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~~AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL~~ FOUNDATION
NATIONAL SECURITY SPEAKERS BUREAU
BOSTON, VIRGINIA 22713 • (703) 825-1776

ANN KRUGER
Director

August 31, 1983

Mr. Morton Blackwell
Assistant to the President for Public Liaison
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Blackwell:

Please accept my grateful thanks to you for your courtesy and hospitality to our Speakers Bureau seminar on Central America when we met Friday afternoon in the Indian Treaty Room.

We are deeply grateful for the most informative briefing which we received. Without exception, each of the participants expressed their delight with the content of the presentation.

Hopefully the thanks which was expressed by individual speakers will be reflected in many informed lectures to grass roots American audiences. I trust the efforts of Dolf Droge, Ambassador Douglas, Mr. Ikle, and Mssrs. Matthews and Romero will be repaid in that manner.


Thank you for providing this opportunity!

Sincerely,



Ann Kruger, Director
National Security Speakers Bureau

AK/bp



MEMO

*file Am
Security
Council*

TO: Mr. Richard Allen
Assistant to the President
National Security Affairs

Mr. Max Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President
Legislative Affairs

Ms. Diana Lozana
Special Assistant to the President
Deputy Director of Public Liason

FROM: Rick Sellers

RE: White House Meeting for Organizations and Associations Supporting AWACS

DATE: October 26, 1981

Per our telephone conversation this morning, I would like to propose that there be a meeting with the President at the White House with representation of the groups that support the AWACS sale, particularly those groups that have signed our telegram to all one hundred Senators delivered Friday, October 23, 1981.

A meeting like this is very important for the following reasons.

- (1) During the next three days before the final AWACS vote on Wednesday, the President needs to gain some attention for the support throughout this country for the AWACS sale. Otherwise, the President's briefing eighteen Senators in individual meetings before the Wednesday vote could be perceived as just "arm twisting." If the wide base of support is not highly publicized, the White House will be losing one of its major assets.
- (2) Thirty-four organizations have already signed the telegram sent to all one hundred Senators last Friday. In addition to these groups a "Dear Colleague" was sent out by Senator Jeremiah Denton to all one hundred Senators listing some additional organizations that are not on the telegram, such as, Air Force Association and American Legion.
- (3) Business groups have been working very closely with the White House and have gained high visibility, but the national security interest of the United States is not perceived just because there is about \$35 billion in business for U.S. firms in Saudi Arabia. A wider show of support is necessary before the final vote on Wednesday.
- (4) The opponents to the AWACS sale so far are mainly organizations with grassroots support, not businesses. This type of opposition to the AWACS sale needs to be offset by the great number of groups that represent millions of Americans who are for the AWACS sale.

- (5) A meeting at the White House preferably early on Tuesday morning, October 27, 1981 would let these organizations know of the President's support which means the leaders of these organizations could become even more active in the final two days before the vote on Wednesday.
- (6) Many of the conservative and moderate Senators that are now undecided on this issue need to be informed through the national press of the great grassroots support for the AWACS sale.
- (7) Since the comments made by leaders of the organizations for AWACS after the meeting with the President is most important for "good" press coverage, I would suggest a select group of the largest organizations with individuals attending who are very articulate on this issue. A meeting in the Oval Office would have more impact.
- (8) Since we have initiated both the telegram and Senator Denton's "Dear Colleague" and have worked very closely with these organizations, I would be very happy to work the remainder of today and tomorrow on helping you arrange this very important meeting with the President.

1-0035020290-000 10/23/81 ICS JHMLANA WSH PCMT
10142 MGX WASHINGTON DC 486 10-22
618P EDT 08149 EST



Telegram

HON JEREMIAH DENTON
SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM 5327
WASHINGTON DC 20510

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED LEADERS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, URGE EACH UNITED STATES SENATOR TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE AWACS 'PACKAGE' SALE.

WE ARE CONVINCED FOR DIFFERING, YET COMPELLING, REASONS THAT THIS SALE IS IN THE WIDE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.


WE NOTE THAT, IF THE SENATE TURNS DOWN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, THE SAUDIS WILL PURCHASE AN AIRBORNE RADAR PACKAGE ELSEWHERE. WE FURTHER NOTE THAT SUCH AN 'ELSEWHERE' PURCHASE WOULD DIMINISH BOTH OUR LONG TERM SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. WE WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY 'SIDE-LINED,' WATCHING EVENTS OVER WHICH WE HAD NO CONTROL.

FINALLY, WE NOTE THE UNGRUDGING BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR THE AWACS SALE BY ALL THREE LIVING EX-PRESIDENTS, ALL SIX LIVING EX-SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE, ALL FIVE LIVING EX-PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS, TWO FORMER SECRETARIES OF STATE, AND ALL THREE LIVING FORMER CHAIRMEN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

FEW VOTES YOU WILL EVER CAST AS A U.S. SENATOR WILL BE SO IRREVERSIBLY SIGNIFICANT.

WE CALL UPON YOU TO CAST A VOTE SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

COLONEL PHILIP C COX SECRETARY
AMERICAN COALITION OF PATRIOTIC SOCIETIES
BRIG GEN ROBERT RICHARDSON USA (RET)
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE
MR W L GLEESON PRESIDENT
AMERICAN FREEDOM NETWORK
MR ED SAJOVIC PRESIDENT
AMERICAN MILITARY RETIREES ASSOCIATION INC
MR JOHN M FISHER PRESIDENT
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL
NATIONAL COMMANDER DONALD R RUSSELL
AMVETS
ADMIRAL THOMAS MOORER USN (RET)
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD ASSOCIATION OF NAVAL AVIATION INC
MR CLAY CLAIBORNE NATIONAL DIRECTOR



Telegram

BLACK SILENT MAJORITY COMMITTEE
 MR GARY POTTER PRESIDENT
 CATHOLICS FOR CHRISTIAN POLITICAL ACTION
 MS KAREN MCKAY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
 COMMITTEE FOR A FREE AFGHANISTAN
 LADY MALCOLM DOUGLAS-HAMILTON PRESIDENT
 CITIZENS FOR FREEDOM COMMITTEE TO UNITE AMERICA
 MS CONNIE MARSHNER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
 COALITIONS FOR AMERICA
 MR MACK STERLING EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
 CONFEDERATE AIRFORCE
 MR RALPH J GALLIANO CHAIRMAN
 CONGRESSIONAL MAJORITY COMMITTEE
 MR GREG HILTON EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
 CONSERVATIVE VICTORY FUND
 MR L FRANCIS BOUCHEY EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
 COUNCIL FOR INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY
 MS PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY PRESIDENT
 EAGLE FORUM
 MR ROBERT HECKMAN CHAIRMAN
 FUND FOR A CONSERVATIVE MAJORITY
 MS MARTHA ROUNDTREE
 PRESIDENT LEADERSHIP ACTION
 MR J A PARKER
 THE LINCOLN INSTITUTE
 MR CY KAMMEIER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
 MARINE CORPS LEAGUE
 GENERAL C M TALBOTT USA (RET)
 CHIEF OF STAFF MILITARY ORDER OF THE WORLD WARS
 LT GEN OREN E HURBUT USA (RET)
 CHAIRMAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR UNIFORMED SERVICES
 MR BILL BILLINGS PRESIDENT
 NATIONAL CHRISTIAN ACTION COALITION
 MS CARY STEADMAN ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
 NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL
 REAR ADMIRAL PHILLIP W SMITH USNR
 PRESIDENT NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION
 MS JOAN HEUTER
 PUBLIC RELATIONS CHAIRMAN PRO-AMERICA
 CHIEF ENGINEER JOE WASSON
 RESERVE ENLISTED ASSOCIATION
 MAJOR GENERAL MILNOR ROBERTS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
 RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
 AMBASSADOR ELBRIDGE DURBROW PRESIDENT
 SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE FUND
 MR JOHN HVASTA
 SECRETARY GENERAL AMERICAN COMMITTEE
 SLOVAK WORLD CONGRESS
 WARRANT OFFICER DONALD HESS
 EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT US ARMY WARRANT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
 MR ARTHUR FELLWOCK NATIONAL COMMANDER
 VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS



Telegram

MR BRADFORD PETERSON
NATIONAL VICE CHAIRMAN
▶ YOUNG AMERICANS FOR FREEDOM
MR RON ROBINSON PRESIDENT
YOUNG AMERICA'S FOUNDATION

08149 EST

IPMPOMX WSH

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

23 October 1981

Dear Howell:

As we approach the critical decision on the proposed AWACS sale, I am concerned that there remain what I regard as misconceptions about the advantages and disadvantages, and the risks or lack of risks, involved in this proposal.

I am particularly concerned and dismayed that several of my colleagues still believe that we face an unreasonable risk of potentially transferring highly classified technology to the Soviet bloc or others not friendly to the Free World. Everything in my training and experience, and my past and present knowledge of this subject, tells me that the risks involved in technology transfer are minimal and need not be a factor in our decision.

Moreover, at this critical juncture in the overall situation in the Mideast, I am very disturbed about the long range foreign policy implications if we fail to provide to our friends in the region the tools with which they can protect themselves, while at the same time helping to protect our own interests there without adverse consequences to the State of Israel.

With respect to oil supplies, we risk setting in motion a chain of events that could bring our economy to its knees. Substantial increases in unemployment and consumer prices at the gas pump, not to mention a return to gas lines, would perhaps represent the least part of the economic impact. This prospect alone should be sufficient reason for intense soul-searching before a final decision is made.

This is not and must not be a partisan issue. We must use this decision as a stepping stone to re-establish the type of strong bipartisan foreign policy that we enjoyed during World II and for almost two decades thereafter.

I strongly urge you to vote against S. Con. Res. 37.

For your information, I am enclosing a list of some of the major organizations across the nation now supporting this sale. This reinforces the endorsement by the bipartisan group of distinguished men who have served in this country's top national security and diplomatic posts.

Respectfully,

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senator

Honorable Howell Heflin
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Veterans of Foreign Wars
American Legion
Reserve Officers Association
American Security Council
Air Force Association
Young Americans for Freedom
Naval Reserve Association
Eagle Forum
Marine Corps League
U. S. Army Warrant Officers Association
The Lincoln Institute
Reserved Enlisted Association
Association of Naval Aviation, Inc.
Military Order of the World Wars
National Association for Uniformed Services
American Military Retirees Association, Inc.
Catholics for Christian Political Action
Black Silent Majority Committee
Coalitions for America
Leadership Action
National Christian Action Coalition
Young America's Foundation
Fund for a Conservative Majority
Conservative Victory Fund
Pro-America
Security and Intelligence Fund
American Foreign Policy Institute
Congressional Majority Committee
Committee to Unite America
American Freedom Network
American Coalition of Patriotic Societies
Council for Inter-American Security
American Committee
National Defense Council
Confederate Airforce
Committee for a Free Afghanistan
Slovak World Congress

United States Senate

MEMORANDUM

Thought you might be interested in seeing this letter, directed to some of our other colleagues.

Jerry



COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

Program Secretariat: American Security Council
Educational Secretariat: American Security Council Foundation

February 19, 1982

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McDonnell Douglas Corporation
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The Committee to Unite America, Inc.
P.S. Heerema

Heerema Engineering (U.S.) Inc.
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Former Commander in Chief Pacific

*Adm. Thomas Moorer, USN (Ret.)
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
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Miss Martha Rountree,
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Prof. Edward Rozeck, Director

Institute for the Study of
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University of Colorado

Hon. Dan Schaefer
Member, Colorado State Senate
Mrs. Phyllis Schlotly, President

Eagle Forum
*Hon. William E. Simon
Former Secretary of the Treasury

Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, USA (Ret.)
Educational Field Director
American Security Council Foundation

Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
*Lt. Gen. C.M. Talbott
Chief of Staff
Military Order of the World Wars

Mrs. Helen Marie Taylor
*Prof. William R. Van Cleave, Director
Strategic and Security Studies Program,
University of Southern California

*Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
Chief U.S. Strategist, World War II

274 Members of Congress
belong to the Coalition
*Members of the
Executive Committee

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20550

Dear Mr. President:

We invite you to address by phone 275 Members of Congress on the occasion when they will each receive a "National Security Leadership Award" for their actions as Members of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength Caucus. The reception will be March 4, 1982 from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. in Room B223 of the Longworth House Office Building and will be chaired by Senator Paul Laxalt.

The reception will be sponsored by the United States Congressional Advisory Board which is part of the American Security Council Foundation which serves as the educational secretariat for the Coalition for Peace Through Strength Caucus.

Many Administration officials plus over 400 major contributors to this program will be attending the reception.

Since this will be the first time they have all been together in one place since your October 15, 1981 letter to me (enclosed), this would be a good opportunity to comment along the lines of the letter as a basis for inspiring them to be strongly supportive of your FY '83 defense budget and U.S. policy in Central America.

Warm regards,

Respectfully,

John M. Fisher
Chairman for Administration
(President
American Security Council)

Enclosure
JMF/dhm

Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

Dear John:

I am pleased to hear that 273 Senators and Representatives, a bipartisan majority of the Congress, have now joined the Coalition for Peace Through Strength Caucus. This is an important milestone in having the Resolution passed by both Houses of Congress.

I am also encouraged to hear that seven state legislatures have already passed the Resolution.

As an early member of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, I supported the Resolution, and it was incorporated as part of the 1980 Republican Platform.

Passage of the Resolution by both Houses will be a powerful symbol of bipartisan support for our national security programs, which are designed to restore the margin of safety to our military power.

I assure you that I will sign the Resolution after it is passed by Congress and look forward to hearing of the Coalition's continuing good works.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Mr. John Fisher
President
American Security Council
Boston, Virginia 22713

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA:

Schedule:

Monday: December 7

Visited with Senator Kassenbaum and Senator Chris Dodd
Lunch hosted by the American Security Council
Visited with Congressman Phil Gramm
Reception hosted by the American Security Council

Tuesday: December 8

Visited with the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs,
Department of Defense - Francis West
Spoke before the Ad Hoc Committee of veterans and defense related
organizations
Visited with Senator Tower
Met with Congressman Stratton and the staffers of other Congressmen
in the House Caucus Room
Met with Secretary of State, Alexander Haig
Reception hosted by the Washington Foreign Affairs Club

Wednesday: December 9

Visited with Senator Zorinsky, Senator Nunn, and Senator Jackson
Met with the Senate Steering Committee for lunch and spoke to this group

Will meet with Congressman Wolpe, House Committee on Africa
Will go to a reception hosted by the Heritage Foundation at the
Hyatt Regency Hotel

Thursday: December 10

Will have a press briefing

Will address a special luncheon arranged by Cong. Bill Dickinson
at the Capitol with the following people present:

Majority and Minority Whip
Chairmen and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee and
the Foreign Affairs Committee
the 12 most senior members of the Armed Services Committee
Leaving in afternoon to go to New York city to be interviewed
on the Lehrer - Mac Neill report

Friday: December 11

Will address a luncheon hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations
Will return to Washington in the afternoon

Saturday and Sunday - He will be in Washington

Monday: December 14

He will be in St. Louis

Tuesday: December 15

He will be back in Washington

Wednesday: December 16

He would like to return home , but he can stay this extra day if needed

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

John Fisher has spoken with:

Bud Nance - he feels that Savimbi should be treated as a
visiting head of state

Fred Wedering - NSC for African Affairs and Fisher calls him
every day to let him know where Savimbi has been

Dick Allen - who said "Keep pushing"

Jim Lyon - a Republican Eagle and a friend of Jim Baker's -
has called Jim Baker

Tony Makros of the American Security Council has spoken with
Thad Garrett of the Vice-President's staff who has volunteered
to help and he is trying to arrange a meeting between
Garrett and Savimbi this afternoon

Fisher is arranging for Senators and Congressmen to send letters
to the President urging a meeting

Fisher said Al Haig said that he was against having the President
meet with Savimbi

*Jesse Helms + Paul Lafayette have called with
Senators' signatures going well*

MEMORANDUM

DRAFT

*newer
Sent up*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

December 10, 1981

TO: GREGORY J. NEWELL, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: ELIZABETH H. DOLE

REQUEST: To meet with Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA

PURPOSE: ? - *I don't know what to put*

BACKGROUND: This request has come from the following constituent groups: American Security Council, VFW, Reserve Officers Association, and College Republicans. All these groups have been very supportive of the Administration. They feel that a meeting with the President would be a powerful signal of America's commitment to freedom, and the majority of Americans would be encouraged to see this practical step toward achieving the President's goal of resisting the expansion of Soviet influence.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION:

shall I mention his meetings of the kind

DATE: Tuesday, December 15

LOCATION: Oval Office

DURATION: 30 minutes

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Private conversation

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

RECOMMENDED BY: Elizabeth H. Dole, ? Thad Garrett - VPO
? Bud Nance - NSC

OPPOSED BY: Secretary of State Alexander Haig

PROJECT OFFICER: Morton Blackwell



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

THE COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

John M. Fisher
President

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USA (Ret.)

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Asa E. Phillips, Jr.
Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Brig. Gen. R. C. Richardson, III,
USAF (Ret.)

Ira G. Ross
Vice Adm. W. A. Schoech, USN (Ret.)
Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub
USA (Ret.)

Prof. Raymond S. Sleeper
Maj. Gen. Dale D. Smith, USAF (Ret.)
Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
Harvey E. Stoehr
Dr. A. B. Suttle
Dr. Edward Teller
John B. Traver, Jr.
Gen. Lewis W. Walt, USMC (Ret.)
Dr. Kenneth M. Watson
Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer
USA (Ret.)

Gen. I. D. White, USA (Ret.)
Dr. Eugene P. Wigner
Harvey Williams

December 9, 1981

Mr. Morton Blackwell
Public Liaison
The White House
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Morton:

I have enclosed a letter to the President requesting an audience for Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA.

I am forwarding it through you because you have the liaison responsibility with organizations like those I am representing in making this request.

Best Regards,

Sincerely,

John M. Fisher
President

Enclosure
JMF:dhm

Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

THE COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

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USA (Ret.)

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Prof. Raymond S. Sleeper
Maj. Gen. Dale O. Smith, USAF (Ret.)
Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
Harvey E. Stoehr
Dr. A. B. Suttle
Dr. Edward Teller
John B. Trevor, Jr.
Gen. Lewis W. Walt, USMC (Ret.)
Dr. Kenneth M. Watson
Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer
USA (Ret.)

Gen. I. D. White, USA (Ret.)
Dr. Eugene P. Wigner
Harvey Williams

December 9, 1981

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the 121 national organizations in the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, I respectfully request that you meet with Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, while he is in the United States.

A half-hour meeting would be a powerful signal of America's commitment to freedom. This would be especially important to:

- 1) those African leaders who are pro-Savimbi in private but need such public evidence of United States' support before going public themselves,
- 2) other countries which are now considering whether to give financial support to UNITA, and
- 3) the majority of Americans who would be encouraged to see this practical step toward achieving President Reagan's goal of resisting the expansion of Soviet influence.

We believe that Dr. Savimbi is the foremost freedom-fighter against Soviet expansion. Thus, how the Administration treats him will be seen by history as the watershed decision as to whether UNITA and America will be successful in defending and expanding freedom.

Leaders of member organizations such as the VFW and the Reserve Officers Association believe that what you decide will be far more important than was President Ford's decision on whether or not to meet with Alexander Solzenitzen.

Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713


President Ronald Reagan
December 9, 1981
Page Two

As Dr. Savimbi's Washington host, we know that he will be here through December 15.

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For this reason, I respectfully suggest that, win or lose, tomorrow would be the perfect timing for you to meet with Dr. Savimbi.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "John". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the printed name and title.

John M. Fisher
President

JMF:dhm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1981

TO: GREGORY J. NEWELL, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: Morton Blackwell *MB*

RE: Request from American Security Council for
a meeting between Dr. Jonas Savimbi and the
President

Thanks for your advice on the Savimbi matter.

Attached is the correspondence from John Fisher of the American Security Council and my response to him.

Since Secretary Haig opposes a Savimbi meeting with the President at this time, this appears to be the appropriate action.



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

THE COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

John M. Fisher
President

Directors

Gus A. Buder, Jr.
Stephen L. Donchess
John M. Fisher
Steven R. Fisher
A. B. McKee, Jr.
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Maj. Gen. Milnor Roberts, USAR
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Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, USAF (Ret.)
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Anthony Harrigan
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Gen. Lewis W. Walt, USMC (Ret.)
Dr. Kenneth M. Watson
Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer
USA (Ret.)

Gen. I. D. White, USA (Ret.)
Dr. Eugene P. Wigner
Harvey Williams

December 9, 1981

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the 121 national organizations in the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, I respectfully request that you meet with Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, while he is in the United States.

A half-hour meeting would be a powerful signal of America's commitment to freedom. This would be especially important to:

- 1) those African leaders who are pro-Savimbi in private but need such public evidence of United States' support before going public themselves,
- 2) other countries which are now considering whether to give financial support to UNITA, and
- 3) the majority of Americans who would be encouraged to see this practical step toward achieving President Reagan's goal of resisting the expansion of Soviet influence.

We believe that Dr. Savimbi is the foremost freedom-fighter against Soviet expansion. Thus, how the Administration treats him will be seen by history as the watershed decision as to whether UNITA and America will be successful in defending and expanding freedom.

Leaders of member organizations such as the VFW and the Reserve Officers Association believe that what you decide will be far more important than was President Ford's decision on whether or not to meet with Alexander Solzenitzen.

Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713


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December 9, 1981
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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "John".

John M. Fisher
President

JMF:dhm

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 10, 1981

Dear John:

I've been asked to respond in behalf of the President to your letter of December 9th. It does not appear that the President's schedule will permit a visit with Dr. Savimbi during his current visit to the United States.

I want to take this opportunity to personally congratulate you for your successful efforts in scheduling Dr. Savimbi with so many of the "movers and shakers" in Washington, D.C.

Dr. Savimbi is a courageous, tenacious man whose country suffers occupation by Castro's army.

I am sorry that the President's schedule won't permit the meeting you requested.

Cordially,



Morton C. Blackwell
Special Assistant to the President

Mr. John Fisher
President
American Security Council
499 South Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20003

THE HIGH FRONTIER

Daniel O. Graham

Americans have always been good at dealing with the challenges of a new frontier. And it doesn't matter whether that frontier is on the ground, at sea or in the air. Today that new frontier is the High Frontier--space--and it offers to the United States and to our Free World Allies the opportunity to reverse the adverse and menacing trends of the times that beset us.

It is well within the capabilities of essentially on-the-shelf U.S. technology to reverse (and reverse quickly) four of today's troublesome world trends--the strategic military balance, the over-reliance of the Free World on diminishing and vulnerable oil sources, the intractable problems of the underdeveloped nations and the malaise of spirit in the West. We can, with a bold application of superior U.S. space technology, at least rearrange all these strategic factors in a pattern favorable to the Free World. Furthermore, these vital changes can be wrought in less time, with lower costs, and with far greater U.S. and Allied public support than can any strategic alternatives available.

We are driven toward space for strategic solutions by the march of history. From the dawn of modern civilization, as man's activities moved from the land to the coastal seas, then to the high seas, then into the air, those nations which first projected their military capabilities into those new realms of human activity reaped enormous advantages.

Several thousand years ago, all military capabilities were land-bound, as were almost all human activities. When man's enterprise and technology moved much of this transportation, communications and commerce to the coastal seas, an imperative arose to project military power into the same:

arena. Those societies which did so first achieved military preeminence. Some were quite small societies which became so expert in projecting power in coastal seas that they came to control vast territories, e.g., the Phoenicians and the Vikings.

In the late fifteenth century the scope of human activity expanded to the high seas. Again, those countries which first projected military power to the oceans became great strategic powers for the ensuing three centuries. Spain and Portugal were first to do so with spectacular results; they were followed by the British, who established a century of Pax Brittanica.

The next thrust of expanded human activity, at the beginning of the twentieth century, was into the air. The Germans, British and Americans most effectively projected military power into this new medium of communications and commerce. Thirty years of unchallengeable strategic superiority and security resulted from American progress in the projection of military power into the world's atmospheric envelope. The U.S. development of nuclear weapons enhanced this strategic advantage in airpower, but was not fundamental to it. The strategic advantage of superior airpower would have pertained if nuclear weapons had never been fashioned.

The High Ground of Space

Today, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, an increasingly critical segment of human and military activity has moved into space. Massive investments have been made by several nations in spaceborne communications, information-gathering and exploration. Space represents the probable long-term answer to certain resource shortages, especially energy. And the most impressive means for projecting military power globally--long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads--must traverse space to reach their targets.

One can readily sense the analogies between man's thrust from the coastal to the high seas and the unfolding thrust from the peripheral envelope of the atmosphere into the "high seas" of space. More important, however, is the need to recognize the inexorable pressures this puts upon contending world powers to establish strategic dominion in the new medium. As matters stand today in terms of technological and resource availability, either the United States or the USSR will eventually establish strategic superiority in space. Soviet activities, especially their development of satellite kill capabilities, indicate a determination to win that race for military dominion.

We must answer this historical challenge and we can. With vigorous presidential support and a Manhattan Project-type of executive management we can establish in five to ten years on the High Frontier of space the equivalent of the British merchantmen and men-of-war which on the high seas assured a century of Pax Britannica.

The military side of this analogy consists of two types of relatively inexpensive spacecraft which provide the United States with a capability to attack and destroy hostile objects in space, most importantly Soviet strategic missiles. The non-military or "merchantmen" side of the analogy consists of solar power satellites capable of delivering an inexhaustible and steady supply of energy to any spot on earth.

The two systems in combination would produce profound strategic effects on our major global problems.

In the military sphere, the space-borne global ballistic missile defense would destroy both the political and military effectiveness of the Soviet advantage in first-strike nuclear offensive weaponry, that is their superior ICBM force. This would obviate the necessity for the MPS MX deployment. Long before the complete BMD system was deployed, any Soviet assurance of an effective first strike against the U.S. deterrent force would begin to deteriorate. While the proposed military system is

independent of development success in space-borne laser technology, the defensive capability could be greatly enhanced downstream by laser weaponry.

Possibly the most important effect of the global ballistic missile defense would be the escape from the perpetual balance-of-terror imposed by the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine. It would restore to U.S. military strategy a long-neglected balance between offense and defense. It would drive both the U.S. and the Soviets toward Mutual Assured Survival, a far more stable situation than that which now prevails. Ironically, the adoption of this high-technology, non-nuclear defense option by the United States would do more to check the urge on both sides to amass even greater nuclear offensive power than have any of the arms control negotiations to date.

The solar power satellite program (which lends itself to an International effort of the NATO variety) would not only reduce the dangerous and disruptive reliance of the Free World on fossil fuels, but would provide an enormous boon to underdeveloped countries. Third World nations could be provided with the energy to effect rural electrification and hence agricultural revolution without the necessity of creating first the roads, ports, power plants and other infrastructure. All that would be required is the receiving antenna and power lines. The antenna, quite incidentally, can be constructed so as to provide a very large greenhouse for year-round growing. The U.S. and its Allies could offer enormous benefits to the underdeveloped nations in return for an unimpeded flow of critical raw materials and political cooperation.

Thus these space programs attack the issues of military security, energy supply, and the hitherto intractable problems of the Third World. And this without proliferating nuclear power or risking major capital investments in unstable nations. But perhaps most important is the potential impact on the malaise of spirit in the West. A commitment to

these bold initiatives can reinstill a sense of optimism and high purpose in the American body politic and in those of our Allies as well. The effects of a rejuvenation of spirit will occur almost immediately, long before the programs produce the security and energy they promise. The United States will be seen again as a pragmatic, resourceful yet altruistic leader of the Free World and the ramifications of such a new attitude can scarcely be overstated.

We have already built a "railroad" to the High Frontier, the Space Shuttle system. Now is the time to use that blazed trail to the maximum immediate benefit of the nation.

TOWARD A NEW U.S. STRATEGY: BOLD STROKES RATHER THAN INCREMENTS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL O. GRAHAM, USA (Ret.)



THE AUTHOR: General Graham is Director of Special Projects of the American Security Council, and served as a national security advisor to Ronald Reagan during the 1976 and 1980 campaigns. After his retirement in 1976 as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, he was Research Professor at the Center for International Studies of the University of Miami from 1976 to 1978. He is the author of *Shall America Be Defended: SALT II and Beyond* (1980).

IN BRIEF

The Secretary of Defense's budget recommendations, while reflecting a realistic view of the depth of America's strategic predicament, also mirror the limitations of a "much-more-of-the-same" approach. There is the distinct danger that even massive infusions of money, poured into the old categories of military programs, could eventually leave the United States in a strategically worse position relative to the Soviet Union. The trouble is that the old U.S. strategic assumptions, although by now thoroughly discredited, have not been replaced by a new strategic framework. What is urgently called for is a strategy of bold strokes rather than increments. A space-based ballistic missile defense offers a salient example of such a bold stroke.

The debate over U.S. defense expenditures is in full swing. Secretary of Defense Weinberger has evinced an encouragingly realistic view of the intensifying threat to the United States, its allies and its global interests, and has recommended a \$222 billion defense budget for Fiscal Year 1982. Those who for years have been decrying the abject decay in the U.S. military posture in the face of an intolerable growth of Soviet military advantages must rejoice at these harbingers of serious and determined concern at the top levels of the U.S. Government. There is little room to doubt that the new Administration intends to

fulfill the popular mandate handed to it last November to reverse the ominous trends in the overall military balance. Furthermore, a bipartisan majority in both Houses of Congress seems ready to support the President in this effort.

It would be comforting to assume that the shifted political climate makes the solution of U.S. defense problems a foregone conclusion. Happy historical experience renders us all too susceptible to the notion that once aroused, the American genius, along with our vast material resources, will in the end triumph over all our problems. Yet, the massive and long-range nature of the challenge confronting the United

States makes this a fragile hope. It is all too possible for an Administration and a Congress, with the best of intentions, to pour vast new sums of money into hitherto neglected military programs and yet fail to redress the dangerous imbalances of today and tomorrow. It is even possible that large sums spent on the wrong programs will consign us to an even more perilous imbalance in the 1990s. History gives us a clear example of heavy expenditures resulting in military disaster: the French investment in the Maginot Line, at the neglect of maneuverable forces, led to France's swift and crushing defeat in 1940. We may be headed for a similarly tragic mistake.

It is the purpose of this article to substantiate the following proposition: A sharp increase in military spending is absolutely essential to repair the damage to a seriously neglected U.S. defense establishment. Nevertheless:

- Changing the basic strategy of the United States is much more important than merely boosting military expenditures.
- Incremental additions to military programs designed originally to support faulty strategy will not solve the U.S. security problem.
- Rather, that problem calls for bold strokes within the framework of a new strategy.

The Discredited Strategic Framework

The imperative, fundamental task facing the United States in rebuilding its military security is to shed the blinders of the faulty and illusory concepts, doctrines and policies that have led us into our present defensive predicament. A new strategic framework is essential to rational, effective military programming and to a coherent effort within government as a whole. The variable of any one military program, past or present, is not crucial to a sound national security posture; the absence of a sound strategic framework within which to judge the merits of military programs invites disaster. To invoke a simple simile: no single sail on the ship may be indispensable, but the rudder certainly cannot be done without.

The strategic framework which has guided the approach of the United States to national security matters, shaped (or distorted) its armed forces and determined its positions in arms

control negotiations was erected on a basic assumption which gained dominance in Washington in the mid-1960s in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split and the Soviet setback in the Cuban Missile Crisis. This assumption was essentially that the Cold War had ended, the West had in effect won, and the Soviet Union henceforth could be dealt with as a status quo nation which was no longer determined to expand its system by force of arms—and, indeed, could be persuaded through diplomacy and agreements to assume the role of co-guarantor of world peace.

Upon this basic assumption was constructed an edifice of new concepts, doctrines and policies replacing the old structure of the strategy of containment which had been in place since the Truman Administration. This new strategic edifice included Mutual Assured Destruction, detente, the central role of arms control, and a "linkage strategy" aimed at obtaining Soviet benevolence, in which the transfer of U.S. technology to a needy Soviet industrial establishment was to have a pivotal place. In combination, these guidelines for U.S. politico-military decisions have engendered a drifting, feeble foreign policy backed by drifting, half-hearted military programs. Each has depended more or less on the cooperation and good faith of the Soviet Union. In sum, the concepts, doctrines and policies which have molded U.S. security decisions over the past fifteen years constitute what might be characterized as a "strategy of peace through trust."

The prevalent assumptions in the 1960s regarding the emergence of a new mellowed Soviet Union interested in domestic progress and global stability were, as has been clearly demonstrated, wildly miscast. The strategy they produced was reinforced in the early 1970s by an American pessimism steeped in the traumas of the Vietnam War—by neo-Spenglerian notions of an inexorable American decline that permeated policymaking in Washington. Specifically, the assumption hardened that the American people, demoralized by the Vietnam War and more generally resentful of global burdens, would support neither large military budgets nor assertive American policies abroad. Thus, it was concluded, there were really no alternatives to the policies of detente, arms limitation, American global retrenchment—and, if necessary, a graceful accommodation to the power of adversaries.

Both the optimistic assumption about Soviet evolution and the pessimistic assumption regarding the American popular mood have been shattered by developments in the recent past. The wistful notions concerning the Soviet Union's transformation into a cooperative, status quo power were assailed, beginning in the mid-1970s, by increasingly incontrovertible evidence that Moscow's response to U.S. restraint in military programs had been an unprecedented Soviet arms build-up. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided the final blow. The second assumption—that the American public would not support policies more onerous than detente and disarmament—was dramatically disproved by the results of the 1978 and 1980 elections in the United States. In the past three years thirty-nine senators supportive of the "peace through trust" school have been replaced. And the polls indicated that the efforts during the 1980 campaign to portray Ronald Reagan's rejection of the old strategic clichés as "trigger-happiness" and "war-mongering" had the effect of expanding rather than narrowing his decisive electoral victory.

Nevertheless, while the assumptions underpinning the moribund "peace through trust" strategy have been thoroughly discredited, the complex lattice-work of concepts, doctrines, policies, arms control agreements and military programs based on the old assumptions has not been dismantled or replaced. Until a new strategic framework is constructed, the governmental bureaucracy is destined to follow the old paths through sheer inertia.

There is a solid foundation for a new strategic framework in the Peace Through Strength Resolution (HRC 306) which was co-sponsored in 1980 by a majority in the House of Representatives. The Resolution called for "a national strategy of peace through strength," defining this in terms of a number of principles and objectives.

Some of these objectives—notably the pursuit by the United States of overall military superiority (now expressed as the achievement of a "margin of safety") and the rejection of arms control agreements that adversely affect the United States—are reflected in the pronouncements of the new Administration. Still missing, however, is the realization that the years of neglect of the U.S. military posture—plus the Soviet Union's concerted build-up across the

full spectrum of military capabilities—have placed the United States into a quandary from which it cannot escape "simply" by accelerating and expanding existing military programs, or "simply" by reinstating programs that had previously been dropped by the wayside (like the B-1 bomber).

The Incremental Approach

As has been noted, Secretary Weinberger's budget recommendations to the President and the Congress, although projecting a substantial rise in U.S. defense expenditures over the next five years, call essentially for incremental additions to a broad range of hitherto underfunded current programs, plus revivals of some cancelled programs. There seems to be little or no intellectual base in the Pentagon to permit any other recommendation. The cost implications of the recommendations are staggering, including higher military pay, more ammunition and spare parts, higher personnel authorizations, more tanks, guns, ships, planes, missiles, research and development, etc.

A preview of the costs involved in the "much-more-of-the-same" approach was provided in a 1980 study by the Committee on the Present Danger. This very thorough analysis recommended additions to the defense budget totaling \$266 billion through Fiscal Year 1985. More disturbing than the large dollar figure are the relatively meager results that can be anticipated from these outlays. To quote the Committee:

Those programs would provide forces substantially better in quality and generally better in quantity than those provided by the Executive Branch's revised budget requests (the Carter defense budget).

The Committee programs would also include a *start* at rebuilding and expanding U.S. forces to meet the challenges of the late 1980s and 1990s.

The serious pitfall in the much-more-of-the-same approach of boosting current military programs is that five to ten years of heavy investments may find the United States in an even more precarious position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union than it is today. The Soviets can hardly be expected to sit still in their military efforts while the United States endeavors to catch up or surpass. Indeed, while the United States is

providing itself with those "substantially better" and "generally larger" military forces, the Soviet Union will be accelerating its own well-gearred military effort across a broad front. Given the relative assets in the competition, it is conceivable that a U.S. spurt in defense procurements could emphasize a *qualitative* U.S. edge; but there is no realistic prospect for the United States to win the race for quantity. As an example, the Soviets have five ICBM production lines moving at the present time, while the United States has none.

The Bold Approach in Historical Perspective

The only real hope for the United States for achieving confident security—a "margin of safety"—in the perilous decades ahead is to discard the habits of incremental thinking and to opt for the strategic framework of the "bold approach." This is not intended to suggest that we abandon all, or even most, existing and projected military programs in favor of radical departures; the United States needs urgently to close existing and impending gaps in its readiness forces, particularly those relevant to rapid, global projections of U.S. power. It does suggest that in all military categories we search for ways of harnessing innovativeness and American technological assets to the pursuit of the "high ground" of military capabilities.

Although this principle is applicable to the broad range of military programs, it asserts itself most notably in the strategic-nuclear arena of opposing U.S. and Soviet intercontinental capabilities. A salient example here is the shift by the United States from the race with the Soviet Union for offensive missile capabilities (a race in which we probably cannot prevail) to a thrust toward defensive capabilities, specifically a spaceborne defense against Soviet missiles. The achievement of such a defense would:

- Establish the "margin of safety" sought by the President;
- Frustrate the Soviet threat to U.S. deterrent forces;
- Move the arena of the initial engagement in a nuclear war from the earth's surface to space;
- Slow down the competitive drive to amass offensive nuclear weapons;
- Encourage and support the exploitation of

space for the solution of another key strategic problem—energy supply;

- Accomplish the above in less time, with less money, and with far greater popular support than would apply to other options.

The example should be viewed against a compelling historical background. From the dawn of modern civilization, as man's activities moved from the land to the coastal seas, then to the high seas, then into the air, those nations which first projected their military capabilities into those new realms of human activity reaped enormous advantages.

Several thousand years ago, all military capabilities were land-bound, as were almost all human activities. When man's enterprise and technology moved much of this transportation, communications and commerce to the coastal seas, an imperative arose to project military power into the same arena. Those societies which did so first achieved military preeminence. Some were quite small societies which became so expert in projecting power in coastal seas that they came to control vast territories, e.g., the Phoenicians and the Vikings.

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The High Ground of Space

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human and military activity has moved into space. Massive investments have been made by several nations in spaceborne communications, information-gathering and exploration. Space represents the probable long-term answer to certain resource shortages, especially energy. And the most impressive means for projecting military power globally—long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads—must traverse space to reach their targets.

One can readily sense the analogies between man's thrust from the coastal to the high seas and the unfolding thrust from the peripheral envelope of the atmosphere into the "high seas" of space. More important, however, is the need to recognize the inexorable pressures this puts upon contending world powers to establish strategic dominion in the new medium. As matters stand today in terms of technological and resource availability, either the United States or the USSR will eventually establish strategic superiority in space. Soviet activities, especially their development of satellite kill capabilities, indicate a determination to win that race for military dominion.

A key strategic logic drives a U.S. space effort initially toward *defense* rather than offense. Today, the Soviet General Staff faces an essentially straightforward arithmetic problem in its plans to checkmate and overwhelm the bulk of the U.S. strategic-nuclear deterrent. Each fixed U.S. target—missile silo, SAC airfield, missile sub-base—requires a finite number of deliverable missile warheads of sufficient yield and accuracy to destroy it. For instance, the destruction of each Minuteman silo calls for two Soviet warheads of current accuracy and yield. If the United States opts to add new targets in the form of new fixed missiles or new firing sites without missiles (as in the proposed "racetrack" mode of deploying new MX missiles), the arithmetic equation remains. What is worse, the ongoing Soviet strategic missile program probably can issue warheads to destroy those targets faster than the United States can proliferate the targets.

The arithmetic problem for the Soviets can be vastly complicated by a strategic defense. Even a less-than-optimum defense of targets against ballistic missile attack would have the effect of heavily burdening the Soviet formula for calculating an effective counterforce strike. The possibility of interception of some portion

of the attacking warheads—indefinite as to numbers and indefinite as to which Soviet warheads aimed at which targets would survive—inserts a whole new range of combinations, permutations and probabilities into the otherwise simple arithmetic formula.

This is not to say that the more complex formula imposed by a strategic defense would be insoluble. Any defense can be attacked, but the time required to do so introduces greater uncertainty into the mind of the attacker regarding the success of his overall attack. And such uncertainty is the essence of deterrence.

There are several technical options for achieving the degree of strategic defense required to remove the threat of a Soviet disarming strike and of Soviet nuclear blackmail. These options include manned and unmanned space vehicles armed with laser weapons or projectile weapons. One option, which has excited interest in the Air Force, is a small, one-man space cruiser with high maneuverability capable of undertaking a large array of missions, including the destruction of Soviet ICBMs prior to the release of their MIRV warheads. The concept of the vehicle is based on proven design, entails "off-the-shelf" hardware, would cost about one-hundredth the amount of a space shuttle, and according to the Stanford Research Institute could be made operational within two and a half years. It could be launched by a 747 aircraft, by the space shuttle, or by any of the available U.S. space boosters.

The strategic defense mission would involve several of these vehicles in an orbit which intersects that sector of space which would be used by the most threatening Soviet ICBMs in case of an attack. Geostationary warning satellites would provide the intelligence necessary to maneuver into the best killing orbit before engagement. Projectile or laser weaponry would then be used by the space cruisers to destroy Soviet missiles prior to MIRV dispersal. The defense could be thickened in times of high tension by additional space cruisers in ready condition on the surface of the earth. As space weapons technology advanced, a fleet of such cruisers could be used to emplace, reposition and service other weapons systems.

There is an important symbiosis between the space cruiser option and the possibility of relieving the dependence of the West on fossil fuels through solar power satellites (SPS). Such

satellites show promise of providing an inexhaustible supply of energy to any place on the globe. The prospect is so attractive that most of the advanced nations of the Free World are highly supportive of the SPS energy solution.

One drawback to solar systems in space is the vulnerability of a five-by-ten-kilometer array of solar cells. The presence of an American protective space cruiser fleet would greatly narrow that vulnerability. At the same time, the powerful nonmilitary thrust of man into space involved in the construction and operation of solar power satellites would enhance the logistic support of the cruiser force. The space shuttles and personnel facilities in space required for SPS could serve the military force as well. Furthermore, much of the total cost of the military program would be offset by the symbiosis with the nonmilitary program, and much of the U.S. share of the costs could be offset by international cooperation.

Advantages of a Space-Based Defense

The salient advantages for this "bold stroke" into space would be the following:

Time. The author of the military spacecraft concept believes that an operational capability could be attained within two and a half years. Spokesmen for Rockwell International, which is heavily engaged in the space shuttle and other space programs, have estimated four to five years for a partial space defense based on the current space shuttle technology.

Contrast this with the ten-year lead time in adding 200 MX missiles to the U.S. inventory, as is currently proposed, or a five-year lag to add a mere 100 B-1 bombers. An interim spaceborne defensive capability, to be successful, need only complicate Soviet calculations sufficiently to remove the confidence of success from the Soviet option of a ballistic missile attack on the U.S. deterrent force. If this can be done, it will sharply reduce the pressures for expensive deployment schemes for MX, the rebasing of SAC bombers and other "quick fixes" to reduce vulnerability. In fact, such an effort could save large sums of money if all trade-offs were considered.

The estimates of four to five years to field a spaceborne defense capability may raise eyebrows. Yet, we should bear in mind that in 1956 the United States decided to build a fleet of Po-

laris submarines when many of the advanced technologies required had not been reliably developed. The first Polaris became operational in just under four years. By contrast, the technologies and even actual hardware for a spaceborne defense are on the shelf today. A fully funded, bureaucratically unconstrained effort to achieve a space defense system could reap even quicker results than indicated by these estimates.

Money. The area of expenditures pertaining to a space-based defense is admittedly a murky one—all the more so in terms of comparisons with the projected costs of offensive strategic programs. Suffice it to say that the incremental approach to the strategic-nuclear balance involves a \$35-50 billion MX deployment, a \$9 billion B-1 program, costly reengineering and rebasing of B-52s, the acceleration of Trident, and the production of additional Minuteman II missiles—in total some \$70-80 billion in additions over the next five to ten years.

The space cruiser program probably will absorb less than half the ten-year cost of the incremental approach—and real costs could be reduced further if coupled to and shared with an energy satellite program. Finally, a spaceborne strategic defense could ease the need for crash programs in other military areas.

The Variable of Popular Support

The solution outlined above to our strategic dilemma would undoubtedly be resisted fiercely by all those who cling to the old strategic framework. In that pattern of logic, strategic defenses of *any* kind are anathema. The adherents of the MAD doctrine take the contradictory position that strategic defense is on the one hand *impossible*, and on the other hand provocative and destabilizing—increasing the likelihood of nuclear war, which in turn they consider *unthinkable* no matter what the strategic balance. This line of attack on spaceborne defense systems will have far less impact than it had in the past, inasmuch as its proponents are now mired in the problem of explaining why the massive Soviet strategic defense efforts are *not* provocative to the United States.

The space initiative will invite opposition leaning on the contention of a "deus ex machina." It will be argued that the concept depends too much on the success of resolving

many technological variables within a tight time schedule. There is some merit to this argument, but the fact remains that the alternatives carry no real promise of changing the strategic imbalance significantly until the late 1980s. The technological risk can be reduced also by deploying as quickly as possible some of the least expensive ground-based Army ballistic missile defense systems in current ICBM deployment areas as a back-up to the spaceborne capability. Furthermore, the disadvantages and risks of a "launch-on-warning" doctrine governing our vulnerable ICBMs could be tolerated for a few years, if necessary.

Finally, there will be a debate as to the Soviet reaction. The Soviets, to be sure, will not welcome a U.S. effort which threatens to erase their current strategic advantages. And the Soviets would undoubtedly prefer that any new U.S. resolve to compete stay within the present arena of number of missiles, aircraft, submarines and deliverable megatons, in which the current Soviet momentum augurs continued Soviet superiority. They would not wish the competition to move to space, where U.S. technological superiority would present the Kremlin with a far less favorable challenge.

Yet, the Soviets are already straining their economy with military expenditures, and it would take several years to redirect their efforts to contend with a concerted U.S. challenge from space. Eventually the USSR undoubtedly would attempt to devise means to offset U.S. spaceborne capabilities, but an action-reaction cycle of development in space would favor the higher technology of the United States.

More effective arguments against the space option will arise from arms control considerations. Previous agreements with the USSR regarding anti-ballistic missile launchers and weapons in space would be stretched, bent, or, in the eyes of some, broken by a major U.S. military thrust into space. However, ratification of the ABM Treaty of 1972 was made contingent upon real progress in limiting offensive systems, and such progress has not occurred. As for weapons-in-space agreements, it can be reasonably argued that the Soviet satellite killer program has already cast grave doubt on the status of those agreements.

Serious disagreement with the space effort will also arise from the pro-defense side of the basic debate. Much of it will be pushed by bu-

reaucratic rather than substantive considerations. For instance, there are many defense experts who by experience have developed an almost traditional antipathy to defense and a high-automatic preference for greater nuclear offensive capabilities.

Civilian and military officials in the Defense Department are inclined to demand the impossible from strategic defense options: namely, an *impermeable* defense or a defense which cannot be attacked at the same time other targets are being attacked. There has never been such a defense, and there never will be. Defenses have always been designed to cost the attacker time and to weaken him. The best defense is one which deters the enemy from attacking at all, and that could be accomplished by a significant spaceborne defense against Soviet missiles.

Much opposition will revolve around the fact that the thrust into space is, in fact, the alternative to a costly incremental approach. Literally thousands of program managers in the Department of Defense are apt to view a new space initiative as a threat to their current hopes for added funds. Sheer bureaucratic inertia and "turf-guarding" among service program managers will create a formidable obstacle.

The chances are that any public debate over this option would find most Americans in favor of the space option. Some public support would be based on a well-founded displeasure with a business-as-usual approach to defense and an understanding of the technological possibilities. But much would arise from an excitement of the public imagination regarding the potential of space, as has been engendered already by highly successful futuristic books and films.

Bold Strokes in Other Arenas

The foregoing has been a rather detailed plea for bold versus incremental approaches to the vital military issue in one area, that of the strategic-nuclear balance. It is worth noting that a recovery of the U.S. advantage at that level of competition could mitigate some of the serious problems existing at other levels of the competition. For instance, if the "extended deterrent" credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent could prospectively be restored, the urgency might be removed from action to restructure and upgrade NATO theater nuclear forces.

As has been emphasized, the dangerous de-

iciencies in U.S. general purpose forces must be repaired irrespective of programs at the strategic-nuclear level. But even here, resource expenditures at all levels of U.S. military capa-

bilities should be determined within the proposed new conceptual framework, and bold strokes should take precedence over incremental adjustments.





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Mr. Morton Blackwell
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Morton:

I write to propose a plan of action to capitalize on the strong defense and foreign affairs mandate of this Administration before it collapses under a vigorous and growing assault from the opposition.

I am deeply concerned with growing public and Congressional resistance to an attempt to redress the military balance by adding billions to the Defense Budget in support of old programs and old strategies. We must avoid an enormously expensive and basically futile attempt to offset masses of Soviet military equipment and forces with similar U.S. military equipment and forces. In terms of both political and strategic realities we have no effective alternative to a technological end run of current Soviet military mass.

It is well within the capabilities of essentially on-the-shelf U.S. technology to reverse (and reverse quickly) four of today's troublesome world trends--the strategic military balance, the over-reliance of the Free World on diminishing and vulnerable oil sources, the intractable problems of the underdeveloped nations and the malaise of spirit in the West. We can, with a bold application of superior U.S. space technology, at least rearrange all these strategic factors in a pattern favorable to the Free World. Furthermore, these vital changes can be wrought in less time, with lower costs, and with far greater U.S. and Allied public support than can any strategic alternatives available.

The basic concept is to capitalize on U.S. superior space technology (especially the logistics system created by the Shuttle) to place in the high seas of space the equivalent of the British merchantmen and men-of-war that created the century of Pax Britannica. The military side of this analogy consists of two types of relatively inexpensive spacecraft which provide the United States with a capability to attack and destroy hostile objects in space, most importantly Soviet strategic missiles. The non-military or "merchantmen" side of the analogy consists of solar power satellites capable of delivering an inexhaustible and steady supply of energy to any spot on earth.

The military system consists of two types of vehicle. One is an unmanned satellite operating in near earth orbit armed with 40 to 50 small non-nuclear space projectiles. Some 300-400 such vehicles would be placed in orbits which would ensure that about one-third of them would be in position at all times to attack Soviet strategic missiles in the first seven to ten minutes of their trajectories, i.e., when the Soviet missiles are very vulnerable. This means that any Soviet ICBM fired at the United States would be attacked by three or four anti-missile projectiles.

The second military vehicle is a one-man space cruiser which can perform a large number of military missions from near earth to geo-stationary orbit. Among its missions would be provision of man-in-the-loop control of the ballistic missile defense vehicles.

The non-military system is the Solar Power Satellite Reference System already designed by NASA and the Department of Energy. Each satellite can deliver five gigawatts of base load electrical power to any spot on earth with an antenna to receive it. This is sufficient to provide the New York metropolitan area with all its electrical power needs on a continuous and essentially inexhaustible basis. Because of the zero fuel costs and very low operations and maintenance costs, the solar power satellite is very competitive with nuclear and coal fueled power plants. The NASA design is completely benign environmentally; the power is relayed to earth by a microwave beam harmless to the ecology.

There is great synergism between the military and non-military systems. Both require the same space logistic support system. The military system protects the heavy investment SPS from hostile action. Both have high potential for sharing costs with the advanced industrialized nations of the Free World, and even with private utility companies.

The two systems in combination would produce profound strategic effects on our major global problems.

In the military sphere, the space-borne global ballistic missile defense would destroy both the political and military effectiveness of the Soviet advantage in first-strike nuclear offensive weaponry, that is their superior ICBM force. This would obviate the necessity for the MPS MX deployment. Long before the complete BMD system was deployed, any Soviet assurance of an effective first strike against the U.S. deterrent force would begin to deteriorate. While the proposed military system is independent of development success in space-borne laser technology, the defensive capability could be greatly enhanced downstream by laser weaponry.

Possibly the most important effect of the global ballistic missile defense would be the escape from the perpetual balance-of-terror imposed by the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine. It would restore to U.S. military strategy a long-neglected balance between offense and defense. It would drive both the U.S. and the Soviets toward Mutual Assured Survival, a far more stable situation than that which now prevails. Ironically, the adoption of this high-technology, non-nuclear defense option by the United States would do more to check the urge on both sides to amass even greater nuclear offensive power than have any of the arms control negotiations to date.

The solar power satellite program (which lends itself to an international effort of the NATO variety) would not only reduce the dangerous and disruptive reliance of the Free World on fossil fuels, but would provide an enormous boon to underdeveloped countries. Third World nations could be provided with the energy to effect rural electrification and hence agricultural revolution without the necessity of creating first the roads, ports, power plants and other infrastructure. All that would be required is the receiving antenna and power lines. The antenna, quite incidentally, can be constructed so as to provide a very large greenhouse for year-round growing. The U.S. and its Allies could offer enormous benefits to the underdeveloped nations in return for an unimpeded flow of critical raw materials and political cooperation. And this without proliferating nuclear power or risking major capital investments in unstable nations.

Thus these space programs attack the issues of military security, energy supply, and the hitherto intractable problems of the Third World. But perhaps most important is the potential impact on the malaise of spirit in the West. A commitment to these bold initiatives can reinstall a sense of optimism and high purpose in the American body politic and in those of our Allies as well. The effects of a rejuvenation of spirit will occur almost immediately, long before the programs produce the security and energy they promise. The United States will be seen again as a pragmatic, resourceful yet altruistic leader of the Free World and the ramifications of such a new attitude can scarcely be overstated.

The Reagan Administration could and should pursue these programs with utmost vigor. If managed in a variant of the Manhattan Project management system, by-passing the enormous roadblocks of our current bureaucratic morass, the global ballistic missile defense system could be deployed in strategically effective strength in five years and the first operational power satellite in ten years, at a cost not exceeding \$80 billion. The strategic effects will be far greater than the addition of 200 MX missiles in multiple protective shelters ("Racetrack") which would take ten years and many believe would be just as expensive.

This critical decision will never be taken if the matter is left up to the Washington bureaucracy. Turf-guarding among the bureaucrats in the departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Energy, ACDA, NASA and among the Military Services would destroy the prospects for either a straightforward plan or vigorous execution. Such a bold departure from business-as-usual would put scores of governmental program managers on the defensive and into a frantic search for reasons to object. It would take years which we cannot afford to lose to overcome bureaucratic inertia, if indeed it is possible to do so.

This bold change of strategy must therefore come from outside the bureaucratic structure. The concept and the technology required to support it are not a mere skeleton of ideas. They are already fairly well fleshed out with considerable strategic and technical study. Nor is the cooperation of other nations a mere hope; West Germany, Japan, France, the UK, Canada and even India have expressed high interest in one or both space programs. However, it will be necessary to assemble credible non-government experts from a number of disciplines to prepare a thoroughly defensible plan of action for the President.

I am prepared to do that. I can secure the services, part or full time of the following people (a partial list):

Bernard K. Schriever (Lt. Gen. USAF, Ret.)
Former Chief of AF Systems Command
Expert on management of high technology projects

Robert Richardson (B. Gen. USAF, Ret.)
Former Deputy to Gen. Schriever
Expert on advanced weaponry and NATO

Hon. John Morse
Former Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense and
Member Atomic Energy Commission

Dr. Peter Glaser
Vice President, Arthur D. Little Company
Foremost expert on solar power satellites

Fred Redding
Stanford Research Institute
Military space concepts expert

Dr. John Bosma
Military economics specialist
Formerly Boeing Company
Now military specialist with Republican
Study Group

Dr. Orlando Johnson
Macro-economist with Boeing Company

Dr. Rocco Petrone
Former mission control chief, Apollo Program
Now Vice President Rockwell International

Dr. Fred Koomaoff
Director, Space Solar Power satellite program,
Department of Energy

Dr. Arnold Kramish
Nuclear physicist
Formerly with AEC

Dr. James Wilson
Top laser expert with the National Science Foundation
Formerly Department of Navy

Mr. Fritz Kraemer
Strategist
Formerly Department of Army


Stewart Meyer (MG USA, Ret.)
Former Director Army Ballistic Missile Defense
Agency, Huntsville, Alabama

With such men assisting and with adequate administrative and logistics support, I am certain that within 120 days we can produce a fully fleshed-out, intellectually and fiscally sound program suitable for presentation to the President and his key advisors for action.

The cost of this 120-day effort is \$247,000 which I shall try to raise from corporations and private individuals who would contribute tax-free money earmarked for this project only to the American Security Council Foundation. In this I need your help. Time is urgent. If the Administration does not commit to a bold course of action soon, the next budget will undoubtedly be more-of-the-same in Defense, and the mandate for new directions will be seriously eroded, and the Reagan people will be irrevocably committed to the security errors of the past. The bold stroke must be ready by 1 December or it stands little chance of implementation.

Are you willing to help? Please advise.

Regards,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Dan", is written over a rectangular stamp area.

Daniel O. Graham
Lt. Gen., USA (Ret.)

DOG:vvm

A New Right Foreign Policy Offensive

By Morton C. Blackwell August 29, 1980

Why don't we bring the lessons we have learned in domestic politics to bear on our problems in foreign policy?

It is no coincidence that the New Right is now a term in general use in the news stories of the nation's media. We have had sufficient success that cannot be ignored. We have tacked too many liberal scalps to our barn doors. We have had too many successful media events. We have trained too many bright new activists. Any reporter who ignores us risks being called blind to reality.

We all have a pretty good understanding of how this domestic political transformation has taken place, how conservatism changed from a footdragging impediment on the march toward socialism to a movement on the offensive which seeks out every opportunity to win, not just battles, but the war.

Here are some of the techniques we are now using in domestic public policy battles:

1. We identify our issue areas of strength and build new organizational vehicles to work in these areas.
2. We identify existing organizations which tend in our direction and develop close relationships with our most likely allies within these groups. We make special efforts to boost the careers of our friends within these groups.
3. We identify targets of opportunity, where the opposition is weak or has blundered. We move in to take maximum advantage of the openings thus presented.

4. We identify the opposition's main sources of strength and target them both for a vigorous discrediting program and, where possible, legal action where they are out of line.

5. We conduct hundreds of training programs in dozens of domestic battle areas, training literally tens of thousands of Americans in the latest techniques of winning.

On the other hand, what are we doing with respect to foreign policy? The Soviets are marching forward almost unimpeded in their attempts to sap all resistance to totalitarian Marxism in country after country. The map looks redder and redder each year.

What are we conservatives doing about this? Very little. We are in the foreign policy area about where we were in domestic politics fifteen years ago. We know what is going wrong. We are mad about it. We share our anger with each other. We write about how bad the Soviets are. We act as if being able to prove that the Soviets are evil is all we need to achieve victory.

Think about that for a moment. If all we had done was publish studies about how bad George McGovern is, if we had spent our time exchanging scathing comments about how wrong his policies are for our country, would McGovern be 20% behind in the polls today? No. He would be ahead, and all we would have is our frustrated anger as we watched things go down the drain.

Why not take a page from our own best selling book? Let's start to build coalitions, start new groups, undermine communist areas of strength, run international political action seminars, etc.

Let's go on the offensive world wide. There's a whole world of opportunity waiting for us, but we had better start acting smart while we have the political resources left. The opposition is moving fast to fill what amounts to a political vacuum.



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Mr. Morton Blackwell
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Morton:

Remember this memo of yours? (Attached)

Well, here in the enclosures is the new national strategy we should get behind. It's picking up some support in Congress, but not enough in the Administration. Any ideas?

Regards,

Daniel O. Graham
Lt. Gen., USA (Ret.)

DOG:vvm

Enclosures: Letter
High Frontier
Bold Strokes

Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713

FYI
This summarizes
what Danny & I are
selling all over at present

Richardson, ASC
5/5/81

file
Am.
Security
Council

SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION

Reagan has to re establish an acceptable military balance while solving inflation. The latter calls for budget cuts, the former for more money. One can kill the other in extremis

Uninformed opinion, which in this case goes down into the leadership and military to a large extent, automatically equates military balance to quantitative and qualitative comparisons of like (similar) types of forces and weapons. (eg ICBM's VS ICBM's.)

Since defense costs are essentially a function of quantities of weapons and manpower required to do the job, comparisons based on the above views produce massive dollar demands to correct the imbalance, especially in the strategic field.

There is a more sophisticated way to right the balance than to compete with Soviet military capabilities in like types of forces and weapons. This is to offset enemy quantitative superiority with both, or a combination of, (1) exclusivity, and/or (2) Methods of doing the business-strategies- that make the enemies superior mass useless.

The problem with the sophisticated approach to righting the balance is that not too many people understand it. Of those that do all too many do not want to face the consequences of adopting it. This is because more forces and hardware is welcome, easy to come by, desired, and not too destabilizing. Changes in strategy, or going into new exotic weaponry, threatens roles, missions, established ideas, past decisions, treaties, agreements, managerial stability etc....

But, if the choice is decisive inferiority or "change" in strategies, policies, etc, and new weaponry, the consequences of the former can overcome the latter. This is what we are trying to point out to the administration. A double sell is involved. First, education as to the possibility. Second, persuade that the consequences of not going this way are worse than going this way.

Fortunately, we have historical precedents. Past US strategic capabilities were based on exclusivity more than mass in like types. Eisenhower saved NATO at the onset by a change in strategy when the nations could not afford to compete with the Soviets in Mass.

Our leaders must learn that there are three factors in security and that ALL THREE are variables. WHAT we do (defend NATO); HOW we do it (TNW or Conventional etc); and WHAT WE DO IT WITH -The Means; forces and weapons. As long as these balance for any given threat we are OK.

The classic, costly, and present Weinberger approach, is to solve the problem by varying the MEANS. (eg) increasing spending to buy more forces and weapons and their support. This approach assumes (erroneously) that the METHOD-strategy-must remain a constant as well as the job.

The above conclusion would be true IF the strategy were optimum — the best possible considering all factors; technology, resources, constraints or lack thereof, etc... This is NOT the case. There are far more cost effective and cheaper ways of doing the JOB than the ones adopted by McNamara and Carter et al. The trouble is we have been, for twenty years, LOCKED into their ways by their aspirations, arms control factors, political and moral factors, treaties, etc....none of which are immutable in a crunch,

In fact the politicians are primarily responsible for the high cost of defense today — NOT valid military requirements, or the present Soviet Threat alone, as some try to argue.

The politicians demanded the volunteer army.
The politicians demanded a high TNW threshold.
The politicians denied us military space systems.
The politicians denied us ABM's forcing costly MX survival.
The politicians put a lid on ICBM's thus sizing the MX.
The politicians refused to fund civil defense.
The politicians object to launch on warning as a measure.
The Managers instituted low risk R&D with built in obsolescence.
The politicians demanded Responsive R&D with lead time loss.
The Managers added 6 years to the procurement cycle of the 50!
Etc, Etc.....

All of these constraints TOP an optimum military solution, to whatever threat, COST MONEY or COST LOSS of effectiveness. The sum total cost is Massive. This is where savings can be made.

For example. If you say I must fight you but you will get to shoot point blank at me first I will want a million dollar steel cylinder with a cast iron top. If you say it can be a fair fight no constraints, all I want is a cheap bullet proof vest !!!! Its that simple re impact of political aspirations on defense costs.

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Morton Blackwell

John Koob

PRESIDENT RONALD W REAGAN
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC 20500

YOUR EXCELLENCY, MR PRESIDENT:

YOUR NATION ASKS YOUR VITALLY IMPERATIVE ACTION TO STOP KREMLIN OVERTAKING MEXICO LIKE CUBA, BY EXTENDING, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES PROTECTORATE OVER MEXICO AND EVERY CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY, TERRITORIES AND WATERS, MAKE PENTAGON SEND MILITARY HELP TO MEXICO AS MORE MONEY THAN KREMLIN PAID MEXICO TO WELCOME ENEMY'S TERROR DICTATORSHIP, ALASKA MUST BE EVACUATED AND FORTRESSED AS MILITARY STATE, HAWAII AND PUERTO RICO MUST HAVE MILITARY AND AIR FORCE NON-STOP GUARD SAME ALL OUR SOUTHERN STATES.

MOST RESPECTFULLY,

SOPHIA M PITTEVIL, MEMBER
~~AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL~~
BI-PARTISAN ADVISORY BOARD
STATE ADVISOR
7081 YUCCA STREET, HOLLYWOOD, CA 90028
TELEPHONE: 213-874-0998

18:31 EST

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- Theodore N. Law, Chairman
Emeritus and Director
Falcon Seaboard, Inc.
- *Gen. L.L. Lemaitre, USA (Ret.)
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Jerry Lindaley
College Republican National Committee
- Adm. John S. McCain, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Former Commander in Chief Pacific
- *Adm. Thomas Moore, USN (Ret.)
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Dr. Laszlo L. Passtor
Chairman of the Board
American Hungarian Federation
- Col. William H. Pietsch, Jr., USA (Ret.)
Former Advisor to Director
of Military Civil Defense
- Brig. Gen. Robt. C. Richardson, III,
USAF (Ret.)
- *Maj. Gen. Milnor Roberts, USAF (Ret.)
Executive Director
Reserve Officers Association
- Miss Martha Rountree,
Leadership Foundation, Inc.
- Prof. Edward Rozek, Director
Institute for the Study of
Comparative Politics and Ideologies
University of Colorado
- Hon. Dan Schaefer
Member, Colorado State Senate
- Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly, President
Eagle Forum
- *Hon. William E. Simon
Former Secretary of the Treasury
- Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, USA (Ret.)
Educational Field Director
American Security Council Foundation
- Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
- *Lt. Gen. C.M. Talbott
Chief of Staff
Military Order of the World Wars
- Mrs. Helen Marie Taylor
- *Prof. William R. Van Cleave, Director
Strategic and Security Studies Program,
University of Southern California
- *Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
Chief U.S. Strategist, World War II

Mr. Morton C. Blackwell
Special Assistant to the President for Public Liaison
The White House Office
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear ~~Mr.~~ ^{Morton} Blackwell:

You are cordially invited to attend a reception in honor of the 275 Members of Congress who belong to the Congressional Division of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.

This reception will be held on Thursday, March 4, 1982 from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. in Room B223 (catereria) of the Longworth House Office Building.

yes
no
you can't
St. Louis

Each of the 275 Congressional Members of the Coalition will receive a National Security Leadership Award.

This reception is being sponsored by the United States Congressional Advisory Board, which sponsors educational efforts on behalf of the Coalition. The Congressional Co-chairmen of this Advisory Board are Senators Paul Laxalt and Dennis DeConcini and Representatives Jack Kemp and Bill Chappell.

Please R.S.V.P. to Ms. Maryland Hurleigh at (202) 484-1676.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

John M. Fisher
Chairman for Administration

JMF/dhm

- cc: Senator Paul Laxalt
Senator Dennis DeConcini
Representative Jack Kemp
Representative Bill Chappell

Air Force Sergeants Association
America's Future American Cause
American Civil Defense Association
American Coalition of Patriotic Societies
American Conservative Union
American Council for a Free Asia
American Council for World Freedom
American Czech Republican Clubs
American Federation of Small Business
American Foreign Policy Institute
American Freedom Network
American Hungarian Federation
American Legion Auxiliary
American Legislative Exchange Council
American Military Retirees Association, Inc.
American Notary Association
American Research Foundation
American Rhodesia Association

American Security Council
American Security Council Foundation
American Security Council Political Action Committee
Americans to Free Captive Nations, Inc.
Americans for a Safe Israel
Armed Forces League
Armenian American Republican Clubs
Assembly of Captive European Nations
Association of Americans to Save Africa
Association of Byelorussian-American Veterans in America
Association of Former Intelligence Officers
Association of Former POW's
Black Silent Majority Committee
Bulgarian National Front, Inc.
Byelorussian American Association
Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation
Catholics for Christian Political Action
The Center for Financial Freedom and Accuracy in Financial Reporting

Center for International Security
Chinese Academic & Professional Association
Chinese American Republican National Federation
The Church League of America
Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Citizens for Freedom, Inc.
Citizens for Seafarer Coalition for a Democratic Majority
College Republican National Committee
Committee for a Free Afghanistan
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, Inc.
The Committee to Unite America, Inc.
Concerned Citizens for an Effective Strategic Policy
Confederate Air Force Congress of Russian-Americans, Inc.
Congressional Majority Committee
The Conservative Caucus, Inc.
Cossack American Nationalists in the U.S.
Council Against Communist Aggression

Council on American Affairs
Council for Inter-American Security
Croatian-American Committee for Human Rights
Czechoslovakian-American Association
Czechoslovak American National Republican Federation
Federation of Cuban Masonic Lodges in Exile
Filipino American Republican Association
Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Inc.
German-American National Congress, Eastern Rgn.
Gospel Advance Mission, Inc.
Greater Overseas Alliance for National Restoration of Viet Nam
Heritage Groups Council for Citizenship Education
Hungarian Organization, Magyar Szerve Szervezet, Inc.
Hungarian Unity Association, Inc.
The Information Council of the Americas
Institute of American Relations

Institute on Strategic Trade
The John Paul Jones Foundation
Leadership Foundation, Inc.
The Lincoln Institute
Lithuanian American Council
Marine Corps League
Reserve Officers Association
Military Order of the World Wars
Moral Majority
National Alliance of Senior Citizens
National Association for Uniformed Services
National Captive Nations Committee
National Committee for Responsible Patriotism
National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups
National Conference on Asians in America and Asian Americans
National Conservative Public Affairs Council
National Defense Council
National Filipino American Republican Association
National Republicans of Italian Descent

National Republican Heritage Groups Council
National Screw Machine Products Association
National Society of Sons of the American Revolution
National Sojourners, Inc.
National Traditionalist Caucus
Naval Enlisted Reserve Association
Naval Order of the United States
Naval Reserve Association
Non-Commissioned Officers Association
NORSE (Scandinavian American Republican Federation)
Order of the Saint John of Jerusalem
The Paul Revere Foundation
Polish American Congress
Polish American Republican Federation
Polish Legion of American Veterans
Reserve Enlisted Association
Reserve Officers Association
Romanian American Republican Clubs
The Second Amendment Foundation

Security and Intelligence Fund
Slovak American Republican Federation
Slovak World Congress
Solzhentyn Society
Stockholders for World Freedom
Truth About Romania Committee
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Ladies Auxiliary
Veterans of Pearl Harbor, Inc.
We the People
World Federation of Cossack National Liberation Movement of Cossackia
World Federation of Free Latvians
Young Americans for Freedom
Young Republican National Federation

MEMORANDUM

file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1981

TO: Virginia Knauer

FROM: Morton C. Blackwell

The American Security Council is a large pro defense organization. Their correspondence to Mrs. Fernandez is simply a personalized fundraising appeal.

This lady has no doubt made contributions to conservative and pro defense groups in the past. I have spoken to people at the American Security Council and they do not know her personally. I recommend we give her no encouragement with respect to federal employment.

Correspondence returned to V. Knauer.



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

file
484-1676

THE COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

John M. Fisher
President

\$20/year

August 19, 1981

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- Stephen L. Donchess
- John M. Fisher
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- Hon. J. William Middendorf, II
- Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.)
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- Maj. Gen. V. B. Lewis, Jr.
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- Amb. John Davis Lodge
- Amb. Clere Boothe Luce
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- Gen. Theodora R. Milton, USAF (Ret.)
- Dr. Robert Morris
- Charles J. V. Murphy
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- Dr. Stefan T. Poesony
- Brig. Gen. R. C. Richardson, III,
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- Ira G. Ross
- Vice Adm. W. A. Schoech, USN (Ret.)
- Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub
USA (Ret.)
- Prof. Raymond S. Slaughter
- Maj. Gen. Dale O. Smith, USAF (Ret.)
- Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
- Harvey E. Stoehr
- Dr. A. B. Suttle
- Dr. Edward D. Teller
- John B. Trevor, Jr.
- Gen. Lewis W. Walt, USMC (Ret.)
- Dr. Kenneth M. Watson
- Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer
USA (Ret.)
- Gen. I. D. White, USA (Ret.)
- Dr. Eugene P. Wigner
- Harvey Williams
- Gen. Melvin Zain, USA (Ret.)

Mr. Morton Blackwell
Special Asst. to the President, Public Liaison
The White House
Room 134, Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear *Morton* Blackwell:

The Coalition for Peace Through Strength Congressional Division has now grown to a majority of the U.S. Congress with 270 Members. I have enclosed a copy of these Congressmen and Senators for you.

We try to work very closely with Members and their staff on a wide range of issues emphasizing foreign policy, defense, and national security. In addition, we were very active on the President's budget and tax program.

The National Peace Through Strength Resolution has been introduced in the House with 230 co-sponsors. Passage by both Houses is expected this Fall.

If you can help on passage of this Resolution which will be referred to the Foreign Affairs Committees, or if you know of Congressmen and Senators who may want to join the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, please give me a call at 484-1676. Thanks.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Richard D. Sellers
Director of Congressional Relations

RDS/lgc

Enclosures

Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

THE COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

John M. Fisher
President

February 16, 1983

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Maj. Gen. Milnor Roberts, USAR
Mrs. June Stolte
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Gen. Paul D. Harkins, USA (Ret.)
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Gen. Leon W. Johnson, USAF (Ret.)
Amb. William R. Kintner
Vice Adm. Fitzhugh Lee, USN (Ret.)
Gen. Curtis E. Lemay, USAF (Ret.)
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USA (Ret.)

Amb. John Davis Lodge
Amb. Clare Boothe Luce
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USAF (Ret.)

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Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
Harvey E. Stoehr
Dr. A. B. Suttle
Dr. Edward Teller
Gen. Lewis W. Walt, USMC (Ret.)
Dr. Kenneth M. Watson
Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer
USA (Ret.)

Gen. I. D. White, USA (Ret.)
Dr. Eugene P. Wigner
Harvey Williams

Mr. Morton C. Blackwell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Blackwell:

Enclosed is a list of the attendees and their organizations as well as organizations which are assisting us with the anti-freeze activities planned in Washington and in 50 state capitals for March 6th, 7th and 8th.

Mr. John M. Fisher, President of the American Security Council, has met with Judge William Clark and asked that March 8th be proclaimed Peace Through Strength Day and that the leaders of the Coalition in the Congress and in the private sector meet with the President about 2 p.m. on March 7th and have a press conference following that meeting.

Enclosed also is the covering letter and packet of information that the Veterans of Foreign Wars sent to their offices in each state capital.

If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to call me.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

David E. Spray

David E. Spray
Special Projects Director

DES/khg

Enclosures

Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

THE COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

John M. Fisher
President

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Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
Harvey E. Stehr
Dr. A. B. Suttle
Dr. Edward Teller
Gen. Lewis W. Walt, USMC (Ret.)
Dr. Kenneth M. Watson
Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer
USA (Ret.)

Gen. I. D. White, USA (Ret.)
Dr. Eugene P. Wigner
Harvey Williams

March 18, 1983

Mr. Morton C. Blackwell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20500

Morton
Dear Mr. Blackwell:

Please find enclosed a short memo prepared by our library on the Conference on the Church & Peacemaking in the Nuclear Age. We agree that the list is unbalanced to the left.

I've enclosed a list of people qualified on quite a number of the topics listed. My suggestion is that you recommend these speakers to balance the conference.

If I can be of further assistance, don't hesitate to call.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

John M. Fisher
John M. Fisher
President

JMF/khg

Enclosures

Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713