday problems of our peoples? Will the average Soviet family be better off or even aware that the Soviet Union has imposed a government of its own choice on the people of Afghanistan? Is life better for the people of Cuba because the Cuban military dictate who shall govern the people of Angola?"

"It is often implied that such things have been made necessary because of territorial ambitions of the United States, that we have imperialistic designs, and they thus constitute a threat to your own security and that of the newly emerging nations. Not only is there no evidence to support such a charge, there is solid evidence that the United States, when it could have dominated the world with no risk to itself, made no effort whatsoever to do so.

"When World War II ended, the United States had the only undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military might was at its peak, and we alone had the ultimate weapon, the nuclear weapon, with the unquestioned ability to deliver it anywhere in the world. If we had sought world domination -- and who could have opposed us? -- but the United States followed a different course, one unique in all the history of mankind. We used our power and wealth to rebuild the war-ravished economies of the world, including those of the nations who had been our enemies. May I say, there is absolutely no substance to charges that the United States is guilty of imperialism or attempts to impose its will on other countries, by use of force."

I continued my letter by saying -- or concluded my letter -- I should say, by saying, "Mr. President, should we not be concerned with eliminating the obstacles which prevent our people, those you and I represent, from achieving their most cherished goals?"

It is in the same spirit that I want to speak today to this audience and the people of the world about America's program for peace and the coming negotiations which begin November 30th in Geneva, Switzerland.

Specifically, I want to present our program for preserving peace in Europe and our wider program for arms controls. Twice in my lifetime, I have seen the peoples of Europe plunged into the tragedy of war. Twice in my lifetime Europe has suffered destruction and military occupation in wars that statesmen proved powerless to prevent, soldiers unable to contain and ordinary citizens unable to escape. And twice in my lifetime, young Americans have bled their lives into the soil of those battlefields, not to enrich or enlarge our domain, but to restore the peace and independence of our friends and allies.

All of us who lived through those troubled times share a common resolve that they must never come again. And most of us share a common appreciation of the Atlantic Alliance that has made a peaceful, free and prosperous Western Europe in the post-war era possible. But today, a new generation is emerging on both sides of the Atlantic. Its members were not present at the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance. Many of them don't fully understand its roots in defending freedom and rebuilding a war-torn continent.

Some young people question why we need weapons, particularly nuclear weapons to deter war and to assure peaceful development. They fear that the accumulation of weapons itself may lead to conflagration.

Some even propose unilateral disarmament. I understand their concerns. Their questions deserve to be answered. But we have an obligation to answer their questions on the basis of judgement and reason and experience. Our policies have resulted in the longest European peace in this century. Wouldn't a rash departure from these policies, as some now suggest, endanger that peace?

From its founding, the Atlantic Alliance has preserved the peace through unity, deterrence and dialogue. First, we and our allies have stood united by the firm commitment that an attack upon any one of us would be considered an attack upon us all. Second, we and our allies have deterred aggression by maintaining forces strong enough to insure that any aggressor would lose more from an attack than he could possibly gain. And third, we and our allies have engaged the Soviets in a dialogue about mutual restraint and arms limitations, hoping to reduce the risk of war and the burden of armaments and to lower the barriers that divide East from West.

These three elements of our policy have preserved the peace in Europe for more than a third of a century. They can preserve it for generations to come, so long as we pursue them with sufficient will and vigor.

Today, I wish to reaffirm America's commitment to the American Alliance and our resolve to sustain the peace. And from my conversations with allied leaders, I know that they also remain true to this tried and proven course.

NATO's policy of peace is based on restraint and balance. No NATO weapons, conventional or nuclear, will ever be used in Europe except in response to attack. NATO's defense plans have been responsible and restrained. The allies remain strong, united and resolute. But the momentum of the continuing Soviet military buildup threatens both the conventional and the nuclear balance.

Consider the facts. Over the past decade, the United States reduced the size of its armed forces and decreased its military spending. The Soviets steadily increased the number of men under arms, they now number more than double those of the United States. Over the same period the Soviets expanded their real military spending by about one-third. The Soviet Union increased its inventory of tanks to some 50,000 compared to our 11,000. Historically a land power, they transformed their navy from a coastal defense force to an open ocean fleet, while the United States, a sea power with trans-oceanic alliances, cut its fleet in half.

During a period when NATO deployed no new intermediate range

nuclear missiles and actually withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union deployed more than 750 nuclear warheads on the new SS-20 missiles alone.

Our response to this relentless build-up of Soviet military power has been restrained but firm. We have made decisions to strengthen all three legs of the strategic triad: Sea, land, and airbase. We have proposed a defense program in the United States for the next five years which will remedy the neglect of the past decade and restore the eroding balance on which our security depends.

I would like to discuss more specifically the growing threat to Western Europe which is posed by the continuing deployment of certain Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union has three different type such missile systems: The SS-20, the SS-4, and the SS-5, all with the range capable of reaching virtually all of Western Europe. There are other Soviet weapon systems which also represent a major threat.

The only answer to these systems is the comparable threat to Soviet threats, to Soviet targets. In other words, a deterrent preventing the use of these Soviet weapons by the counter-threat of a like response against their own territory. At present, however, there is no equivalent deterrent to these Soviet intermediate missiles. And the Soviets continue to add one new SS-20 a week.

To counter this the Allies agreed in 1979, as part of a two-track decision to deploy as a deterrent land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union. These missiles are to be deployed in several countries of Western Europe. This relatively limited force in no way serves as a substitute for the much larger strategic umbrella spread over our NATO allies. Rather, it provides a vital link between conventional shorter-range nuclear forces in Europe and intercontinental forces in the United States.

Deployment of these systems will demonstrate to the Soviet Union that this link cannot be broken. Deterring war depends on the perceived ability of our forces to perform effectively. The more effective our forces are, the less likely that we'll have to use them. So we and our allies are proceeding to modernize NATO's nuclear forces of intermediate range to meet increased Soviet deployments of nuclear systems threatening Western Europe.

Now, let me turn now to our hopes for arms control negotiations. There is a tendency to make this entire subject overly complex. I want be clear and concise. I told you of the letter I wrote to President Brezhnev last April. I've just sent another message to the Soviet leadership. It's a simple, straightforward yet historic message. The United States proposes the mutual reduction of conventional intermediate range nuclear and strategic forces. Specifically, I have proposed a four-point agenda to achieve this objective in my letter to President Brezhnev.

The first and most important point concerns the Geneva negotiations. As part of the 1979 two-track decision, NATO made a commitment to seek arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union on intermediate range nuclear forces. The United States has been preparing for these negotiations through close consultation with our NATO partners.

We're now ready to set forth our proposal. I have informed President Brezhnev that when our delegation travels to the negotiations on intermediate range land based nuclear missiles in Geneva on the 30th of this month, my representatives will present the following proposal: The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground launch missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. This would be an historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over the people of Europe.

This, like the first footstep on the moon would be a giant step for mankind. And we intend to negotiate in good faith and go to Geneva willing to listen to and consider the proposals of our Soviet counterparts. But let me call to your attention the background against which our proposal is made.

During the past six years while the United States deployed no new intermediate range missiles and withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe, the Soviet Union deployed 750 warheads on mobile accurate ballistic missiles. They now have 1100 warheads on the SS-20s, SS-4s and 5s. And the United States has no comparable missile. Indeed, the United States dismantled the last such missile in Europe over 15 years ago.

As we look to the future of the negotiations, it's also important to address certain Soviet claims which left unrefuted could become critical barriers to world progress and arms control.

The Soviets assert that a balance of intermediate range nuclear forces already exist. That assertion is wrong. By any objective measure, as this chart indicates, the Soviet Union has developed an increasing overwhelming advantage. They now enjoy a superiority on the order of six to one. The red is the Soviet build-up. The blue is our own -- that is 1975 and that is 1981.

A Soviet spokesman has suggested that moving their SS-20s behind the Ural Mountains will remove the threat to Europe. As this map demonstrates, the SS-20s, even if deployed behind the Urals, will have a range that puts almost all of Western Europe -- the great cities -- Rome, Athens, Paris, London, Brussels, Amsterdam, Berlin, and so many more, all of Scandinavia, all of the Middle East, all of Northern Africa, all within range of these missiles which incidentally are mobile and can be moved on shorter notice.

These little images marked the present location which would give them a range clear out into the Atlantic. The second proposal that I've made to President Brezhnev concerns strategic weapons. The United States proposes to open negotiations on strategic arms as soon as possible next year.

I've instructed Secretary Haig to discuss the timing of such meetings with Soviet representatives. Substance, however, is far more important than timing. As our proposal for the Geneva talks this month illustrates we can make proposals for genuinely serious reductions, but only if we take the time to prepare carefully.

The United States has been preparing carefully for resumption of strategic arms negotiations because we don't want a repetition of past disappointments. We don't want an arms control process that sends hopes soaring only to end in dashed expectations.

Now, I have informed President Brezhnev that we will seek to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which would result in levels that are equal and verifiable. Our approach to verification will be to emphasize openness and creativity, rather than the secrecy and suspicion which have undermined confidence in arms control in the past.

While we can hope to benefit from work done over the past decade in strategic arms negotiations, let us agree to do more than simply begin where these previous efforts left off. We can and should attempt major qualitative and quantitative progress. Only such progress can fulfill the hopes of our own people and the rest of the world. And let us see how far we can go in achieving truly substantial reductions in our strategic arsenals.

To symbolize this fundamental change in direction, we will call these negotiations START -- Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

The third proposal I've made to the Soviet Union is that we act to achieve equality at lower levels of conventional forces in Europe. The defense needs of the Soviet Union hardly call for maintaining more combat divisions in East Germany today than were in the whole allied invasion force that landed in Normandy on D-Day.

The Soviet Union could make no more convincing contribution to peace in Europe and in the world than by agreeing to reduce its conventional forces significantly and constrain the potential for sudden aggression.

Finally, I have pointed out to President Brezhnev that to maintain peace we must reduce the risks of surprise attack and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation.

I am renewing our proposal for a conference to develop effective measures that would reduce these dangers. At the current Madrid meeting, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, we're laying the foundation for a Western proposed Conference on Disarmament in Europe. This conference would discuss new measures to enhance stability and security in Europe. Agreement in this conference is within reach. I urge the Soviet Union to join us and many other nations who are ready to launch this important enterprise.

All of these proposals are based on the same fair-minded principles -- substantial militarily significant reduction in forces, equal feelings for similar types of forces, and adequate provisions for verification.

MORE

My administration, our country, and I are committed to achieving arms reductions agreements based on these principles. Today, I have outlined the kinds of bold equitable proposals which the world expects of us. But we cannot reduce arms unilaterally. Success can only come if the Soviet Union will share our commitment -- if it will demonstrate that its often repeated professions of concern for peace will be matched by positive action.

Preservation of peace in Europe and the pursuit of arms reduction talks are of fundamental importance. But we must also help to bring peace and security to regions now torn by conflict, external intervention and war.

The American concept of peace goes well beyond the absence of war. We foresee a flowering of economic growth and individual liberty in a world at peace.

At the economic summit conference in Cancun, I met with the leaders of 21 nations and sketched out our approach to global economic growth. We want to eliminate the barriers to trade and investment which hinder these critical incentives to growth. And we're working to develop new programs to help the poorest nations achieve self-sustaining growth. And terms like "peace" and "security" we have to say have little meaning for the oppressed and the destitute. They also mean little to the individual whose state has stripped him of human freedom and dignity.

Wherever there is oppression, we must strive for the peace and security of individuals as well as states. We must recognize that progress and the pursuit of liberty is a necessary complement to military security. Nowhere has this fundamental truth been more boldly and clearly stated than in the Helsinki Accords of 1975. These accords have not yet been translated into living reality.

Today I am announcing an agenda that can help to achieve peace, security, and freedom across the globe. In particular, I have made an important offer to forego entirely deployment of new American missiles in Europe if the Soviet Union is prepared to respond on an equal footing.

There is no reason why people in any part of the world should have to live in permanent fear of war or expect it. I believe the time has come for all nations to act in a responsible spirit that doesn't threaten other states. I believe the time is right to move forward on arms control and the resolution of critical regional disputes at the conference table. Nothing will have a higher priority for me and for the American people over the coming months and years.

Addressing the United Nations 20 years ago, another American President described the goal that we still pursue today. He said, "If we all can persevere, if we can look beyond our shores and ambitions, then surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved."

He didn't live to see that goal achieved. I invite all nations to join with America today in the quest for such a world. Thank you. (Applause.)





U.S. — file  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330

APR 1 1982

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Mr. Morton C. Blackwell  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20504

Dear *Morton* Blackwell:

Here's a "first aid kit" to use in response to the verbal slashes we're hearing about Defense spending. This information isn't guaranteed to cure the disease, but perhaps it will help us inoculate those who care.

The numbers show clearly that our Air Force budget has suffered deep cuts and band-aid fixes for many years. The chart on Social Program spending demonstrates that although Defense is taking a larger percentage of the pie than in the recent past, it is still a modest second place to social spending.

We've also addressed five myths with the realities of national Defense needs in the 1980s and 90s. And I'm attaching the posture statements Secretary Orr and General Allen used to introduce next year's budget to Congress.

Our friends in the choir will be delighted with these facts. The non-choir will most likely be surprised to find that the figures do not support the heated critics of stronger Defense. Our antagonists may wish we had not surfaced this information. Use it in good health!

Respectfully,

RICHARD F. ABEL  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Director of Public Affairs

6 Attachments

1. Pocket Summary, President's FY 83 Budget
2. Budget Comparisons
3. Myths and Realities
4. Opening Statement FY 83 Posture Hearing, SECAF
5. Opening Statement FY 83 Posture Hearing, CSAF
6. Joint Statement on Budget Estimates for FY 83, SECAF and CSAF

## BUDGET COMPARISONS

Historic and Future  
(in Billions of "then year" dollars)

| <u>Fiscal Year</u> | <u>Social Programs</u> | <u>Department of Defense</u> |
|--------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1977               | 213.5                  | 95.6                         |
| 1978               | 232.3                  | 103.0                        |
| 1979               | 256.7                  | 115.0                        |
| 1980               | 300.3                  | 132.8                        |
| 1981               | 345.5                  | 156.1                        |
| 1982               | 376.2                  | 182.8                        |
| 1983               | 385.8                  | 215.9                        |
| 1984               | 404.6                  | 247.0                        |
| 1985               | 428.4                  | 285.5                        |
| 1986               | 453.3                  | 324.0                        |
| 1987               | 480.6                  | 356.0                        |

"Social Programs" refers to four major functions within the human resources area of the federal budget. These four functions are:

1. Education, Training, Employment and Social Services
2. Health
3. Income Security
4. Veterans Benefits and Services

Collectively, these functions contain the majority of what are commonly referred to as the social programs. Some of the major programs are:

1. Elementary and Secondary Education
2. Student Assistance
3. Education for the Handicapped
4. The Comprehensive Employment Training Assistance Program (CETA)
5. Vocational Rehabilitation
6. Medicare/Medicaid
7. Research--i.e. National Institute of Health
8. Food and Drug Administration
9. Social Security
10. Federal Civilian Retirement
11. Unemployment Compensation
12. Food Stamp Program
13. Public Assistance Programs, i.e. for the Elderly
14. Housing Assistance Programs
15. Food and Nutrition Programs, i.e. School Lunch Program
16. Veterans Medical Care and Service Connected Disability Compensation

## The Defense Program: Myths and Realities

Myth: The nation "can't afford" this much defense.

Reality:

- The proposed Defense budget requires 6.3 percent of 1983 GNP, and 7.2 percent of 1987 GNP.

- This is a substantially smaller share of GNP than the nation spent in the 1950s and 1960s (8.9 percent). And the 1950s and 1960s were prosperous years for the United States: Per capita GNP grew 59 percent in real terms.

Myth: Strategic forces are gobbling up all the money; little will be left for conventional forces.

Reality:

- Strategic forces will require approximately 15 percent of defense spending over the next five years.

- It's considerably less than we have allocated in previous strategic buildups. Direct costs associated with the strategic buildup of the early 1960s, for example, consumed over 20 percent of the total defense budget.

- The bulk of our investment funds in FY 1983 will go to conventional forces. DOD is requesting approximately \$60 billion for R&D, procurement and military construction associated with conventional forces, and approximately \$15 billion in these accounts for strategic forces. The FY 1980 budget divided investment funds in about the same proportion, spending about \$30 billion for conventional investment (in FY 83 dollars), and \$7 billion for strategic investment.

Myth: The proposed defense program is unbalanced. In particular, it neglects airlift and sealift forces.

Reality:

- The proposed budget adds substantial resources for both airlift and sealift.

- The program (through FY 1987) procures 50 C-5 aircraft for outsize cargo, and 44 KC-10s for oversize and bulk cargo. Together with the revamped Civil Reserve Air Fleet Enhancement program scheduled to begin in 1984, this increases our airlift capability by over 40 percent, adding 17 million ton-miles per day of airlift.

- This increases the airlift we need to achieve our mid-term objective of being able to deploy the Rapid Development Joint Task Force to Southwest Asia and subsequently reinforce NATO.

- Additional programs are planned for early completion beyond the current five-year plan.

- Nor does the proposed budget ignore sealift.

-- It funds acquisition and conversion of eight fast container ships (SL-7s) in FY 1981-83.

-- It adds six more near-term prepositioning ships to preposition additional supplies for the RDJTF at Diego Garcia, for a total of 13.

-- It provides for several ammunition depot ships for the RDJTF, with funding starting in FY 1983.

-- It accelerates the Army's Logistics-Over-The-Shore program (critical to our ability to unload sealift in austere locations), adding \$60 million in FY 1983.

Myth: The proposed budget improves air and naval forces at the expense of land forces.

Reality:

- Budget shares for the military services FY 1982-86 are about the same as they have been for years.

- Because the Army started out with smallest share, of course, its budget increased less than the other services in absolute terms.

-- Army faces a particularly large bill for modernizing its equipment -- acquiring a new tank, a new fighting vehicle, a new attack helicopter, two new air defense systems, and a new light armored vehicle in the next several years.

-- Thus, the Army's budget did not permit any force expansion.

-- But the Army will be readier, able to fight for a significantly longer period, and equipped with much more modern equipment.

- Moreover, significant Air Force and Navy expenditures support land forces.

-- Airlift and sealift are needed to move land force units to the theater. Airlift has been significantly expanded, and sealift programs accelerated.

Myth: The proposed strategic program is misguided and excessive. It buys unnecessary air defenses, and a B-1 bomber that we don't need.

Reality:

- A key part of the strategic program is the improvements in communications and control systems. These systems are essential to the effective employment of our forces and to the credibility of our deterrent. The planned program ends many years of underinvestment in these systems.

- The strategic program also increases the capability of our TRIAD -- bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-based forces -- to survive and retaliate after a Soviet first strike. Today -- abstracting from the inadequacies of our communications and control systems -- surviving U.S. forces could do significant damage in retaliation against Soviet economic installations and fixed military facilities that had not been hardened against nuclear attack. But we would have little firepower left in reserve after such an attack, and we could not attack effectively hardened or mobile military targets. Our program is designed to correct these deficiencies, thereby strengthening deterrence.

- From an historical perspective, in the mid-1970s and prior years, the U.S. had a larger peacetime arsenal of strategic forces than did the Soviet Union -- however one measured the strategic balance. That is not true for most measures of the balance today. The proposed budget halts these negative trends, but it does not fully reverse them in the near term. It is important to remember that the Soviet strategic buildup has a great deal of momentum; they have hot production lines for all major systems, which could enable them to expand significantly their forces in the 1980s.

- Our proposed air defense programs are designed primarily to deter surprise bomber attacks on our military forces. We are not attempting to provide a comprehensive defense against massive air attacks on urban-industrial areas, similar to the air defenses the U.S. had in the late 1950s and early 1960s. But over the last 15 years or so, air defenses have been allowed to deteriorate to the point where our radar warning networks could be easily underflown or circumnavigated by Soviet bombers, and the aircraft we use for interceptors (principally F-106s) are aging and are not outfitted with modern radars or weapons. Hence our proposals to improve North American air defenses.

- Is the B-1 bomber needed? Couldn't we save money by going directly to the advanced technology ("stealth") bomber?

-- In the end, a one-bomber program would cost about as much as a two-bomber program. With a one-bomber program, we would have to modernize and maintain more of our aging B-52s, and ultimately buy a new cruise missile carrier to replace the

B-52. The B-1 will be configured to carry out this mission, and will transition to a cruise missile carrier in the mid to late 1990s.

-- Only with the B-1 can we get significant near-term additions to our bomber force. The advanced technology ("stealth") bomber will not be available until the 1990s.

-- These near-term additions to our bomber force are necessary if we are to reverse the adverse strategic trends within this decade.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

OPENING STATEMENT  
FY 83 POSTURE HEARING

BY

THE HONORABLE VERNE ORR  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

BEFORE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
FEBRUARY 11, 1982

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee

I am indeed honored to have the opportunity again to appear before this Committee and to present, for your consideration, the FY 83 Air Force Program. It is an affordable program developed to continue the momentum of last year and restore to this nation the military capability required to maintain our own security and that of our allies.

I am also happy to report that in the year since my last appearance before this Committee, the Air Force has progressed towards a more capable and resilient force, better able to meet the numerous challenges and threats presented by the tremendous buildup in Soviet weaponry and the accompanying Soviet expansionist foreign policy. As a direct result, our nation is, today, moving toward a more secure future.

In short, I believe that we are "turning the corner" away from years of neglect of our defense needs and that this has resulted, in part, from a President who has put a new vigor into restoring the military capability of this nation along with a dedicated and highly motivated military force led by professionals of the highest caliber, such as the man who sits beside me, General Allen. The program we present today and which is detailed in the Posture Statement that we are now tabling, is one which we both support fully and consider vital if the progress made during the past year is to be continued into the future.

In a very real sense, this progress is a direct result of the efforts of this Committee. I speak for every man and woman in the Air Force when I say that we are most grateful for your continuing support.

In terms of our nuclear capability, the President's announcement in October of a comprehensive strategic modernization program was a significant step toward redressing the strategic imbalance with the Soviet Union. The Air Force has the responsibility to implement the bulk of this program. In terms of conventional forces, the priority emphasis that has been placed on improving the readiness and sustainability of our tactical and airlift forces is bearing fruit. The recent airlift decision is designed to give this nation the capability to meet the Soviet threat head-on, wherever it occurs. Our FY 83 program contains the blueprint and funding profile to implement these programs. General Allen will address them further in his remarks.

Ultimately, however, the actual combat capability and, thus, the deterrent value of the Air Force depends on having adequate numbers of highly qualified, motivated and technically competent people--military and civilian, active and reserve. The most advanced weapon systems in the world are useless unless you have the people competent to operate and maintain them. For this reason, it is people that are my number one priority. I would like to discuss with you briefly what has been accomplished and what remains to be done.

You may know that since becoming Secretary last February, I have had the opportunity to travel to more than two dozen Air Force bases on two continents to talk with our men and women, to learn of their needs and

concerns. I am happy to report that morale is high and our personnel are competent and effective.

Our recruiting efforts are moving forward splendidly. For FY 81, the Air Force set a target that 88 percent of the recruits with no prior military experience should be high school graduates and that target was achieved. For the current fiscal year, we have increased the target to 92 percent and are confident that it will be met. A similar story is found in the area of retention.

The most critical problem that the Air Force faces today is retaining the right numbers of quality people to support mission requirements. In this effort to retain quality people, we in the Air Force are engaged in a highly competitive enterprise with private industry. The intense competition that takes place between the public and private sectors over funds is more than equalled when it comes to people. Surveys of people entering the service indicate that the two major motivations for joining the Air Force are education and training. Those two functions we do quite well, in fact, in some respects too well. For once we educate and train our people, they become highly prized resources for which the private sector is willing to pay dearly. We are forced, therefore, to compete with that sector to retain these people. Not an easy task today - and a more difficult one tomorrow when you realize that while there will be an expanding national requirement for highly qualified individuals, there will also be a diminishing national supply.

Fortunately, the retention decline of the late 1970s, which drained much of our experience base, has been reversed and the upward retention momentum

which began in Fiscal Years 1980/81 has continued into Fiscal Year 1982. First-term reenlistments rates are up nearly 20 percent and second-term reenlistment rates are up nearly 15 percent over the previous fiscal year.

Officer retention has also improved. Retention among pilots today has increased by nearly 30 percent over the previous year and retention among our engineering officers has increased slightly over 30 percent since FY 79.

We also find that fewer people are retiring voluntarily. During FY 81, 25 percent fewer officers and nearly 20 percent fewer enlisted retired. In fact, the current retirement rate is the lowest it has been since the early 1970s.

These gains result from a new appreciation by the citizens of this nation for the contributions of the men and women in uniform. My officers tell me that they now wear their uniforms where they never wore them a few years ago. These improvements also are the result of the compensation gains provided by the Uniformed Services Pay Act. And for that we tip our hat to this committee. With your support, we have been able to restore pay comparability through last year's 14.3 percent pay raise for officers and the 10-17 percent raise for enlisted personnel; provide a cost-of-living allowance (COLA) for singles stationed overseas living in government quarters; provide advance travel payments for dependents in PCS moves; repeal the overseas dependent ceiling, which had been set at 123,000; increase the Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) by 30-35 percent and provide it to those who have over 25 years of service and are in operational flying positions; increase and expand hazardous duty incentive pay; and finally, increase the Serviceman's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) to \$35,000.

I need to add a note of caution however. My concern is that the gains that we have made may be fragile. The improvements in recruiting and retention obtained this past year are largely untested in a strong economy with low unemployment rates. If the efforts which we in the Air Force and you in the Congress began in the past two years are to be sustained, much remains to be done.

For example, we face a significant challenge in the recruiting area. We know that the recruiting function will become more difficult in the future as a result of the decline in the number of young men and women eligible for service. The number of 18-year-old males eligible for military service will decline by 14 percent by 1986 and by as much as 22 percent by 1992. Unfortunately, this will occur at the same time that countering an increasingly sophisticated threat will require more highly qualified people.

The problem therefore is not only Quantity, it is also Quality. The Air Force must compete for skilled people. For example, the shortage of engineers is a national problem. By 1990, we project a shortage of more than 114,000 engineers nationally. Within the Air Force, there is, at present, a shortage of approximately 1,000 military engineers, a shortage that is expected to continue through 1983.

There are similar shortages among our civilian employees. Currently, there is a shortage of about 1700 civilian engineers and that deficit is expected to continue to exist for some time. Despite reduced employment levels and the civilian pay limitations, however, we have been able to maintain a high quality civilian work force.

There is one specific compensation-related problem which exemplifies the need to improve overall reimbursement for the movement of our people and which is adversely affecting the morale, retention, and hence the readiness of enlisted personnel. The loss of per diem equity for enlisted members through a funding restriction in the Fiscal Year 1982 DoD Appropriations Act represents our most serious problem in terms of negative impact on morale, while its application to Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves constitutes a major setback in our efforts to eliminate the "negative compensation" our people incur when ordered to relocate. I urge the Congress to provide the Department with relief from the requirement to reduce enlisted PCS travel reimbursements and to permit us to restore full per diem equity to enlisted members.

Another area of concern that must be addressed is the Quality of Life in the Air Force. We take pride in saying that, "The Air Force is a great way of life." The challenge, however, is to ensure that it continues to be so. Our program is designed to do just that. We need to do such things as build base-level Family Support Centers to consolidate base/community support activities, upgrade the quality of military family housing by constructing new homes and by renovating existing ones; upgrade the quality of dormitories and BOQs; bring the standards of work and office facilities up to that common in the civilian business community; improve enlisted dining facilities; and modernize transient facilities for accompanied and non-accompanied personnel.

The FY 83 program that General Allen and I present to you today is focused on addressing those needs and challenges. We support a predictable, visible, easily understood, stable pay adjustment mechanism. Military compensation must provide a reasonable standard of living, and also

support our unique military institutional values. Our FY 83 budget includes a series of PCS reimbursement initiatives as well as a number of health benefit enhancements.

Finally, I want to say something about good stewardship. We in the Air Force realize that, if we are to continue to build for a strong defense, we must maintain the confidence of the American people. Maintaining this confidence requires that we spend defense dollars wisely. The consensus for defense demands that we be good stewards, and I pledge that we will do everything in our power to deserve the public's support and trust.

To work toward that goal, our FY 83 Posture Statement outlines a five point Integrity and Management Improvement Program. This program will serve as an umbrella for many existing oversight, cost awareness and incentive programs and will add new management, emphasis and cross-feed to obtain efficiencies at all levels of the Air Force.

A major part of this program is aimed at acquisition management. In this area we are implementing a series of specific actions which will result in significant savings in new weapons systems by reducing acquisition costs, shortening acquisition time, and improving the selection management and support process. Multiyear contracts are one of the major efforts in this area. By avoiding yearly contractual processes and retaining contractors and quality control procedures over several years, the multiyear contract produces direct and indirect savings in contract administration. For example, in the case of the F-16, we estimate saving \$259.5 million over the next four years.



To conclude my opening remarks, permit me to add a personal note. I believe that in the past year we in the Air Force and you, the members of this committee and this Congress, have made significant progress toward restoring the defense capability of this nation. The FY 83 Air Force budget and program builds upon that effort. I look forward to working with you this year as we have in the past to make this goal a reality.

Thank you.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

OPENING STATEMENT  
FY 83 POSTURE HEARING

BY

GENERAL LEW ALLEN, JR  
CHIEF OF STAFF

BEFORE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES SENATE

FEBRUARY 11, 1982

RELEASED

GENERAL ALLEN  
OPENING REMARKS  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
10 FEBRUARY 1982

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you this morning with Secretary Orr to support our requests contained in the FY 1983 Air Force budget. As signified by our joint statement, the Secretary and I are fully in accord on the priorities and programs presented and on the challenges confronting the Air Force. In my opening remarks, I would like to underscore a few points of particular significance to the future capabilities of the Air Force.

Before turning to specific programs, I would like to thank the Committee for its strong and consistent support of our defense needs. Because of your support, we are making significant progress toward building the Air Force we must have to counterbalance the unrelenting growth in Soviet military capabilities.

With the program before you, we will be acquiring capabilities that will help us to regain an adequate strategic nuclear balance, forces with the flexibility and effectiveness to continue to deny the Soviets the prospect of victory in any nuclear conflict. Our general purpose forces programs will strengthen our ability to deter and, if necessary, to defeat Soviet aggression in key areas of interest. In concert with our allies, we will be improving our collective ability for strong forward defense in Europe and Korea and for an

effective response to further Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia. Airpower is an essential element of this strategy. The Air Force has the right people, the right training and the basic equipment to meet the demanding challenges which lie before us. As a nation, we must have the courage and steadfastness to carry-out the essential improvement programs we have begun and stay what will necessarily be a long course.

The significant real increase in the FY 1983 Air Force budget and the growth projected over the planning period are made necessary by the accumulated deficiencies in our forces resulting from inadequate attention to our defense needs in the preceding decade and by the continued expansion of Soviet military might. We must strengthen both our nuclear and conventional forces. The Soviet challenge remains formidable, indeed.

As we have moved to correct accumulated deficiencies in our forces, Moscow has continued to add to its already massive arsenal. The strategic nuclear balance remains unsatisfactory, and the momentum of on-going Soviet programs will continue to tilt that balance in the Kremlin's favor for the next few years until we field the new strategic systems called for in the President's program. Soviet industry also continues to produce a steady stream of new aircraft, tanks, artillery, missiles and ships.

In short, while we have begun to make progress in improving our defense capabilities over the past few years, we have not yet closed the gap. Our adversary has not waited for us to catch up; he has continued to build. And, all signs indicate that, despite the economic hardships imposed on the people of the USSR by the Kremlin's single-minded devotion to the accumulation of military power, this unprecedented effort will not soon abate.

The Soviets have not accumulated this awesome military arsenal solely for defense of the Fatherland or even their swollen empire. Their military forces far exceed those required for defensive purposes. Instead, these growing forces are designed to support the Kremlin's unmasked aspirations for imperial expansion as demonstrated by Moscow's continuing brutal occupation of Afghanistan, its scarcely veiled direction of repression in Poland and its sponsorship and military assistance to so-called "liberation" movements around the globe.

We must recognize that we are engaged in a protracted conflict with the Soviet Union. Our views of the rights of men and nations are inextricably opposed. Soviet actions are today and will continue to be inimical to our interests. There will be no quick solution to the fundamental differences that divide us, no quick fixes to the defense challenges that lie before us. The U.S. and its allies must maintain the

range of military capabilities needed to counterbalance Soviet military power to meet and defeat a major Soviet attack, wherever it might occur. Only such clearcut military capability can provide us with an effective deterrent.

If we can muster the determination and persistence to proceed with the course set in this defense program, I believe we will have the military strength needed to get through the difficult period that lies ahead. We will thus make obvious to the Soviet leaders that time is not on their side and the so-called "correlation of forces" will not favor the Soviet Union. If we should fail to follow through on the path we have set, however, the Russians will continue to gain in relative military power and our ability to deter aggression will be dangerously weakened.

As I noted earlier, we are beginning to make good progress toward the essential strengthening of our defenses, but, much remains to be done. We must improve the survivability and effectiveness of our strategic forces; further enhance the combat readiness and sustainability of our general purpose forces; expand our airlift capability; and modernize and expand our tactical fighter forces. And, as Secretary Orr emphasized, key to our force improvement efforts is having adequate numbers of experienced, motivated people to man and maintain our systems.

While we must improve all elements of our forces to meet the country's defense responsibilities, our paramount need is to increase the survivability and effectiveness of our strategic nuclear forces.

We must proceed with an overall strategic modernization program that improves the survivability of our strategic forces, restores our strength relative to that of the Soviet Union, and assures that the Kremlin is denied any prospect of success in nuclear conflict. The broad strategic improvement program set forth by President Reagan last fall is designed to fulfill these objectives. We must proceed with it quickly; we must proceed with it resolutely. There must be no doubt in the minds of our foes and friends alike that we have the determination and capability to match the Soviets in strategic strength, both to deter Soviet aggression and coercion and to provide a sound basis for the negotiation of equitable agreements to reduce strategic arms. Arms limitation negotiations can succeed only if we can bargain from a position of strength. Without a vigorous U.S. strategic modernization effort, the Soviets would have little reason to negotiate toward meaningful reductions in our respective nuclear arsenals.

We have embarked on a three fold program to rebuild our bomber forces. We will be fielding 100 B-1B bombers in the latter half of this decade, increasing procurement of air launched cruise missiles, and pursuing vigorously the development of an advanced technology bomber.

With last fall's Congressional approval of the B-1B program, we are moving out smartly to bring this vital program in on time and within cost. We are confident we will meet the cost goal of \$20.5 billion in FY 81 dollars we have set for the B-1B program and have instituted extraordinary management procedures to that end. We signed contracts with Rockwell last month for production of the initial aircraft and our first B-1B squadron will enter operational service on schedule in 1986.

The B-1B will incorporate advances in design and avionics that will make it highly survivable against both existing and projected threats. It will include a combination of techniques to reduce its radar cross section by a factor of one hundred below that of the B-52 and will include the latest developments in electronic countermeasures. From our continuing analysis, we remain confident that the B-1B will be able to penetrate Russian air defenses and strike targets throughout the Soviet Union well into the 1990s, even though we expect the Soviets to make major improvements in their air defense capabilities over the course of this decade.

We are also proceeding with the development of the Advanced Technology Bomber and are determined to bring it on board at the fastest reasonable pace. We recognize that it is essential for us to deploy an advanced bomber that is



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effective across a range of combat applications and is durable and maintainable as well. We are confident our program will meet these objectives. And, if technology and our development efforts permit, we will do our best to accelerate this important program.

In addition to rebuilding our bomber fleet, we must improve the survivability and capability of our land-based ICBMs. ICBMs with their very high accuracy, responsiveness, virtually assured penetration, and retargeting capability, remain the centerpiece of our strategic deterrence and defense capability.

With our FY 1983 budget request, we will complete the development of the M-X and fund production of the first nine missiles. Our first flight test is slated for next January, leading to an initial operating capability in 1986. Deployment of the M-X will begin to alleviate the asymmetries in ICBM capabilities that have developed in recent years as the accuracy and number of Soviet warheads has markedly increased.

As the committee is aware, developing and reaching agreement on a long-term survivable basing mode for M-X has proved difficult. We are engaged in an aggressive research and development effort to develop more survivable basing modes. We are examining Deep Basing, Continuous Patrol

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Aircraft and Ballistic Missile Defense basing alternatives, with the aim of reaching a long term basing decision in 1983. In the interim, we will deploy a minimum of 40 M-X missiles in existing Minuteman silos.

Though not a lasting solution to growing ICBM vulnerability, initially deploying M-X in silos will complicate and add uncertainty to Soviet attack calculations. More importantly, it is a needed early step toward countering Soviet ICBM capabilities. With greater accuracy and more than three times as many warheads as our newest Minuteman missiles, the MX will be able to destroy high value Soviet targets such as hardened command posts, nuclear storage sites and missile silos. It will thus confront the Soviets with some of the vulnerability problems that their heavy, accurate SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs present to us.

While we must, as a matter of urgency, rebuild our nuclear deterrent, we must also continue to improve our general purpose forces. With Soviet conventional capabilities steadily expanding, it is imperative that our conventional forces have the capability to deploy and employ effective fighting power rapidly. Accordingly, our FY 83 budget continues the priority emphasis of the preceding two budgets on enhancing the readiness and sustainability of our tactical and airlift forces.

We will increase tactical flying hours by eight percent, bringing the average flying hours per pilot up to about 18 hours per month compared to less than 15 in 1980. With our FY 83 request, we will eliminate the long-standing backlog in depot purchased equipment maintenance, we have fully funded both peacetime and initial war reserve spare parts for our tactical forces, and we will achieve full wartime operating capability for our strategic airlift aircraft by FY 86. Over the five-year program period, we will invest nearly \$20 billion to upgrade our munitions inventory in order to bring our stocks up to the levels required to fight and win a prolonged conventional conflict.

I would like to thank this Committee personally for your strong support of our operations and maintenance and logistics support requests over the past several years. As you know well, these less glamorous nuts and bolts accounts are the key to combat readiness and staying power. I solicit your continued backing for our efforts in these important areas.

The global character of U.S. interests and commitments makes it imperative that we maintain forward deployed forces in key regions and that we be able both to reinforce those forces rapidly and to deploy effective combat forces worldwide with great dispatch. Improved mobility is absolutely essential if we are to bring U.S. military power to bear in distant

regions with the speed dictated by the nature of modern warfare and to sustain effective combat. The inadequacy of our longrange airlift is the principal deficiency in our reinforcement and force projection capability.

In light of the urgent and compelling need to be able to transport large quantities of equipment and supplies over intercontinental distances, we have modified our earlier airlift plans. Our previous program would not have provided the needed increases in airlift capability before the end of the decade. Because we believe we cannot afford to wait that long, we now plan to proceed with a combined program that will substantially increase our long range airlift capability over the next few years. When this new program is carried out and the modifications to present C-141s and C-5As are completed, we will have an airlift capacity of 50 million ton-miles a day -- a doubling of our present capability.

We plan to procure 44 additional KC-10s which can both refuel our deploying fighters and transports and carry cargo, thus enhancing our rapid deployment capabilities. We will be able to take advantage of a particularly favorable contract option in acquiring the additional KC-10s. And, to increase our capability to transport large volume cargo, particularly "outsize" equipment such as tanks, self-propelled artillery, and helicopters, we will be acquiring 50 new C-5Ns, an improved version of the C-5As in our present airlift fleet.

With no research and development required and with an existing production base, we will be able to field C-5Ns in the middle of this decade, well before a new production aircraft would be available.

Finally, and most importantly, our budget request emphasizes programs designed to provide adequate compensation and improved quality of life for our service men and women. We must continue to demonstrate to our people that their service is valued by the nation they serve.

In closing, I would like to stress again the imperative of continuing to strengthen our military capabilities. The Soviet threat is real; it is serious; it is growing. If we are to contain Soviet expansionism and protect our free way of life, we must face this challenge squarely and counter-balance the steady growth in Soviet military might.

The way is clear. The programs before you reflect our best judgment of the correct path to follow. We must proceed with courage, with commitment, with perserverance.

I urge you to assist us in strengthening the nation's defense.

# Operation New Life Honduras

*We have a vision and a burden as part of the Church to become a source of supply of helps to the poor of Honduras (also aiding the little children there) in Bibles, clothes, medicines, etc.*

*This burden will include all of the Central American countries eventually where God is pouring out His Spirit today.*

*Honduras and all of Central America will be vital to Latin America, Mexico, and North America as the Lord raises up a standard there to stop the flow of Communism.*

*Won't you be a part of this in giving to help us mobilize — so we can help others in ... Operation New Life Honduras*

Name \_\_\_\_\_ Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ I am enclosing my one-time gift of \$ \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_ I would like to contribute \$ \_\_\_\_\_ monthly.

These funds will be used to supply food, clothing, medicines, and Bibles for the poor of Honduras.  
Send clothing contributions to address on opposite side.

All contributions are tax deductible. Checks are payable to: Rose of Sharon Ministries.

\_\_\_\_\_ I would like to become a Volunteer. I will be available \_\_\_\_\_

(date)

\_\_\_\_\_ I can teach \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ I can train \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Agriculture \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Electrician \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Plumbing \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL THIS PORTION OF THE BROCHURE



Rose of Sharon Ministries  
 Sister Rene LaPlante  
 P. O. Box 15371  
 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70895



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
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## HONDURAS COMMITTEE

- Rene La Plante
- Emmanuel Rodriguez B.
- Myriam de Mejia A.
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- Sister Maria Hernandez
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# Operation New Life Honduras

*"... and the Levite,  
 the stranger,  
 the fatherless,  
 and the widow shall come,  
 eat, and be satisfied..."*

Deuteronomy 14:29