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STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE

SUMMARY OF LATIN AMERICAN TELEVISION PLACEMENT OF
USIA-PRODUCED SPANISH LANGUAGE SATELLITE FEED

Brazil -- TV Globo, the nation's dominant network, used two minutes on its Feb. 5 evening newscast, which is seen by 35 million viewers. The TV Manchete network used a brief portion on its evening news the same day, reaching an audience of 10 million.

Argentina -- Two of the four television channels in Buenos Aires used three-minute excerpts on their evening news shows. The total combined audience was 3.4 million.

Chile -- The national television network used one minute of the transmission on its main evening newscast the same day. Two university channels also used excerpts.

Peru -- The Agency feed was broadcast in its entirety by Lima's Channel 5 during its morning show that has an estimated three million viewers. Three stations used an average of five minutes of the speech on their nightly newscasts, reaching an estimated audience of 3.2 million.

Ecuador -- Three stations in Quito and Guayaquil used excerpts ranging between one and a half and three minutes. The total audience in Ecuador was put at four million.

Venezuela -- The leading Venevision network opened its international news segment with two and a half minutes of the Agency feed. Two other Venezuelan channels likewise used excerpts.

Colombia -- The nation's two midday newscasts each broadcast on Feb. 5 segments of the satellite transmission; the combined viewership was 3.5 million. The same two channels featured the State of the Union address in their evening newscasts later that day as well. Each of these programs was seen by four million viewers.

Paraguay -- Both local stations used the feed in their Feb. 5 noon newscasts. The combined audience was put at 700,000. The two stations also used excerpts of the President's address that evening.

Uruguay -- Three private television stations in Montevideo used the Agency feed in their evening news programs Feb. 5.

Guatemala -- The satellite feed was carried in full on two occasions, during a midday news show and on a late-night newscast. Total audience for the two shows was nearly 500,000.



January 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Larry M. Speakes
Assistant to the President
and Principal Deputy Press Secretary
The White House

FROM : Charles Z. Wick *CZW*

SUBJECT : Impact in Europe of the President's New Year
Greetings to the Soviet People

REFERENCE : Attached memorandum on the same subject

The attached report throws light on how Europeans, East and West, received the President's New Year greetings to the Soviet people.

January 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Director
FROM : EU - John F. Kordek JK
SUBJECT : The President's Exchange of New Year's Greetings
with Gorbachev A Sign Of Hope To Europeans

SUMMARY

At a week's distance from the unexpected, widely heralded New Year's exchange, most West Europeans see it as a signal that both leaders remain committed to the hope for better relations between their countries. This is the message from West European PAOs polled by the Area this week. Warsaw and Moscow report a wait and see mood of cautious optimism.

BACKGROUND

Our PAOs report that West Europeans are focusing on two elements that they credit with making the New Year's exchange possible.

The first element is the fact that the Soviet authorities allowed the President to appear on Soviet TV to make his case directly to the Soviet people. This is not taken as a sign of internal Soviet liberalization, but as evidence that improved relations with the U.S. is a key Soviet objective for which they are willing to pay a price. This is a reason for hope.

The second element is the President's initiative in forcing the Soviet state to open its airwaves to him. To West Europeans this showed his ability to take a tangible step forward to exploit this historic moment in US/Soviet relations in a highly public, beneficial manner. This is a second reason for hope.

Moscow reports that the fact of the President's appearance, and what he said, conveyed a two-tiered message to the Soviet people. First, the fact that he appeared was a message from the Soviet leadership to the people signaling a shift in international relations. Secondly, the President's words, invoking peace and cooperation, contrasting sharply with his war-mongering Soviet media image, may have provided some grounds for cautious optimism among viewers that the international shift underway is in a positive direction for the Soviet people.

In Warsaw, Polish preoccupation with the internal situation caused sentiment to focus on what the New Year's exchange might mean for improved US/Polish relations in the near future.

EU posts surveyed for this report included: London, Paris, Madrid, Ottawa, Oslo, The Hague, Bonn, Stockholm, Belgrade, Warsaw and Moscow.



DEC 11 1985

Dear Larry:

I am enclosing, for your information, a copy of the report which synthesizes the United States Information Agency's Television and Film Service support of the Geneva Summit, via WORLDNET, our global satellite television network.

As you will note, an unprecedented worldwide audience of one billion television viewers were accorded the opportunity to see and hear United States foreign policy articulated by the President.

I am sure you will share our pride in this outstanding American achievement.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Charles Z. Wick'. The signature is fluid and somewhat stylized, with a large initial 'C'.

Charles Z. Wick
Director

The Honorable
Larry M. Speakes
Assistant to the President and
Principal Deputy Press Secretary
The White House

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 26, 1985


Dear Charlie:

Let me express my deep appreciation to you for the personal role you played, and the tremendous contribution USIA made to the success of the President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva.

Your willingness to provide us with a tremendously valuable staff from the Agency was particularly instrumental in enabling us to present the President's message effectively to the world. I am deeply indebted for the assignment of Bud Korengold of London and Phil Brown of Paris to our staff during the weeks prior to the Summit. They are two true professionals who contributed immeasurably to our effort.

No words of appreciation would be complete without a deep measure of gratitude for your personal advice and counsel, which I value deeply.

Best regards,



Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
to the President

The Honorable Charles Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C.




November 7, 1985

Dear Larry:

Thank you so much for your thoughtful letter of October 31.

It was very nice of you to take the time to write such a heartwarming letter. Your kind words about USIA's recent efforts in regard to improved communications with the Soviet people are much appreciated. We are merely trying to do our job, and we are more than delighted to cooperate with all of you at the White House. It is a great pleasure to work with someone as thoughtful and considerate as you.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
to the President
The White House

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



DEC 5 1981

Dear Don:

USIA is preparing a U.S.-USSR videoconference for December 16 which presents exciting public affairs opportunities. The program will last two hours and be devoted to a discussion of advances in medicine between panels of prestigious American and Soviet cardiologists.

This videoconference will be the first USIA-facilitated dialogue with the Soviet Union since the Geneva meeting. It is non-political and, I believe, can be an excellent vehicle to advance the good work which you and the President and other members of the administration so ably began in Geneva.

USIA is planning activities related to the videoconference: attendance at the videoconference by prominent physicians, members of Congress, and administration officials, reception of the feed by Embassies in Europe together with invitations to interested guests, and a press conference to precede the videoconference.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick
Director

The Honorable
Donald T. Regan
Chief of Staff and
Assistant to the President
The White House

cc: The Honorable
Larry Speakes ✓

The Honorable
Patrick J. Buchanan



December 4, 1985

Dear Larry:

I am always struck by the great Southern courtesy that you displayed again in the beautiful note you took the time to write to me on November 26. It touched all of us deeply.

Everyone at USIA who participated in the effort at Geneva joins me in saluting you for the marvelous role you played for hours and hours and hours. You skillfully made your way through minefields -- looking at all times as if you were Baryshnikov.

Our thanks and appreciation for your kind words and continued great success.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
Larry M. Speakes
Assistant to the President and
Principal Deputy Press Secretary
The White House

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 31, 1985


Dear Charlie:

Ed Djerejian and I want to thank you most sincerely for hosting lunch with the Soviet journalists. It was an important gesture, and an appropriate way to mark an historic event.

Credit goes to you for much of the groundwork in the this field of improved communications with the Soviet people. Your unanswered letter to Zamyatin may yet bear fruit, especially if today's interview works as well as we hope it will.

Thank you as well for making Bud Korengold and Phil Brown available to us. Their efforts have been a big help over the last several weeks, and should be even more important between now and our return from Geneva.

Best regards,




Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
to the President

The Honorable Charles Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547



December 11, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick 
Director

SUBJECT: Report on "Public Diplomacy Support by the
USIA for the Geneva Meetings"

As soon as the Geneva meetings were announced last July, USIA mounted a major public diplomacy campaign abroad on behalf of U.S. policies, summarized in the attached report "Public Diplomacy Support by the U.S. Information Agency for the Geneva Meetings."

The Agency transmitted the U.S. government's hopes and concerns to foreign opinion leaders and publics in the most direct and unbiased fashion, drawing on all vehicles of communication available to it and the assistance of the White House and outstanding Administration officials.

We hope that the report will be of interest to you.



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December 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CZW*
Director

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. Public Diplomacy for
Geneva Meetings and Next Steps

Attached is a memo assessing U.S. public diplomacy and the support of USIA for the President's meetings with Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva. Although this assessment prepared by my staff might be of interest to you, we would be quite happy to discuss it and future followup.

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December 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO: The Director
FROM: P - Michael D. Schneider, *MS*
SUBJECT: Going Forward from Geneva

Summary:

With the Geneva experience fresh in mind, we must begin to plan for public treatment of major international meetings on the President's 1986 calendar. This memo contains our assessment of the impact of the Geneva Summit on international audiences, and suggests some actions to build on our present momentum.

Background:

Summit Outcome

U.S. Public Diplomacy deserves at least a measure of credit for contributing to the successful outcome of the meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev:

--There was broad acceptance abroad of the U.S. agenda and rationale for dealing with the several issues.

--The President's definition of the outcome as being a "fresh start" in U.S.-Soviet relations which could produce tangible results over time was widely repeated, not the least by the Soviets.

--Public expectations for dramatic breakthroughs ultimately were modest.

--The President was portrayed in the media as firm, forceful, and constructive.

--The President clearly identified areas of fundamental differences between the two nations, and the note of reality he struck in dealing with future prospects was well received

--The Soviet people saw on their own media for the first time in a long while a smiling, responsible American President rather than a cartoon ogre.

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--Soviet media activities received more attention for their form (surprise that they were briefing the Western media so extensively) than for their content (which was frequently exposed for its inaccuracies and doctrinaire wrongheadedness.)

--The news blackout at Geneva and U.S. handling of the media were well received.

--The President's immediate briefing of allies in Brussels and of the American public through Congress in Washington was very positively covered and interpreted as exemplary of democracy at work.

Factors of Effectiveness

Some of the elements which produced such a positive result in international perceptions were:

--Good timing of public announcements, interviews, and statements. The Administration did not cave in in the face of alarmist views that the Soviets were winning the "propaganda war" through early media activities. This steadiness paid off.

--Close coordination of spokesmen. We spoke with a single voice thanks to the limited number of authorized spokespersons.

--Repetition of our objectives. The early definition of our agenda for Geneva, and its regular reiteration in public statements by senior leaders, led to acceptance by world audiences of a broader framework than that promoted by Moscow. Perhaps the ultimate victory for this strategy was the use by Gorbachev and his Soviet front-men of our own characterization of the Meeting, rather than their pre-Geneva arms control/SDI focus.

--Excellent coordination of our overseas output through both the Agency's Geneva Task Force internally and the Matlock public diplomacy coordinating group. Of course our team of officers assigned to the NSC worked wonders for all concerned, especially in assuring that principals were available when needed for Worldnet, FPC, VOA and Wireless File interviews and briefings.

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--Extensive, well-timed activities with the foreign press. The President's Figaro interview timed to blunt Gorbachev's Paris visit, his interview with the Times of India to capture Third World support at the time of the UNGA appearance, the BBC interview, the interviews with foreign TV and print media, and the VOA address to the Soviet people all were evidence of superb preparation for the meeting itself. These Presidential events were also supported by Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Nitze's Worldnets, the White House press background series, and pre and post Geneva press briefings by a number of leading spokesmen at the USIA Foreign Press Center. Although unintended, this impressive schedule with the international media also produced big domestic spinoff dividends when our own media picked up the substance and gave it added gloss because of its world-wide audience.

Assessment of our Actions:

There were many outstanding organizational and personal performances which went into producing a smooth public presentation of the U.S. Geneva approach. There were a few minor areas which could have been better. We should take future advantage of these lessons learned.

--During the "long summer" preceding the November meetings, the important opening articulation of issues between the U.S. and USSR by Bud McFarlane in Santa Barbara received far less attention than it merited. A more effective venue and press advance work is needed for spotlighting our opening statement in the next round to come.

--The limit on summit spokespersons helped create a single voice and averted confusion of signals. At the same time, definitive guidelines for USIA media and overseas posts are needed early in the game. It was difficult at first to deal with Geneva issues.

--Cooperation between the White House, NSC and USIA during the pre-summit period was outstanding, and permitted formation of an effective public diplomacy team in Washington and an experienced team of officers in Geneva to handle the media and public aspects of the meeting.

--Anticipating the opposition's moves is important, although obviously we cannot control them. Our plans

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included reasonably accurate forecasts of Soviet moves which left time for USG counter-steps. The best example: the Gorbachev visit to Paris October 2-5 created considerable world press attention, but a tough French media and our efforts to lay out the President's position through the Figaro interview and subsequent interviews with foreign media overshadowed whatever impact the Soviets may have hoped for.

--The President's special attention to foreign audiences in the weeks before Geneva resulted in wide coverage, very favorable acceptance and coincidentally a big replay in the U.S.

--Quickening the pace of output in the weeks before Geneva, with major public events that made headlines, including Worldnets, the VOA Presidential address, and Foreign Press Center briefings assure that our effort didn't dissipate.

--The Soviet media blitz in Geneva in the week before the meeting was impressive, and next time we could consider putting in place a system and officers to maintain as much control over the public debate as possible and co-opt or quickly rebut their charges. We did set up a fast-reaction system to rebut misinformation or blatant propaganda. The volume of our background support material was so effective that at one point TASS complained to the Swiss about our provision of transcripts and other materials (a welcome confirmation of our effectiveness).

--In Geneva, Bud McFarlane's two visits to the international press center were highly useful in keeping the world press in the picture. Likewise, our explicit attention to their concerns and facilitative efforts helped create favorable coverage by media from around the world.

--Assignment of USIA officers to deal with non-governmental groups in Geneva produced a positive public response, and a perception that the U.S. took seriously the genuine interests of peoples with many special interests, from human rights to world peace.

--Follow-up of the summit with international press briefings by several of the key policy-makers through Worldnet and at the USIA Foreign Press Center helped the world media interpret the results of the meeting.

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Looking Ahead:

Beginning in mid-January, with the resumption of the next round of Geneva negotiations, we face an intense schedule of international meetings at the highest levels. The President will meet with Western leaders in May for the Economic Summit, and later with Gorbachev for the U.S. follow-on talks. In between there will be various levels of meetings to carry forward discussions on regional issues, cultural and people-to-people exchanges and other subjects flowing from Geneva. The momentum is ours at the moment; we need to plan and act now to keep it that way.

These are several steps that can be taken immediately to capitalize on the positive aspects of the Geneva experience:

Suggested Actions

--The White House Press office and the NSC and the State Department should identify with USIA the major international events for next year and begin now to plan for public diplomacy teams to handle public aspects. These teams might be even more effective if assembled earlier, so that personnel are at least readied for the intensive efforts required and necessary backgrounding is prepared. Budgets for these teams need determination.

--A meeting of relevant organizations, including the White House Press Office and NSC, should be convened early in January to look ahead and develop general guidelines for information activities. The IIC might be the appropriate group for this. The basic purpose is for us to develop a broad strategy that will bridge major meetings and take effective advantage of credits we have earned by our successes at Geneva.

--Among other concerns, the Administration needs to consider our orientation toward the next meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. Should it be labeled a "Summit" for the sake of convenience or a "Meeting"? More important are our expectations: concrete agreements or less tangible progress? Specific or general formulae for further progress? Having set the right tone

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for Geneva and achieved a solid "fresh start," we need to know the fundamental political premise for the next round in order to shape an effective public approach.

--Continuing outreach to the foreign media should be conducted during the periods between major meetings. Building on present foreign media goodwill, we can accomplish much to set the stage for future meetings. But this is an educational process that should begin at year's end and in early 1986. Senior U.S. officials should agree to participate in a carefully orchestrated series of meetings, and interviews. Public debate over U.S. spending priorities, and options for national defense and arms control may, as usual, create confusion abroad. With two major international meetings this Spring, the Administration will face special public diplomacy challenges abroad.

--Close contact between the policy community and public diplomacy community are critical for success - effective policy and effective public diplomacy should rely on each other. The members of the USIA coordinating team should selectively attend meetings on the substantive policy issues, and our research and advice should be presented directly by key Agency officers to the substantive groups.

--Continuity between meetings should be strengthened by assignment of a senior USIA officer to the White House Press office. He would be able to assist the President's spokesman in daily coordination for international public affairs.

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DEC 18 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Larry M. Speakes
Assistant to the President and
Principal Deputy Press Secretary
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CZW*
Director

SUBJECT: Highlights of European Public Opinion
After the Geneva Summit

The attached results of a flash telephone survey, conducted by the Agency's Research Office shortly after Geneva, show that:

- o Although West Europeans believe the Summit resulted in few concrete accomplishments, their initial low expectations have given way to the view that the meeting had a positive outcome for U.S.-Soviet relations.
- o After Geneva, President Reagan increased his public opinion edge over Gorbachev as being more understanding of European problems.
- o A majority would sacrifice SDI research to get an arms control agreement, but a greater number after the Summit consider SDI research too important to trade away.

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Post-Geneva Flash Survey

December 11, 1985

WEST EUROPEANS ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC AFTER GENEVA

USIA-sponsored telephone surveys in Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands before and after the Summit -- the latest completed December 5 -- show that:

Many Think More Summits Can Lead to Peace, But Few Saw Concrete Progress at Geneva

Substantially more Europeans after Geneva think U.S.-USSR relations are "good" than before. Publics in all five countries predominantly believe that Geneva specifically helped improve those relations and that more frequent summits will increase the chances for peace.

On the other hand, Europeans' low expectations for specific accomplishments at Geneva tended to be confirmed. On the three main issues -- arms control, human rights in the Soviet Union, and regional conflicts -- only minorities in each country could see much accomplishment. Moreover, majorities in each country but Italy still think a nuclear arms control agreement is unlikely in the next two years.

Europeans Still Rate Reagan Slightly Ahead of Gorbachev on Key Factors

Before and after Geneva, President Reagan receives more positive ratings than General Secretary Gorbachev on four leadership traits -- wanting peace, trustworthy, openminded and flexible. And Reagan's edge over Gorbachev for understanding European problems increased slightly in each country during November.

Still, the Summit produced no major shifts in public assessments of either leader. Reagan and Gorbachev continue to be perceived as more similar than different on all five traits. Meanwhile, majorities of West Europeans expect Gorbachev to do more than his predecessors in the Kremlin to reduce world tensions.

Support Increases Slightly for SDI

Majorities in most countries are still willing to trade SDI as a bargaining chip for an arms control agreement. But a greater number after the summit than before consider SDI too important to trade away.

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WEST EUROPEAN ASSESSMENTS OF U.S.-USSR RELATIONS,
BEFORE AND AFTER GENEVA SUMMIT

How would you describe the current relations between the United States and the Soviet Union? Would you say that relations between these two countries are very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?

	Britain		France		W. Germany		Italy		Netherlands	
	11/85 (511)	12/85 (504)	11/85 (514)	12/85 (500)	11/85 (504)	12/85 (510)	11/85 (508)	12/85 (501)	11/85 (505)	12/85 (504)
Very good	-	2%	4%	3%	2%	2%	5%	9%	1%	*
Fairly good	48	58	44	57	33	53	51	59	35	48
Subtotal	48	60	48	60	35	55	56	68	36	48
Fairly bad	41	31	43	29	54	33	27	15	53	41
Very bad	9	5	4	3	8	3	9	4	9	6
Subtotal	50	36	47	32	62	36	36	19	62	47
Don't know	2	4	4	8	4	9	8	13	2	6
Total	100	100	99	100	101	100	100	100	100	101

WEST EUROPEAN EXPECTATIONS FOR AND ASSESSMENTS OF
ACCOMPLISHMENT AT GENEVA SUMMIT

In general, how much do you think this meeting accomplished [NOV: will accomplish] in resolving various issues between the United States and the Soviet Union -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?

	Britain		France		W. Germany		Italy		Netherlands	
	11/85 (511)	12/85 (504)	11/85 (514)	12/85 (500)	11/85 (504)	12/85 (510)	11/85 (508)	12/85 (501)	11/85 (505)	12/85 (504)
A great deal	3%	5%	4%	3%	2%	3%	6%	9%	2%	2%
A fair amount	31	33	33	36	13	23	30	42	11	19
Subtotal	34	38	37	39	15	26	36	51	13	21
Not very much	53	45	36	36	73	55	50	34	73	60
Nothing at all	11	9	20	10	7	10	9	2	11	9
Subtotal	64	54	56	46	80	65	59	36	84	69
Don't know, not asked	2	9	8	15	5	9	5	13	3	9
Total	100	101	101	100	100	100	100	100	100	99

*This symbol indicates less than 0.5 percent. A hyphen (-) means none at all.

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WEST EUROPEAN ASSESSMENTS OF PERSONAL QUALITIES OF PRESIDENT REAGAN
AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

Now I am going to read several statements. For each one, please tell me if you think it best describes President Reagan or the Soviet leader Gorbachev, or does it describe both of them or neither of them?

	Britain		France		W. Germany		Italy		Netherlands	
	11/85	12/85	11/85	12/85	11/85	12/85	11/85	12/85	11/85	12/85
	(511)	(504)	(514)	(500)	(504)	(510)	(508)	(501)	(505)	(504)

A. Listens to various points of view?

Mr. Reagan	28%	25%	31%	35%	21%	19%	24%	25%	17%	20%
Mr. Gorbachev	10	16	8	7	6	17	6	8	13	10
Both	29	38	27	29	52	46	29	35	29	41
Neither	27	17	22	15	10	6	27	16	31	18

B. Is understanding of European problems?

Mr. Reagan	29%	34%	34%	41%	37%	41%	27%	34%	21%	30%
Mr. Gorbachev	15	17	11	6	11	12	11	8	19	14
Both	17	16	16	19	29	27	21	22	26	26
Neither	32	27	31	27	17	13	31	20	28	23

C. Wants world peace?

Mr. Reagan	22%	21%	29%	29%	19%	11%	15%	15%	15%	12%
Mr. Gorbachev	8	6	5	4	5	6	6	4	5	4
Both	53	61	37	47	64	74	55	59	60	70
Neither	12	9	20	14	6	5	15	13	14	9

D. Is trustworthy?

Mr. Reagan	18%	20%	34%	35%	27%	22%	22%	24%	15%	14%
Mr. Gorbachev	8	5	5	5	9	14	15	10	7	7
Both	12	20	15	21	24	30	32	37	11	22
Neither	51	43	34	27	26	19	20	14	53	44

E. Is flexible in negotiations?

Mr. Reagan	25%	22%	28%	27%	22%	29%	24%	22%	15%	17%
Mr. Gorbachev	11	7	12	12	14	14	12	10	17	12
Both	30	24	24	20	38	36	35	24	31	26
Neither	28	38	23	25	15	12	20	23	28	33

F. Is likely to use military force to achieve his objectives?

Mr. Reagan	20%	17%	11%	9%	12%	13%	13%	13%	17%	16%
Mr. Gorbachev	20	22	21	26	18	18	13	15	11	17
Both	41	37	36	34	36	34	42	40	52	50
Neither	13	18	22	20	26	27	20	17	14	11

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WEST EUROPEAN COMMITMENT TO SDI RESEARCH,
BEFORE AND AFTER GENEVA

Do you think the U.S. should give up research on an anti-missile defense system if that were necessary in order to reach a nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviet Union OR is this research too important to give up?

	Britain		France		W. Germany		Italy		Netherlands	
	11/85 (511)	12/85 (504)	11/85 (514)	12/85 (500)	11/85 (504)	12/85 (510)	11/85 (508)	12/85 (501)	11/85 (505)	12/85 (504)
Should give it up	53%	49%	49%	40%	75%	64%	72%	55%	70%	57%
Too important to give up	43	42	45	53	20	24	26	33	27	33
Don't know	<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	99	99	100

Prepared by:
Charles S. Spencer Jr. (P/RWE)

B-12/11/85

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December 27, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CZW*
Director

SUBJECT: Soviet Public Diplomacy

Attached is a paper assessing the Soviet public diplomacy campaign surrounding the November meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, including implications for U.S. public diplomacy in coming months.

We hope that the report will be of interest to you.

December 16, 1985

Assessing Soviet Public Diplomacy
for the Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting

Summary

This paper examines the Soviet public diplomacy campaign surrounding the November meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. It assesses the Soviet public diplomacy effort by examining four themes: Soviet public diplomacy objectives, the content of Soviet propaganda, communications techniques, and the impact of Soviet public diplomacy.

Soviet Aims: to set the Geneva agenda on arms control almost exclusively; to portray the U.S. as not serious and thus at fault for any failures; and to enhance the image of the USSR and especially of its new leader.

Content of Soviet Propaganda: stressing that the USSR seeks peace and disarmament; aiming to split the U.S. from its allies (especially on arms control issues); portraying Gorbachev as a responsible, reasonable, and charismatic world leader; pre-Geneva continuing attacks on the President but during and after Geneva, depicting President Reagan in a new, more positive light -- as a man the USSR may be able to do business with; parrying accusations against the Soviet human rights record; downplaying or ignoring regional and bilateral issues.

Communications Techniques: the Soviets stressed style over substance, relied heavily on media blitzes just before and during the meeting, and utilized propaganda teams to increase their exposure.

The Impact of Soviet Public Diplomacy: world reaction was generally favorable to the results of the Geneva meeting, for which both sides received credit; the Soviet focus on arms control did not divert attention from other issues on the U.S. agenda; Soviet style did not satisfy most Western media seeking substance.

In sum, the Soviet attempt to divert attention from matters of substance, even using sophisticated Western techniques, was not wholly successful. They were also not able to set the agenda they desired and hold the U.S. and Western media coverage to it.

End Summary

Implications for U.S. Public Diplomacy
(from the attached report)

- o Public opinion surveys show several themes gain support in Europe for SDI: the U.S. acts responsibly in world affairs; SDI will decrease the risk of nuclear war and increase the chances of reaching arms control agreements; and Allied participation in SDI research is in their interests.
- o Public diplomacy stress on concrete U.S. arms control proposals, and nonpolemical, factual exposure of flaws in Soviet proposals and noncompliance with existing agreements should continue.
- o Publicity and promotion of overseas public awareness of the exchange agreements will demonstrate U.S. willingness to do business with the USSR and the openness of American society, and heighten awareness of the need to open Soviet society.
- o The negative consequences of Soviet intervention/opportunism in the Third World merit public treatment and contrast with U.S. efforts to assist peaceful economic and social development and to aid freedom fighters while offering proposals to resolve regional conflicts.
- o The Soviets are even more vulnerable on human rights failures because of heightened media coverage and overseas public attention. Encouragement of international and independent monitoring organizations will help carry the attack to the Soviets. Meanwhile, the U.S. should continue to educate Western opinion on Soviet human rights practices in general in order to develop an understanding of the relationship between the internal Soviet order and their external policies.
- o Gorbachev the media superstar can be combatted. The Western press should be encouraged to engage him in more open forums. There, Soviet practices will not support the cultivated image of Gorbachev as an open and reasonable leader.
- o The U.S. should press the USSR for greater openness and media reciprocity in the "Spirit of Geneva." The positive images that the Soviet media (especially TV) purveyed of both leaders may be conducive to this.

- o USIA will monitor the image of President Reagan in the Soviet media over the next several weeks/months. If, and how, it "slips" (i.e., becomes again negative and harsh) should tell us a great deal about prospects for agreements and the next meeting.
- o As we approach the next meeting, the U.S. should not be pushed into abrupt reactions to Soviet initiatives; early initiatives, even though general, followed by calm, confident, and consistent responses over the long term will better establish the basis for more successful public diplomacy built around key objectives for the next round of discussions.
- o There is a need for continued coordination, with an experienced USIA team located in the NSC, to manage the public diplomacy connected with highest-level meetings. Without such a central control, too much effort is chaotic, duplicated and/or wasted.
- o The fact that the next meeting will be in the U.S. opens special opportunities for public diplomacy and poses certain problems. As hosts, we may be able to control the tempo and some of the tone of events, as well as help set the images of the meeting itself. But our role as hosts for an official visit may also provide Gorbachev with more platforms for media events. Hostile press and public encounters will both prove embarrassing at times to the Soviets, but also at times to the USG as hosts.

Assessing Soviet Public Diplomacy
for the Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting

This paper examines the Soviet public diplomacy campaign before, during, and after the November meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. It attempts to assess the Soviet public diplomacy effort by considering the following themes:

Soviet Public Diplomacy Objectives

The Content of Soviet Propaganda

Communications Techniques

The Impact of Soviet Public Diplomacy

Soviet Aims

From past experience and the way in which the Soviet public diplomacy campaign was conducted, it is possible to make some inferences about what Soviet propagandists sought to accomplish. The following appear to be major objectives of Soviet public diplomacy.

Setting the Agenda: Focus on Arms Control

The USSR sought to set the agenda for the meeting by concentrating on arms control in its public diplomacy. The objective evidently was to project an image of the USSR as a nation devoutly committed to peace and to put pressure on the U.S. for favorable arms control agreements. In this connection, Soviet propagandists gave extensive publicity to and lavished praise on the USSR's "peace initiatives." This effort, clearly designed to gain the support of world opinion (especially in Western Europe and the U.S.), set the tone for much of the Soviet public diplomacy, as will be seen below.

More specifically, the USSR tried to gain leverage over the Reagan Administration so the latter would make concessions on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), reaffirm earlier agreements (particularly the ABM and unratified SALT II treaties), and eventually conclude major new arms reduction agreements that met Soviet interests.

At the same time, of course, the Soviets tried to deflect attention from issues that it felt vulnerable on -- especially human rights and its war in Afghanistan.

Portraying the U.S. as "Not Serious" and in Disarray

While seeking to set the agenda for the meeting, Soviet commentators tried to portray the U.S. Administration in such a light that any "failure" at Geneva could be blamed on the American side. In the weeks leading up to the meeting, Soviet propaganda continued to emphasize divisions within the U.S. Administration and how U.S. "hardliners" and the "military-industrial complex" had prevented a positive U.S. response to the USSR's bold initiatives. Because of these divisions in the U.S., the Reagan Administration was said to be without a clear policy direction; thus, it was still "not serious" regarding arms limitation and the summit itself.

Yet, there was another side to the Soviet public presentation of the U.S. that could pave the way, from the Soviet vantage, for more fruitful Soviet-American relations. Soviet commentators emphasized that public opinion in the U.S. favored both better relations with the USSR and an arms control agreement. The groundswell of public sentiment in the U.S., in the Soviet view, was growing so strong that the President could no longer ignore it. This portrayal of forces within U.S. society allowed for possible shifts in U.S. policy and hence for doing business with the "new" ("realistic") Ronald Reagan.

Enhancing the Image of the USSR and its New Leader

Throughout the events in Geneva, it was clear that the USSR wished to gain recognition as a superpower. The Soviets wanted to gain for their leader and the country as a whole the respect they feel is their due. It became extremely important for them to be seen and treated as an equal by the U.S. and President Reagan.

Certainly Gorbachev had a major stake in the outcome of the meeting. By providing him with the opportunity to appear as a world-class statesman, on an equal footing with the U.S. President, the summit meeting gave Gorbachev the possibility of enhancing his stature at home and gaining support for his foreign and domestic programs.

In this connection, it should be stressed that virtually all of Soviet public diplomacy had a dual audience in mind. In some respects, the Soviet people back home may have been more

important than publics in the U.S. and the West. This is why Gorbachev's Time interview received prominent play in the Soviet media, and why Soviet television devoted large chunks of time to Geneva. The Gorbachev leadership sought to assure Soviet publics that it was in the forefront of efforts to promote "peace." Yet for all his "reasonableness" at Geneva, Gorbachev still found it necessary to repeat vigorously and often that SDI remains the major obstacle to arms control and that the USSR can and will take countermeasures if the U.S. pursues its development. These assertions may either reflect Gorbachev's own views as a "hardliner" or have been intended to reassure "hardliners" at home that their interests would not be sacrificed.

The Content of Soviet Propaganda

Arms Control -- the Central Concern

In the entire period leading to the Geneva meeting, Soviet propaganda strongly emphasized arms control issues. The USSR sought consistently to demonstrate its commitment to peace, as contrasted to the "militarist" aims of the U.S. It announced a series of unilateral moratoria to which it urged the U.S. to respond. In early October, Gorbachev disclosed that the USSR had proposed a 50-percent reduction in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Clearly, the Soviet leadership sought to convey the impression that it was moving boldly on these issues, leaving the U.S. behind. (Soviet commentary never referred to the U.S. proposals for deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals which preceded its counterproposal -- rather, it emphasized that the U.S. was slow to respond.)

Soviet spokesmen stressed that President Reagan's "blind" devotion to SDI would make any agreement extremely difficult, if not impossible. They also counterposed alleged Soviet devotion to "Star Peace" to the U.S. Administration's preparations for "Star Wars" (e.g., Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the UN).

While attacking SDI, Soviet spokesmen accused the U.S. of deliberately changing the terms of the ABM treaty and seeking to "neutralize" Soviet "initiatives" on arms control. The first charge was based on the so-called narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty explored by U.S. spokesmen. The President's eventual decision to hold to a broad treaty interpretation (like his continued practice of abiding by the terms of the unratified SALT II treaty) was practically ignored in this Soviet campaign.

The second accusation was bolstered by Soviet attempts to show that the U.S. was trying to divert attention from serious, concrete Soviet proposals by putting forth unrealistic, unhelpful proposals of its own. They caustically attacked the American offer for Soviet representatives to observe nuclear tests, contrasting the U.S. offer with their unilateral moratorium on such testing. They also criticized the President's UN General Assembly speech in October for addressing matters of secondary concern -- regional conflicts.

Propaganda Directed at U.S. Allies

Leading up to Geneva, the USSR made several moves designed to create fissures in the Western alliance. In his October interview with French journalists, Gorbachev sought to stress the commonality of West European and Soviet security interests. In addressing the French parliament, he also called for separate talks with France and Britain on intermediate-range missiles and sought to forestall the Netherlands' decision to deploy U.S. cruise missiles.

In its public diplomacy, the Soviet intent was clearly to drive a wedge between the West Europeans and the U.S., or at least to encourage the West Europeans to put pressure on the U.S. to modify its arms control negotiating posture. At the same time, Soviet spokesmen did not neglect the grassroots: they continued to reach out to members of the West European peace movement.

In the aftermath of Geneva, this same approach has been followed to gain support for Soviet positions in countries close to the U.S. Soviet spokesmen, like American officials, have already made several public diplomacy trips to European capitals to present their views on the meeting. More such forays are planned in the near future (e.g., Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's trip to Japan in January).

Portrayal of the Two Leaders at the Summit

The Gorbachev Image. The public diplomacy campaign used both Western and Soviet media to communicate the dynamic persona of the new Soviet leader. Gorbachev's Time interview and trip to France, accompanied by his wife Raisa, elicited much favorable Western publicity. Likewise, his October 1st interview with French journalists, which was given wide coverage in both Soviet domestic and foreign media, appeared designed to project an image of an open, reasonable, and flexible Soviet leader.

However, in such public appearances, Gorbachev sometimes made ill-advised statements, and he probably appeared unconvincing to many Western observers on important issues, especially human rights and the status of Soviet Jews.

Yet, on the whole, Gorbachev appeared to make a good showing because many Western observers were inclined to compare him, not with Western politicians, but with prior Soviet leaders. Much commentary in the Western media implied such comparisons, pointing out that no longer do Soviet leaders appear in baggy suits or pound the table with their shoes to make a point. This gave the Soviet public diplomacy effort an advantage that it is less likely to capitalize on in the future -- at least in Western Europe.

In Geneva -- with his arrival remarks, his speech at the closing ceremony, and especially the final press conference -- Gorbachev attempted to project the image of a responsible world leader taking the high road of peace and disarmament. He tried to shine as a statesman above petty wrangling, as a peace-bringer in tune with the needs and desires of the world's peoples, and as a responsible world leader. He faced the Western media with assurance and self-confidence. The effort to humanize the Soviet leader was helped by the coverage of his wife, Raisa, which Soviet public relations personnel tried to promote in the Western media.

The Reagan Image. As important as the depiction of their own leader was the Soviet portrait of the U.S. President during the meeting. In the five years preceding the Geneva meeting, the picture of Ronald Reagan in all Soviet media had been unremittingly negative. Virtually never presented live on Soviet television, the President was always shown on the small screen and in print as scowling and hostile. Soviet commentators painted Reagan as a cowboy, an uninformed ex-movie actor, a virulent anti-communist, and a warmonger.

Then suddenly, at Geneva, Reagan's image changed: Soviet TV showed him as a smiling, affable human being. He was presented to Soviet viewers as a man engaged in frank, businesslike, and constructive talks with Gorbachev.

It may be that this shift in the Soviets' public portrayal of Reagan is one price they had to pay for having the high-level meeting. But it may also be designed to convey a message, particularly to domestic Soviet audiences: it might have been impossible to deal with the "old Reagan," but it might be possible to do business with this "new Reagan."

Portrayal of the Geneva Meeting Itself

Before the meeting Soviet propagandists maintained that success at Geneva depended on the seriousness and good faith of the U.S. They argued that the U.S. was not making serious preparations for the meeting. Worse, they charged that the U.S. side was still deeply divided over how to deal with the Soviet Union at Geneva and in arms control forums.

The Soviet propagandists accused certain "right-wing circles" and the "military-industrial complex" of trying to sabotage the meeting. The "smoking gun" here was seen to be Defense Secretary Weinberger's "notorious" letter urging that the U.S. not commit itself to an extension of the ABM treaty and of compliance with the terms of SALT II. In the Soviet view, this sort of pressure from within the Administration was likely to "doom" meaningful results at Geneva.

Within hours of the initial Reagan-Gorbachev encounter, however, expressions of guarded optimism became the order of the day for Soviet commentators. The very fact that there was a news blackout was hailed as evidence that serious talks were underway. Gorbachev himself confirmed that the talks were serious and candid, opening up possibilities for positive results. The closing ceremony and final press conference remarks by Gorbachev confirmed the message: Geneva seemed to mark a new stage in the bilateral relationship.

Soviet propaganda played the meeting as a positive first step, the beginning of a long, hard process which should lead to improved relations. Equally emphasized, however, was that Geneva did not bridge the fundamental differences which divide the two nations and that it brought no resolution to many serious problems, including the most important one of arms control.

Human Rights

No other subject caused Soviet propagandists more discomfort than human rights issues. It was on this matter that Gorbachev sounded flat and unconvincing -- and at times combative -- in his public comments (e.g., the Moscow interview with French correspondents, the press conference in Paris, and the meeting with Jesse Jackson). Furthermore, the Soviet public relations specialists and briefers had obvious difficulty with this subject in Geneva: a Soviet press conference on human rights announced for Sunday was cancelled, and after repeated

promises, the briefing never materialized. Meanwhile, Soviet emigres caught the eye of Western correspondents by demonstrating in Geneva, and the otherwise fairly well-oiled Soviet propaganda machine was thrown into disarray by the appearance at Soviet press conferences of a former Soviet dissident, Irina Grivnina, who held Dutch press credentials.

Soviet propagandists tried to deflect human rights charges by turning the spotlight on the U.S. Through the mass media, briefings, and special brochures, Soviet spokesmen countered by charging that America supports "state terrorism," tolerates widespread anti-Semitism and racial discrimination at home, and does not guarantee to its citizens such "basic rights" as employment and housing. Trying to take the offensive as much as possible, they accused the U.S. of all sorts of human rights abuses (a favorite example is the case of convicted Indian prisoner Leonard Peltier). Along the same lines, accusations by Yurchenko, the Soviet official who claimed to have been kidnapped and drugged by the CIA, were given prominent coverage by TASS and the Soviet media on the eve of the summit.

On the other hand, because Soviet spokesmen ignored or papered over U.S. accusations of human rights abuses in the Soviet Union, the Soviet case did not appear strong. Their stock reply to most charges leveled against them was to cry that such discussions constitute "outside interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state."

Regional Issues

Regional issues, which were not really on the Soviet agenda for Geneva, were sometimes given short shrift in the public diplomacy campaigns leading up to the November meeting. For each item on the U.S. agenda, the Soviets had a ready response.

Thus, they charged that turmoil in Nicaragua was not caused by Soviet support for the Sandinistas but by American interference and threats against the legitimate Nicaraguan government. In the Soviet view, not Soviet troops but "outside" American aid to the rebels was the problem in Afghanistan. And where the U.S. charged that Communist intervention accounted for destabilization and revolution, the Soviets maintained that there were justified wars of national liberation taking place.

For the most part, the Soviet tack during the Geneva meeting was to ignore these issues publicly. At some points, however, Gorbachev was able to bring in regional issues when discussing arms control, as in the final press conference when he proposed solving Latin American problems with funds available from cut-backs in arms expenditures.

Bilateral Issues

On most bilateral issues the Soviets took a wait-and-see attitude in their public diplomacy. Thus, on questions of a new exchange agreement, a consular agreement, civil aviation and North Pacific safety accords, and other matters, they were low-key. They did little either to encourage or discourage speculation that the Geneva meeting would produce concrete results in any or all of these areas.

When the meeting in fact produced new agreements on such matters, it served to demonstrate the Soviet point that concrete results are possible if the two sides sit down and negotiate seriously and with good will. But they did not claim unilateral credit for the accords nor try to make a propaganda victory out of them. They clearly interpreted these measures as small steps which may lead to bigger and better results from Geneva.

Communications Techniques

Style Over Substance

The "new style" so apparent in Gorbachev's dealings with Western media since assuming the leadership in March 1985 was everywhere evident in Soviet public diplomacy before and during Geneva. Gorbachev tried to appear honest, frank, sincere, and flexible in all public encounters. He made himself accessible to the Western press in an hour-and-a-half conference the final day.

Geneva in a sense only confirmed what has been increasingly obvious for several months. The Soviet leader and his media spokesmen are mastering Western communications techniques: the press conference, briefings, accessibility to the public, etc. They are becoming more adept in each sphere and therefore appear more relaxed and at ease in them. This in turn contributes to their making, at least superficially, a good impression on their audience. Gorbachev has the makings of a media/communications phenomenon.

The obvious problem looming for Soviet public diplomacy efforts is what do they do for an encore? A great second act is going to be very hard for them to write, unless and until they change certain policies and realities. They cannot continue to score public diplomacy points merely on the strength of putting in appearances in Western media. They will have to concentrate more in the future on what they are saying and doing (i.e., on substance), not just how they speak and act.

Media Blitzes and the Advance Team

Not only were Soviet spokesmen and Gorbachev himself very visible in the period leading up to the meeting, but there were also veritable blitzes on Western media during Geneva. In a technique that bears watching, the Soviets made extensive use of an "advance team" of scholar-propagandists. This group of Soviet officials and specialists arrived in Geneva a week before the meeting got underway and began staging well-publicized press briefings. Members of this team such as Georgii Arbatov, Roald Sagdeev, and Evgenii Velikhov appeared on American public affairs programs constantly during the pre-meeting period. In addition, Vladimir Posner and another media team hit the UK.

Some Western correspondents commented on the unusual cooperation and support that Soviet officials gave them, drawing a sharp contrast with previous Soviet efforts to restrict their coverage. Thus, the Soviets seemed to unleash a two-pronged attack on the public. While Gorbachev occupied center stage, other Soviet spokesmen held their own press conferences and engaged Western officials/observers. They were able to bombard the Western media with the Soviet viewpoint.

While the Soviets seem to want the scholar-propagandists to appear to be independent academics and concerned citizens, as foreign policy critics in the West often are, they have not fully succeeded in this aim. Most American coverage (print and broadcast) of these Soviets calls them officials or otherwise identifies them as government/party spokesmen as well as scholars.

The Soviets may be following a time-honored principle in all this: more is better, big is beautiful. But while they made a big splash initially, the official commentators in Geneva appeared to run out of things to say after a few days. As analysis of European media trends shows, the public diplomacy gains sharply diminished within a short time.

As a result, the Soviets cannot be content to believe that quantity is a substitute for quality in the future. They may well go more and more to their most adept spokesmen (including Gorbachev above all) when using the Western media. Yet, they may have come to realize that there is the danger of overloading the airwaves. Perhaps this explains why Gorbachev turned down repeated offers to appear on American television networks, and why several scheduled briefings by lesser officials were cancelled.

West European and Japanese television coverage of Geneva shows that, by and large, the Western media recognize the Soviet propaganda effort for what it is. They commented on the "unprecedented" public relations battle being waged by the USSR surrounding Geneva. They noted that Mrs. Gorbachev seemed "part of a carefully constructed Soviet duo" and added "the glamor element" to the General Secretary's image.

Although Western media also treated the President's commitment to SDI in reasonably balanced fashion, they frequently called it the critical factor inhibiting a superpower agreement on arms control. Soviet propaganda harped on this second point, and, indeed, public opinion surveys show that Europeans favor the use of SDI as a bargaining chip. But there is no certain cause-and-effect relationship between the two facts.

In some (but not all) Japanese and West European media the Soviets received a slight black eye on the human rights question. Especially in Italy the press portrayed the USSR in a poor light in this sphere. But in all these countries the dominant issues were nuclear arms agreements and the SDI.

Coverage in the PRC

The PRC's coverage has been intriguing. Pre-meeting developments received heavy media coverage, and pessimism about the expected results was the dominant mood. During and after the meeting, the Chinese media have not commented extensively on the outcome and have balanced their criticisms of the two sides. In fact, an apparent pro-Moscow bias in pre-Geneva reporting (because of the fact that Chinese positions on disarmament are close to Gorbachev's arms control proposals) has disappeared in post-meeting commentary thus far. In contrast to countries within the Soviet orbit, the Chinese media have referred to the "U.S.-Soviet" meeting and have also mentioned Reagan before Gorbachev.

Coverage in India

Before the Geneva meeting, Indian media devoted moderate attention to the upcoming event. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi seemed to reflect a pro-Moscow bent in public statements. He stressed India's desire to see "something big" come out of Geneva on disarmament and praised Gorbachev's "very positive attitude" toward this problem. In an interview broadcast on

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Indian radio to domestic audiences (November 9), Gandhi said that people in India do not believe that the President's SDI will lead to arms control. (These statements were in turn given a good deal of attention by the Soviet media and played a role in the USSR's public diplomacy campaign, particularly toward Third World countries.)

After the meeting Gandhi hailed the improved atmosphere in Soviet-American relations as being important for the rest of the world as well. He welcomed the joint declaration that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, as well as the agreement to try to reduce nuclear arsenals by 50 percent. In this assessment he seemed somewhat more evenhanded than earlier.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1985


Dear Charlie:

Flo Taussig, a Staff Assistant in the Office of the Press Secretary, has recently had conversations with Ambassador Price and your Public Affairs Officer in London, Bud Korengold. They have mentioned to her the positions of Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer in the U.S. Embassy in London.

I would give Flo the highest recommendation for consideration. She is an outstanding individual who has brought a sense of professionalism to our office. She serves in one of the most critical positions in the White House Press Office, as liaison with the Office of the Executive Clerk of the White House, and prepares all the White House news releases, Presidential appointments, statements, signings of bills, proclamations and other Presidential actions.

While I would like to keep Flo here, I feel the opportunity in London would be an excellent step forward for her. I hope you and Ambassador Price will consider her for this position.

Sincerely,


Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
to the President

The Honorable Charles Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
Washington, D. C. 20547

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Sincerely,


Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
to the President

The Honorable Charles Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
Washington, D. C. 20547

September 17, 1985

Larry:

I spoke with Bud Korengold today about the two positions that are opening up in the U.S. Embassy in London. They are:

- Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer
- Assistant Information Officer

I am most interested in the cultural affairs job, but I suppose that it would be best to mention both. As I said, Bud thought the position in the cultural affairs office might be better for me.

Thank you so much for helping me...it may be a longshot, but I certainly think it is worth a good try. I would really be happy if it worked out...London would be great!

-Flo



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AUG 3 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Larry M. Speakes
Assistant to the President and
Principal Deputy Press Secretary
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CZW*
Director

SUBJECT: Soviet Propaganda

Soviet propaganda and disinformation activities worldwide are a major concern of USIA. The Agency has been vigorously attacking this problem throughout my tenure as Director, but -- while there has been some significant progress -- we are still far from turning the situation around.

One of the difficulties is that people at policy levels in Washington are simply too busy to pay much attention to the enormous volume of propaganda and disinformation generated by the Soviets which criticizes every aspect of our society as well as the policies of this and every other Administration. For the past few months USIA has prepared a weekly summary of the most significant Soviet propaganda themes. The summary is highly selective and brief -- no more than one page -- with a compressed description of the main Soviet allegations. It is sent to every policy-level office at USIA.

This report, in my view, deserves wider distribution. I plan on sending it to you and a number of other top Administration officials for background as well as action, if you deem it appropriate. A copy of the latest report is attached, as well as a brief description of how the report is compiled and the purposes for which it might be appropriate.

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USIA WEEKLY REPORT ON SIGNIFICANT
SOVIET PROPAGANDA HIGHLIGHTS

The USIA weekly report on significant Soviet propaganda highlights was initiated at the Director's request in order to better inform policy-level officers of the most significant current themes and allegations in Soviet propaganda and disinformation.

Space constraints (one-page maximum) require a very high level of selectivity and that the Soviet arguments be presented in a highly compressed, very blunt form. Space constraints also mean that no analysis can be offered. (Trend analysis is provided by the Agency's bimonthly Soviet Propaganda Alert)

Subjects for the report concern topical international issues, with occasional items on less transitory themes. The report is mainly a "how current Soviet propaganda is playing the issue" summary. The FBIS Daily Report for the Soviet Union is the source for the report.

The report also distinguishes between domestic Soviet propaganda and that designed for external consumption. With few exceptions, external propaganda is the focus, meaning that TASS and Radio Moscow foreign services generate the bulk of the source material. Occasional items are taken from Pravda and Izvestiia on the assumption that these important Soviet newspapers have a wide foreign audience also.

Not all the items in the weekly propaganda report require or are amenable to action on the part of USIA. Some arguments are so absurd that commentary on the part of the U.S. Government would merely draw attention to them and give credibility where none would otherwise be granted. Other arguments are so nonspecific that they cannot be decisively refuted. Finally, the information required to refute some charges would compromise U.S. intelligence or military activities. Nonetheless, recipients of the report should be alert to charges that can be effectively refuted.

Soviet Propaganda Highlights

August 9 - 15

South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone

With the American Pacific fleet adopting Tomahawk nuclear cruise missiles, Oceania may well turn into a giant American nuclear base. For this reason the island nations of the Pacific are resisting Washington's militarism in an effort to restrict its military expansion in the region. (Radio Moscow English, August 14)

Micronesia

It is strategic military considerations that have determined the American Administration's approach to Micronesia and prompted the U.S. general policy of sabotaging the fulfillment of the UN declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples and U.S. attempts to arrogate step by step territories which have never belonged to it. (TASS, August 13)

U.S-South Africa

Reagan's national security advisor held a meeting in Vienna recently with South Africa's foreign minister and pledged America's continued support for the racist Pretoria regime. The Pretoria government sees Western cooperation as a green light for continued harassment and repression of those fighting against it. The U.S. and its allies have once again shown the world that they favor keeping the racist government in power and approve its actions. (Radio Moscow Zulu, August 12)

Soviet Testing Moratorium

Washington does everything to avoid accepting the Soviet proposal and the negative approach is covered up with fabrications, falsehoods, and even slander. Washington is still under the illusion that, with the help of nuclear weapons, it will be able to upset the military parity in its favor and ensure a victory in a nuclear war. And that is where the real reason should be sought for the refusal of official Washington to join the Soviet moratorium. (Radio Moscow English, August 12)

NSC Involvement in Nicaragua

The Reagan Administration admitted that officials of the NSC were involved in the operations of the Nicaraguan contras. The confirmation is an admission that the U.S. has got itself a real war waged in every way except with American troops. (Radio Moscow English, August 9)

Abduction of American Peace Group in Nicaragua

A new heinous crime has been committed by the Washington-financed contras: the abduction of a group of American religious workers who were on a trip on the San Juan River. This means that state terror masterminded from the White House is directed not only against countries whose policy official Washington does not like, but also against the citizens of the USA itself. (TASS, August 8)

United States Information Agency

Washington, D.C.



May 31, 1985

Dear Larry:

Thank you so much for sharing with me your letter of May 16 to Bud Korengold.

Your kind words about Bud's role in making the President's trip to Europe a success were very generous. Your thoughtfulness is most appreciated.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
Larry M. Speakes
Assistant to the President and
Principal Deputy Press Secretary
The White House

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 2, 1985

Dear Charlie:

Many thanks for your letter and the good news that we can again count on the professional hand of USIA to assist us in planning for the President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. We appreciate your willingness to provide Mort Allin and Phil Brown to assist us.

After discussions with Mort, we have elected to utilize Phil and others in our efforts, and will be working with you staff on the details.

Best regards,



Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
to the President

Mr. Charles Z. Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547



July 26, 1985

Dear Larry:

USIA stands ready to assist in any way we can with the public diplomacy planning for the meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev in November.

As you requested in your letter of July 24, we have been in touch with Mort Allin and with Phil Brown. My Deputy Director for the Office of European Affairs, Marlin Remick, telephoned Mort July 30 in Helsinki, where Mort presently is assisting with George Shultz's team during the 10th anniversary events commemorating the signing of the CSCE Agreement. Mort indicated that he would like to telephone you directly to discuss the matter, so I assume he has been trying to do so.

In the meantime I can assure you that Phil Brown, our IO in Paris, stands ready to join the Inter-Agency Public Diplomacy effort.

We will be happy to follow through on any other arrangements you will wish to make and will wait in the meantime for further word regarding Mort Allin organizing the Inter-Agency Public Diplomacy teams.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
to the President
The White House

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 31, 1985

Dear Charlie:

Several months ago, this office started making the White House News Summary available to United States Embassies overseas through USIA's Wang computer system, an experiment that apparently was well received by a limited number of Embassies.

Recently, however, a determination was made that the News Summary distribution had expanded beyond what was originally envisioned. Effective this week, therefore, the News Summary is being made available only to personnel within the executive office of the President.

I hope this decision is acceptable to you, and we thank you for your initial acceptance and guidance in this project. If there are any questions, please call me.

Best regards,



Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
to the President

The Honorable Charles Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
Room 800
400 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 24, 1985

Dear Charlie:

We had the first opportunity today to hear a full report from our advance team on their trip to Geneva in preparation for the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. Needless to say, we are eager that our public diplomacy planning get underway, and we recognize the challenge that we face between now and the conclusion of the Geneva sessions. Mike Schneider represented you at today's meeting.

We would like to request the full assistance of USIA in this endeavor, and look forward to working closely with you in the coming weeks. One of the specific ideas we have is that Lyndon K. (Mort) Allin, the Public Affairs Officer in Leningrad, be given the responsibility of organizing the Inter-Agency Public Diplomacy teams. As you know, Mort was Deputy Press Secretary in the White House, and has been in Leningrad for two years. He would be an ideal person to head up the team. There are others, including the Information Officer in Paris, Phil Brown, who has Russian experience and language ability, who could also be very helpful.

Again, we look forward to working with your team as we head toward what we all hope is a successful meeting on November 19 and 20.

Best regards,



Larry Speakes
Deputy Press Secretary
to the President

The Honorable Charles Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
Room 800
400 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C.

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Director



May 31, 1985

Dear Larry:

Thank you so much for your letter of May 17.

I greatly appreciate receiving your cogent thoughts concerning a faster response to Soviet propaganda. We believe that our request to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service for a better alert procedure will help. Your ongoing support for a coordinated effort is appreciated.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
Larry M. Speakes
Assistant to the President and
Principal Deputy Press Secretary
The White House