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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: President, Office of the: Presidential Briefing Papers
OA/Box: CFOA 740
File Folder: Oct.16, 1981 (Casefile 043569)

Archivist: snf/bcb
FOIA ID: F99-036/2 [Laham]
Date: 2/1/01

| DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|---------------------|--|----------|-------------|
| 1. list | Editorial Page Editors Attending Briefings and Luncheons with President (partial), 2p. | 10/16/81 | B6 |

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
WORKSHEET

H-INTERNAL
 X-MEDIA

Subject Codes:

Name of Document: BRIEFING PAPERS FOR
PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULED
APPOINTMENTS FOR

P R 0 0 7 . 0 1

OCT. 16 81

Subject:

- | | | |
|----|---|-----------------------------------|
| 1 | Sen Bennett JOHNSTON re AWACS | FO 003.02 |
| 2 | " Patrick LEAHY " " | CO 134 |
| 3 | " Dennis DECONCINI " " | ND 001 |
| 4 | QUENTIN BURDICK " " | |
| 5 | Executive Agency Heads re Fall Budget Program | FG 065 FI 004 FG |
| 6 | Luncheon w Editorial Page Writers | PR 016 02 ? |
| 7 | Talking Notes for " " " | PR 005.02 PR 005.02 |
| 8 | Sen David BOREN re AWACS | |
| 9 | " John HEINZ " " | |
| 10 | " Howell HELFIN " " | |
| 11 | Prime Minister SEEWOOSAGUR RAMGOOLAM OF MAURITIUS | CO 103 |
| 12 | HELMUT KOHL, CHAIRMAN, GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION | CO 054.02 |

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

| Office/Agency | (Staff Name) | Action Code | Tracking Date YY/MM/DD | Type of Response | Code | Completion Date YY/MM/DD |
|---------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------------|------------------|------|-----------------------------|
| RMMATT | | RSZ | 1 1 | | | 1 1 |

Referral Note:

BCF

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE
Friday, October 16, 1981

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| 9:00 am (30 min) | <u>Staff Time</u> 9:05 (Baker, Meese, Deaver) C. S. HEIKES | Oval Office |
| 9:30 am (15 min) | 9:31 - Em PHOTO (USN+WR - HERRERA + HIKUS) 9:35 <u>Senior Staff Time</u> 9:35-10:00 Em, TB, Allen, Anderson, Green, Harman, Small | Oval Office |
| 9:45 am (30 min) | Meeting with National Security Planning Group 10:03-10:40 (Richard Allen) (distributed separately) | Oval Office SIT. Rm. |
| 10:15 am (15 min) | <u>Personal Staff Time</u> | Oval Office |
| 10:30 am (15 min) | Meeting with Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Mauritius Prime Minister 10:44-11:08 (Richard Allen) PHOTO OPP. (distributed separately) | Oval Office |
| 11:00 am (60 min) | <u>Congressional Time re AWACS</u> (Max Friedersdorf) ALLEN | Oval Office |
| | (1) Sen. Bennett Johnston (D-La) 11:00 11:10-11:18 | |
| | (2) Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) 11:15 11:20-11:44 | |
| | (3) Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz) 11:30 (TAB A) 11:45-12:09 | |
| | (4) Sen. Quentin Burdick (D-ND) 11:45 12:11- 12:33 12:33 | |
| 12:00 m (60 min) | <u>Luncheon with Editorial Page Writers</u> (Karna Small) 12:34-1:39 (TAB B) | Cabinet Room |
| 1:00 pm (30 min) | <u>Personal Staff Time</u> NOT TIME! | Oval Office |
| 1:30 pm (20 min) | Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Opposition Leader, Federal Republic of Germany 1:43-2:19 (Richard Allen) PHOTO OPP. (distributed separately) | Oval Office |
| 2:00 pm (60 min) | <u>National Security Council Meeting</u> (Richard Allen) 2:19-3:16 (distributed separately) | Cabinet Room |
| 3:15 pm (15 min) | <u>Meeting with Independent Agency Officials</u> (Craig Fuller) 3:26-3:32 (TAB C) | Cabinet Room |
| 3:30 pm (60 min) | <u>Congressional Time re AWACS</u> (Max Friedersdorf) | Oval Office |
| | (1) Sen. David Boren (D-Okla) 3:30 3:36-4:00 | |
| | (2) Sen. John Heinz (R-Pa) 3:45 4:02-4:28 | |
| | (3) Sen. Howell Heflin (D-Ala) 4:00 4:29 (TAB D)-4:51 | |
| | (4) Sen. Russell Long (D-La) 4:15 4:52-5:05 | |
| 4:30 pm (60 min) | <u>Briefing for Yorktown Trip</u> 5:07-5:27 (Richard Allen) | Oval Office |
| 5:30 pm | <u>Staff Time</u> 6:03 RESIDENCE | Oval Office |

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

ty

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER
RICHARD DARMAN

FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON *cpt*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with
Helmut Kohl
Friday, October 16, 1:30 p.m.

The following will participate in the President's meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), on Friday, October 16, at 1:30 p.m.

United States

- ✓ The President
- ✓ Secretary of State Haig
- ~~Edwin Moose~~
- ~~James Baker~~
- ~~Michael Deaver~~
- ✓ Richard Allen
- ~~Tom Niles (State Desk Officer)~~
- ✓ William Stearman (NSC)
- D. FISCHER
- Federal Republic of Germany

*Harry Obst,
interpreter, State*

- ✓ Dr. Helmut Kohl
- ✓ Ambassador Peter Hermes
- ✓ Alois Mertes, *foreign policy Adl to CDU*
- ✓ R. K. Lochner (interpreter)

per Wm Spearman

cc: Dave Fischer

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

10:44 -

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER
RICHARD DARMAN

FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON *CPT*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with
Prime Minister of Mauritius

The following will participate in the President's
meeting with Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam
of Mauritius -- Friday, October 16, at 10:30 a.m. + 1

STAFF

White House

- ✓ Richard V. Allen
- ✓ Frederick L. Wettering

*Chitmansing
Jesseramsing,
Chargé d'Affaires*

State Department

- ✓ Secretary of State Haig
- ✓ Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker
- ✓ *R. Allen.*

cc: Dave Fischer

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR QUENTIN BURDICK (D-NORTH DAKOTA)

DATE: October 16, 1981

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 11:45 - 12:00 (15 minutes)

FROM: Max Friedersdorf

M.F.

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Burdick has served in the Senate for over twenty years, but observers will tell you that his service has been extremely inconspicuous. He seldom speaks or makes demands. The normal advantages of seniority have not accrued to him, because he has switched committee assignments several times in the course of his career.

He is usually counted as a solid Democratic vote, but broke with his party when he opposed the Panama Canal Treaty during the previous Administration.

He is a cosponsor of the Packwood Resolution and when asked about the possibility of this meeting, he said that he wanted you to know that he has made several public commitments in opposition to the sale. He added, however, that he did not want to hold to a position if it were proven wrong and he would like to give you an opportunity to make your case.

He will be flattered by attention from you and you could possibly sway him.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Burdick

Staff

Jim Baker
Ed Meese
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer and statement by Senator Burdick on the driveway.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Senator Burdick will arrive through the Northwest Gate, enter the West lobby and be escorted to the Oval Office for a 15-minute meeting with the President.

Attachment: Talking Points

Talking Points

President's Meeting with Senators

- Thank you for joining with me today to discuss an issue of vital importance to our national security: the sale to Saudi Arabia of AWACS aircraft and F-15 enhancement items.
- This sale serves our national security interests in two important ways: 1) It strengthens our strategic posture in that vital part of the world; and 2) it provides the cornerstone for initiatives designed to bring Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states into the peace process.
- In 1978, the Senate approved the sale to Saudi Arabia of much more sophisticated aircraft -- the F-15s -- at a time when that country did not face the threat occasioned by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and Iranian stability, and Soviet advances in Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, and the Yemens.
- I find it inconceivable that the Senate might now disapprove a less-sophisticated package at a time of greater threat to Saudi Arabia and its vital oil facilities.
- The only reasons I could see for this negative action would be if the package presents a risk to Israel or an unacceptable risk of technology compromise. This package presents neither risk.
- As I told Prime Minister Begin, and the American public, I remain firmly committed to Israel's security. I would not have approved this package if it adversely affected Israel's qualitative edge.
- To ensure against misuse and technology compromise, we negotiated with the Saudis a very detailed series of arrangements providing for full U.S. participation in the program, safeguards against sharing data with third countries, and the most detailed security plan ever developed in connection with an arms sales.
- These negotiations were conducted after we had received from Senator Baker and others of you your concerns about this sale. Thus, I believe we have been fully responsive to the Congress, especially the Senate, and that we have gone as far with the Saudis as we can and should go.
- I intend to win this battle and am prepared to use all the means available to me to do so. Success is important both to our Mideast policy and to my goal of reestablishing a bipartisan foreign policy consensus.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR BENNETT JOHNSTON (D-LOUISIANA)

DATE: October 16, 1981

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 11:00 - 11:10 a.m. (10 minutes)

FROM: Max Friedersdorf *MB*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Johnston has been leaning in favor of the Saudi AWACS sale but has not yet announced his support publicly. The purpose of his visit today is to discuss the issue briefly with you and to make his announcement to the press as he leaves the White House. As you may recall from the September 14 meeting with a bi-partisan group of Senators, Senator Johnston initially felt that we waited too long to start our lobbying efforts on the AWACS sale. He offered this advice not as a substantive criticism against the sale but as an observation on the procedural attempts to win Senate approval.

In a subsequent conversation which you had with Senator Johnston aboard Air Force I en route to New Orleans, he indicated that he was leaning for the sale but would have difficulty going with us if there were a landslide vote against. Johnston is now prepared to announce his support for the sale. You should express your appreciation for his support and express the hope that he will encourage his fellow Democrats to join him.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Bennett Johnston

Staff

Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Senator Johnston to enter through Northwest Gate and be escorted to the Oval Office for a 10-minute meeting with the President.

Attachment: Talking Points

Talking Points

President's Meeting with Senators

- Thank you for joining with me today to discuss an issue of vital importance to our national security: the sale to Saudi Arabia of AWACS aircraft and F-15 enhancement items.
- This sale serves our national security interests in two important ways: 1) It strengthens our strategic posture in that vital part of the world; and 2) it provides the cornerstone for initiatives designed to bring Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states into the peace process.
- In 1978, the Senate approved the sale to Saudi Arabia of much more sophisticated aircraft -- the F-15s -- at a time when that country did not face the threat occasioned by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and Iranian stability, and Soviet advances in Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, and the Yemens.
- I find it inconceivable that the Senate might now disapprove a less-sophisticated package at a time of greater threat to Saudi Arabia and its vital oil facilities.
- The only reasons I could see for this negative action would be if the package presents a risk to Israel or an unacceptable risk of technology compromise. This package presents neither risk.
- As I told Prime Minister Begin, and the American public, I remain firmly committed to Israel's security. I would not have approved this package if it adversely affected Israel's qualitative edge.
- To ensure against misuse and technology compromise, we negotiated with the Saudis a very detailed series of arrangements providing for full U.S. participation in the program, safeguards against sharing data with third countries, and the most detailed security plan ever developed in connection with an arms sales.
- These negotiations were conducted after we had received from Senator Baker and others of you your concerns about this sale. Thus, I believe we have been fully responsive to the Congress, especially the Senate, and that we have gone as far with the Saudis as we can and should go.
- I intend to win this battle and am prepared to use all the means available to me to do so. Success is important both to our Mideast policy and to my goal of reestablishing a bipartisan foreign policy consensus.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY (D-VERMONT)

DATE: October 16, 1981
LOCATION: The Oval Office
TIME: 11:10 a.m. (20 minutes)
FROM: Max L. Friedersdorf *M.L.F.*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Pat Leahy is a liberal Democrat, who votes with this Administration as seldom as any member of the United States Senate, but he has remained open on this issue. When the possibility of this meeting with you was raised with him last week, he indicated a desire to have a more detailed discussion with Dick Allen in advance of his meeting with you. This has been accomplished and he spent an hour-and-a-half with Dick Allen yesterday exploring a number of technical questions drawing on his experience on the Senate Intelligence Committee.

When the Senate Intelligence Committee was involved in the controversy surrounding Bill Casey last summer, Senator Leahy made a request to Senator Laxalt for a meeting with you to discuss some of the problems he perceives with the intelligence operations of the U. S. Government. Some attempt was made to schedule this meeting, but it was never given sufficient priority to be accomplished. Leahy has expressed some disappointment over the fact that this meeting was not scheduled. If there is enough time, you can probably score points with him by making reference to the fact that Paul Laxalt has commented favorably on his insights into the problems of our intelligence operations. You could also invite him to express some of his views.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Leahy

Staff

Jim Baker
Ed Meese
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer and statement by Senator Leahy on the driveway.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Senator Leahy will arrive through the Northwest Gate, enter the West lobby and be escorted to the Oval Office for a twenty minute meeting.

Attachment: Talking Points

Talking Points

President's Meeting with Senators

- Thank you for joining with me today to discuss an issue of vital importance to our national security: the sale to Saudi Arabia of AWACS aircraft and F-15 enhancement items.
- This sale serves our national security interests in two important ways: 1) It strengthens our strategic posture in that vital part of the world; and 2) it provides the cornerstone for initiatives designed to bring Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states into the peace process.
- In 1978, the Senate approved the sale to Saudi Arabia of much more sophisticated aircraft -- the F-15s -- at a time when that country did not face the threat occasioned by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and Iranian stability, and Soviet advances in Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, and the Yemens.
- I find it inconceivable that the Senate might now disapprove a less-sophisticated package at a time of greater threat to Saudi Arabia and its vital oil facilities.
- The only reasons I could see for this negative action would be if the package presents a risk to Israel or an unacceptable risk of technology compromise. This package presents neither risk.
- As I told Prime Minister Begin, and the American public, I remain firmly committed to Israel's security. I would not have approved this package if it adversely affected Israel's qualitative edge.
- To ensure against misuse and technology compromise, we negotiated with the Saudis a very detailed series of arrangements providing for full U.S. participation in the program, safeguards against sharing data with third countries, and the most detailed security plan ever developed in connection with an arms sales.
- These negotiations were conducted after we had received from Senator Baker and others of you your concerns about this sale. Thus, I believe we have been fully responsive to the Congress, especially the Senate, and that we have gone as far with the Saudis as we can and should go.
- I intend to win this battle and am prepared to use all the means available to me to do so. Success is important both to our Mideast policy and to my goal of reestablishing a bipartisan foreign policy consensus.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR DENNIS DECONCINI (D-ARIZONA)

DATE: October 16, 1981

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 11:30 - 11:45 a.m. (15 minutes)

FROM: Max Friedersdorf *M 6*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator DeConcini is a co-sponsor of the Packwood resolution of disapproval. He has given some indications that he would be willing to listen to our arguments on this issue, but there is no assurance that he will change his mind.

You should be aware of public comments which have come from DeConcini's office in the past few days implying that "someone with a very close relationship with the White House had told DeConcini that Reagan probably would not campaign against him next year if he changes his opposition to the sale." The White House has denied this report.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Dennis DeConcini

Staff

Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Senator DeConcini to enter through Northwest Gate and be escorted to the Oval Office for a 15-minute meeting with the President.

Attachment: Talking Points

Talking Points

President's Meeting with Senators

- Thank you for joining with me today to discuss an issue of vital importance to our national security: the sale to Saudi Arabia of AWACS aircraft and F-15 enhancement items.
- This sale serves our national security interests in two important ways: 1) It strengthens our strategic posture in that vital part of the world; and 2) it provides the cornerstone for initiatives designed to bring Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states into the peace process.
- In 1978, the Senate approved the sale to Saudi Arabia of much more sophisticated aircraft -- the F-15s -- at a time when that country did not face the threat occasioned by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and Iranian stability, and Soviet advances in Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, and the Yemens.
- I find it inconceivable that the Senate might now disapprove a less-sophisticated package at a time of greater threat to Saudi Arabia and its vital oil facilities.
- The only reasons I could see for this negative action would be if the package presents a risk to Israel or an unacceptable risk of technology compromise. This package presents neither risk.
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- These negotiations were conducted after we had received from Senator Baker and others of you your concerns about this sale. Thus, I believe we have been fully responsive to the Congress, especially the Senate, and that we have gone as far with the Saudis as we can and should go.
- I intend to win this battle and am prepared to use all the means available to me to do so. Success is important both to our Mideast policy and to my goal of reestablishing a bipartisan foreign policy consensus.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE
Friday, October 16, 1981

| | | |
|----------------------|--|--------------|
| 9:00 am (30 min) | <u>Staff Time</u> (Baker, Meese, Deaver) | Oval Office |
| 9:30 am (15 min) | <u>Senior Staff Time</u> | Oval Office |
| 9:45 am (30 min) | <u>Meeting with National Security Planning Group</u> (Richard Allen) (distributed separately) | Oval Office |
| 10:15 am (15 min) | <u>Personal Staff Time</u> | Oval Office |
| 10:30 am (15 min) | <u>Meeting with Sir Seewosagur Ramgoolam, Mauritius Prime Minister</u> (Richard Allen) (distributed separately) | Oval Office |
| 11:00 am (60 min) | <u>Congressional Time re AWACS</u> (Max Friedersdorf) (1) Sen. Bennett Johnston (D-La) 11:00 (2) Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) 11:15 (3) Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz) 11:30 (TAB A) (4) Sen. Quentin Burdick (D-ND) 11:45 | Oval Office |
| 12:00 m (60 min) | <u>Luncheon with Editorial Page Writers</u> (Karna Small) (TAB B) | Cabinet Room |
| 1:00 pm (30 min) | <u>Personal Staff Time</u> | Oval Office |
| 1:30 pm (20 min) | <u>Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Opposition Leader, Federal Republic of Germany</u> (Richard Allen) (distributed separately) | Oval Office |
| 2:00 pm (60 min) | <u>National Security Council Meeting</u> (Richard Allen) (distributed separately) | Cabinet Room |
| 3:15 pm (15 min) | <u>Meeting with Independent Agency Officials</u> (Craig Fuller) (TAB C) | Cabinet Room |
| 3:30 pm (60 min) | <u>Congressional Time re AWACS</u> (Max Friedersdorf) (1) Sen. David Boren (D-Okla) 3:30 (2) Sen. John Heinz (R-Pa) 3:45 (3) Sen. Lowell Heflin (D-Ala) 4:00 (TAB D) (4) Sen. Russell Long (D-La) 4:15 | Oval Office |
| 4:30 pm (60 min) | <u>Briefing for Yorktown Trip</u> (Richard Allen) | Oval Office |
| 5:30 pm (30 min) | <u>Staff Time</u> (Baker, Meese, Deaver) | Oval Office |

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER
RICHARD DARMAN

FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON *CT*

SUBJECT: Briefing of the President
Friday, October 16, 4:30 p.m.

The following will participate in the briefing of the President in preparation for his meeting with President Mitterrand of France:

White House

~~Edwin Meese~~

- James Baker
- Michael Deaver
- Richard Allen
- Richard Darman
- Craig Fuller
- David Gergen
- James Rentschler
- Joe Canzani*

State

- Secretary Haig
- Deputy Assistant Secretary Allen Helmes
- Ambassador-designate Evan Galbraith

cc: Dave Fischer

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR BENNETT JOHNSTON (D-LOUISIANA)

DATE: October 16, 1981

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 11:00 - 11:10 a.m. (10 minutes)

FROM: Max Friedersdorf ^{11:10 - 11:18} M.G.

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Johnston has been leaning in favor of the Saudi AWACS sale but has not yet announced his support publicly. The purpose of his visit today is to discuss the issue briefly with you and to make his announcement to the press as he leaves the White House. As you may recall from the September 14 meeting with a bi-partisan group of Senators, Senator Johnston initially felt that we waited too long to start our lobbying efforts on the AWACS sale. He offered this advice not as a substantive criticism against the sale but as an observation on the procedural attempts to win Senate approval.

In a subsequent conversation which you had with Senator Johnston aboard Air Force I en route to New Orleans, he indicated that he was leaning for the sale but would have difficulty going with us if there were a landslide vote against. Johnston is now prepared to announce his support for the sale. You should express your appreciation for his support and express the hope that he will encourage his fellow Democrats to join him.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Bennett Johnston

Staff

~~Ed Meese~~

~~Jim Baker~~

✓ Dick Allen

✓ Max Friedersdorf

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY (D-VERMONT)

DATE: October 16, 1981
LOCATION: The Oval Office
TIME: 11:10 a.m. (20 minutes)
FROM: ^{11:20 - 11:44} Max L. Friedersdorf *M.L.F.*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Pat Leahy is a liberal Democrat, who votes with this Administration as seldom as any member of the United States Senate, but he has remained open on this issue. When the possibility of this meeting with you was raised with him last week, he indicated a desire to have a more detailed discussion with Dick Allen in advance of his meeting with you. This has been accomplished and he spent an hour-and-a-half with Dick Allen yesterday exploring a number of technical questions drawing on his experience on the Senate Intelligence Committee.

When the Senate Intelligence Committee was involved in the controversy surrounding Bill Casey last summer, Senator Leahy made a request to Senator Laxalt for a meeting with you to discuss some of the problems he perceives with the intelligence operations of the U. S. Government. Some attempt was made to schedule this meeting, but it was never given sufficient priority to be accomplished. Leahy has expressed some disappointment over the fact that this meeting was not scheduled. If there is enough time, you can probably score points with him by making reference to the fact that Paul Laxalt has commented favorably on his insights into the problems of our intelligence operations. You could also invite him to express some of his views.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Leahy

Staff

~~Jim Baker~~
~~Ed Meese~~
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR DENNIS DECONCINI (D-ARIZONA)

DATE: October 16, 1981

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 11:30 - 11:45 a.m. (15 minutes)

FROM: Max Friedersdorf ^{11:45-12:09} M.C.

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator DeConcini is a co-sponsor of the Packwood resolution of disapproval. He has given some indications that he would be willing to listen to our arguments on this issue, but there is no assurance that he will change his mind.

You should be aware of public comments which have come from DeConcini's office in the past few days implying that "someone with a very close relationship with the White House had told DeConcini that Reagan probably would not campaign against him next year if he changes his opposition to the sale." The White House has denied this report.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Dennis DeConcini

ROMANO ROMANI (STAFF)

Staff

~~Ed Meese~~
~~Jim Baker~~
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR QUENTIN BURDICK (D-NORTH DAKOTA)

DATE: October 16, 1981

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 11:45 - 12:00 (15 minutes)

12:11 - 12:33

FROM: Max Friedersdorf

M.F.

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Burdick has served in the Senate for over twenty years, but observers will tell you that his service has been extremely inconspicuous. He seldom speaks or makes demands. The normal advantages of seniority have not accrued to him, because he has switched committee assignments several times in the course of his career.

He is usually counted as a solid Democratic vote, but broke with his party when he opposed the Panama Canal Treaty during the previous Administration.

He is a cosponsor of the Packwood Resolution and when asked about the possibility of this meeting, he said that he wanted you to know that he has made several public commitments in opposition to the sale. He added, however, that he did not want to hold to a position if it were proven wrong and he would like to give you an opportunity to make your case.

He will be flattered by attention from you and you could possibly sway him.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Burdick

Staff

~~Jim Baker~~
~~Ed Meese~~
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR DAVID BOREN (D-OKLAHOMA)

DATE: October 16, 1981

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 3:30 - 3:45 p.m. (15 minutes)

3:36 - 4:00

FROM: Max Friedersdorf *M.F.*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Boren attended your bi-partisan group meeting with several Senators on September 14. He did not initiate comments at that time. Boren has subsequently said that he would not vote for the package "as is" and has suggested some language pertaining to "continuous surveillance" which we are trying to work into the letter which you will eventually send to the Senate.

Boren had said at one time that he strongly favored the Glenn proposal involving joint crewing and although his current suggestions stop short of the joint crewing language, they would involve continuous presence of American personnel both in the air and on land with regard to the use of AWACS.

Boren has made comments to several people indicating that he would like to support the President on this issue although he has not yet given any public indication that he is willing to change his current position of leaning against the sale. You should reiterate the fact that we are giving careful consideration to his suggested language changes and that we would like to work further with him on this point.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator David Boren

Staff

~~Ed Meese~~

✓ Jim Baker

✓ Dick Allen

✓ Max Friedersdorf

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR JOHN HEINZ (R-PENNSYLVANIA)

DATE: October 16, 1981
LOCATION: The Oval Office
TIME: 3:45 p.m. (15-minutes)
4:02 - 4:28
FROM: Max Friedersdorf

M.F.

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Heinz has been opposed to the sale of the air defense equipment and he has signed the Packwood resolution. He also has a large Jewish constituency in his state.

We do have reports that the Senator is workable on this issue. While there does not appear to have been any lessening of his opposition, it is also true that he has not been vocal in opposing you on this issue. He is considered one of the Senators who will have to be worked hard to move him over to your position.

Senator Heinz should be responsive to appeals to his party loyalty and Republican solidarity with references to the success achieved in the 1980 campaign with you at the top of the GOP ticket and him as Chairman of the Senate Campaign Committee. His current primary objective is his reelection in Pennsylvania in 1982 and you should mention your interest in his campaign.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator John Heinz

Staff

~~Ed Meese~~

// Jim Baker

// Dick Allen

/ Max Friedersdorf

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR HOWELL HEFLIN (D-ALABAMA)

DATE: October 16, 1981

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 4:00 - 4:15 p.m. (15 minutes)

FROM: Max Friedersdorf *4:29 - 4:51 M.G.*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Howell Heflin is a cosponsor of the Packwood Resolution and has expressed his firm opposition to the sale, but he has left enough room to make this meeting worthwhile. It seems inconsistent with his normal position on issues for him to be against this sale, and he should be responsive to points about the national interest and the need to preserve executive authority.

He will be difficult to sway, but not impossible.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Heflin

Staff

Jim Baker
~~Ed Meese~~
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer and statement by Senator Heflin on the driveway.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Senator Heflin will arrive through the Northwest Gate, enter the West lobby and be escorted to the Oval Office for a 15-minute meeting with the President.

Attachment: Talking Points

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR RUSSELL LONG (D-LOUISIANA)

DATE: October 16, 1981
LOCATION: The Oval Office
TIME: 4:15 p.m. (15 minutes)
FROM: Max L. Friedersdorf *M.L.F.*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Russell Long has been saying in Louisiana and to colleagues that he has an open mind and wants to listen to all of the debate. It is more likely, however, that he has been waiting to see what develops with an idea of supporting you if his vote is needed, and voting against the sale if the cause is hopeless. He is one of our best current prospects for an early declaration in favor of the sale.

He is and considers himself to be one of the best strategists in the Senate. If he indicates that he is favorable to the sale, he should be encouraged to give his advice on how you can win on this issue.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Long

Staff

Jim Baker
~~Ed Meese~~
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer and statement by Senator Long on the driveway.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Senator Long will arrive through the Northwest Gate, enter the West lobby and be escorted to the Oval Office for a 15-minute meeting with the President.

Attachment: Talking Points

B

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

LUNCHEON WITH EDITORIAL PAGE EDITORS

DATE: Friday, October 16, 1981
LOCATION: The Cabinet Room
TIME: 12:00 - 1:00 p.m.
FROM: Karna Small *KS*

I. PURPOSE:

To greet a group of editorial page editors representing top newspapers all across the country and discuss your priorities and answer their questions. The group will be spending the entire day at the White House and will be briefed in the morning on AWACS, The Freedom of Information Act and the upcoming Cancun Conference. After lunch with you, Edwin Meese, the editors will be meeting with David Stockman, Richard Schweiker and Drew Lewis.

II. BACKGROUND:

This group was put together by Joseph Sterne of the Baltimore Sun who was most cooperative, handled the invitations and coordinated their arrival. The group came to the White House during the previous administration and has wanted an opportunity to meet with you and top members of your Administration. They will then go home and write editorials for weeks to come.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Edwin Meese

Karna Small
plus 19 editors as listed on Tab A

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer. No White House press present. A transcript will be made of the luncheon remarks, Q & A which will be given to the editors for their immediate use, and embargoed for use by other media until 6 a.m. Sunday.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The President will enter the Cabinet Room, be seated for lunch. Karna Small will ask the editors to introduce themselves and their newspapers, then the President can make some opening remarks and later take questions. Messrs. Meese and Baker will be seated on either side of The President to answer questions as well.

VI. REMARKS

See Tab B

Editorial Page Editors Attending Briefings and Luncheon with
the President, Friday, October 16, 1981.

Michael P. McGough
Pittsburgh Post Gazette
50 Boulevard of the Allies
Pittsburgh, PA, 15222
DOB: 8-2-51
[REDACTED]

Joseph Sterne
Baltimore Sun
501 N. Calvert Street
Baltimore, MD, 21202
DOB: 4-25-28
[REDACTED]

Charles W. Bailey
Minneapolis Tribune
425 Portland Ave.
Minneapolis, Minn. 55488
DOB: 4-28-29
[REDACTED]

James Edward Grimsley
Richmond Times-Dispatch
P.O. Box C-32333
Richmond, Virginia, 23293
DOB: 5-25-27
[REDACTED]

Sylvan Fox
Newsday
Garden City, P.O.
Long Island, NY 11747
DOB: 6-2-28
[REDACTED]

James O. Powell
Arkansas Gazette
P.O. Box 1821
Little Rock, Ark, 72203
DOB: 10-24-19
[REDACTED]

William F. Woo
St. Louis Post Dispatch
900 North Tucker Blvd.
St. Louis, MO, 63101
DOB: 10-4-36
[REDACTED]

Rachelle Cohen
Boston Herald American
300 Harrison Avenue
Boston, Mass., 02106
DOB: 10-21-46
[REDACTED]

Leonard W. Halpert
Buffalo Evening News
1 News Plaza
P.O. Box 100
Buffalo, NY, 14240
DOB: 7-7-24
[REDACTED]

Robert Barnard
Louisville Courier-Journal
525 W. Broadway
Louisville, KY, 40202
DOB: 8-2-26
[REDACTED]

Lois J. Wille
Chicago Sun-Times
401 N. Wabash Avenue
Chicago, Ill. 60611
DOB: 9-19-31
[REDACTED]

William Hosokawa
Denver Post
650 - 15th Street
Denver, CO, 80202
DOB: 1-30-15
[REDACTED]

Thomas S. Gephardt
Cincinnati Enquirer
617 Vine Street
Cincinnati, Ohio, 45201
DOB: 5-23-27
[REDACTED]

Gil Cranberg
Des Moines Register Tribune
715 Locust Street
Des Moines, Iowa, 50304
DOB: 2-20-25
[REDACTED]

John Lyst
Indianapolis Star
307 N. Pennsylvania St.
Indianapolis, Ind. 46202
DOB: 3-28-33
[REDACTED]

Gerald Warren
San Diego Union
350 Camino de la Reina
San Diego, CA, 92108
DOB: 8-17-30
[REDACTED]

Harold Gulliver
Atlanta Constitution
72 Marietta St., N.W.
Atlanta, GA, 30303
DOB: 9-25-35
[REDACTED]

David Molyneaux
Cleveland Plain Dealer
1801 Superior Avenue.
Cleveland, OH, 44114
DOB: 10-16-45
[REDACTED]

Paul Larocque
Ft. Worth Star Telegram
400 West Seventh St.
Ft. Worth, Texas, 76102
DOB: 3-28-31
[REDACTED]

3 x 3
CARDS

Suggested opening comments during lunch with Editorial page Editors October 16.

-- I'd like to say welcome to the White House and I'd like especially to thank Joe Sterne of the Baltimore Sun for putting this group together, issuing the invitations and being so helpful to Karna in arranging this day of briefings.

-- I see Jerry Warren is here - who used to work here in the White House press operation under both Presidents Nixon and Ford - you've obviously gone on to bigger challenges.

-- I do get pretty busy around here, they give me so much to read, but I do try to keep up with what your papers are saying about my Administration. ~~Our~~ White House News Summary includes your editorials - yesterday it included letters to the editor from the Cleveland Plain Dealer.

-- ~~And~~ on most of your editorial pages, you run the best cartoons, here's one that ran in some of your papers the other day (attached). ~~And that's the problem we're facing right now - everyone wants instant results in the economy when it took us decades to get into this mess. People point to FDR and the New Deal. Well, it really took eight years for that to take hold -- we've been into our program, a scaled-down program from our original request, only 16 days.~~

-- ~~And yes, we~~ have asked for another round of budget cuts, we always said the first round was only the beginning, and ~~we'd have to keep a close eye on the budget. It's kind of like the little boy who plays outside and his mother finally gets him to take a bath. Then when she says he needs another one cause he's been out playing again, he says "Aw, Mom, I already DID that!"~~

-- Now I know you have some questions - I'll try to answer them but Ed Meese and Jim Baker ¹⁵ are here to answer as well.

original copies in the Presidential History Library File

3 x 5
CARDS

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT

- As heads of agencies, you are very important to the success of our economic recovery program. Some agencies have budgets larger than ^{SOME} Cabinet Departments.

Wanted to be sure we have a good understanding of the situation.

We face a tough job as we work with Congress on the 1982 budget ^{at the}

^{same time} as we prepare ^{the} 1983 budget.

- We set our course last February when I outlined our program for economic recovery and ^{we're not going to} ~~we cannot~~ deviate from it.
- We succeeded in getting tax relief. We've been partially successful in getting budget cuts. But, high interest rates and higher costs from automatic spending programs have threatened us with higher deficits than I will accept or the nation can stand.
- On September 24th, I outlined the new measures:
 1. cut 12% from the budget requests proposed last March.
 2. tight outlay targets for 1983 and 1984 for all government agencies.
 3. reduce government employment by 75,000 jobs by 1984.
- These actions place a great burden on all of you as you go to the Congress to defend these reductions and as you prepare your 1983 budget proposals that you are sending to OMB. I wish ~~that~~ these tough actions were not necessary. But, we must begin now. We have only a short time to achieve a major redirection in the size, role and cost of government.

- I appreciate all that you have done already in defending my budget proposals. I know you sometimes face hostile Congressional committees and hostile special interest groups.
- Ed Meese and Dave Stockman will continue the briefing on the economic situation and the actions we must take to keep on track, reduce deficits and move toward a balanced budget.
- To help meet these goals I formed a Budget Review Board. I also want you to understand that those tough new budget and employment ceilings you have been receiving from Dave are not just OMB targets. The 1983 and 1984 ceilings have been reviewed by my Budget Review Board (Ed Meese, Jim Baker and Dave Stockman) and I have approved them.
- So, thanks for all the help, hard work, dedication and support, so far. ~~And know that~~ We continue to count on your support and assistance.
- What I said to the Cabinet certainly applies here ---
If not now, when?
If not us, who?

C

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH EXECUTIVE AGENCY HEADS
ON FALL BUDGET PROGRAM

DATE: October 16, 1981
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
TIME: 3:15 (15 minutes)

FROM: Craig L. Fuller *CS*

I. PURPOSE

This meeting will entail a presentation on the Fall Budget Program to the heads of seventeen executive agencies.

II. BACKGROUND

This will be the first time that the heads of the major executive agencies have met together at the White House. It is anticipated that such meetings will be called from time to time.

While this occasion will afford the President an opportunity to thank the agency heads for their accomplishments thus far, the focus of the meeting will be the Fall Budget Program. The President, Ed Meese, and David Stockman will make presentations on the new round of budget cuts and will take questions from the agency heads.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is attached.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Just after the President enters at 3:15 pm, there will be a press photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Before the President's arrival Ed Meese will convene the meeting and review selected Administration accomplishments. The President will arrive at 3:15 pm and will make appropriate remarks (attached), and will answer questions until 3:30 (sample Q & As attached). After the President's departure, David Stockman will speak on the Fall Budget Program and Ed Meese will answer further questions.

PARTICIPANTS

M. Peter McPherson, Administrator
Agency for International Development

James M. Beggs, Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration

John B. Slaughter, Director
National Science Foundation

Robert P. Nimmo, Administrator
The Veterans Administration

Gerald P. Carmen, Administrator
General Services Administration

Donald J. Devine, Director
Office of Personnel Management

Michael Cardenas, Administrator
Small Business Administration

Charles Z. Wick, Director
International Communication Agency

William H. Draper, III, Chairman
U.S. Export-Import Bank

Nancy Harvey Steorts, Chairman
The Consumer Product Safety Commission

Thomas W. Pauken, Director
ACTION

Eugene Victor Rostow, Director
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Louis O. Giuffrida, Director
Federal Emergency Management Agency

William Giannelli, Chief of Engineers
Department of Defense

Richard T. Pratt, Chairman
Federal Home Loan Bank Board

Loret Ruppe, Director
Peace Corps

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR DAVID BOREN (D-OKLAHOMA)

DATE: October 16, 1981

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 3:30 - 3:45 p.m. (15 minutes)

FROM: Max Friedersdorf *MF*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Boren attended your bi-partisan group meeting with several Senators on September 14. He did not initiate comments at that time. Boren has subsequently said that he would not vote for the package "as is" and has suggested some language pertaining to "continuous surveillance" which we are trying to work into the letter which you will eventually send to the Senate.

Boren had said at one time that he strongly favored the Glenn proposal involving joint crewing and although his current suggestions stop short of the joint crewing language, they would involve continuous presence of American personnel both in the air and on land with regard to the use of AWACS.

Boren has made comments to several people indicating that he would like to support the President on this issue although he has not yet given any public indication that he is willing to change his current position of leaning against the sale. You should reiterate the fact that we are giving careful consideration to his suggested language changes and that we would like to work further with him on this point.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator David Boren

Staff

Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Senator Boren to enter through Northwest Gate and be escorted to the Oval Office for a 15-minute meeting with the President.

Attachment: Talking Points

Talking Points
President's Meeting with Senators

- Thank you for joining with me today to discuss an issue of vital importance to our national security: the sale to Saudi Arabia of AWACS aircraft and F-15 enhancement items.
- This sale serves our national security interests in two important ways: 1) It strengthens our strategic posture in that vital part of the world; and 2) it provides the cornerstone for initiatives designed to bring Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states into the peace process.
- In 1978, the Senate approved the sale to Saudi Arabia of much more sophisticated aircraft -- the F-15s -- at a time when that country did not face the threat occasioned by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and Iranian stability, and Soviet advances in Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, and the Yemens.
- I find it inconceivable that the Senate might now disapprove a less-sophisticated package at a time of greater threat to Saudi Arabia and its vital oil facilities.
- The only reasons I could see for this negative action would be if the package presents a risk to Israel or an unacceptable risk of technology compromise. This package presents neither risk.
- As I told Prime Minister Begin, and the American public, I remain firmly committed to Israel's security. I would not have approved this package if it adversely affected Israel's qualitative edge.
- To ensure against misuse and technology compromise, we negotiated with the Saudis a very detailed series of arrangements providing for full U.S. participation in the program, safeguards against sharing data with third countries, and the most detailed security plan ever developed in connection with an arms sales.
- These negotiations were conducted after we had received from Senator Baker and others of you your concerns about this sale. Thus, I believe we have been fully responsive to the Congress, especially the Senate, and that we have gone as far with the Saudis as we can and should go.
- I intend to win this battle and am prepared to use all the means available to me to do so. Success is important both to our Mideast policy and to my goal of reestablishing a bipartisan foreign policy consensus.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR JOHN HEINZ (R-PENNSYLVANIA)

DATE: October 16, 1981
LOCATION: The Oval Office
TIME: 3:45 p.m. (15-minutes)
FROM: Max Friedersdorf *M.F.*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Heinz has been opposed to the sale of the air defense equipment and he has signed the Packwood resolution. He also has a large Jewish constituency in his state.

We do have reports that the Senator is workable on this issue. While there does not appear to have been any lessening of his opposition, it is also true that he has not been vocal in opposing you on this issue. He is considered one of the Senators who will have to be worked hard to move him over to your position.

Senator Heinz should be responsive to appeals to his party loyalty and Republican solidarity with references to the success achieved in the 1980 campaign with you at the top of the GOP ticket and him as Chairman of the Senate Campaign Committee. His current primary objective is his reelection in Pennsylvania in 1982 and you should mention your interest in his campaign.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator John Heinz

Staff

Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer and statement by Senator Heinz on the driveway.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Senator Heinz will arrive through the Northwest Gate, enter the West Lobby and be escorted to the Oval Office for a 15 minute meeting with the President.

Attachment: Talking Points

Talking Points

President's Meeting with Senators

- Thank you for joining with me today to discuss an issue of vital importance to our national security: the sale to Saudi Arabia of AWACS aircraft and F-15 enhancement items.
- This sale serves our national security interests in two important ways: 1) It strengthens our strategic posture in that vital part of the world; and 2) it provides the cornerstone for initiatives designed to bring Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states into the peace process.
- In 1978, the Senate approved the sale to Saudi Arabia of much more sophisticated aircraft -- the F-15s -- at a time when that country did not face the threat occasioned by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and Iranian stability, and Soviet advances in Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, and the Yemens.
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- I intend to win this battle and am prepared to use all the means available to me to do so. Success is important both to our Mideast policy and to my goal of reestablishing a bipartisan foreign policy consensus.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR HOWELL HEFLIN (D-ALABAMA)

DATE: October 16, 1981

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 4:00 - 4:15 p.m. (15 minutes)

FROM: Max Friedersdorf *M.G.*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Howell Heflin is a cosponsor of the Packwood Resolution and has expressed his firm opposition to the sale, but he has left enough room to make this meeting worthwhile. It seems inconsistent with his normal position on issues for him to be against this sale, and he should be responsive to points about the national interest and the need to preserve executive authority.

He will be difficult to sway, but not impossible.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Heflin

Staff

Jim Baker
Ed Meese
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer and statement by Senator Heflin on the driveway.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Senator Heflin will arrive through the Northwest Gate, enter the West lobby and be escorted to the Oval Office for a 15-minute meeting with the President.

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Talking Points

President's Meeting with Senators

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1981

MEETING WITH SENATOR RUSSELL LONG (D-LOUISIANA)

DATE: October 16, 1981
LOCATION: The Oval Office
TIME: 4:15 p.m. (15 minutes)
FROM: Max L. Friedersdorf *M.L.F.*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the proposed Saudi AWACS sale.

II. BACKGROUND

Senator Russell Long has been saying in Louisiana and to colleagues that he has an open mind and wants to listen to all of the debate. It is more likely, however, that he has been waiting to see what develops with an idea of supporting you if his vote is needed, and voting against the sale if the cause is hopeless. He is one of our best current prospects for an early declaration in favor of the sale.

He is and considers himself to be one of the best strategists in the Senate. If he indicates that he is favorable to the sale, he should be encouraged to give his advice on how you can win on this issue.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Long

Staff

Jim Baker
Ed Meese
Dick Allen
Max Friedersdorf

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer and statement by Senator Long on the driveway.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

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Talking Points

President's Meeting with Senators

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