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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 14, 1985

BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY GEORGE SHULTZ
ON GENEVA SUMMIT

Room 450
Old Executive Office Building

10:18 A.M. EST

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Any questions?

Q Yes.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Helen?

Q What do you think is going to come out of the summit? Will there be any kind of strong agreement? Any agreements at all?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Pretty soon, we won't have to speculate anymore, so that will be a relief for everyone.

Q Is that your answer?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: But I think that -- well, there will be some things that -- of a significant, but not major sort that will be agreed on. We know that.

On the other hand, the main point of the meeting is to have a good, thorough exchange between the heads of these two great countries. And that will take place and we can hope, perhaps even expect that it will be a fruitful exchange and worthy of continuance.

Q Mr. Secretary, can we hope, perhaps even expect that there will be some guidance on arms control, that there will be a little more out of this than you've led us to believe so far?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Whether, on arms control, you're referring to the space defense talks -- there are lots of other arms control areas where progress and movement toward agreement varies from one to the other -- but on the nuclear and space talks, there now has been a U.S. proposal, a Soviet counter-proposal, a U.S. counter-counter-proposal. And some interesting numbers have emerged from that. And if there can be some impulse to the negotiators out of this meeting, that will be all to the good.

But I think we have to wait and see. And there isn't any way of predicting that at this point or, in other words, there has been nothing negotiated out that would suggest that we're somewhere near that point.

Q But what's it depend on?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I suppose it depends on whether or not the Soviet Union will see the light and see the reasonableness of our positions.

Q Mr. Secretary, the Soviets have been in Geneva all week, briefing foreign press. They've been holding news conferences, going on televisions. The Ambassador's speaking later today. What affect do you think all of this Soviet publicity has on expectations for the summit and on the U.S. bargaining position?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, you're a better judge of the publicity side than I am. From our standpoint, we're very serious about this meeting and about the other things that we're talking about in various other fora with the Soviet Union. We're trying to approach them all in a constructive way. We try to make our proposals at the place that's designated for them. And, on the whole, I think that's generally appreciated.

Q Do you think that it puts us in any way on the defensive in world opinion or a little bit on the defensive going into these meetings?

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Actually, I think that the notion that there is public opinion out there, including American public opinion, perhaps especially American public opinion, is a good perception. And it has always seemed to me that when you have to appeal to the common sense of the American people, it's a good thing for you. So if the Soviet Union starts to feel that way, that's good.

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But, at any rate, that subject is under review by the two sides.

Q Have you ruled out the possibility of some kind of limited or controlled joint appearance before some group of press? You wouldn't rule that out at this point?

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Our allies in Europe and in the Pacific region, Japan, are very important to us. Their contribution to the strength of our ideals and posture is very great. So we'll be reporting to them. And then the President, of course, will report to the American people and the Congress.

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will still be important differences of opinion. The question is whether they will be narrowed at all, whether some things can emerge that will be on the positive side, and whether the differences are highlighted in a useful way and whether there is any sense of an agenda for the future. Those are the kinds of questions. And a lot of it will depend on the meeting between these two individuals, at least as I see it. Those of us who are scurrying around in the woodwork like me and trying to get things prepared have worked at it -- we've worked very hard at it, and the President has worked very hard at it. It's been a good preparatory effort. And my observation is that the same can be said on the Soviet side. And we've had a lot of discussions together. And now all of that has been laid in and we are moving to a different stage of this in which the two leaders take over and it's their meeting. And we can all -- I'll be a spectator, a little closer than you, and I hope it works out.

Q Mr. Secretary, as a prelude to the summit there is a report that the Soviets offered a first-slice cut of 200 land-based missiles on either side in your meeting with them in Moscow. One, is this true, and, two, is this acceptable?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Soviets, in their counterproposal last October -- whenever it was -- put out a broad range of things and one of them did have to do with a small reduction of the kind you describe. It wasn't discussed at all in my meetings in Moscow. And of course we consider all the things that have been proposed. There are some obvious problems with small absolute-number reductions when you start from inequitable levels, if you go down absolutely you don't get to an equitable end point. Furthermore, small reductions usually get made from systems that are not that meaningful anyway. But at any rate it was put on the table and I don't think it's any big deal.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you went to Moscow it seemed that the U.S. had greater expectations than you had when you left Moscow.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, that's not -- I don't know what it seemed, but if you say, did I have greater expectations before I went than after, the answer is no.

Q But in your talks with Mr. Gorbachev and the Time interview, for instance, I mean, he seemed to indicate then that he would accept research. The Soviets seemed to go back on that during your meetings in Moscow unquestionably. And that was reported. Why -- what do you think --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there are -- you can quote Soviet leaders in varying ways on the question of research. They have said right along that however you want to define it pure research obviously can't be dealt with in any kind of agreement. And then what exactly that means one can argue about. But from our standpoint, we are pursuing a research program designed to answer the question, can you defend yourself at all adequately against ballistic missiles? That program is going forward in a manner consistent with the ABM Treaty -- in fact consistent with what is generally regarded as a relatively narrow interpretation of that treaty. And we feel that it is possible to find the answer one way or another on the basis of that process. So what we are doing is consistent with the obligations that have been undertaken, and the President will continue to pursue that program.

Q Mr. Secretary, it's been suggested that you and other administration officials are playing an expectations game and purposely low-balling chances for success at the summit so that if it is a failure it won't seem so or if you get little successes they will seem big successes. Are you playing that kind of game?

Q Yes, Chris. (Laughter.)

The problem of human rights -- We are deeply concerned about that. We must be. It's part of our way of life. It's part of our tradition. Immigration? We're a nation of immigrants. We've got to think that it should be okay for people if they want to leave and go someplace else to do so. It's what we all did, or our forefathers did. The Helsinki Accords? We believe give a proper basis for discussing these things. So these matters will be talked about, and always will be.

Now, there's always a question of what's the best way to do it. Now, there are a number of bilateral questions. And, to some extent, these are a little more readily resolved. Because they're more readily resolved, you shouldn't get the feeling -- or we shouldn't get the feeling that they're not important because they can, over a period of time, add up to something that can help a little bit in atmospherics and maybe help in settling things that are broader and deeper and more difficult.

And then, of course, there are the subjects of arms control and while, obviously, the nuclear and space talks are at the center of attention -- and properly so -- there are a number of other arms control issues that we are concerned about and they are -- and there are places where we are, in an official way, discussing various issues with them. And all of these things will come up.

So the agenda at this meeting will be a broad agenda. That doesn't mean that there are going to be so many tick points to get across on each subject. I don't think that's in the nature of a heads-of-state meeting. But, nevertheless, all of these things will be discussed and none will be dropped off the table, as far as we're concerned.

Q -- follow up, sir --

Q Since you talk about regional issues and since the

--

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Since I talk about what?

Q Regional issues.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes.

Q And since Richard Murphy is accompanying you to Geneva, are we to expect a major breakthrough regarding the international conference on Middle East, especially Prime Minister Peres is now talking about international context and so on?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would be very much surprised if there were any breakthrough on an international conference in the Middle East. However, we will talk about regional issues, and certainly the Middle East is one of them that both countries have a major interest in.

I would remind you that the Middle East is a place that contains many difficulties, and one of them involves Iran and Iraq. That is a war that deserves attention. And that's a war that's been very deadly, where chemical weapons have been used, where there doesn't seem to be any outcome in prospect and which is not, in any inherent way, a product of conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And I would hope that we might be able to talk about it constructively. But that, again, remains to be seen. But the regional issues will get plenty of attention.

Q Mr. Secretary, going back to your bookmaker, Jimmy the Greek, would you spell out for us, as you did on the arms control question, what the odds would be for agreements on specific issues, such as cultural exchange,

civil aviation agreement, Pacific air safety agreements, chemical weapons, and so on. (Laughter) -- the same odds?

Q Give us the morning line.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't think I want to get into the morning line across the board.

Q What does 3 -- 2 -- what does .2 mean?

Q Well, Mr. Secretary --

Q That's pretty low.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Haven't you ever studied statistics?

Q No, I didn't.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Gosh, you're uneducated.

Q Yes, that's correct. (Laughter.) What does .2 mean? Is that bad?

Q Give us a feeling, please, how close you are to --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Two chances out of ten -- .2.

Q Oh, okay. Good. Now I can put a reverse in there and I've got a bite.

Q Give us a feeling of how close you are on those kinds of bilateral issues --

Q Price for an insult.

Q -- as opposed to the arms control issues that you discussed earlier.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are some things that, I think, have some real significance, where I think we're pretty well there. There are other things which are being worked on very hard and which may very well get agreed to. And, so, there's a variation. So, I could give you a .95 on some. How's that? You got that? (Laughter.) And others may be --

Q That's nine and a half chances out of ten, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: So, there's a range of probabilities here. But there will definitely be some things that have been agreed to.

Q Mr. Secretary, if --

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q On SALT II, the Soviets are reported to be rather interested in continuing the no-undercut policy after the end of the year when the Treaty, under its terms, would have expired. President Reagan in June said that we would continue under certain conditions for a time which wasn't specified. What is the U.S. position regarding the extension of SALT II no-undercut policy after December 31st? And do you think that it is possible or even likely that the two leaders will be able to reach some agreement on this subject in Geneva?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President's position on that is exactly as he stated it last June. He said then that he was going the extra mile; we broke up the boat. And he said that would continue, and what he would be watching was parallel Soviet behavior

on the one hand and progress in negotiations on the other. That was his position then, and that's his position right now. There hasn't been any change in it.

Q Does December 31st make any difference to the United States?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I just simply said that the President's position now is exactly what it was then. There hasn't been any change in it.

Q How about the --

Q Well, to follow on that --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: And that's all I'm going to say on the subject.

Q But, Mr. Secretary, to follow on that, what the President's position was also was that Soviet behavior and Soviet responses would --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, I said that.

Q And if there is no satisfaction of the U.S. complaints about verification at the summit, would that then be a logical time for the President to reconsider, analyze again the prospects, and consider proportional responses?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President's position today is the same as it was then. And he's watching all these things. And if it changes, you'll be the first to know. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: And I'm sure that's true. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary, what is the prospect of a joint reaffirmation --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't mean you, I mean you.
(Laughter.)

Q Ohhh.

Q Sir, what is the prospect of a joint reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty and what would make it easy or difficult?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far as our -- we are concerned, we are adhering to the ABM Treaty. So, we don't need to reaffirm it; we are adhering to it.

Q Well, Mr. Secretary, either in statistical terms or otherwise, could you give us your estimate of where we are toward an agreement for a second summit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have agreed with the Soviets that one of the things that ought to get a little reflection is the agenda for the future -- where do we go from mid-November -- there's life after mid-November -- and how are we going to get there. So, the question of both substance and the means of talking about substance, namely, meetings of one kind or another, including heads of state, will be, I'm sure, dealt with. And precisely what the outcome of that discussion will be, I can't tell you at this point.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you assess what impact, if any, these recent events will have on the talks -- the events, including the sailor who jumped in the Mississippi River and Mr. Yurchenko's return to the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far as the sailor is concerned, and for that matter the soldier who came into our embassy in Kabul, the Soviet Union, in our presence, made certain undertakings to those two individuals. And, so, I think we're entitled to ask how are they doing. As far as the defector -- redefector is concerned, he seems to be singing in Moscow as he sang here and I don't think anybody takes seriously these things that he's now saying. So, I don't see that it has any particular effect as far as we're concerned.

Q Mr. Secretary, if there is less hope now that there will be an arms reduction agreement, does that give the United States a greater interest in reaching agreement on confidence building measures, such as, perhaps, joint crisis centers or joint military -- centers.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know where the notion comes from that there's less hope now -- less hope than when? Actually, I think what has happened is a quickening of the pace of negotiations insofar as the nuclear and space talks are concerned. Last early January, we agreed to hold the talks; they got underway in the spring. We put a comprehensive set of proposals on the table. That sat there and got discussed through, basically, two rounds of negotiations. Then the Soviet Union came in with a counterproposal and we came very promptly back with a counter-counterproposal. And, in our counter-counterproposal we picked up some of the ideas that were in the Soviet counterproposal. So, that's, I think, a quickening of the pace so I don't see where you get the less hope. There's -- I think there is more taking place. But, insofar as will there be an agreement, when will it be, and so on, I think, at least my basic rule is, you don't have an agreement until you've got an agreement and we're nowhere near that point at this stage of the game.

MR. SPEAKES: We're at the one more question point and I'd like to go to the furthest hand in the back, which is there. And before you start, trip books for those that are travelling in the press plane area available through this door, so you take it through that door -- everybody will go that way -- the books are that way.

Last question in the back.

Q Mr. Secretary, how would you assess the Pentagon report on SALT violations? Have you seen it, do you find it disquieting, and will it be brought up at the summit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the problem of violations of agreements is a matter of tremendous moment and it highlights the importance of that subject and it highlights the importance of adequate means for verification and that subject verification is very much a part of any discussions we have on subjects in the field of arms control or otherwise. So, I think the Pentagon report underlines that -- the importance of that subject and puts an exclamation point behind it.

See you in Geneva.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

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will still be important differences of opinion. The question is whether they will be narrowed at all, whether some things can emerge that will be on the positive side, and whether the differences are highlighted in a useful way and whether there is any sense of an agenda for the future. Those are the kinds of questions. And a lot of it will depend on the meeting between these two individuals, at least as I see it. Those of us who are scurrying around in the woodwork like me and trying to get things prepared have worked at it -- we've worked very hard at it, and the President has worked very hard at it. It's been a good preparatory effort. And my observation is that the same can be said on the Soviet side. And we've had a lot of discussions together. And now all of that has been laid in and we are moving to a different stage of this in which the two leaders take over and it's their meeting. And we can all -- I'll be a spectator, a little closer than you, and I hope it works out.

Q Mr. Secretary, as a prelude to the summit there is a report that the Soviets offered a first-slice cut of 200 land-based missiles on either side in your meeting with them in Moscow. One, is this true, and, two, is this acceptable?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Soviets, in their counterproposal last October -- whenever it was -- put out a broad range of things and one of them did have to do with a small reduction of the kind you describe. It wasn't discussed at all in my meetings in Moscow. And of course we consider all the things that have been proposed. There are some obvious problems with small absolute-number reductions when you start from inequitable levels, if you go down absolutely you don't get to an equitable end point. Furthermore, small reductions usually get made from systems that are not that meaningful anyway. But at any rate it was put on the table and I don't think it's any big deal.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you went to Moscow it seemed that the U.S. had greater expectations than you had when you left Moscow.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, that's not -- I don't know what it seemed, but if you say, did I have greater expectations before I went than after, the answer is no.

Q But in your talks with Mr. Gorbachev and the Time interview, for instance, I mean, he seemed to indicate then that he would accept research. The Soviets seemed to go back on that during your meetings in Moscow unquestionably. And that was reported. Why -- what do you think --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there are -- you can quote Soviet leaders in varying ways on the question of research. They have said right along that however you want to define it pure research obviously can't be dealt with in any kind of agreement. And then what exactly that means one can argue about. But from our standpoint, we are pursuing a research program designed to answer the question, can you defend yourself at all adequately against ballistic missiles? That program is going forward in a manner consistent with the ABM Treaty -- in fact consistent with what is generally regarded as a relatively narrow interpretation of that treaty. And we feel that it is possible to find the answer one way or another on the basis of that process. So what we are doing is consistent with the obligations that have been undertaken, and the President will continue to pursue that program.

Q Mr. Secretary, it's been suggested that you and other administration officials are playing an expectations game and purposely low-balling chances for success at the summit so that if it is a failure it won't seem so or if you get little successes they will seem big successes. Are you playing that kind of game?

Q Yes, Chris. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I tell you, I gave a press conference in Moscow after my meetings, and the write-ups of the press conference were all that somehow it was a big downer. So I was surprised. And I went to by counselor on these matters, Bernie Kalb -- where is Bernie? There he is. And I said, "Bernie, what kind of a story would you have written?" And he said, "Oh, I probably would have written it about the way the guys did." (Laughter.) So -- (Laughter.) But that was not intentional.

Q Those guys had a little help.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Sometime I'll speak prose and won't know it. (Laughter.)

Q Now that you've had a chance to see Mr. Gorbachev close up and since you've worked many times with the President, how do you think these two men will get on in their talks and do you think that there is a reasonable chance that in their private discussions they might be able to reach a new understanding or any breakthrough where their diplomats so far have failed?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I'm going to be fascinated to watch and see what they answer to that question is, and we are not going to have to wait much longer. But they are both, I would say, strong, engaging personalities. So we'll just see what happens.

Q Mr. Secretary, in all of the pre-summit activity people on the left seem to be concerned that the President is going to abandon arms control concerns while people on the right seem to be concerned that he is going to sell out human rights concerns. Is the President going to be equally emphatic on all of those areas?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have said consistently, going way back to the beginning of this administration, and set it out painstakingly, that our agenda and our concerns are broad. We have great concerns about Soviet behavior in various regions of the world. I think it's worth noting that in the United Nations yesterday there was a vote about Afghanistan by the widest margin ever. So we think that world opinion shares the concerns we have about Afghanistan, and so on -- regional issues. That's a big problem. It must be talked about, and it will be. And the Soviets are prepared to talk about it.

The problem of human rights -- We are deeply concerned about that. We must be. It's part of our way of life. It's part of our tradition. Immigration? We're a nation of immigrants. We've got to think that it should be okay for people if they want to leave and go someplace else to do so. It's what we all did, or our forefathers did. The Helsinki Accords? We believe give a proper basis for discussing these things. So these matters will be talked about, and always will be.

Now, there's always a question of what's the best way to do it. Now, there are a number of bilateral questions. And, to some extent, these are a little more readily resolved. Because they're more readily resolved, you shouldn't get the feeling -- or we shouldn't get the feeling that they're not important because they can, over a period of time, add up to something that can help a little bit in atmospheric and maybe help in settling things that are broader and deeper and more difficult.

And then, of course, there are the subjects of arms control and while, obviously, the nuclear and space talks are at the center of attention -- and properly so -- there are a number of other arms control issues that we are concerned about and they are -- and there are places where we are, in an official way, discussing various issues with them. And all of these things will come up.

So the agenda at this meeting will be a broad agenda. That doesn't mean that there are going to be so many tick points to get across on each subject. I don't think that's in the nature of a heads-of-state meeting. But, nevertheless, all of these things will be discussed and none will be dropped off the table, as far as we're concerned.

Q -- follow up, sir --

Q Since you talk about regional issues and since the

--

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Since I talk about what?

Q Regional issues.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes.

Q And since Richard Murphy is accompanying you to Geneva, are we to expect a major breakthrough regarding the international conference on Middle East, especially Prime Minister Peres is now talking about international context and so on?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would be very much surprised if there were any breakthrough on an international conference in the Middle East. However, we will talk about regional issues, and certainly the Middle East is one of them that both countries have a major interest in.

I would remind you that the Middle East is a place that contains many difficulties, and one of them involves Iran and Iraq. That is a war that deserves attention. And that's a war that's been very deadly, where chemical weapons have been used, where there doesn't seem to be any outcome in prospect and which is not, in any inherent way, a product of conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And I would hope that we might be able to talk about it constructively. But that, again, remains to be seen. But the regional issues will get plenty of attention.

Q Mr. Secretary, going back to your bookmaker, Jimmy the Greek, would you spell out for us, as you did on the arms control question, what the odds would be for agreements on specific issues, such as cultural exchange,

civil aviation agreement, Pacific air safety agreements, chemical weapons, and so on. (Laughter) -- the same odds?

Q Give us the morning line.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't think I want to get into the morning line across the board.

Q What does 3 -- 2 -- what does .2 mean?

Q Well, Mr. Secretary --

Q That's pretty low.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Haven't you ever studied statistics?

Q No, I didn't.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Gosh, you're uneducated.

Q Yes, that's correct. (Laughter.) What does .2 mean? Is that bad?

Q Give us a feeling, please, how close you are to --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Two chances out of ten -- .2.

Q Oh, okay. Good. Now I can put a reverse in there and I've got a bite.

Q Give us a feeling of how close you are on those kinds of bilateral issues --

Q Price for an insult.

Q -- as opposed to the arms control issues that you discussed earlier.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are some things that, I think, have some real significance, where I think we're pretty well there. There are other things which are being worked on very hard and which may very well get agreed to. And, so, there's a variation. So, I could give you a .95 on some. How's that? You got that? (Laughter.) And others may be --

Q That's nine and a half chances out of ten, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: So, there's a range of probabilities here. But there will definitely be some things that have been agreed to.

Q Mr. Secretary, if --

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q On SALT II, the Soviets are reported to be rather interested in continuing the no-undercut policy after the end of the year when the Treaty, under its terms, would have expired. President Reagan in June said that we would continue under certain conditions for a time which wasn't specified. What is the U.S. position regarding the extension of SALT II no-undercut policy after December 31st? And do you think that it is possible or even likely that the two leaders will be able to reach some agreement on this subject in Geneva?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President's position on that is exactly as he stated it last June. He said then that he was going the extra mile; we broke up the boat. And he said that would continue, and what he would be watching was parallel Soviet behavior

on the one hand and progress in negotiations on the other. That was his position then, and that's his position right now. There hasn't been any change in it.

Q Does December 31st make any difference to the United States?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I just simply said that the President's position now is exactly what it was then. There hasn't been any change in it.

Q How about the --

Q Well, to follow on that --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: And that's all I'm going to say on the subject.

Q But, Mr. Secretary, to follow on that, what the President's position was also was that Soviet behavior and Soviet responses would --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, I said that.

Q And if there is no satisfaction of the U.S. complaints about verification at the summit, would that then be a logical time for the President to reconsider, analyze again the prospects, and consider proportional responses?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President's position today is the same as it was then. And he's watching all these things. And if it changes, you'll be the first to know. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: And I'm sure that's true. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary, what is the prospect of a joint reaffirmation --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't mean you, I mean you.

(Laughter.)

Q Ohhh.

Q Sir, what is the prospect of a joint reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty and what would make it easy or difficult?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far as our -- we are concerned, we are adhering to the ABM Treaty. So, we don't need to reaffirm it; we are adhering to it.

Q Well, Mr. Secretary, either in statistical terms or otherwise, could you give us your estimate of where we are toward an agreement for a second summit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have agreed with the Soviets that one of the things that ought to get a little reflection is the agenda for the future -- where do we go from mid-November -- there's life after mid-November -- and how are we going to get there. So, the question of both substance and the means of talking about substance, namely, meetings of one kind or another, including heads of state, will be, I'm sure, dealt with. And precisely what the outcome of that discussion will be, I can't tell you at this point.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you assess what impact, if any, these recent events will have on the talks -- the events, including the sailor who jumped in the Mississippi River and Mr. Yurchenko's return to the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far as the sailor is concerned, and for that matter the soldier who came into our embassy in Kabul, the Soviet Union, in our presence, made certain undertakings to those two individuals. And, so, I think we're entitled to ask how are they doing. As far as the defector -- redefector is concerned, he seems to be singing in Moscow as he sang here and I don't think anybody takes seriously these things that he's now saying. So, I don't see that it has any particular effect as far as we're concerned.

Q Mr. Secretary, if there is less hope now that there will be an arms reduction agreement, does that give the United States a greater interest in reaching agreement on confidence building measures, such as, perhaps, joint crisis centers or joint military -- centers.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know where the notion comes from that there's less hope now -- less hope than when? Actually, I think what has happened is a quickening of the pace of negotiations insofar as the nuclear and space talks are concerned. Last early January, we agreed to hold the talks; they got underway in the spring. We put a comprehensive set of proposals on the table. That sat there and got discussed through, basically, two rounds of negotiations. Then the Soviet Union came in with a counterproposal and we came very promptly back with a counter-counterproposal. And, in our counter-counterproposal we picked up some of the ideas that were in the Soviet counterproposal. So, that's, I think, a quickening of the pace so I don't see where you get the less hope. There's -- I think there is more taking place. But, insofar as will there be an agreement, when will it be, and so on, I think, at least my basic rule is, you don't have an agreement until you've got an agreement and we're nowhere near that point at this stage of the game.

MR. SPEAKES: We're at the one more question point and I'd like to go to the furthest hand in the back, which is there. And before you start, trip books for those that are travelling in the press plane area available through this door, so you take it through that door -- everybody will go that way -- the books are that way.

Last question in the back.

Q Mr. Secretary, how would you assess the Pentagon report on SALT violations? Have you seen it, do you find it disquieting, and will it be brought up at the summit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the problem of violations of agreements is a matter of tremendous moment and it highlights the importance of that subject and it highlights the importance of adequate means for verification and that subject verification is very much a part of any discussions we have on subjects in the field of arms control or otherwise. So, I think the Pentagon report underlines that -- the importance of that subject and puts an exclamation point behind it.

See you in Geneva.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

10:48 A.M. EST