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EXCHANGE COMMISSION

⇒ 12:30 - 1:00 SUBJECT

→

2107 Press center

2:15





TALKING POINTS FOR
BRIEFING ON REGIONAL ISSUES
Iceland Meeting, October 1986

- We appreciate your taking time from your busy schedules to join us on such short notice this afternoon.

 - I believe that you, like we, are looking forward to President Reagan's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev with great anticipation.

 - The agenda, as you will hear, for the meeting in Reykiavik, as it was in Geneva, is a broad one, which will include: arms control, bilateral issues, regional conflicts and human rights.


 - The Soviets are tough negotiators. That is why it is important for the President to go to Iceland with the strongest possible hand.
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Tim

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/5/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: -----

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: EXECUTIVE EXCHANGE COMMISSION

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MILLER - ADMIN.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BARBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SS	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>DOLAN</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MASENG 	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: LThe attached has been forwarded to the President.

RESPONSE:

86 OCT 6 9 100 98

RECEIVED OPL-WW

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

(Dolan)
October 5, 1986
4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: EXECUTIVE EXCHANGE COMMISSION
MONDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1986

I am delighted we could meet today. First, this is a chance to say hello to all of you and compliment you on the work of the Executive Exchange Commission, an organization which remains one of the principal assets of America's private and public sector.

And second, I wanted to use this opportunity to offer a perspective -- the American perspective if you will -- on the meetings between Mr. Gorbachev and myself later this week in Reykjavik, Iceland. By the way, since we Americans have developed a reputation for being uncomplicated, straightforward and not especially long-winded, I want you to know I'll be trying to practice these national traits -- especially the last one -- in my remarks to you today.

Recently, as you know, there has been some speculation that the United States and the Soviet Union are about to sign important new arms control agreements. Now this sort of talk isn't all that unexpected; whenever leaders of countries are about to meet there are always those who predict landmark treaties and historical breakthroughs.

But, when I see such speculation I can't help but think of the first administrative post I held. I hope you'll forgive me for reminiscing here, but as a union president, I spent a good deal of time at the bargaining table and learned one valuable lesson: that it's the initial phase of the negotiating process -- laying the groundwork -- setting the agenda -- establishing

areas of agreement as well as disagreement -- that pays off in the future.

Now if that's true of labor and management negotiations here, you can imagine how relevant it is to Soviet-American bargaining sessions; after all, we both have a little more separating us than, say, G.M. and the U.A.W. So, groundwork is essential.

And from the beginning we have tried to make this a hallmark of Administration policy; we've tried to take a prudent, realistic and, above all, deliberate approach toward Soviet-American relations. Instead of rushing unprepared into negotiations with the Soviets, the Administration took the time in its earliest days to make clear the essential elements of American foreign policy: our commitment to the twin goals of world peace and world freedom, our willingness to be realistic and candid about the Soviets, to publicly define the crucial, moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy and to actively assist those who are struggling for their own self-determination. Yet at the same time we also made plain another of our essential objectives -- our determination to seek ways of working with the Soviets -- to prevent war and to keep the peace. In pursuing this objective, we adopted a step-by-step approach towards Soviet-American negotiations, gradually expanding and intensifying the areas of both bilateral and multilateral discussion. And, as we've seen, eventually summit meetings themselves became a critical part of that effort.

Now this willingness to make painstaking preparations was what I believe made last year's talks in Geneva a success. Each

side had a good idea of what to expect; there was an agenda; Mr. Gorbachev and I could be candid with each other. In short, we had something to work with, something to build on.

And we must continue in this spirit. That's why Iceland is not intended to be a signing ceremony or a media event but a pre-summit planning session, a chance to make preparations for the serious work Mr. Gorbachev and I will have to do when he visits the United States. As I've said, Iceland is a base camp before the summit.

And yet, while our emphasis will be on planning and preparation not treaty papers or publicity, part of the emphasis in Iceland will be on the broad-based agenda we have agreed to: discussion not only of critical arms reduction proposals but equally important questions such as Soviet human rights violations and military intervention by the Soviets and their proxies in regional conflicts.

On this point of the summit agenda, let me add another point of background. A few years ago in a speech to the United Nations I said that I shared the sense of urgency many felt about arms control issues. But I also suggested that placing the entire burden of Soviet-American relations on arms controls negotiations could be dangerous and counterproductive. I noted that problems in arms negotiations should not be permitted to thwart or imperil the entire Soviet-American relationship and, similarly, that sometimes negotiations in other areas could assist in speeding up the arms control process. In short -- doing more about arms control meant talking about more than arms control. And so I

proposed what I called "umbrella talks," negotiations with a broad-based agenda.

The summit process has reflected this approach and included a broad-based agenda; we have stressed in addition to arms reduction three other agenda items: respect for human rights, resolving regional conflicts, and improving bilateral contacts between the Soviets and ourselves.

Now that first area, human rights, takes on -- in view of the recent Daniloff incident -- a particular relevance. As you know, after a Soviet spy was arrested at the U.N., the Soviets retaliated by arresting an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, on trumped-up charges. It was an act that held hostage not only an innocent American journalist but the future of Soviet-American relations.

That the arrest of a single spy could lead to such risk-taking by the Soviets again underscores the differences between our two systems. It was an extremely grave step but one that could hardly surprise us; after all human rights violations in the Soviet bloc remain unceasing because they are institutionalized and sanctioned by the state ideology.

It's worth noting here that shortly after Mr. Daniloff was freed we agreed to exchange the Soviet spy in question for the noted Russian human rights leader, Yuri Orlov and his wife. Mr. Orlov's service to humanity -- the record of his sufferings -- makes him a hero for our time; yet it is also worth noting he was persecuted simply because he led an effort to get the Soviet government to live up to the human rights agreements

it signed at Helsinki in 1975. When the Soviet state's ideology makes it a crime to advocate living up to international commitments, the rest of the world has to take notice; this point as well as the entire range of Soviet human rights abuses must be addressed at future summits.

So too, there is the issue of regional conflicts. It would be simply unthinkable for world leaders to meet in splendid isolation even as the people of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa and Southeast Asia undergo terrible sufferings as a result of Soviet invasion or military intervention. Again our proposals for resolving regional conflicts remain a critical agenda item. And on this point, you may have read last week that the Soviet Foreign Minister acknowledged that Afghanistan has to be discussed in Reykjavik. I wish we saw any evidence that the Soviets had made a decision to get out. They need to see that the only solution that can last is one providing self-determination for the Afghan people and a rapid, complete withdrawal of Soviet forces. Short of that, the freedom fighters will struggle on, and let me promise you, they'll have the support they need from people around the world.

Finally, there is the issue of broader contacts between the Soviet and American peoples especially young people. We all welcomed the commitment made last year in Geneva to increase contacts, notably in the cultural exchange area. This was the result of careful pre-summit planning and it is our hope that our work in Iceland will speed up implementation of these programs and lay the groundwork for further progress at future summits.

These then are the difficult matters on our summit agenda, arms reductions, human rights, regional conflicts, bilateral contacts -- I think you can understand then when Mr. Gorbachev extended his invitation to a pre-summit discussion I accepted. With such grave and complex matters, there is no such thing as too much preparation.

So, I hope that in explaining all this I have done something to dispel some of the inaccurate speculation and false hopes raised about the Iceland talks. I expect these talks to be useful and successful but only as preparation for future summit conferences. Our view is that we will proceed as we have from the start -- step-by-step -- cautiously, prudently, and realistically.

And by the way, I hope this last point about our realism helps to answer some of the domestic criticisms recently of the summit process. Actually, I've got to confess that hearing suggestions that I'm getting soft on communism is for me a new -- and perhaps the word is titillating -- experience.

But, seriously, I would ask those of my old supporters who may have voiced doubts to simply consider three facts that I think make the current summit process very different from that of previous decades. First, the United States has made it plain we enter these negotiations without illusions; and that we will continue to be candid about the Soviet Union, the moral implications of its ideology, the grave danger of its geopolitical intentions. Second, part of this candid approach includes restatement of what I said in my 1982 speech at Westminster Palace in Great Britain: that the ultimate goal of

American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom -- to see that every nation, every people, every person someday enjoys the blessings of liberty. And finally, I would ask that some note be taken of the historical tides. America is no longer under siege; far from it. Our economic and military power is resurgent, the Western democracies are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. In all of this, the United States continues to play its historical role and assist those who struggle for world freedom. And we believe the summit process can be useful in preventing war as we move towards a world of expanding personal freedom and growing respect for human rights. We believe the summit agenda reflects the helpful changes that have occurred in the world; we are discussing not just arms control, for example, but arms reductions.

Progress towards our twin goals of peace and freedom then will not be easy; as I mentioned in my Saturday radio talk -- we seek the support of all Americans. We need your help. And we also need, as I said, some careful preparation. And that is why we agreed to the talks in Iceland and will look forward to meeting Mr. Gorbachev there. And, come to think of it, it's also why I have to get back across the street to my homework and my briefing books.

Thanks for having me; again my compliments on your great work.

Thank you and God bless you.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 4, 1986

ADDRESS TO SUPPORTERS ON U.S./SOVIET MEETING IN ICELAND

DATE: October 6, 1986

LOCATION: Room 450 OEOB

TIME: 2:15 p.m.

FROM: MARI MASENG 

I. PURPOSE

To shape public perceptions of the upcoming Iceland meeting and to lay out the United States' four-part agenda.

II. BACKGROUND

Our goal for the meeting between you and Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland, just as it was last November, is to promote a broad, four-part agenda: arms control, regional conflicts, bilateral issues and human rights. The Soviets, on the other hand, wish to turn these meetings exclusively into arms control forums. We have invited representatives of groups which have supported your policies in Central America, Afghanistan, Africa, Southeast Asia and on national defense to provide you a forum at which you will reiterate that we are committed to pursue a broad agenda in Iceland.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Dais guests:

Mari Maseng, Deputy Assistant to the President and Director, Office of Public Liaison

June Walker, Director, President's Executive Exchange Commission

Peter Rodman, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC

The audience will include 100 representatives of veterans, women's, business, conservative, Jewish, ethnic and minority groups which support our pro-democracy and strong defense policies, as well as 60 participants of the President's Executive Exchange.

IV. PRESS PLAN: Open media coverage

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

You will enter Room 450 from the holding room, greet the dais guests, deliver remarks and depart.

Coordination: NSC (J. Mandel)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCENARIO

DROP-BY EXECUTIVE EXCHANGE COMMISSION

MONDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1986

450 OEOB

- 1:00 p.m. Guests begin arriving Pennsylvania Avenue entrance and are escorted via elevator to 450 OEOB.
- 1:45 p.m. Ms. Mari Maseng, Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Public Liaison makes opening remarks.
- 1:50 p.m. Mr. Peter Rodman, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council makes remarks.
- 2:05 p.m. Program break for press set-up.
- 2:10 p.m. THE PRESIDENT departs The Oval Office en route 450 OEOB.
- THE PRESIDENT arrives 450 OEOB anteroom.
- Announcement (off-stage)
- 2:15 p.m. THE PRESIDENT proceeds on stage and makes remarks.

Dais Participants

THE PRESIDENT

Ms. Mari Maseng, Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Public Liaison

Mr. Peter Rodman, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council

Mrs. June Walker, Director, The President's Executive Exchange Commission

OPEN PHOTO/WRITING POOL

(The photo will be THE PRESIDENT making remarks.)

10/06/86 11:00 a.m.

2:30 p.m.* THE PRESIDENT concludes remarks and departs 450 OEOB en route The Oval Office.

NOTE: Program concludes.

2:35 p.m.* THE PRESIDENT arrives The Oval Office.

* Denotes approximate time.