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## SOVIET MILITARY POWER

Over the past <sup>25</sup>~~10-15~~ years the Soviets have concentrated on enlarging and improving their arms production capacity with demonstrable success. This is reflected in the large quantities of weapons the Soviets have ~~deployed~~ in recent years. *↳ been deploying*

The most recent comprehensive survey of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces is contained in "Soviet Military Power", ~~a book~~ prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency and made public in September, 1981.

TOTAL PERSONNEL IN UNIFORM (OVER): 4.8 million

### SOVIET GROUND FORCES

Total 180 divisions (2,015,000 to 2,500,000 men)

-126 motorized Rifle Divisions (11,000 to 13,000 men) *each*

-47 Tank Divisions (9,000 to 11,000 men each)

-7 Airborne Divisions (8,000 and up each)

Total tanks: 50,000 (1980) (1000 a year <sup>AVERAGE</sup> increase since 1966)

Total Artillery: 20,000 (1980) (doubled since 1966)

Helicopters: 5,200 (includes Air Force)

### SOVIET NAVAL FORCES

Combatant ships: 1,297

Submarines: 377 (179 nuclear)

Auxiliaries: 755

Naval aircraft: 1,440 (390 bombers, 70 fighters, antisub 400, ~~XXXX~~  
70 tankers, Recon & ECM 180, 330 transport ~~etc~~)  
*helicopters, etc*)

### SOVIET AIR FORCE

Long range bombers: 880 (Backfires/70 supersonic)

Frontal: 4,800 (recon, fighters, all fixed wing)

Air Defense Interceptors: 2,500

Sam missile sites: 1000 *missiles: 10,000 - 12,000*

ABM launchers: 32

SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES

Land-based

ICBMs: SS-11 580  
SS-13 60  
SS-17 150  
SS-18 308  
SS-19 300 (approx)

ICBM launchers: 1,398

IRBM: / SS-4 320  
MRBM: SS-5 35  
SS-20 250+ (mobile)

SLBMs: SS-N-6 }  
SS-N-8 }  
SS-N-18 } total: 950 (2,000 warheads)

- launchers

TOTAL: 7,000 warheads-

Long Range Bombers: 150

Military Production Base

Major plants 135 (up 34% since 1970)  
with over 410, million square feet floor space  
Research in Chemical warfare, laser, particle beam, radio, AWACS,

Soviet arms production has increased steadily since WWII. Today there are 135 major plants producing a variety of weaponry,

a total of over 400million square feet of floorspace. Research continues on chemical warfare, laser and particle beam technology. The gap between Soviet and U.S. technology is rapidly closing.

### Missile Production USSR

Missile Type	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
ICBMs	300	300	200	200	200
IRBMs	50	100	100	100	100
SRBMs	100	200	250	300	300
SLCMs	600	600	600	700	700
SLBMs	150	175	225	175	175
ASMs	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
SAMs	40,000	50,000	60,000	50,000	50,000

### Aircraft Production USSR

Aircraft Type	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Bombers	25	30	30	30	30
Fighters/ Fighter-Bombers	1,200	1,200	1,300	1,300	1,300
Transports	450	400	400	400	350
Trainers	50	50	50	25	225
ASW	5	10	10	10	10
Helicopters	1,400	900	600	700	750
Utility	125	100	100	100	100
Total	3,255	2,690	2,490	2,565	2,765

### Ground Forces Materiel Production USSR


	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Tanks	2,500	2,500	2,500	3,000	3,000
T-55	500	500	500	500	-
T-64	500	500	500	500	500
T-72	1,500	1,500	1,500	2,000	2,500
T-80				Trial Output	Trial Output
Other Armored Vehicles	4,500	4,500	5,500	5,500	5,500
Self-Propelled Field Artillery	900	950	650	250	150

### Naval Ship Construction USSR

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Submarines	10	13	12	12	11
Major Combatants	12	12	12	11	11
Minor Combatants	58	56	52	48	52
Auxiliaries	4	6	4	7	5

# STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCE


The Soviets have approximately 7,000 nuclear warheads



ICBMs Not shown *older*  
 SS-11 (TOTAL 580)  
 and SS-13 (total 60)


Total ICBM launchers is 1,398. The Soviets also have 150 long range bombers capable of carrying free fall or cruise nuclear bombs.

### Long-Range Theater Nuclear Weapons



### Soviet MRBM/IRBM Characteristics


	Warhead	Range	Propellant	Mobility
<b>MRBM</b>				
SS-4 SANDAL	1	2,000	Liquid	Fixed
<b>IRBM</b>				
SS-5 SKEAN	1	4,100	Liquid	Fixed
SS-20	3	5,000	Solid	Mobile




### Characteristics of Primary US & Soviet Theater Missiles

The new Soviet SS-20 is deployed on mobile launchers. Over 250 have been deployed, most in E. Europe. The NATO equivalent is the U.S. made Pershing which is also mobile but has much less of a range.

**Soviet Manpower  
by Type of Division  
1966-1980**



**Soviet Tanks  
and Artillery  
1966-1980**



**GROUND FORCES**  
=====

(Right) Graph shows growth in ground forces between 1966 and 1980

(Below) Tanks models now deployed. The new T-80 will soon be deployed. In the last 2 years, the T-72 has been produced in larger quantities (see below)

**Main Battle Tanks**

T-54/55



T-62



T-64



T-72



	T-54/55	T-62	T-64	T-72
WEIGHT (TONS)	36	37	35	41
SPEED (KM/HR)	50	50	50	60
MAIN ARMAMENT	100mm TANK GUN	115mm SMOOTHBORE	125mm SMOOTHBORE	125mm SMOOTHBORE
MUZZLE VELOCITY (MPS)	1,400	1,600	1,750	1,750

TOTAL: 50,000 deployed

Total tanks deployed with USSR and Warsaw Pact divisions is 50,000

**Production of Ground Forces Materiel  
USSR and Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact**


	1976		1977		1978		1979		1980	
	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP
Tanks	2500	800	2500	800	2500	800	3000	800	3000	750
T-55	500	800	500	800	500	800	500	800	—	750
T-64	500	—	500	—	500	—	500	—	500	—
T-72	1500	—	1500	—	1500	—	2000	—	2500	—
T-80	—	—	—	—	—	—	Trial Output	—	Trial Output	—
Other Armored Fighting Vehicles	4500	1800	4500	1900	5500	1700	5500	1600	5500	1200
Towed Field Artillery	900	50	1300	50	1500	100	1500	100	1300	100
Self-Propelled Field Artillery	900	—	950	—	650	—	250	50	150	50
Multiple Rocket Launchers	500	250	550	200	550	150	450	150	300	150
Self-Propelled AA Artillery	500	100	500	100	100	50	100	50	100	50
Towed-AA Artillery	500	300	250	250	100	200	—	200	—	150
Infantry Weapons	250,000	140,000	350,000	120,000	450,000	200,000	450,000	115,000	400,000	100,000

Production figures <sup>also</sup> include items for international arms sales

STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES include 2,300 interceptor type aircraft, and approximately 10,000 surface to air missiles coordinated by 5,000 early warning radars. Designed to protect ballistic missile sites.

**Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft**

64




Below:

Total Surface to Air missiles 10,000 to 12,000  
Launch sites : 1000

**Surface-to-Air Missiles**


67



**Antiballistic Missiles**

67

(left) ABMs are limited to 100 launchers within 4 sites outside Moscow by 1972 Treaty. Soviet ABM system is only operational system in the world. Soviets have only anti-satellite system known to be operational in the world



Treaty limited (1972) to 100 launchers in existing sites

world's only operational ABM system deployed in 4 sites near Moscow

also has world's only operational anti-satellite system (ASAT)

# Soviet Navy Order of Battle

## Submarines—Nuclear Powered

*SSBN	Ballistic Missile Submarines (YANKEE, DELTA classes) .....	62
SSBN	Ballistic Missile Submarines (HOTEL class) .....	7
*SSGN	Cruise Missile Submarines .....	50
*SSN	Torpedo-Attack Submarines .....	60

## Submarines—Diesel-electric Powered

SSB	Ballistic Missile Submarines .....	18
SSG	Cruise Missile Submarines .....	20
*SS	Torpedo-Attack Submarines .....	160

## Aircraft Carriers and Aviation Cruisers

CVHG	VSTOL Carriers (KIEV class) .....	2
CHG	Aviation Cruisers (MOSKVA class) .....	2

## Cruisers

*CGN	Guided Missile Cruiser (Nuclear) (KIROV class) .....	1
*CG	Guided Missile Cruisers (SAM/SSM) .....	26
CL	Light Cruisers (SVERDLOV class) .....	9

## Destroyers

*DDG	Guided Missile Destroyers (SAM/SSM) .....	38
DD	Destroyers .....	30

## Frigates (Escorts)

*FFG	Guided Missile Frigates (KRIVAK class) .....	28
*FF/FFL	Frigates / small frigates .....	140

## Small Combatants

*Missile Craft .....	145
*Patrol /ASW/ Torpedo Craft .....	395
*Minesweepers .....	395

## Amphibious Ships


*LPD	Amphibious Assault Transport Dock (IVAN ROGOV class) .....	1
LST	Amphibious Vehicle Landing Ships (ALLIGATOR, ROPUCHA classes) .....	25
LSM	Medium Landing Ships (POLNOCNY/MP-4 classes) .....	60

## Auxiliary Ships

*Mobile Logistics Ships .....	150
*Other Auxiliaries .....	605

\* Indicates additional units under construction in these categories.

The Typhoon class sub is the equivalent of the U.S. Trident sub. It has 20 missile firing tubes. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ It is undergoing trials and will soon be operational.



**Length of TYPHOON Compared to Height of Washington Monument**



**Soviet Navy Aircraft**

37  
47

Strike/Bombers ..... 390

- BACKFIRE (supersonic, about 70)
- BADGER
- BLINDER

Fighter/Fighter Bombers ..... 70

- FITTER
- FORGER

Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare

Aircraft ..... 180

- BADGER
- BEAR D
- BLINDER

Antisubmarine Aircraft ..... 400

- BEAR F                      HOUND
- HAZE A                      MAIL
- HORMONE A                MAY

Tanker ..... 70


- BADGER

Transport/Training Aircraft ..... 330


**New Generation of Major Surface Ships**

31


KIEV, 2 total  
VSTOL Carrier




KIROV Guided Missile Cruiser  
Nuclear powered  
Total : 1




MOSKVA : Aviation Cruiser Total : 2



UDALOY Guided Missile Destroyer  
Total : 2  
at least 1




SOVREMENNY Guided Missile Destroyer  
(New) TOTAL: 2  
at least 1



**Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Missiles**


58



	SS-N-5		SS-N-6		SS-N-8		SS-NX-17		SS-N-18			SS-NX-20
METERS	15		10		10		10		15		15	15
MOD		1	2	3	1	2		1	2	3		
RV's	1	1	1	2 MIRVs	1	1	1	3 MIRVs	1	7 MIRVs	12	
RANGE (KM)	1,400	2,400	3,000	3,000	7,800	9,100	3,900	6,500	8,000	6,500	8,300	

The 8, 18 and 20 can hit the U.S. even when fired by Soviet subs in their home ports.

**Long-Range Strike and Support Aircraft**




approx 100  
25,000 lbs.

approx 75  
(30 tanks)  
12,100 lbs


approx 70  
12,000 lbs -  
producing 1/2  
2 1/2 MONTH

600  
8,360 lbs

**Frontal Aviation Ground Attack Aircraft**



**Transport Aircraft**



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Frontal: 4,800 (recon, fighters, all fixed wing)

Air Defense Interceptors: 2,500

Sam missile sites: 1000 Missiles: 10,000 - 12,000

ABM launchers: 32

-1,050 launchers-

SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES

land-based

ICBMs:	SS-11	580	
	SS-13	60	
	SS-17	150	
	SS-18	308	
	SS-19	300	(approx)

JOBM launchers: 1,398 known

IRBM: /	SS-4	320	0
MRBM:	SS-5	35	-
	SS-20	250+	(mobile) -

SLBMs:	SS-N-6	}	total: 950 (2,000 warheads)
	SS-N-8		
	SS-N-18		

- Launchers

TOTAL: 7,000 warheads-

Long Range Bombers: 150

Military Production Base

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with over 410, million square feet floor space  
Research in Chemical warfare, laser, particle beam, radio, AWACS,

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USSR**

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a total of over 400million square feet of floorspace. Research continues on chemical warfare, laser and particle beam technology. The gap between Soviet and U.S. technology is rapidly closing.

**Aircraft Production  
USSR**

Aircraft Type	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
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**Ground Forces Materiel Production  
USSR**


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STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCE

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


ICBMs Not shown older  
 SS-11 (TOTAL 580)  
 and SS-13 (total 60)

SS-18 CAN HIT ANY TARGET  
 IN U.S. with single warhead

Total ICBM launchers is 1,398. The Soviets also have 150 long range bombers capable of carrying free fall or cruise nuclear bombs.


**Long-Range Theater Nuclear Weapons**



26

**Soviet MRBM/IRBM Characteristics**


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<b>IRBM</b>				
SS-5 SKEAN	1	4,100	Liquid	Fixed
SS-20	3	5,000	Solid	Mobile




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by Type of Division  
1966-1980**



**Soviet Tanks  
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1966-1980**



**GROUND FORCES  
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T-72



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
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	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP	USSR	NSWP
Tanks	2500	800	2500	800	2500	800	3000	800	3000	750
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T-64	500	—	500	—	500	—	500	—	500	—
T-72	1500	—	1500	—	1500	—	2000	—	2500	—
T-80	—	—	—	—	—	—	Trial Output	—	Trial Output	—
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Towed Field Artillery	900	50	1300	50	1500	100	1500	100	1300	100
Self-Propelled Field Artillery	900	—	950	—	650	—	250	50	150	50
Multiple Rocket Launchers	500	250	550	200	550	150	450	150	300	150
Self-Propelled AA Artillery	500	100	500	100	100	50	100	50	100	50
Towed-AA Artillery	500	300	250	250	100	200	—	200	—	150
Infantry Weapons	250,000	140,000	350,000	120,000	450,000	200,000	450,000	115,000	400,000	100,000

Production figures include items for international arms sales

STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES include 2,500 interceptor type aircraft, and approximately 10,000 surface to air missiles coordinated by 5,000 early warning radars. Designed to protect ballistic missile sites.

64

**Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft**




Below:

Total Surface to Air missiles 10,000 to 12,000  
Launch sites : 1000


**Surface-to-Air Missiles**

67



**Antiballistic Missiles**

(left) ABMs are limited to 100 launchers within 4 sites outside Moscow by 1972 Treaty. Soviet ABM system is only operational system in the world. Soviets have only anti-satellite system known to be operational in the world



world's only operational ABM system  
deployed in 4 sites near Moscow

only anti-satellite system (ASAT)  
not anti-ballistic missile system



### Submarines—Nuclear Powered

*SSBN	Ballistic Missile Submarines (YANKEE, DELTA classes) .....	62
SSBN	Ballistic Missile Submarines (HOTEL class).....	7
*SSGN	Cruise Missile Submarines .....	50
*SSN	Torpedo-Attack Submarines.....	60

### Destroyers

*DDG	Guided Missile Destroyers (SAM/SSM) .....	38
DD	Destroyers .....	30

### Frigates (Escorts)

*FFG	Guided Missile Frigates (KRIVAK class) .....	28
*FF/FFL	Frigates /small frigates.....	140

### Small Combatants

*Missile Craft .....	145
*Patrol /ASW/ Torpedo Craft.....	395
*Minesweepers .....	395

### Amphibious Ships

*LPD	Amphibious Assault Transport Dock (IVAN ROGOV class) .....	1
LST	Amphibious Vehicle Landing Ships (ALLIGATOR, ROPUCHA classes) .....	25
LSM	Medium Landing Ships (POLNOCNY/MP-4 classes).....	60

### Auxiliary Ships

*Mobile Logistics Ships .....	150
*Other Auxiliaries.....	605

### Submarines—Diesel-electric Powered

SSB	Ballistic Missile Submarines.....	18
SSG	Cruise Missile Submarines .....	20
*SS	Torpedo-Attack Submarines.....	160

### Aircraft Carriers and Aviation Cruisers


CVHG	VSTOL Carriers (KIEV class) .....	2
CHG	Aviation Cruisers (MOSKVA class).....	2

### Cruisers

*CGN	Guided Missile Cruiser (Nuclear) (KIROV class).....	1
*CG	Guided Missile Cruisers (SAM/SSM) .....	26
CL	Light Cruisers (SVERDLOV class).....	9

\* Indicates additional units under construction in these categories.

The Typhoon class sub is the equivalent of the U.S. Trident sub. It has 20 missile firing tubes. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ It is undergoing trials and will soon be operational.



**Length of TYPHOON Compared to Height of Washington Monument**

## Soviet Navy Aircraft

47

Strike/Bombers ..... 390

**BACKFIRE** (supersonic, about 70)  
**BADGER**  
**BLINDER**

Fighter/Fighter Bombers ..... 70

**FITTER**  
**FORGER**

Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare

Aircraft ..... 180

**BADGER**  
**BEAR D**  
**BLINDER**

Antisubmarine Aircraft ..... 400

**BEAR F**                      **HOUND**  
**HAZE A**                      **MAIL**  
**HORMONE A**                  **MAY**

Tanker ..... 70


**BADGER**

Transport/Training Aircraft ..... 330


## New Generation of Major Surface Ships

39


KIEV, 2 total  
VSTOL Carrier




KIROV Guided Missile Cruiser  
Nuclear powered  
Total : 1




MOSKVA : Aviation Cruiser Total : 2



UDALOY Guided Missile Destroyer  
TOTAL : 2  
*at least 1*




SOVREMENNY Guided Missile Destroyer  
(New) TOTAL : 2  
*at least 1*



## Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Missiles


58




METERS	SS-N-5	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-NX-17	SS-N-18	SS-NX-20
15						
10						
5						
0						
		MOD 2	MOD 1 2		MOD 1 2 3	
RV's	1	1	1	2 MIRVs	1	1
RANGE (KM)	1,400	2,400	3,000	3,000	7,800	9,100
					3 MIRVs	1
					8,000	6,500
					12	8,300

The 8, 18 and 20 can hit the U.S. even when fired by Soviet subs in their home ports.


### Long-Range Strike and Support Aircraft



### Frontal Aviation Ground Attack Aircraft



### Transport Aircraft





# PUBLICATION BRIEF

## Technology and Soviet Energy Availability

**No U.S. policy of restricting Soviet access to energy technology is likely to succeed unless U.S. allies change their present views of their interests in this matter.** A policy intended to bolster Soviet energy production would not succeed without significant changes in Soviet economic policy. A course of action seeking maximum commercial advantage for the United States in energy equipment sales would be aided by making the export licensing process more predictable.

The vast majority of the U.S.S.R.'s energy-related imports of technology are destined for its oil and natural gas industries, but **it obtains most of these from sources outside the United States.** There are a few energy technologies solely available from the United States, and a few instances in which U.S. equipment is preferred. But except for advanced computers, **the U.S.S.R. is either not purchasing these items, is on the way to acquiring domestic production capabilities, or has demonstrated that such imports are not essential.** Moreover, **the United States does not produce the large diameter pipe that constitutes the U.S.S.R.'s single most important energy-related import.**

Western technology has been and will continue to be important to Soviet energy development. In the long term, Western exploration technology and equipment may be crucial to the oil industry. But **the most vital area for such Western assistance is equipment for the construction of large diameter gas pipelines.** This is the only area in which Soviet energy-related imports might be described as "massive."

**Contrary to common belief, oil is not the key to Soviet energy performance in this decade.** The relevant question is not how much oil the U.S.S.R. can produce by 1990, but how much energy. Predicting future Soviet energy production is a tenuous exercise, but to the extent that plausible outcomes can be identified, **the Soviet's own goal of a small rise in oil output by 1985 is reasonable.** On the other hand, prospects for the Soviet coal industry are poor; even the relatively modest 1985 targets are excessively optimistic. Soviet targets for nuclear power are overly optimistic—not because of lack of know-how—but because of shortcomings in the efficiency and capacity of producing the required equipment and constructing power stations. OTA also found that potentially large savings through energy conservation are not likely to be achieved.

Gains in total energy production will therefore have to come from gas. **Proven Soviet gas reserves may be likened to the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia.** This is the energy sector with the best prospects and performance record, and Soviet planners have accorded it high investment priority.

Gains in gas output could more than compensate—both in energy value and in hard currency earnings—for slowing growth in oil production. **It is therefore highly unlikely that the Soviet Union itself or the Soviet bloc as a whole will become a net energy importer in the 1980's.**

The extent to which the U.S.S.R. can capitalize on its tremendous gas potential will depend on its ability to substitute gas for oil, i.e., to convert to gas in boiler and industrial applications, and to add to the gas pipeline network. **The rate of construction of new pipelines, both for domestic use and for export, is the most important determinant of the extent to which Soviet gas can be utilized.**

Energy availability is a critical factor in the growth of the Soviet Union's domestic economy; energy exports provide over half of Soviet hard currency receipts; and subsidized energy sales to Eastern Europe are vital tools of Soviet influence in that region. From the perspective of Japan and some countries in Western Europe, Soviet energy industries are important customers for equipment and technology and a source of energy supplies.

Copies of the full OTA report, "Technology and Soviet Energy Availability," are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office. The GPO stock number is 052-003-00858-1; the price is \$10.00. Copies of the full report for **congressional use** are available by calling 4-8996. Summary copies are available at no charge from the Office of Technology Assessment.

# Soviet Active Measures: An Update

July 1982



United States Department of State  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*  
Washington, D.C.

*This report describes Soviet "active measures" which have come to light since the publication of Special Report No. 88, "Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations," in October 1981.*

The Soviet Union uses the term "active measures" (*aktivnyye meropriyatiya*) to cover a broad range of activities designed to promote Soviet foreign policy goals, including undercutting opponents of the U.S.S.R. Active measures include disinformation, manipulating the media in foreign countries, the use of Communist parties and Communist front groups, and operations to expand Soviet political influence. In contrast to public diplomacy, which all nations practice, Soviet active measures often involve deception and are frequently implemented by clandestine means. Active measures are carried out not only by the KGB but also by the International Department and the International Information Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The active measures discussed in this report are necessarily limited to those that have been publicly exposed. They make clear that these activities take place worldwide. The open societies of many industrialized and developing countries afford the Soviets opportunities to use active measures to influence opinions in favor of Soviet policies and against those of the United States and its allies. It is our hope that this report will increase public awareness and understanding of Soviet active measures and thereby reduce the likelihood that people will be deceived.

## Forgeries

Forgeries are a frequently used active measures technique. Several have come to light in recent months. Their appearance has been timed to influence Western opinion on current sensitive issues. As far as we are aware, only one of these recent forgeries achieved uncritical publication.

Forgeries are usually sent through the mail to journalists, officials, or other persons who might make them available to the media. Forgeries normally do not carry a return address, nor is the sender identified in a way that can be checked. How the document was acquired invariably is vague.

**The NATO Information Service Documents.** In late October 1981, Spanish journalists living in Brussels received form letters purporting to come from the NATO Information Service. The letters enclosed a publicity packet that had been updated to include Spain as a new member of the alliance. As the Spanish Parliament was still debating Spain's application to join NATO, the letter could impress Spaniards as showing contempt for Spain's democratic institutions. The journalists checked with NATO, and stories in the Spanish press spoke of a forgery designed to influence Spain's domestic debate on NATO.

**The President Reagan Letter to the King of Spain.** In November 1981, an attempt was made in Madrid to surface a forged letter from President Reagan to the King of Spain. In terms likely to offend Spanish sensitivities, the letter urged the King to join NATO and to crack down on groups such as the "OPUS DEI pacifists" and the "left-wing opposition."

After an initial mailing to Spanish journalists failed to obtain publication, the forgery was circulated on November 11 to all delegations (except the U.S. and Spanish) to the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), then meeting in Madrid. This time several Madrid newspapers ran stories that exposed the letter as a fabrication probably of Soviet origin.

**The Clark-Stearns Letter.** In January 1982, a forged letter and an accompanying research analysis dated September 23, 1981, from Judge William Clark, then Deputy Secretary of State, to the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Monteagle Stearns, circulated in Athens. This forgery indicated U.S. support for the conservatives in the October Greek elections and alluded to a possible military coup if Socialist leader Andreas Papandreou won at the polls. On the basis of Embassy assurances that the letter was a fake, it was not initially published. Several weeks later, after copies had been circulated at the CSCE in Madrid, the Athens daily *Vrathini* published a story describing the letter as of doubtful authenticity and probably attributable to a "third-country" intelligence service.

**The Swedish Mailgrams.** During the week of November 8, 1981, at least 10 mailgrams—initiated by telephone calls to Western Union—were circulated to journalists in the Washington, D.C. area. Supposedly sent by U.S. Government officials, the mailgrams offered to make available the text of an alleged secret agreement for U.S. use of the Swedish base at Karlskrona for intelligence purposes.



**Angola/Zaire/South Africa.** One Soviet campaign has been to discredit U.S. policy in southern Africa—in particular, the credibility of U.S. efforts to solve the Namibia problem—by media stories that the United States is trying to oust the Government of Angola. A number of recent examples illustrate this effort.

- On September 15 and 23–24, 1981, the *Portugal Hoje* of Lisbon, a paper close to the Socialist Party, published reports that U.S., Zairian, and South African representatives had met secretly to conspire against the Angolan regime. The source for the story, an Angolan traveling to Lisbon, claimed he had stolen Zairian documents as proof, but he never made the documents available. Both Zaire and the United States denied the allegations. TASS promptly picked up the *Hoje* story, and in turn it was replayed in a number of African papers, including the *Jornal de Angola*.

- On December 22, 1981, *Diario de Lisboa*, a pro-Communist paper, reported that the United States was supporting “2,000 specially trained gunmen” based in Zaire to attack Angola. The State Department denied the story December 24, but TASS nonetheless picked it up. In turn, a number of African papers and radio stations and the Flemish Socialist daily *De Morgen* replayed the allegations on the basis of the TASS account.

- A similar story was carried in the April 17, 1982 Congolese newspaper *Etumba*, which alleged a meeting in 1981 between the United States, South Africa, and others to plot against Angola. The U.S. Embassy in Brazzaville promptly denied the report.

**The Seychelles Coup Attempt.** A day after the November 25, 1981 attempt by a group of mercenaries to overthrow the Government of the Seychelles, Soviet news reports were implying that the CIA was responsible. In keeping with frequent Soviet practice, these accusations were attributed to unnamed, and therefore unverifiable, “African radio commentaries.” Despite a statement by Seychelles President France Albert René on December 2 that his government had no indication of any foreign involvement other than South African, Soviet media continued to accuse the United States. In December, several African newspapers (among them the *Nairobi Nation* and *Lagos Daily Times*, the leading dailies in Kenya and Nigeria, respectively) repeated the story. Soviet media then replayed the allegations, citing the African papers as sources.

**The Pakistani Mosquitoes.** In the wake of compelling evidence that the Soviets are using chemical weapons in Afghanistan and supplying mycotoxins for use in Laos and Kampuchea, Moscow has launched a disinformation effort focused on Pakistan. The February 2, 1982 *Literaturnaya Gazeta* alleged that the antimalaria program of the Pakistan Malaria Research Center in Lahore was a CIA-financed effort to breed special mosquitoes “which infect their victims with deadly viruses as part of U.S. plans to introduce biological warfare into Afghanistan.” In fact, the Pakistan Malaria Research Center has been conducting antimalaria research for 20 years. Much of the funding comes from the U.S. National Institutes of Health and AID through a contract with the University of Maryland. The State Department promptly labeled the Soviet charges “utterly baseless.”

The American Center Director Dr. David Nalin told the *Baltimore Sun* on February 9, 1982 that the allegations were a Soviet disinformation effort to counter U.S. “yellow rain” charges. Nonetheless, TASS continued to carry the false stories, which were replayed not only by regular disinformation outlets, such as Bombay’s *Blitz* and the New Delhi *Patriot*, but also by independent newspapers not usually associated with Soviet propaganda, such as the influential *Times of India* and Pakistani daily *Jang*, and the *Muslim News* of Capetown, South Africa.

**A Moscow-funded Greek Newspaper?** Another way to exert media influence is by secretly subsidizing a newspaper. This may have occurred recently in Greece. In May 1982, the Athens daily *Messimvrini* charged that a new large circulation daily, *To Ethnos*, had begun publication in September 1981 thanks to a secret Soviet subsidy of \$1.8 million; *Messimvrini* alleged that covert payments were continuing. The Greek Government has ordered an investigation.

**Military Base Hoaxes.** A disinformation staple is to float false stories about U.S. military cooperation. Recent examples from Soviet and Communist media have included false stories that the United States has or intends to establish bases on the Honduran island of Amapala, the Colombian island of San Andres, and in the Comoros Islands off the east coast of Africa. Although these have not gained credence, one relating to Pakistan attracted more attention. As a result, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry on December 10, 1981 found it

necessary to deny Radio Moscow’s assertion that the United States would seek military bases in Pakistan during a visit by Secretary of State Haig. Among other things, the Radio Moscow account falsely asserted that Indian Foreign Minister Rao had claimed in the Indian Parliament that Pakistan had agreed to provide bases for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force.

### Front Groups/Pro-Moscow Communist Parties

Front groups are nominally independent organizations that are controlled by the Soviets, usually through the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.<sup>1</sup> These organizations have long sought to build support for Soviet foreign policy goals. In recent months the main thrust of front activity has been to try to see that the peace movement in Western Europe and the United States is directed solely against U.S. policy and that it avoids any criticism of the Soviet nuclear threat. The 1982 program of the World Peace Council, for example, calls for:

- “Further intensification of actions against the dangers of nuclear war and the deployment of new U.S. weapons of mass destruction in Western Europe. . . .”

- “National events (demonstrations, seminars, colloquia, etc.) with international participation ‘against nuclear arms build-up and the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe; for peace and detente in Europe.’”

- “International meeting of mayors and elected representatives (city councillors, municipalities, etc.) and of peace forces from European towns and regions where new U.S. nuclear missiles are to be deployed. . . .”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>See Foreign Affairs Note, *The World Peace Council, Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Department of State, April 1982. Other well-known international fronts are the International Institute for Peace (IIP), The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the International Union of Students (IUS), the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF), the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), the International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR), and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).

<sup>2</sup>*World Peace Council: Programme of Action 1982* published by the Information Center of the WPC, Helsinki.

Communist parties linked with Moscow have pursued the same path. The impact of the fronts and local Communist groups varies markedly from country to country and is difficult to evaluate. Nevertheless, awareness is increasing that the Communists and their supporters are attempting to channel the peace and antinuclear movements to serve Moscow's purpose. This has led to friction within the movement in some countries.

In West Germany, after efforts by the German Communist Party (DKP) in early April 1982 produced anti-U.S. slogans without mentioning the Soviet nuclear arsenal as a threat to peace, Petra Kelly, a prominent leader of the Environment Party (the "Greens") publicly criticized the Communists. She repeated this criticism when interviewed on CBS Television during President Reagan's visit to Bonn. Similarly, in Austria, the original platform adopted by the organizers of a peace march on May 15 under pressure from pro-Moscow Communists avoided criticism of Soviet atomic weapons. The non-Communists later regrouped; as a result, the Austrian Youth Council issued a less one-sided platform.

#### Political Influence Operations

Political influence operations, especially those using agents of influence, are harder to detect than other active measures. In these operations, individuals disguise their KGB connection while taking

an active role in public affairs. Exposure, when it occurs, is frequently the result of an espionage investigation. The scale of improper Soviet activities is reflected in the publicized expulsion of 19 Soviet officials involved in espionage and active measures cases from 10 countries during the first 5 months of 1982. Among these were the expulsion of the Soviet military attache from Washington and the uncovering of spy nets in Indonesia and Singapore.

**Denmark.** In October 1981, the Danish Government expelled Vladimir Merkulov, a KGB officer serving as a second secretary of the Soviet Embassy, for improper conduct, including directing the activities of Danish agent-of-influence Arne Herloev Petersen. An April 17, 1982 Danish Ministry of Justice statement detailed Petersen's work with the KGB.

- In the summer of 1981, the Soviets arranged to cover Petersen's expenses for a series of advertisements in which Danish artists expressed support for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone.

- Petersen brought foreign policy documents provided by the Soviet Embassy to the North Korean Embassy; on Soviet instructions he misrepresented the documents as coming from an American journalist.

- Petersen provided information several times to the Soviet Embassy on

the Danish "left wing" and on "progressive" journalists who were not Communist Party members.

- Petersen arranged for the printing of a pamphlet attacking British Prime Minister Thatcher. The text was supplied by the Soviet Embassy.

The Ministry of Justice noted that clandestine meetings between Petersen and a succession of three Soviet "diplomats" (of whom Merkulov was the latest) had extended over several years. Petersen specifically was requested by his KGB handlers not to join the Danish Communist Party.

The Danish Government decided not to prosecute Petersen, although it declared that he violated Danish law. In a television interview 2 days after the official statement, the Danish Foreign Minister challenged Petersen to sue for slander so that the full extent of the government's evidence could be made public.

**Sweden.** Soviet Third Secretary Albert Liepa was expelled in April 1982. According to a Swedish Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liepa had made systematic efforts to collect information on and exert influence over the Latvian exile community in Sweden. Before his assignment to Stockholm, Liepa had been chairman of a committee based in Riga concerned with maintaining "cultural ties" with Latvians living outside the Soviet Union. ■

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United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

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OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS  
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WASHINGTON DC 20500



Chronology

# Soviet and Soviet-proxy Involvement in Poland

July 1980-December 1981

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United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, D.C.

*Following is a chronology of public Soviet and Soviet-proxy involvement in Polish events of the last year and a half with an appendix of Soviet statements on Poland. It reveals a consistent pattern of pressure, threats, and intimidation that flagrantly violates the principles embodied in the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. It does not consider the covert Soviet pressure and manipulation about which the U.S. Government has classified information not contained in this chronology.*

## July 1980

**2**—First strike at Warsaw's Ursus Tractor Factory began. Workers protest increased meat prices.

## August 1980

**14**—Labor unrest has spread. More than 50,000 workers in Gdansk went on strike.

**15**—TASS announced Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Baltic region and G.D.R.

**20**—U.S.S.R. resumed jamming of Voice of America and other Western broadcasters.

**27**—In the first direct Soviet criticism of the Polish strikers, TASS charged that "anti-socialist forces" were trying to undermine socialism in Poland and to push it "off the socialist road it has chosen . . . which meets the vital interests of the entire Polish people."

## September 1980

**1**—*Pravda* editorial by "Petrov" criticized the Polish settlement. It made no mention of the Gdansk agreement or issue of free trade unions but firmly rejected "political" demands advanced by "anti-socialist elements" to inflict "direct damage" on socialism and "violate" the crucial link between the party and working class. It reminded Poland of its obligations to the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. *Izvestiya*, in addition, attacked dissidents Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik.

**2**—TASS and Moscow TV criticized Carter and Reagan Labor Day speeches for interfering in Poland's internal affairs and charged that money is being collected in the West to undermine Polish socialism.

**8**—40,000 Warsaw Pact troops begin 4-day maneuvers in G.D.R.

**10**—Polish Deputy Premier Jagielski, heading a government economic delegation on a 2-day visit, met with chief Kremlin ideologist Mikhail Suslov and other senior officials in Moscow.

**18**—A report by William Beecher in *Boston Globe* (carried by the September 19 *Washington Star*) indicated that Western intelligence had picked up over the last few days signs of unusual military activity in the G.D.R. and U.S.S.R. which could presage either an invasion of Poland or a significant show of force for intimidation purposes.

19—Another authoritative “Petrov” article in *Pravda* warned the West not to interfere in Polish affairs.

25—*Pravda* carried a “book review” citing Lenin’s castigation of any “workers’ opposition” in a socialist state as an “anarcho-syndicalist view” which threatened “party’s leading role.”

#### October 1980

7—Moscow’s trade union daily *Trud* report from Gdansk alleged that there had been attempts to discredit the official Polish unions and warned of the “serious nature” of attempts to give trade union reforms an “anti-socialist tendency.”

30—Polish party First Secretary Kania and Premier Pinkowski made a sudden “working” visit to Moscow for talks with Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. Communique did not endorse Kania personally but expressed confidence in the Polish party.

East Germany “temporarily” abolished visa-free travel between the G.D.R. and Poland until, according to the East German news agency, there was progress toward “stabilization” in Poland.

#### November 1980

8—Warsaw Radio reported that maneuvers had taken place in Poland by units of the Polish Army and the Soviet Northern Group of Forces. Warsaw TV broadcast a documentary about them.

24—Communist Party Central Committee department head in charge of radio and TV, Josef Klasa, in an interview with *New York Times*, *Figaro*, and *Financial Times* of London charged that “elements” close to Solidarity seemed to be working for economic anarchy, that Solidarity had the seeds of a political entity, and that its demands were growing voraciously. He claimed that Kania told Walesa in their meeting 2 weeks ago that a confrontation between the party and Solidarity would be catastrophic and declared that the Soviets had reason to be concerned.

A TASS dispatch from Warsaw warned that a threatened railway strike in Poland “could touch on Poland’s national and defense interests,” and accused the Solidarity federation of attempting to “maintain the tense situation in the country.”

25—*Trybuna Ludu* (apparently in answer to Soviet concerns) stated that labor problems would “never make it impossible for Poland to make good on its export and transit commitments.”

27—In its strongest attack thus far, *Rude Pravo* stated that there were limits to Solidarity’s activities, and drew an ominous parallel to Czechoslovakia’s liberal upsurge in 1968 quelled by a Warsaw Pact invasion.

#### December 1980

1-5—Press reports of Soviet troop activity in western military districts and of some mobilization of reserves indicated an increased military readiness. Soviet reservists called up during summer at height of labor unrest remain on duty.

3—An official party spokesman told a press conference that Polish communists had the “right and duty” to request Soviet assistance if socialism were endangered.

4—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman charged that Western statements on Poland were exacerbating the situation; a Soviet television commentary accused President Carter and other U.S. officials of waging psychological warfare against the Polish Government.

5—The Warsaw Pact’s emergency summit meeting in Moscow expressed confidence that Poland would be able to overcome its present difficulties and pledged “firm fraternal solidarity and support” to Poland, which “has been, is, and will remain a socialist state.”

7—White House statement says: “Preparation for possible intervention in Poland appears to have been completed.”

8—The Polish information agency Interpress and the local Solidarity chapter in Kielce denied a TASS report that “counterrevolutionary groups” within Solidarity at the Kielce electrical plant Iskra had ousted official trade union representatives and replaced them with persons “who openly adhere to anti-government positions.” (Czechoslovak, East German, and Bulgarian media had carried similar reports.) (Note: This was a deliberately fabricated TASS report, never published in the Soviet press after Polish denials. It represented a warning by evoking the memory of similar fabrications as part of Soviet preparations for the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.)

18—*Pravda* accused NATO of trying to deny Poland’s leaders the right to call on allies to help in dealing with the crisis.

25-26—Foreign Minister Czyrek made an “official, friendly visit” to Moscow, where he met with Brezhnev and Gromyko. He reaffirmed that Poland “was, is, and will remain a socialist state, a firm link in the common family of socialist countries.”

#### January 1981

6—Polish-Soviet Friendship Society called on its members “to fight the political forces that are trying to turn the renewal into an . . . anti-Soviet trend.”

13—Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Viktor Kulikov made surprise visit to Waraw, met with Kania and Polish defense chiefs.

Chairman of Polish-Soviet Friendship Society Stanislaw Wronski arrived in Moscow.

14-21—A delegation headed by Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) International Information Department head Leonid Zamyatin met with editorial boards of Polish media and expressed displeasure over Polish coverage of developments since August.

23—*Krasnaya zvezda* reported a recent joint training exercise of Soviet and Polish troops in Poland, but did not specify date or place. Polish military officials denied that exercises were taking place.

28—*Krasnaya zvezda* accused NATO of attempting to detach Poland from Warsaw Pact.

29—Polish Government declaration issued a barely veiled threat to invoke a state of emergency or martial law. This coincided with a TASS item from Warsaw alleging that, since January 24, opposition anti-socialist forces had been more active in Poland and that Solidarity was “veering to the right, opposing efforts of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party—the Communist party] Central Committee and the Polish Government to normalize the situation and safeguard the vital interests of the people.” Leaders and extremist elements of Solidarity were said to be resorting to blackmail, provocation, and physical force and were making more and more political demands, putting Solidarity in political opposition to the state and party authorities.

#### February 1981

2—TASS said that many Poles expect that “measures will be adopted to resist counterrevolution.”

8, 10—Pentagon and intelligence sources said Soviet troops alerted for crisis in December (altogether 26 divisions) remain in high state of readiness on Poland’s border.

17—Jaruzelski met with Soviet and Warsaw Pact ambassadors to Poland.

23—Brezhnev addressed CPSU Congress and reasserted the Brezhnev Doctrine. (See appendix, February 24, 1981.)

24—Kania tells CPSU Congress that Polish leaders are able and willing to “prevent a counterrevolution in Poland.” He added that “the situation in Poland and around it is directly connected with the security of all socialist states. The socialist community is indissoluble and its defense is not only the affair of each state, but of the entire coalition as well.”

24-28—Crescendo of Soviet media attacks culminating in charges that Solidarity had seized radio stations, blocked highways, and committed other illegal acts in preparation for a takeover.

### March 1981

4—Kania, Jaruzelski, and other Polish leaders held talks in Moscow with Brezhnev and other senior Soviet Politburo members. The communique said the Soviets expected the Poles “to turn the course of events.” It also said that the defense of socialism is a concern of “the entire socialist community.”

5—U.S.S.R. announced plans for Warsaw Pact maneuvers in March in the area from the Polish-Czech border north to the Baltic.

19—The Polish News Agency (PAP) reported Warsaw Pact “Soyuz-81” maneuvers in Poland, G.D.R., U.S.S.R., and Czechoslovakia, stressing that the Polish Army with Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces would fulfill its duty to defend socialism.

22—Deputy Premier Rakowski informed Solidarity leaders that the Warsaw Pact exercise “Soyuz-81” was to be extended “because of the situation in Poland.” He warned Solidarity that its actions could bring in Soviet tanks.

29—Secretaries Haig and Weinberger described the “heightened state of readiness” of Soviet troops postured near Poland.

### April 1981

2-3—The Western press reported more on military movements in and around Poland. Meanwhile, Soviet press commentary appeared aimed at providing a justification for possible Soviet action.

6—At Czech party congress with Brezhnev present, President Husak reaffirmed the right of the Warsaw Pact to intervene to preserve Poland’s socialist system.

7—State Department reported unusual levels of Warsaw Pact military activity, increases in Soviet troops near Poland, the establishment of a Soviet communications and command network, and supply stockpiles in Poland.

9—U.S. officials reported that Soviet transport helicopters, planes, pilots, and technicians were flown to Soviet military headquarters in southwest Poland on March 3.

10—Speaking before the *Sejm* [parliament], Jaruzelski asked for a suspension of the right to strike for 2 months. He said Poland’s current chance to work out its problems on its own was “not repeatable.”

State Department reported that the U.S.S.R. had sent even more transport aircraft to Poland.

11—At the G.D.R. party congress, Party Chief Honecker declared that Poland “was, is, and will remain socialist.”

23-24—Soviet Politburo ideologist Mikhail Suslov arrived in Warsaw unexpectedly to hold talks with members of the Polish Politburo. The Polish News Agency reported that the talks stressed the need to “remove the dangers to the gains of socialism.”

25—TASS attacked “revisionist elements” within the Polish party, the first such accusation in the Soviet media, reflecting the poor outcome of the Suslov visit.

### May 1981

4—Following a report in the April 29 Solidarity bulletin that Soviet troops “landed” in southeast Poland on April 22, Western military sources revealed that Soviet troops in that region were constructing military communications.

28—The party youth newspaper *Sztandar Mlodych* published an appeal by an obscure “Katowice party forum” for “decisive action” by Poland’s leaders against “counterrevolution” and “revisionism.” (Although widely condemned in Polish party circles, the appeal was favorably reported by Czechoslovak radio on May 31, by Soviet TASS on June 1, by *Pravda*, and by Soviet TV on June 2.)

30—Kania and Jaruzelski met in Warsaw with Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Marshal Kulikov in what was described as a “friendly” atmosphere.

### June 1981

5—The Soviet party sent a seven-page “warning” letter to the Polish party Central Committee. The letter accused the Kania-Jaruzelski leadership of incapacity to deal with “counterrevolution.” (See appendix, June 12, 1981.)

Notwithstanding the widespread opposition in Poland to the Katowice forum’s harsh criticism of Kania’s policies, TASS carried a lengthy and favorable report on the forum.

9-11—The 11th plenum of the Polish party Central Committee, convened to deal with the June 5 CPSU letter, developed into an open power struggle between Kania and his moderate supporters and the Moscow-backed hardliners led by Grabski. Kania survived the challenge, but acknowledged that Soviet concern over developments in Poland was “fully justified.”

14-16—Walesa embarked on a cross-country campaign to urge Solidarity chapters to refrain from confrontations and to concentrate on union activities. His efforts coincided with the defacement of a Soviet war memorial, which he denounced as a provocation designed to implicate Solidarity and destabilize an already tense situation.

20—Chief Kremlin spokesman Zamyatin declared on Soviet TV that “the time has come for decisive action” by Polish leaders “to avert a national catastrophe.”

22—Soviet military paper *Krasnaya zvezda* carried Warsaw Pact Chief Kulikov’s article denouncing Polish “counter-revolutionary forces.”

23—*Pravda* said any change in Poland’s status would weaken a key link in the Warsaw Pact, threatening the entire balance of post-World War II Europe. TASS accused Solidarity of seeking to pack the Polish party congress with delegates who would seek to challenge the Marxist-Leninist character of the party.

25—The Polish News Agency reported joint Polish-Soviet military exercises in Silesia.

29—Polish TV reported that Polish-Soviet military exercises extended to the northwest province of Pomerania.

30—*Neues Deutschland* reported military maneuvers in G.D.R.

### July 1981

3-5—Gromyko conferred in Warsaw with the Polish leadership on eve of PZPR Ninth Congress.

3—Soviet troops in western Ukraine on Polish border resumed 2-day intensive training for full mobilization, according to sources in Moscow.

7—Western sources reported that the U.S.S.R. was preparing yet another major military exercise near Poland.

19—Brezhnev sent a terse message of congratulations to Kania on his reelection. The message lacked any praise or statement of confidence in Kania's leadership.

21—Brezhnev and Tikhonov cabled congratulations on the anniversary of the Polish People's Republic. The message noted that the party congress "has set the task of stabilizing the situation" and that the Polish party is "capable of rallying all the working people . . . to resolutely rebuff anarchy and counterrevolution."

#### August 1981

8—Polish Premier Jaruzelski held talks with visiting Warsaw Pact Chief Kulikov.

13—The Soviet Union announced that it would hold major land and sea maneuvers in the western U.S.S.R. on September 4-12.

14-15—Polish leaders Kania and Jaruzelski flew to the Crimea for a "short working visit" with Brezhnev and other senior Soviet leaders.

#### September 1981

4-12—U.S.S.R. hosted "Zapad-81" military exercises.

8—TASS announced that, at the invitation of Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, the defense ministers of all Warsaw Pact countries, Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam were attending the "Zapad-81" exercise in the U.S.S.R.

10—Polish News Agency reported that Kania received Soviet Ambassador Aristov, who, it is speculated, presented Kania with a warning letter from the Kremlin. (See September 17, 1981, and appendix, September 18, 1981.)

17—Following a report that Soviet Ambassador Aristov had been received by Polish leaders Kania and Jaruzelski, the Polish News Agency disclosed that the Soviet leadership had reminded Warsaw in a letter that the "growth of anti-Sovietism in Poland . . . has reached dangerous limits" and had called for resolute action to halt such activities. (See appendix, September 18, 1981.)

22—Soviet Gen. Gibkov, Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, met with Polish Prime Minister Jaruzelski on "problems of training and combat readiness of the detached [Polish] troops which form part of the Joint Armed Forces."

22-26—Soviet Deputy Premier and Planning Chief Baybakov discussed Polish-Soviet economic relations in Warsaw amid rumors that the Soviets were considering the use of economic leverage to bring Warsaw to heel.

23—On the eve (September 26) of the Solidarity congress's second session, TASS criticized the Polish leadership for not acting against the union leaders or halting what it called preparations for a takeover of power.

26—TASS indirectly criticized the Polish leadership by carrying an appeal of the hardline "Marxist-Leninist Seminar" in Katowice that Warsaw "use all existing means" to defend socialism.

#### October 1981

13—*Pravda* carried an authoritative "A. Petrov" commentary criticizing Solidarity for seeking the destruction of Polish socialism and taking over political power. The article contained an implied threat of intervention. (See appendix, October 13, 1981.)

14—Suslov made a speech emphasizing "imperialist" attempts to weaken Polish socialism through overt and covert assistance to "counterrevolutionary" forces. He promised Poland "the fraternal solidarity and support of the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact."

17—Premier Jaruzelski replaced Kania as Communist party chief.

#### November 1981

Early November—Press accounts reported that the Soviets had warned the Poles that Soviet economic assistance to Poland would be reduced and that Moscow would insist on a trade balance beginning in 1982.

27-28—The Polish sixth party plenum adopted a resolution authorizing the government to seek enabling legislation in the *Sejm* for the restoration of social peace, including special emergency powers.

#### December 1981

7—Polish press intensified criticism of Solidarity, publishing excerpts from tape recordings of Solidarity meetings in Radom; TASS replayed the Polish attacks.

11—In one of its sharpest attacks in some time, TASS charged that counter-revolutionary forces have expanded their struggle against the Polish Party, citing various extreme actions which "justly anger the Soviet people." (See appendix, December 11, 1981.)

13—Another TASS report attacking Solidarity concocted a virtual invitation by "patriotic forces" in Poland for the imposition of military repression. (See appendix, December 13, 1981.)

Radio Moscow reported the imposition of martial law in Poland, the internment of "extremists" of Solidarity, the formation of a military ruling council, and the reaffirmation of Polish-Soviet ties.

14—A TASS statement called the martial law a "purely internal affair."

23—President Reagan denounced the public and secret Soviet pressure on Poland. He then revealed that Marshal Kulikov and other senior Red Army officers were in Poland while the martial law was being initiated and that the martial law proclamation issued 10 days before was printed in Moscow in September.

Late December—A Soviet lecturer, speaking to a public audience in the Soviet Union shortly after the declaration of martial law, stated that martial law had been in preparation for a month (i.e., well before Solidarity's call on December 3 at Radom for free elections—the supposed reason for the imposition of martial law) and said that it had been "brilliantly conspired."

#### APPENDIX

##### Soviet Statements on Poland

##### December 6, 1980—*Pravda*

Statement by Warsaw Pact leaders meeting in Moscow:

Socialist Poland, the Polish United Workers Party and the Polish people can firmly count on the fraternal solidarity and support of the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty. Representatives of the Polish United Workers Party stressed that Poland has been, is and will remain a socialist state, a firm link in the common family of the countries of socialism.

##### February 24, 1981—*Pravda*

Brezhnev speech to CPSU Congress:

In fraternal Poland . . . the enemies of socialism, with the support of outside forces, are creating anarchy and endeavoring to turn the development of events into a counter-revolutionary channel. . . . A threat to the foundations of the socialist state has arisen. . . . We will stand up for socialist Poland, fraternal Poland, and will not leave her in the lurch. . . . Communists have always boldly met the attacks of the adversary and won out. This is how it was and how it will be, and let not one have any doubt about our common determination to secure our interests and defend the peoples' socialist gains.

**March 5, 1981—Pravda**

Statement on Brezhnev-Kania meeting in Moscow:

The Polish comrades spoke about . . . the measures taken to overcome the serious threat to the Polish people's socialist gains. The PZPR and the Government of the Polish People's Republic . . . will steadfastly press for fully overcoming anarchy and disarray, for strengthening the socialist system. . . . Imperialism and internal reaction hope that the economic and political crisis in Poland will result in a change in the alignment of forces in the world, in a weakening of the socialist community, the international communist and the entire liberation movement. This makes particularly pressing a firm and resolute rebuff to such dangerous attempts. The socialist community is inseparable; defense of it is the cause not only of each state but of the entire socialist coalition. . . . Poland was and will be a reliable link of the socialist community.

**June 12, 1981—Pravda**

Letter from the CPSU Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party:

A deep crisis has broken out in Poland, which has encompassed the entire political and economic life of the country.

. . . From the very first days of the crisis we considered it important that the party should resolutely repulse the attempts by the enemies of socialism, to take advantage of the difficulties which have arisen in their far-reaching aims.

But this was not done. Endless concessions to the anti-socialist forces and their solicitations have brought about a situation in which the PZPR was retreating step by step under the onslaught of the internal counter-revolution, which relies on the support of imperialist subversion centers from abroad.

Today the situation is not just dangerous. It has brought the country to the critical point. . . . The enemies of socialist Poland . . . are engaged in a struggle for power, and are already capturing it. They are gaining control of one position after another. . . .

The extremely serious danger, which is hanging over socialism in Poland, is a threat also to the very existence of the independent Polish state.

. . . Stanislaw Kania, Wojciech Jaruzelski and other Polish comrades expressed agreement with our considerations on all issues, which were brought up for discussion. But in fact everything remains unchanged. No corrections have been made in the policy of concessions and compromises. One position after another is being surrendered. . . .

The offensive by the hostile anti-socialist forces in the Polish People's Republic threatens the interests of the whole of our community, its cohesion, integrity and security of borders. Yes, our common security. . . .

The point is to mobilize all the healthy forces of society. . . . This requires in the first place revolutionary determination of the party itself, its activists and leadership. Yes, leadership. Time is not waiting. The party can and must find the strength in itself to change the course of events. . . .

**September 18, 1981—Warsaw**

**Domestic Radio**

Statement of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, delivered to the Polish leaders by the Soviet ambassador to Warsaw:

An acute and unbridled campaign against the Soviet Union and its foreign and domestic policy is manifestly being extensively waged in the country and it is going unpunished. These are not isolated, irresponsible attacks but the coordinated action of enemies of socialism with a precisely determined political thrust. . . .

Threats are appearing against soldiers of Soviet Army units, which are standing guard over the western boundaries of the socialist community. . . . The anti-socialist forces are aiming at evoking an atmosphere of extreme nationalism in Poland, giving it a distinctly anti-Soviet character. . . .

This cannot but give rise to this question in our country: Why, on the part of official authorities in Poland, have no decisive steps been taken up to now to put an end to the hostile campaign against the U.S.S.R. . . . ?

All this gives rise to profound indignation among Soviet people. . . . The Soviet people . . . have a full moral right to demand that an end be put to the anti-Soviet impudence in the Polish People's Republic.

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government consider that further tolerance of any kinds of phenomena of anti-Sovietism causes tremendous damage to Polish-Soviet relations and is in direct contradiction with the commitments based on alliance taken on by Poland, and to the vital interests of the Polish people. We expect that the leadership of the PZPR and the Government of the Polish People's Republic will without delay take resolute and radical steps in order to stop the malicious anti-Soviet propaganda and acts which are hostile to the Soviet Union.

**October 13, 1981—Pravda**

*Pravda* article over "Aleksey Petrov" pseudonym:

The situation in Poland is growing more acute, increasingly alarming the Polish communists, the patriots of socialist Poland and all its friends. . . . The socialist foundations of Polish society are being eroded under the flag of the so-called "renewal."

The antisocialist forces are using Solidarity as a battering ram to destroy the foundations of the public ownership of the means of production with a view to switching the country onto the rails of the restoration of capitalism. . . .

The enemies of socialism operating in Solidarity have disclosed the ultimate scheme of the imperialist circles, namely, the shattering of the socialist community by beginning with Poland. The preservation of the revolutionary gains of the Polish people is not only their domestic question. It is a question directly affecting the vital interests of all the peoples and states which have chosen the road of socialism. All this places special responsibility on the Polish working people and on the party and government leadership

of the country. Awareness of this responsibility, as many Polish communists stress, should be translated into an effective rebuff to counterrevolution and its imperialist inspirers and into the strengthening of the positions of socialism in Poland.

**December 11, 1981—Pravda**

TASS report on Poland:

The counterrevolutionary forces are broadening the front of their open struggle against the PZPR, the government and socialism. . . . The leaders of local Solidarity organizations have begun setting up commando units at enterprises. Every strike unit includes up to 250-300 members. Theft of weapons and explosives from State storehouses has been recorded.

Leaflets have been disseminated in the Szczecin, Radom and some other voivodships [provinces] announcing December 20 to be "a Sunday of crushing the PZPR." Slogans are called out to do away with communists. . . . Mazowsze's leader, Bujak, said that they were planning to take over the premises of the central television and radio of Poland on December 17.

Attacks on Poland's relations with its allies are being stepped up and demagogical demands are being made for Poland's withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and for using the lines of communications passing through Polish territory to pressure Poland's allies. Individual provocative elements question the existing Soviet-Polish border and maliciously smear the history of the liberation of Poland from the Hitler invaders by the Soviet Army. All this justly angers the Soviet people.

**December 13, 1981—Pravda**

TASS report on Poland:

. . . Solidarity and counterrevolutionary elements operating within it are preparing for direct seizure of power.

Precisely this is evidenced by a session of the All-Poland Solidarity Commission currently underway in Gdansk. Most of its participants favor a general strike, which would fully paralyze the country, and transition to activate operations with a view to overthrowing the socialist system.

Solidarity's attempts to mask their offensive on the PZPR and the government by slogans of "moderation" and lull the authorities' vigilance cannot delude those who are fully resolved to defend the Polish socialist state against encroachments from the class enemies. Patriotic forces of Polish society increasingly more resolutely demand that a rebuff be given to the enemies of socialism, the rebuff which they deserve for their criminal actions. Fraternal countries of socialism side with the Polish people in this just struggle against counterrevolution. ■

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## US-USSR Exchanges

December 1981

Background: Since 1958, agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union have sponsored exchanges in the fields of education, culture, information, and science and technology. Cooperation was expanded during the summits in Moscow (1972, 1974) and Washington (1973) to include specialized cooperative agreements on the environment; in medical science and public health; and on space, science and technology, agriculture, oceanography, energy, transportation, atomic energy, artificial heart research, and housing and other construction. A 6-year General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation was concluded during the 1973 Washington summit. In addition, the US National Academy of Sciences and the American Council of Learned Societies have exchange agreements with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Several American universities also have entered into exchange agreements with Soviet universities.

Current status: As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the US Government greatly reduced funding and other support for exchanges. The 6-year General Agreement expired in December 1979, and we informed the Soviets shortly thereafter that as long as the situation in Afghanistan continues, we will be unable to negotiate a renewal. However, many privately administered academic exchanges set in train by the old agreement continue. Other government-funded activities in the cultural field also have been curtailed.

Although many individual exchange activities under the specialized agreement have been reduced and high-level contacts eliminated, activities of particular benefit to the United States, especially in the areas of health, environmental protection, and safety are proceeding. We have maintained the structure of scientific cooperation so that beneficial exchanges can be expanded if the political situation should warrant. Consistent with this view, the specialized agreements on cooperation in oceanography, medicine and public health, artificial heart research, and environmental protection were renewed in 1981.



SOVIET OIL PROSPECTS

*Soviet  
Union*

*Barb*

The recent accounts of a major change in the CIA assessment of Soviet oil prospects are overstated. In April 1977, CIA published a study on Soviet oil industry. That study concluded that Soviet oil production would peak, possibly as early as 1978, and not later than the early 1980s. We further noted that maximum output reached would likely be between 11 million and 12 million barrels per day (b/d) and would not likely be maintained for long. Finally, we concluded that by 1985 output would fall to between 8-10 million b/d.

All of the problems that we foresaw the Soviet's facing are emerging, although output in the near term will be somewhat higher than we anticipated in 1977. Despite extremely costly efforts, Soviet output, at most, is likely to remain at about present levels of 12 million b/d for 1 to 3 years and then begin to decline. We now expect 1985 output to approximate 10-11 million b/d compared to our original estimate of 8-10 million b/d. Only the rapid discovery of very large amounts of new oil can avert this outcome.

*Do we foresee need to import*



# Soviet-West European Natural Gas Pipeline

October 14, 1981



United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, D.C.

*Following is a statement by Robert D. Hormats, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government Processes of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, October 14, 1981.*

I am pleased to be here, along with my colleagues from the Departments of Energy and Commerce, to discuss the proposed Western Siberia to Western Europe natural gas pipeline. As you know, this prospective project has been the subject of considerable international and domestic controversy.

This attention is well deserved. Issues relating to the pipeline are among the most complex facing us and our European allies. This issue cuts across a number of policy areas including East-West commerce, alliance politics, and energy security. The West European-Soviet pipeline issue and the manner in which the Western alliance deals with it will have significant short- and long-term security, political, energy, and economic ramifications.

It is no secret that the United States has serious concerns about the pipeline. Within the executive branch, we have explored a broad set of analytical questions in the context of our deliberations on this project and East-West energy relations more generally. Our strong concern is that this project crosses the

threshold of a prudent level of European dependency on Soviet gas. But because the Europeans see this project as enhancing their energy security by permitting them to diversify away from oil and unpredictable suppliers, our simply objecting to the project would be an inadequate response. We, therefore, plan to suggest to the European countries alternative ways in which European energy security can be enhanced, including measures they can take on their own as well as those on which we and they can cooperate.

My colleagues from other executive agencies will discuss commercial factors and alternative energy options available to the Europeans. I will address my comments to the energy security aspect of the pipeline and the role of gas in Europe's energy profile.

## **European Gas Consumption**

During the 1970s, natural gas became an increasingly important fuel in European markets. A number of factors, including the advent of advanced exploration and production technologies, discovery and development of additional European gas reserves, and the decline of the European coal industry, contributed to the expanded production and use of gas.

Of particular importance was the economic and political volatility of international oil markets after 1973. After the 1973 OPEC [Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil em-

bargo, we and other industrial nations recognized that we had become excessively dependent on insecure and expensive supplies of imported oil. A reduction of this oil-import dependence became a central element of the energy policies of most industrial nations. We pursued this objective vigorously in the International Energy Agency and at annual economic summit meetings. The oil supply interruptions of 1979 and 1980 gave new impetus to reducing reliance on oil.

The problem of oil-import dependence was especially acute in Europe. Most European nations were more dependent on oil imports than we. Furthermore, a much larger share of these imports came from the politically volatile gulf region. European leaders began to view expanded gas use as an effective way to reduce their national dependence on unpredictable imported oil.


The volume of natural gas consumed in Western Europe increased by about 50% between 1973 and 1980. This growth rate significantly exceeded that of total energy demand; thus gas's share of the energy market increased rapidly. In 1973 gas provided less than 10% of total West European energy needs. By 1980 gas accounted for approximately 14% of total West European energy con-

# World Energy Trade, 1975 and 1990

Japan and Western Europe import 90% of their oil—more than three-fourths from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In 1974, as a result of the 1973 Arab embargoes and OPEC's subsequent price increases, members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development established the International Energy Agency to provide for emergency oil sharing and for collective efforts to

develop other sources of energy. Ultimately, the world will have to derive the major portion of its energy from other sources, but there is no immediate substitute for oil.

Source: Adapted from *Global 2000 Report to the President*, 1980



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

sumption and 18% of the energy consumption of the six countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands) currently involved in the Siberian pipeline negotiations.

Gas use grew most rapidly in the residential and commercial sectors, where consumption rose by nearly 80% between 1973 and 1979. Industrial gas use expanded much more slowly but still increased by 27% in this period.

Price competitiveness was probably the conclusive selling point for European gas consumers during the 1970s. In 1973 gas prices were approximately two-thirds that of crude oil. But between 1974 and 1977, the price was closer to one-half that of crude. This favorable cost relationship and generally more stable and predictable price encouraged expanded gas consumption and substitution for oil.


Substantial growth in the gas market enabled producers and consumers to secure long-term supply agreements which justified investments in new exploration and development, pipelines, LNG [liquefied natural gas] tankers and facilities, distribution networks, and new or converted gas-powered equipment. Furthermore, the rapid expansion of consumption and investments created a new enthusiasm in the gas industry and the impression that the unprecedented rates of growth would continue.

It appeared that European consumers could use all gas made available to them. The expectation that gas demand would grow sent analysts off to their computers to predict the scale of future gas trade, and government and industry officials off to the marketplace and foreign capitals in search of new gas sources which would meet future needs.

### Role of Imported Gas

Before the gas boom of the 1970s, indigenous European production had met almost all European gas demand. Europe first began importing small amounts of gas in 1965. Total West European dependence on imported gas was less than 5% in 1973. But it zoomed to over 16% in 1980.

Growth in indigenous production, largely in the North Sea and the Netherlands, still satisfied more than half of the increased gas demand from 1973 to 1980. However, gas discoveries



<sup>1</sup>Includes imports from the U.S.S.R. to be received under proposed revision of deal.

did not keep pace with rising consumption, and the expected life of known European reserves began to drop. In 1979, for example, experts estimated that known European gas reserves would last only 19 years at the then-present rates of production.

More immediately, other technical and political factors promised to limit the amount of gas indigenous producers could supply. Norway and the Netherlands adopted conservative production policies designed to extend the life of their reserves. Many of the most easily accessible European reserves were nearing the end of their productive lives. Other key European fields were already producing at the highest sustainable rates.

Faced with a growing market and rising prices, the European gas industry increased drilling in deep water off-shore areas and at more marginal on-land sites. But this new indigenous production promised only to maintain a constant—or perhaps slightly falling—level of European output. In 1980 European

governments projected that total European gas production would decline from 3.1 million barrels per day of oil equivalent (mmbdoe) in 1980 to 2.8 mmbdoe in 1990. European gas and government officials, therefore, began to consider how they could increase gas imports.

For a variety of technical, financial, and political reasons, the Soviet Union seemed the most promising source of imported gas. Soviet gas reserves are massive, more than one-third of total known world reserves. The Soviet gas could be shipped to West European markets by overland pipelines, a cheaper and technically more reliable means than LNG tankers. Energy sales to Western Europe are an important source of Soviet hard currency earnings (over 50% in 1979), which finance Soviet purchases of European machinery and manufactured products. Expanded purchases of Soviet gas promised to generate major new orders and jobs for the ailing Euro-

pean steel and machinery industries in particular. Finally, key European leaders have viewed expanded East-West commerce as a means for building political ties and moderating Soviet behavior.

From the Soviet perspective, European interest in Soviet gas was most welcome. The Soviet Union will probably have to cut back oil exports during this decade due to increasing domestic demand and a leveling off, or perhaps even a decline, in production. Gas appears to be one of the most readily available new hard currency earners. In addition, European purchases of Siberian gas would help Soviets finance the infrastructure costs of gas exploration and exploitation in outlying regions.

### Soviet Gas

The setting which I have just described gives insight into the European desire, in 1978, to explore the prospects for a Siberian pipeline. Indeed, at that time, European leaders believed that their political-economic interests justified large, long-term gas contracts with the U.S.S.R.

But since 1978 the economic factors affecting East-West gas trade have changed dramatically. Overall energy growth rates are down and markets are soft. European gas demand fell last year for the first time ever, declining by 4%. Although demand for gas outpaced that of other fuels, it appears that the rate of substitution of gas for oil has slowed. Official estimates of future gas demand have been revised downward and the market is likely to be weak for a considerable period of time.

These fundamental changes in world energy markets raise serious questions as to whether the volume of gas contemplated for transmission through the pipeline can, in fact, find a market in Western Europe or, alternatively, whether the Soviet price expectations are not so high as to make the gas uncompetitive in most European markets. While the Soviets may wish to set the free-on-board price as close as possible to the btu [British thermal unit] equivalent of crude oil, in the current market and for the foreseeable future such a high price will almost certainly make it impossible for the gas to be competitive with other forms of energy in Western Europe.

The Europeans and Soviets have taken account, to some extent, of the softening of the oil and gas market. In

the beginning of 1980, reports noted the prospect that the Soviets and Europeans would construct a dual-strand pipeline from Siberia to deliver over 4 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) to Western Europe. (This would be equivalent in energy terms to about 700,000 barrels of oil daily.) The Soviets and West Europeans are now considering constructing a dual-strand pipeline in two distinct stages. The first strand could move roughly 3.0 bcf/d or the equivalent of about 500,000 barrels of oil daily. But even this volume is likely to be difficult to sell unless the price is extremely competitive.

Furthermore, in political terms, the risks involved in the pipeline project seem greater now. In the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan and developments in Eastern Europe, Western countries have become more attentive to the full set of risks associated with East-West energy trade.

### Energy Security Implications

Let's consider how the proposed Siberian pipeline could alter the energy security of the West European pipeline participants. The table shows how European dependence on Soviet gas would grow from 1979 to 1990 if the pipeline were built to deliver the equivalent of over 700,000 barrels of oil daily. In most countries dependence on Soviet gas would more than double. The third column of the table presents rough estimates of comparable figures for the currently planned scaled-down pipeline, which would deliver the equivalent of over 500,000 barrels of oil daily.

One could argue, and many European energy officials have, that projected levels of European dependence on Soviet gas are small. With the scaled-down one-strand pipeline, dependence on Soviet energy will be 5% or less of total energy consumption in all countries except Austria. The Europeans conclude, therefore, that the Soviets would not gain any real leverage as a result of this pipeline.

European officials further argue that their use of Soviet gas is a necessary part of their strategy to reduce their oil consumption and to diversify their sources of energy. They postulate that Soviet gas imports, by reducing their dependence on fuels from the Middle East, would, on balance, improve their overall energy security. They note that the Soviet Union has never in the past shut off energy shipments to West European countries for political reasons and that Middle Eastern suppliers have. They contend that the only immediate alternatives to increased Soviet gas imports would be increased dependence on oil and gas from the least reliable Middle Eastern suppliers.

However, the volume of Soviet gas as a percentage of total European energy consumption is not a sufficient indicator of economic and political vulnerability. This is true for two major reasons.

First, gas is a difficult fuel to replace on short notice. Unlike oil, there is no spot market. Gas trade requires large start-up investments in pipelines or LNG facilities. Furthermore, it is much more expensive and technically challenging to

**Western Europe: Dependence on Soviet Gas**  
(% of total gas and of total energy consumption)

	1979		Original 4bcf/d Project 1980 <sup>1</sup>		Revised 3bcf/d Project 1990	
	Gas	Energy	Gas	Energy	Gas	Energy
France <sup>2</sup>	0	0	23-28	4	17-20	3
Netherlands	0	0	10	4	6	2
Austria	59	12	82	18	62	14

<sup>1</sup>Based on individual government estimates of total gas and energy consumption.

<sup>2</sup>French-contracted volumes of Soviet natural gas were delivered to Italy in exchange for Italian-contracted gas from the Netherlands until February 1980.

hold large strategic stocks of gas as compared to oil. Certain regions will be very heavily dependent on Soviet gas and might apply strong pressure on national governments to avoid actions which could result in an interruption. In the event of an interruption, Soviet gas could not be readily replaced unless there were excess capacity in other parts of the European energy grid.

Second, as noted above, residential and commercial consumers are particularly dependent on gas. A cutoff of Soviet gas would be particularly onerous for these politically sensitive sectors. Thirty percent of gas from the pipeline is earmarked for residential use. Residential and commercial consumers are the least able to absorb an abrupt fuel supply interruption. Homeowners have limited capacity to switch easily to another fuel. Furthermore, gas prices would probably rise precipitously in the wake of a Soviet embargo and thus place a harsh financial burden on homeowners and commercial businesses. Hence, West European vulnerability to Soviet gas leverage could be substantial.

It is important to note that in the past the Soviet Union has used energy exports as a political lever, interrupting supplies to Yugoslavia, Israel, and China, among others. In addition, technical or seasonal difficulties—perhaps complicated by the need to divert gas from export to domestic use to make up for reduced deliveries of Iranian gas—forced the Soviets to slow some gas shipments to the West last winter and spring. The probability of further technical or seasonal interruptions may increase as the Soviets try to ship more gas from outlying and more risky Siberian provinces to Western Europe.

It is, of course, difficult to speculate just how Soviet energy leverage might be applied. But it is not unreasonable to assume that the Soviets from time to time would see the dependence of

Western Europe on Soviet gas as an opportunity to try to obtain political and/or economic benefits. Even in the current bargaining stage, the Soviets have effectively used their leverage to secure most generous terms and to force the Europeans to underwrite much of the risk.

### The Need To Minimize Vulnerability

In shaping our policy on this issue, we recognize the major differences between the United States and Europe in terms of vulnerability and the strong European determination to reduce dependence on oil and unpredictable suppliers thereof. We recognize also that the final decision on the pipeline is Europe's and that the consequences of their decision, for good or ill, will be felt primarily by Europeans, not Americans.

But we are Europe's friend and ally. To the degree that the pipeline affects Europe's political well-being and to the extent that it opens Europe to the threat of disruptions or indeed to actual disruptions of gas supplies, it also affects us. We, therefore, feel an obligation to present our concerns and our suggestions for improving European energy security through expansion of the supply of more reliable energy resources, diversification of European energy supplies, and better coordination of Western energy planning and policies.

We believe, in short, that there are alternatives to Soviet gas which better serve European economic, security, and political interests. We also are aware of reports that strand one of the pipeline has been virtually agreed upon. Anticipating this, the Europeans themselves are developing a mechanism to respond to interruptions through a safety net based on:

- The flexibility of indigenous European gas production;
- Their ability to substitute other fuels (oil or coal) for gas used in electric power plants and industry;
- Significantly expanded stored gas reserves; and
- The integration of European national gas grids.

### Conclusion

The United States, at the Ottawa summit, expressed its desire to expand the Western dialogue on energy security. We plan to discuss with our European partners alternatives to Soviet gas which would limit potential Soviet leverage and improve the security of energy supplies. In addition, we need to continue to consider in the International Energy Agency and in the economic summits coordinated long-term energy supply strategies, which will provide Western countries attractive alternatives to further dependence on Soviet resources and set a common Western understanding for energy trade with the Soviet Union. I am confident that a cooperative effort working toward complementary U.S. and European energy futures will be able to head off potential tensions and build a stronger and more stable economic foundation for the Western alliance.

In summary, let me state that the central element of our policy on the pipeline is our serious concern about its implications for European vulnerability. We want to work with the Europeans to suggest what they can do, and what we can do together, to find alternatives which are more secure and economic than Soviet gas. We want to do this in a way which is based on a common assessment of the risk and a common approach to avoid it and in a way which strengthens the U.S.-European relations rather than weakens them. We do not regard this as an issue which should be resolved by the United States attempting to dictate what Europe should do but rather by a process in which we raise the genuine and serious concerns we have, put forward our suggestions, and attempt to help Europe to find alternatives and thus to minimize its vulnerability to energy supply interruptions. ■

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PROJECT TRUTH

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, November 18, 1981

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY  
The Director's Conference Room  
Seventh Floor  
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20547

AGENDA

UPDATE ON PROJECT TRUTH ACTIVITIES

- Afghanistan, List of experts - Mike Ledeen, State
- Central America/Caribbean/Cuba materials
  - Ed Harper, ICA
  - Mike Ledeen, State
- Chemical and Biological Warfare
  - General Review and Assessment
- Crime & Punishment
  - Status Report - Gifford Malone, ICA
- Tag/logo for PROJECT TRUTH field traffic
- TNF speech - Follow-up strategy
  - Mike Schneider, ICA
  - Mark Palmer, State
- Preparation for November 30 Arms Control talks





OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE PROJECT TRUTH

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Information on Soviet-Cuban Destabilizing Activities  
in the Caribbean and Central America Culled from Intelligence Sources and  
Declassified

Situation: The Soviet Union and Cuba have increased their activities to foment unrest and, if possible, destabilize pro-American regimes in the Caribbean while accusing the US of supporting non-democratic governments.

Task: Conduct a campaign to inform allied and third world target audiences that two of the most totalitarian governments extant today with the least claim to being havens of human rights -- the Soviet Union and Cuba -- are supplying arms, munitions, training, advisors, money and propaganda support to terrorist groups in the Caribbean and Central America to enable them to create chaos and if possible destabilize the legitimate governments of the region.

Purpose: Blunt perceptions fostered by Soviet propaganda of the US as an aggressive imperialist nation intent on dominating its neighbors and persuade world opinion, with special emphasis on European leftwing Socialists, that the Soviet Union and Cuba by their destabilizing actions in the area are exacerbating East-West tensions and making a dialogue between the two blocs impossible.

Targets: Synchronized release of information through USICA and State Department channels, one-on-one background briefings of journalists known to be sympathetic to the US, a speaker program targeted to politically active academics with access to the media, clips suitable for use in television documentaries, a half-hour VTR for use in restricted settings summarizing available visual material, articles ghosted in house for placement in sympathetic overseas publications, news stories in the wireless file based on credible US sources who have been supplied information by State and the commissioning of a book on Soviet activities in the area summarizing in scholarly form all available information on Soviet-Cuban activities in the area since 1960.

State of Play: A joint USICA-State-CIA-DoD committee is declassifying information suitable for release.

Edward M. Harper  
Special Assistant

Background: Establishment of a new world information order (NWIO), by which the developing countries would acquire information and communications facilities approaching those enjoyed by the developed countries, has been discussed in UNESCO and other UN bodies over the past decade. The discussion has generated much controversy because of the important philosophical, developmental, and commercial issues involved. An NWIO has never been codified and probably cannot be codified in a way that reconciles the diverse views of the international community. It remains a vague concept with little program content and no timetables.

Third World position: Advocates of an NWIO among the developing countries point out that a small number of developed countries provide most of the world's news coverage, entertainment, and advertising. Much of the news coverage is controlled by a few multinational news agencies. According to NWIO advocates, this is unacceptable because the agencies devote too little attention to the domestic affairs of the developing countries and foster a negative image of those countries by focusing on sensational and disastrous events while ignoring positive ones, particularly development issues. In addition, NWIO proponents view commercial advertising as fostering biases in favor of the industrialized world and multinational corporations and as a threat to their cultural heritage.

For some of the more radical NWIO advocates, the remedy is to restrict the free international flow of information, particularly by curbing the power of the multinational news agencies. Specifically, they seek to license journalists, impose international codes of journalistic ethics, inhibit advertising, and extend government control over the press. In this way, they hope to limit outside influences and keep a tighter control over the information coming in and out of their countries. The Soviets assiduously support all of these proposals for restricting press freedoms.

Not all developing countries see an NWIO in such negative terms. Many believe that the gaps in information and communications capacity are real and should be filled by practical development efforts, including more assistance from the developed countries. They seek cooperation with the developed countries, not confrontation.

US position: The US recognizes the existence of an information and communications imbalance and supports a practical approach to communications development. As the result of a US initiative in late 1980, UNESCO established the International Program for the Development of Communications (IPDC). The US hopes that the IPDC will bring a greater degree of coordination to international communications development efforts and that it will raise the priority assigned to communications by national and international development experts.



At the same time, our fundamental commitment to First Amendment and free market values causes us to reject efforts to restrict the free international flow of information under cover of a new world information order.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UNESCO's constitution protect the free flow of information. It is inappropriate that organizations of the UN should be used for, or should lend themselves to, the promotion of restrictions on the press. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

The US concurs in the views expressed in the May 1981 Talloires Declaration (France), a statement by 62 members of the private media from 21 developed and developing countries. The declaration, among other things, decries censorship and other press restrictions as a violation of every individual's right to be informed. It sees the licensing of journalists as inconsistent with a free press and an international code of ethics for journalists as damaging and impractical in a world of diverse views and communication policies. It recognizes advertising as an important source of information and as a source of financial support that is fundamental to an independent press.

At a time of rapid technological change in the communications field, the US looks forward to expanded information horizons for all individuals and peoples and is prepared to work constructively with others to reach this goal.

November 4, 1981

PROJECT TRUTH

PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVES

AGENDA

DATE: Thursday, November 5, 1981, at 10:30 a. m.

PLACE: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY  
Sixth Floor Conference Room  
Room 600  
1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20006

1. Presentation of PROJECT TRUTH and its various components
  - Soviet Propaganda Alert
  - Foreign Media Reaction
  - Active Measures
  - ICA Initiatives
  - Press clippings
2. Description of Dateline America -- What's Good About the U.S.A.?
3. Discussion of governmental participation in gathering of Dateline America materials and data

Attachments:

1. Dateline America -- What's Good About the U.S.A.?
2. List of Participants
3. USICA Project Truth Initiatives

FACT SHEET

DATELINE: AMERICA / WHAT'S GOOD ABOUT THE U.S.A.

DATELINE: AMERICA is one of the components of PROJECT TRUTH, an overseas information program coordinated by the U.S. International Communication Agency (USICA) under a recent Presidential directive.

Amid mounting evidence of a global campaign by the Soviet Union to undercut and damage U.S. foreign policy objectives through distortion, deceit, and disinformation, USICA intends to produce and promote all the necessary facts and information from the policymaking agencies of this Government in order to fully explain U.S. policy in every country of the world.

The DATELINE: AMERICA news and feature service is to be distributed on a regular basis to USICA Public Affairs Officers at 201 posts in 156 countries.

DATELINE: AMERICA is intended to project a positive view of America, its people, and its society. In addition to feature stories and vignettes portraying "What's Good About the U.S.A.," it includes short factual statements and pertinent statistics that dramatize the differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

DATELINE: AMERICA subjects include economic matters, scientific progress, volunteerism, private sector initiatives, agricultural advances, space technology achievements, energy development, educational programs, minority affairs, etc., presenting our country's accomplishments in these areas, as well as pointing out the technological and social benefits accruing to other countries as a result of U.S. efforts.

DATELINE: AMERICA material is translated where appropriate, is released in each country to an array of media, and significantly strengthens our efforts to shape public opinion abroad.

DATELINE: AMERICA material is designed to have broad appeal and to reach diverse elements of the overseas public, i.e., the "man in the street," members of the "successor generation," as well as the "intellectual elite" of the targeted countries.

We welcome any initiatives and input that you and your department can provide USICA in connection with DATELINE: AMERICA.

November 4, 1981

PROJECT TRUTH

PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVES MEETING

Thursday, November 5, 1981, at 10:30 a. m.

Participants

✓ John Ochs, Agriculture	447-4623
✓ Mary Nimmo, Commerce	377-3263
✓ Captain Ralph Slawson, U.S.N., Defense	695-9082
✓ John Roberts, Education	245-8233
✓ Jay Vivari, Energy	252-5730
Pamela Bailey, HHS	245-1850
✓ Ralph Dannheisser and/or ✓ Frederick Sontag, HUD	755-6980
Tom Decair, Justice	633-2028
✓ Earl Cox, Labor (Bonnie Friedman)	523-9711
✓ Frank Gomez, State	632-1620
✓ Drucella Andersen, Transportation	426-4570
✓ Sherine Hamaway, Treasury	566-5252
✓ Linda Holwick, OMB	395-3080
✓ Charles E. Wilson, CIA	351-7676
Jacqueline Tillman, USUN	632-8345
✓ David Demerest, USTR	395-4647
✓ Michael Baroody or ✓ Barbara Gleason, White House	456-7170

ICA Participants

John Hughes  
Gifford Malone  
Phyllis Kaminsky  
Barbara Haig  
Richard Borden  
Robert Cattell  
Csaba Chikes  
Mike Schneider

November 5, 1981

USICA PROJECT TRUTH INITIATIVES

- dissemination and summary translations of "Soviet Military Power" and "Active Measures" material
- "Soviet Propaganda Alert" (monthly)
- USINFO cables (allegations and rebuttals)
- "Dateline: America" -- "What's Good About the U.S.A." -- news and feature service
- USICA worldwide projection rights to Canadian film "The KGB in North America"
- production and distribution of pamphlet on Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and related film footage from German, British, and Italian television
- USICA acquisition of Italian TV production on "Soviet Military Power"
- production of two USICA films: "TNF" and "The Rapid Deployment Force"
- programmed Eugene Rostow, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as AmPart speaker in Western Europe