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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
December 15, 1983

T. E. L.

MEMORANDUM FOR: MORTON C. BLACKWELL

FROM: EDWARD A. LYNCH *EAL*

SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE DIGEST ON ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA

As I mentioned at the Monday working group meeting, Peter Romero sent a short analysis of the recent Sandinista preparations for elections. He thought that there was not enough material to merit a separate Digest. I looked over the material he sent and I think that if we can get answers to a few questions, we will have enough. We could also compare the promises of the Sandinistas with the reality of periodic elections in El Salvador.

Do you want me to act on this? If so, should I write a memo to Romero directly, should it go through you or someone else, or should I do it over the phone?

*Yes. Follow up with the memo*

*Yes*

*Morton*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 16, 1983

To: Ed Lynch  
From: Morton

MEMORANDUM FOR: MORTON BLACKWELL  
FROM: EDWARD LYNCH  
SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE DIGEST - QUESTIONS ON PROCEDURES

Cuban Involvement in Drug Trafficking - Francis Mullen, the acting head of DEA, testified before two Senate Committees on this subject in April. Can we have someone in DEA draft the paper? *Sure. You handle*

The Development of Democracy in Central America - As I mentioned the other day, Mike Skol's office is ready to move on this as soon as he gets the details of exactly what is wanted. Is it my responsibility to decide what is wanted and to communicate this to Skol? *Yes*

What Central Americans are Saying About Central America - With the quote file that both Skol and Romero have mentioned, I could probably draft that paper myself. Would this present a problem? *No. Do it.*

In your memo to FRW attached to the draft of the Strategic and Economic Importance paper, you said that Constantine Menges oversees the informal clearances and Darmans routes the paper through for official clearances. I am not clear on what my role is during those processes.

Finally, I spoke to Otto Reich yesterday evening and he told me that his office has been charged with coordinating the clearance process for White House digests and he requested that we work through this office. This, according to Reich, applies not only to papers begun in the State Department but also to those originating from the Intelligence community. He is planning to bring me a memo to Faith with the status of the Digests this afternoon. I know that we do not want to let State exercise this kind of control. What I do not know is how to get around this. Please advise.

*I spoke w/ Otto & set this straight.*

*We coordinate per my memo to FRW.*  
*We back Otto re State clearance.*

*12/20*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
December 12, 1983

*file  
W.H. Digest,  
working  
file*

MEMORANDUM TO: MORTON BLACKWELL

FROM: EDWARD A. LYNCH

SUBJECT: STATUS OF WHITE HOUSE DIGESTS

I have been able to gather the following information. Other calls are still out so there should be more information later this afternoon.

Persecution of Christians: I spoke to Constantine Menges. He has not received replies from the agencies working on it but will push them again and try to have a draft in another week. He plans to talk to you this afternoon about it.

Strategic and Economic Importance: I spoke to Peter Romero. The Eco/Bus office at State should have a draft, with DOD input, over this afternoon.

August/Sept./Oct. in Nicaragua: I spoke to Jackie Tillman. She has not started yet due to the General Assembly session. No estimate on draft was available. She did say, however, that she has not been receiving the cables she needs from State to do the project.

1985 elections: I spoke to Romero. They have a 1 or two page analysis of the Sandinista promises but little else. He is sending what he has over here. He suggests combining this with the Human Rights paper since there may not be enough on the elections to merit a separate effort.

Miskitos persecution: I spoke to Romero. He asked the desk office about it again on Friday and hopes to have a draft from them this week.

Persecution of Labor Unions: at State's office of Labor Affairs; no estimate available yet.

High Life Style: I spoke to Romero. Office of Public Diplomacy is working on it and he hopes to have a draft next Monday.

Nicaraguan Disinformation: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs is working on it; no estimate on draft.

What Central Americans are Saying: Romero has quotes from Central American media and from Carlos Rangell from Venezuela. Can we quote these and add our own analysis, since we cannot simply reprint them? *yes*

Refugees: I spoke to Jan in Darmans office. She said NSC felt the paper should not be distributed at this time, and suggested I call Bob Kimmitt to find out why.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY  
THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond, III  
FROM: Morton C. Blackwell *MB*  
SUBJECT: White House Digest #6

I believe the attached are self-explanatory.

We need to get this new Digest over to Dick Darman today so that we will have it ready for distribution on Wednesday, August 24th.

MCB:jet

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: RICHARD DARMAN

FROM: Faith Ryan Whittlesey

SUBJECT: White House Digest #6

Attached is a memorandum from Mr. Kimmitt noting that the White House Digest paper, "Nicaraguan Repression of Labor Unions" has been coordinated with State, Defense, and CIA and suggesting changes to the text.

All changes have been incorporated, and a "clean copy" of the proposed Digest paper is attached.

We propose to distribute this paper at our Wednesday, August 24th meeting of the White House Outreach Working Group on Central America, and would appreciate your assistance in that regard.

MEMORANDUM

5520  
Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FAITH WHITTLESEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *RMK*  
SUBJECT: White House Digest Paper: Nicaraguan  
Repression of Labor Unions

The subject Digest paper has been coordinated with State, Defense, and CIA. Suggested changes are reflected in the attached text.

Attachment

Nicaraguan Repression  
of Labor Unions

### NICARAGUAN REPRESSION OF LABOR UNIONS

In Communist countries throughout the world, trade unions serve not to advance the interests of the workers, but to serve the political interests of the rulers. They serve not to organize strikes but to forbid them; not to improve wages and benefits but to restrain them; not to bargain collectively on behalf of the workers but organize the collective submission of the workers to their employer -- the state.

This same path is being pursued by the ~~new~~ Communist leadership of Nicaragua. The primary purpose of labor unions in today's Nicaragua is to assist in the forced transformation of society along the lines determined by the Sandinista leadership.1/ Existing independent trade unions are being harassed, their members blacklisted, threatened, and sometimes



jailed. Most of the unions and most of the union members in the country have been <sup>PRESSED</sup> ~~herded~~ into Sandinista labor confederations subservient to the government. These confederations have surrendered hard won contract concessions and have forced lower pay and inferior working conditions on their members. Strikes have been forbidden, collective bargaining has become a farce.2/

#### REDUCED TO OBJECTS

Edgard Macias, who was Sandinista Vice-Minister of Labor before he was forced to seek asylum for criticizing the regime, has summed up the situation well:

"Thus the Nicaraguan workers have been reduced to being objects...the workers cannot choose, free of fears, either their labor union, or their central labor organization, their ideological option, [or] their political party."3/

Immediately after the revolution, the Sandinistas formed two large labor confederations -- the Sandinista Workers Central (CST), for non-agricultural workers, and the Rural Workers Association (<sup>ATC</sup> ~~ACT~~) -- to replace the Somocista labor organizations and to compete with the two leading democratic labor confederations, the Nicaraguan Workers Central (CTN) and the Confederation for Labor Unification (CUS), both of which opposed the Somoza dictatorship.

At first, the CST, the Sandinista non-farmworkers confederation, worked for traditional labor goals -- better wages, better working conditions.

#### LABOR "DISCIPLINE"

But by late 1980 it had shifted its emphasis toward~~s~~ organizing political support for the government and enforcing government economic policies. It endorsed Sandinista policies blocking wage increases and forbidding strikes. The Sandinista Ministry of Labor participates in all collective bargaining negotiations and must approve all final agreements.4/ The CST

cooperates with the Ministry's policy of revising labor agreements to deny workers wage and benefit increases previously secured -- even when the employers are willing to maintain the original, costlier contracts. It pressures members into taking an active role in "defending the revolution" and into joining the Sandinista militia.5/ The ACT similarly adheres to Sandinista labor policies.6/

In 1981 the CST joined the Moscow-led World Federation of Trade Unions, and since has signed friendship and cooperation agreements with the Soviet Central Council of Trade Unions. It receives technical and training assistance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

#### "RECRUITMENT"

In spite of their refusal to pursue their members' interests, the Sandinista confederations are overwhelmingly the largest in the country. Workers who refuse to join and labor leaders who refuse to affiliate with Sandinista labor organizations are subjected to punishments ranging from harassment, unemployment, threats, and official denunciations all the way to arrest, destruction of personal property, and beatings. In Macias's words:

"the [Sandinista front] and its central organizations unleashed a war against all other central organizations, using all of their resources including the Ministry of Labor, the army, the militias, and the manipulation of the right to a job... against the CTN and... the CUS."7/

#### "PERSUASION FIRST"

Government favoritism toward Sandinista labor organizations is the simplest method of persuasion.

The Sandinista unions have access to official government communications outlets, which are used to promote the Sandinista unions as well as to attack the independents. Also the

Sandinista unions have the use of government buildings, meeting places and offices free of charge.8/

The Ministry of Labor has, in effect, a veto over the workers' choice of unions. It expedites agreements between workers and Sandinista unions while interfering with those between independent unions and workers.9/ In some cases it has even forcibly removed members of legitimately elected unions from their workplaces. In other cases it has created dummy pro-Sandinista unions, enrolled a few workers in them and arbitrarily designated the dummy unions as the bargaining agents for enterprises at which a majority of the workers belong to independent unions.10/

Workers have been denied social benefits or jobs11/ -- especially in nationalized enterprises12/ -- for not belonging to a Sandinista labor organization. And, as mentioned, when an independent union does reach a favorable settlement for its workers, the Ministry of Labor can void the agreement, thus severely punishing the workers for their choice of unions.

#### TWO WORLDS

Leaders of the independents have repeatedly been denied the right to carry on the normal activities of a free trade union. They have been forbidden to hold normal meetings, to collect dues, to bargain without government intervention, to hold seminars, to organize, or to leave the country without the explicit approval of the Council of State.13/

To quote Macias again:

"There are two different labor worlds in Nicaragua: On one side the workers who are protected and privileged by the FSLN, and on the other side those who...belong to the "second class" labor unions and for whom life is much harsher."14/

But, short of real terror, perhaps the Sandinistas' most potent weapon is political intimidation. In a totalitarian society, expressions of disapproval from the government transmit fears that we as free people find it difficult to comprehend.

Since coming to power, the Sandinistas have loudly and consistently labeled the independent unions "counter-revolutionary," "destabilizing," and "conspiratory."15/

The charges are false -- the independent trade unions were in the vanguard of the opposition to Somoza. But the charges mark the independent unions as enemies of the ruling clique, which is sufficient to frighten many workers away.

Even so, outright terror and repression of the independents has been common all along. From the start of the CST organizing drive, CST representatives -- in reality Sandinista activists with little or no trade union experience -- would arrive at union meetings accompanied by armed militiamen, whose very presence intimidated the workers into favoring the CST in affiliation votes.

#### GOVERNMENT MOBS

Government directed mobs have attacked the homes of union officials and painted their properties with denunciations. Union property has been destroyed by the police.16/ Articles favorable to the CUS or the CTN have been censured from the newspapers.

Union meetings have been disrupted and broken up by mobs. Independent trade union organizers have been threatened by the police, the army, and Sandinista organizations, and sometimes jailed. The CUS headquarters in Chinandega and Esteli were taken over by the local police and Sandinista groups.17/ It is dangerous even to protest these activities, for critics of government policy face prosecution.18/

#### CORINTO

The case of the stevedores union for the key strategic port of Corinto is illustrative of Sandinista labor practices. Immediately after the revolution, when unions were affiliating en

masse with the CST, the Corinto stevedores union did so as well, though even the original affiliation may have been a result of heavy pressure, including the arrest and detention of the secretary general of the union.

The stevedores were soon dissatisfied. In early 1983 they moved to disaffiliate from the CST. In mid-March the unions' executive board voted to switch the stevedores to the CUS. The Sandinistas responded by sending militia to occupy the union's headquarters. The all-powerful Ministry of Labor voided the executive board's decision, ruling that only a two-thirds vote of the membership could effect the switch.

A "WELCOMING COMMITTEE"

But the Ministry avoided an immediate vote by trumping up charges of corruption and forbidding any elections until the charges were "investigated." Eventually elections were scheduled in June. But on May 21, when CUS officials came to Corinto to meet with several hundred stevedores, they were attacked and forced to flee by a Sandinista mob, some of whom were armed and wearing militia uniforms.19/

The Sandinistas then packed the June 1 assembly with hundreds of non-members of the union. The bona fide union members voted overwhelmingly for the CUS, but the government recognized the CST as the victor and now there are two organizations purporting to represent the workers. <sup>At least six union leaders</sup> Since the vote, <sup>nine members</sup> ~~of the stevedores union have been arrested.~~ <sup>The Government refused to give an explanation for the arrests. Although some were later released, the union claims that many activists subsequently lost their jobs.</sup> 20/

Though Corinto is a classic example it is far from the only one:

In August 1981, the President of the CTN, Juan Rafael Suazo Trujillo was abducted by a group of thugs identifying themselves as "members of the young forces against reactionaries." He was forced into a car bearing government license plates and pistol whipped. His abductors called him a

check spelling

traitor and an agent of the CIA, told him the beating was small punishment for his crimes and let him go.21/

In March 1982, the Secretary General of the Federation of Health Workers, a union that has for the most part cooperated with the Sandinistas, was arrested by government agents and taken to the offices of the Sandinista police and interrogated with a pistol at his head. His captors interrogated him for nine hours, repeatedly demanding he sign a blank sheet of paper, while they impugned his role in the union as counter-revolutionary. He has since taken refuge in the Venezuelan embassy.22/

"PROVISIONALLY" FREE

After a lengthy campaign of harrassment, five leaders of the CTN union "Aldo Chavarria" were arrested in the Nueva Guinea municipality in May 1982 by police and army officials. Before a public assembly they were accused of being counter-revolutionaries and threatened with a firing squad. Several days later they were told it was all a mistake and "provisionally" freed.23/

Bonifacio and Armando Ramos Matute, members of the Executive Committee of the CTN in Jalapa, have been continually harassed by the Sandinista Defense Committees for the area. They were told that if they did not affiliate with the Sandinista National Agricultural and Cattle Union they would be "cleaned out" of the area.24/

Days before the Sandinista declaration of the State of Emergency in September 1981, Rosendo Solorzano Fonseca and Javier Altamirano Perez, two CUS leaders from the Western region were arrested, and threatened and beaten by a mob that included members of the police. The two fled and took refuge in the headquarters of an independent union in Chinandega. The Sandinista police tracked them down, arrested them, stripped them and took them to a place in Chinandega where they were further interrogated and threatened with reprisals if they told anyone of their experiences.25/

WORKERS TOO

Many more incidents have been reported, including not only harassment of labor leaders, as in the cases mentioned here, but of ordinary workers as well. The aim is clear -- <sup>to render</sup> ~~wipe out~~ the independents <sup>impotent</sup> without risking the bad publicity from officially outlawing them. Indeed, according to a February 14, 1980 statement signed by Carlos Huembes Trejos, Secretary General of the CTN, Tomas Borge, Sandinista Minister of the Interior, has said that the CTN would be wiped out.26/

AS IN POLAND...

To quote Macias a final time:

"There are many mechanisms to enroll workers in organizations which appear to be labor unions, but ... lack the intrinsic quality of labor unions -- their freedom of choice and action"27/

That is the classic Communist labor strategy -- replace legitimate labor unions devoted to the good of the worker with pseudo-unions devoted to the convenience of the rulers. That strategy has kept Poland on the front pages for nearly three years -- but the same tragedy is being played in Nicaragua today.

NOTES

1. Annual Labor Report: "Labor Trends in Nicaragua;" p.1.
2. The Permanent Committee for Nicaraguan Human Rights: "A Union Report On Nicaragua." (This committee is one of the few remaining bodies in Nicaragua with the right to criticize the government.)
3. Macias, Edgard (former Sandinista Vice Minister of Labor); Statement of February 11, 1983: "Labor Relations in the Sandinista Regime;" p.14.
4. Op. Cit., "Labor Trends;" p.15.
5. Ibid, p.6.
6. Ibid, p.8.
7. Op. Cit., Macias; p.13.
8. Op. Cit., "A Union Report"
9. Op. Cit., "Labor Trends;" p.16
10. Op. Cit., Macias; p.6.
11. Verbal report from Latin American area advisor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor.
12. Petition of the Leaders of the United Confederation of Workers to Sandinista Commandante Bayardo Arce Castano, p.2.
13. Unclassified attachment to 3/1/83 AFL-CIO letter to Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor.
14. Op. Cit., Macias; p.10.
15. Op. Cit., "Petition;" p.5.
16. Op. Cit., "A Union Report."
17. Op. Cit., "Petition;" p.4.
18. Op. Cit., "Attachment to AFL-CIO letter."
19. State Department Cable, Managua 2268, unclassified paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.
20. Confederation of Central American Workers: Press release; June 13, 1983; San Jose, Costa Rica. Also cable from American Embassy, Managua, 3294, July 29, 1983, unclassified.
21. Op. Cit., "A Union Report."
22. Ibid
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Ibid
27. Op. Cit. Macias; p.12.



### NICARAGUAN REPRESSION OF LABOR UNIONS

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This same path is being pursued by the Communist leaders of Nicaragua. The primary purpose of labor unions in today's Nicaragua is to assist in the forced transformation of society along the lines determined by the Sandinista leadership.<sup>1/</sup> Existing independent trade unions are being harassed, their members blacklisted, threatened, and sometimes

jailed. Most of the unions and most of the union members in the country have been pressed into Sandinista labor confederations subservient to the government. These confederations have surrendered hard won contract concessions and have forced lower pay and inferior working conditions on their members. Strikes have been forbidden, collective bargaining has become a farce.2/

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10. Op. Cit., Macias; p.6.
11. Verbal report from Latin American area advisor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor.
12. Petition of the Leaders of the United Confederation of Workers to Sandinista Commandante Bayardo Arce Castano, p.2.
13. Unclassified attachment to 3/1/83 AFL-CIO letter to Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor.
14. Op. Cit., Macias; p.10.
15. Op. Cit., "Petition;" p.5.
16. Op. Cit., "A Union Report."
17. Op. Cit., "Petition;" p.4.
18. Op. Cit., "Attachment to AFL-CIO letter."
19. State Department Cable, Managua 2268, unclassified paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.
20. Confederation of Central American Workers: Press release; June 13, 1983; San Jose, Costa Rica. Also cable from American Embassy, Managua, 3294, July 29, 1983, unclassified.
21. Op. Cit., "A Union Report."
22. Ibid
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Ibid
27. Op. Cit. Macias; p.12.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO JUDGE WILLIAM P. CLARK,  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Faith Ryan Whittlesey

SUBJECT: White House Digest Paper, "Human Rights in  
Cuba" for Release August 3, 1983, and  
Related Matters

As we have all realized by now, one of the difficulties we face in selling the President's policies on Central America is the American people's unfamiliarity with the region and the players. Only a tiny percentage of Americans know which governments in Central America are friendly to the United States and which are not. The same holds true for the guerrilla groups.

We are all working to overcome this information gap. We realize that it would not be possible to educate every American thoroughly on the subject, however, Dr. Richard Wirthlin's Central American poll data shows a very great concern about the installation of "Marxist" and especially "Communist" governments or revolutions. If the American people knew we are opposing the Communists in Central America, the data suggests they would very much sympathize with our goals even lacking a detailed knowledge of the situation.

Common sense suggests the same conclusion. Wouldn't it be a great deal more difficult for some Congressmen to oppose aid to El Salvador if the network news shows had been using the identifying phrase, "Communist guerrillas" when speaking of the Salvadoran guerrillas rather than the phrase, "leftist guerrillas" as they have been?

The President and the United States would gain enormously by successfully identifying the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas as Marxists but particularly as "Communists," a word about which there is no ambiguity and which is recognized by the largest number of people. "Marxist" and "Marxist-Leninist" will, occasionally, be appropriate, but both sound a little professorial, and also sound as if we are avoiding the word "Communist" and thus deliberately inviting ambiguity.

I am very distressed, therefore, by attempts by some people at NSC, DoD, and the State Department to sanitize the word "Communist" out of the White House Digest series.

The latest instance is our paper scheduled for release Wednesday, August 3, 1983, "Human Rights in Cuba." As drafted by this office, the paper identified the government of Nicaragua as "Communist." Some people in the clearance process at the State Department and DoD objected. NSC concurred in the objections and inserted "pro-Soviet" for "Communist."

After strenuous objections from us, NSC, through Walter Raymond, went as far as "Marxist-Leninist" but no further.

At the Monday, August 1, 1983, meeting of the Outreach Working Group there was, except for Walter Raymond, a unanimous consensus to use the stronger and more well-recognized word, "Communist."

Despite this unanimity of opinion, NSC, through Walter Raymond, refused to reinsert "Communist" and the paper has been forwarded to Mr. Darman with the less effective "Marxist-Leninist" phrasing.

This is ridiculous. "Marxist-Leninist" is an exact synonym for "Communist" as that word is most frequently and popularly used. If "Communist" has more impact, as it obviously does, there is no reason whatsoever to forbid its use in any case where "Marxist-Leninist" could be used.

At some times, and for some audiences, we will certainly use "Marxist-Leninist." But as there is no cause for shyness or ambiguity in this instance, I would appreciate it if you would clear the paper with the word "Communist" as a description for the Nicaraguan government.

More generally, it should be made clear to interested parties that the description "Communist" holds great advantages and should be used when the facts permit. As the key Sandinista leadership as well as the key Salvadoran guerrilla leadership have publicly accepted the label "Marxist-Leninist" on various occasions, there should never be any hesitation about identifying them as Communists.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 9, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Boh*

SUBJECT: Digest Paper for Central America Outreach  
Working Group re Human Rights in Cuba

On July 22, you circulated a draft Digest paper on human rights in Cuba. We provided a revised draft on August 1, and now one further revision has been made to accommodate concerns raised by Faith Whittlesey. Specifically, the second sentence in the second paragraph should read: "Today, the Communist leaders of Nicaragua are threatening the fledgling democracy in El Salvador."

Attachment

Revised Digest paper

cc: Faith Whittlesey

### HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA

Since Castro's coming to power, Soviet supported Cuba has been violating her neighbors' right to self determination by attempting to "spread the revolution" throughout Latin America -- recruiting Communist and other radical leftist insurgents and providing them funds, arms, advisors, and organizations. The Cubans and their Soviet allies are attempting to subjugate the entire Caribbean basin into a second Eastern Europe.

Cuban intervention has helped establish a pro Soviet/Cuban regime in Managua. Today, <sup>the Communist leaders of</sup> ~~this self proclaimed~~ <sup>are</sup> ~~Marxist-Leninist Nicaraguan junta~~ is threatening the fledgling democracy in El Salvador. Cuban agents have tried to destabilize Guatemala for two decades. To fully understand what Cuban aggression means to the people of the region, it is important to look at the Castro Government's appalling record on human rights.

### CLASSIC TOTALITARIANS

In over two decades, that record has shown no sign of improvement. Like other Communist countries, Cuba is a tightly controlled, highly centralized, totalitarian state. The government fiercely represses those it identifies as being "in opposition to the state," wantonly violating their human rights.

Over the years Castro has jailed thousands of Cubans who opposed or were suspected of opposing or criticizing Communist rule. Most sources place the current number of political prisoners at up to 1000, some of whom have been in jail since 1959, making them some of the longest-held political prisoners in the world.

Prisoners are treated brutally. In defiance, several hundred prisoners, known as "Plantados," have refused "reeducation" and refuse to wear uniforms that would identify them as common criminals. As punishment they have been denied food, medicine, and clothing.

### TORTURE

Beatings are common. Prisoners are sometimes punished by being held, naked, in cold, dark isolation cells for long periods. According to reports received by Freedom House, the non-partisan human rights organization, the Cubans, like the Soviets, are using psychiatric hospitals as prisons.

Recently a long-time political prisoner, poet Armando Valladares, gave the world a chilling first hand account of Cuban treatment of political prisoners. In December 1982, Valladares, only lately released, testified in Congress that repression of Cuban political prisoners is "ferocious." According to Valladares, the Cuban police forced his mother to write a letter denouncing him. The letter was dictated by a Cuban secret

policeman holding a court order that would have sent Valladares' sister to jail had her mother refused to cooperate.

Valladares testified that the imprisoned include children and that physical and psychological torture is common. While in prison, he was brutally beaten and at one point was denied food for more than 40 days, losing the use of his legs as a result.

Amnesty International has transmitted a report that last year 29 prisoners were executed for political offenses.

### CUBAN DISSIDENTS

Though Castro claims that Cubans are free to emigrate, and though some emigration, as in the Mariel exodus in 1980, is strongly encouraged, the Cuban government routinely refuses to allow citizens to leave the country. This restriction is applied especially, though not exclusively, to political opponents of the regime, and especially to opponents who have been imprisoned.

Cuban poet Angel Cuadra Landrove was released from Castro's prisons in April 1982. Though he holds several foreign visas, the Cuban government will not allow him to leave the country. Andres Vargas Gomez, a Cuban intellectual and diplomat, also served many years in Castro's political prisons. Now out of prison, he is still denied the exit permit required for emigration.

The case of Cuban Ambassador Gustavo Arcos Bergnes is especially instructive. Arcos fought and was wounded at Castro's side during the famous July 26, 1953 attack on Batista's Moncada barracks. When Castro took power, Arcos was named Cuban Ambassador to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. But, in the mid-1960s, he was recalled and imprisoned for four years for his democratic beliefs.

In 1979, his son was gravely injured in a motorcycle accident in Florida. The U.S. Congress appealed to the Cuban government to allow Arcos to leave Cuba to visit his son. The appeal was refused. Months later, Arcos was charged with attempting to leave the island without the necessary papers and was given a seven year prison sentence.

The reverse policy, forced emigration, can be just as cruel. Suddenly, in 1980, the emigration gates were opened. During the rush that followed out of the port of Mariel, when 125,000 Cuban "boat people" fled to our shores, the Castro government shipped along many of Cuba's psychiatric patients. The American Psychiatric Association denounced this action on September 28, 1980, saying it was:

"deeply concerned about the plight of numerous recent refugees who have been identified as mentally ill. There is growing evidence that many of these Cuban citizens were bused from Cuban mental hospitals to the Freedom Flotilla to the United States. If this is the case, the transplanted of these patients constitutes a grossly inhumane act since it deprives the patients of their right to psychiatric treatment within the context of their culture and primary language."

#### DISAPPEARED

American citizenship has been no protection. Several dual-national Cuban Americans have been arrested while visiting relatives in Cuba. In eight cases the United States has not been given access to these Cuban Americans.

As in the Soviet Union, in Cuba opposition political parties, like all forms of dissent, are outlawed. There is no freedom of the press or of speech. All print and electronic media are owned and censored by the Ministry of Culture. Freedom of expression is further hampered by a widespread informer network, part of which is institutionalized in the neighborhood "Committees for the Defense of the Revolution."



### "ARTISTIC" STANDARDS

Artists have been jailed for not conforming with the government's artistic guidelines. In 1977, for instance, journalist Amaro Gomez was arrested and sentenced to eight years in prison for possessing his own unpublished and uncirculated poems and plays. Freedom House states that "writing or speaking against the system, even in private, is severely repressed." Though literacy is growing in Cuba, less and less can be written or read.

Those who practice religion are excluded from the Communist Party and thus from responsible positions in the government or the army. The religious also face discrimination in employment, housing, and schooling. Some believers have been prosecuted for their differences with the government. Others have lost their jobs or have been excluded from universities. All Catholic Church-run schools have been closed and the church is forbidden its traditional role in education.

### JAILING WORKERS

Free trade unions, collective bargaining, and strikes are all forbidden. In the last year, over 200 workers have been prosecuted for trying to organize strikes in the sugar and construction industries. Five trade unionists were condemned to death. But, according to reports, their sentences were reduced to 30 years after their cases became public knowledge. The Cuban government, after at first denying the facts, has said the "terrorists" received severe sentences.

At the recent conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Prague, the Cubans defended the sentences, explaining they were necessary to block any possible attempts to set up a Solidarity-style organization.

Rather than permit citizens to join independent groups, the government enrolls people in mass organizations such as the five million member Committee for the Defense of the Revolution. These non-democratic groups are used to channel the people's energies toward party-approved goals and to isolate people from more fruitful, but to the Party, dangerous associations.

As a result of 24 years of Communist control, more than one million Cubans, more than 10 percent of the island's inhabitants, have fled their homeland. An estimated 200,000 more have applied to emigrate, even though those who apply are usually stripped of their jobs, their ration cards, and their housing, and their children are forbidden to attend school.

#### THE GREAT CUBAN "EXPERIMENT"

All-in-all, the great Cuban "experiment" has developed into nothing more original than a tropical version of the Soviet Union, complete with political prisoners and total government control of human freedoms. And that is precisely what those who are trying to spread revolution to other Central American countries have in mind for the entire region.

It is no wonder then that in Nicaragua there is growing opposition to the Sandinista regime, nor that the people of El Salvador, 80 percent of whom voted in recent elections, are resisting the attempts of Communist terrorists to destroy democracy in that country.

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Already, Cuban intervention has helped establish a pro-Soviet/Cuban regime in Nicaragua. Today, the Communist leaders of Nicaragua are threatening the fledgling democracy of El Salvador. Cuban agents have tried to destabilize Guatemala for two decades. To fully understand what Cuban aggression means to the people of the region, it is important to look at the Castro government's appalling record on human rights.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond, II

FROM: Morton C. Blackwell *MCB:jet*

SUBJECT: White House Digest Paper

Attached is our fourth White House Digest Paper.

The footnotes are attached, however, as you are aware, they are not complete. Otto Reich will be providing the appropriate information to us by Monday morning.

You will note on your memo to Darman that I have not mentioned when we will need the paper on Wednesday (our usual practice has been to give him the time of the Wednesday meeting). It was my feeling that you might want to informally indicate the possibility of the President speaking to the group, but in case you did not want to do so, I did not want to give a more definite time.

MCB:jet

1 Attachment a/s

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: Faith Ryan Whittlesey

SUBJECT: White House Digest Paper

Attached is another paper in our series prepared by our Outreach Working Group on Central America.

I would appreciate your getting it cleared so that it can be printed and distributed at our Outreach Working Group Meeting on Central America which meets next Wednesday.

Thank you for your assistance.

1 Attachment a/s

The Palestine Liberation Organization is an active ally of Communist revolutionaries throughout Central America. The PLO supplied troops as well as materiel to the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, and is still supplying military aid and advisors to the Communist Sandinista government. For their part, Sandinista revolutionaries were fighting beside their PLO comrades in the Middle East as early as 1970, are brutally anti-Semitic, have persecuted the Jews in Nicaragua, and are dedicated to the destruction of Israel.

Right now, the PLO is giving the Salvadoran Communists the same sort of help. Since the late 1960s, the PLO has been working with Fidel Castro and his network of Latin American revolutionaries and has developed ties to revolutionary organizations in at least nine Latin American countries.

"BLOOD UNITY"

Though this alliance has received little attention in the press, neither the PLO nor its Latin Communist allies trouble to deny it. On June 7, 1979, six weeks before the Sandinistas came to power, Sandinista press spokesman Jorge Mandi delivered a particularly strong testimonial to the alliance:

There is a longstanding blood unity between us and the Palestinians. Many of the units belonging to the Sandinista movements were at Palestinian revolutionary bases in Jordan. In the early 1970s, Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood was spilled together in Amman and in other places during the Black September Battles.

. . . . .

It is natural therefore, that in our war against Somoza, we received Palestinian aid for our revolution in various forms.

Mandi also made it clear that the Sandinistas had participated in PLO terrorist acts such as hijacking.<sup>1</sup>

START WITH CUBA

Cuba has been the great organizing center and supply depot for Communist revolution in Central America. Fidel Castro introduced the PLO into the region and has vigorously promoted and supported the PLO's activities there.

Until the mid-1960s, Castro was a firm supporter of Israel. But, in 1966, Castro sponsored the First Conference of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, bringing together terrorists from three continents in order to get them to work together.

PLO representatives attended, and Castro began efforts to make the PLO a part of international revolutionary activities, especially in Latin America.

By 1968, Cuban intelligence and military personnel were assisting the PLO in North Africa and Iraq. By 1969, Cuban officers were in joint training with PLO officers in the U.S.S.R. In June 1969, Cubans from that training class participated in a joint raid with the PLO in the Sinai desert.<sup>2</sup>


In 1972, Castro met with PLO leaders in Algeria and the two sides agreed to step up their joint activities.<sup>3</sup> The PLO undertook to augment Cuban training of Latin American terrorists with specialized training in Lebanon, South Yemen, and Libya. In 1973, Castro broke relations with Israel. Cuba had become one of Israel's most vicious enemies. In 1974, the PLO opened its first Latin American office in Havana.<sup>4</sup>

Since being introduced to the region by Castro, the PLO has developed ties with revolutionary groups in nearly half the countries in the region.

(ILLUSTRATION OF ARAFAT FACE SHOWING RELATIONS TO TERROR GROUPS)

#### THE NICARAGUA CONNECTION

Cooperation between the Sandinistas and the PLO goes back at least to 1969, seven or eight years before most



**Intelligence information has linked the PLO with terrorist and guerrilla organizations around the world.**

Americans had heard of the Sandinistas. That year, 52 Sandinista guerrillas went to Tyre for training under the PLO.<sup>5</sup> Other Sandinistas went to train in terror at PLO camps in Algeria.<sup>6</sup>

The Sandinista terrorists fit right in with their PLO counterparts. Pedro Arauz, a Sandinista who had hijacked a Nicaraguan airliner in 1969, trained under the PLO in 1970.<sup>7</sup> As the quote from Jorge Mandi makes clear, Sandinista troops fought beside the PLO against King Hussein of Jordan in 1970.<sup>8</sup>

Thomas Borge, the first Interior Minister of the Sandinista regime, has confirmed that he and other Sandinist-leaders were trained by Al Fatah, the leading PLO group, prior to 1970. Borge spent much of the early '70s working for Castro, and was frequently in the Middle East, where he used Libyan money and PLO assistance to obtain arms for Central American guerrilla movements.<sup>9</sup>

The first official confirmation of the PLO-Sandinista alliance came in February 1978. The two groups issued a joint communique in Mexico City that affirmed the "ties of solidarity existing between the two revolutionary organizations. They were united in their hatred of what they called the "racist state of Israel."<sup>10</sup>

In a similar incident in March of 1978, the Sandinistas went so far as to join the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine in a joint "declaration of war" against Israel.<sup>11</sup>

As the Sandinistas became more confident of victory, PLO aid became more concrete. Early in 1979, shortly before the

final Sandinista victory, the PLO sent an arms shipment to the Sandinistas but it was intercepted by the government of Morocco.<sup>12</sup> During the final weeks of the revolution, several large shipments of arms arrived from the Middle East.<sup>13</sup> According to one source, Thomas Borge arranged for a shipment of guns to be sent from North Korea on a ship owned and operated by the PLO.<sup>14</sup>

Within two weeks of the Sandinista victory in July 1979, the Sandinistas sent a mission to Beirut to establish official contacts with the PLO.<sup>15</sup> The PLO also extended the Sandinistas a \$12 million loan.<sup>16</sup> Today, Nicaragua is the only country in the world where the PLO mission is officially designated as an Embassy and the ranking PLO official is referred to as "Ambassador" -- a testimony to the importance the Sandinistas attach to their PLO connections.

#### THE STORMS OF REVOLUTION

In 1980, on the first anniversary of the Sandinista Communist takeover, Yasser Arafat came to Managua as an honored guest. Thomas Borge proclaimed, "the PLO cause is the cause of the Sandinistas." And Arafat replied, "the links between us are not new; your comrades did not come to our country just to train, but to fight."<sup>17</sup> . . . Anyone who threatens Nicaraguans will have to face Palestinian combatants."<sup>18</sup>

The PLO information bulletin, Palestine, commented:



There is no doubt there is a common line between Nicaragua, Iran, and Palestine. A common front against a common enemy. . . .

The Palestinian revolution understands the international dimensions of its struggle and its international task of supporting, within its capabilities,<sup>19</sup> international liberation movements.

Current estimates suggest that there are about 50 PLO personnel in Nicaragua. Some are involved in training Sandinista military in the use of Eastern Bloc weapons, some training pilots and flying helicopters, maintaining aircraft and training Salvadoran guerrillas to export Communist terror to that country.

#### VICIOUS PERSECUTION

In a frightening development, the entire small Jewish community of Nicaragua has been forced into exile over the past several years. The Sandinistas seem always to have been rabidly anti-semitic -- in 1978 Sandinista supporters torched the doors of the Managua synagogue while services were going on. Even before the Sandinista takeover, the remaining Jews were terrorized into leaving. Some were arrested, some had their property confiscated. Others were turned out of their homes or subjected to death threats.

The Sandinistas confiscated the synagogue in Managua and turned it into a government youth center, covering the

Stars of David outside with propaganda posters and displaying anti-zionist slogans on the walls inside. Nuevo Diario, a Managua newspaper that often reflects government policy, has run articles filled with revolting anti-semitic propaganda.<sup>20</sup>

#### IN EL SALVADOR

There is also a strong alliance between the PLO and the Salvadoran Communist guerrillas. The Salvadoran Communists, like the Sandinistas, share the PLO's rabid hatred of Israel.

One of the first clear signs of sympathy between the two groups emerged when one of the major Salvadoran Communist guerrilla groups, the Popular Liberation Forces-Farabundo Marti (FPL-FM) kidnapped and murdered the South African Ambassador to El Salvador. The FPL demanded, as part of the ransom, that the Salvadoran government break relations with Israel and establish official relations with the PLO.<sup>21</sup>

Just a month later, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), another Salvadoran communist guerrilla group, bombed the Israeli embassy in San Salvador to show "solidarity with the Palestinian people," and demanded that the government recognize the PLO.<sup>22</sup>

In May 1980, a delegation from Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses (CRM), the unified political front for all the important Salvadoran Communist groups, met in Beirut with one of Yasser Arafat's deputies, Abu Jihad, and with George

Habash, head of the terrorist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and arrived at agreements for training programs and arms purchases. The first group of Salvadoran trainees finished a "course" in PLO-style terrorism at an Al Fatah camp in June, 1980.<sup>23</sup>

On July 23, 1980 representatives of the Salvadoran United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) which was then the unified military command for the various Salvadoran Communist groups, met with Arafat in Managua. Arafat promised them arms and aircraft.<sup>24</sup> Later in the year, Arafat did send some arms to the DRU,<sup>25</sup> and PLO fighters were sent to El Salvador in September.<sup>26</sup>

The alliance picked up steam in 1981. In March, Shafik Handal, a Salvadoran of Palestinian descent and President of El Salvador's Communist Party, met with Arafat and representatives of Habash's Popular Front in Lebanon. The meeting resulted in a joint communique that, among other points, included an agreement to continue cooperation between the unified Salvadoran guerrilla groups and Habash's group.<sup>27</sup>

By early 1981, according to Congressional testimony from Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Bushnell, there had been "a massive influx of arms from Soviet and other Communist sources. Radical Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the terrorist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have

furnished funds, arms, and training.

In January 1982, Arafat said publicly that PLO guerrillas were serving in El Salvador.<sup>28</sup> And documents captured in Beirut during the summer of 1982 reveal that there were Salvadoran guerrillas in PLO camps in Lebanon.<sup>29</sup>

THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

Though these fragments of information have left a clear trail, even without them there would be no doubt about the relationship between the Central American Communists and PLO terror, because both sides have loudly proclaimed it. In 1981, Yasser Arafat spoke in words too clear to be misunderstood or explained away:

We are a great revolution that can never be intimidated. We have connections with all the revolutionary movements throughout the world, in El Salvador, in Nicaragua -- and I reiterate Salvador -- and elsewhere in the world.<sup>30</sup>

1. Al Watan (Kuwaiti newspaper) June 7, 1979.
2. Palestine (PLO Information Bulletin), June, 1980.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Hadar, The Jerusalem Post, August 14, 1981.
6. Washington Post, July 12, 1979.
7. Bell, Human Events, November 25, 1978.
8. Israeli Defense Force paper, "Report -- The PLO and International Terror", March 1981.
9. (Refers to internal document, reich will provide alternative source.)
10. Op. cit., Hadar.
11. (Reich will provide source.)
12. State Department paper, "Communist, PLO and Libyan Support for Nicaragua and the Salvadoran Insurgents." May 25, 1983.
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16. London Daily Telegraph, December 2, 1981.
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18. (Refers to internal document, Reich will provide source.)
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20. The Jewish Week, June 2-8, 1983.
21. (Reich will clarify source.)
22. (Reich will clarify source.)
23. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Briefing, May 16, 1982.
24. U.S. Department of State Special Report #30, Feb. 23, 1981.
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26. Op. cit., U.S. News.

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