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December 16, 1985, UNITED STATES EDITION

SECTION: NATIONAL AFFAIRS; Pg. 24

LENGTH: 846 words

HEADLINE: Changing the Guard at National Security

BYLINE: TOM MORGANTHAU with JOHN BARRY and KIM WILLENSON in Washington

HIGHLIGHT:

Is Donald Regan the real chief of the NSC?

BODY:

When Henry Kissinger held it, the job of White House national-security adviser was regarded as the second most powerful job in the free world. But there was remarkably little fanfare last week when Robert C. McFarlane resigned -- a clear sign that the powers of the office have shriveled. Ronald Reagan announced the change during a brief appearance in the White House pressroom: McFarlane, said the president, was moving on to new challenges in private life, and his place would be taken by Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, McFarlane's deputy on the National Security Council staff. To all appearances, it was a routine bureaucratic transition.

McFarlane leaves at a difficult time for Reagan foreign policy -- just as its streak of global good fortune may be ending. The Philippines and South Africa could explode, a second U.S.-Soviet summit barely seven months off may increase pressure for a new arms-control agreement, and the superpower shoving matches in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua are heating up. Meanwhile, the administration is beset by internal squabbles over power and policy. Some presidents have settled such feuds themselves; others delegated them to the national-security adviser. Ronald Reagan has done neither, so the advantage goes to the toughest infighter.

That title now seems to belong to White House chief of staff Donald Regan, a hard-nosed ex-Marine with a well-known drive for primacy but little experience in foreign policy. Washington was abuzz with rumors that McFarlane's departure was the result of a Reagan power play -- gossip stoutly denied by Reagan, Regan and McFarlane himself. Nonetheless, said one administration official, the national-security adviser now is "nothing more than an assistant secretary to the chief of staff." He added: "you can't run a big-time foreign policy" that way.

The fact that Poindexter, like McFarlane, has a reputation for being a low-profile team player did nothing to dampen the gloomy speculation. Poindexter, who graduated first in his class at the Naval Academy and holds a doctorate in nuclear physics, is the very model of the modern military technocrat. He is known as a pragmatist, mostly apolitical, who on the eve of the 1983 Grenada invasion called the pre-invasion rumors "preposterous." After four years on the NSC staff, Poindexter made his mark in October during the Achille Lauro incident: it was he who pushed the plan to intercept the Palestinian hijackers' plane with Navy fighters.

(c) 1985 Newsweek, December 16, 1985

"John is a good choice and a capable staff officer," says one insider, "but he's no match for Don Regan, and Regan knew it." Regan pushed Poindexter's appointment, in part, critics charge, to avert a rivalry with a stronger national-security adviser -- someone like Lawrence Eagleburger, who was on the short list of five names presented to the president. Worse, some within the administration see Regan as an obstacle to the smooth development of Reagan's foreign policy. Several second-tier-officials who participated in the preparations for the Reagan-Gorbachev summit saw Regan as an ill-informed interloper. One said he had "come to the conclusion that Regan practices 'autohumiliation.' Why else would he insist on coming to meetings at which he has to sit in total silence because he understands nothing about the issues under discussion?"

"Direct access": Regan understandably bristles at the suggestion that he is in over his head on foreign policy. And he insists Poindexter will have the same access to Reagan that McFarlane had: he has "the freedom to see the president whenever he wants. He doesn't have to tell me first, and I don't have to sit in. But I do have to know what it's all about, and he's said that's fair enough. So did Bud [McFarlane]." Poindexter himself told reporters, "Don Regan told me yesterday that I had direct access." But his comment left some insiders groaning: already Regan seemed to be setting the ground rules.

There is little question that the role of national-security adviser has been substantially diminished under Reagan's cabinet style of government. Indeed, as one official sees it, McFarlane's resignation was prompted not only by the friction with Regan, but also by his frustration at the conflicts between Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. The corollary is that Poindexter faces the same problems in the months ahead. Further, some administration officials worry that Poindexter will be less capable than McFarlane was in dealing with Congress -- a crucial point, since Regan's confrontational style is widely criticized on Capitol Hill.

If so, the success of Regan's second-term foreign policy may be at risk. The administration remains divided on fundamental issues like arms control, and some believe that only the national-security adviser, acting for the president, can broker the necessary consensus. What seemed to be a routine transition between two White House bureaucrats, in short, may ultimately matter a great deal to Ronald Reagan.

GRAPHIC: Picture, Poindexter: "Don Regan told me yesterday I had direct access", JOHN FICARA -- NEWSWEEK

Senior White House officials, despite their outward lack of concern, are boiling over lack of support by European leaders for the attack on Libya. Some presidential aides complain bitterly that, if Europe had backed Reagan earlier on economic and political sanctions against Qadhafi for sponsoring terrorists, the raid would not have been necessary.

Fading prospects for a summer summit between Reagan and Gorbachev are taken in stride at the White House. Aides figure Moscow only used the Libya bombing as an excuse to call off preliminary talks because Gorbachev needs time to settle his own domestic problems and prefers a session late this year anyway.

Emerging as heroes of the Libya bombing: Secretary of State Shultz, who has argued a hard line for months, and National Security Adviser John Poindexter, praised for his cool briefings of the President.

Attorney General Meese is pressing Congress to let him hire private lawyers to go after \$23 billion owed to the government. Uncle Sam is losing about \$5 billion a year as the statute of limitations runs out on debts owed by students, farmers, businesses and others.

Did George Bush come out of the starting gate too soon for the 1988 presidential race? Some Republican strategists say the Vice President should have kept quiet this year and concentrated on raising money and organizing. Instead, they note, Bush's high profile is drawing early criticism by foes and the news media that he could have avoided.

Twice Libyan commanders in Tripoli ordered their Soviet-built MiG-23 fighters into the air to oppose the American raiders. And twice the Libyan pilots, known to be unenthusiastic about night flying, refused to take off.

David Stockman's book attacking Reagan's economic policies will backfire, Washington insiders predict. Some key members of Congress and business executives resent the former budget chief's dumping on his old colleagues and are turning a cold shoulder to his firm, the New York investment house of Salomon Brothers.

Bitter feelings inside the White House

Why Ed Meese is calling in the cavalry

Did George Bush jump the starting gun?

Richard Nixon will get a slightly bigger share than Gerald Ford or Jimmy Carter of the \$1.1 million that taxpayers will shell out for pensions and other expenses of former Presidents next year. Reason: Nixon's Manhattan office costs more than Ford's quarters in California or Carter's digs in Atlanta.

Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd finds himself virtually alone in protest-



Senator Robert Byrd
Standing alone

ing lack of consultation by Reagan before the attack on Libya. The West Virginia Democrat, a zealous protector of the Senate's authority and privileges, complained that the President's notification only hours before the bombers struck did not meet requirements of the War Powers Act. Not only will most of Byrd's fellow Democrats refuse to back him up but some may well go along with a Republican move to give the White House even more leeway on punishing terrorists.

Democrats weren't the only ones surprised when House Republican leader Robert Michel pulled a parliamentary maneuver to delay a vote on aid for the contra rebels in Nicaragua. Most GOP members and even some top White House aides were purposely kept in the dark to prevent a leak that would enable Speaker "Tip" O'Neill to block the move.

Republican Jake Garn of Utah is spearheading a drive in the Senate to give the President power to block loans by U.S. banks to the U.S.S.R. Some lawmakers want falling oil prices to keep economic pressure on Moscow, and say that American lenders let the Kremlin borrow some \$200 million last year.

Arizona Governor Bruce Babbitt will borrow Gary Hart's battle plan in his dark-horse race for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination. Like the Colorado senator in 1984, he will go all out in the early Iowa and New Hampshire voting. He already plans 30 days in Iowa and 12 in New Hampshire this year alone.

Look for a sharp upturn in the number of boat people fleeing Vietnam with an eye to reaching the United States. Refugee officials expect worsening economic conditions under Hanoi's regime to spur thousands into fleeing as soon as spring's monsoon rains abate.

California Democrats are growing more and more nervous over being on the same ballot with the effort to recall Chief Justice Rose Bird of the State Supreme Court. Bird's ratings have sunk so low that fellow liberals fear she'll take them down with her.

Congress is being urged to hit Qadhafi where it really hurts—in the wallet. A move is under way to deny a \$7.6 million Pentagon contract for tractors to an Italian firm that turns out to be partly owned by the Libyan government.

It will cost hard cash from now on to keep track of what's going on in Congress. Pressed to trim the deficit, lawmakers will charge lobbyists, reporters and citizens for copies of committee hearings that for years were handed out free. One of the last "bargains" will be free nine-volume sets of hearings on tax reform by the House Ways and Means Committee.

The Poindexter Doctrine

A cool warrior steadies the NSC


There was an almost palpable tension in the air as Ronald Reagan sat down in the Situation Room with his National Security Council last month. At issue were the rules of engagement for a chancy U.S. naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra, and in the past such a bold venture might have caused bitter wrangling between Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz. But this time Reagan and his advisers cordially agreed to a policy of "proportional response," under which Libyan military targets would be attacked in escalating stages of retaliation for terrorist acts. The doctrine was the work of John Poindexter, the laconic vice admiral who now occupies Henry Kissinger's old office in the White House.

When the 49-year-old Poindexter was named to succeed Robert (Bud) McFarlane last December, word went out that he was essentially a competent technician who would have no more success than his predecessor in settling the longstanding squabble between the two cabinet chiefs. His new policy did manage to placate both Weinberger, who believed that American commanders in the field should have the right to decide how to commit their firepower, and Shultz, who wanted Washington to determine in advance just how to escalate in response to terrorism. But while there was momentary calm in the wheelhouse, there was still a real question whether anyone was really in command of the administration's foreign-policy machinery.

Poindexter's colleagues, nevertheless, caution that

his pipe-puffing, soft-spoken style should not be taken for personal softness. On the contrary, says an admirer, he is the "classic U.S. Navy officer," shipshape, straight-backed, who has been known to counsel the president in blunt language. When U.S. jet fighters intercepted an EgyptAir plane carrying the

he is "without illusions [about the Soviets] but ready to make the all-out effort to achieve arms reductions. In his five years at the NSC, the only blot on his reputation came when he labeled reports of an invasion of Grenada "preposterous," prompting the White House press office to mislead reporters.



On the bridge: National-security adviser (left) with Reagan

hijackers of the Achille Lauro, Poindexter, then McFarlane's deputy, managed the operation by a secure transatlantic telephone hookup. A presidential aide recalls seeing him in the White House Situation Room, nonchalantly eating dinner while chatting on the phone with the U.S. commander at the NATO air base where the Egyptian plane was about to land. "I was damned impressed," the aide marvels.

Poindexter learned to be a cool warrior in 27 years of active naval service, after graduating at the head of his Annapolis class of 1958. Ideologically, he is said to be a "conservative pragmatist" on arms control, for instance,

But defenders see that willingness to tell a strategic fib as proof of his pragmatism.

Aides say Poindexter has achieved his first ambition in his new post, a melioration of the animus between the national-security adviser and the other principal players in the Reagan White House. Certainly, he has avoided the grinding tensions that characterized the relationship between his former boss, McFarlane, and White House chief of staff Donald Regan. Much of that conflict was over access to the president, but Poindexter has healed the breach by publicly deferring to the sometimes imperious chief of staff. Poindexter retains independent access but is careful to

keep Regan informed. Reagan deems Poindexter "able, alert, highly intelligent and low-key in a positive way."

'How, not whether': Ironically, some observers say, Poindexter's conciliatory style has contributed to a toughening of foreign policy. There is little doubt that since he assumed the top NSC job, the Reagan White House has seemed to adopt a more muscular stance toward the Soviet Union and adversaries ranging from the Sandinistas to the Libyans. Administration sources say this is not because Poindexter has assertively initiated these moves; rather, he simply doesn't exercise the restraining influence that the more summit-conscious McFarlane did. "Poindexter's forte is telling you how to mount an operation," says one insider, "but not whether you should."

Indeed the NSC chief's ability to get things done sometimes is limited because "he's not a manipulator," one source notes. Some senior officials worry that without a more aggressive political strategy, Congress may be able to take the foreign-policy initiative away from the White House, especially on the crucial issue of defense spending. A larger issue is whether the administration needs yet another problem solver or a real strategist at the president's right hand. "John is too much like Shultz and Regan," says one official. "All of them tend to think about the next battle, and none of them tries to look over the horizon much." What remains to be seen is whether Poindexter's conciliatory approach, having helped quell the conflict among Reagan's foreign-policy generals, can muster a vision to lead them forward.

DAVID GELMAN with JOHN WALCOTT and THOMAS M. DEFRANK in Washington

That Shy Fellow on the Firing Line

As the U.S. drifts on security issues, critics assail Poindexter

After 6½ years in Washington, the Reagan Administration is still scandalously divided on whether it really wants a new strategic-arms-control agreement with the Soviet Union and, if it does, just what kind. Increasingly beset by congressional critics, the Administration last week was still struggling to define its policy toward South Africa's repressive white government. Ronald Reagan floats blithely above the bureaucratic battles, apparently unwilling to knock heads, bruise egos and decide the urgent issues. Many officials in the capital deplore the drifting and look for someone to blame. Rather than take on the popular President, some are taking their frustrations out on the man who, on critical security matters, is assumed to have the President's ear: John Poindexter.

Poindexter? Almost unknown outside the Washington Beltway, he is a shy, pipe-smoking introvert who became Reagan's National Security Adviser last December and has tried to remain out of public view ever since. Mostly, he has succeeded. A Navy vice admiral still on active duty, Poindexter, 49, sees his role in a limited way: as a staff officer, skillfully condensing the arguments of the quarreling Cabinet secretaries and their underlings, then presenting the various action options to the President. Unlike Henry Kissinger under Nixon and Ford and, to a slightly lesser degree, Zbigniew Brzezinski under Carter, Poindexter does not consider himself a virtual foreign-policy czar. He has neither the desire nor the personality to pressure other high officials into agreement. Instead, by avoiding the limelight, Poindexter believes he can effectively work out compromises among his large-ego clients.

For all his apparent detachment, Reagan apparently favors a low-profile National Security Adviser. None of his previous appointees (Richard Allen, William Clark, Robert McFarlane) was a forceful head basher, eager to humble a department chief, as Kissinger did with Secretary of State William Rogers. Unfortunately for Poindexter, however, the NSC post is still widely considered a power center with such multiple responsibilities as massaging, if not coercing the departments, dealing with key legislators on critical issues and helping to sell and explain White House policy through press contacts. Not surprisingly, the reluctant

Poindexter has been criticized for failing to perform these tasks effectively.

— Poindexter botched the handling of an admittedly difficult White House switch on SALT II in May: Reagan's tentative decision to abandon the unratified treaty's limits on various strategic weapons. The NSC chief allowed news of the change to leak from a critical forum: a meeting of NATO foreign ministers. He re-



The National Security Adviser: trying to serve one master

"It doesn't make sense for me to change."

fused to brief the press on the matter, leaving a less expert White House spokesman, Larry Speakes, to fumble with explanations. Poindexter was also blamed for failing to get the nuances across to the President, who gave highly confusing answers to questions at a press conference.

A White House staffer complains that "Poindexter refuses to concede that explanation and promotion of policy is part of his job. At times, it hurts us." Poindexter, frankly admitting his weakness as a public spokesman, has told his aides, "I'm worried about that, but considering the things I do best, it doesn't make sense for me to change." He added, "I'm here to serve the President."

When Poindexter did finally decide to take a rare initiative with the press, announcing a South Africa policy review last month, the news captured front-page headlines, but he was bitten by both the

White House and State Department. Speakes complained that the significance of the review was overstated and Secretary of State George Shultz considered the pronouncement premature. While allowing that Poindexter, who holds a Ph.D. in nuclear physics, has a brilliant analytical mind, his critics contend that he is such a poor communicator that he cannot brief the Great Communicator in the big-picture, skip-the-details style that Reagan prefers.

The NSC has suffered some personnel problems under Poindexter, notably the loss to the State Department of Jack Matlock, a respected Kremlinologist. Another highly regarded key aide, Donald Fortier, has been seriously ill and was belatedly replaced last week by Alton Keel, an experienced bureaucrat who most recently excelled as the executive director of the commission that investigated the *Challenger* disaster. Overall, however, most observers feel that Poindexter has strengthened the staff since taking charge.

Despite the carping, Poindexter has many admirers in Government who point to his substantive successes. They cite his role in devising the Navy's bold interception of an Egyptian airliner carrying the hijackers of the *Achille Lauro*, his ability to overcome Pentagon qualms about launching air strikes against Libya and his role in getting Congress to renew military aid to *contra* forces in Nicaragua.

One Poindexter defender is White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, who says, "He doesn't talk to the press as much as some of us, and maybe that's wise. But he's brilliant, thoughtful, reasoned and completely unflappable." Poindexter has had some problems

dealing with Regan, but so do most White House aides. "You either grovel at Don's feet or have a confrontation," contends a friend of the NSC head, Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, praises Poindexter's work as "absolutely superb" and lauds the fact that "no matter what happens, John just keeps puffing on his pipe. That's something in that job."

Perhaps so. But a few less puffs and more forceful words may be needed from the National Security Adviser as he faces a series of imminent tests. If the Administration cannot explain its South Africa policy more effectively, Congress seems ready to impose its own views. If there is to be another summit, the U.S. must decide where it is headed on arms control. Perhaps unfairly, the man who advises the easygoing President cannot afford to go too easy himself.

—By Ed Magnuson.
Reported by David Beckwith/Washington

June 1986

International Terrorism

Background: International terrorism is a serious and growing threat to the US and the world. It is becoming increasingly frequent, indiscriminate, and state-supported. The US is a prime target because we have an extensive official and commercial presence overseas: our citizens and facilities are accessible to the public; our policies, values, and culture are directly opposed by many terrorist groups; and moderate pro-Western governments that we support are often those which terrorists are trying to destabilize.

Terrorist activity: From 1975 through 1985, more than 6,200 terrorist incidents were recorded worldwide, leaving roughly 4,700 people dead and more than 9,000 wounded. During 1985, the US Government counted about 812 international terrorist incidents, up more than 30% from the 1984 level and 55% higher than the average for the previous 5 years. Most terrorist incidents in 1985, some 45%, occurred in the Middle East, an additional 25% in Europe, with about 15% in Latin America, and the remaining 15% in other regions. Total 1985 casualties were 2,223 (926 dead). In the first 3 months of 1986 we recorded 162 casualties, with France sustaining the most, 47. The past year also has seen a dramatic rise in state-supported terrorism, with terrorists affiliated or supported by Libya, Iran, and Syria claiming many of the attacks. Terrorists are increasingly willing to use more violent methods: the murders of innocent civilians at the Rome and Vienna airports, the slaying of Leon Klinghoffer aboard the Achille Lauro and of Robert Stethem on the hijacked TWA 847, the bombing of TWA 840 and the disco in Berlin all point to greater violence intended to hit as many people as possible. The scope of terrorism has also widened: last year terrorists hit citizens and facilities of more than 90 nations.

Chief perpetrators and targets: The most deadly terrorists continue to operate in and from the Middle East, including Libya. Middle East terrorists were involved in the majority of terrorist attacks in 1985, many of them in Western Europe. The two main categories of Middle East terrorists include: militant Shi'ites from various Arab countries, especially Lebanon, inspired and trained, often armed and financed, and, to varying degrees, guided by Iran; and radical Palestinian elements of the mainline Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), often with the direct support of Libya, Syria, and Iran. In addition, actual agents of governments such as Libya often act directly rather than through surrogates. The targets of Middle East terrorists fall principally into three groups: Israel; Western governments and citizens, particularly France and the US; and Arab governments and their officials, including Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, as well as the mainline PLO.

In Europe, many terrorists have operated during the past decade: lesser known ethnic groups as well as leftist organizations such as the Red Brigades, Direct Action, Red Army Faction, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Beginning in late 1984, several different terrorist groups in various West European countries adopted a common propaganda line and attacked a common set of targets related to NATO. This resurgence of leftist terrorist activity in West Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal plus continued terrorism in Greece, accounted for most of the increase in European incidents, with Middle East-origin terrorism accounting for the rest.

In Latin America, social, economic, and political turmoil prolonged

existing patterns of insurgency and international and domestic terrorism in several countries, particularly El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile and Peru. Most Latin American terrorism appears aimed at governments associated with the US and at US Government installation, officials, and private businesses. Nicaragua and Cuba have been implicated in some regional terrorist activity.

US Policy: President Reagan said in June 1985 that "America will never make concessions to terrorists--to do so would only invite more terrorism--nor will we ask or pressure any other government to do so." US policy is direct. We make no concessions, we pay no ransom, we permit no release of prisoners, nor agree to other acts that might encourage further terrorism. WE make no changes in US

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SECTION: Section A; Page 14, Column 1; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 728 words

HEADLINE: MAN IN THE NEWS;
THE NEW SKIPPER; JOHN MARLASN POINDEXTER

BYLINE: By MICHAEL R. GORDON, Special to the New York Times

DATELINE: WASHINGTON, Dec. 3

BODY:

At a White House news conference today, Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter was asked if the press would ever see him again.

'Maybe,' he replied and the remark drew general laughter.

Admiral Poindexter, whom

President Reagan named as his national security adviser today, has shunned publicity and press contacts since he joined the staff of the National Security Council in 1981.

Since 1983 he has served as the deputy to Robert C. McFarlane and has been known as an insider's insider. But those who know him describe him as intelligent, extremely hard working, politically conservative and personable.

First in His Class

The 49-year-old admiral is the fourth national security adviser to serve President Reagan and the 14th to hold the position since it was established in 1953 under President Eisenhower.

He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1958. 'He was not only first in his class at the Naval Academy but also Brigade Commander' of the class, President Reagan said today.

Mr. Reagan said that the only other graduate of a military service academy to achieve that distinction was Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

Admiral Poindexter also earned a Ph.D. in nuclear physics in 1964 from the California Institute of Technology, where he studied under the Nobel laureate Rudolph Mossbauer.

Service in Washington

John Marlan Poindexter was born in Washington, Ind., on Aug. 12, 1936. After his graduation from the Naval Academy, he was married in the chapel there to Linda A. Goodwin, a colonel's daughter. They have five sons: Daniel, Alan, Mark, Thomas and Joseph. The family now lives in Rockville, Md..

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During his naval career, Admiral Poindexter commanded the guided missile cruiser England and a destroyer squadron and saw service in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific.

But from 1971 to 1978 he made his mark as an aide to Navy secretaries and the Chief of Naval Operations.

From 1978 to 1981 he served as the deputy chief of naval education and training. Then he went to the National Security Council.

As Mr. McFarlane's deputy, Admiral Poindexter was more involved in regional issues and crisis management than arms control. But Administration officials said he was "plugged in" on arms control issues.

Admiral Poindexter headed the Security Council's so-called crisis pre-planning group. He was deeply involved in the Administration's handling of the Achille Lauro affair, including the decision to intercept an Egyptian airliner carrying the hijackers of that ship, according to a White House official. The official also said that the admiral was also intensely involved in the Administration deliberations over the hijacking last summer of the T.W.A. plane in Beirut.

He has also taken a strong interest in the organization of the Security Council staff and was said by a White House official to have been the favorite candidate of Mr. McFarlane and the staff to follow Mr. McFarlane as national security adviser.

'Pragmatic' Approach Praised

A State Department official said that many in that agency were pleased with the appointment of a military officer who had a "pragmatic" approach to issues.

"He is a smart, energetic guy who has tried in an energetic way to get things done," one official said.

But some here said they were disappointed that Admiral Poindexter was selected instead of other candidates with a more ideological approach to national security issues.

Richard A. Viguerie, a conservative publisher and publicist, described Admiral Poindexter as a "technocrat" and said his appointment reflected a "mind-boggling insensitivity" to conservatives.

Others have questioned whether he will be willing to play the sort of assertive role that is necessary to resolve the continuing bureaucratic clashes between Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and Secretary of State George P. Shultz on arms control, United States-Soviet relations and other issues.

But R. James Woolsey, who served as an Under Secretary of the Navy during the Carter Administration, disputed that view.

"He is not the table-slamming, cigar-chewing type of military officer," said Mr. Woolsey, who has worked with Admiral Poindexter. "He speaks in soft tones but nobody will have any doubt that he is a major player. He has no

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trouble at all making it clear where he stands.''

GRAPHIC: photo of John M. Poindexter (NYT/Jose R. Lopez)

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October 12, 1985, Saturday, Late City Final Edition

SECTION: Section 1; Page 1, Column 3; National Desk

LENGTH: 1547 words

HEADLINE: U.S. HEADS OFF THE HIJACKERS: HOW THE OPERATION UNFOLDED

BYLINE: By FRANCIS X. CLINES, Special to the New York Times

DATELINE: WASHINGTON, Oct. 11

BODY:

Shortly after noon Thursday, Eastern daylight time, President Reagan conferred in a private office at a cake factory near Chicago and, after weighing the risks, decided to try to intercept an Egyptian civilian jet with United States fighter aircraft.

Mr. Reagan was told that intelligence experts expected that the plane would soon be flying from Cairo with the four hijackers of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, and the President decided to try and force them away from a safe haven and into a court of justice. His order was racing through Pentagon channels by 1:30 P.M.

The bold plan for an airborne operation to seize some initiative from international terrorists was conceived and presented to the President early Thursday morning, according to White House officials.

Fighter Planes Are Scrambled

After he gave initial approval at midday in Illinois, F-14 fighter planes were scrambled from the American aircraft carrier Saratoga and were flying over the Mediterranean at 2:15 P.M. Eastern time - it was already evening in Europe - to await his final order.

At 4:37 P.M., as he returned to Washington on Air Force One after his visit to the Chicago area, the President received confirmation that the Egyptian plane had taken off 22 minutes earlier, and he issued his final instruction to have the armed fighters carry out the interception plan.

Mr. Reagan gave no hint of the risky operation as he traveled from Washington to Chicago on Thursday morning for a speech on tax reform. He told jokes to Representatives Henry J. Hyde and Lynn Martin, Republicans of Illinois, as they flew west aboard Air Force One.

But the attractiveness of the plan already was clear to him, according to aides, and he summarized that today in explaining his decision to proceed despite the attendant risks.

'Here was a clear-cut case in which we could lay our hands on the terrorists,' he said, after five years of frustration over a series of bombings and kidnappings directed at United States citizens in the Middle East.

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"We did this all by our little selves," Mr. Reagan said rather proudly. His advisers concurred, exultantly describing the seizure of the terrorists as a singular success for American intelligence and military planners, and as a tribute to the President's quiet decisiveness.

At the President's side in Illinois monitoring the word from Cairo was his national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, a soft-spoken combat veteran who said today that Mr. Reagan had expressed "very prudent regard" for the risks and had several times asked "what if" questions as he went over final details of the plan during a break on his tour of the Sara Lee Kitchens cake factory in Deerfield, Ill. RR

"It never reached the point where the risks exceeded the potential gains," Mr. McFarlane said. Memory of Failed Mission But as the time approached for the President's final order, various officials knew of the operation and could appreciate the risks, recalling the failed attempt by President Jimmy Carter to use military force to rescue the hostages in Iran in 1980.

"Those four people will be brought to justice," a cryptic but unusually confident Senator Dave Durenberger, Republican of Minnesota, told reporters Thursday at 4 P.M., shortly after he was briefed about the plan.

"Or whoever is still living at the time they can be brought to justice," Mr. Durenberger, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, quickly added, since the plan was still far from certain success.

When the cruise ship was commandeered on Monday, the Administration put into effect standing plans to have a military assault force prepare for a possible boarding action. But Wednesday was the earliest opportunity for the nighttime raid - too late to capture the terrorists, who had by then surrendered to Egyptian authorities and been promised safe passage from Cairo.

While the boarding raid was a known option of the Administration's antiterrorist contingency plans, the idea of intercepting the Egyptian airliner was not. Even as he was ordering the interception, the President was telling a Chicago crowd of his "gorge" of frustration at the incident, in which an invalid passenger from New York reportedly was shot in the head by the terrorists and thrown overboard.

Quality of Intelligence Data

As the President ordered the interceptors to proceed, he was operating with what Mr. McFarlane said was an unusually high quality of intelligence information from various sources, including the Central Intelligence Agency. He would not elaborate, but other Administration officials hinted there might have been sources who had the Egyptian plane, a Boeing 737, under visual surveillance as the takeoff was awaited.

In contrast to the joke-telling session on the trip to Chicago, Mr. Reagan did not visit his guests on the return trip aboard Air Force One, after he had issued his initial order and details were being received about the scrambling of the F-14's. "He was quieter, less ebullient," a Presidential aide recalled of the flight back to Washington.

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The aircraft that took off from the Saratoga included four F-14 fighters that had rehearsed their close-winged approach to the civilian jetliner, as well as three other F-14's, an E-2C radar intelligence plane and tanker planes to refuel the force during its five hours of action. It was being closely tracked by a team of Administration officials working in the Situation Room in the White House basement under the direction of Mr. McFarlane's deputy, Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter.

The Saratoga had been cruising at night near the Peloponnesus when the President's initial order arrived and had to turn into the wind to launch the aircraft. In formation above the Mediterranean, the planes were ordered to operate "in total darkness, in total silence," according to Navy Secretary John F. Lehman Jr. After waiting more than three hours, the planes, aided by extensive radar information, spotted the Egyptian 737 at 5:30 P.M. Eastern time at 34 degrees 25 minutes north latitude and 25 degrees east longitude, 80 miles south of Crete. They trailed it without announcing themselves; the jetliner's crew gave no indication it was aware of the surveillance, according to Pentagon officials.

Order to Intercept Is Given

The F-14 force monitored radio transmissions as the jetliner sought and was denied permission to land at Tunis, then Athens. Finally, the order was passed to the fighters to turn on their running lights and confront the jetliner by radio and shepherd it to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization base at Sigonella in Sicily.

One crucial question that Administration officials would not answer definitively today was whether the planes had been prepared to fire on the jetliner if the order were resisted.

"That's for them to go to bed every night wondering," Mr. Reagan said today, speaking of the incident as a lesson for any potential future terrorists.

The F-14's were equipped with 20-millimeter cannons and air-to-air missiles, and they could have fired bursts of bright tracer rounds in the darkness to impress the pilot of the unarmed civilian plane. But such action proved unnecessary, Pentagon officials said, as the pilot acceded soon after four F-14's approached nearly wing to wing. No shots were fired. "They would accept the escort, so to speak," Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger said, summarizing a moment of great relief, 6:10 P.M., as the message was relayed to the Situation Room.

The jetliner and its escort landed at the Sicily base at 6:45 P.M. Eastern time. It was instantly surrounded by troops from the base, which is near the city of Catania.

A Period of Confusion

A period of confusion followed involving American and Italian officials, according to Administration officials. Heavy air cover could be seen, with planes circling the field, according to one officer on duty at the time, and from time to time the jetliner was towed from one point to another, as if to protect against potentially unfriendly interlopers.

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Shortly after 11 P.M. Thursday in Washington, the White House confirmed the mission and said it had achieved the President's goal: to see the terrorists brought to custody in order to face charges for the hijacking.

Larry Speakes, the President's spokesman, summarized the mission and Mr. Reagan's role in it. 'He approved the escalation of it as events warranted,' Mr. Speakes said. 'It was just the right application of U.S. force.'

Mr. Reagan's joy was evident today when he paraphrased Joe Louis, the boxing champion, in contending that terrorists henceforth will know that 'you can run but you can't hide.'

By midday today, 24 hours after the President made his decision at the cake factory in Illinois, Administration officials were discussing a new concern: the incident's effect on relations with Egypt.

Diplomacy, not midair confrontation, was the new mission at the White House, which had been tracking the terrorists in Egypt even as Egyptian officials contended they had moved on. Mr. Speakes said the President wished to emphasize that he did not consider relations with Egypt to have been severely damaged.

'These have been trying times,' Mr. Speakes said.

GRAPHIC: Photo of the Egyptian plane under guard at the NATO airport in Sicily (Reuters); Photo of American passengers leaving the Achille Lauro in Port Said (AP); Chart showing chronology of events leading to interception

TYPE: CHRONOLOGY

SUBJECT: SHIPS AND SHIPPING; HIJACKING; CRUISES; PALESTINIANS; HOSTAGES

ORGANIZATION: PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

NAME: CLINES, FRANCIS X; REAGAN, RONALD WILSON (PRES)

GEOGRAPHIC: MEDITERRANEAN SEA; EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF; ISRAEL, STATE OF; ITALY; MIDDLE EAST

TITLE: ACHILLE LAURO (SHIP)

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January 12, 1987, Monday, Late City Final Edition

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HEADLINE: POINDEXTER AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL: A QUICK RISE AND A TROUBLED REIGN

BYLINE: By KEITH SCHNEIDER, Special to the New York Times

DATELINE: WASHINGTON, Jan. 11

BODY:

Throughout his career in the Navy, Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter was regarded as the consummate military aide, the man who carried out orders with alacrity and, at times, brilliance.

That was the principal trait that President Reagan and Donald T. Regan, the White House chief of staff, sought in December 1985 when Robert C. McFarlane resigned as national security adviser and Admiral Poindexter was promoted to the job, Administration officials said.

But the skills that allowed Admiral Poindexter to perform well within the military restricted his knowledge of civilian politics and caused him to become drawn into the Iran arms affair, civil and military officials agreed.

In the last week it became clear that Admiral Poindexter played a much greater role than had earlier been acknowledged in the program to sell American arms to Iran and divert money from those sales to the Nicaraguan rebels, known as contras.

Drafted Order on Arms

Documents made public by the White House on Friday showed that Admiral Poindexter drafted President Reagan's order last January that the United States should continue selling weapons to Iran and did his best to keep the program secret, even misleading other senior Administration officials at times.

A draft report by the Senate Intelligence Committee shows that Admiral Poindexter was an active participant in planning the operation from the early days in the summer of 1985. According to the report, Admiral Poindexter also played a pivotal part in January 1986, when he persuaded President Reagan to resume shipping arms to Iran after Mr. Reagan had decided to end the program late in 1985. Admiral Poindexter briefed the President on the necessity of the arms sale after he met with Israeli officials in December, soon after taking over as national security adviser, the report said.

The report said that early last November he even persuaded William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, not to consult the White House counsel on the legality of diverting money to the contras. Admiral Poindexter said he worried that he could not trust the counsel to keep the matter secret.

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Admiral Poindexter would not agree to an interview or respond to allegations raised in the Senate report or elsewhere.

Turmoil on the Staff

According to colleagues on the staff of the National Security Council, senior officers in the Pentagon, White House officials and members of Congress, Admiral Poindexter had difficulties on the job from his earliest days as national security adviser.

Until he resigned on Nov. 25, according to these officials, Admiral Poindexter's short term as national security adviser was marked by turmoil on the N.S.C. staff, distrust on Capitol Hill and a desire to conduct most affairs of the N.S.C. in an envelope of secrecy so secure that the Congress, the State Department, the Pentagon, the White House and most of his own staff members were not aware of some important developments, including many related to the Iran-contra affair.

Senior officers who worked with Admiral Poindexter in the Navy said they were bewildered by his participation in the Iran-contra affair.

'He was a guy of unquestionable integrity,' said Adm. James L. Holloway 3d, the Chief of Naval Operations from 1974 to 1978, who hired Admiral Poindexter, then a captain, to serve as his executive assistant. 'He was not a fanatic on any issue. He had no hangups. He was just very well balanced.' But former National Security Council staff members, and top officers at the Pentagon who worked with him on issues ranging from arms control to terrorism, said Admiral Poindexter had difficulty in mastering his new role as national security adviser. He was abrupt with some staff members, they said. He was unwilling to listen to views that differed from his own and sometimes punished those who offered them.

The staff members said he loathed the press and disliked dealing with members of Congress - even though dealing with them is among the essential duties of the national security adviser.

'He told us time and time again that he was more comfortable alone in his office with the door closed, reprogramming his computer, or at home tinkering with his car or making furniture,' said a former N.S.C. staff member. 'Those are all kind of solitary endeavors.'

Key Aide Was Ailing

'He was a nuclear scientist and a military man,' said another former staff member, who said he believed that Admiral Poindexter did not understand the politics of the situation.

Admiral Poindexter was further hampered by the illness of a key aide, Donald R. Fortier, the deputy national security adviser and a well-respected member of the staff, who was hospitalized early in 1986 and died of cancer in August at the age of 39.

Colleagues say Mr. Fortier had an aptitude for the larger geopolitical demands of the agency's work. 'When Donald left, nobody was there to deflect staff demands, or carry out all the paper chores, or be the principal deputy

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that staff members could trust," said a former N.S.C. official, who said he believed that Mr. Fortier would have exerted more supervision over Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North.

Mr. Fortier was also in charge of the political-military affairs staff, the group that included Colonel North as deputy director. Colonel North was dismissed in November because of his role in the Iran-contra affair.

After Mr. Fortier became ill and left the agency, Colonel North quickly filled the role of principal adviser to Admiral Poindexter on Central American policy and was left free to roam almost at will, former staff members said.

North His Own Boss

Several staff members said Admiral Poindexter clearly indicated early in 1986 that Colonel North was his own boss. According to Robert S. Bennett, the lawyer for Howard J. Teicher, former director of political-military affairs, Admiral Poindexter specifically told Mr. Teicher in February 1986 that Colonel North would not be under his command.

"Poindexter also told Teicher that he would be establishing a separate directorate which would retain direct responsibility for terrorism matters," Mr. Bennett said. Further, according to Mr. Bennett, Admiral Poindexter told Mr. Teicher that matters concerning the contras in Nicaragua would remain Colonel North's responsibility and that Mr. Teicher's directorate was not to get involved in those matters.

Admiral Poindexter turned to a group of retired and active Navy officers to manage the staff and advise him. At one point, 10 N.S.C. staff members - 20 percent of the staff - were retired or active Navy men, including the executive secretary, the defense policy coordinator and the legal adviser, according to N.S.C. records.

"He had limited contact in the Government or in politics, and when things got tough, he turned to the men he most trusted and those were Navy men," said a foreign affairs expert who worked with the N.S.C. staff.

The result, say many former N.S.C. officials, was that policies were considered and decisions made in a very tight circle of close Navy colleagues. Most staff members felt "locked out" of the process.

Other foreign policy experts worried that Admiral Poindexter, who continued to serve as an active-duty officer, would be unable to perform the important role of mediating the views of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, whom he continued to work for, and the Secretary of State, George P. Shultz. And they wondered whether Admiral Poindexter, who had no formal training and only modest practical experience in diplomacy, would be able to unravel and understand the complexities of the myriad of policy questions that had to be considered on most national security issues.

Admired in the White House

But within the White House, Admiral Poindexter was widely admired, according to former staff members. He had joined the staff of the N.S.C. in June 1981 as the military aide to Mr. Reagan's first national security adviser, Richard V.

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Allen. When Mr. Allen resigned in January 1982 and was replaced by William P. Clark Jr., Admiral Poindexter continued to serve as the military aide.

Mr. Clark, who had been the Deputy Secretary of State, took several of his aides with him to the National Security Council, including Mr. McFarlane, whom he named deputy national security adviser. When Mr. Clark left the N.S.C. in October 1983 to replace James G. Watt as Interior Secretary, Mr. McFarlane was named to the top post and Admiral Poindexter became his deputy.

So Admiral Poindexter was quickly catapulted from a role as a junior aide to one of the Administration's most senior positions. And he did so without sitting on the interagency committees, without having to cement relations with Congress and without having to talk with reporters - in short, without gaining the broad political and public relations experience most accomplished officials need before becoming senior members of an administration.

During most of 1984 and 1985, Admiral Poindexter joined Mr. McFarlane, the President, the Vice President and other top Administration officers in the daily national security briefings. In Mr. McFarlane's absence he usually conducted the meetings. Admiral Poindexter also proved himself an able crisis planner and manager; he was credited by many in the Administration with developing much of the planning for intercepting the Egyptian airliner carrying the hijackers of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and diverting it to Italy in October 1985.

And just as important, Admiral Poindexter carried out his duties in a manner that indicated he was more comfortable with assuming a role that was subordinate to his superiors. He did not attract attention.

'He wasn't the kind of officer who would do something without authority,' said Adm. Daniel J. Murphy, the chief of staff for Vice President Bush from 1981 to 1985. 'He demonstrated an ability to communicate with the President. He showed he could run a staff. He was a natural when the job came up. Personally I thought he'd do a fantastic job.'

GRAPHIC: photo of Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter (Agence France-Presse)

SUBJECT: ARMS SALES ABROAD; UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION; CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS; NEWS AND NEWS MEDIA

ORGANIZATION: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA); SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

NAME: SCHNEIDER, KEITH; POINDEXTER, JOHN M (VICE ADM); CASEY, WILLIAM J (DIR); REAGAN, RONALD WILSON (PRES); REGAN, DONALD T

GEOGRAPHIC: IRAN; NICARAGUA

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HEADLINE: Tale of Two White House Aides; Confidence and Motivation;
Aloof Poindexter Still Contends That History Will Vindicate Him

BYLINE: Bob Woodward, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

Last Tuesday morning at about 7:30 White House national security adviser John M. Poindexter was picking over his breakfast in his West Wing office when he suddenly mentioned to an aide, "I'll be telling the president . . . requesting reassignment in the Navy."

There were no jitters, no real emotion. The vice admiral's face was stony as he blinked behind his glasses and returned to his in-box, still stuffed with the endless flow of national security paper.

Poindexter has always sought to be prepared for every turn of fate. "Of all the people in the world who might have to take a fall," the aide later said, "the admiral was probably the most qualified in history."

Poindexter, who at 51 was one of the most powerful career officers in naval service, has turned inward in these days after his fall, according to several of those who thought they were closest to this most distant of men.

"He thinks history will vindicate him," one aide said, "that the Iran opening was well-intended, well-thought out . . . There's two years of paper over here that will show it was not a policy wrapped around an attempt to get hostages out."

Senior administration and Cabinet officers have spoken privately with extreme derision of Poindexter as a man who never mastered his assignment, isolated himself and never displayed any political understanding while holding one of the most politically sensitive posts in government.

Said a ranking administration figure close to the president, "John Poindexter turned in one of the most miserable performances in decades."

But Poindexter is so confident of his position that two sources said that as of Friday he had not sought an attorney. They said the admiral thinks that it probably was not illegal when funds from the Iran arms sales were diverted to aid the counterrevolutionaries fighting the Nicaraguan government. Marine Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, the Poindexter aide fired last week when Poindexter's resignation was announced by the president, also "did not treat the contra spinoff as illegal," according to one informed source.

But a thousand questions remain about Poindexter, his actions, his timing, and who he told, what he told, when he told -- if he told. Poindexter will be one of the most sought-after witnesses, as the Justice Department criminal

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investigation and related probes by Congress get under way -- with investigators looking at potential violations of U.S. export laws and of congressional prohibitions on providing military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels.

One source close to Poindexter said the admiral will cooperate with all appropriate investigations. Referring to news accounts of possible document-shredding in the last week by Poindexter and North, the source said any such shredding was routine.

Several of those closest to the admiral said that not only is Poindexter a private man, but that he ran an intensely private shop in the West Wing.

"Need-to-know was second nature with him," one official said. Another called him "the covert man."

Poindexter learned about the contra connection to the Iranian arms sales from North, according to sources, when North said, "Admiral, you'll be happy to hear that one spinoff" That reference, the sources said, was to the \$ 10 million to \$ 30 million that Attorney General Edwin Meese III said was deposited in Swiss bank accounts to aid the Nicaraguan rebels.

Poindexter never sought a legal opinion about this "spinoff," which has become the core of the controversy, according to one source. A number of sources maintain that Poindexter did not share the information with his closest National Security Council aides, and after the public disclosure on Tuesday, Poindexter did not treat it as a big secret.

"It was not treated as that ultra-sensitive, not like arms control matters and really sensitive intelligence covert operations," said one source who talked with Poindexter after Tuesday.

Yet sources said that Poindexter ran the NSC operation in considerable secrecy, keeping himself at the center with many private spokes radiating out. There were matters not known by his two key assistants who occupied the two closet-like offices in the security adviser's warren in the West Wing.

Four channels were important and generally not known to others on the NSC staff, the sources said. They were: The paper flow of "eyes only" messages or documents that came to Poindexter in sealed envelopes; also messengers occasionally delivered intelligence and other reports to him.

Face-to-face, closed-door meetings with key aides or other senior government officials in Poindexter's office. One source said that North had such sessions with Poindexter, but no more frequently than some other senior NSC aides.

The relationship with White House chief of staff Donald T. Regan that included periodic one-on-one briefings, usual weekly breakfasts between the two men generally at the end of the work week, and the so-called "9:30 time" when Poindexter briefed the president in the morning with Regan frequently attending.

The direct access to the president which included one-on-one meetings on rare occasions and a direct phone line to the Oval Office that was used regularly. One source said the Poindexter also frequently sent memos, intelligence reports or cables to the president.

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Half a dozen sources and officials who worked closely with Poindexter during his 50-week tenure as security adviser agreed that it was pretty much a guessing game for anyone to figure out what Poindexter did or did not pass along to Regan and to the president.

These sources said that Poindexter has not given any clue to what he may or may not have said to Reagan and Regan.

Poindexter, according to one source, considered Regan the person who provided order to the president's day and not someone to inform about every detail of national security policy. This source with firsthand knowledge of the workings of the White House in the last year said he was suspicious of reports claiming that North informed Regan of the contra connection.

"Ollie just wasn't with Regan very often," this source said.

Another more senior White House official who nevertheless was less informed about the daily information flow, said Regan was keenly attuned to the president's near-obsession with the contra cause and that the chief of staff accordingly made sure he kept himself informed about the matter. Regan, this source said, was aware that North had more information about the contras than anyone else in the U.S. government.

Other sources said Poindexter realized that the president did not want many details about policy unless the president was preparing for a speech or news conference.

In his five years at the NSC, as military assistant, deputy security adviser and then as security adviser, Poindexter was the chief force in establishing an orderly system of national security decision-making.

Formal presidential decisions were codified in National Security Decision Directives. "We even had an NSDD on Malta," one source said last week, and another joked that Poindexter "probably had an NSDD on when to use the john."

In fact, sources said that in June 1985 a draft NSDD was circulated to the departments and agencies on Iran, but it was impossible to develop a consensus.

"State and Defense objected," one source said. "It was all too sensitive, and it seemed logical to go covert."

United States involvement in arms to Iran was handled through Israeli transfers, beginning in September 1985. But the covert presidential authority for direct U.S. arms sales to Iran was not obtained until Jan. 17 of this year when the president signed an intelligence "finding" or order.

When the arms sales and transfers became public this month, Poindexter publicly and privately emphasized the role of the Central Intelligence Agency, and sources said that he has claimed he cannot reconstruct all that happened from his memory and files.

"These things were done mostly up the river," said one source familiar with Poindexter's thinking. The reference is to the CIA, which has its headquarters in Langley, up the Potomac River from Washington.

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Sources said that Poindexter thinks that CIA Director William J. Casey, several key CIA operations officers and CIA lawyers have most of the answers on the Iranian arms sales this year.

Intelligence sources, however, emphasize the role of the NSC and Poindexter as the operational arms for all the transactions, and said that the contacts with Iranian moderates were handled by the NSC without intermediaries.

Poindexter managed to remain relatively anonymous in the White House until this fall when it was disclosed that he had authored a memo to the president proposing a "disinformation program" to make Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi think that he was about to be attacked again by the United States or overthrown by key trusted aides.

All along Poindexter has said that he did not intend this disinformation for the American news media and when it did appear there he wanted to distance himself and the White House from any responsibility.

Last week one of his senior assistants said, "John does see the difference between intent and consequence at times Disinformation was meant for Gadhafi, not [the news media], arms for Iran were meant for good purposes, not to cause a scandal or get money for the contras. . . ."

"But sometimes you don't get what you intended, and that's perhaps the John Poindexter story."

Whatever Poindexter's aspirations to be a conceptualizer or organizer of foreign policy, even those friendly toward him say he failed. Not only is the U.S. policy toward Iran in shambles, but Poindexter's critics and friends seem to agree that some of the major policies have come out confused, if not also in shambles. They cite the Middle East, arms control, South Africa and U.S.-Soviet relations.

Poindexter was largely a military planner. Any alleged administration "successes" he is identified with involve military action, such as the 1983 Grenada invasion, the 1985 interception of the four hijackers of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and the U.S. bombing raid on Libya last April.

Poindexter used to take Sunday mornings off, about the only time he allowed himself away from his office and in-box. But two weeks ago he did not get that, sources said, because he was waiting for one of a series of interviews to explain and attempt to put out the firestorm that had erupted over the sales.

He was asked about his 28 years as a naval officer and his time as commanding officer of a destroyer in the mid-1970s.

"Naval officers," he said, gently extracting his pipe from his jacket pocket, "are better equipped because of command at sea. You have to make decisions; you learn there is nobody else out there in a pinch.

"You learn to be cool," he added, smiling, "whether on the bridge of a destroyer or here. They're the same."

TYPE: FOREIGN NEWS, NATIONAL NEWS, BIOGRAPHY

A quiet voice, with authority

Originally seen as a perfect example of the intellectual-but-low-profile staff man, Vice Adm. John Poindexter still speaks softly, but his influence as President Reagan's national-security adviser is commanding and growing.

Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger remain in public view as the main power brokers of the administration's foreign-policy apparatus. But Poindexter, seven months into his new post, is emerging as the point man on sensitive security issues and the arbiter of policy disputes with worldwide impact.

The ascendancy of Poindexter, a naval careerist for 32 years, is cited as an important factor in the administration's harder-line foreign-policy decisions, particularly in the use of military force as a diplomatic tool, not necessarily as a last resort. The most celebrated example: His instrumental role in overcoming objections by Weinberger, among others, to the bombing of Libya.

The 49-year-old admiral also has proved unafraid of playing bureaucratic hardball, butting heads with Shultz in arguing for President Reagan's decision to disavow the unratified SALT II Treaty. And it was the national-security adviser who persuaded Reagan to appoint Adm. Carlisle Trost as chief of naval operations in the face of arguments for another candidate put forward by top Pentagon officials.

All of this adds up to a vastly different role for Poindexter than some envisioned when he replaced Robert McFarlane at the helm of the National Security Council staff. Initially, he was dismissed as a bright, efficient team player who would be content to provide technical analyses on the issues and then fade into the background while others, such as Shultz, Weinberger and White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, decided the policy course to be followed.

"He was supposed to be the quintessential staffer who would make no waves," says a White House colleague who admires him. "Instead, the admiral not only makes waves; he rides on top."

Poindexter's admirers among White House deputies are legion. Cited among his main attributes is coolness under fire. Even before Poindexter assumed the top NSC post, he amazed other officials by casually eating dinner at his desk while directing the interception of the Egyptian passenger jet carrying the *Achille Lauro* hijackers.

Poindexter is praised, too, for his concise, sometimes blunt, briefings for the President as well as for his congenial style of dealing with colleagues and subordinates. "He's a terrific guy, easy to work with and receptive to other staff arguments, even if he disagrees," says one co-worker. In contrast to McFarlane, he gets along well with Regan, a necessary relationship for survival in the White House chain of command.

One acknowledged shortcoming of the NSC chief is his discomfort in dealing with Congress. Aides say he has tried to overcome this by talking with key lawmakers, either in person or on the telephone, "several times a week."

Through it all, Poindexter has refused to bend to the traditional demands made on the Washington power elite. His public briefings of the White House press corps can be counted on one hand. He has made only a few appearances on television-interview shows and has a steadfast policy against giving background sessions to reporters.

In fact, he remains virtually invisible to the public. Since he took the NSC job in December, Poindexter has made just one speech, before a home-state business group in Indianapolis. His second is coming up soon—to his son's reserve-officer class at Georgia Tech.

by James M. Hildreth



Regan, Weinberger, Poindexter

the Chernobyl nuclear accident, and increase internal Soviet pressure on leader Mikhail Gorbachev to avoid a summit and raise military spending.

Moscow appeared ready for all of these possibilities. Its first reaction to the decision was a warning that it would openly violate SALT once Reagan did. On June 4, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh claimed that by scrapping the treaty, Reagan himself was "doing everything possible" to destroy arms talks and prospects for a summit.

Yet there was an intriguing aspect to the Kremlin reaction, which in fact was less militant than some officials expected. That could mean merely that the Soviets are content to let Western protesters do their work for the time being. But it also could mean that Gorbachev is still willing to deal with Reagan on the President's terms, judging that some sort of arms-control accommodation is possible even without SALT. By such logic, the superpowers could deploy the arms dictated by their respective national interests without unleashing a free-for-all buildup. This apparently is the hope of U.S. arms-control pragmatists such as Secretary of State George Shultz.

But the hope of U.S. conservatives most suspicious of the Soviet Union is that Reagan, by shedding the constraints of SALT, is embarking on a path toward U.S. nuclear superiority. As for the President, if the isolation and other pressures remain strong enough, he is free to change his mind. ■

by James Wallace with staff reports

find doc
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guidance

Terrorism: The Challenge and the Response



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, before the Brookings Institution Conference on Terrorism, Washington, D.C., December 10, 1986.

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this important conference on terrorism. I note from your program that you have already heard the perspectives of many distinguished academics and specialists; this afternoon, I would like to present our views on this scourge. More specifically, there are three questions that I want to address.

First, what exactly is terrorism?

Second, why is the United States so concerned about terrorism?

And third, what are we doing to combat it?

Let me begin with some observations on the nature of terrorism. In recent years, we have learned a good deal about what terrorism is and is not. What once may have seemed the random, senseless acts of a few crazed individuals has come into clearer focus as a new pattern of low-technology and inexpensive warfare against the West and its friends. And, while it is an alarming pattern, it is a threat that we can identify, combat, and, ultimately, defeat.

Terrorism is a sophisticated form of political violence. It is neither random nor without purpose. On the contrary, terrorism is a strategy and tool of those who reject the norms and values of civilized people everywhere.

Today, humanity is confronted by a wide assortment of terrorist groups whose stated objectives may range from separatist causes to ethnic grievances to social and political revolutions. Their methods include hijackings, bombings, kidnappings, and political assassinations. But the overreaching goal of virtually all terrorists is the same: to impose their will by using force against civilians.

The horrors they inflict on the defenseless are calculated to achieve very specific political purposes. They want people to feel vulnerable and afraid; they want citizens to lose faith in their government's ability to protect them; and they want to undermine the legitimacy not only of specific government policies but of the governments themselves.

Terrorists gain from the confusion and anarchy caused by their violence. They succeed when governments alter their policies out of intimidation. They also succeed when governments respond to terrorist violence with repressive, polarizing actions that alienate the authorities from the populace—and, thereby, play directly into the terrorists' hands.

State-Sponsored Terrorism

As you may well know, terrorist violence is hardly a new phenomenon. Nearly two centuries ago, for example, the Barbary pirates conducted their own form of terrorism, operating from North African ports and leading to the landing of U.S. marines on the shores of Tripoli. Similarly, the forerunner of the car bomb,

the cart bomb, dates back to Napoleonic times. Nevertheless, certain features of modern-day terrorism seem to be, if not historically unprecedented, then certainly very unusual.

To begin with, a good deal of contemporary terrorism is state sponsored. As an example, consider one of the most notorious terrorist groups of our day, the Abu Nidal organization. This group now receives backing and support from Libya; it finds sanctuary in Eastern Europe; and Damascus has provided it with important logistical support since 1983. Indeed, Syria allows Abu Nidal's group to maintain training camps in areas of Lebanon under Syrian control. Syria also provides the group with travel documents, permits its operatives to transit freely, and continues to sanction the operation of Abu Nidal's facilities in Damascus.

Nor is Abu Nidal the only terrorist group supported by Syria. Damascus also provides varying amounts of support to other radical Palestinian groups. Non-Palestinian terrorist groups, as well, have facilities or have received training in Syria or Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon. These groups include the Japanese Red Army, the Kurdish Labor Party, the Armenian terrorist organization ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia], and al-Zulfikar of Pakistan. In the past, we have had to rely on intelligence sources for information on Syrian support for international terrorism. More

recently, however, public trials in London and Berlin have conclusively demonstrated Syria's complicity in terrorist actions.

Unfortunately, Syria is not the only state which supports terrorism. Iran, Cuba, Libya, and South Yemen are also key members of today's terrorist international. Indeed, the deadly combination of direct government assistance such as arms, explosives, communications, travel documents, and training, on the one hand, and violent individuals or groups, on the other hand, is a major factor in both the growth and the effectiveness of terrorism in recent years.

The Soviet Role

In the past, terrorism was almost exclusively the weapon of the weak, a gesture by small groups of determined extremists to call attention to their cause. Today, however, we see that even a major power like the Soviet Union supports terrorist activity in pursuit of its ambitions.

We should understand the Soviet role in international terrorism without exaggeration or distortion. The Soviet Union officially denounces the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Yet here, as elsewhere, there is a wide disparity between Soviet statements and actions. The Soviet Union uses terrorist groups to advance its own purposes and goals, including the weakening of liberal democracy and the undermining of regional stability. One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups can be found in almost every society. But, certainly, in some countries terrorism has been more violent and pervasive because of support from the Soviet Union and its satellites—notably Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

Terrorism and Democracy

In thinking about terrorism, certain facts must be faced. All states and all political systems are vulnerable to terrorist assault. Nevertheless, the number of terrorist incidents in totalitarian states is minimal; markedly fewer acts are committed against their citizens abroad than against westerners. This discrepancy has not arisen simply because police states make it harder for terrorists to carry out acts of violence. It also reflects the fundamental antagonism between terrorism and democracy.

One reason that the United States is so concerned about terrorism, wherever it takes place, is that it is largely directed against the democracies—often against our fundamental strategic interests, always against our most basic values. The moral values upon which democracy is based—individual rights, equality under the law, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, and the peaceful resolution of disputes—all stand in the way of those who seek to impose their will, their ideology, or their religious beliefs by force. The terrorists reject and despise the open processes of democratic society and, therefore, consider us their mortal enemy.

States that sponsor terrorism use it as another weapon of warfare against the United States and our allies. Through terrorism, they seek to gain strategic advantages where they cannot use conventional means of attack. When terrorists, reportedly with Iranian backing, set out to bomb Western personnel in Beirut, they hoped to weaken the West's commitment to defend its interests in the Middle East. When North Korea perpetrated the murder of South Korean Government officials in Rangoon, it sought to weaken the non-communist stronghold on the mainland of East Asia. When Syria participated in the attempt to blow up the El Al airliner and murder over 300 people, it attempted to strike a major blow against Israel, the United States, and Britain.

In Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere, the United States is a principal target of terrorist violence, not so much because of what we do or don't do but, rather, because of what we are: a nation dedicated to the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Preventing Future Terrorist Violence

Terrorist violence is taking an increasingly grim toll on human life. Last year, for example, nearly 800 terrorist attacks hit citizens and public facilities in 84 countries; over 900 persons were killed, of whom 38 were American. As an American official, I highlight the number of Americans who have been killed. But, no matter what their nationality, 900 deaths are just too many.

The potential of future incidents is even more worrying. Terrorists now rely on guns, grenades, and bombs to spread ruin and fear. That is bad enough. In the future, however, states which support terrorists could provide even more lethal means of destruction. The fact that this has not happened yet does not allow us to be complacent about the future. On

the contrary, the essence of an effective policy is to identify a danger to our interests before it is self-evident and implement a sensible preventive response.

U.S. Counterterrorist Policy

What I have said thus far should give you a clear conception of this Administration's view of the phenomenon of terrorism. Now let me turn to the third and final point I want to discuss this afternoon: U.S. counterterrorist policy. I hardly need say that this is a particularly controversial topic just now. Many of you, I am sure, have strong views on this subject. Yet I urge you not to lose sight of the many real and substantial achievements this Administration has made in the fight against terrorism. Much of this effort receives little attention and takes place in the realm of intelligence gathering, in the cluttered offices of analysts, or in the laboratories of scientists trying to develop better ways of detecting hidden explosives.

What are these achievements? During the past few years, we have made remarkable progress in thwarting potential attacks. Only successful terrorist acts receive front-page coverage, but I'd like to draw your attention to the attempts that fail—largely due to our efforts. Last year alone, we and our friends foiled more than 120 planned terrorist attacks. For example, in Turkey this April, security officers arrested Libyan-supported terrorists who were planning to attack the U.S. officers club in Ankara during a wedding celebration. In Paris, at about the same time, officials thwarted a similar attack planned against the visa line at the U.S. Embassy.

A number of initiatives have contributed to this progress. We have been developing our own intelligence capabilities vis-a-vis international terrorists and sharing that intelligence with other nations in a timely fashion. We have expanded international cooperation in the fields of law enforcement and counterterrorist training. Under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, which began in April 1984, we have established active exchange and training programs with 32 foreign governments.

States which may not actually train and fund terrorists but which ignore terrorist activity in their own countries pose a particularly difficult problem. Unless their own citizens are the targets of terrorist acts, many nations assume it's not their problem. We are responding to this unwillingness to act by

discussing terrorism with all nations—not just our allies. I recently returned from a trip to Eastern Europe, which is an area well known for its leniency toward terrorists. Eastern Europeans are realizing that terrorism is their problem too: there were Hungarians at the Vienna airport when it was attacked last year, and Romania recently stated its opposition to terrorism. There is much more to be done in Eastern Europe, but with continued effort, we can make all countries understand that terrorism is a crime against humanity.

We are also for putting teeth into international antiterrorism conventions. For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization toughened its regulations dramatically after the hijacking of TWA Flight 847. In response to the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, the International Maritime Organization began to develop similar regulations for seaborne transportation. Last year, the UN General Assembly adopted a strong resolution declaring terrorism a crime, whatever the rationale.

We have taken great strides toward bringing our diplomatic installations in threatened areas up to the standards necessary to protect our people. All of our posts have conducted intensive reviews of their security needs, and these reviews have been the basis for speedy action. We have made immediate improvements at 23 high-threat posts. We are planning to construct new office buildings that will measure up to the latest security standards. The Inman commission [Advisory Panel on Overseas Security] has estimated that improving the security of our institutions abroad will cost \$4.2 billion over a 5-year period. Congress has approved less than \$1 billion for the first stage. There is obviously a great need for increased funding over the next 5 years.

Our research into new technologies for enhancing physical security is also continuing. We have begun working with the private sector to help corporations improve their capacity for dealing with terrorists. We have passed tougher laws against terrorism, such as the Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, which makes terrorist acts against Americans abroad punishable in U.S. courts. And we are urging other nations to tighten their procedures for issuing visas to suspected terrorists.

We have also developed our own counterterrorist military capabilities to react swiftly to terrorist situations. In both the *Achille Lauro* affair and last April's assault on Tripoli, we demonstrated our willingness and ability to use

force against terrorists and against states that support them. Col. Qadhafi now has no illusions about our determination—and neither should any others who would use terrorist violence against us.

Most important, perhaps, we are helping to educate the public about the real nature of the terrorist threat. Over the years, too many of us have accepted uncritically certain very misleading views about the nature of terrorism—views which disarm us intellectually and strengthen our adversaries. For any counterterrorism policy to be effective, these misconceptions must be dispelled.

Misconceptions About Terrorism

What misconceptions am I referring to? Let me briefly mention three of them. We have all heard the insidious assertion that "one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter." What this constitutes, of course, is an attempt to justify terrorism as a legitimate form of warfare and political struggle.

When Secretary Shultz addresses this issue, he sometimes quotes the powerful rebuttal of this kind of moral relativism made by the late Senator Henry Jackson. Senator Jackson's statement bears repeating today.

The idea that one person's "terrorist" is another's "freedom fighter" cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word "freedom" to be associated with acts of terrorists.

So spoke Scoop Jackson. So should we all speak.

Another fallacy we often hear is that military action taken to retaliate against or preempt terrorism is contrary to international law. Some have even suggested that to use force against terrorism is to lower ourselves to the barbaric level of the terrorists. But, as the President and Secretary Shultz have pointed out time and again, the UN Charter is not a suicide pact. Article 51 explicitly allows the right of self-defense. It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from acting in our self-defense. On the contrary, there is ample legal authority for the view that a state which supports terrorist or subversive attacks against another state or which supports terrorist planning within its

own territory is responsible for such attacks. Such conduct can amount to an ongoing armed aggression against the other state in international law. As the President said in connection with Libya's support for terrorist violence:

By providing material support to terrorist groups which attack U.S. citizens, Libya has engaged in armed aggression against the United States under established principles of international law, just as if [it] had used its own armed forces.

All of us can agree, I hope, that the United States has not only the right but the obligation to defend its citizens against terrorist violence. We should use our military power only if the stakes justify it, if other measures are unavailable, and then only in a manner appropriate to a clear objective. But we cannot rule out the use of armed force in every context. Our morality must be a source of strength, not paralysis. Otherwise, we will be surrendering the world's future to those who are most brutal, most unscrupulous, and most hostile to everything we believe in.

A third argument we sometimes hear is that by openly discussing terrorism, we're only giving the terrorists unwarranted recognition and legitimacy. According to this line of reasoning, we should downplay public expression of our concerns in the hope that a low profile will deprive the terrorists of the visibility they seek. Unfortunately, terrorist groups have shown great skill in dealing with the media, and their crimes are likely to attract considerable press and television attention, regardless of what the U.S. Government does. Under these circumstances, our duty is clear: we must persist in our campaign to build a broad coalition, at home and abroad, willing to stand up against terrorism.

Conclusion

Let me conclude with a final observation. Recent events may have raised doubts in some minds about the credibility of U.S. counterterrorist policy. But I can assure you that this Administration's overall policy is well in place, and it remains a sound framework for countering the terrorist scourge. Today, as in the past, our policy is based on four principles.

- We consider terrorism a criminal activity that no political cause can justify.
- We refuse to make concessions to terrorists.

- We regard state-sponsored terrorism as a menace to all nations and promote cooperation among states on practical measures to track down, arrest, and prosecute terrorists.

- We encourage international cooperation in isolating terrorist states to make it clear that costs will be imposed on those states that support or facilitate the use of terror.

Implementing these guidelines will not be easy. There are no magic solutions or quick fixes; and, as in all situations where human lives are at stake, there are political complexities and moral dilemmas that cannot be wished away. But, bilaterally and multilaterally, we are working at home and abroad in

our war against terrorism. We are in this war for the duration, and we are determined to win. ■

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LIBYAN ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

"My brother, given the brutal terrorist action launched by the U.S. government against the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, I wish to send sentiments and solidarity from the FSLN National Directorate and the Nicaraguan people and government."

Daniel Ortega, President of Nicaragua, to
Muammar Qadhafi, May 1986

"Libyan fighters, arms, and backing to the Nicaraguan people have reached them because they fight with us. They fight America on its own ground."

Muammar Qadhafi, September 1, 1984,
New York Times

"We will send arms to the rebels in Latin America, in spite of America....We are the leaders of a world revolution which combines the masses of all continents."

Muammar Qadhafi, June 11, 1986

"The trouble is that left to Libya, the Caribbean would soon become not a 'zone of peace,' a phrase that militants of the left like to raise when it suits them, but a sea of blood."

Daily Express (Trinidad),
July 14, 1986

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INTRODUCTION

Muammar Qadhafi seized power in a military coup in 1969. In the succeeding years, he has attempted to foment revolution by pursuing a dual strategy of subversion of legitimate governments and support for terrorism. This dual strategy is the cornerstone of his effort to carry out the program he described in the "Green Book," Qadhafi's handbook which describes his version of an ideal society (similar in function to Mao's "Red Book"). He proposes a program of radical socialism and societal upheaval which distorts Islam in the same way that "liberation theology" distorts Christianity.

His activities in the Western Hemisphere began in the 1970s, when he arranged for Latin American extremists to come to guerrilla training camps in Libya. They intensified in 1979, when he held a conference of Latin American terrorist and guerrilla groups in Benghazi. And now they have spread through the Caribbean and into the Latin American mainland.

That this is a potentially dangerous development can be seen from current terrorist attacks against American and other targets in Europe--attacks in which Libya has had varying degrees of involvement.

"REVOLUTIONARY SOLIDARITY": LIBYA AND NICARAGUA

Foreign policy analysts and the news media have noted Sandinista relations with the Cubans and Soviets, and Sandinista dependence on Eastern-bloc aid, arms, and advisers. However, a different yet related aspect of Sandinista policy has not received as much attention: the relationship between the Sandinistas and Libya. Libya gave the Sandinistas aid before they came to power, and now has political, economic, and military ties with the Sandinista government.

Relations between the Sandinistas and Libya result from years of carefully developed contacts between radical forces in Central America and the Middle East. In 1969, Sandinista representative Benito Escobar arranged for training in Lebanon for a contingent of 50-70 Sandinistas; several years later, other contingents of Sandinistas were sent to camps in Libya.¹

Also during the 1970s, Tomas Borge, a founder of the FSLN, became a familiar figure in both Damascus and Beirut, not only because of his trips there on behalf of the Sandinistas, but also on behalf of Fidel Castro. The wide range of contacts he amassed served him well as he prepared for the Sandinistas' own revolution.²

In 1979, Qadhafi invited the leaders of Central American guerrilla groups, including the Sandinistas, to a meeting in Benghazi during which he pledged financial and political support for their movement.³ Shortly thereafter, Borge used Libyan money to obtain arms from North Korea and Vietnam for the Sandinistas.⁴

By the time the Sandinistas came to power in mid-1979, they had developed close political relations with the Qadhafi regime.⁵ Tomas Borge and Construction Minister Moises Hassan were key figures in working with Libya. Both were instrumental in obtaining a \$100 million loan from Libya; in late 1980 Borge made an unpublicized visit to Libya to complete arrangements for the loan agreement and to discuss Libyan offers for joint agricultural ventures in Nicaragua. The Libyans made the loan in 1981, receipt of which the Sandinistas have since publicly acknowledged.⁶

On June 20, 1981, the Sandinistas had a lavish celebration in Managua marking the eleventh anniversary of Qadhafi's ouster of the United States from its air bases on Libyan territory. Junta member Sergio Ramirez stated in his speech at the public ceremony: "The ties between the Libyan people and the Nicaraguan people are not new, but were consolidated when the Sandinista Front struggled in the field of battle to win the

liberty of our homeland. The solidarity of the Libyan people, of the Libyan government and comrade Muammar Khaddafi [Qadhafi] was always patently manifest. This solidarity has been made real, has been made effective, has been made more fraternal since the triumph of our revolution." The representative of the Libyan "Peoples' Bureau" (as their embassies are called), Ibrahim Mohammed Farhat, returned these sentiments in his response, with references to Libya's "particular friendship" with Borge.⁷

Libya's support for the Sandinistas has not been purely political and economic; the Libyans have also sent arms shipments to the Sandinistas. One huge arms shipment was intercepted in Brazil during April 1983.⁸ Four Libyan planes had made a stop in Brazil for technical reasons. The crews claimed that the planes were carrying medical supplies to Colombia. The Brazilians became suspicious when the pilots could not produce cargo manifests. The planes were searched by skeptical Brazilian authorities, who found about 84 tons of arms, explosives, and other military equipment. Press reports have indicated that the planes, three of Soviet manufacture, contained: two dismantled fighter planes, wire-guided missiles, rifles, machine guns, mortars, bazookas, 90mm cannons, eight multiple rocket launchers, five tons of bombs, eight anti-aircraft guns, 600 light artillery rockets, and other unspecified crates of military equipment.⁹

The Sandinistas' initial reaction to the discovery of this arms shipment was almost as noteworthy as the shipment itself. The Nicaraguan ambassador to Brazil, Ernesto Gutierrez, stated: "It was a donation from our Libyan comrades, but I do not know what it was."¹⁰ Subsequently Rafael Solis, then Secretary of the Nicaraguan Council of State, and now FSLN delegate in the National Assembly, admitted that the arms were destined for the Sandinista army. He added it should be no surprise that the Sandinista government received arms from Libya and Soviet-bloc countries, and further emphasized that such arms supply relationships are discussed openly in Managua. Asked why the shipment was labeled "medical supplies," Solis said the Libyans would have to answer that.¹¹ Qadhafi's response was that the planes were indeed carrying arms to Nicaragua and he was sorry for any problems the incident caused for Brazilian authorities.¹²

The Sandinistas and the Qadhafi regime have expressed solidarity on numerous occasions. A resolution passed on March 18, 1986, by a Qadhafi-sponsored conference in Tripoli stated: "The conference expresses its appreciation for the steadfast stance of the Sandinista revolution in confronting the U.S. imperialist plots and declares its support and backing for the

Nicaraguan people and its revolution."¹³ Qadhafi himself said at the conference, "Brothers, we should all stand by the people of Nicaragua against the blatant and harsh threats from the United States."¹⁴

Even earlier, on September 1, 1984, Tomas Borge represented the Sandinista government at the fifteenth anniversary celebration of Qadhafi's overthrow of King Idris of Libya (Qadhafi's celebration was ignored by moderate Arab leaders--only the Vice President of Syria attended). Qadhafi, acknowledging Borge's attendance, stated: "Libyan fighters, arms, and backing to the Nicaraguan people have reached them because they fight with us. They fight America on its own ground."¹⁵

Qadhafi's reference to "fighters" can be taken literally, as there have been reports of Libyans assisting the Sandinistas in the fight against the armed democratic resistance as well as serving as advisers and pilot trainers.¹⁶ About forty Libyan advisers reportedly work in the Ministry of the Interior; their mission is to assist the political police in "interrogation techniques." They live in a Managua suburb, La Colonia las Colinas.¹⁷

Libya has also used Nicaragua to support terrorism in Latin America. Nicaragua has had the practice of issuing passports to Middle Eastern radicals, a matter of concern in light of Qadhafi's threats of terrorism against U.S. citizens around the world.

This "solidarity" works both ways. In Barricada, September 11, 1985, an "Announcement of Admission of Members to Green World Guard" stated: "Considering the international scope of the Great Revolution of September First and the role of revolutionary leader Muammar al-Qadhafi in inciting revolutionary and rebel forces worldwide to rise up and rebel...with these historic factors in mind, the revolutionary forces of the world urge those organized into revolutionary movements, worldwide revolutionary committees, and rebel forces everywhere to join the ranks of the Green World Guard."¹⁸

Economic ties between Libya and the Sandinista government continue. On January 16, 1985, the Sandinistas announced a barter trade agreement regarding Libyan oil. The amount of the agreement is \$15 million.¹⁹

The Libyans have followed up on their 1980 discussions with Borge about joint agricultural projects. The Libyan and Sandinista governments have set up a joint venture company called ANILIB (Agricultura Nicaragua Libia). Its Managua

Guerrilla groups trained in Libya include M-19, Peruvian terrorists, and Alfaro Vive of Ecuador. As early as September 1983, members of Alfaro Vive traveled to Libya for military training and political indoctrination. The four-month training course included instruction in the use of bazookas, machine guns, assault rifles, patrol and ambush tactics, use of TNT and construction of detonators. A small cadre of Costa Ricans went to Libya for training in November 1985.

SUBVERTING THE CARIBBEAN...AND BEYOND

While Libya's official presence in Latin America is decreasing, other Libyan activity is on the upswing. This tide of events has caused such concern that high-level officials from Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador met in January 1986 to discuss Libyan activity in the hemisphere.²⁴

Six countries in the Western Hemisphere have Libyan "Peoples' Bureaus" (embassies): Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, and Suriname. (Of these, Panama and Suriname do not have embassies in Libya, probably for economic reasons; the other three countries do.)

Other Libyan government presence is slightly less overt. Barbados, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles, and Nicaragua all have Islamic groups created by Libya. In Barbados, it is the "Islamic Teaching Center"; in Nicaragua, the "Islamic School" and the "Islamic Center"; in Curacao and the Netherlands Antilles, the "Islamic Call Society." Under cover of "religious groups," Libya may be establishing intelligence links.

And there is a still deeper level of Libyan involvement: covert funding. In at least eight Caribbean countries, Libya is providing support to leftist movements: Antigua, the Bahamas, Dominica, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Martinique, and St. Lucia.

In Antigua, Libya has forged ties with the leftist Antigua-Caribbean Liberation Movement. Tim Hector, the movement's leader, met with Qadhafi in Libya in July 1982; his party's official newspaper, Outlet, carried a picture of his meeting with the Libyan dictator. Hector also participated in an April 1983 Libyan conference attended by 1,500 radicals from around the world.²⁵

In the Bahamas, the Vanguard Nationalist and Socialist Party has sought Libyan help to finance its election campaign.

offices are two blocks from the Libyan Culture Center. (The Culture Center, or Centro Libio, offers courses featuring the Green Book as a textbook and gives out free copies of the Green Book upon request.)

Headed by a Libyan, Sa'id Gawair, ANILIB has invested \$20 million in two projects:²⁰

Its largest current project, an agricultural complex near the military airport at Punta Huete, grows sorghum, corn, cotton, and beans and has 130 laborers on 3,700 acres. The project is on land expropriated from COSEP (Superior Council of Private Enterprise) head Enrique Bolanos and on land taken from an American.

Ten miles east of Managua, near the town of Tipitapa, is another ANILIB project, a cattle-fattening facility. It handles 50,000-60,000 head of cattle per year and has 30 workers.

Two additional projects are in the planning stage: a sugar mill with a projected Libyan investment of \$200 million, and an additional cattle-fattening facility, to be constructed in the San Miguelito area, at an estimated cost of \$36 million. As the joint venture company now exists, shares in the venture are 51% Nicaraguan and 49% Libyan.

QADHAFI HELPS GUERRILLA GROUPS

Through its "Peoples' Bureaus," Libya has provided financial support to radical leftist and guerrilla groups in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. The Colombian M-19 (Movement of April 19), and at least one other guerrilla group in Colombia, have also received Libyan support.²¹ Solidarity has been publicly expressed as well. At a March 15, 1986, conference Qadhafi stated: "We are sorry to say we have received a report from the 19 April Movement in Colombia that our friend and comrade Alvaro Fayad, general commander of the 19 April Movement, was killed in a battle in the past 2 days. If this report is confirmed, and in any case, we have to stand up and salute him and we glorify him."²²

Press reports indicate that several hundred thousand dollars have been sent to the MIR (Leftist Revolutionary Movement) terrorist group.²³ Uruguayan guerrilla groups have used the Basque terrorist group ETA as their point of contact with the Libyans.

In Dominica, Libya has financed a political movement called the "Caribbean Nation Movement." This Jamaica-based organization, founded in 1982, is run by a three-member "Leadership Council," of which Roosevelt Douglas is the head. The Libyan funds are used both for demonstrations and subversive activities.²⁶

In the spring of 1986, a Libyan official tried--apparently without success--to induce Caribbean nationalists to take violent action against U.S. interests in the region. Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica, said on March 4, 1986, that her country is a major target of Qadhafi because of its support role in the Grenada rescue mission. "Anybody who is hand in glove with the Libyan regime is not spouting ideology. He is embracing terrorism."

In the Dominican Republic, Libyans recently led a march on the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo.²⁷

The Haitian Liberation Movement also has Libyan ties. Raymond and Alex Fils-Aime, the heads of the movement, met with Libyan officials in Tripoli in March 1986 to plan strategy (the Anti-Imperialism Conference they attended will be discussed later).

Libyan contacts with the Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance of Guadeloupe, Progressive Labor Party of St. Lucia, and radical groups from Jamaica and Trinidad have also occurred.

In addition, leftist leaders from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and the French "Departments" have been invited to Libya for "seminars" at which they are urged to undertake violent action rather than peacefully participate in the political process. Some have also received paramilitary training in Libya.

Even more recently, from March 15-18, 1986, the Libyan "International Center for Combatting Imperialism" held a conference in Tripoli, attended by about 1,000 representatives of radical and terrorist groups.²⁸ The movement was begun in Tripoli on August 28, 1981; its initial organizational meeting was held February 21, 1982. Later that same year, from June 15-18, its First Global Conference was held.²⁹

At the 1986 conference, the director of the Center, Musa Kusa, met separately with delegates from Caribbean countries to urge them to show greater militancy. Representatives of groups

from Antigua, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Jamaica, and St. Lucia were among those attending, as well as M-19, Sendero Luminoso (Peru), the Liberation Front of Guyana, the Liberation Front of Martinique, and Montoneros.

A Jamaican leftist was approached by a Libyan from the "Center for International Revolution" after the conference and asked to organize a bombing attack against the U.S. Embassy in Kingston, Jamaica. The Jamaican refused to become involved.

In addition to its activity in the Caribbean, Libya is now stepping up its activity on the South American continent itself. One of its more recent activities is the clandestine purchase of arms. In late February 1986, a Libyan delegation attempted to buy arms from Brazil. The Brazilian government subsequently announced in April 1986 that it was tightening up controls on arms shipments.

In other countries, Libya has concentrated its attention on revolutionary leftist and terrorist groups.

On April 18, 1986, the leftist MOJUPO (Political Youth Movement) staged a demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires. The Libyan Peoples' Bureau provided funds to pay for newspaper advertisements and to defray other costs incurred in their anti-U.S. demonstration.

In Guyana, a Guyana Committee for Solidarity with Libya has directed an anti-U.S. demonstration. The demonstration occurred on April 19, and was led by Gerald Anthony Perreira, Secretary of the Committee, who has made frequent visits to Tripoli.

In Panama, the Revolutionary Workers' Party has received Libyan funding. The Libyan Peoples' Bureau in Panama also functions as a hub for Libyan activity in Colombia and Venezuela.

Libya is also attempting to spread its influence into Paraguay by means of ties with Humberto Dominguez Dibb, the owner of two major Paraguayan dailies, Hoy (Today) and La Tarde (The Afternoon). After the U.S. raid on Libya, Dominguez made a veiled suggestion in his papers' editorials that a mob overrun the U.S. Embassy.

There are reports that Libya has used Suriname as a point of transit for subversive activity elsewhere on the continent. Surinamese students have also studied in Libya. 30

In Venezuela, the Libyan Peoples' Bureau received permission from Tripoli earlier this year to carry out terrorist attacks. Officials of the Peoples' Bureau have been known to purchase explosives as recently as May 1986. So far, however, the Libyan-Venezuelan community has not been receptive to Qadhafi's overtures. Nevertheless, Libya has had some success in establishing ties to radical opposition groups in Venezuela. A raid on a radical group in January 1986 resulted in the capture of materials linking opposition members to Libyans. Libya has also provided financial aid, political indoctrination, and insurgent/terrorist training in Libya for Venezuelan guerrillas.

Libya's support for terrorism has not stopped it from making overtures to governments in the region. In an effort to shore up Libyan relationships with Latin American governments after the U.S. raid, Qadhafi sent special envoys to Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. These envoys attempted to convince Latin American governments that the U.S. action was unjustifiable and should be condemned. A few Latin American papers assisted in this effort.

The envoys also attempted to justify Libyan involvement with terrorist groups. "What is Libya's terrorism?" asked envoy Ibrahim Abu Hassam. "All it is doing is backing all liberation movements throughout the world."³¹

CONCLUSION

Libya has attempted to subvert many countries in Latin America. The methods are many: funds to leftist parties, training and arms to guerrilla movements, conferences for radicals and terrorists. Libya has also run illegal activities out of its Peoples' Bureaus, gathered recruits through "friendship societies," engineered takeovers of legitimate Islamic organizations, and created its own Muslim groups and schools to promote its distorted version of Islam.

Libya's goal in the region is twofold: to destabilize current governments and to foster an anti-U.S. climate. Its training and supplying of armed movements serves the former purpose; its instigation and funding of anti-U.S. propaganda and demonstrations supports the latter. More recently, Libya has combined these two objectives by directing some guerrilla groups it funds to attack U.S. facilities in Latin American countries, so far without success.

Since the Benghazi conference in 1979, Qadhafi has attempted to bring together Latin American guerrilla and terrorist movements for greater unity of purpose and action. At first he utilized conferences and joint training in Libyan camps to build solidarity between groups from various countries. Later he set up centers for revolutionary activity in the countries themselves. These organizations received much of their direction from the Peoples' Bureaus in the countries themselves or their neighbors.

That Libya's reach has extended to Nicaragua, to the Caribbean, and into the South American continent is a matter of serious concern for the whole Western Hemisphere.

NOTES

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