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CFA Call For Action

CITIZENS FOR AMERICA

MEMORANDUM

TO: Congressional District Chairmen
FROM: David Carmen
DATE: October 26, 1983
SUBJECT: Grenada Rescue Operation

↑
file

This is a call for immediate action by your local committee. President Reagan acted with political and moral courage yesterday by swiftly dispatching U.S. Marines to protect the lives of over a thousand innocent Americans trapped in a ruthless military takeover on the island of Grenada.

Much of the national media has taken part in a blatant politicizing of this action. Refusing to report the position of both the government and most Americans, the networks and wire services have instead termed the action, "an invasion" -- words that were first applied to the operation by Fidel Castro. The media has repeated the falsehood that Americans were not in danger in Grenada, implying that the action was taken for political reasons, or worse still, that it was the result of "warmongering" by President Reagan and his advisors.

The local chapters of Citizens for American must respond at once by utilizing the enclosed information to make their voices heard. Please circulate this information to your committees and undertake the following actions:

1) Call your newspaper publisher and editor-in-chief.

Let them know of your displeasure with the national coverage and with the coverage of the local paper if it has been equally poor.

Offer to write a brief guest piece for the paper, outlining the position of Citizens for America on this issue.

Let them know that you will be writing a letter to the editor on the subject of the coverage, and urge others to do the same.

Urge them to immediately act to correct their coverage.

2) Call your television station owner and assignment desk.

Again, let them know of your concern as above.

Offer to tape an editorial response, presenting the position of Citizens for America.

Offer to appear on any locally produced talk show that will be discussing the subject.

3) Call your radio station and do the same as in #2.

4) Issue a written statement to all local media.

As District Chairmen of C.F.A., you should prepare a statement similar to the enclosed statement of Lew Lehrman, and hand-carry or mail it to every news outlet in your district. Simply address it to your newspapers, television and radio stations, and be sure to add the following on the envelope:

ATTN: ASSIGNMENT DESK
IMMEDIATE RELEASE

5) Please fill out the "Action Taken" form that is enclosed and mail it to our office in Washington. We want to be able to provide all Chairmen with the results of the nationwide effort.

6) Call your elected representatives and urge their support for both The President and our U.S. Marines.

October 26, 1983

"The United States' objectives are clear: to protect our own citizens... and to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada."

- President Ronald Wilson Reagan

THE FACTS ABOUT THE GRENADA RESCUE OPERATION

President Reagan has acted swiftly with political and moral courage to save the lives of over 1,000 American citizens.

- Over 1,000 Americans were trapped in Grenada, unable to evacuate the island by either of the airports.
- Their lives were directly threatened by a curfew which included the order to "shoot to kill" anyone found outdoors.
- The leaders of the take-over were responsible for brutally murdering the prime minister, three cabinet members, two labor leaders and other civilians, including children.

President Reagan acted at the urgent request of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to aid them in preventing the immediate spread of terror in the region, and to help them protect their own citizens that were also trapped in Grenada.

- Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent asked the United States for assistance in conducting the rescue operation.
- Despite their meager military forces, these nations immediately committed 300 troops to the effort.

The Soviet Union and Cuba have been involved in Grenada for some time.

- Some 600 Cubans and 30 Soviets were residing in Grenada at the time of the take-over.
- The largest Cuban involvement, prior to taking up arms to battle the rescue mission, was in the building of a 9,000 foot air-strip for a country with no air force. This air strip is believed to have been intended as a Soviet refueling station for planes delivering arms to Nicaragua.

GRENADA


GEOGRAPHY—Grenada, with the first "a" pronounced as in HAY, is one of the world's smallest independent states, with a population of 110,000 and a land area of 133 square miles, about twice the size of the District of Columbia. It is the southernmost of the Windward Islands, about 90 miles north of Venezuela, and includes a string of smaller islands to the north, called the Grenadines. The main island, 20 miles long by eight miles wide, is volcanic, with a central mountainous rain forest and a tropical climate.

PEOPLE—Grenadans are mostly descendants of African slaves with some Europeans and remnants of the original Indian population. English is the official language, with French *patois* occasionally spoken. The chief religion is Roman Catholicism; there are also many Anglicans and other Protestants.

HISTORY—Grenada was discovered by Columbus in 1498 on his third voyage to the New World. It was not successfully settled until 1650 when France violently subdued the Carib tribe that inhabited it. France and Britain alternated in control of the island until 1783 when Britain became the uncontested colonial power. Grenada became an independent state in 1974, with Eric Gairy, an eccentric figure accused by opponents of being a despot, serving as the first prime minister. Gairy was overthrown in a largely bloodless coup in March 1979 by opposition leader Maurice Bishop, who later developed close ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Bishop was overthrown and killed last week by other members of his Marxist political party.

GOVERNMENT—Since independence, Grenada has been a member of the Commonwealth, with the queen of England as nominal sovereign and a British governor general. The country is governed by a prime minister and a two-house elected parliament. Since the overthrow of Gairy, it has been ruled by the New Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education and Liberation Party, known generally as the New Jewel Party.

ECONOMICS—Grenada's economy is almost totally agricultural. Nutmeg, introduced by Britain in 1782, is a chief export, along with bananas, cacao and mace. In 1980 the gross national product was \$80 million. Tourism is an important source of revenue, but it has dropped off in recent years. The country has suffered from high unemployment and strikes in recent years.



GRENADA

- o The President gave three reasons for yesterday's U.S. action in Grenada:
 - to protect innocent lives, particularly the 1000 Americans on the island;
 - to prevent further violence and help restore order;
 - to assist in restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada.
- o The United States acted at the urgent request of five democratic nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
- o Since the October 12th coup, which ousted Grenadan Prime Minister Bishop (he and five members of his Cabinet were killed by the new regime) the situation in Grenada has been marked by a potential for increased violence.
- o After the coup, the new regime murdered officials of the ousted government, killed innocent civilians, and imposed a curfew with authorization to shoot on sight any who violated it.
- o There could be no guarantee of the safety of Americans. President Reagan refused to risk a repeat of the Iranian hostage tragedy. He chose to act to ensure nothing like it would happen, rather than to wait and see if it did.
- o The other small island nations in the area which asked for U.S. help were urgently concerned that the chaos in Grenada not only denied the people there the freedom to choose their own government but also was a threat to peace and democracy in neighboring nations.
- o Cuban and Soviet involvement with Grenada had been well-known. U.S. and Caribbean troops encountered heavily armed resistance from Cuban personnel, erasing any doubts that the Cubans on the island were not benign construction crews but military and para-military personnel.

(NOT PRINTED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE)

For Release: IMMEDIATE

Contact: David Carmen
202-544-7888

STATEMENT BY LEWIS E. LEHRMAN ON THE
GRENADA RESCUE OPERATION

October 26 - Early Tuesday morning, President Reagan acted swiftly to protect the lives of nearly a thousand American citizens who were suddenly trapped in the midst of a brutal, criminal, marxist take-over of the island of Grenada.

By dispatching the Marines to the island with speed, The President has prevented what would certainly have developed into a crisis of the highest order. Before the landing of our rescue forces, Americans were at the mercy of a group of terrorists who had murdered their prime minister, three cabinet members, two labor leaders and other civilians, including children. These same lawless revolutionaries had imposed a curfew, saying that anyone caught outdoors would be shot on sight. Finally, hundreds of our citizens who wished to evacuate the country were unable to leave.

In a politically courageous and morally upstanding decision, The President has acted to preserve the freedom of all Americans throughout the world. By standing with six other democratic nations of the Caribbean against the forces of Cuba and the Soviet Union who are present in Grenada, he has shown free nations everywhere that America can be counted on to act on its beliefs.

I join with all Americans, in thanking God that our nation has learned from the inaction that led to over 400 days of terror in Iran. I now hope that all Americans will lend their spiritual support to our Marines in this valiant effort.

October 26, 1983

CALL FOR ACTION
RESPONSE FORM

Please describe the action taken on this item: _____

Attach any clippings or additional information.

Name: _____

Address: _____

City, State, Zip Code: _____

Area Code & Telephone No.: _____

Congressional District No.: _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 25, 1983

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
AND BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF DOMINICA
EUGENIA CHARLES
ON U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN GRENADA

The Briefing Room

9:07 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, on Sunday, October 23rd, the United States received an urgent, formal request from the five member nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada. We acceded to the request to become part of a multinational effort with contingents from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the United States. I might add that two of those, Barbados and Jamaica, are not members of the organization but were first approached, as we later were, by the OECS and asked to join in that undertaking. And then all of them joined unanimously in asking us to participate.

Early this morning, forces from six Caribbean democracies and the United States began a landing or landings on the island of Grenada in the eastern Caribbean.

We have taken this decisive action for three reasons. First, and of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives, including up to 1,000 Americans whose personal safety is, of course, my paramount concern. Second, to forestall further chaos. And third, to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, where a brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized power, killing the Prime Minister, three Cabinet Members, two labor leaders and other civilians, including children.

Let there be no misunderstanding, this collective action has been forced on us by events that have no precedent in the eastern Caribbean and no place in any civilized society.

American lives are at stake. We've been following the situation as closely as possible. Between 800 and 1,000 Americans, including many medical students and senior citizens, make up the largest single group of foreign residents in Grenada.

From the start we have consciously sought to calm fears. We were determined not to make an already bad situation worse and increase the risks our citizens faced. But when I received reports that a large number of our citizens were seeking to escape the island, thereby exposing themselves to great danger, and after receiving a formal request for help, a unanimous request from our neighboring states, I concluded the United States had no choice but to act strongly and decisively.

Let me repeat, the United States objectives are clear, to protect our own citizens, to facilitate the evacuation of those who want to leave and to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada.

I understand that several Caribbean states are asking that the Organization of American States consider the situation in Grenada.

Our diplomatic efforts will be in close cooperation with the Organization of Eastern

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MORE

Caribbean states and the other countries participating in this multinational effort.

And now I'm very proud to present to you the Chairman of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and the Prime Minister of Dominica, Prime Minister Charles.

PRIME MINISTER CHARLES: I think we were all very horrified at the events which took place recently in Grenada.

We, as part of the Organization of East Caribbean States, realizing that we are, of course, one region, we belong to each other, are kith and kin. We all have members of our state living in Grenada. We're very concerned that this event should take place again.

It is true that we have managed to live with the regime since March '79. And we felt quite clearly and we had good reason to believe that the Bishop regime was seeing it our way and was on the way to have elections. And we think this is the reason why himself and his Cabinet were destroyed. Because he realized that the pressure we put on him to have elections was worthwhile, was right. And he begun to see that the democratic institutions must be put in place in any of these small countries.

It is even more important in a small island state, poor island state, to have the democratic institutions. And this we've had for a long time and we've continued it and we wish to continue it. Grenada was an aberration in this respect.

But that these men, who had for all these years accepted the Bishop regime should then on -- for their own reasons, and I think the power-hungry reasons -- decide to destroy the persons whom they had accepted as their leaders for so long, made us realize that this sort of assassination must not be allowed to continue in our country. It means that our people there are not safe. It means that Grenadians had never been given the chance to choose for themselves the country that they want. And, therefore, it is necessary for us to see to it that they have the opportunity to do so.

To do this, we have to isolate the persons who have committed the acts that they did last week, in killing off most of the Cabinet. And we have to insure that, in fact, an interim government of persons of -- not political greed, but persons who are good administrators and who are Grenadians who can run the country for a few months for the pure purpose of putting the country back on the democratic status, so that elections can take place as soon as possible. This is what you want to do so that Grenadians can choose for themselves the government they want and not have, every few years have governments imposed on them by persons who will otherwise ---

Q -- are all the Americans safe?

Q Did you have information that the Soviets and the Cubans were behind this takeover of Grenada? Did the Joint Chiefs tell you that yesterday afternoon?

PRIME MINISTER CHARLES: Want me to answer this? Yes, we do have this information. I can't give you all the details because of the safety of people concerned. But we noted with great -- in the two weeks before the assassination took place the movements between the Soviet Embassies and known activists and the activists return to Grenada, obviously a conduit between some of these Russians and some of these --

Q Mr. President, can you tell us are all the Americans safe, sir? Can you tell us that? And how long will

MORE

the American forces be on the ground there? What is their role?

THE PRESIDENT: I could -- well, we don't know how long that will be. We want to be out as quickly as possible, because this -- our purpose in being there is only for them to enable -- to take over their own affairs. As far as we know, the citizens are safe. We have been monitoring that very closely. And one of our prime objectives in the actual invasion that was almost instantly done was the securing of that St. George's Medical College where several hundred of the students were.

Q The military situation, sir?

Q Mr. President, as late as yesterday, your own spokesman said that Americans on Grenada were in no danger. Did you have information that things had changed?

THE PRESIDENT: They were in no danger in the sense of that, right now, anything was being done to them. But we know that there was concern on the part of those, because already we'd been informed of several hundred who wanted to leave. But the airports were closed. There was no way of leaving. This was a case of not waiting until something actually happened to them. But we did manage to get some intelligence out of the island, intelligence information on this. And the tenuous situation was, as I said, the only authority that you could say of a governmental nature on that island was a 24-hour curfew with orders to "shoot on sight" anyone found moving in those 24 hours.

Q What is the military situation now, sir, in Grenada? Can you tell us?

THE PRESIDENT: I can only tell you that we've secured both the airports. And the landings have been completed. But we are yielding to the influence of General Vessey in that we don't think in these early hours of that landing that we should be on the horn asking the Commanders to stop and give us detailed reports.

Q Mr. President, do you think that the United States has the right to invade another country to change its government.

PRIME MINISTER CHARLES: But I don't think it's an invasion if I may answer that question.

Q What is it?

PRIME MINISTER CHARLES: This is a question of our asking for support. We are one region. Grenada is part and parcel of us -- an organization.

Q But you're sovereign nations, are you not?

PRIME MINISTER CHARLES: And we don't have the capacity, ourselves, to see to it that Grenadians get the freedom that they're required to have to choose their own government.

Q With what's happening in Lebanon, are we spread too thin, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait one second here. No, we're not spread too thin. And let me augment what the Prime Minister just said. Once these nations which were once British colonies were freed, they -- themselves -- had a treaty. And their treaty was one of mutual support. And Grenada is one of the countries,

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signatories to that treaty -- and observe that treaty at one time when they had a democratic government and a constitution -- a constitutional government, the constitution that was left to them by the British. So this action that is being taken is being taken under the umbrella of an existing treaty.

Q Mr. Reagan, there are reports that a helicopter has been shot down, that a U.S. helicopter has been shot down on Grenada. Do you have any information of any U.S. casualties on the island, sir?

MR. SPEAKES: This is the last question. And we'll cut off after this last question.

Q Do we have any information of any U.S. casualties on the island, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I have been in meetings. And we both have been busy since we arrived here. And I've only had the first report of our landings and so forth. So I don't know whether that's true or not.

THE PRESS: Thank you, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: What? It has --

Q What reports have you received, sir --

MR. SPEAKES: No, sir.

Q -- on the success of our operation -- of the U.S. Caribbean operation?

THE PRESIDENT: What's that?

Q What reports have you received of the success of the operation?

THE PRESIDENT: Of the initial operation, of landings, securing the immediate targets, taking control of the airports: completely successful.

Now, the Prime Minister and I are going to depart, but I know there are going to be a lot more technical questions of that kind and Ambassador Motley is here, and I'm going to put him before you to ask all of the technical questions you may have.

Q What's the situation in Lebanon now?

MR. SPEAKES: I'm sorry. That's the last question.

Q Could you answer the question, are the Soviets behind this? Were the Soviets behind the Grenada takeover?

MR. SPEAKES: I'm sorry. The President said that's the last question.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

9:17 A.M. EDT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 25, 1983
No. 377

PC #34

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1983

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For further information contact:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1983, 3:00 P.M.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Good afternoon.

I'd like, first, to cover four points:

-- First, the reasons for the President's decision to commit U.S. forces in Grenada;

-- Second, our objectives as we undertake this effort;

-- Third, the chain of events as they led up to the President's decision in the immediate days preceding it;

-- And, fourth, the situation on the ground, very generally, as it was as of about half an hour ago.

There are two basic reasons that determined the President's decision.

First was his concern for the welfare of American citizens living on Grenada. There are roughly a thousand of them. And what we saw was an atmosphere of violent uncertainty: of the Prime Minister of the country first put under house arrest, freed from house arrest by a large number of demonstrators estimated in the thousands, with that demonstration in one way or another becoming attacked, and with the Prime Minister and some of his cabinet members being executed.

We see no responsible government in the country. We see arrests of leading figures. We see a shoot-on-sight curfew in effect.

Reports -- their validity uncertain -- but reports are rife about arrests, deaths, and so forth, and certainly random sporadic firing that one could hear.

All of these things are part of an atmosphere of violent uncertainty that certainly caused anxiety among U.S. citizens and caused the President to be very concerned about their safety and welfare. He felt that it is better under the circumstances to act before they might be hurt or be hostage than to take any chance, given the great uncertainty clearly present in the situation.

So that is the first reason why the President acted as he did.

Second, the President received an urgent request from the countries closest to the area, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, who of course followed these developments very closely over a long period of time, and intensively in recent days, and who determined for themselves that there were developments of grave concern to their safety and peace taking place. They brought in Jamaica and Barbados, and along with those two countries, made a request to the United States to help them in their desire to insure peace and stability in their area. So their analysis of the situation, in terms of the atmosphere of violent uncertainty, paralleled our own.

And so in response to the request of this Organization and in line with a request that they made pursuant to Article VIII of their treaty, bringing them -- the states -- together, the President decided to respond to their request and to look after the welfare of American citizens in this atmosphere of uncertainty and violence.

Second, insofar as our objectives are concerned, there are basically two, and very simple:

-- First of all, to secure the safety of American citizens -- and, for that matter, the citizens of other countries -- and to assure that any who wish to leave may do so;

-- And, second, to help the OECS States establish law and order in the country and establish again governmental institutions responsive to the will of the people of Grenada.

Now third, let me just review very briefly the chain of events here.

I think you undoubtedly know that on October 13, Prime Minister Bishop was placed under house arrest and subsequently on October 19 the demonstration and the freeing of him from house arrest took place, and then his death -- our information is by execution -- taking place on that date.

On Thursday, October 20, as information about these developments was coming in to us here in the United States, of course the President was receiving them, and he had the Vice President chair a meeting in the Situation Room reviewing these events. That meeting took place in the late afternoon. I was not present at the beginning of the meeting since I was testifying before a Senate committee in closed-door session, but I came in with Ambassador Motley about halfway through the meeting; and essentially it was a meeting to review the grave turn of events and to consider their implications for the American citizens on the island.

Subsequent to that meeting and on the recommendation of that group, the President decided to divert some naval ships in the area, among them the task force that was carrying the group that would be the normal routine replacement of the Marines who are in Lebanon, and diverted them in the direction of Grenada. Other ships were also included. That was essentially precautionary so that if the situation became worse, we would have a capability nearby.

There were various discussions during the course of Friday, but on Saturday, October 22, a message came in from Bridgetown in Barbados. It reached me at 2:45 a.m. in Augusta, and I discussed it with Bud McFarlane. About a half or three-quarters of an hour later, the Vice-President convening the key National Security advisers, in Washington, in their discussion, we joined with him through a secure conference call to again evaluate the situation and the information in the cable.

The information in the cable basically gave the OFCS states' analysis of the situation, and stated their very strong feeling that they must do something about it on Grenada and their feeling that they were not able to do it on their own, and so they asked if we would help them. I think you should note that by this time they had not only gathered themselves together, but they had brought Barbados and Jamaica in their counsels.

We shortly got the President up and we went through this material with him, and went over the views of various people that were taking part in the Vice President's meeting. The President talked to the Vice President, talked to the Secretary of Defense, heard their views, gave his own reactions.

The meeting chaired by the Vice President reconvened at 9:00 on Saturday morning. The President spoke to them by telephone. I might say we considered whether or not to return, and we felt that if we were going to respond to this request, then the element of secrecy should be maintained; and if there was a sudden change in the President's plans, it would obviously call great attention to that possibility, so we stayed there.

On Sunday, October 23, of course, that night we received the tragic news from Lebanon of the attack on the Marines, and that stunning news caused the President to decide in the early morning hours that we should return right away to Washington, and we did so.

During the day on Sunday, we met first from 9:00 to 11:00, and then again later in the afternoon from 4:00 to 7:00.

However, tracking back to the decision on October 22, it was felt that we should explore carefully with the leaders of the

OECs and Jamaica and Barbados their information, their analysis, and their intentions. So, Ambassador McNeil and Major General Crist were sent to Bridgetown. They left early Sunday. They met in the afternoon and evening in Barbados with leaders there, and they were on the telephone to us through this period, giving us more information about the evaluation being made in the area and the options that were before us.

It was in the meeting on Sunday, that last meeting on Sunday, that the President made what I think one would call a tentative decision that we should respond to this urgent request, and that particularly so since their analysis and ours was of a very uncertain and violent situation threatening to our citizens.

On Monday, October 24, of course, the plans were being made, the forces organized, and so forth. The President met in the afternoon from roughly 2:15 to 3:30, something like that, with the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs, and at the conclusion of that meeting, made a sort of semi-final military decision, he having had the advice of all his advisers the previous day that on general grounds we should proceed. I think the directive of the President to proceed was signed at about 6 p.m. yesterday.

That's kind of the chronology.

Finally, where do we stand on the ground? Both airports at Pearls and Port Salinas have been secured. The elements of the Caribbean Task Force, that is, of the countries from the Caribbean, are at Port Salinas. They landed approximately 10:45 this morning. I think there are about 150 there now. The southern campus at the medical college near Port Salinas airport has been secured. There are no reports of injuries to any American civilians.

There are pockets of resistance in the St. Georges area. I don't want to identify further precisely where, because this is an ongoing operation, and the military people need to be able to conduct their operation secure from any such disclosure. So that is the situation on the ground very generally at this point.

Now for your questions..

GREG WOKES, AP: Mr. Secretary, the charter of the Organization of American States, of which the United States is a member, provides that, "No state or group of states has the right to inter-

vene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. This prohibits not only armed force, but also any other form of interference."

Aren't we in violation of that Charter, sir? And if not, why not?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Organization of East Caribbean States provides for their collective security. Those states are not members of the Rio Treaty, under which the clause that you've mentioned would operate. So they have asserted themselves under their treaty, and asked us to help them.

As they view it, and perhaps you heard Prime Minister Charles today express her views most eloquently, the developments on Grenada pose definite security and peace risks to them, and that is the basis for their desire to act. Some are members of the OAS, but they are not members of the Rio Treaty; and their equivalent of the Rio Treaty is their own treaty.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, yesterday, in testifying to the Senate, you said, "At stake is the right of a small country to decide for itself how to achieve its sovereign objectives, free of outside pressure, threat, or blackmail." You were talking about Lebanon there. But why should not that same standard apply to Grenada?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it does; and in Grenada what you have at the present time is a set of events like this: In 1979, a constitutional government being in power, it was displaced by a bloodless coup, and Prime Minister Bishop has been in charge since that time.

In the events that I described to you, Prime Minister Bishop was placed under house arrest, and then executed. For all intents and purpose, there is no semblance of a genuine government present. There is a vacuum of governmental responsibility -- the only genuine evidence of governmental authority being a shoot-on-sight curfew. So in the light of that and in the light of the affinity that the other states feel together, they felt that they had to protect their peace and their security by taking this action and that doing so would help reconstitute legitimate government in Grenada.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Cubans and the Soviets were in any way responsible for the execution of Prime Minister Bishop? And to what extent was the action taken, at least in general terms, as a signal to Havana and Moscow that the United States was prepared to act to protect its own security?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I've tried to give very carefully what the considerations of the President were, and those are the reasons and the considerations for this action. This was not taken as a signal about anything else. It was taken in the light of the threat to the lives and welfare of American citizens and in the light of a request from the local states who are close to the situation and whose analysis of the situation was parallel, and in fact, went a lot further than our own.

QUESTION: About the first part of the question, sir, do you have any reason to believe that the Soviets or the Cubans were in any way responsible for the overthrow of the Bishop government?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We don't have any direct information on that point. However, the OECS states feel that such is the case. But that is not the basis of this action on our part.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have said that one of our two objectives there was to help the OECS states establish law and order and governmental institutions. Does that mean that our troops will remain in Grenada until that is done? And what is your time estimate for how long that will take?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Our troops will leave as soon as they possibly can. The forces of the other countries in the Caribbean who have initiated this action will be in the lead and working with Grenadans in trying to establish law and order and some form of provisional government. It will be their decisions to make in seeing how this situation unfolds, and we will leave as soon as we possibly can, leaving the island to those who are closest to it.

QUESTION: Does that mean that our troops will stay there until they are satisfied that law and order has been established -- they, the other countries?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think they will be leaving very, very promptly, and we will have to decide for ourselves what the proper conditions are. We will work the people from the other governments involved, and they will have a leading role in making these decisions.

I might say that the situation is one in which, in many of these countries, there really is no armed force at all. Prime Minister Charles expressed herself -- I might say to the amusement, I guess, of Secretary Weinberger -- she said, "When I

took office, I decided the worst thing in the world you could have is an army, so I abolished it. I saved myself a lot of money, and I saved conflict between the military and the police force on the Island."

So, that's what they have. And their belief is that the way to have law and order is not to have military establishment, but just a police force. And I imagine that they will work somewhat along those lines, although Grenada has a population of 100,000, so you have to take measures.

I think you have the next question.

-- MORE --

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the United States has now invaded this island with help from some other area democracies in the Caribbean to save and protect the lives of a thousand people, none of whom so far as we know, I guess, have been injured or killed. Why did it take the deaths of 200 Marines in Beirut to send Commander Kelley there to start thinking about additional preventive, precautionary measures to save those lives?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, we have been concerned about the safety of our Marines all along as they have been there. It didn't take this terrible tragedy to create that concern. I think it is certainly the right thing to do, to have the Commandant of the Marine Corps go promptly to the area and evaluate the security situation in a fresh way. And I think, also, that when you are establishing a presence in an operating, commercial, international airport, naturally, you make decisions that involve some sort of balance between security risks on the one hand, and what it takes for an airport to operate on the other.

I think that, certainly, in the light of the terrible tragedy, that balance needs to be shifted, and the emphasis on security will have to be heightened very significantly. But, of course, we look for General Kelley's report.

I think there is a certain pertinence to your question, because, it seems to me, and the President had to weigh this, with the violent and uncertain atmosphere that certainly was present on Grenada, the question is: Should he act to prevent Americans from being hurt or taken hostage? I think that if he waited and they were taken hostage, or many were killed, then you would be asking me that same question: "Why didn't you in the light of this clear violent situation, take some action to protect American citizens there?"

I don't want to get in the position of second-guessing myself, or the President, but rather to say, one has to weigh these considerations and be willing to take a decision in the light of all of the circumstances, and that is what the President did.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as you know, Grenada is a former British colony, and the Governor-General there was appointed by the British, the person you spoke of a while ago. Mrs. Thatcher has said in Parliament over there that their government advised against this and that the British did not wish to go along with it.

I would like to ask you two things flowing from that. First of all, does the fact that the British do not go along with it cause some cloud over the Governor-General, the British-appointed person now being the one we look to? And, secondly,

in view of their experience on the island, why did the United States disregard their recommendation?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We responded to the urgent request of the states in the area, which are now independent states. They're no longer British colonies. Although obviously the British have had great experience there, so have we. The Caribbean is in our neighborhood, too, so we have a very legitimate affinity for those people.

We responded to their request just as Barbados and Jamaica did. British or other states that may or may not have been asked -- I don't have the list of who the OECS asked to help them. But each state has to take its own decision, and the President took ours.

As far as the establishment of authority on the island is concerned, we believe that the Governor-General is the logical person, given the fact that there is a vacuum of government there, and we expect that it will occur that way. We are, of course, always impressed with the views of the British Government and Mrs. Thatcher, but that doesn't mean that we always have to agree with them. Of course, we also have to make decisions in the light of the security situation of our citizens as we see it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you give us a report on casualties, including whether there have been Cuban casualties in combat with Americans, and the status of the Cubans and the Soviets on the island?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't give you an account of casualties. I don't have that information at hand, but it will be made available as soon as we have it. I think probably the appropriate place, since they have it, is at the Pentagon.

As far as the Soviet Union and Cuba are concerned, as the operation got underway, we notified both the Soviet Union and Cuba of the fact of the operation, of our intentions, and of our readiness to look to the safety of their people on the island. It's my understanding that the Soviets that are there have been identified; they are safe, and their safety is being looked to. On the other hand, in the case of the Cubans, there are many more there. I think there are some 600 Cubans there. Presumably, construction workers. But it is the case that some number -- I don't know how many, and perhaps the military don't know at this point how many -- are resisting and firing at our forces and, of course, that would cause us to fire back.

QUESTION: I would like to ask two questions. One factual and one more philosophical. Who is in charge of Grenada tonight? I mean, at this minute? Where is Mr. Austin? Are we running the country, or are they still running the country? And, secondly, even though your intention may not have been to send a message, do you think anybody in the Caribbean or anywhere else in the world gets a message from this action?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't. I can't identify the whereabouts of Mr. Austin who was not genuinely in charge insofar as we could see, in any case.

As far as who is running the country is concerned, the country has been in a state since the house arrest of Prime Minister Bishop, essentially, of a kind of vacuum of governmental authority. And that still exists although as the forces of the Caribbean task force are able to develop their contacts there, presumably a governmental structure will emerge.

As far as your philosophic question is concerned, of course, those who want to receive a message will have to receive it. That was not the purpose of this operation. The purpose was as I have stated it.

QUESTION: Traditionally, in this part of the world, there's been a great concern about Yankee force, Yankee imperialism, Yankee aggression, et cetera.

How do you plan -- how do you intend to counter the impression that the United States is once again using its overwhelming military superiority in this part of the world to achieve a specific, political objective?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the principal point here is that the concerns and the requests for help came from the states in the region, and they have put their own forces into this picture. The fact that their forces are small in comparison with ours is only a reflection of the fact that they don't invest very much in the way of resources into military capability; and, of course, they don't have much to invest in the first place. It's in the nature of these countries that they're essentially peaceful. But they have put what they can of their own forces forward, and they have taken the lead in suggesting this, and they are there now in the early stages of this effort. And as law and order returns, they will basically be in charge; not us. So it is no effort on our part to gain control of any other country.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if I can just follow up. The British, who have been critical of this action, took an inde-

pendent action against the Falklands last year when they thought it was necessary.

If they cannot accept the American justification, how do you think, or how many countries in Latin America do you feel will accept the American explanation now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Certainly, Jamaica, Barbados, and the Caribbean states involved. They have asked us very explicitly, not only in the first instances I brought out, but on further probing from Ambassador McNeil, to really be sure that they had analyzed the situation carefully and they were making a thoughtful and thoroughly thought-through request, which they were and are.

I think that's the thing you have to rest on, and it seems to me people ought to recognize where this request came from; and, also, the fact that we will leave promptly. We have no intention of staying there, and the government that will be produced by the people of Grenada is entirely up to them as far as we're concerned.

QUESTION: Just to clear up one thing, Mr. Secretary, you said that there were contacts with the Cubans and with the Soviet Union to inform them of what we were about to do, or had just done. Had there been any contacts at any level since then, and what have you heard from the Soviet Union about this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to go into detail about diplomatic exchanges. But, of course, in general, their response has been that they expect us to look to the safety of their citizens. And certainly, as one might expect, they object strenuously to this action.

The boss says I have to go. I have to go up to the House and talk to them and then the Senate. So I'm on my way to the Congress.

(Press conference concluded at 3:35 P.M.)

**CITIZENS
FOR
AMERICA**

← file

November 4, 1983

Mr. Morton C. Blackwell
Special Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison
Old Executive Office Building
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009

Dear Morton:

Just a note to say it was a pleasure to see you at lunch on Monday. I enjoyed the opportunity to talk about Citizens for America. Enclosed please find our Reality Report on the first one thousand days of the Reagan Administration that will be mailed to our congressional district chairman this week.

I look forward to seeing you at our open house on November 17th. With warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Marc

Marc L. Holtzman
Executive Director

MLH
Enclosure

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 20, 1983

Dear Lew:

Thank you for sending me the excellent briefing material Citizens for America has put together on the situation in Central America. For our policies to succeed in this vital area, a sustained national consensus is necessary. Our people must get the facts. When they do, I'm confident we will have the support we need. Your efforts are greatly appreciated.

Nancy joins me in sending you our warmest good wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ron".

Mr. Lew Lehrman
Chairman
Citizens for America
Suite 320
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

"It's time we found ways to make the American economic pie bigger instead of just cutting an ever smaller pie into more but smaller slices. It's time we welcomed those Americans into the circle of prosperity to let them share in the wonders of our society, and it's time to break the cycle of dependency that has become the legacy of so many Federal programs that no longer work - indeed, some of which never did work."

President Reagan, June 29, 1983

October 27, 1983

MOVING TOWARD POLICIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE FIRST 1000 DAYS

This edition of "The Reality Report" focuses on the stunning recovery of our nation's economy. President Reagan applied policies of growth to our ailing economy, and the result has been an across-the-board move past recovery into economic expansion. Yet, if a long lasting change for the better is to take place, much more will have to be done.

Enclosed you will find conclusive data that proves the value of the policies we all believe in so deeply. Facts that demonstrate that an expanding private sector helps all Americans; facts that show the effect of the recovery on lower income Americans, senior citizens, the unemployed as well as the employed.

The very success of President Reagan's policies has meant that economic problems no longer command the public's attention, as they did in previous years. If we want to see further progress, it is essential that we get these facts out to the people and give President Reagan the consensus he will need to continue implementing policies of economic growth.

To make it easier for you to use these facts in your speeches, letters-to-the-editor, talk show appearances and guest editorials, we have included a set of Q & A cards.

Please put this information to use and, as always, keep me posted on your reaction to our reports.

Sincerely,



David Carmen
Director of Policy
and Communications

P.S. I have enclosed a letter which Lew received from President Reagan, detailing his reaction to our first report.

THE REALITY REPORT

MOVING TOWARD POLICIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH:
THE FIRST ONE THOUSAND DAYS

- I. DUE TO POLICIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH THAT WERE IMPLEMENTED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE UNITED STATES HAS EXPERIENCED A CLASSIC ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND IS WELL ON ITS WAY TO SOLID ECONOMIC EXPANSION THAT WILL BENEFIT EVERY AMERICAN.
- A. The resurgence of our nation's business and industry, stimulated by policies of economic growth, is leading the way to a healthy economy.
- Second quarter growth of the GNP was 9.7%, higher than in five of the past seven recoveries. Growth of approximately 7.0% in the third quarter exceeded most economists expectations.
 - During the first nine months of 1983, venture capital reached \$2.5 billion, nearly three times the amount raised in all of 1980.
 - The stock market reached an all-time high of 1284.65 in October, up from 962.1 at the end of the Carter Administration.
 - Nearly 600,000 new businesses were formed in 1981 and again in 1983. That is more than twice the number of ten years ago.
 - Domestic Auto sales rose 40% over last year.
 - Auto production rose 49% over last year.
 - Housing starts in August rose 8.4% to the highest level since 1978.
 - Housing permits rose to a high of 1.76 million units, the highest in four and a half years.
 - Factory production is up to 78.1% of capacity.
- B. Employment is at record levels, spurred by record growth in the private sector.
- Employment is rising faster than in any recovery in the past 30 years.
 - As of October, 101.9 million Americans had civilian jobs, the most ever in our nation's history.
 - Since the recovery began, over 2.9 million new jobs have been created.
 - Last month alone, nearly 400,000 new jobs were created.
 - In September, the manufacturing workweek and overtime were at their highest levels in five years (40.7 and 3.3 hours, respectively). These

levels indicate continued increases in new hiring.

II. DESPITE THE CLAIMS OF SKEPTICS, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE POLICIES HAVE CURED TWO OF THE MOST SERIOUS SYMPTOMS OF THE ECONOMIC ILLNESS WE FACED IN 1980: RAGING INFLATION AND SOARING INTEREST RATES.

A. By beginning to steer resources away from the public sector and toward the private sector, inflation has been beaten.

- In 1980, Inflation stood at 12.4%; In 1979 at 13.3%. A family on a fixed income of \$10,000 in 1979 found their income worth less than \$8,000 at the end of 1980. In effect, inflation gave this family a whopping 20% cut in pay.
- Over the past year, inflation has averaged 2.6%, the lowest in 15 years.
- The typical family's income is worth \$2,500 more now than if the 1980 inflation rate had continued.
- Had inflation continued at the 1979/1980 rate, family grocery bills would be \$520/\$990 a year higher than they are now.
- Lower inflation gives a retired person's private pension benefit about \$1,100 more per year in purchasing power than if the 1980 rate still existed.

B. Though the job is not yet finished, these same policies have driven interest rates far below the levels that existed at the end of the Carter Administration.

- During the last days of the Carter Administration, prime interest rates stood at 21.5%, the highest rates since the Civil War.
- Those same interest rates have almost been cut in half since the implementation of policies of economic growth, and now stand at less than 11%.
- The monthly payment on a \$55,000 mortgage has dropped over \$200 as a result of lower interest rates.
- An \$80,000, 30 year mortgage now costs \$350 a month less.
- Home-ownership is now within the reach of 10 million families who couldn't afford it two years ago.

III. A REDUCTION IN TAX RATES HAS BEGUN, ALLOWING LESS OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL TO BE SAPPED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

- Personal income tax rates have been cut by 25% as a result of President Reagan's economic policies. By contrast, taxes doubled during the previous 5 years.
- The typical family pays over \$700 less in taxes than they would under the old tax policies.

- Repeal of President Reagan's proposal for tax indexing and a third year tax cut would have cost the average taxpayer \$3,500 over the next 4 years.

IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH HAVE IMPROVED THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF EVERY AMERICAN.

- Personal income increased by \$25.2 billion in September, a 0.9% increase for the month.
- Real disposable income, the amount of money left after taxes and inflation, has increased \$30.6 billion since last fall.
- Total financial assets of households will have increased (based on second quarter figures) by \$411.2 billion this year, as compared to a \$277.4 billion increase in 1980.
- Consumer spending in the second quarter of this year, surged at a 10% annual rate adjusted for inflation -- the largest quarterly surge in 20 years.
- Confidence in the recovery caused consumer installment credit to grow by \$3.4 billion, an 11 percent annual increase.
- Gasoline prices fell by about 10 cents a gallon in 1982, the first drop in 10 years, the steepest drop ever.
- U.S. energy imports have been almost cut in half, from 6 million barrels to just over 3 million barrels.

V. OTHER BY-PRODUCTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A GAIN IN THE QUALITY OF LIFE

- The crime rate was reduced by five percent in the first six months of 1983. In 1982 the rate dropped 3 percent, and was the first significant decline since 1977.
- Life expectancy reached a record high last year of 74.5 years.
- Infant mortality declined to an all-time low of 11.2 deaths per 1,000 live births.
- The number of divorces dropped for the first time since 1962.

For more information, please contact Deb Smarth at 202-544-7888.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 15, 1983

RADIO ADDRESS BY
THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION

Camp David

12:06 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, I know I court trouble when I dispute experts who specialize in spotting storm clouds and preaching doom and gloom. But at the risk of being the skunk that invades their garden party, I must warn them -- some very good news is sneaking up on you. The quality of American life is improving again. "Quality of life," that's a term often used, but seldom defined. Certainly, our standard of living is part of it. And one good measure of that is purchasing power.

Just a few years ago, double-digit inflation was bleeding our purchasing power. Record price increases, interest rates, and taxation punished the thrifty, impoverished the needy, and discouraged entrepreneurs. When an economy goes haywire, confidence is destroyed. Well, today, the tables have been turned. Double-digit inflation is gone. And confidence is coming back. In 1980, the U.S. ranked only 10th among 20 industrial nations in per capita income. By the end of 1982, we'd climbed all the way up to third place. Our stronger dollar has increased purchasing power. Real wages are up. And inflation is down to 2.6 percent. Sometimes when we shop, we don't realize how much inflation has dropped because prices are still going up. But they're going up much more slowly than before. If food prices had kept rising as fast the last two years as the two years before we took office, a loaf of bread would cost seven cents more than it does today, a half gallon of milk 18 cents more, a pound of hamburger 60 cents more, and a gallon of gas 97 cents more.

The prime interest rate has been cut nearly in half so costs of business, mortgage, education, and car loans have dropped. The federal income tax on a typical working family is \$700 less than if our tax program had not been passed. With parents, students, entrepreneurs, workers, and consumers feeling more secure, opportunities for jobs are expanding. Our work force, in September, rose by nearly 400,000 to 101.9 million -- the highest level in American history. And the trend will continue.

Quality of life is not just more jobs. It's, also, better jobs. And we're seeing better opportunities opening up for all Americans. Women, for example, filled more than half of all the new jobs in managerial, professional, and technical fields between 1980 and 1982. The number of women-owned businesses is growing five times faster than men's. The future looks brighter. To get a peak at what tomorrow's jobs and products may be, look at the venture capital industry. This is where high-powered capital is invested, and much of the technological revolution is taking place.

During the first nine months of 1983, the venture industry raised about \$2.5 billion -- nearly three times more than in all of 1980. The General Accounting Office has already estimated that previous venture investments of some \$209 million in the sample of 72 companies directly generated 130,000 jobs during the decade of the '70s. Well, if \$209 million of venture capital generated 130,000 jobs in 10 years, imagine how many jobs \$2.5 billion will create during the next year. And like interest that compounds, growth and opportunities create more growth and more opportunities. Capital spending by business, a key source of higher productivity and new jobs help propel the economy

MORE

NOT PRINTED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

forward in the third quarter.

Much of the increase in spending went for products of high technology like computers and word processors.

We're witnessing an industrial renaissance and this is only act one. It's being nourished by incentives from lower tax rates, starting with the 1978 capital gains tax reduction, passed, incidentally, over the objections of the last administration, and followed by our own more sweeping tax cut program in 1981.

Our program to create opportunity and bring big government under control, the subsequent decline in inflation and interest rates and prospects for robust growth have all led to another basic change: America's confidence in their institutions is turning up after nearly two decades of decline. A 1982 survey by the University of Michigan found people more likely to say they trusted the government to do what is right.

Looking beyond the economy, we see more evidence that the quality of life is improving. Life expectancy reached a record high last year, climbing to 74.5 years. Infant mortality declined to an all-time low with only 11.2 deaths per 1,000 live births. And the number of divorces dropped for the first time since 1962. Serious crime dropped 3 percent, the first measurable decline since 1977. Quality education, an American tradition, but one neglected for years, will be restored, thanks to leadership in Washington and vigorous action by your families at the grass roots.

Good things are happening in America. Confidence is returning. Our quality of life is improving because your voices, voices of common sense, are finally getting through. Believe me, it wasn't Washington experts who said government is too big, taxes are too high, criminals are coddled, education's basics are neglected and values of family and faith are being undermined. That was your message. You made reforms possible.

With your help, we'll make even more progress because I'll be the first to admit much more progress needs to be made. We're on a new road for America, a far better road, filled with hope and opportunities. Our critics may never be satisfied with anything we do; but I can only say, those who created the worst economic mess in post-war history should be the last people crying wolf, 1,000 days into this administration, when so many trends that were headed the wrong way are headed back in the right direction.

Thanks for listening and God bless you.

END

12:11 P.M. EDT

Q: How well have the President's economic programs worked to curb inflation and reduce interest rates?

A: -Over the past year, inflation has averaged 2.6%, the lowest in 15 years, a drastic improvement from the 1979 high of 13.3%.

-During the last days of the Carter Administration, prime interest rates stood at 21.5%, the highest since the Civil War. Interest rates have now been cut to almost half that figure and stand at less than 11%.

Q: How well have the President's economic programs worked to curb inflation and reduce interest rates?

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-During the last days of the Carter Administration, prime interest rates stood at 21.5%, the highest since the Civil War. Interest rates have now been cut to almost half that figure and stand at less than 11%.

Q: What have lower tax rates meant for most Americans?

A: -The typical family pays under \$700 less in taxes than they would under the old tax policies.

-Repeal of President Reagan's proposal for a third year tax cut and tax indexing would have sapped \$3500 over the next four years from the average household income.

Q: Does lower inflation benefit the average American?

A: -A family on a fixed income of \$10,000 in 1979 found their income worth less than \$8,000 at the end of 1980. In effect inflation gave this family a whopping 20% cut in pay.

-The typical family's income is worth \$2500 more now than if the 1980 inflation rate had continued.

-The family grocery bills would be \$520/\$990 a year higher than they are now, at the 1979/1980 rate of inflation.

-Real disposable income has increased \$30.6 billion since last fall.

Q: What do lower interest rates mean for average Americans?

A: -Due to lower interest rates, home ownership is now within the reach of ten million families who couldn't afford it two years ago.

-As a result of lower interest rates, the monthly payment on a \$50,000 mortgage has dropped over \$200 while an \$80,000 mortgage now costs \$350 less a month.

Q: How have the President's programs affected the business environment?

A: -GNP second quarter growth of 9.7% is higher than five of the seven past recoveries.

-During the first nine months of 1983, venture capital reached \$2.5 billion, nearly three times the amount raised in all of 1980.

-Nearly 600,000 new businesses were formed in 1981 and again in 1982, over twice the number of the Carter Administration.

-The stock market is at an all time high, reaching 1284.5 in October. This is up from 962.1 at the end of the Carter Administration.

Q: What is the present status of the employment situation?

A: -Employment is rising faster than in any recovery during the last 30 years.

-Since December of 1982, 2.9 million new jobs have been created.

-Total employment rose by nearly 400,000 in September to a record civilian employment total of 101.9 million Americans.

-In September, the manufacturing work week and overtime reached their highest level in five years. This signifies a continued increase in new hiring.

LEW LEHRMAN

November 15, 1983

file

Dear Chairman,

We have before us yet another challenge. Enclosed you will find a "Call for Action" on the subject of the ABC television film, "The Day After." Our response to this piece of nuclear freeze propaganda must be swift and convincing. President Reagan has presented this country with the only option to nuclear disaster: the construction of a strategic defense system that can protect the free world from aggression without the use of the threat of annihilation as a deterrent.

Please give this packet your immediate and full attention. Included are several remarkable items:

- 1) A letter to you from Dr. Edward Teller, one of the most distinguished and renowned nuclear physicists in the world.
- 2) A "Call for Action."
- 3) Instructions on how to hold a press conference and a sample guest editorial.
- 4) A CITIZENS FOR AMERICA "Briefing Paper" on strategic defense.
- 5) A Heritage Foundation "Backgrounder" on the issue.
- 6) A copy of President Reagan's March 23 speech on defense.
- 7) A copy of remarks by Dr. George A. Keyworth II, Science Advisor to the President. These remarks contain much of the technical background on strategic defense.

On November 22, 1963, John F. Kennedy was to have delivered some historic words which still resonate today when we speak of strategic defense. On that fatal day in Texas, Kennedy was to have said:

"This effort is expensive -- but pays its own way, for freedom and America. There is no longer any doubt about the strength and skill of American science...industry...education and free enterprise system...our national space effort represents a great gain in, and a great resource of, national strength."

Again, I hope you will give this your very best effort and make our nationwide press conferences into a victory for the policies of President Reagan.

Best Regards,

Leu
Lew Lehrman

EDWARD TELLER

November 12, 1983

Dear CITIZENS FOR AMERICA Chairman,

On Sunday, November 20th, the ABC television network will air "The Day After," a film widely advertised.

It will be watched by countless millions and it presents a contrast of the quiet American life and the horrors of a nuclear war, to induce a desire for peace at any price. It portrays the words of the President and even a monument dedicated to the defense of freedom in a manner that can be all too easily misconstrued. Its appearance is impartial -- its content is not.

It is remarkable that the film, "The Day After," makes no constructive suggestion. That suggestions will follow is certain. How constructive they will be is doubtful.

I lived through two world wars. I don't want a third. No American does. The implicit suggestion in the film is that had we not risen to the defense of West Berlin, an unspeakable catastrophe could have been avoided. It's all too reminiscent of the period of appeasement when the democracies tried to avoid the second World War by agreeing to the extension of Hitler's terror. This attempt failed to succeed and 50 million people died in Central Europe.

For the last quarter of the century, administrations that had very little in common consistently attempted a bilateral reduction of nuclear arms. When was the world more safe -- in 1958 or today? The result of our effort has been an increase of Soviet power. In the knowledge of this power, the Kremlin has extended its influence in Africa and encircled the vital area of the Persian Gulf.

By contrast to this picture of despair, our President has made on the twenty-third of March a remarkable proposal: that we bend our efforts to the development of protective weapons. Not weapons of retaliation and mass destruction, but wherever possible, weapons directed against the approaching instruments of destruction. In many cases, protection could be achieved by stopping missiles without the loss of human life.

I have positive knowledge that the President has made this announcement after careful consideration of many months.

The film disregards our President's constructive approach. Indeed, the majority of our press has made an attempt to ridicule Reagan's suggestions by dubbing it "Star Wars." It is remarkable that in his speech of March 23rd, President Reagan did not once use the word "space." However, he did ask the relevant question, "Is it not better to save lives than to avenge them?"

The idea that defense can prevail over aggression even in a nuclear conflict is new to the public, though my younger colleagues in the defense laboratories have labored on this problem for many years. Such defense will require ingenuity and more ingenuity. Indeed, remarkable and promising suggestions exist today, in many cases, suggestions that are by no means obvious. We are aiming at solutions where defense can not be readily countered by additional offensive power. But for a full and rapid development, the united effort of free scientists everywhere will be required. I am convinced on the basis of concrete initial accomplishments that together with our allies we can prevail in the prevention of war.

The task is not easy. Indeed, all possible methods must be explored. The proper distinction is not one between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. It is between indiscriminate destruction by an aggressor and justified protection by the defender.

What is perhaps more obvious from the film, is that our civil defense preparedness is absent. By contrast, the Soviet Union has an organization to evacuate their cities before they intend to strike. Less than one percent of our military budget would suffice to save the great majority of Americans by proceeding with counter-evacuations, yet this obvious suggestion is made nowhere in the film.


"The Day After" will be discussed in newspapers, on the television and radio stations across the country. The truly important debate will focus on what can be done to prevent such a horrible occurrence. The most important part you can play in the discussion is to raise the consciousness of the citizens in your district by informing them about the only viable solution: to protect our population and the people of the free world by building a defensive system.

I have heard of your excellent efforts as a new national civic league; your work is of great importance and I hope my words will induce you to take action during the next period to help your community understand the difference between blind fear and intelligent action.

If I can be of further help, you may be in touch with me by writing to:

Citizens for America
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Suite 320
Washington, D.C. 20002

Sincerely,



Edward Teller



CFA Call For Action

CITIZENS FOR AMERICA

MEMORANDUM

TO: Congressional District Chairmen
FROM: David Carmen
DATE: November 14, 1983
SUBJECT: "The Day After"

ON MONDAY MORNING AT 11 A.M. LOCAL TIME, EVERY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT CHAIRMAN IN THE COUNTRY SHOULD HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE CONCERNING THE FILM, "THE DAY AFTER." IMMEDIATELY AFTER READING THIS CALL FOR ACTION PLEASE CONTACT YOUR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR ASSISTANCE WITH THIS PROJECT. THE EFFECT OF OVER A HUNDRED SIMULTANEOUS NEWS CONFERENCES NATIONWIDE WILL BE TREMENDOUS. YOUR COOPERATION IS APPRECIATED.

This is a call for immediate action by your local committee. On Sunday, November 20, the ABC network will air, "The Day After," a film which portrays a nuclear holocaust in gruesome detail. The film will be watched by millions of Americans. Many citizens in your community will be deeply upset by its content.

"The Day After" clearly implies that we are sitting on the brink of nuclear disaster and implies that President Reagan will be personally responsible for causing nuclear war within his term.

Though there is much to criticize about the timing and content of the film, a much larger issue is immediately raised by the movie. What can be done to avoid such a catastrophe? Nothing in "The Day After" suggests a solution.

Yet, a solution exists. On March 23rd, President Reagan announced a new course for the strategic defense of our nation. This new course is the only solution to the nuclear crisis that is at once morally right, militarily advantageous and economically acceptable. The implementation of the President's strategic defense plan will mean that the next generation need not live under threat of nuclear annihilation. All that is needed to assure our future security is the support of the American people.

Most of the discussion after the showing of "The Day After" will focus on the desire for an immediate nuclear freeze -- a position which does nothing to remove the threat of annihilation, yet much to impair our security. The freeze movement is organized and ready to take full advantage of the movie. Still other discussion will rightly criticize the movie and suggest that viewers boycott the network and its affiliates.

Neither of these points addresses the true issue. CITIZENS FOR AMERICA must get across the message of strategic defense to the American people. Because you are a community leader, you have the ability to participate in the debate which will follow "The Day After." By carrying the message of President Reagan's strategic defense plan into your community, you will be presenting the truly constructive answer to the fears that will be raised Sunday night.

To make our voices heard above the din of nuclear freeze activists, we will need to act with speed and conviction. By holding simultaneous press conferences in every congressional district where we are organized, our voice will be heard.

In addition to the press conference (see attached "news" sheet), please undertake the following steps:

- 1) Call your ABC affiliate and express concern over the content and timing of the film. Ask them for time to air an editorial response to the film.
- 2) Call every television and radio station in your district and ask what talk shows will be discussing "The Day After." Offer to appear on these shows.
- 3) Call your newspapers and offer to write a guest editorial on the subject of strategic defense as a response to the threat of nuclear annihilation (see sample op-ed piece attached).
- 4) Distribute this material to your committee and get them involved in the above activities, as well as a letter-to-the-editor campaign.
- 5) Call your Congressman and Senator and urge them to support the strategic defense proposals of the President.
- 6) Fill out the attached response form and mail it to the office in Washington. Please attach any clips that have been generated.

For Release: IMMEDIATE
NOVEMBER 14, 1983

Contact: DAVID CARMEN
202-544-7888

How to call a press conference

1) Pick a place.

- It is best to pick a location that is convenient to the press. Your office may be suitable, or perhaps a room in your city hall, state house, or a local hotel. Whatever the choice, the first step is to arrange to have the room for 11 a.m. on Monday.

2) Issue a release to the press on Friday detailing the time, place and subject of the press conference.

- EX: JOHN DOE, OF HOMETOWN, ANYSTATE, WILL HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT 11 A.M. AT THE GREENBRIAR ROOM IN THE DOWNTOWN HOLIDAY INN ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 21.

DOE IS THE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT CHAIRMAN FOR CITIZENS FOR AMERICA, A NATIONAL CIVIC LEAGUE. DOE'S REMARKS WILL CONCERN THE ABC FILM "THE DAY AFTER." THE PRESS CONFERENCE WILL OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH OVER A HUNDRED OTHER DISTRICT CHAPTERS OF CITIZENS FOR AMERICA NATIONWIDE.

At the top be sure to put the name and phone number of either yourself or someone else who can be counted on to receive calls from the press.

3) Have someone telephone every member of the press Friday, and again Monday morning, informing them about the press conference. Don't give out too much information in advance about what you will be saying.

4) Prepare a statement which will take 5 to 10 minutes to deliver, and be prepared to answer questions for a maximum of 10 minutes. Do not let the press conference last more than 20 minutes. Offer follow-up interviews with individual members of the press if appropriate.

5) Hand out copies of your statement to the press and deliver copies to those who did not attend.

SAMPLE GUEST EDITORIAL FOR LOCAL
OP-ED PAGE

Much of the nation tuned-in Sunday night to watch "The Day After," a gruesome portrayal of a nuclear holocaust and its effect on a once peaceful middle-American town.

Many questions have been raised by the film, not the least of which is: can we let the media continue to pursue its own political agenda, without regard to facts or responsible judgement? The airing of a film so violent in content during prime time is certainly a valid criticism. The fact that the film deliberately represents President Reagan and his policies as a catalyst in the making of a nuclear war is pure editorialization, based more on the theory of what makes good horror movies than on what makes good documentary style.

Still, the most pertinent question to be asked is more serious. What can we, the American people, do to prevent our obliteration from the face of the earth? Now that millions of Americans are busy trying to calm their own fears, and at the same time, erase the nightmares of their children, what action are we to take? Not a word in "The Day After" addresses this problem. The viewer is made to feel powerless in the face of the apocalypse.

Nothing could be further from the truth. On March 23rd, President Reagan presented the morally upstanding, militarily sound, and economically feasible proposal for the end of this nuclear madness when he announced, "wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them."

What the President was referring to was the construction of a strategic defense system based partially in space and also on earth. This system would include weapons that could not destroy a single life, yet they would destroy any attacking missile before it ever left enemy territory. The system could be built to protect the entire free world and at reasonable cost. Finally, the technology to build such a system is not in the distant future, rather, it is available today.

The reaction of most scientists to this proposal has been almost unanimously enthusiastic. By effectively creating a "shield" over the free world, the advantage to offensive firepower would be virtually eliminated. Real reductions could be easily negotiated.

Who then stands in the way of such a glorious solution to our problem? The answer is surprising. The very same people who claim that we must have an immediate nuclear freeze, regardless of the cost to our defense, are the people who object to the building of such a system.

For the past twenty-five years, America has embarked on a strategy called mutual assured-destruction (MAD). This strategy made it necessary to have no defense against nuclear attack whatsoever, but rather to count on the threat of total retaliation to deter a Soviet attack. The result of this posture is the predicament we face today. The civilian population of the free world is held hostage in the nuclear dilemma.

A nuclear freeze would not remove one missile aimed at the United States. The Soviet Union currently has sufficient power to destroy our civilization, as "The Day After" graphically depicted. Why then, would a freeze improve our situation? On the contrary, the United States would become still weaker in opposing the Soviet threat, more vulnerable to annihilation than ever before.

A strategic defense releases innocent lives from their captive position as hostages in the theory of mutual assured destruction. Yet the freeze movement claims that such a system would be destabilizing and stall negotiations.

For twenty-five years, under many different administrations, the United States has attempted to negotiate its way out from under the nuclear dilemma. The result is that the threat of nuclear war is greater than ever before. The construction of a suitable defensive system, capable of protecting the free world from annihilation and encouraging any aggressor to dismantle useless offensive weaponry, does not depend on negotiation -- it depends upon the will of the American people.

If the American people stand together now and support President Reagan in his effort to remove the threat of nuclear annihilation for the next generation, we will succeed in building a new age of peace. That effort will cost money. Yet, there will be tremendous return in private sector derivatives from military space efforts. Further, what better return on our investment than the protection of our citizens, present and future, from the nuclear threat?

Finally, this defensive system is capable of destroying missiles fired by accident anywhere in the world. It has the capability to protect against any attack, be it by the Soviet Union or by a madman leading a small country with new-found nuclear capability. Even a verifiable bi-lateral freeze does not address the issue of attacks from other countries.

"The Day After" is full of scare-tactics designed to bring herds of panic stricken Americans into the fold of the freeze movement. Clearly, it is designed to change the public's mind about President Reagan, who currently is enjoying the greatest popularity of a president in his third year in recent history. Yet, once again the facts are on his side. As in Grenada, and as with the economy, President Reagan is on the right track by demanding a strategic defense system for our nation. As the American people begin to become familiar with the facts, "The Day After" may end up serving a useful purpose: ending the pacifist, pro-Soviet Union mood of misguided elitists and turning us to an historic course of intelligent, patriotic action.

November 14, 1983

"For the first time in memory, we are in the position of developing weapons that pose no threat to the people. Instead they could provide an effective defense from what has become the nightmare of modern life: nuclear war. In calling for their development, President Reagan is not only pioneering heretofore unseen defensive strategy to deal with that nightmare, he is calling for an advancement in civilization, overdue since Hiroshima."

- Senator Malcolm Wallop

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SOLUTION TO NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST: STRATEGIC DEFENSE

In a major address on March 23, President Reagan called for an historic rethinking of our national defense policy. He asked that we begin to build a strategic defense which, if implemented, would mean an end to living under the daily threat of a nuclear holocaust.

- The President has asked the American people to face a new challenge: an all-out effort to construct a defensive weapon system capable of "shielding" our nation and the free world from attack by enemy missiles.
- This system would destroy any attacking weapon before it ever reached the atmosphere over the United States. It would be capable of safeguarding the nation against attack by any other power.
- By undertaking a strategic defense, the need to build offensive weapons is diminished. Further, it discourages the Soviet Union from building offensive weapons that would be destroyed before they ever left their own airspace.
- A strategic defense is stabilizing, encouraging the reduction of useless offensive weaponry.

President Reagan's proposals are achievable with present day technology.

- We have the technology that is necessary to construct a defensive system in space and on the earth. Many technical proposals have been under consideration for many years.

We can have a strategic defense that is non-nuclear.

- Some of these proposals do not require any nuclear devices to attain their objectives.

President Reagan's proposals are the only moral solution.

- For the first time in modern history, we can construct weapons that do not endanger human lives, but instead target weaponry and seek to save lives.
- The construction of a defensive system removes the use of hundreds of millions of civilians as hostages in a nuclear face-off of terror.
- Such a system can protect not only our own nation, but that of the allied countries as well.

The defensive strategy of the United States over the past 25 years has failed. We are threatened by nuclear war more than ever before.

- For 25 years, the United States has followed a policy of mutual-assured destruction (MAD). This is the theory that attempts to deter the use of nuclear weapons by threatening to annihilate the population of the aggressor in retaliation. This strategy demands that neither side defends its own population for fear of tipping the balance. We are left in a position of hoping that the Soviets "wouldn't dare" to risk the result of a first strike.
- The American people are held hostage in this nuclear face-off. We are at the constant mercy of the threat of nuclear holocaust -- whether initiated by design or by accident -- whether by the Soviet Union or by a madman leading a small country with new-found nuclear capability.

Attempts at negotiating a suitable "balance of terror" have repeatedly failed.

- For 25 years, the United States has attempted to negotiate the balance of nuclear power, yet we are worse off now than ever before.
- Throughout the years of negotiation, the Soviet Union has undertaken a massive build-up of offensive nuclear weaponry. For our own protection, we have been forced to expand our own offensive weapons.
- During these years, the Soviet Union has broken and circumvented negotiated agreements.

A nuclear freeze is no solution.

- A nuclear freeze on the part of the United States will not eliminate a single Soviet weapon, nor lessen the threat of annihilation that these weapons pose.

- A temporary freeze will encourage the Soviet Union to continue their course of weapons build-up and encourage them to test their strength in Europe and around the world.

A strategic defense system depends on American support, not Soviet agreements.

- All that is needed to build our strategic defense is the resolve of the American people to support the President's proposals.
- We do not need to wait for Soviet approval of negotiated agreements. A system can be built immediately that will reduce the threat of nuclear war.

A space-based strategic defense system makes good economic sense.

- Investment in new technologies will yield new growth in the private sector and new jobs.
- The safeguarding of space will encourage private development and produce many technical derivatives of our military effort, much as the safeguarding of the seas encouraged the merchants centuries ago.
- Building a defensive system is economical and will put an end to wasteful spending on offensive weaponry that is needed in ever-enlarging quantities, but does little to make our society more secure.

November 9, 1983

STRATEGIC DEFENSE: AVOIDING ANNIHILATION

INTRODUCTION

How can the U.S. protect itself from nuclear attack? Mutual deterrence based on a superpower balance in offensive nuclear capability is one means, and for years the U.S. has bet its future on this potentially unstable and disastrous scheme. It depends on the morally questionable practice of deliberately leaving the American people unprotected from a Soviet attack, and it ignores the fact that the Soviet Union is investing heavily in defenses to protect itself from U.S. nuclear retaliation.

There is another way of protecting the U.S.--it is called strategic defense. It is more moral than deterrence based on retaliation and more certain to deter nuclear war, for it does not use civilian lives as hostages in the hope that this would deter attack. Strategic defense instead creates a shield that actually protects Americans from incoming Soviet missiles and bombers. For those rightly horrified by the devastation of nuclear holocaust, it offers a means of preventing nuclear attack, while keeping the nation secure.

After years of neglecting it, Washington now is taking a hard look at strategic defense. It was at the core of President Reagan's March 23, 1983, speech endorsing space based ballistic missile defense. It has been endorsed by two study teams of prominent scientists and strategists in recent reports to the White House.¹

¹ The Defense Technologies Study Team, chaired by James C. Fletcher, former head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Future Security Strategy Study, headed by Fred S. Hoffman, director of a think tank called Pan Heuristics. See Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Panel Urges Defense Technology Advocacy," Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 17, 1983, pp. 16-18.

The high risk that a U.S.-Soviet conflict will escalate to all-out nuclear war, Soviet paranoia about security matters, and the massive continuing Soviet buildup in nuclear warfighting capability make it extremely imprudent for the U.S. to let its security rely solely on an increasingly lopsided "balance" of strategic offensive capability, as is current U.S. policy. Strategic defense is imperative--the only solution to the moral dilemma posed by nuclear deterrence, a matter of grave concern to the U.S. Roman Catholic bishops and others.

Critics of current strategic defense proposals use aging arguments that were voiced in the late 1960s during the heated debate over deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems for population defense. Their principal contention is that successful defense against anything greater than a small-scale nuclear attack is impossible. In the age of nuclear missiles, it is argued, the advantage inherently belongs to the offense. This might have sounded true 15 years ago; it is very dubious today.

The Administration's space weapons study group of leading technical experts (the Fletcher Commission) has concluded that effective space based ballistic missile defense (BMD) using a variety of technologies, including directed energy weapons (DEWs), can be deployed at an affordable cost.² The technology for more traditional ground based defense against ballistic missiles and defense against low flying bombers and cruise missiles also has advanced considerably since the days of Nike-Hercules, Sprint, and Spartan. With a comprehensive set of strategic defense programs, including multiple layers of ballistic missile defenses, air defenses, and civil defense measures, assured survival against even a massive Soviet nuclear attack now seems achievable.

In addition to technical criticism, arms control considerations also are used by opponents of strategic defense, who contend that it is destabilizing (that is, makes war more likely). This argument, too, collapses under scrutiny. Indeed, the critics' view that deterrence must be based on population vulnerability is a major reason for today's dangerous strategic imbalance and the lack of a timely U.S. response.

Since deployment of robust strategic defenses will take some time, the U.S. must continue in the short run to rely for deterrence on offensive nuclear weapons, which must be made more survivable. But strategic defense rightfully concerns Congress, the Administration, and the American people, for it offers, at last, protection from nuclear attack that does not threaten the lives of one hundred million Americans. It fulfills a government's primary responsibility--to protect its citizens.

² Ibid.

WHAT IS STRATEGIC DEFENSE?

The goal of strategic defense is to increase the prospects of survival of the U.S. homeland against even large-scale nuclear attack.³ It involves limiting the possibility of damage to key national assets: the U.S. population, government institutions, residential and commercial property, industry, farmland, transportation systems, and so on. Damage limitation can be accomplished in two ways: (1) by destroying enemy nuclear forces (intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBMs; submarine launched ballistic missiles, SLBMs; bombers) before they are launched; and (2) by defending against these weapons after they have been launched.

Having correctly rejected the option of a preemptive strategic nuclear strike, the U.S. can limit damage to itself, using offensive weapons only, by attacking Soviet post-first strike forces (those remaining after a Soviet first strike). The U.S. capability to destroy Soviet offensive nuclear weapons is severely limited today in part because most U.S. ICBMs--the major counterforce weapons in the U.S. strategic arsenal--would be destroyed in a Soviet first strike. Deployment of the Trident II submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and deployment of U.S. ICBMs in a survivable basing mode would enhance somewhat U.S. capability to limit U.S. damage through destruction of Soviet reserve offensive forces. Nevertheless, in light of America's second strike nuclear policy, the major burden of damage limitation for the U.S. must rest with strategic defense, which has four major components:

- 1) strategic and tactical warning of Soviet attack;⁴
- 2) defense against ballistic missiles, using space based and ground based weapons systems firing directed energy laser and particle beams, nuclear missiles, high velocity impact rockets, or other traditional defensive weapons;
- 3) defense against enemy bombers and low-flying cruise missiles, using surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and manned interceptors armed with both guns and air-to-air missiles (AAMs); and

³ There are other good reasons for deploying strategic defenses: to protect the U.S. against small-scale nuclear attacks from minor nuclear powers, such as the People's Republic of China, to prevent accidental nuclear war, to defend U.S. strategic forces against a Soviet first strike, or to complicate Soviet war planning. The heart of the current debate over strategic defense, however, is: can and should the U.S. defend itself against a large-scale Soviet nuclear attack?

⁴ For strategic warning (warning of impending attack before it is launched) the U.S. relies on intelligence about general Soviet military and civilian mobilization activity gathered from a variety of sources. For tactical warning (warning of an attack in progress) the U.S. relies primarily on early warning Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites equipped with infrared sensors to detect rocket firings and some ground-based radars to detect SLBM launches.

- 4) civil defense through blast shelters, fallout shelters, city evacuation, and industrial hardening and dispersal.⁵

STRATEGIC DEFENSE IN U.S. DEFENSE POLICY

The U.S. has not always been defenseless against nuclear attack. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the joint U.S. and Canadian North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command maintained a vast air defense system of 2,612 interceptors, 180 surface-to-air missile batteries, and about 600 radars, all that was needed to successfully defend U.S. cities against Soviet bombers--the only Soviet strategic nuclear threat at the time.⁶ During the 1960s the U.S. seriously contemplated deployment of a nationwide ABM system and investigated technology for a space based defense system.⁷ Civil defense spending reached its peak in 1962--\$500 million (1977 dollars)--for evacuation planning, shelter identification, and the stockpiling of survival kits.⁸

With the deployment of large numbers of Soviet ICBMs after the mid-1960s, nationwide anti-ballistic missile (ABM) protection was abandoned by the U.S. government because of the widespread belief that successful ballistic missile defense of the entire nation was technically infeasible and destabilizing. Opponents of ABM held the view, commonly accepted by critics of strategic defense today, that the essence of deterrence is mutual assured destruction (MAD)--the capability of each side to destroy the other side as a viable society. Although the U.S. government has never accepted MAD as the basis for U.S. nuclear weapons targeting or war planning,⁹ MAD has been used by civilian strategists and

⁵ For an overview of strategic defense components and a comparison between U.S. and Soviet efforts, see John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: 1960-1980 (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1980), pp. 154-175.

⁶ For a discussion of U.S. air defenses, past and present, see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Full Committee Hearing on Continental Air Defenses, July 22, 1981; Collins, op. cit., and "NORAD--A Study in Evolution," International Defense Review, vol. 3 (1974), pp. 15-19.

⁷ The first U.S. ABM system involved Nike-Zeus interceptors (tested 1959-1962) and mechanically manipulated radars. This was superseded by the Nike-X system which used high-speed, short-range missiles for point defense and phased array (electronically scanning) radars. Spartan missiles, for intercepting Soviet warheads outside the atmosphere--an essential requirement for city defense--were added later to the system, which as the Sentinel program was proposed for deployment at 17 sites for "thin area" defense of the U.S. homeland against small-scale nuclear attacks. See John Collins, United States and Soviet City Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 73-82.

⁸ "Only half the spaces were ever marked or stocked with the simplest survival kits." Ibid., p. 89.

⁹ For an historical review of U.S. strategic doctrine and targeting policy, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "A History of U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'--1945 to 1980," Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 3 (December 1980), pp. 37-71.

the Congress as the standard for structuring U.S. strategic nuclear force deployments and served to justify a U.S. policy of population vulnerability.

Research and development, nevertheless, continued on ABM systems for the less demanding role of protecting U.S. strategic nuclear forces from a potential Soviet first strike, as even according to MAD, deterrence requires survivable nuclear forces to retaliate after an aggressor's first strike. In 1969, Congress approved funding for two sites of the proposed 12-site Safeguard system for defense of U.S. strategic forces.¹⁰ The 1972 ABM Treaty, amended in 1974, however, restricted deployment of ABM interceptors to 100 at one site and banned space based ABM interceptors, thus preventing the U.S. by international treaty from defending either its citizens or strategic forces against Soviet missile attack.

* U.S. support of the ABM Treaty was officially linked to an expected follow-on agreement, which was to prevent the Soviets from deploying ICBMs capable of threatening U.S. strategic retaliatory forces.¹¹ The U.S., however, failed to win Soviet approval of such an agreement, and after 1975, the Soviet Union deployed large numbers of multiple warhead ICBMs not prohibited by SALT I or SALT II, which have put U.S. ICBMs at extreme risk and added substantially to Soviet megatonnage. Instead of proceeding with deployment of ABM interceptors to protect its ICBMs, the U.S. cut back on ABM research and development, virtually phased out its air defenses, and reduced civil defense to an organization without a serious national program.¹²

During the late 1970s, interest in strategic defense revived somewhat when the Carter Administration, concerned about the growing Soviet nuclear warfighting capability, turned again to the need to limit damage to the United States. Presidential Directive-41, signed in 1978, recognized civil defense as an element in the strategic balance that could enhance deterrence and stability, an idea endorsed by Congress in a 1980 amendment

¹⁰ Safeguard used the basic components of Sentinel: high acceleration, nuclear missiles for intercepting Soviet warheads in the atmosphere (Sprint), nuclear missiles for intercepting Soviet missiles outside the atmosphere (Spartan), Perimeter Acquisition Radars (PARs) for warhead detection and tracking, Missile Site Radars (MSRs) for battle management, and data processing computers.

¹¹ U.S. Unilateral Statement A of the ABM Treaty states: "If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty."

¹² In 1981 NORAD had 307 interceptor aircraft, no SAMs, only 111 functioning radars, and the capability only to protect the sovereignty of U.S. airspace in peacetime. Continental Air Defense, p. 25. See also "Neglect of Bomber, Missile Defense Hit," Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 20, 1979, p. 64. The civil defense budget between 1969 and 1979 was \$100 million (1977 dollars) a year.

to the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.¹³ Funding for research and development of ground based ABM systems was increased with focus on two programs: Sentry, designed for low level defense of hardened strategic assets; and the Army's Overlay system for intercepting Soviet missiles in space with small homing non-nuclear rockets.¹⁴ In response to the alarming surge in Soviet space weapons effort, the Carter Administration increased funding for space laser technology with a limited potential for ballistic missile defense.

The Reagan Administration has placed even greater emphasis on strategic defense. It has requested substantially more funding for civil defense (\$4.2 billion over seven years),¹⁵ about \$8 billion for procurement of 100 F-15 fighters, additional E-3 airborne warning and control (AWACs) aircraft, Patriot SAMs for air defense, and more R&D funding for Sentry, Overlay, and space laser weapons. In the wake of the President's March 23 speech, the White House Science Office, the Defense Department, and a special research team are studying the technological feasibility and the policy implications of protecting the U.S. with space weapons. Some Members of Congress are urging the U.S. government to adopt a national strategy for protecting U.S. civilians in the event of nuclear war.¹⁶ The Administration's interest in strategic defense, however, has yet to be translated into an official U.S. policy commitment to assured survival through a comprehensive, detailed set of programs.

WHY STRATEGIC DEFENSE?

The goals of U.S. strategic planning are to deter nuclear war and to limit damage to the U.S. should deterrence fail. Despite some official public statements endorsing mutual assured destruction (MAD), the U.S. has based deterrence since the early

¹³ The 1978 Amendment established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

¹⁴ Sentry (formerly LoAD--Low Altitude Defense) consists of small, nuclear armed, high acceleration, interceptors for low altitude intercept and large numbers of small, mobile, or silo based phased array radars. The Army's Overlay system would involve the launch of an optical probe on warning of Soviet attack to detect Soviet missiles in space followed by launch of ABM missiles armed with many radar or optically guided submunitions for destroying Soviet warhead "buses." Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Layered Defense System Pushed to Protect ICBMs," Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 9, 1981, pp. 82-86.

¹⁵ National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-26 calls for survival of a significant portion of the American people in the event of nuclear war.

¹⁶ Rep. Ken Kramer (R-CO) and over eleven cosponsors, for example, have submitted the so-called People Protection Act (H.R. 3073) "to implement the call of the President for a national strategy seeking to protect people from nuclear war...."

1960s primarily on being able to destroy the USSR's military capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Primary targets of U.S. nuclear weapons are Soviet strategic and theater nuclear forces, conventional forces, political and military command and control centers, and vital war supporting industries. The Scowcroft Commission and nuclear strategists in both Democrat and Republican administrations over the past ten years have acknowledged that the capability to threaten these targets with controlled, limited retaliatory strikes is essential for stable deterrence, since it gives the U.S. President retaliatory options other than attacking Soviet cities, which would almost certainly lead to a Soviet attack on U.S. cities.

America's capability to implement its so-called countervailing strategy, however, is dangerously weak because the U.S. strategic command and control structure and the U.S. ICBM force are vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. It is vital for stable deterrence that the U.S. move quickly to enhance the survivability of the offensive components of the U.S. deterrent force. At the same time, however, the U.S. must augment its strategic nuclear force posture with deployment of defenses capable of ensuring survival of U.S. homeland in a nuclear war. Here are six reasons why:

1. Strategic defense is necessary to offset Soviet defense efforts.

The Soviet Union has never accepted the dominant American view that security is enhanced by having a vulnerable society. In 1967, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin rejected U.S. proposals to limit ABM systems on grounds that defense against missile attack "is not a cause of the arms race but represents a factor preventing the death of peoples." The Soviet Union signed the 1972 ABM Treaty not because it accepted mutual population vulnerability, as some U.S. analysts contended at the time, but more likely because it feared that an active U.S. ABM system would interfere with its objective of acquiring a first strike capability against U.S. nuclear forces.¹⁷ Official Soviet military writings since 1972 continue to stress the desirability of strategic defense, and Soviet investment in air defenses, civil defense, and ABM systems has been extensive.¹⁸

¹⁷ See Carnes Lord, "The ABM Question," Commentary, May 1980, p. 34. See also Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 149.

¹⁸ For a discussion of Soviet attitudes toward ballistic missile defense, see Rebecca V. Strode, "Space-Based Lasers for Ballistic Missile Defense: Soviet Policy Options," in Laser Weapons in Space: Policy and Doctrine, edited by Keith B. Payne (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 106-161. In 1977, 12 percent of the Soviet defense budget was spent on strategic defense and only 8 percent on strategic offensive systems. According to the CIA, the percentage of funds for strategic defense will probably increase in the 1980s as new systems come on line. Strode, p. 136.

The Soviet strategic defense capability is considerable and growing. Moscow deploys 2,600 interceptors, 11,000 surface-to-air missile launchers, and 3,000 air defense radars for air defense. This force is being upgraded with more effective interceptors with look-down/shoot-down radars and missiles, the more capable SA-10 surface-to-air missile (SAM), and airborne warning and control (AWAC) aircraft for defense against low flying U.S. cruise missiles.¹⁹

The Soviet Union is spending \$2.5 billion (ten times the U.S. level) a year on civil defense measures, such as evacuation planning and training, stockpiling of food, medical supplies, and other necessities, construction and maintenance of blast shelters, and protection for industrial equipment.²⁰ A 1978 Central Intelligence Agency study concluded that, with a few days warning to allow evacuation, Soviet casualties in a large-scale nuclear war could be held to 50 million. With a week's preparation, Soviet civil defense could reduce casualties to levels suffered by the USSR in World War II.²¹ The U.S., on the other hand, with virtually no civil defense program would suffer more than 100 million casualties regardless of warning.

The Soviet Union is conducting vigorous research and development on ABM technology and is upgrading the Galosh ABM system around Moscow with new phased array radars and missiles manufactured on mass production assembly lines, which give the Soviet Union the capability to quickly deploy a nationwide ABM system.²² A number of these upgrades violate the 1972 ABM Treaty.²³

¹⁹ Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Emphasis Grows on Nuclear Defense," Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 8, 1982, p. 36.

²⁰ W. Dale Nelson, "Soviet's Budget for Civil Defense Set at \$2.5 Billion," Philadelphia Inquirer, March 18, 1982, p. 6. Some civil defense critics dispute this figure as far too high. See, for example, Les Aspin, "Soviet Civil Defense: Myth and Reality," Arms Control Today, September 1976. If true, however, this merely shows that, as the 1957 Gaither Committee and other study groups have concluded, "no other practicable addition to our defense, regardless of cost, can offer so much of a return (survivability) under as wide variety of conditions (as civil defense)." Quoted in Collins, United States and Soviet Civil Defense, pp. 88-89.

²¹ Director of Central Intelligence, Soviet Civil Defense (NI78-10003), July 1978, p. 4.

²² The Soviets are deploying a two-tiered BMD system to modernize their Galosh ABM complex with the SH-04 (Spartan-like) exoatmospheric interceptor, the SH-08 endoatmospheric interceptor, and ABM-X-3 mobile, phased array radars. See "Soviets Test Defense Missile Reload," Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 8, 1982, p. 27; Berman and Baker, op. cit., p. 149; and Walter Pincus, "Soviets Believed to Have Problems with New Typhoon Missile," Washington Post, January 18, 1982, p. 15.

²³ In particular, the Soviets have tested SAMs in an ABM mode for upgrading air defenses for BMD missions, developed and tested mobile radars and missile launchers, deployed battle management radars for a nationwide ABM

The Soviet Union is the only country with an operational anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. According to the U.S. Defense Department, it could deploy a prototype orbiting laser ASAT battle station within the next six years providing valuable operational experience for a large-scale space based BMD system which could be deployed by the mid-1990s.²⁴

The Soviet Union seems bent on acquiring the capability to limit nuclear war damage to what it considers tolerable levels, which would give the Soviet Union a war winning capability.²⁵ Two options are available to the U.S. for offsetting Soviet strategic defense deployments and hedging against a possible Soviet ABM breakout: (1) a massive buildup of offensive weapons to defeat Soviet strategic defense; or (2) a more balanced deployment of strategic defenses and modernized offensive weapons to ensure continued deterrence and vastly improved survivability of the U.S. in a nuclear war.

Option (1) would undermine U.S. efforts to achieve deep reductions in nuclear weapons through arms control--a highly desirable objective despite Soviet resistance. Option (2), on the other hand, could make offensive nuclear arms control easier by channeling the Soviet arms buildup into the area of defense forces, and it would have the following other advantages.

2. Strategic defense would reduce the inherent uncertainty of deterrence through retaliation.

Much can and should be done to enhance U.S. capability to limit nuclear war. Even so, it is possible that a U.S.-Soviet conflict could escalate to a massive nuclear exchange with large-scale destruction in the United States. This makes deterrence through offensive power uncertain because in an extreme crisis Soviet leaders might be tempted to launch unlimited nuclear attacks against U.S. nuclear forces in the hope that U.S. leaders would choose surrender rather than risk national suicide. True, Soviet leaders cannot be sure that the U.S. would not retaliate. But doubts about U.S. retaliation undermine its deterrent value.

system, and tested rapid reload missile launchers--all in violation of the ABM Treaty. See Manfred Hamm, "Soviet SALT Cheating: The New Evidence," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 31, August 5, 1983; "Soviets Test Defense Missile Reload," *op. cit.*, and Senator Steven Symms (R-Idaho), "Soviet Violations of ABM Treaty," Congressional Record, April 14, 1983, pp. S4625-S4627.

²⁴ Craig Covault, "Soviet Antisatellite Treaty Raises Verification Issue," Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 29, 1983, p. 20.

²⁵ For the argument that "Soviet layered defenses are likely to prove workable and highly successful" after a Soviet first strike against vulnerable U.S. nuclear forces, see Daniel Goure and Gordon H. McCormick, "Soviet Strategic Defense: The Neglected Dimension of the U.S.-Soviet Balance," Orbis, Spring 1980, pp. 103-127.

U.S. threats to retaliate must be as credible as possible. Improved U.S. capability to survive massive nuclear attack would reduce the chances of nuclear brinkmanship and enhance deterrence by protecting the U.S. from the effects of nuclear escalation.

3. Strategic defense would strengthen U.S. security with a new kind of deterrence.

In addition to deterrence through retaliation, a potential aggressor can be deterred because his victim's defense can prevent his achieving his goals (deterrence through denial).

Strategic defense would also give the U.S. this new capability of deterrence through denial, strengthening deterrence even more, since an aggressor is less likely to attack if his victim has the capability to avoid damage as well as to retaliate. At minimum, strategic defense would enhance deterrence by introducing significant uncertainties in the minds of Soviet planners about the success of a Soviet first strike.

4. Strategic defense is a needed prudent hedge against deterrence failure.

War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is not inevitable, but planning for the possibility of deterrence failure is nonetheless prudent. Reasons:

- o There is no evidence that the Soviet leaders have abandoned Lenin's dictum that "the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist [Western] states is unthinkable." Soviet leaders are paranoid about their security, and they have amassed significant strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional force superiority to protect interests that are constantly expanding beyond legitimate bounds with the growth in Soviet military power.

- o Soviet leaders cannot be trusted to use their military force with restraint and respect for human life, as illustrated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet or Soviet sponsored use of chemical weapons in South Asia, the murder of 269 innocent passengers aboard Korean Airlines Flight 007, and numerous other examples of Soviet inhumanity toward its own and other people.

- o In contrast to the purely defensive strategy of the Western Alliance, Soviet military doctrine sanctions preemptive strategic nuclear war as a legitimate means of defense, which raises the risk of Soviet initiated nuclear war.²⁶

²⁶ See John M. Caravelli, "The Role of Surprise and Preemption in Soviet Military Strategy," International Security Review, Summer 1981, pp. 219-236.

5. Strategic defense addresses the moral dilemma of nuclear deterrence.

The U.S. Roman Catholic bishops, in their recent Pastoral Letter on Peace and War, and many others have argued that, from the viewpoint of the traditional Judeo-Christian Just War doctrine, virtually any use of nuclear weapons--second or first, limited or large-scale, countermilitary or countercity--would be immoral because of the likelihood of escalation to all-out war with catastrophic destruction of humanity. This argument cannot be easily dismissed.

This moral conundrum cannot be solved, however, by arms control talks, since the Soviet leaders have consistently rejected U.S. proposals for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. Nor is dismantling the apparatus of deterrence a solution, since this would make Soviet aggression more likely. The best approach is for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to build up strategic defenses that can deter without threat to the lives of hundreds of millions of innocent U.S. and Soviet civilians.

6. Defense against nuclear attack is a moral duty.

It is a right of all nations, as codified in the U.N. Charter, to defend themselves against external attack. While individual Americans are free to choose to be dead rather than Red, this does not justify U.S. policy that leaves its citizens defenseless against Soviet attack. Critics of strategic defense are concerned solely with a deterrent plan, which makes nuclear war so horrible--because societies are undefended--that no nation will risk such a conflict. This kind of deterrence has three problems: first, the Soviet Union does not subscribe to it, as evidenced by Soviet strategic defense programs; second, it puts too much faith in the rationality and decency of Soviet leaders; third, if it fails, it fails catastrophically. Given the horrible consequences of nuclear war, strategic defense would appear to be the only morally correct policy.

SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT STRATEGIC DEFENSE

Opponents of strategic defense claim that assured survival against nuclear attack is not possible. Their arguments are flawed by false assumptions.

Flaw One is that strategic defense must be leakproof. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense from 1961-1968, for example, apparently rejected a nationwide ABM system on grounds that

none of the ABM systems at the present or foreseeable future state of the art would provide an impermeable shield over the United States....If we could build and deploy a genuine impenetrable shield over the United

States, we would be willing to spend not \$40 billion, but any reasonable multiple of that amount that was necessary. The money itself is not the problem: the penetrability of the proposed shield is the problem.²⁷

Strategic defense, however, need not be absolutely 100 percent effective against an all-out attack to be strategically and politically worthwhile. Strategic defense capable of limiting leakage to a few tens of warheads is technically feasible and affordable. While the casualties resulting from such an attack would be bad, this is far preferable to the more than 100 million who might die if the U.S. were undefended.

Flaw Two is the assumption that the Soviet Union would respond to U.S. strategic defense programs by deploying more offensive weapons (missiles and bombers). Kosta Tsipis, Director of MIT's Program in Science and Technology for International Security, and a persistent critic of new strategic weapons deployments, for example, has said that "the most likely outcome of a U.S. effort to build defense systems for our cities will be an increase in the number and sophistication of Soviet offensive weapons and an intensification of the arms race."²⁸ It is more likely, however, that the Soviet Union would try to match U.S. strategic defense programs with a comparable defense effort.²⁹ Although Soviet leaders have shown a remarkable willingness to sacrifice the economic well-being of their citizens for military power (spending 13 percent of Soviet GNP on defense versus 6.5 percent in the U.S.), even their defense budget is finite. Soviet planners probably would be forced to choose between building even more offensive weapons to try to overcome U.S. defenses and spending more rubles on strategic defense systems. Soviet military doctrine emphasizes the need to destroy U.S. nuclear forces and other important warfighting assets in a surprise first strike, but it stresses even more the need to protect the Soviet motherland with defensive measures. Soviet leaders, therefore, would be unlikely to concede superiority to the U.S. in the critical area of strategic defense.

Flaw Three exaggerates worst case scenarios for strategic defense by falsely assuming that the Soviets would preferentially "go after" the U.S. civilians with their missiles. As far as U.S. experts on Soviet nuclear forces can determine, however, the primary targets of Soviet nuclear forces are U.S. nuclear forces, conventional forces, and defense industries, for these represent

²⁷ Department of State Bulletin, October 9, 1967. Quoted in General Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier: A Strategy for National Survival (New York: Tom Dougherty Associates, Inc. 1983), p. 75.

²⁸ Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1983. Quoted in "Onward and Upward with Space Defense," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June/July 1983, p. 6.

²⁹ Strode, op. cit., pp. 125-129.

the greatest threat to the Soviet Union.³⁰ U.S. civilians face grave danger from the collateral effects of large-scale Soviet attacks on U.S. military/industrial targets near cities, but the Soviets would be unlikely to send huge waves of missiles against the U.S. population per se. In short, the Soviet threat against U.S. cities is not insurmountable with strategic defenses.

Flaw Four is the contention that assured survival depends solely on space weapons that are not leakproof. The key to strategic survival, however, would be to deploy multiple layers of missile defense systems: a space based layer to attack Soviet missiles in their vulnerable boost phase; a ground or space based layer to attack Soviet warhead platforms ("buses") in their mid-course phase; and a ground based layer to attack Soviet warheads as they fall through the atmosphere back to earth. Air defenses against Soviet bombers and cruise missiles and civil defense measures would back up ballistic missile defenses. As Soviet missiles and bombers passed through each defense layer, fewer and fewer weapons would survive--making the task of defense easier for each successive defense layer.

Flaw Five argues that the U.S. cannot afford an effective strategic defense. But even McNamara, an avid cost-cutter, recognized that removing the nuclear sword of Damocles hanging over the United States is worth a very high cost.³¹

STRATEGIC DEFENSE IS NOT DESTABILIZING

The most frequently used argument against strategic defense is that it is destabilizing--that it would increase the chances of nuclear war. Critics say that Soviet leaders would feel threatened by U.S. strategic defenses because they would cut off the Soviet Union's effective second strike response to a U.S. first strike, and that the Soviets then might be tempted to attack the U.S. before it fully deployed its strategic defenses. Critics also argue that, if the U.S. were to deploy strategic defenses, U.S. leaders would be more willing to use force to solve U.S. security problems in the belief that the U.S. could fight, win, and survive a nuclear war. Finally, critics argue that deployment of strategic defenses would intensify the arms race, fueling U.S.-Soviet tensions.

These arguments are fallacious. In the first place, U.S. deployment of comprehensive strategic defenses would tilt the

³⁰ Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoerber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1979), pp. 75-88.

³¹ Even a \$250 billion price tag--over twice the estimates of the Defense Technologies Study Team--would amount to only \$10 billion a year for a 25-year program or less than 0.3 percent GNP.

strategic balance in favor of the U.S. only if the Soviet Union did nothing in response. Moscow could ensure strategic balance simply by matching U.S. efforts in the defense area. True, the USSR would lose whatever strategic superiority it now enjoys if the U.S. deployed nationwide defenses. But strategic inferiority to the USSR is an unacceptable and dangerous position for the West. Parity with the Soviet Union is the bare minimal condition for stable deterrence and U.S. security. For rational Soviet leaders, parity based on mutual U.S.-Soviet survivability should be preferable to nuclear war. Indeed, Soviet leaders might welcome U.S. deployment of strategic defense since it would reduce the likelihood, from their perspective, that the U.S. would launch a damage limiting preemptive attack.³²

The charge that U.S. leaders would be more inclined to go to war if the U.S. had an assured survival capability is totally unfounded. The record of U.S. restraint in past East-West crises, even when the U.S. had overwhelming nuclear superiority, bears witness that U.S. leaders are cautious and responsible. In any case, if the Soviets were to match U.S. strategic defense efforts, there would be no advantage in a U.S. attack on the Soviet Union. A nuclear military victory would be impossible for the U.S. or the Soviet Union, and deterrence would be stable.

The charge that U.S. deployment of strategic defenses would fuel the arms race falsely assumes that the Soviets deploy nuclear weapons in direct response to U.S. force deployments. In fact, however, as former Defense Secretary Harold Brown has commented, "When we build, the Soviets build. When we don't build, the Soviets build." For the past twenty years, the Soviet Union has steadily deployed more threatening ICBMs to attack U.S. nuclear forces and more capable strategic defenses to protect itself from U.S. retaliation. Arms control and unilateral U.S. restraint in nuclear weapons deployments in the 1970s have had no discernible limiting effect on the intensity of the Soviet strategic buildup. Indeed, improvements in Soviet strategic capability have been most dramatic since the signing of SALT I in 1972. In addition to deploying a large force of multiple warhead ICBMs capable of destroying U.S. ICBMs in a first strike, the Soviet Union is in the process of acquiring an ABM breakout capability, which would tilt the strategic balance even more in its favor. U.S. deployment of strategic defenses would restore the strategic balance, which could only enhance deterrence of nuclear war.

CONCLUSION

Since the late 1960s, the U.S. has lived with the threat of destruction of its society in a very short time by Soviet nuclear

³² Colin S. Gray, "A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense," Survival, March/April 1981, p. 69.

missiles. To prevent this, the U.S. has developed offensive nuclear weapons designed to destroy the Soviet military capability to wage nuclear war successfully. Deterrence has rested ultimately on the fear of nuclear holocaust and the hope that Soviet fears equalled American fears. It is strategically imprudent and morally irresponsible, however, for the U.S. to base deterrence solely on this hope and the capability for retaliation. The U.S. needs strategic defenses to bolster deterrence and to protect the U.S. homeland should deterrence fail.

The deployment of an effective assured survival capability will take at least 15 years, in part because of the further development needed in space based ballistic missile defense weaponry. In the meantime, Congress and the Executive must work to improve the U.S. capability to use nuclear weapons in a limited manner by supporting programs for enhancing the survivability of U.S. command and control systems and offensive forces, especially the ICBM force. It is essential, however, that the U.S. move quickly to devise a comprehensive set of programs for strategic defense of the nation and that Congress begin funding these at required levels.

Many politicians may be tempted to postpone a decision on strategic defense programs because of their cost. On the issue of nuclear war survival, however, there is only one choice. It makes no sense to continue to live under threat of nuclear destruction if survival is possible.

Robert Foelber
Policy Analyst

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 23, 1983

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

8:02 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, thank you for sharing your time with me tonight.

The subject I want to discuss with you, peace and national security, is both timely and important. Timely, because I've reached a decision which offers a new hope for our children in the Twenty-First Century, a decision I'll tell you about in a few minutes. And important because there's a very big decision that you must make for yourselves.

This subject involves the most basic duty that any President and any people share, the duty to protect and strengthen the peace.

At the beginning of this year, I submitted to the Congress a defense budget which reflects my best judgment of the best understanding of the experts and specialists who advised me about what we and our allies must do to protect our people in the years ahead. That budget is much more than a long list of numbers. For behind all the numbers lies America's ability to prevent the greatest of human tragedies and preserve our free way of life in a sometimes dangerous world. It is part of a careful, long-term plan to make America strong again after too many years of neglect and mistakes.

Our efforts to rebuild America's defenses and strengthen the peace began two years ago when we requested a major increase in the defense program. Since then, the amount of those increases we first proposed has been reduced by half, through improvements in management and procurement and other savings.

The budget request that is now before the Congress has been trimmed to the limits of safety. Further deep cuts cannot be made without seriously endangering the security of the nation. The choice is up to the men and women you have elected to the Congress and that means the choice is up to you.

Tonight, I want to explain to you what this defense debate is all about and why I'm convinced that the budget now before the Congress is necessary, responsible and deserving of your support. And I want to offer hope for the future.

But first, let me say what the defense debate is not about. It is not about spending arithmetic. I know that in the last few weeks you have been bombarded with numbers and percentages. Some say we need only a five percent increase in defense spending. The so-called alternate budget backed by liberals in the House of Representatives would lower the figure to two to three percent, cutting our defense spending by \$163 billion over the next five years.

The trouble with all these numbers is that they tell us little about the kind of defense program America needs or the benefits and security and freedom that our defense effort buys for us.

What seems to have been lost in all this debate is the simple truth of how a defense budget is arrived at. It isn't done by deciding to spend a certain number of dollars. Those loud voices that are occasionally heard charging that the government is trying to solve a security problem by throwing money at it are nothing more than noise based on ignorance. We start by considering what must be done to maintain peace and review all the possible threats against our security. Then, a strategy for strengthening peace and defending against those threats must be agreed upon. And, finally, our defense establishment

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must be evaluated to see what is necessary to protect against any or all of the potential threats. The cost of achieving these ends is totaled up and the result is the budget for national defense.

There is no logical way that you can say, let's spend X billion dollars less. You can only say, which part of our defense measures do we believe we can do without and still have security against all contingencies? Anyone in the Congress who advocates a percentage or a specific dollar cut in defense spending should be made to say what part of our defenses he would eliminate, and he should be candid enough to acknowledge that his cuts mean cutting our commitments to allies or inviting greater risk or both.

The defense policy of the United States is based on a simple premise: The United States does not start fights. We will never be an aggressor. We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression -- to preserve freedom and peace.

Since the dawn of the atomic age, we've sought to reduce the risk of war by maintaining a strong deterrent and by seeking genuine arms control. "Deterrence" means simply this: Making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he understands that, he won't attack. We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites aggression.

This strategy of deterrence has not changed. It still works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed. It took one kind of military force to deter an attack when we had far more nuclear weapons than any other power; it takes another kind now that the Soviets, for example, have enough accurate and powerful nuclear weapons to destroy virtually all of our missiles on the ground. Now this is not to say that the Soviet Union is planning to make war on us. Nor do I believe a war is inevitable -- quite the contrary. But what must be recognized is that our security is based on being prepared to meet all threats.

There was a time when we depended on coastal forts and artillery batteries because, with the weaponry of that day, any attack would have had to come by sea. Well, this is a different world and our defenses must be based on recognition and awareness of the weaponry possessed by other nations in the nuclear age.

We can't afford to believe that we will never be threatened. There have been two world wars in my lifetime. We didn't start them and, indeed, did everything we could to avoid being drawn into them. But we were ill-prepared for both -- had we been better prepared, peace might have been preserved.

For 20 years the Soviet Union has been accumulating enormous military might. They didn't stop when their forces exceeded all requirements of a legitimate defensive capability. And they haven't stopped now. During the past decade and a half, the Soviets have built up a massive arsenal of new strategic nuclear weapons -- weapons that can strike directly at the United States.

As an example, the United States introduced its last new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Minute Man III, in 1969, and we're now dismantling our even older

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Titan missiles. But what has the Soviet Union done in these intervening years? Well, since 1969, the Soviet Union has built five new classes of ICBMs, and upgraded these eight times. As a result, their missiles are much more powerful and accurate than they were several years ago and they continue to develop more, while ours are increasingly obsolete.

The same thing has happened in other areas. Over the same period, the Soviet Union built four new classes of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and over sixty new missile submarines. We built two new types of submarine missiles and actually withdrew ten submarines from strategic missions. The Soviet Union built over two hundred new Backfire bombers, and their brand new Blackjack bomber is now under development. We haven't built a new long-range bomber since our B-52's were deployed about a quarter of a century ago, and we've already retired several hundred of those because of old age. Indeed, despite what many people think, our strategic forces only cost about 15 percent of the defense budget.

Another example of what's happened: In 1978, the Soviets had 600 intermediate-range nuclear missiles based on land and were beginning to add the SS-20 -- a new, highly accurate mobile missile, with three warheads. We had none. Since then the Soviets have strengthened their lead. By the end of 1979, when Soviet leader Brezhnev declared "a balance now exists," the Soviets had over 800 warheads. We still had none. A year ago this month, Mr. Brezhnev pledged a moratorium, or freeze, on SS-20 deployment. But by last August, their 800 warheads had become more than 1200. We still had none. Some freeze. At this time Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov announced "approximate parity of forces continues to exist." But the Soviets are still adding an average of three new warheads a week, and now have 1,300. These warheads can reach their targets in a matter of a few minutes. We still have none. So far, it seems that the Soviet definition of parity is a box score of 1,300 to nothing, in their favor.

So, together with our NATO allies, we decided in 1979 to deploy new weapons, beginning this year, as a deterrent to their SS-20's and as an incentive to the Soviet Union to meet us in serious arms control negotiations. We will begin that deployment late this year. At the same time, however, we're willing to cancel our program if the Soviets will dismantle theirs. This is what we've called a zero-zero plan. The Soviets are now at the negotiating table -- and I think it's fair to say that without our planned deployments, they wouldn't be there.

Now, let's consider conventional forces. Since 1974, the United States has produced 3,050 tactical combat aircraft. By contrast, the Soviet Union has produced twice as many.

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When we look at attack submarines, the United States has produced 27 while the Soviet Union has produced 61. For armored vehicles, including tanks, we have produced 1,200. The Soviet Union has produced 54,000 -- nearly 5 to 1 in their favor. Finally, with artillery, we have produced 950 artillery and rocket launchers while the Soviets have produced more than 13,000 -- a staggering 14 to 1 ratio.

There was a time when we were able to offset superior Soviet numbers with higher quality. But today, they are building weapons as sophisticated and modern as our own. As the Soviets have increased their military power, they have been emboldened to extend that power. They are spreading their military influence in ways that can directly challenge our vital interests and those of our allies.

The following aerial photographs, most of them secret until now, illustrate this point in a crucial area very close to home: Central America and the Caribbean Basin. They are not dramatic photographs. But I think they help give you a better understanding of what I am talking about.

This Soviet, intelligence collection facility less than 100 miles from our coast is the largest of its kind in the world. The acres and acres of antennae fields and intelligence monitors are targeted on key, U.S. military installations and sensitive activities. The installation in Lourdes, Cuba is manned by 1500 Soviet technicians. And the satellite ground station allows instant communications with Moscow. This 28-square-mile facility has grown by more than 60 percent in size and capability during the past decade.

In western Cuba, we see this military airfield and its compliment of modern, Soviet-built MIG-23 aircraft. The Soviet Union uses this Cuban airfield for its own long-range reconnaissance missions. And earlier this month, two modern Soviet anti-submarine warfare aircraft began operating from it. During the past two years, the level of Soviet arms exports to Cuba can only be compared to the levels reached during the Cuban Missile Crisis 20 years ago.

This third photo, which is the only one in this series that has been previously made public, shows Soviet military hardware that has made its way to Central America. This airfield with its MI-8 helicopters, anti-aircraft guns, and protected fighter sites is one of number of military facilities in Nicaragua which has received Soviet equipment funneled through Cuba, and reflects the massive military buildup going on in that country.

On the small island of Grenada, at the southern end of the Caribbean chain, the Cubans with Soviet financing and backing are in the process of building an airfield with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who is it intended for? The Caribbean is a very important passage way for our international commerce and military lines of communication. More than half of all American oil imports now pass through the Caribbean. The rapid buildup of Grenada's military potential

is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this island country of under 110,000 people and totally at odds with the pattern of other eastern Caribbean states, most of which are unarmed.

The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as power projection into the region. And it is in this important economic and strategic area that we're trying to help the governments of El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and others in their struggles for democracy against guerrillas supported through Cuba and Nicaragua.

These pictures only tell a small part of the story. I wish I could show you more without compromising our most sensitive intelligence sources and methods. But the Soviet Union is also supporting Cuban military forces in Angola and Ethiopia. They have bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen, near the Persian Gulf oil fields. They have taken over the port that we built at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. And now for the first time in history, the Soviet Navy is a force to be reckoned with in the South Pacific.

Some people may still ask: Would the Soviets ever use their formidable military power? Well, again, can we afford to believe they won't? There is Afghanistan. And in Poland, the Soviets denied the will of the people and in so doing demonstrated to the world how their military power could also be used to intimidate.

The final fact is that the Soviet Union is acquiring what can only be considered an offensive military force. They have continued to build far more intercontinental ballistic missiles than they could possibly need simply to deter an attack. Their conventional forces are trained and equipped not so much to defend against an attack as they are to permit sudden surprise offenses of their own.

Our NATO allies have assumed a great defense burden, including the military draft in most countries. We're working with them and our other friends around the world to do more. Our defensive strategy means we need military forces that can move very quickly, forces that are trained and ready to respond to any emergency.

Every item in our defense program, our ships, our tanks, our planes, our funds for training and spare parts is intended for one all-important purpose, to keep the peace. Unfortunately, a decade of neglecting our military forces had called into question our ability to do that.

When I took office in January 1981, I was appalled by what I found: American planes that couldn't fly and American ships that couldn't sail for lack of spare parts and trained personnel and insufficient fuel and ammunition for essential training. The inevitable result of all this was poor morale in our armed forces, difficulty in recruiting the brightest young Americans to wear the uniform and difficulty in convincing our most experienced military personnel to stay on.

There was a real question then about how well we could meet a crisis. And it was obvious that we had to begin a major modernization program to ensure we could deter aggression and preserve the peace in the years ahead.

We had to move immediately to improve the basic readiness and staying power of our conventional

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forces, so they could meet -- and therefore help deter -- a crisis. We had to make up for lost years of investment by moving forward with a long-term plan to prepare our forces to counter the military capabilities our adversaries were developing for the future.

I know that all of you want peace and so do I. I know too that many of you seriously believe that a nuclear freeze would further the cause of peace. But a freeze now would make us less, not more, secure and would raise, not reduce, the risks of war. It would be largely unverifiable and would seriously undercut our negotiations on arms reduction. It would reward the Soviets for their massive military buildup while preventing us from modernizing our aging and increasingly vulnerable forces. With their present margin of superiority, why should they agree to arms reductions knowing that we were prohibited from catching up?

Believe me, it wasn't pleasant for someone who had come to Washington determined to reduce government spending, but we had to move forward with the task of repairing our defenses or we would lose our ability to deter conflict now and in the future. We had to demonstrate to any adversary that aggression could not succeed, and that the only real solution was substantial, equitable, and effectively verifiable arms reduction -- the kind we're working for right now in Geneva.

Thanks to your strong support, and bipartisan support from the Congress, we began to turn things around. Already, we're seeing some very encouraging results. Quality recruitment and retention are up, dramatically -- more high school graduates are choosing military careers and more experienced career personnel are choosing to stay. Our men and women in uniform at last are getting the tools and training they need to do their jobs.

Ask around today, especially among our young people, and I think you will find a whole new attitude toward serving their country. This reflects more than just better pay, equipment, and leadership. You the American people have sent a signal to these young people that it is once again an honor to wear the uniform. That's not something you measure in a budget, but it's a very real part of our nation's strength.

It'll take us longer to build the kind of equipment we need to keep peace in the future, but we've made a good start.

We haven't built a new long-range bomber for 21 years. Now we're building the B-1. We hadn't launched one new strategic submarine for 17 years. Now we're building one Trident submarine a year. Our land-based missiles are increasingly threatened by the many huge, new Soviet ICBMs. We're determining how to solve that problem. At the same time, we're working in the START and INF negotiations with the goal of achieving deep reductions in the strategic and intermediate nuclear arsenals of both sides.

We have also begun the long-needed modernization of our conventional forces. The Army is getting its first new tank in 20 years. The Air Force is modernizing. We're rebuilding our Navy which shrank from about 1000 ships in the late 1960's to 453 during the 1970's. Our nation needs a superior Navy to support our military

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forces and vital interests overseas. We're now on the road to achieving a 600-ship Navy and increasing the amphibious capabilities of our Marines who are now serving the cause of peace in Lebanon. And we're building a real capability to assist our friends in the vitally-important Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region.

This adds up to a major effort, and it isn't cheap. It comes at a time when there are many other pressures on our budget, and when the American people have already had to make major sacrifices during the recession. But we must not be misled by those who would make defense once again the scapegoat of the federal budget.

The fact is that in the past few decades we have seen a dramatic shift in how we spend the taxpayer's dollar. Back in 1955, payments to individuals took up only about 20 percent of the federal budget. For nearly three decades, these payments steadily increased and this year will account for 49 percent of the budget. By contrast, in 1955, defense took up more than half of the federal budget. By 1980, this spending had fallen to a low of 23 percent. Even with the increase that I am requesting this year, defense will still amount to only 28 percent of the budget.

The calls for cutting back the defense budget come in nice simple arithmetic. They're the same kind of talk that led the democracies to neglect their defenses in the 1930's and invited the tragedy of World War II. We must not let that grim chapter of history repeat itself through apathy or neglect.

This is why I'm speaking to you tonight -- to urge you to tell your Senators and Congressmen that you know we must continue to restore our military strength. If we stop in midstream, we will send a signal of decline, of lessened will, to friends and adversaries alike. Free people must voluntarily, through open debate and democratic means, meet the challenge that totalitarians pose by compulsion. It's up to us, in our time, to choose and choose wisely between the hard but necessary task of preserving peace and freedom and the temptation to ignore our duty and blindly hope for the best while the enemies of freedom grow stonger day by day.

The solution is well within our grasp. But to reach it, there is simply no alternative but to continue this year, in this budget, to provide the resources we need to preserve the peace and guarantee our freedom.

Now, thus far tonight I have shared with you my thoughts on the problems of national security we must face together. My predecessors in the Oval Office have appeared before you on other occasions to describe the threat posed by Soviet power and have proposed steps to address that threat. But since the advent of nuclear weapons, those steps have been increasingly directed toward deterrence of aggression through the promise of retaliation. This approach to stability through offensive threat has worked. We and our allies have succeeded in preventing nuclear war for more than three decades. In recent months, however, my advisors, including in particular the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have underscored the necessity to break out

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of a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation for our security. Over the course of these discussions, I have become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence. Feeling this way, I believe we must thoroughly examine every opportunity for reducing tensions, and for introducing greater stability into the strategic calculus on both sides.

One of the most important contributions we can make is, of course, to lower the level of all arms, and particularly nuclear arms. We are engaged right now in several negotiations with the Soviet Union to bring about a mutual reduction of weapons.

I will report to you a week from tomorrow my thoughts on that score. But let me just say, I am totally committed to this course. If the Soviet Union will join with us in our effort to achieve major reduction, we will have succeeded in stabilizing the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to rely on the spectre of retaliation, on mutual threat. And that is a sad commentary on the human condition. Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability.

I think we are. Indeed, we must. After careful consultation with my advisors including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe there is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base, and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today.

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it is reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response.

But isn't it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war? We know it is. In the meantime, we will continue to pursue real reductions in nuclear arms, negotiating from a position of strength that can be assured only by modernizing our strategic forces.

At the same time, we must take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional military conflict escalating to nuclear war by improving our non-nuclear capabilities.

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America does possess -- now -- the technologies to attain very significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional, non-nuclear forces. Proceeding boldly with these new technologies, we can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet Union may have to threaten attack against the United States or its allies.

As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we recognize that our allies rely upon our strategic offensive power to deter attacks against them. Their vital interests and ours are inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are one. And no change in technology can or will alter that reality. We must and shall continue to honor our commitments.

I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that.

But with these considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM Treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I'm taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose -- one all people share -- is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

My fellow Americans, tonight we're launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it. As we cross this threshold, I ask for your prayers and your support. Thank you. Good night. And God bless you.

END

8:29 P.M. EST

REMARKS OF DR. GEORGE A. KEYWORTH, II
SCIENCE ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT, AND
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

TO THE WASHINGTON CHAPTER OF THE
ARMED FORCES COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OCTOBER 13, 1983

"MARCH 23--SIX MONTHS LATER"

OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS THE NATION HAS BEEN
PREOCCUPIED WITH TWO OVERWHELMING CONCERNS: THE ECONOMY,
AND NATIONAL SECURITY. THOSE TWO THINGS, IN VARIOUS
FORMS, DOMINATE POLICYMAKING HERE IN WASHINGTON AND
CONSUME THE MAJOR PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S TIME.

IT TURNS OUT THAT BOTH ISSUES SHARE A STRONG
COMMON ELEMENT--THEIR DEPENDENCE ON TECHNOLOGY.
WHETHER WE'RE TALKING ABOUT CHANGES IN BASIC INDUSTRIES
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT, TALKING ABOUT THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGES IN BALANCE OF TRADE,
TALKING ABOUT SHORTAGES OF MATH AND SCIENCE TEACHERS IN
OUR SCHOOLS, TALKING ABOUT STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION OF
OUR ARMED FORCES, OR TALKING ABOUT PRESERVING STABILITY
AND PEACE IN THE FACE OF THE ADVENTURISM OF THE SOVIET

UNION, WE QUICKLY FIND OURSELVES TALKING ABOUT CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY AS WELL.

TO ME, AS SCIENCE ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, I FIND GREAT REASSURANCE--IN FACT, I'M MORE THAN A LITTLE HUMBLER--IN OUR PRESIDENT'S INSTINCTIVE FEEL FOR THIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF MODERN SOCIETY. HE HAS A DEEP COMMON-SENSE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT HAS MADE AMERICA STRONG BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY--AND HE'S DETERMINED TO BUILD ON THOSE UNIQUE AMERICAN QUALITIES TO FORGE OUR FUTURE. UNLIKE ANY OTHER PRESIDENT IN MY MEMORY, HE NOT ONLY KNOWS THAT OUR COUNTRY IS DISTINGUISHED FROM ALL OTHERS BY THE DEPTH OF OUR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE--BUT HE REALIZES THAT OUR FUTURE LIES IN TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THAT EXPERTISE AND MAKING SURE IT'S MAINTAINED.

I WANT TO TALK TODAY ABOUT THAT REALIZATION AND ITS PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. I'VE PARTICULARLY LOOKED FORWARD TO THIS CHANCE TO TALK ABOUT DEFENSE TO YOU MEMBERS OF AFCEA. I KNOW YOU'RE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN MILITARY ISSUES AND COMMITTED TO A STRONG AND SECURE U.S. YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES REPRESENT THE PEOPLE WHO ARE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO OUR LONG-TERM SUCCESS IN MAINTAINING A STRONG DEFENSE POSTURE.

THESE ARE RAPIDLY CHANGING TIMES IN DEFENSE--AND

THOSE CHANGES ARE GOING TO INTENSIFY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WHAT KINDS OF CHANGES AM I REFERRING TO? PRIMARILY, WE'RE SHIFTING TO A MORE BALANCED MILITARY DETERRENT, WITH INCREASED EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. THIS REFLECTS A CHANGE IN STRATEGY THAT ANTICIPATES WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR DETERRENTS IN THE FUTURE.

EVEN TODAY, 85 PERCENT OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET GOES FOR CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS--AND FOR GOOD REASON. ALTHOUGH PUBLIC DEBATE OVER THE ADEQUACY OF OUR DETERRENCE HAS FOCUSED PEOPLES' ATTENTION ON SOVIET IMPROVEMENTS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN QUIETLY ACHIEVING COMPARABLE ADVANCES IN THEIR CONVENTIONAL MILITARY AS WELL. OVER THE PAST DECADE THEY'VE MANAGED TO ENCROACH ON OUR TECHNICAL SUPERIORITY THERE AS WELL AS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. JUST TO POINT TO TWO EXAMPLES, THEY NOW HAVE A TANK, THE T-80, THAT'S A GOOD MATCH FOR OUR BEST, AND WE CAN NO LONGER BE CERTAIN OF AIR SUPERIORITY. MOREOVER, THEY'RE MORE THAN READY--AND ABLE--TO PUT AS MANY UNITS IN THE FIELD AS THEY NEED TO ACHIEVE A SUPERIOR FORCE. OUR RESPONSE HAS TO BE TO GO BACK TO OUR STRENGTH--TECHNOLOGY.

FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIET ARMORED FORCES ARE A SERIOUS THREAT IN PLACES LIKE EASTERN EUROPE. BUT SHOULD WE

CONTINUE TO TRY TO MATCH THE SOVIETS, TANK FOR TANK--OR, LACKING SUFFICIENT NUMBERS, BE FORCED TO RELY ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS? NO MATTER HOW SOPHISTICATED A WEAPON A TANK CAN BE MADE TO BE, IT'S GOING TO BE VULNERABLE TO PINPOINT ATTACK FROM A DISTANCE. IN AN ERA OF SMART MUNITIONS AND NEW TACTICAL RADARS, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MOUNT SUCH AN ATTACK--AND PERHAPS COME UP WITH A SYSTEM SO SUPERIOR THAT IT NULLIFIES THE SOVIET ARMORED LEVERAGE.

THAT'S NOT A TECHNICAL PIPE DREAM. LET ME GIVE ANOTHER EXAMPLE, A VERY REAL ONE, OF THE KIND OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEM ADVANCE THAT HAS SO MUCH POTENTIAL--WHAT ARE CALLED LOW-OBSERVABLE AIRCRAFT. USING HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, WE'RE FINDING WAYS TO CHEAT RADAR SYSTEMS, TO REDUCE THE RADAR CROSS-SECTION OF AIRCRAFT AND INCREASE THEIR ABILITY TO PENETRATE ENEMY DEFENSES. TO MY MIND THIS GENERAL AREA IS THE MOST IMPORTANT NEW MILITARY TECHNOLOGY SINCE THE ICBM AND NUCLEAR SUBMARINES; IT'S GOING TO REQUIRE CONTINUED R&D TO IMPROVE IT AND, OF COURSE, TO EXPLORE COUNTERMEASURES.

THERE ARE PLENTY OF OTHER WAYS IN WHICH TECHNOLOGY CAN GIVE US HIGH LEVERAGE ON CONVENTIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS. BUT, SADLY, WE STILL DON'T DO A GOOD ENOUGH JOB OF INCORPORATING TECHNICAL ADVANCES, LET

ALONE NEW SCIENCE, INTO OUR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
WE NEED A LARGER PART OF OUR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
COMMUNITY ADDRESSING THESE KINDS OF OPPORTUNITIES.

NOW, THIS DISCUSSION OF CHANGES IN DETERRENTS AND
IMPROVEMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE LEADS ME TO THE
TOPIC I WANT TO FOCUS ON TODAY. THAT'S A DISCUSSION OF
THE PRESIDENT'S NEW DEFENSE INITIATIVES. THESE COME
OUT OF HIS SPEECH LAST MARCH 23 WHEN HE CALLED FOR THE
NATION TO DEVELOP A MEANS TO DETER NUCLEAR WAR BY
PREVENTING IT FROM OCCURRING, RATHER THAN BY CONTINUING
TO THREATEN ANNIHILATION OF AN ENEMY WHO STARTS A
NUCLEAR CONFLICT.

NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO UNDERTAKE
THE MOST PROFOUND SHIFT IN DEFENSE STRATEGY IN DECADES
PRODUCED STRONG REACTIONS. ONE REASON WAS BECAUSE THIS
NATION HAS GROWN OUT OF EXPECTING ITS PRESIDENT TO
INITIATE POLICY; WE'VE HAD TOO MANY YEARS OF BOTTOM-UP
PROCESSES WHERE THE INTEREST GROUPS, THE AGENCIES, AND
THE CONGRESS ALL HAVE THEIR CHANCES TO NEUTER NEW
POLICIES BEFORE THE PRESIDENT HAS A CHANCE TO CONSIDER
THEM. WE'RE NOT USED TO BOLDNESS, NOR ARE OUR INSTITUTIONS.
UNTIL THIS EVENT I HAD NEVER REALLY APPRECIATED HOW
SLOWLY THE NATION ACCOMODATES TO CHANGE--AND THAT THE
PACE OF CHANGE IN WASHINGTON CAN BE POSITIVELY GLACIAL.

WELL, WHAT DID THE PRESIDENT PROPOSE? WAS IT, AS THE EVER-CONSTRUCTIVE PRESS LABELLED IT, A STAR WARS FANTASY TO ORBIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SPACE? WAS IT AN ATTEMPT TO BRUSH OFF TRADITIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE HARD-SITE DEFENSE SYSTEMS AS IF THEY WERE SOMETHING NEW? OF COURSE NOT.

FIRST OF ALL, THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED NO SYSTEM AT ALL. HE PROPOSED A CONCEPT, ONE HE HAD LONG CHERISHED AND WHICH ONLY IN RECENT YEARS HAS TECHNOLOGY MADE FEASIBLE. IT WAS THE CONCEPT OF CREATING AT LONG LAST A STRATEGIC DEFENSE THAT NO LONGER RELIED ON RETALIATION FOR ITS EFFECTIVENESS. RATHER THAN ASKING US TO CONTINUE TO RELY ON THE THREAT OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION, A SITUATION THAT BECOMES MORE UNSTABLE EACH YEAR, HE OFFERED THE NATION THE HOPE OF A NEW STABILITY BASED ON, AS HE CALLED IT, RENDERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OBSOLETE. AND, MAY I ADD, I DON'T KNOW OF A SINGLE ONE OF US WHO HAS WORKED ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHO HASN'T WISHED FERVENTLY FOR JUST SUCH OBSOLESCENCE.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE SUCCESS OF SUCH AN APPROACH-- AND WE HAVE TO ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S ONGOING EFFORTS ALONG A SIMILAR DEVELOPMENT PATH HAVE AS GOOD A CHANCE TO BE SUCCESSFUL--WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO INCREASED EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

IT HAS NOW BEEN JUST A LITTLE OVER SIX MONTHS SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. A LOT HAS HAPPENED IN THAT TIME--MUCH OF IT CENTERED ON A HIGH-LEVEL PANEL, HEADED BY JIM FLETCHER, CHARGED WITH RECOMMENDING AN R&D PLAN TO CARRY OUT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL. AND A LOT MORE IS GOING TO HAPPEN.

WHEN THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS FIRST MADE, I WAS DISAPPOINTED, BUT NOT SURPRISED, AT THE VEHEMENT REACTIONS FROM SOME OF THE TRADITIONAL ARMS CONTROL ACTIVISTS. I WATCHED WITH SOME AMAZEMENT WHILE A COUPLE OF DOZEN OF THEM MARSHALLED LARGELY IRRELEVANT TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR MUTUAL ASSURED DEFENSE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THEY EMBRACED MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION AS THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE. THAT WAS REALLY LOGIC TURNED UPSIDE DOWN.

BUT I WAS MUCH MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE REACTION OF THE BROADER SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMMUNITY, UPON WHOM THE SUCCESS OF THIS NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY WOULD ULTIMATELY RIDE. THERE WAS, NOT UNEXPECTEDLY, STRONG SKEPTICISM, NOT ON IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDS, BUT MORE OF A PROVE-IT-TO-ME KIND. SO, I'M DELIGHTED TO FIND NOW THAT, AMONG THOSE TECHNICAL PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN PART OF OR OBSERVING THIS PROCESS OF TRYING TO DEFINE AN R&D PATH, MUCH OF THAT INITIAL SKEPTICISM HAS GIVEN WAY TO

CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO REACH THE PRESIDENT'S OBJECTIVE.

THE BASIS FOR THAT OPTIMISM IS THE TREMENDOUS TECHNICAL PROGRESS OVER THE PAST DECADE AND, IN SEVERAL AREAS, OVER THE PAST YEAR OR SO. CONSIDER THE KIND OF PROGRESS WE'VE BEEN SEEING IN INFORMATION PROCESSING, WHICH WOULD BE A CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY FOR ANY FAST-RESPONSE SYSTEM. TEN YEARS AGO IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POINTLESS TO TALK ABOUT DATA TRANSFER RATES OF, SAY, A GIGAHERTZ PER SECOND. OUR HIGH-SPEED PROCESSING CAPABILITIES WERE RELATIVELY RUDIMENTARY. THEN, WE WEREN'T EVEN THINKING OF ANYTHING AS AMBITIOUS AS A 16K KAM. NOW WE SEE THAT FOR THE PAST YEAR THE PHONE COMPANY HAS BEEN INSTALLING 256K KAMS IN THE FIELD, AND ADVENTUROUS RESEARCH GROUPS ARE ALREADY TALKING ABOUT HAVING A 4 MEGABIT KAM AVAILABLE WITHIN A FEW YEARS. THESE KINDS OF JUMPS IN DATA PROCESSING CAN CHANGE A TECHNOLOGY VERY QUICKLY.

WE'VE ALSO SEEN TRULY REMARKABLE ADVANCES IN OUR ABILITY TO USE SATELLITES FOR NAVIGATION, FOR COMMUNICATIONS, AND FOR RECONNAISSANCE. AT THE SAME TIME WE KNOW OF DEFENSIVE MEANS TO PROTECT THESE KINDS OF VULNERABLE, SPACE-DEPLOYED ASSETS.

RECENT ADVANCES THAT COMPENSATE FOR ATMOSPHERIC

DISPERSION IN LASER BEAMS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ADAPTIVE OPTICS--MIRRORS THAT CAN BE POINTED ELECTROMECHANICALLY LIKE PHASED-ARRAY RADARS--COULD PERMIT OPERATION OF HIGH-POWER SPACE LASERS, BUT ON THE GROUND. THAT COULD PERMIT US EASIER OPERATION AND PROTECTION OF COMPLEX, EXPENSIVE COMPONENTS. WE'RE ALSO SEEING GOOD PROGRESS IN USING ULTRASHORT LASER PULSES TO CREATE DAMAGE QUICKLY BY IMPULSE RATHER THAN THROUGH THE THERMAL EFFECTS OF SLOWER-ACTING;CONTINUOUS BEAMS.

THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN RECENT ADVANCES IN TRADITIONAL NON-NUCLEAR TERMINAL BMD TECHNOLOGY THAT WE BELIEVE MAY BE EXTRAPOLATED TO THE NEEDS OF A MID-COURSE INTERCEPT SYSTEM.

SO IT'S THESE AND OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THAT HAVE BREATHED VITALITY INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF A WORKABLE STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEM. NOW THE FLETCHER PANEL--THE GROUP PUTTING TOGETHER THE LONG-TERM R&D PLAN--HAS CONCLUDED THAT WE CAN NOW PROJECT THE TECHNOLOGY--EVEN THOUGH IT HASN'T BEEN DEMONSTRATED YET--TO DEVELOP A DEFENSE SYSTEM THAT COULD DRASTICALLY REDUCE THE THREAT OF ATTACK BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS--NOT ONLY TODAY'S, BUT THOSE THAT COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO BE DEVELOPED TO COUNTER SUCH A DEFENSE SYSTEM. THIS WOULD BE A MULTI-TIERED ARRAY, PROBABLY DESIGNED TO RESPOND FIRST TO BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE BOOST PHASE, SECOND TO

MID-COURSE VEHICLES, AND THIRD TO VEHICLES DURING REENTRY INTO THE ATMOSPHERE.

NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE R&D PROGRAM THAT'S FINALLY ADOPTED WILL HAVE A FUNDING IMPACT. SOME OF THE MONEY TO CONDUCT IT WILL COME FROM NEW FUNDS, BUT SOME WILL ALSO COME FROM SHIFTING FUNDS OUT OF EXISTING R&D PROGRAMS. OUR GOAL NOW IS TO KEEP BUILDING MOMENTUM FOR THE PROGRAM AND TO BUILD NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORT, IN ORDER TO ATTRACT THE BEST TALENT TO A FORMIDABLE BUT WORTHY GOAL.

MY FEELING IS THAT IT'S LIKELY TO TAKE FIVE OR SIX YEARS OF R&D TO BRING US TO THE POINT WHERE WE CAN MAKE THE CRITICAL DECISIONS ABOUT DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING ACTUAL SYSTEMS. ALTHOUGH THERE WILL BE UNDERSTANDABLE TEMPTATIONS--AND PRESSURES--TO MOVE QUICKLY TO NEAR-TERM DEPLOYMENT OF WHATEVER IS THE BEST TECHNOLOGY WE HAVE AVAILABLE, IT'S IMPORTANT TO GIVE THE R&D A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME TO EXPLORE SOME OF THE LESS WELL-DEVELOPED TECHNICAL OPTIONS.

FOR EXAMPLE, I WOULD HATE TO SEE PARTICLE BEAMS RULED OUT PREMATURELY SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY AREN'T AS WELL DEVELOPED AS, SAY, CHEMICAL OR EXCIMER LASERS. AND OTHER POSSIBILITIES, SUCH AS FREE-ELECTRON AND BOMB-PUMPED

LASERS, ARE AT EVEN EARLIER STAGES AND STILL NEED TO HAVE THEIR BASIC TECHNOLOGIES DEMONSTRATED BEFORE THEIR POSSIBLE ROLES COULD EVEN BE ASSESSED.

INCIDENTALLY, I WOULD MAKE ONE THING VERY CLEAR: I DON'T SEE A CRITICAL ROLE IN THIS DEFENSE INITIATIVE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PER SE. FIRST OF ALL, I'M NOT SURE THAT THE USES PROPOSED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SPACE COULDN'T BE PERFORMED WITH NON-NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES. MORE IMPORTANT, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE NOT LIKELY TO ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORT THE PLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SPACE. BUT TO RETURN TO MY THOUGHT--BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO GIVE THESE NASCENT TECHNOLOGIES A CHANCE TO UNFOLD, I SEE THE 1980'S AS THE KEY TIME FOR WEIGHING THE FEASIBILITY OF A VARIETY OF APPROACHES TO STRATEGIC DEFENSE.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE TO GUARD AGAINST THE OTHER UNDERSTANDABLE TENDENCY OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS TO BECOME SO FASCINATED WITH THE RESEARCH PROCESS THAT WE NEVER GET OUT OF THE LABORATORY STAGE. TO PREVENT THAT WE HAVE TO KEEP PRESSURE ON THE R&D PROGRAM TO MOVE TO CLOSURE. MY OWN PREFERENCE IS TO PLAN FOR A NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY. BY THAT I DON'T MEAN DEPLOYMENT OF A PIECE OF A SYSTEM, BUT RATHER SOME PERIODIC VISIBLE PROOF OF PROGRESS--NEAR-TERM DEMONSTRATIONS OF MILITARILY MEANINGFUL SYSTEMS.

I CAN SUGGEST AN EXAMPLE. IT'S CERTAINLY POSSIBLE, THOUGH BY NO MEANS CERTAIN, THAT AN EVENTUAL SYSTEM COULD EMPLOY A HIGH-POWER GROUND-BASED EXCIMER LASER. I'VE ALREADY SUGGESTED THE REASONS FOR WANTING SUCH A DEVICE. BASED ON THE TECHNICAL PROGRESS TO DATE, WE MIGHT SET AS A GOAL THE DEMONSTRATION OF A MULTI-MEGAWATT PULSED LASER WHOSE BEAM IS CORRECTED FOR ATMOSPHERIC DISTORTIONS. MAYBE SOMETHING POWERFUL ENOUGH TO ACT AS AN ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPON, MAYBE EVEN STRONG ENOUGH TO BE EFFECTIVE AS FAR AWAY AS GEOSYNCHRONOUS ALTITUDES. I THINK WE COULD DO THAT BEFORE THE DECADE IS OUT.

NOW, SUCH A DEMONSTRATION WOULD NOT DEMONSTRATE A WORKABLE ABM SYSTEM. BUT, QUITE FRANKLY, IF I WERE A SOVIET PLANNER, I WOULD QUICKLY PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER AND REALIZE THAT AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE TECHNOLOGY FOR AN ABM SYSTEM WAS WELL IN HAND AND THAT DEVELOPMENT WAS MORE A MATTER OF TIME THAN BREAKTHROUGHS AT THAT POINT. SUCH A DEMONSTRATION WOULD PRESSURE THE SOVIETS TO TAKE OUR ARMS REDUCTIONS PROPOSALS MUCH MORE SERIOUSLY THAN THEY DO NOW. ALTHOUGH THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAM'S GOAL WOULD STILL BE EVENTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF A WORKING SYSTEM, WE SHOULDN'T OVERLOOK ITS POTENTIAL BENEFICIAL IMPACTS ON ARMS REDUCTIONS AS IT PROGRESSES.

WELL THEN, HOW ARE WE GOING TO MOBILIZE THE TECHNICAL

SKILLS AND RESOURCES WE NEED TO CARRY OUT THIS AMBITIOUS PROGRAM? OR MORE TO YOUR INTEREST, HOW AND WHERE DOES U.S. INDUSTRY FIT INTO THIS NEW DEFENSE INITIATIVE?

AT THIS POINT I WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT THE SITUATION IS STILL QUITE FLUID. BUT IN ANY CASE WE INTEND TO CAST AS BROAD A NET AS POSSIBLE BY ESTABLISHING A COMPETITIVE PROGRAM OPEN TO ANY INTERESTED PARTICIPANTS. WE'LL RESPOND TO GOOD IDEAS, CREDIBLE PROPOSALS, AND GOOD PEOPLE. MY STRONG HOPE IS THAT WE'LL ATTRACT CREATIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND BRIGHT YOUNG PEOPLE INTO THIS DEFENSE INITIATIVE, PERHAPS PEOPLE WHO MIGHT NOT HAVE EVEN CONSIDERED DEFENSE WORK BEFORE.

WHEN YOU CONSIDER THE KIND OF TALENT THAT FLOCKED TO DEFENSE WORK IN THE FORTIES AND FIFTIES, YOU REALIZE THAT TODAY WE REALLY TAP AN INADEQUATE AMOUNT OF THE NATION'S IMMENSE BRAINPOWER TO WORK ON ITS DEFENSE. I HAVE SOME HOPES THAT WE MAY SEE THAT CHANGE.

I SAID EARLIER THAT I WAS FINDING A MARKED SHIFT IN ATTITUDES AMONG THE TECHNICAL PEOPLE WHO HAVE BECOME INVOLVED IN THIS PLANNING STAGE. I THINK, AS THE PROGRAM EVOLVES, OTHER PEOPLE ARE GOING TO START TO REALIZE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, AND THE PLAN TO ACHIEVE IT, OFFER A WAY TO GET OFF THE RUNAWAY HORSE OF

MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION. I SEE IT NOT ONLY AS RESPONDING TO THE SAME KINDS OF SENTIMENTS AND CONCERNS THAT DRIVE THE NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT--THAT IS, A REALIZATION OF THE INCREASING INSTABILITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENTS--BUT ALSO AS A LOT MORE REALISTIC WAY TO ACHIEVE AN EVEN MORE DESIRABLE END RESULT.

AFTER ALL, THIS PLAN DOESN'T STOP AT FREEZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR EVEN REDUCING THEM TO SOME LOWER, BUT STILL DEADLY RETALIATORY LEVEL. IN PRECISE TERMS IT OFFERS A WAY TO STOP AN ATTACK AFTER IT BEGINS BUT BEFORE IT CAN REACH US. MORE TO THE POINT, IN PRACTICAL TERMS IT REMOVES THE PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK OPTION FROM THE MILITARY PLANNERS. IF THAT MEANS OUR WORST DISPUTES MAY THEN FORCE A RESORT TO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, THEN WE'LL HAVE MOVED A LONG WAY TOWARD ASSURING HUMAN SURVIVAL.

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