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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 23, 1983

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

8:02 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, thank you for sharing your time with me tonight.

The subject I want to discuss with you, peace and national security, is both timely and important. Timely, because I've reached a decision which offers a new hope for our children in the Twenty-First Century, a decision I'll tell you about in a few minutes. And important because there's a very big decision that you must make for yourselves.

This subject involves the most basic duty that any President and any people share, the duty to protect and strengthen the peace.

At the beginning of this year, I submitted to the Congress a defense budget which reflects my best judgment of the best understanding of the experts and specialists who advised me about what we and our allies must do to protect our people in the years ahead. That budget is much more than a long list of numbers. For behind all the numbers lies America's ability to prevent the greatest of human tragedies and preserve our free way of life in a sometimes dangerous world. It is part of a careful, long-term plan to make America strong again after too many years of neglect and mistakes.

Our efforts to rebuild America's defenses and strengthen the peace began two years ago when we requested a major increase in the defense program. Since then, the amount of those increases we first proposed has been reduced by half, through improvements in management and procurement and other savings.

The budget request that is now before the Congress has been trimmed to the limits of safety. Further deep cuts cannot be made without seriously endangering the security of the nation. The choice is up to the men and women you have elected to the Congress and that means the choice is up to you.

Tonight, I want to explain to you what this defense debate is all about and why I'm convinced that the budget now before the Congress is necessary, responsible and deserving of your support. And I want to offer hope for the future.

But first, let me say what the defense debate is not about. It is not about spending arithmetic. I know that in the last few weeks you have been bombarded with numbers and percentages. Some say we need only a five percent increase in defense spending. The so-called alternate budget backed by liberals in the House of Representatives would lower the figure to two to three percent, cutting our defense spending by \$163 billion over the next five years.

The trouble with all these numbers is that they tell us little about the kind of defense program America needs or the benefits and security and freedom that our defense effort buys for us.

What seems to have been lost in all this debate is the simple truth of how a defense budget is arrived at. It isn't done by deciding to spend a certain number of dollars. Those loud voices that are occasionally heard charging that the government is trying to solve a security problem by throwing money at it are nothing more than noise based on ignorance. We start by considering what must be done to maintain peace and review all the possible threats against our security. Then, a strategy for strengthening peace and defending against those threats must be agreed upon. And, finally, our defense establishment

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must be evaluated to see what is necessary to protect against any or all of the potential threats. The cost of achieving these ends is totaled up and the result is the budget for national defense.

There is no logical way that you can say, let's spend X billion dollars less. You can only say, which part of our defense measures do we believe we can do without and still have security against all contingencies? Anyone in the Congress who advocates a percentage or a specific dollar cut in defense spending should be made to say what part of our defenses he would eliminate, and he should be candid enough to acknowledge that his cuts mean cutting our commitments to allies or inviting greater risk or both.

The defense policy of the United States is based on a simple premise: The United States does not start fights. We will never be an aggressor. We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression -- to preserve freedom and peace.

Since the dawn of the atomic age, we've sought to reduce the risk of war by maintaining a strong deterrent and by seeking genuine arms control. "Deterrence" means simply this: Making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he understands that, he won't attack. We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites aggression.

This strategy of deterrence has not changed. It still works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed. It took one kind of military force to deter an attack when we had far more nuclear weapons than any other power; it takes another kind now that the Soviets, for example, have enough accurate and powerful nuclear weapons to destroy virtually all of our missiles on the ground. Now this is not to say that the Soviet Union is planning to make war on us. Nor do I believe a war is inevitable -- quite the contrary. But what must be recognized is that our security is based on being prepared to meet all threats.

There was a time when we depended on coastal forts and artillery batteries because, with the weaponry of that day, any attack would have had to come by sea. Well, this is a different world and our defenses must be based on recognition and awareness of the weaponry possessed by other nations in the nuclear age.

We can't afford to believe that we will never be threatened. There have been two world wars in my lifetime. We didn't start them and, indeed, did everything we could to avoid being drawn into them. But we were ill-prepared for both -- had we been better prepared, peace might have been preserved.

For 20 years the Soviet Union has been accumulating enormous military might. They didn't stop when their forces exceeded all requirements of a legitimate defensive capability. And they haven't stopped now. During the past decade and a half, the Soviets have built up a massive arsenal of new strategic nuclear weapons -- weapons that can strike directly at the United States.

As an example, the United States introduced its last new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Minute Man III, in 1969, and we're now dismantling our even older

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Titan missiles. But what has the Soviet Union done in these intervening years? Well, since 1969, the Soviet Union has built five new classes of ICBMs, and upgraded these eight times. As a result, their missiles are much more powerful and accurate than they were several years ago and they continue to develop more, while ours are increasingly obsolete.

The same thing has happened in other areas. Over the same period, the Soviet Union built four new classes of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and over sixty new missile submarines. We built two new types of submarine missiles and actually withdrew ten submarines from strategic missions. The Soviet Union built over two hundred new Backfire bombers, and their brand new Blackjack bomber is now under development. We haven't built a new long-range bomber since our B-52's were deployed about a quarter of a century ago, and we've already retired several hundred of those because of old age. Indeed, despite what many people think, our strategic forces only cost about 15 percent of the defense budget.

Another example of what's happened: In 1978, the Soviets had 600 intermediate-range nuclear missiles based on land and were beginning to add the SS-20 -- a new, highly accurate mobile missile, with three warheads. We had none. Since then the Soviets have strengthened their lead. By the end of 1979, when Soviet leader Brezhnev declared "a balance now exists," the Soviets had over 800 warheads. We still had none. A year ago this month, Mr. Brezhnev pledged a moratorium, or freeze, on SS-20 deployment. But by last August, their 800 warheads had become more than 1200. We still had none. Some freeze. At this time Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov announced "approximate parity of forces continues to exist." But the Soviets are still adding an average of three new warheads a week, and now have 1,300. These warheads can reach their targets in a matter of a few minutes. We still have none. So far, it seems that the Soviet definition of parity is a box score of 1,300 to nothing, in their favor.

So, together with our NATO allies, we decided in 1979 to deploy new weapons, beginning this year, as a deterrent to their SS-20's and as an incentive to the Soviet Union to meet us in serious arms control negotiations. We will begin that deployment late this year. At the same time, however, we're willing to cancel our program if the Soviets will dismantle theirs. This is what we've called a zero-zero plan. The Soviets are now at the negotiating table -- and I think it's fair to say that without our planned deployments, they wouldn't be there.

Now, let's consider conventional forces. Since 1974, the United States has produced 3,050 tactical combat aircraft. By contrast, the Soviet Union has produced twice as many.

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When we look at attack submarines, the United States has produced 27 while the Soviet Union has produced 61. For armored vehicles, including tanks, we have produced 1,200. The Soviet Union has produced 54,000 -- nearly 5 to 1 in their favor. Finally, with artillery, we have produced 950 artillery and rocket launchers while the Soviets have produced more than 13,000 -- a staggering 14 to 1 ratio.

There was a time when we were able to offset superior Soviet numbers with higher quality. But today, they are building weapons as sophisticated and modern as our own. As the Soviets have increased their military power, they have been emboldened to extend that power. They are spreading their military influence in ways that can directly challenge our vital interests and those of our allies.

The following aerial photographs, most of them secret until now, illustrate this point in a crucial area very close to home: Central America and the Caribbean Basin. They are not dramatic photographs. But I think they help give you a better understanding of what I am talking about.

This Soviet, intelligence collection facility less than 100 miles from our coast is the largest of its kind in the world. The acres and acres of antennae fields and intelligence monitors are targeted on key, U.S. military installations and sensitive activities. The installation in Lourdes, Cuba is manned by 1500 Soviet technicians. And the satellite ground station allows instant communications with Moscow. This 28-square-mile facility has grown by more than 60 percent in size and capability during the past decade.

In western Cuba, we see this military airfield and its compliment of modern, Soviet-built MIG-23 aircraft. The Soviet Union uses this Cuban airfield for its own long-range reconnaissance missions. And earlier this month, two modern Soviet anti-submarine warfare aircraft began operating from it. During the past two years, the level of Soviet arms exports to Cuba can only be compared to the levels reached during the Cuban Missile Crisis 20 years ago.

This third photo, which is the only one in this series that has been previously made public, shows Soviet military hardware that has made its way to Central America. This airfield with its MI-8 helicopters, anti-aircraft guns, and protected fighter sites is one of number of military facilities in Nicaragua which has received Soviet equipment funneled through Cuba, and reflects the massive military buildup going on in that country.

On the small island of Grenada, at the southern end of the Caribbean chain, the Cubans with Soviet financing and backing are in the process of building an airfield with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who is it intended for? The Caribbean is a very important passage way for our international commerce and military lines of communication. More than half of all American oil imports now pass through the Caribbean. The rapid buildup of Grenada's military potential

is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this island country of under 110,000 people and totally at odds with the pattern of other eastern Caribbean states, most of which are unarmed.

The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as power projection into the region. And it is in this important economic and strategic area that we're trying to help the governments of El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and others in their struggles for democracy against guerrillas supported through Cuba and Nicaragua.

These pictures only tell a small part of the story. I wish I could show you more without compromising our most sensitive intelligence sources and methods. But the Soviet Union is also supporting Cuban military forces in Angola and Ethiopia. They have bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen, near the Persian Gulf oil fields. They have taken over the port that we built at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. And now for the first time in history, the Soviet Navy is a force to be reckoned with in the South Pacific.

Some people may still ask: Would the Soviets ever use their formidable military power? Well, again, can we afford to believe they won't? There is Afghanistan. And in Poland, the Soviets denied the will of the people and in so doing demonstrated to the world how their military power could also be used to intimidate.

The final fact is that the Soviet Union is acquiring what can only be considered an offensive military force. They have continued to build far more intercontinental ballistic missiles than they could possibly need simply to deter an attack. Their conventional forces are trained and equipped not so much to defend against an attack as they are to permit sudden surprise offenses of their own.

Our NATO allies have assumed a great defense burden, including the military draft in most countries. We're working with them and our other friends around the world to do more. Our defensive strategy means we need military forces that can move very quickly, forces that are trained and ready to respond to any emergency.

Every item in our defense program, our ships, our tanks, our planes, our funds for training and spare parts is intended for one all-important purpose, to keep the peace. Unfortunately, a decade of neglecting our military forces had called into question our ability to do that.

When I took office in January 1981, I was appalled by what I found: American planes that couldn't fly and American ships that couldn't sail for lack of spare parts and trained personnel and insufficient fuel and ammunition for essential training. The inevitable result of all this was poor morale in our armed forces, difficulty in recruiting the brightest young Americans to wear the uniform and difficulty in convincing our most experienced military personnel to stay on.

There was a real question then about how well we could meet a crisis. And it was obvious that we had to begin a major modernization program to ensure we could deter aggression and preserve the peace in the years ahead.

We had to move immediately to improve the basic readiness and staying power of our conventional

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forces, so they could meet -- and therefore help deter -- a crisis. We had to make up for lost years of investment by moving forward with a long-term plan to prepare our forces to counter the military capabilities our adversaries were developing for the future.

I know that all of you want peace and so do I. I know too that many of you seriously believe that a nuclear freeze would further the cause of peace. But a freeze now would make us less, not more, secure and would raise, not reduce, the risks of war. It would be largely unverifiable and would seriously undercut our negotiations on arms reduction. It would reward the Soviets for their massive military buildup while preventing us from modernizing our aging and increasingly vulnerable forces. With their present margin of superiority, why should they agree to arms reductions knowing that we were prohibited from catching up?

Believe me, it wasn't pleasant for someone who had come to Washington determined to reduce government spending, but we had to move forward with the task of repairing our defenses or we would lose our ability to deter conflict now and in the future. We had to demonstrate to any adversary that aggression could not succeed, and that the only real solution was substantial, equitable, and effectively verifiable arms reduction -- the kind we're working for right now in Geneva.

Thanks to your strong support, and bipartisan support from the Congress, we began to turn things around. Already, we're seeing some very encouraging results. Quality recruitment and retention are up, dramatically -- more high school graduates are choosing military careers and more experienced career personnel are choosing to stay. Our men and women in uniform at last are getting the tools and training they need to do their jobs.

Ask around today, especially among our young people, and I think you will find a whole new attitude toward serving their country. This reflects more than just better pay, equipment, and leadership. You the American people have sent a signal to these young people that it is once again an honor to wear the uniform. That's not something you measure in a budget, but it's a very real part of our nation's strength.

It'll take us longer to build the kind of equipment we need to keep peace in the future, but we've made a good start.

We haven't built a new long-range bomber for 21 years. Now we're building the B-1. We hadn't launched one new strategic submarine for 17 years. Now we're building one Trident submarine a year. Our land-based missiles are increasingly threatened by the many huge, new Soviet ICBMs. We're determining how to solve that problem. At the same time, we're working in the START and INF negotiations with the goal of achieving deep reductions in the strategic and intermediate nuclear arsenals of both sides.

We have also begun the long-needed modernization of our conventional forces. The Army is getting its first new tank in 20 years. The Air Force is modernizing. We're rebuilding our Navy which shrank from about 1000 ships in the late 1960's to 453 during the 1970's. Our nation needs a superior Navy to support our military

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forces and vital interests overseas. We're now on the road to achieving a 600-ship Navy and increasing the amphibious capabilities of our Marines who are now serving the cause of peace in Lebanon. And we're building a real capability to assist our friends in the vitally-important Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region.

This adds up to a major effort, and it isn't cheap. It comes at a time when there are many other pressures on our budget, and when the American people have already had to make major sacrifices during the recession. But we must not be misled by those who would make defense once again the scapegoat of the federal budget.

The fact is that in the past few decades we have seen a dramatic shift in how we spend the taxpayer's dollar. Back in 1955, payments to individuals took up only about 20 percent of the federal budget. For nearly three decades, these payments steadily increased and this year will account for 49 percent of the budget. By contrast, in 1955, defense took up more than half of the federal budget. By 1980, this spending had fallen to a low of 23 percent. Even with the increase that I am requesting this year, defense will still amount to only 28 percent of the budget.

The calls for cutting back the defense budget come in nice simple arithmetic. They're the same kind of talk that led the democracies to neglect their defenses in the 1930's and invited the tragedy of World War II. We must not let that grim chapter of history repeat itself through apathy or neglect.

This is why I'm speaking to you tonight -- to urge you to tell your Senators and Congressmen that you know we must continue to restore our military strength. If we stop in midstream, we will send a signal of decline, of lessened will, to friends and adversaries alike. Free people must voluntarily, through open debate and democratic means, meet the challenge that totalitarians pose by compulsion. It's up to us, in our time, to choose and choose wisely between the hard but necessary task of preserving peace and freedom and the temptation to ignore our duty and blindly hope for the best while the enemies of freedom grow stonger day by day.

The solution is well within our grasp. But to reach it, there is simply no alternative but to continue this year, in this budget, to provide the resources we need to preserve the peace and guarantee our freedom.

Now, thus far tonight I have shared with you my thoughts on the problems of national security we must face together. My predecessors in the Oval Office have appeared before you on other occasions to describe the threat posed by Soviet power and have proposed steps to address that threat. But since the advent of nuclear weapons, those steps have been increasingly directed toward deterrence of aggression through the promise of retaliation. This approach to stability through offensive threat has worked. We and our allies have succeeded in preventing nuclear war for more than three decades. In recent months, however, my advisors, including in particular the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have underscored the necessity to break out

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of a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation for our security. Over the course of these discussions, I have become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence. Feeling this way, I believe we must thoroughly examine every opportunity for reducing tensions, and for introducing greater stability into the strategic calculus on both sides.

One of the most important contributions we can make is, of course, to lower the level of all arms, and particularly nuclear arms. We are engaged right now in several negotiations with the Soviet Union to bring about a mutual reduction of weapons.

I will report to you a week from tomorrow my thoughts on that score. But let me just say, I am totally committed to this course. If the Soviet Union will join with us in our effort to achieve major reduction, we will have succeeded in stabilizing the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to rely on the spectre of retaliation, on mutual threat. And that is a sad commentary on the human condition. Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability.

I think we are. Indeed, we must. After careful consultation with my advisors including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe there is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base, and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today.

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it is reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response.

But isn't it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war? We know it is. In the meantime, we will continue to pursue real reductions in nuclear arms, negotiating from a position of strength that can be assured only by modernizing our strategic forces.

At the same time, we must take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional military conflict escalating to nuclear war by improving our non-nuclear capabilities.

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America does possess -- now -- the technologies to attain very significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional, non-nuclear forces. Proceeding boldly with these new technologies, we can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet Union may have to threaten attack against the United States or its allies.

As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we recognize that our allies rely upon our strategic offensive power to deter attacks against them. Their vital interests and ours are inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are one. And no change in technology can or will alter that reality. We must and shall continue to honor our commitments.

I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that.

But with these considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM Treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I'm taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose -- one all people share -- is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

My fellow Americans, tonight we're launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it. As we cross this threshold, I ask for your prayers and your support. Thank you. Good night. And God bless you.

END

8:29 P.M. EST



MICHIGAN CITIZENS SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENCY

An Affiliate of the National Foundation

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Alice L. Schoenholtz
Senator Ed Fredricks
Jack Welborn

MEMO

1983 Advisory Board: Listed in alphabetical order on reverse side of this page.

To: Advisory Board Members
From: Alice L. Schoenholtz
Subject: President Reagan's Defense Program

October 26, 1983

What has happened in Lebanon and Grenada this week points to the need of the United States to have a strong and viable defense that is flexible to protect the PEACE of the world.

The enclosed briefing book on President Reagan's defense programs and policies could not have come at a more appropriate time. It highlights the priority the President places on defense to protect our Country and Democracy throughout the world.

Please share "Rebuilding Our Defenses: The Reagan Administration's Record on Defense Issues" with friends so they will become more informed and understand what President Reagan describes as "the most difficult job in the world." He needs your support, at this time, more than ever.

From: Bill McMaster
Subject: Chairmanship of Michigan Committee to Re-elect President Reagan

The Chairperson of the Michigan Committee to Re-elect President Reagan should be named very soon. Frankly, delayed action in Washington has caused a rumor mill to develop. All that is certain today is that John Gnau will not be Chairman.

Dick Headlee, who we believe would do the best job of organizing the grassroots for the President, is not a shoo-in. During two visits and numerous letters to Washington in the last two weeks, I've conveyed the results of the poll of Michigan Citizens Supporting the Presidency and of Republican State Central Committee. An impressive 68% of you want Dick Headlee to be Chairman.

That corresponds with a 60% approval rating among Republicans of Dick Headlee "as a person active in politics" recorded in a recent 800-person survey by Market Opinion Research. Headlee also had a 43% approval rating among ticketsplitters and 31% among Democrats. (Gov. Blanchard's approval rating in the total sample was 29% compared to Dick Headlee's 44%.)

We've been pushing Dick Headlee for Chairman with Alice Schoenholtz as Co-Chair.

Others mentioned as being considered for the Chairmanship include Ronna Romney, Bob Huber, Jackie McGregor, Alice Schoenholtz, Congressman William Broomfield, Dick Chrysler, Palmer Heenan and Mary Coleman.

Feel free to express your opinion directly to: Mr. Ed Rollins
Reagan/Bush "84"
440 First St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

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**Rebuilding
Our
Defenses:
The Reagan Administration's
Record
on
Defense Issues**

September 1983



A special report prepared by the Communications Division Research Department
Republican National Committee,
310 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., Chairman
William I. Greener, III, Director, Communications Division
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**Rebuilding
Our
Defenses:
The Reagan Administration's
Record
on
Defense Issues**

September 1983



September, 1983

Few issues are so critical to our nation as the maintenance of our national security and the keeping of the peace. President Reagan is standing firmly behind his pledge to strengthen the nation's defenses while pursuing a responsible policy toward arms control.

The Reagan Administration is pledged to restoring our "margin of safety," rebuilding our defenses after almost a decade of neglect, and pursuing effective and verifiable arms control agreements. The Reagan Administration is determined to negotiate agreements that will make a positive contribution to reducing the risk of war; that is, that are equal in all respects, that are verifiable, and that involve actual reductions in the threat we face. That threat is real and growing and wishful thinking or simplistic and irresponsible proposals, such as the nuclear freeze, will not enhance our security or serve the cause of peace. The President will continue to oppose any proposal that involves the acceptance of Soviet superiority, unverifiable arms control agreements, or the termination of those vital U.S. programs that are required to rebuild our defenses and restore our deterrence.

The enclosed materials highlight the President's defense program. The materials contain an outline of the main points in the debate, a more detailed text to expand upon the arguments, and a series of questions and answers.

The purpose of this defense issues package is to enable you to state President Reagan's position clearly and simply. The goal is to generate broad support for the President's efforts to restore our "margin of safety" and to negotiate responsible arms control agreements.

Use the information we have provided. Let the media in your area hear from you. Write or call your Congressman.

The fate of a free America is in the balance. Our future and that of our children will be determined by the outcome of this great national debate. We must convince Congress and the American people that the President's policies and programs are critical to our national security and to the preservation of the lives and safety of all Americans. Your effort on this behalf is vitally important.

Very truly yours,



Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr.
Chairman
Republican National Committee

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*When text contains an asterisk, refer to glossary.

Defense Budget/ Strategic Modernization— Key Points

- President Reagan's five-year defense budget is an affordable program designed to correct the deficiencies in our current defense posture caused by years of neglect of our military forces.
- Defense spending as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) and as a percentage of total budget expenditures has declined steadily in the last two decades, except for the Vietnam years, while spending on federally-funded social programs has skyrocketed.
- The Reagan FY 1984 defense budget proposes \$238.6 billion in outlays. This represents 6.8 percent of GNP and 29 percent of total federal expenditures.
- The largest share of the FY 1984 defense budget, 42.2 percent, is taken up by manpower costs, compared to 10 percent for strategic forces.
- To redress the strategic imbalance caused by a two-decade-long Soviet buildup, President Reagan announced a comprehensive five-part strategic modernization program on October 31, 1981. The program calls for:
 1. ICBM* modernization
 2. SLBM* modernization
 3. Modernization of strategic bombers
 4. Improvement in command, control, and communications systems *
 5. Improvement in strategic defenses.
- U.S. ICBM forces are old and obsolete. The Soviet ICBM force is more modern and powerful than our own. As a result, the Soviets can threaten the survivability of U.S. ICBMs by using only a fraction of their own ICBM force. The current U.S. ICBM force cannot now inflict similar damage on the Soviet Union, even using our entire force.
- To ensure the U.S. has the ability to destroy Soviet military targets if we are attacked, President Reagan has called for the deployment of 100 MX Peacekeeper missiles* and a new, smaller, mobile ICBM, called the Midgetman*.

Overview


- The MX Peacekeeper missile faces survivability problems in the short run, but, in the longer run, the development of Midgetman and research and development into new techniques to harden silos and shelters, for example, will ensure the effectiveness of our land-based inter-continental ballistic missile force.
- The Reagan defense program also seeks to correct deficiencies in our conventional force structure through improvements in the readiness* and sustainability* of our armed forces.
- President Reagan's defense budget is a minimal budget to protect our country's vital interests and to meet our commitments.

President Reagan's defense budget is an affordable, multi-year program designed to correct the deficiencies in our current defense posture caused by years of declining funding for our military forces. By contrast, funding for social programs during those years mushroomed.

1. *Defense budget trends.* In 1962, defense comprised 45.9 percent of federal budget expenditures; by fiscal year 1978 it had declined to 22.9 percent of the budget.
 - The President has asked Congress for \$238.6 billion in outlays for fiscal year 1984, only 29 percent of total federal expenditures.
2. *Defense budget by category.* The largest share of the FY 1984 defense budget goes for manpower costs; it does not go for procurement of new weapons systems.
 - 12.5 percent of defense spending in the 1984 budget will be available for new programs compared to an estimated 42.2 percent for manpower costs.

- Despite the great attention they receive, strategic nuclear forces—our intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers—do not consume most of the budget. Spending on strategic forces will comprise 10 percent of the 1984 defense budget. At no point in the Reagan five-year plan are expenditures on strategic forces to exceed 15 percent.

The Federal Budget, National Defense, and Strategic Forces 1950-1983




Strategic forces represent a small proportion of the defense budget and a very tiny fraction of total federal expenditures.

3. *Non-defense spending.* More money was spent on social programs in the last decade than on defense.

- Non-defense spending mushroomed during the 1970s while defense spending did not even keep up with inflation. Today, direct payments to individuals represent 42 percent of total budget outlays.
- This Administration spends more than ever on human needs. HHS spends more than two-thirds of a billion dollars every day on social programs. The HHS budget is the third largest budget in the world; only the United States and the Soviet Union have larger budgets.

Percent of Budget



This graph illustrates the dramatic increase in social spending since the late 1950s and the concomitant decrease in defense spending.

The Reagan Strategic Modernization Program

4. *U.S.-Soviet budget trends.* Soviet military expenditures grew during the 1960s and 1970s while U.S. expenditures declined after accounting for inflation.
- Today, the Soviet Union spends 15 percent of its GNP on defense compared to 6.5 percent for the U.S.
 - While the Reagan five-year defense program envisions spending under 8 percent of GNP by 1988, the Soviet defense allotment could reach 20 percent in the not-too-distant future.

U.S. ICBMs are currently obsolete and vulnerable to nuclear attack. They lack the necessary accuracy and power to attack the most important Soviet military targets, which have been hardened or strengthened to withstand nuclear attack.

To redress the imbalance created by the unprecedented Soviet buildup of the 1970s and to correct the deficiencies of our forces, President Reagan announced a comprehensive five-part strategic modernization program on October 31, 1981. The program calls for:

1. *ICBM modernization.* This modernization will entail the development and deployment of 100 MX Peacemaker missiles and the development of the Midgetman ICBM.

The Need for ICBM Modernization: MX and Midgetman

The Soviet ICBM force grew enormously in numbers and destructive power in the past two decades. As a result, the bipartisan Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces (also known as the Scowcroft Commission) noted, "The Soviets...now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability, accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all...U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of their own ICBM force.

The U.S. ICBM force now deployed cannot inflict similar damage, even using the entire force." (Emphasis added)

- a. *Restoring retaliatory effectiveness.* Effective deterrence requires the U.S. to have the ability to destroy Soviet military targets if we are attacked.
- To solve the problem of retaliatory effectiveness President Reagan called for a limited deployment of 100 MX Peacekeeper missiles in Minuteman III silos.
 - The MX missile will reestablish our hard-target capability; i.e., the MX will restore our ability to destroy hardened or strengthened Soviet military targets.
- b. *Decreasing the risk of attack.* The deployment of MX will make it more difficult for the Soviets to attack, and, by threatening their remaining ICBM force, decrease Soviet confidence that an attack might succeed.
- As the President's Commission notes: "Soviet planners would have to account for the possibility that Peacekeeper missiles would be available for use and thus they would help deter such an attack."

- c. *Problem of survivability.* In the near term, survivability of the MX Peacekeeper will depend on its interaction with the other components of the Triad—the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the strategic bombers.
- In the longer run, ICBM modernization will be achieved through the development (in the early 1990s) of a new small ICBM called the Midgetman, as well as through research and development on new techniques to harden silos and shelters or underground basing.
- d. *Midgetman.* As Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger pointed out, "...The deployment of a new small missile will add to the flexibility and overall capability of the ICBM force."
- The Midgetman will be designed so that it can be made mobile or placed in super-hardened or strengthened underground facilities which can survive a Soviet attack. Because of its small size, the Midgetman can be deployed in a variety of ways. This is stabilizing because it makes it

more difficult for the Soviets to destroy the missile and hence increases the risk to the Soviets of attacking the U.S.

2. *SLBM* modernization.* Trident* submarine construction will continue, and a larger, more accurate sea-launched ballistic missile— known as Trident II*—will be developed and deployed on Trident submarines in 1989.

- *The need for SLBM modernization.* The current fleet of U.S. missile submarines is old. Except for the first two Trident missile submarines that have just recently become operational, all other U.S. ballistic missile submarines were built before 1967. These submarines will have to be retired in the 1990s due to age if nothing else.
- The Trident II and the submarine-launched cruise missile will improve our ability to destroy hardened or strengthened Soviet military targets. The existing submarine-launched missiles do not have this capability.

- As a result of SLBM modernization, the U.S. will have a survivable force that can attack the things the Soviets value most: their strategic nuclear missiles, their fortified military facilities and their civilian and military leadership. This capability will serve as a major deterrent to a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S.

3. *Modernization of strategic bombers.* A variant of the B-1B,* will be developed and 100 aircraft will be operational by 1988. Research and development will continue on the advanced technology bomber (ATB) or "Stealth"* aircraft.

- *The need for bomber modernization.* All U.S. heavy strategic bombers are already more than 20 years old. They face a vast and sophisticated array of Soviet defenses that are continually being improved. If not replaced soon, our B-52 bombers will not be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses and attack their targets. Additionally, the B-52 bomber is vulnerable to Soviet attack on its air bases.

-
- The B-1B bomber and the Stealth aircraft are designed to remedy these defects. Both aircraft will have a dramatically improved capability to penetrate Soviet air defenses and to survive a Soviet attack on their air bases.
4. *Improvement in command, control and communications systems.* The U.S. will deploy improved radar and satellite systems to enhance early warning capabilities and to assess more accurately and reliably the size and scope of a Soviet missile attack. Development of a new satellite communications system to ensure that Presidential orders can be passed from command centers to commanders in the field will also take place.
 - *The need for improved command, control and communications systems.* An absolutely vital element of our deterrent is our ability to communicate with our forces. We take extensive measures that make it impossible to launch an attack without authorization from the President. Today, our command, control and communications network has many deficiencies. There are real doubts that some elements of it can perform under enemy attack.
 5. *Improvement in strategic defenses.* The President's program involves the construction of radar to detect bomber attack, the procurement of airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACs), and five squadrons of F-15 fighter interceptors. The President has also authorized a very substantial increase in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) research and development.
 - *The need for strategic defenses.* Strategic defenses are defenses against bomber or missile attack. These consist of anti-missile defenses of various types, of which the U.S. has none; surface-to-air missiles, of which the U.S. has none; and interceptor aircraft of which the U.S. has a small force of old, obsolete aircraft. By comparison, the Soviets have 64 anti-ballistic missiles, 10,000 surface-to-air missiles, and 2,500 interceptor aircraft.

Conventional Forces

The Reagan Administration has also moved to correct deficiencies in our conventional forces. When President Reagan took office, many American planes couldn't fly and some American ships couldn't sail because we lacked spare parts and trained personnel and had insufficient fuel and ammunition for essential training. To improve the readiness and sustainability of our conventional forces, the Administration's five-year program proposes to:

- provide our ground forces with additional quantities of both weapons systems and support equipment;
- modernize Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps tactical aircraft;
- increase the naval construction program;
- replenish stocks of supplies and ammunition.

The Soviet Threat and the Need for a Strong Defense

President Reagan's defense program is a measured response to the threat we face. The threat is real and growing. Disparities in military strength *do* matter. As President Reagan noted, military strength must be preserved "in order to deter and defend against aggression—to preserve our freedom and peace."


Two decades of underfunding of our military forces has resulted in:

1. the loss of U.S. strategic superiority;
2. a threat to the survivability of our ICBM force;
3. substantial Soviet superiority in theater nuclear forces over those of the U.S. and NATO;
4. an inadequately-sized, ill-equipped army that lacked the requisite combat readiness and sustainability;
5. a serious threat to U.S. command of the seas, and hence our ability to maintain supply lines to Europe and the rest of the world; and,


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6. a substantial Soviet leap in technological sophistication. Not only are the Soviets outproducing us but much of their equipment is better than our own. Even in areas where we had a major lead in technology, the Soviets have closed much of the gap.

The Soviet Union poses a formidable military threat to the United States, its allies, and its vital interests. If we permit the disparity between Soviet and U.S. arms buildup to continue, the threat against us will continue to grow and the risk of war will increase. Weakness, not strength, will invite aggression.


**Weapons Production
1974-1982**



**Weapons Production
1974-1982**



**Weapons Production
1974-1982**



Questions and Answers

QUESTION: Critics of the President's defense budget argue that we cannot afford such an expensive military buildup. How do you respond to such criticism?

ANSWER: We cannot afford *not* to respond to threats that constitute clear and present dangers to our security, our freedom and to the peace. Providing protection and security against external attack is the most basic responsibility of the government.

Defense spending must be placed in the proper perspective. Defense spending must be measured not in dollars but in terms of our needs. The threat our country faces is real and growing, and wishful thinking will not make it disappear. National defense must be our highest priority. Our military strength preserves and defends our liberty and the American way of life.

QUESTION: Why is the President spending so much money on costly strategic programs?

ANSWER: The President's strategic weapons program was designed to be affordable. It is not costly in relation to the total defense budget. The strategic weapons program President Reagan has approved will be only 10 to 15 percent of the defense budget over the next five years. These are not great sums to pay for forces that are most directly involved in the deterrence of attack on the United States and the limitation of damage if such an attack occurs.

For almost two decades, the United States has underfunded strategic programs. During the 1970s, the Soviet Union spent three times as much for strategic forces as did the United States. This included both a massive research and development program, and the deployment of new and far more capable missile systems.

The Reagan Administration has approved a comprehensive modernization program to eliminate the disparities that currently exist, and restore an effective strategic deterrent to the United States.

QUESTION: We often read in the newspaper that many military weapons do not work as they are supposed to and suffer from enormous cost-overruns. How do you account for this and what can be done to correct the problem?

ANSWER: The defense budget is subject to more scrutiny than perhaps any other government budget. Attacks on supposed waste and inefficiency are quite often little more than disguised attacks on the defense program by people who would weaken defense to spend more on their pet social programs. Generally speaking, the Pentagon is better run than any other government agency. The Reagan Administration is currently taking action to further improve management efficiency.

There are cost-overruns in defense programs just as there are cost-overruns in domestic programs. Weapons system development often requires the development of new technology, the cost of which is difficult to estimate in advance of the development. In addition, during the 1970s, there was massive unanticipated inflation. The annual cuts in the defense program, during the 1970s, often forced the procurement of weapons systems at rates of production that were simply not economical; such procurement often resulted in large increases in unit costs.

The Reagan Administration is now taking action to improve management and reduce future cost-overruns. These changes have already saved billions of dollars. We are now engaging increasingly in multi-year procurement and producing weapons systems at more economical rates.

QUESTION: There has been so much controversy surrounding the MX missile. Why is the MX necessary?

ANSWER: Land-based ICBMs offer a number of unique characteristics that are essential to the maintenance of a strong and reliable deterrent. They are accurate, responsive, enjoy reliable rapid communications with command authorities, have short time-to-target capability (ICBMs take 30 to 35 minutes to reach their target), and offer alert rates approaching 100 percent. (By alert rates, we mean availability for use.) They are based on U.S. sovereign territory, thus raising the stakes greatly for any attacker. Their engineering and survivability characteristics make them fully independent of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and bombers. This combination, known as the Triad, presents an impossible targeting problem to an attacker intent on avoiding our retaliation.

Unfortunately, large, accurate new missiles developed by the Soviet Union have threatened the survivability and retaliatory effectiveness of our current ICBM force. The Soviets have developed and widely deployed numerous and highly accurate ICBMs that are capable of destroying most of our ICBM force in a first strike.

The MX is the only improvement in our ICBM force that can take place this decade. Our ICBM force is much less powerful than that of the Soviet Union; it currently has less than one-third the number of warheads. Moreover, Soviet warheads are two to four times more powerful than those of U.S. ICBMs. This factor, combined with the lower accuracy of U.S. ICBMs, means the Soviet Union is capable of attacking the full range of U.S. targets while the U.S. cannot effectively attack all types of Soviet targets, particularly the most important military targets. MX would partially remedy that.

The Soviet Threat— Key Points

- The 1970s witnessed the most massive Soviet military buildup in history.
 - Soviet defense spending increased by 40 percent, while the U.S. defense spending did not even keep up with inflation.
 - U.S. expenditures decreased to five percent of national output; Soviet military expenditures increased to 12 to 14 percent of their national output.
- Under President Reagan's five-year defense program, the U.S. would still be spending under eight percent of its national output for defense (by 1988). The Soviet defense allotment will continue to grow despite a slowing economy. The Defense Department estimates that the Soviets could spend 20 percent of their national output on defense in the not-too-distant future.
- During the 1970s, the Soviets moved from strategic parity to a position where they are ahead of the U.S. in most measures of military capability; i.e., numbers of missiles, destructive power (yield and payload),* ability to destroy military targets (hard target capability), number of missile submarines, and strategic defenses.
- Because of the massive buildup of Soviet ICBM forces, the Soviet Union has the capability to destroy virtually all U.S. land-based ICBMs. *The U.S. has no comparable capability.*
 - This inability is not the result of accident. It has resulted from the fact that the Soviet Union has rapidly and extensively modernized its missile forces over the last decade while the U.S. has not.
- While the current U.S. bomber force consists of 300 vintage 1950s B-52s, the Soviet not only produced heavy* and medium bombers* in the 1960s, they also introduced a new type of intercontinental bomber, the Backfire,* and are developing a second new type—the larger Blackjack.
 - The Soviet bomber threat can be expected to increase significantly over the next decade.
- The Soviet threat to Europe continues to grow with the increasing Soviet deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, particularly the SS-20 missile.*
 - Not only do the Soviets have an overall advantage in conventional forces facing NATO, they have

achieved as much as a six-to-one advantage in theater nuclear missiles and aircraft.


- Recognizing the considerable advantage held by the Soviet Union in intermediate-range nuclear missiles and the growing Soviet military threat, NATO decided in 1979 to deploy 108 Pershing II missiles* and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles.*
- The Pershing IIs and the ground-launched cruise missiles, scheduled for installation in late 1983, will allow NATO to respond in-kind to an attack by Soviet intermediate-range missiles—a capability NATO does not now possess.
- The Soviets have a large advantage in chemical weapons. They are currently using chemicals and biological weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. The U.S. and its allies have a grossly inadequate chemical deterrent capability.
- Current U.S. chemical weapons are obsolete and in many cases their delivery systems have been retired due to age.
- The U.S. ceased production of all chemical weapons in 1969 and destroyed all its biological weapons as well.

U.S.–Soviet Defense Spending: Trends

As President Reagan has said, “The decade of so-called detente witnessed the most massive Soviet buildup of military power in history.” U.S. defense spending, by contrast, grew in the 1960s because of Vietnam, but fell continuously through the 1970s.

- During the decade of the 1970s, the Soviets increased their defense spending by 40 percent, outspending the U.S. by more than \$400 billion.

Comparison of U.S-Soviet Defense Spending



Since the late 1960s the Soviet Union has outspent the U.S. on defense. Soviet expenditures in the 1970s increased by 4 to 5 percent each year, while U.S. expenditures declined.

- By 1980, the Soviet Union was spending 50 percent more for military forces than the U.S.
- In terms of budget percentages, U.S. expenditures declined to about five percent of the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP) while Soviet military expenditures increased to 12 to 14 percent of their national output. At present, the Soviet Union is spending 15 percent of its national output on defense and the trend is continuing up.
- Even if the five-year Reagan defense program were fully funded, the U.S. would be spending somewhat less than eight percent of its GNP in 1988. Year by year projections are:

1983: 6.5 percent
 1984: 6.8 percent
 1985: 7.3 percent
 1986: 7.6 percent
 1987: 7.7 percent
 1988: 7.7 percent

U.S.-Soviet Military Balance (Strategic Forces): An Overview

During the 1970s the Soviets moved from strategic parity to a position where they were well ahead of the United States in most measures of military capability (i.e., numbers of missiles, destructive power, ability to destroy protected or fortified military targets, numbers of missile submarines, and strategic defenses).

1. Over the last decade, the Soviet Union has spent three times as much on strategic nuclear forces as has the U.S.
2. The Soviets now have 2,778 strategic missiles and bombers; the U.S. has 1,890.

Soviet Union	United States
1,398 ICBMs	1,046 ICBMs
950 SLBMs	544 SLBMs
430 bombers	300 bombers

Land-Based Missiles (ICBMs)


The Soviet Union has a monopoly on the largest and most powerful missiles—the so-called heavy missiles,* such as the SS-18.*

1. Of the 1,398 Soviet ICBMs, 308 are heavy missiles.
2. Each Soviet SS-18 has twice the payload or destructive potential as the projected U.S. MX Peacekeeper ICBM.
3. Each Soviet SS-18 missile can deliver 10 warheads, each with the destructive potential of a million tons of TNT.

4. The 308 SS-18s *alone* carry more destructive power than *all* U.S. strategic missiles combined.

Because of the massive buildup of the Soviet ICBM forces, the Soviet Union is capable of destroying virtually all of our land-based ICBMs. The U.S. has *no* comparable capability, because our missiles lack the destructive power and the accuracy.

Size Comparison of U.S. Minuteman III and Existing Soviet Intercontinental Missiles



The United States has one modern intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Minuteman III, deployed in 1970. Modern Soviet missiles, particularly the SS-18 and SS-19 are much larger and more powerful and more accurate than the Minuteman III. These large Soviet missiles are the primary cause for the strategic imbalance that now exists.

1. This inability is not the result of accident. It has resulted from the fact that the Soviet Union has modernized its missiles over the last decade while the U.S. has not.
2. To meet the threat to our land-based ICBM force, President Reagan has ordered the deployment of 100 MX Peacekeeper missiles and the development of a smaller, mobile, single-warhead missile, the so-called Midgetman.*

Sea-Based Missiles (SLBMs)

The Soviet Union has built up a very large force of ballistic missile submarines that exceeds that of the United States in every characteristic except number of warheads (the number of bombs missiles carry).

-
1. Between 1967 and 1982 the United States did not build a single ballistic missile submarine. The Soviets built more than 60.
 2. The Soviet Union now has more than twice the number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, carrying almost twice the number of missiles, as we do:

U.S.S.R.	U.S.
68 submarines	33 submarines
950 missiles	544 missiles
 3. The Soviets are about to introduce the Typhoon, a new missile submarine, which is about 50 percent larger than our new Trident submarine, with larger and more powerful missiles.
 - The missile carried by the Typhoon is roughly comparable to the U.S. Trident II missile, which will not become operational until 1989.
 4. The Typhoon missile may be the first submarine-launched missile capable of destroying protected or fortified military targets, a capability that we do not presently have.
 5. To meet the expanding Soviet threat, the Reagan Administration has ordered the production of the submarine-launched cruise missile. The submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)* will be deployed in 1984.
 6. While the survivability of the U.S. sea-based force is currently not threatened by the Soviet Union, current trends show that such a threat could soon develop unless we keep upgrading our forces.

Strategic Bombers

The current U.S. bomber force consists of 300 B52s. The B52s were designed in the late 1940s to meet the threat of the 1950s. While some of the equipment on the B52s has been upgraded, the aircraft is still basically a 1950s vintage aircraft. Today, our entire heavy bomber force consists of these aging and increasingly vulnerable B52s.

The United States terminated production of heavy and medium strategic bombers in 1961. The Soviet Union has continued producing both types, and has developed two new intercontinental bombers, the Backfire and the Blackjack.


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1. The Backfire was introduced in the mid-1970s and is being produced at a rate of more than 30 per year. The Blackjack will be introduced in 1986.
 2. The Soviets now have 430 heavy bombers compared to 300 for the United States. Since the number is increasing steadily, the threat to the United States can be expected to increase significantly over the next decade.
 3. To meet the Soviet bomber threat, President Reagan has ordered the development and deployment of 100 B-1B bombers and the development of the Stealth aircraft, an advanced technology bomber.
 - The B-1B is an advanced, multipurpose heavy bomber capable of delivering a wide variety of nuclear and conventional munitions and long-range cruise missiles. The first B-1B squadron will be operational in 1986, with all 100 operational by 1988.
 - The Stealth aircraft is an advanced bomber designed primarily for nuclear strike missions against very advanced enemy air defenses. Stealth aircraft will be operational in the early 1990s.

NATO—Warsaw Pact Comparison

A secure Western Europe is of vital importance to the United States. The security of Western Europe rests on the ability of the U.S. and its allies to maintain conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter aggression and defend itself if attacked. The Soviet threat to Western security and political independence is real and serious.

1. *Conventional Forces.* Conventional forces are land armies, their equipment, fighter aircraft, and helicopters.
 - NATO has 84 Army divisions; the Warsaw Pact has 173.
 - Soviet-Warsaw Pact nations have a six-to-one advantage in tactical interceptor aircraft; a three-to-one advantage in anti-tank guided weapon launchers; a two-and-a-half-to-one advantage in armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles; a three-to-one advantage in tanks.

NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Comparison (in place in Europe)



	Warsaw Pact	NATO
Military Manpower:		
(men under arms)	4,000,000	2,600,000
(divisions)	173	84
Tactical Interceptor Aircraft	4,370	740
Anti-Tank Guided Weapon Launchers	24,300	8,100
Armored Personnel Carriers and Infantry Fighting Vehicles	78,800	30,000
Artillery and Mortars	31,500	10,750
Tanks	42,500	13,000

2. *Theater Nuclear Forces.* Theater nuclear forces are battlefield and short- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles and aircraft which can be utilized to support ground forces in combat.
- The Warsaw Pact has a three-to-one advantage in overall theater nuclear forces, with a Soviet monopoly on intermediate-range missiles.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles



The Soviets have 600 intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The U.S. has zero.

- To meet the threat posed to Europe by the massive Soviet buildup of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO requested in 1979 that the United States deploy 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. Deployment is scheduled to begin in late 1983.
 - The Pershing IIs and the ground-launched cruise missiles will allow NATO to respond in-kind to an attack by Soviet intermediate-range missiles—a capability NATO does not now possess.
3. *Investment.* U.S. and NATO military investment (research and development, construction, and procurement) has lagged alarmingly behind the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

- Effective Soviet and Warsaw Pact investment is 35 to 40 percent greater than that of the NATO Alliance plus Japan. It has been greater since 1973, so the Warsaw Pact has been steadily accumulating more military assets than the NATO Alliance.

4. *Chemical Weapons.* The Soviets have a large advantage in chemical weapons. Their forces are better equipped in both offensive and defensive equipment than any Western army. Our deterrent to chemical attack rests mainly on the threat of escalation to nuclear weapons.

- The Soviet Union currently has advantages in chemical weapons and associated equipment that range from 10-to-1 to 100-to-1.

- The United States ceased production of chemical weapons in 1969 and destroyed all its biological weapons. U.S. chemical weapons are obsolete.


Questions and Answers

QUESTION: Which nation has military superiority over the other—the USSR or the U.S.?

ANSWER: As President Reagan has stated, “The Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority, enough so that there is risk...”

There is no dispute concerning the basic numbers that make up the military balance. The Soviets have about 50 percent more strategic bombers and missiles than does the United States. Some Soviet land-based missiles are eight times as powerful as those of the U.S. and are more accurate. The Soviets have some defenses against missile attack and we do not. Soviet defenses against bomber attack literally dwarf those of the United States. In the area of intermediate-range nuclear missiles the balance is even more one-sided—the Soviets have 1,300 warheads; the U.S. has zero.

Chemical/Biological Warfare Comparison



Enormous disparities exist between the chemical warfare capability of the United States and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies. This disparity is all the more disturbing by Soviet use of these weapons in Afghanistan and Indochina in violation of existing agreements and international law.

Those who argue that this constitutes “parity” depart from the usual meaning of the word. They are really arguing that the military imbalances that favor the Soviet Union are not important. These people frequently embrace the concept of “overkill” which conceives of cities as the only targets for nuclear weapons and argues both sides have more than enough weapons to destroy each other many times over.

President Reagan is concerned about the vulnerability of our nuclear deterrent forces to Pearl Harbor-type surprise attacks and the inability of our forces to effectively destroy many legitimate Soviet *military* targets. He recognizes that today the Soviets “could absorb our retaliatory blow and hit us again.” He is concerned over the fact that we have no meaningful ability to protect our people from nuclear attack. This is why he is concerned about the imbalance of power that now exists.

QUESTION: Is the U.S. attempting to achieve strategic superiority?

ANSWER: The United States is *not* attempting to achieve strategic superiority nor is its current strategic weapons program any serious threat to the Soviet Union. Our objective is to develop a reliable deterrent to prevent attack on ourselves and our allies. In the words of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in early 1982, “While this modernization program is not designed to achieve nuclear ‘superiority’ for the United States, by the same token, we will make every necessary effort to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring such superiority and to insure the margin of safety necessary for our security.”

Our policy does not demand parity in the classic sense of equal numbers; we are not attempting to match the Soviets plane for plane or missile for missile. According to Secretary Weinberger, “Nuclear weapons systems will not be funded merely to make our forces mirror Soviet forces according to some superficial tally of missiles or aircraft deployed in peacetime....Instead, our goal will be to gain and maintain a nuclear deterrent force which provides us an adequate margin of safety with emphasis on enduring survivability.”

QUESTION: What are the consequences of Soviet military superiority to the West?

ANSWER: Military power continues to be a key determinate of the balance of power, the way states relate to one another, and the prospect for maintaining the peace. When the military balance shifts towards states that seek to expand their influence and power by all means, including the use of force and violence, the world moves closer to war. The Soviet Union is such a state.

The Soviet Union utilized the Second World War to annex territory and to impose satellite regimes on Eastern Europe. In the early postwar period they attempted further military expansion in Greece and Korea. In the 1960s, the Soviets began to support so-called wars of national liberation. They established a satellite regime in Castro's Cuba and supported North Vietnam's war of aggression against South Vietnam.

In the 1970s, the Soviets utilized Cuban mercenaries throughout Africa to establish pro-Soviet regimes. In 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and overthrew its government. They are still in the process of attempting to suppress the Afghan people. Their brutal attacks have resulted in at least two million refugees. More recently, they have used the threat of military force to intimidate the people of Poland.

QUESTION: Can't we cut defense spending by getting our troops out of Europe? Why not let the Europeans defend themselves?

ANSWER: The United States does not maintain troops in Europe to defend the Europeans but to defend the United States. Europe represents an enormous concentration of economic and hence potential military power. If the Soviet Union controlled Europe, that economic power would be converted into military power that would be used against us. Our ability to survive in a hostile world as a free nation would be dramatically impaired.

We maintain troops in Europe to deter a Soviet attack on Europe that could easily result in a Third World War. Without the American troops and nuclear weapons we have there, there would be no possibility for the nations of Europe to defend themselves against the Soviet threat. Even with the American presence the Soviet Union and its satellite states clearly have military superiority on the ground.

It is not true that the Europeans are making no efforts for their defense. Some 90 percent of all the ground forces in Europe are provided by our NATO allies. While the United States cut its defense budgets almost every year during the 1970s, our European allies increased theirs.

QUESTION: Why not have NATO declare that it will never use nuclear weapons first as the Soviets have done?

ANSWER: The objective of our deterrence and arms control policies should not be to make the world safe for conventional warfare. Not only is conventional warfare enormously destructive (more than 40 million people died in World War II) but such no-first-use pledges aside, there would always be substantial risk of nuclear escalation in a European war. Our goal must be to deter all types of war. The threat of nuclear retaliation is an effective deterrent to war and it should not be discarded.

As a practical matter the Soviet Union and its satellite states have a substantial superiority over NATO in non-nuclear forces. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are superior to NATO to a substantial degree in manpower, divisions, tanks, tactical aircraft and artillery. NATO reserves of ammunition and combat equipment are at dangerously low levels.

It is one thing to talk in the abstract of the desirability of eliminating these deficiencies. It is another thing to actually pay for them. There exist substantial pressures in the United States and other NATO nations to

cut military expenditures. If this situation were combined with an announcement of a no-first-use policy, the degree of deterrence we have to prevent Soviet attack would be substantially reduced.

NATO is a defensive alliance. It will only use nuclear arms if it is attacked on a scale in which it cannot successfully defend itself with conventional arms. Its nuclear arms are not an offensive threat to the Soviet Union.

QUESTION: Why are we deploying the Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe? Won't our actions provoke the Soviet Union and make a lasting peace more difficult to achieve?

ANSWER: The purpose of U.S. missile deployment in Europe is to give NATO a deterrent against Soviet SS-20 attack. The proposed deployment of the Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles does not match the scale of even current Soviet capabilities. Only 572 warheads will be deployed. The Soviets already have more than that targeted against Europe and this force is expanding. Without such a deployment, the balance of power will increasingly favor the Soviet Union.

The deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe is stabilizing. These weapons are being deployed in response to a massive buildup of Soviet intermediate-range missiles. The Soviets already have about 600 such missiles deployed in Europe, with more than 1,300 warheads. The Soviets have 360 SS-20 missile launchers, each with three very accurate warheads. The missile launchers began to be deployed in the mid-1970s. To date, there are no comparable U.S. missiles in Europe. The Soviet SS-20 threat to Europe is growing at the rate of about one missile launcher a week. In addition, the SS-20 missile launcher can be reloaded after the first set of missiles is launched. We believe the Soviets now have two SS-20 missiles per launcher.

The United States is now attempting to convince the Soviets to agree to the abolition or at least reduction of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. If we do not deploy the Pershing IIs and the cruise missiles, the Soviets will not negotiate. Indeed, the Soviets refused to begin negotiating until the governments of NATO decided to deploy the Pershing II and cruise missiles.

Arms Control—Key Points

- Arms control efforts should support national security objectives but cannot substitute for the necessary modernization of our forces.
- Arms control must be a component of, not a replacement for, a coherent national security policy.
- President Reagan's approach to arms control is *realistic*. It takes into account our past experience in dealing with the Soviet Union and our national security requirements.
- The Reagan Administration is proposing arms control agreements based on the principles of equality and verifiability and the need for real reductions.
- Previous arms control agreements did not prevent the Soviet Union from engaging in the largest military buildup in history. Since SALT I and SALT II were negotiated, the Soviet military threat to the U.S. has increased significantly.
- The Reagan Administration has begun a broad range of arms control negotiations to reduce strategic nuclear weapons (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF negotiations) and the number of NATO and Warsaw Pact troops in Europe (Mutual Balanced Force Reductions).
- The U.S. is seeking a complete ban on chemical and biological weapons, such as poisonous gases and other deadly agents.
- The Soviet response to U.S. arms control proposals has not been serious. Soviet proposals are blatantly one-sided in their own favor.
- The U.S. has complied strictly with existing arms control agreements.
 - There is conclusive evidence that the Soviet Union has violated the chemical and biological weapons treaties.
 - There is evidence that the Soviets have violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the SALT II Treaty. The issue is under review.

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- President Reagan has proposed that the U.S. move from a doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to a posture of Mutual Assured Survival (MAS).
 - To replace MAD with MAS, the President has proposed that we develop systems such as a space-based system to defend us against nuclear attack.

The Reagan Administration's Arms Control Principles

After a careful reassessment of our experience with arms control during the 1970s, President Reagan has initiated a wide range of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at achieving substantial reductions in force levels to *equal* and *verifiable* levels.

President Reagan has announced an approach to arms control that is *realistic*. It takes into account our experience in dealing with the Soviet Union and our national security requirements.

The U.S. is proposing arms control agreements:

1. *That are equal.* The American people will accept no less than equality because it is dangerous to allow the Soviet Union to achieve

military superiority which could lead them to test our resolve with the inherent risks of war and escalation.

2. *That are verifiable.* The Reagan Administration is placing a clear and consistent emphasis on verification and compliance in view of the history of Soviet treaty violations and recent evidence of their violation of arms control treaties. Without adequate verification, we create only the illusion of arms control.
3. *That will lead to real reductions.* The Reagan Administration rejects "cosmetic" arms control agreements like SALT II that allow substantial increases in the military forces of both sides. It has proposed agreements involving real reductions. For example, it has proposed the abolition of land-based intermediate-range missiles and very substantial reductions in land- and sea-based strategic missile systems.

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4. *That will reduce the risk of war.* The Reagan Administration has put emphasis on the reduction or elimination of land-based missile forces that are most suitable for surprise nuclear attacks. This approach is designed to increase the security of both sides by emphasizing those systems that have the best retaliatory capability but the least ability to launch a surprise nuclear attack.

Reagan Administration Arms Control Proposals

The Reagan Administration has begun arms control negotiations with the USSR on a wide range of issues. These include both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons systems, and conventional and chemical weapons. The major Administration arms control proposals are:

1. *START* (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). The United States has proposed the reduction of the number of strategic missile warheads on both sides from the current number of about 7,500 to 5,000. No more than half of these proposed that both sides would be limited to about 850 nuclear missile systems—about half the current U.S. level. In response to the Scowcroft Commission Report, President

Reagan has ordered the adoption of a more flexible position on the number of deployed missiles.

2. *INF* (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces). The United States has proposed the complete abolition of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, and certain limits on shorter-range forces that could substitute for them. Namely, the United States has proposed, with procedures for verification, the dismantling of the SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 ballistic missiles in exchange for U.S. cancellation of its plans to deploy Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe to counter these Soviet missiles. This proposal is designed to eliminate first-strike weapons.

- *Interim Proposal*—In an effort to speed the INF negotiations toward a successful conclusion, and in view of Soviet rejection of our initial proposal, President

Reagan has proposed an interim agreement in which U.S. and Soviet INF missiles would be limited to an equal number of warheads, preferably at the lowest possible level. This proposal was also rejected by the Russians.

3. *Other Proposals*

- *MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reductions)*. The United States has proposed that both sides reduce military manpower in Europe to a common ceiling of 900,000 of which no more than 700,000 would be in ground forces. This proposal is designed to stabilize the European military balance and prevent either side from maintaining sufficient forces for a successful invasion of the other's territory.
- *Chemical Weapons*. The United States seeks to abolish lethal chemical weapons.

- *Biological Weapons*. The United States seeks to terminate Soviet use and supply of biological weapons against the peoples of Afghanistan and Indochina. We also seek the negotiation of verification procedures for the Biological Warfare Convention that will assure Soviet compliance.
- *Nuclear Testing*. The United States will seek to negotiate procedures to assure Soviet compliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit of 150 kilotons on underground nuclear testing.

Confidence-Building Measures

President Reagan has proposed that both the United States and the Soviet Union agree to a series of confidence-building measures as part of our overall arms control policy. These measures are designed to build mutual trust and reduce the risk of conflict.

These proposals include:

1. *Advance notification of all U.S. and Soviet test launches* of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This would remove surprise and uncertainty that

can result from the sudden appearance of such missiles on the warning screens of both nations.

2. *Advance notification of major military training exercises.* The objective is to reduce the uncertainty and surprise surrounding sudden military moves by both sides.
3. *Exchange of information* on nuclear forces to reduce mutual ignorance and suspicion.
4. *Possible improvements to the "Hot Line" communications network* between the United States and the Soviet government.

Soviet Response to U.S. Arms Control Proposals

The Soviet Union has yet to make serious proposals at either the INF or START negotiations.

1. At the INF talks, the Soviets have proposed an agreement that is so blatantly one-sided that it cannot be considered to be anything but propaganda. The Soviets have proposed:

- counting British and French missiles as belonging to the United States. These missiles not only do not belong to us, but they are of a different type from the ones under discussion at the negotiations;
 - excluding the Asian part of the Soviet Union from the limitations, even though intermediate-range Soviet missiles launched from Asia can easily reach Western Europe;
 - counting U.S. but not Soviet fighter bombers.
2. If the U.S. were to accept the proposal, the Soviets
 - would have 162 missiles in Europe, compared to none for the U.S.
 - There would be no limit on Soviet missiles outside of Europe, despite the fact that these missiles could attack Europe.

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- All U.S. fighter bombers would have to be withdrawn from Europe, but there would be no limit on Soviet fighter bombers in Europe.
3. At the START negotiations, the Soviets have proposed a series of limitations that would terminate critical U.S. programs such as the Trident submarine and the Trident II missile while allowing most Soviet programs to continue without effective limitations.

Previous Arms Control Efforts (SALT I & II)

The Reagan Administration recognizes that past efforts to achieve strategic arms control agreements have not prevented the Soviet Union from engaging in the largest military buildup in history. This buildup occurred despite the existence of arms control agreements, including SALT I and SALT II, because of loopholes and ambiguities in the agreements.

SALT I:

- failed to put any effective restraint on Soviet military capabilities. Within seven years of the signing, the Soviet threat had tripled. In 1972, the Soviet Union had under 2,500 nuclear bombs for all strategic forces; by 1981 it had 8,000.
- by 1980, the Soviets were threatening U.S. ICBM survivability.

SALT II:

- is unequal in the Soviets' favor. It has serious flaws and dangerous, destabilizing asymmetries including a Soviet monopoly on modern heavy missiles M-308 SS-18 ICBMs.
- The SALT II Treaty excludes the Soviet Backfire bomber, which is capable of striking the U.S. homeland, from effective limitation.
- The SALT II Treaty contains many ambiguities, particularly related to provisions for verification. For example, there is no definition in the Treaty of its basic units of limitation—missile launchers and heavy bombers. There is no agreement on the

precise limits on missile size and power.

- SALT II would allow a doubling in the number of Soviet nuclear warheads or bombs targeted against the U.S. Since SALT II was signed in mid-1979, the Soviet force of nuclear bombs targeted on the U.S. has increased by 70 percent.

The Senate Armed Services Committee concluded in 1979 that SALT II was “not in the national security interest of the United States of America.” The Reagan Administration has endorsed this conclusion.

U.S. and Soviet Compliance with Existing Agreements

The U.S. has complied with existing arms control agreements. Indeed, we have even avoided actions that could give the appearance of noncompliance.

The Soviet compliance record is clearly not good.

1. The United States has officially charged the Soviet Union with violating the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons

Convention. These treaties ban the use of poison gases or other toxic agents.

2. The President has pointed out that “there have been numerous violations” of the 1974 treaty limiting underground nuclear testing (Threshold Test Ban Treaty), although verification difficulties preclude us from proving it conclusively.
3. Additionally, President Reagan has noted that the Soviet test of a second new ICBM possibly violates the SALT II Treaty, although the issue is still being reviewed.

Because of the ambiguities and lack of definitions in existing arms control treaties, it is very difficult to prove conclusively that there are violations. It is for these reasons that President Reagan insists that any agreement we sign be verifiable.

From MAD to MAS

President Reagan has proposed that the United States move from a doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to a posture of Mutual Assured Survival (MAS).

1. The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction holds that the Soviet Union and the U.S. must hold each other's population hostage as a means of preventing war. The idea is that the prevention of war depends on a mutual ability to devastate each other's societies. Efforts to prevent damage to one's society are regarded as destabilizing under this theory.
 - The President believes that this "balance of terror" is far too dangerous because the protection of the American people from foreign attack is a basic responsibility of our government.
2. The doctrine of MAD has not reduced the arms race, as its proponents argued a decade and a half ago. Indeed, it has contributed to the decline of our deterrent capability. Because of the MAD doctrine, we did not modernize our weapons in a manner that would give us the capability to threaten the things that the Soviets value most—

the physical existence of their military and political leadership, their strategic nuclear forces, and other key elements of their military power.

President Reagan has proposed replacing MAD with Mutual Assured Survival.

1. MAS is a theory that holds that the most fundamental duty of a government is to protect people from attack and that this can be best accomplished by physically defending them against nuclear attack. Emphasis is placed on saving Americans rather than on killing Russians.
2. To replace MAD with MAS, the President has proposed that we develop defensive systems, including space-based systems, that would allow the U.S. to defend itself from nuclear attack by ballistic missiles and bombers. Under such defenses, enemy missiles would be destroyed in space before they could reach American soil.

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3. A nationwide telephone poll by the Heritage Foundation released in August, 1982, revealed that:
 - sixty-six percent of the respondents were unaware that the U.S. has no anti-ballistic missile defense;
 - eighty percent said this vulnerability concerned them a great deal;
 - eighty-six percent supported deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system; and,
 - seventy-three percent held that the cost of such a system should not be the primary factor by which to judge whether such a system should or should not be deployed.

Critics of President Reagan's efforts to build effective defenses against nuclear attack maintain that such programs will be destabilizing, will provoke the Soviet Union, will militarize space and fuel the arms race by forcing the Soviets to develop an anti-ballistic missile capability of their own.

1. Supporters of space-based systems argue that such a defense *would not be destabilizing*. Deterrence depends critically upon preventing the enemy from achieving any military advantage from attacking, which can be achieved as well by building defenses.
2. Will not *initiate* the militarization of space. Space has been militarized by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union for *offensive* purposes for more than a generation.
3. The Soviet Union is already developing space-based defensive systems. The Soviets are not newcomers to the exploration of outer space for military purposes.
 - On any given day, 70 to 110 Soviet satellites are in orbit, more than half of which serve military purposes solely.
 - Some 85 percent of all Soviet space launches are exclusively military or joint military/civilian missions.
 - One direction of the Soviet Union's space weapons program is toward the development and deployment of a space-based laser system. A prototype could be launched by the late 1980s.

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- An operational system capable of attacking other satellites, within a few thousand kilometers range could be established in the early 1990s.
 - Space-based anti-ballistic missile systems could be tested in the 1990s.
 - The Soviets have also developed and deployed an anti-satellite system* and a fractional orbital bombardment system,* which the U.S. does not possess.

Mutual Assured Survival (MAS) and Arms Control

Those who argue that the development of space-based defenses will merely stimulate the development of improved offensive forces ignore the substantial problem involved in hardening or protecting missiles against these types of defensive weapons. They also ignore the fact that the President has proposed adopting these defenses as part of an arms control program that would substantially limit or completely eliminate the offensive forces the critics are talking about. One cannot penetrate defenses with non-existent offensive forces.

Questions and Answers

QUESTION: Why has the U.S. been so resistant to negotiate a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union? Isn't arms control the key to a peaceful future?

ANSWER: The United States has not been resistant to negotiating strategic arms limitation agreements with the U.S.S.R. When the Reagan Administration assumed office it was obvious that previous approaches to strategic arms limitation had failed. Both the SALT I and II Treaties had placed no significant restraint upon the growth of Soviet strategic nuclear capability. Despite 12 years of negotiation and two agreements, there was an enormous increase in the number of Soviet nuclear warheads aimed at the United States. By 1980, the U.S. ICBM force was already vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack. In addition, the United States faced significant compliance problems by the Soviets. The Reagan Administration was forced to engage in a comprehensive reassessment of our approaches to arms control. As a result

of this, the United States has proposed, for the first time, agreements that would be equal and verifiable and would involve significant reductions of nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: Has the Soviet Union violated arms control agreements?

ANSWER: In June, 1982, speaking before the United Nations, President Reagan accused the Soviets of violating the 1925 and 1972 treaties banning the use of chemical and biological weapons. "There is conclusive evidence," he said, "that the Soviet government has provided toxins for use in Laos and Kampuchea, and are themselves using chemical weapons against freedom fighters in Afghanistan." President Reagan noted in March, 1983, that there "have been increasingly serious grounds for questioning their compliance with the arms control agreements that have been already signed and that we have both pledged to uphold." President Reagan has indicated we have evidence, although not conclusive, that the Soviet Union has violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which limits testing of nuclear weapons yields, and the 1979 SALT II Treaty. These issues are now under study.

QUESTION: Would the introduction of space-based defense systems be destabilizing and provoke the Soviet Union?

ANSWER: Defensive systems are in no way destabilizing unless one accepts the strange logic of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which maintains that only the ability to wipe each other out can guarantee that the two superpowers will not attack each other. However, if one rejects this notion of deterrence, then defense ceases to become destabilizing and mutual defensive capabilities become desirable and stabilizing.

Moreover, why should the Soviet Union be provoked by our desire to prepare an adequate defense for our population, when it is obviously trying to do the same for its own? Their national security agenda is based on their own goals, not what we do or do not do. It is convenient to claim provocation as an excuse for their own actions.

Nuclear Freeze—Key Points

QUESTION: Isn't it impossible to build an effective defense against missile attack?

ANSWER: While results will not be achieved overnight, we have faith in the ability of the American scientific community to solve the problems that are associated with an effective defense against missile attack. Even today, lasers are being developed that have potential for ballistic missile defense. There is no reason to believe that concerted effort will not be able to develop effective weapons against missile attack.

- The nuclear freeze is a simplistic, utopian and irresponsible approach to arms control that has no chance of being negotiated with the Soviet Union.
- Freeze proposals are too broad and ill-defined. Freeze advocates disagree as to the meaning of the nuclear freeze. They disagree as to whether a military build up and/or modernization of our forces would be allowed.
- Freeze advocates have an unrealistic and naive view of the Soviet Union. They fail to recognize that the Soviets consider nuclear weapons as instruments of coercion and arms control negotiations as another arena of political conflict.
- The Soviet Union has not accepted arms control proposals that significantly constrain its military expansion, resisting cooperative measures of verification such as mutual inspection of military facilities.
- The Soviets have circumvented or violated treaties they have signed with us in the past.
- The Soviets have rejected freeze proposals offered by Presidents Nixon and Carter.

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- Freeze proponents subscribe to the “overkill theory,” a simplistic approach that ignores the requirements of a credible deterrent.
 - President Reagan opposes the freeze for the following reasons:
 - It would leave the U.S. not only with nuclear forces that are inferior to those of the Soviet Union but with forces which are also old and vulnerable to a Pearl Harbor-type surprise attack.
 - It would preserve a dangerous imbalance in nuclear forces, an imbalance which currently favors the Soviet Union.
 - Key elements of the freeze are not verifiable. By contrast, the types of limitations and reductions proposed by the Reagan Administration (such as in deployed ballistic missiles) were chosen because they would be easier to verify.
 - A freeze would violate an important commitment to NATO to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles to meet the threat posed to Europe by 360 Soviet SS-20 missiles.
 - The Reagan Administration shares the concern of all Americans that something be done to control nuclear weapons, but it rejects proposals that are unequal and unverifiable. The Administration, like the American people, rejects unilateral disarmament.

The Freeze Approach

The nuclear freeze is a simplistic, utopian and irresponsible approach to arms control that has no chance of being successfully negotiated with the Soviet Union. Even advocates of a nuclear freeze cannot agree upon precisely what they want. A nuclear freeze could not possibly improve the security of the American people even if it could be negotiated, because it would leave the United States with nuclear forces that are not only inferior to the Soviet Union's but are also old and vulnerable to a Pearl Harbor-type surprise attack. The advocates of the “freeze”:

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1. Refuse to look realistically at Soviet objectives or recognize Soviet responsibility for the arms race.
 2. Are willing to accept substantial Soviet superiority and ignore its military and political consequences. Advocates of the simplistic freeze approach do not care whether the Soviet Union is ahead of the United States or whether the nuclear freeze increases the margin of Soviet superiority, since they assert that nuclear weapons make the concept of "superiority" meaningless.
 3. Oppose vital U.S. military programs like the MX missile, the B-1 bomber or the Trident missile submarine system. Many freeze advocates have a long record of opposing U.S. military programs.
 4. Do not care about verification and Soviet compliance. Many freeze advocates have a naive faith in the Soviet Union. They ignore evidence of Soviet violations of existing treaties and oppose efforts to obtain Soviet compliance with these treaties.
 5. Resort to emotional and pseudo-moralistic arguments concerning nuclear weapons. Many of their statements are blatant attempts to scare the American people into doing irresponsible things about our defenses. Freeze advocates would have the U.S. ignore the requirement to maintain our deterrent while, at the same time, have the U.S. embrace arms control proposals that could not conceivably enhance our national security.
- Freeze proponents seek to portray freeze opponents as "warmongers" while portraying themselves as the advocates of peace. They consider themselves to be the only ones genuinely concerned about the dangers and horrors of nuclear war, implying that those who oppose them are uncaring, unconcerned, and leading us ever closer to nuclear apocalypse. This is absolute nonsense.

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6. Reject the necessity of maintaining effective nuclear deterrent forces. This is often based upon the acceptance of the simplistic idea of nuclear “overkill.” Overkill presumes that deterrence is somehow automatic and does not depend on the military balance or the ability of our forces to survive an attack and effectively retaliate after enemy attack.

Overkill and the Nuclear Freeze

The often repeated argument that the Soviet Union and the United States both have the ability to destroy many times over the population of the other, or even of the entire world, is untrue and misleading. There can be no denying the enormous destructive potential of nuclear weapons, but the “overkill” argument is of no more relevance than the assertion, undoubtedly true, that the armies of the world have enough bullets to kill the earth’s population many times over. This hardly assures deterrence or an adequate defense capability.

The fact of the matter is that nuclear weapons are not targeted primarily against civilian populations, either by the United States or, to judge from all available evidence, by the Soviet Union. For moral,

political and military reasons, the United States does not target civilian populations as such. We have no reason to believe that the intentional and systematic destruction of civilians is necessary to a deterrent strategy, or would even enhance our deterrent.

“Overkill” is a myth, a simplistic idea that overlooks key elements of a credible deterrence.

1. Deterrence depends on the ability of our forces to *survive a surprise missile attack*.
2. Deterrence depends on the ability of our forces to *penetrate Soviet defenses*.
 - The Soviets have already threatened the survivability of our land-based missiles (ICBMs) and of our strategic bombers.
 - Soviet civil and military defense programs have already downgraded the effectiveness of our weapons against a wide range of Soviet targets.

The Reagan Administration and the Nuclear Freeze

The Reagan Administration strongly opposes the nuclear freeze. It believes that a nuclear freeze is both dangerous to our security and will reduce the chances for the successful negotiation of meaningful arms control agreements. Its reasons include:

1. A nuclear freeze will preserve the dangerous imbalance between U.S. and Soviet military forces. A few illustrative numbers highlight the problem:

	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
Land-based missiles	1,046	1,398
Sea-based missiles	544	950
Nuclear missile submarines	33	68
Heavy missiles	0	308
Missile warheads	7,200	7,500
ABM missiles	0	64
Surface-to-air missiles	0	10,000
Strategic bombers	300	430
Strategic missile throw-weight*	1.9 mkg	5.6 mkg

2. U.S. nuclear deterrent forces are old and vulnerable to a Soviet attack. For example, the U.S. B-52 bombers were all built prior to 1961, and the U.S. missile submarines were built prior to 1967. Soviet forces, on the other hand, are modern—mainly built within the last decade. A freeze on modernization would mean that U.S. forces would wear out much sooner than Soviet forces.

Moreover, the U.S. land-based missiles, ICBMs, are highly vulnerable to Soviet missile attack. Old U.S. bombers are also potentially vulnerable to Soviet missile attack. This is why we are building the B-1 bomber as soon as possible and are developing the MX Peacekeeper ICBM.

3. Key elements of the nuclear freeze proposal are simply not verifiable: verification is not possible, using photo satellites and other means of intelligence collection to determine accurately what is being produced inside factory buildings. The key defect of the nuclear freeze is that it seeks to limit a very wide range of systems without serious consideration as to whether these limitations can be effectively verified.

4. While proposing unrealistically broad objectives, the freeze advocates reject realistic goals concerning the significant reduction in the most dangerous types of nuclear arms, such as ballistic missiles. The types of limitations and reductions that have been proposed by the Reagan Administration were picked in part because they are easier to verify than the indiscriminate freeze approach.
5. The nuclear freeze would entail a breach of faith between the United States and our NATO allies. It would prevent us from deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe to counter the enormous Soviet threat posed by existing SS-20 missiles, as we have promised our NATO allies.


The Soviet Approach to Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the Nuclear Freeze

The Soviet Union believes that nuclear weapons are instruments of coercion and are building nuclear forces that are far beyond the legitimate requirements of self-defense. Soviet nuclear forces are designed to wage nuclear warfare and to defeat potential adversaries.

The Soviet approach to arms control is very different from our own. They regard arms control negotiations as another arena of political power. They have:

1. Sought to negotiate agreements that guarantee them superior force levels and have strongly resisted equal force levels;

Longer Range INF Missile Warheads



† Includes Soviet SS-20s and older SS-4s and SS-5s.

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2. Sought to ban the most promising U.S. weapons, while placing little or no restraint upon Soviet weapons programs;
 3. Sought to avoid significant reductions in force levels while allowing loopholes that could allow for significant force expansion, particularly in weapons suitable for waging war;
 4. Sought to resist cooperative verification or effective means of verification (such as on-site inspection or mutual inspection of military facilities).

Well over a decade of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union has illustrated time and again that the Soviets reject comprehensive limitations on their armaments.

1. They rejected a nuclear freeze proposal that was made by the Carter Administration.
2. They rejected a proposal by the Nixon Administration that would have frozen the number of weapons on strategic missiles.

As the bipartisan Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces reported recently, "In the Soviet strategic view, nuclear weapons are closely related to, and are integrated with, their other military and political instruments as a means of advancing their interests. The Soviets have

concentrated enormous efforts on the development and modernization of nuclear weapons, obviously seeking what they regard as important advantages in certain areas of nuclear weaponry."

Questions and Answers

QUESTION: Why does the Reagan Administration oppose the proposal for an immediate freeze on testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons?

ANSWER: President Reagan had denounced the nuclear freeze as "a very dangerous fraud" which would create "merely the illusion of peace." A freeze would perpetuate Soviet military superiority and leave the United States with old and vulnerable systems, many of which could be destroyed by a Pearl Harbor-type surprise attack. A freeze would contain key elements which could not possibly be verified, particularly with respect to production. A freeze on production of nuclear weapons, bombers, and missiles cannot possibly be verified because it is impossible to see what is being produced inside factories.

A freeze on nuclear weapons testing, production, and deployment would

be nearly impossible to negotiate with the Soviet Union because the Soviets have always resisted significant arms limitations and necessary cooperative means to verify the limitations. The Soviets have always opposed mutual inspection of the military facilities of each party as a means of ensuring that terms of arms control agreements are met.

A nuclear freeze would reward the Soviet Union for a decade of military expansion and prevent the United States from taking the necessary means to assure our security in an increasingly dangerous world. As President Reagan stated on March 8, 1983, "I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets' global desires." A freeze now at unequal force levels that preserves current Soviet advantages would severely hamper our efforts to preserve the peace.

QUESTION: Why do you think so many people across the country support a freeze?

ANSWER: The American people support a freeze in the sense that they support responsible arms control. Support for a freeze reflects the genuine concern of millions of Americans that something be done to control nuclear weapons. That concern is also shared by the Reagan Administration. However, surveys have shown that the American people, like the Administration, do not support a freeze that would give the Soviet Union any military advantages or a freeze that could not be verified—a freeze in which we could not determine whether or not the Soviet Union was abiding by the terms of the agreement. The American people do not advocate any form of unilateral disarmament by the United States. They recognize the serious military threats we face from the Soviet Union.

QUESTION: Isn't an immediate freeze necessary as a first step towards achieving real arms reduction?

ANSWER: A freeze would not halt the arms race. The Soviet Union will not accept an equal and verifiable freeze. Despite what freeze proponents choose to believe, the Soviet Union has never really accepted significant constraints on its military capabilities. Even though the Soviet Union has signed arms control agreements in the past, the number of Soviet weapons has continued to grow significantly. Indeed, most existing arms control agreements have allowed the Soviets to continue their military buildup.

QUESTION: Since we already have thousands of nuclear weapons, why do we need more?

ANSWER: The size of our military forces, both nuclear and conventional, must be related to the threats we face. Since the 1960s there has been a vast expansion of the Soviet nuclear threat to the United States and our allies while the number of U.S. nuclear weapons has declined by a third and their destructive potential by 75 percent.

Many of our current nuclear weapons are rapidly aging and some of them are more than 20 years old, close to the limit of their useful lives. U.S. nuclear missiles and bombers are also very old. Our B-52 bombers were all produced before 1961, and our Poseidon missile submarines were all produced before 1967.

In the final analysis, it is not merely a question of numbers. U.S. nuclear deterrent forces must be able to deter the Soviet Union and other potential enemies by being able to retaliate effectively against a wide range of relevant military targets. To do this, they must be able to survive a Soviet attack and penetrate Soviet

defenses, and destroy increasingly fortified Soviet military targets. The enormous Soviet buildup has severely eroded our ability to accomplish these objectives while the Soviet military buildup has given them the ability to attack nearly all comparable U.S. targets.

Many elements of the U.S. deterrent, our land-based ICBMs and to a lesser extent our bombers, are vulnerable to Soviet surprise attack. The objective of the President's strategic weapons modernization program is not to increase the number of our weapons, but to replace aging systems with modern weapons with the ability to survive Soviet attack and effectively accomplish their missions. This will substantially enhance our ability to deter war, which is, of course, our ultimate objective.

Glossary

anti-satellite system (ASAT)—systems designed to destroy or incapacitate satellites in orbit. Soviet anti-satellite systems can destroy low-altitude military and civilian satellites.

Backfire bomber—a modern supersonic bomber similar in design to the U.S. B-1A, which was cancelled by President Carter. The Backfire bomber is capable of striking targets in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States.

B-1B bomber—an advanced, supersonic low-altitude bomber designed to penetrate advanced air defenses.

command, control and communications systems—a intricate web of satellites, sensors, communications gear, computers, etc., that enable our strategic forces to carry out their assigned missions in peacetime or in case of war.

cruise missile—a small, jet propelled pilotless vehicle with an advanced guidance system that gives it high accuracy. Cruise missiles can be launched from ships, submarines, aircraft, or ground vehicles.

fractional orbit bombardment system (FOB)—a system that injects a nuclear warhead into a low earth orbit, allowing it to attack any target in the world within an hour with little warning. The Soviets had developed this capability by 1970.

ground-launched cruise missile—small, jet propelled pilotless vehicle launched from a mobile truck launcher that carries a 200-kiloton warhead. The ground-launched cruise missile has a range of 1,550 miles. Although it would require at least 4 to 5 hours to reach its target, it has a unique advantage—its guidance system allows it to follow the contour of the land. It can thus evade enemy radar by flying below the “radar floor” at a minimum altitude of only 50 feet.

heavy missile—the largest, most destructive missile that now exists. Each Soviet SS18 heavy missile has twice the payload or destructive potential as the projected U.S. MX ICBM. Each SS-18 can deliver 10 warheads with the destructive potential of a million tons of TNT.

heavy strategic bomber—a bomber aircraft with a range over 4,000 miles.

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—a ballistic missile capable of propelling a nuclear warhead to ranges beyond 3,000 miles. Quite literally, an ICBM can be launched from one continent to another.

medium strategic bomber—a bomber aircraft with a range less than 4,000 miles.

Midgetman—small, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile that carries one 300-kiloton warhead.

MX Peacekeeper missile—a large intercontinental ballistic missile which can deliver ten 300-kiloton warheads. It will be the first new ICBM since 1970.

payload—the weight a missile can deliver to a given distance.

Pershing II missile—an intermediate range nuclear missile. It has a range of 1,000 miles; it carries a single 100-kiloton warhead and its speed enables it to reach Soviet targets within 15 minutes from launch time.

readiness—the ability of forces, units, weapons systems, or equipment to deliver the output for which they were designed. It depends on having the required quantities of equipment in the hands of the units on a day-to-day basis, and on having the required number of adequately trained people assigned to ensure that people and machines can work together.

SS-18—the largest, most destructive missile in the world. Each missile has twice the destructive potential of any missile that was allowed the U.S. under the SALT II agreement (see heavy missile).

SS-20—a very powerful intermediate-range nuclear missile capable of delivering three nuclear warheads up to a 5,000 kilometer range with great accuracy. The SS-20 has a reload capability. In other words, the Soviets have two missiles for each of the 360 SS-20 missile launchers.

Stealth bomber—an advanced bomber designed to incorporate advanced technology (even more advanced technology than that incorporated into the B-1B) that will be able to penetrate the most advanced air defense systems. The Stealth aircraft will be operational in the early 1990s. The Stealth bomber is an advanced technology bomber (ATB).

submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—a ballistic missile launched from a submarine. This missile is capable of performing the same missions as an ICBM even with missiles of much shorter range because of a submarine's mobility.

sustainability—groups together items needed by forces to sustain combat in the event of war. It includes replacement equipment, spare parts and ammunition, and other essential consumables. Sustainability also includes the manpower required to maintain combat strength—to rotate, replace, and reinforce as the course of battle demands.

throw-weight—the total weight of nuclear explosives a missile can deliver to either the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

Trident missile submarine—a large, long-range missile-carrying submarine designed to replace missile submarines built in the 1960s. It carries 24 nuclear missiles.

Trident II missile—a larger, more accurate missile able to attack all types of Soviet targets, including hardened or fortified military targets.

yield—roughly speaking, the amount of energy or destructive potential of a nuclear weapon. It would be roughly proportional to the payload or throw-weight. In other words, the heavier the weapon, the more powerful it tends to be.



