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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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STRATEGIC EVALUATION MEMORANDUM #7

TO: George Bush
James A. Baker
Edwin Meese
Michael Deaver
Lyn Nofziger
Ed Rollins
David Gergen

FROM: Richard S. Beal

SUBJECT: Analysis of the Virginia 1981 Elections

DATE: November 16, 1981

WHY WE LOST VIRGINIA?

Analytical Propositions

Proposition #1: The main reason Coleman lost the Governorship was his poor showing among Republicans.

- o Coleman ran badly in the premier Republican counties in the state. He failed to carry Virginia Beach and Fairfax and turned in poor margins in Henrico and Chesterfield.
- o All of these areas are heavily Republican; the defection of suburban Republicans is a serious element of the inability to hold the Republican vote.
- o In addition to the suburban areas, Coleman ran badly in traditional Republican counties in the Mountains and Valley, even though he, and Miller, are from that part of the state.
- o The failure of Coleman and the Republican ticket to build normal margins in GOP areas meant that they were unable to offset the Democratic areas of the state.

Proposition #2: A secondary reason for the defeat was the defection of "Byrd" Democrats back to the Democratic party.

- o Coleman failed to seek their advice or help until the end.

- o As a consequence, many rural Southside counties which had been voting Republican in recent years turned in solid Democratic margins.

Proposition #3: The increased turnout did not account for the Democratic victory.

- o An additional 200,000 voters participated as compared to the 1977 gubernatorial race.
- o But this increase was below the percentage increase of the 1977 election over the 1973 election. Thus the increase was normal for Virginia.
- o The turnout was still below preseidential years.
- o Increased turnout could be expected given the intense interest and large amounts of money expended.

Proposition #4: Geography was a major contributor to the defeat of the ticket.

- o The Democratic ticket was balanced geographically, with candidates from the Tidewater, Richmond, and northern Virginia.
- o The Republicans had two candidates from the upper Shenandoah Valley (Coleman, Miller) and none from the Tidewater or Richmond.
- o Robb is the first governor elected from northern Virginia since 1917. Davis greatly aided the Democratic ticket in Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Virginia Beach.
- o Coleman barely carried his hometown.

Proposition #5: Contrary to popular opinion, the Black vote did not account for the Republican defeat and should not be used as an excuse.

- o To be sure the Black vote cut badly against the Republicans. Coleman won 4 to 6 percent (based on the actual vote in Black areas). But, at that rate, it was no worse than in presidential years.
- o Black turnout was high by state election standards, but not by presidential election standards.
- o The Black vote is a significant factor in less than half of the state (Norfolk, Portsmouth, Southside, Richmond).

- o The significance of the Black vote was far overshadowed by the collapse of the normal Republican vote.
- o The fact that Coleman won a significant share of the Black vote in 1977 in his race for Attorney General can be explained by the fact that the Democrat was a former segregationist.
- o The black voting patterns in the 1981 election, both urban and rural, were more in keeping with the traditional voting patterns.

Proposition #6: Despite the Democratic clean sweep, the election was not a Democratic landslide.

- o The GOP increased its strength in the House of Delegates from 25 to 33 out of 100 -- one of the highest percentages in a Confederate state.
- o Coleman lost by 7.2% of the vote, 53.6 to 46.4, which is a solid but not overwhelming margin.
- o Durette lost by only 27,000 votes, 51 to 49.
- o Even Nathan Miller, plagued by scandal, was not even totally blown away. He lost 56 to 44, just barely in the landslide category.

Proposition #7: The President and Vice-President were positive factors in the contest.

- o There is no evidence in the returns to indicate an anti-Reagan vote. The President did close the gap somewhat in the final weeks, but not sufficient to avoid the sweep.
- o The polls support this conclusion by the fact that Coleman was behind by 9 to 10 points at the beginning of October, but lost by only 7.

Conclusion

- o The data overwhelmingly support the conclusion that Coleman failed to unite the Republican Party. The fact that there were constant complaints about the Coleman campaign by regular Party people should have indicated trouble with the Republican vote.
- o The election returns support the notion that both conservatives and moderates were suspicious of Coleman.

- o The Coleman campaign failed to secure its own home base in the western part of the state. There is no excuse for not running well there.
- o Everyone agrees that the Coleman media campaign was ineffective. The election returns concur.
- o The Coleman campaign failed to rally the "Byrd" vote to the Republican ticket.
- o The Democrats will misread the returns and think they are on the verge of a rebirth in the Old Dominion.

Supporting Data

Keep in mind that Reagan won Virginia by 240,000 votes. Ford barely carried the state, winning by only 24,000 votes. Thus, Ford's race cannot be considered a good run for a Republican in Virginia by any standard. Coleman lost by 100,000 votes in a much smaller turnout. Dalton won by over 150,000.

Turnout

As one might expect, the turnout was smaller than in presidential years. The increase over the last governor's race in 1977 was about 200,000 votes, but the percentage increase was smaller than the increase of the 1977 election over the 1973 election. The following table shows the size of the turnout for governor and president over the past few years along with the percentage increase of the vote from election to election. The turnout did not account for Coleman's defeat, but rather was what could be expected in light of the increased interest in the contest and the large amount of money spent.

TURNOUT IN THOUSANDS

	<u>Governor</u>		<u>President</u>	
1957	515		1956	696
1961	393		1960	770 +10.6
1965	557 +41.7		1964	1042 +35.3
1969	895 +60.7		1968	1368 +31.1
1973	1035 +15.6		1972	1456 + 6.4
1977	1240 +19.8		1976	1685 +15.7
1981	1436 +15.8		1980	1865 +10.7

Comparisons

To illustrate the dismal showing by Coleman among Republicans, we have selected the premier Republican counties in the state. Three of the jurisdictions are overwhelmingly Republican, while the other, Fairfax, leans Republican. There is no way in these

counties that the poor showing can be blamed on Democratic strength. In Fairfax, of course, allowance must be made for the fact that it was Robb's home county.

	1980	1976	1981	1977
Virginia Beach City	60.5	57.3	49.1	57.6
Henrico (sub. Rich)	66.9	67.6	57.2	74.3
Chesterfield (sub. Rich)	70.1	66.3	61.9	73.6
Fairfax County	57.4	54.4	48.2	59.2

Traditionally, the upper Shenandoah Valley, including Coleman's home city (Staunton) and his home county (Augusta), are strong Republican territories. Also included is the typical Republican County of Shenandoah. It is totally incredible that Coleman did so poorly in his own home base, which is so heavily Republican. Again, it can only point to the dissatisfaction with his candidacy among various factions of the state GOP.

	1980	1976	1981	1977
Staunton	60.8	61.3	50.8	69.4
Augusta	64.3	60.0	57.8	66.7
Shenandoah	67.1	65.2	59.2	69.3

The lower Valley is not nearly as Republican as further north, but the vote remains relatively stable year after year. Some of these counties because of the Civil War, have never voted Democratic for president even though the margins are small. Roanoke County, which is suburban Roanoke, is in the same congressional district as Coleman's home. The other two counties are rural. There is generally very little change in the vote from year to year in these mountain and valley counties.

	1980	1976	1981	1977
Roanoke County	55.8	50.9	49.5	65.0
Floyd	56.6	54.5	53.2	67.3
Wythe	54.3	54.2	47.6	66.1

The Republican cities in the state illustrate our main point also. The cities are widely scattered throughout the state and are heavily Republican. One cannot help but wonder by the results from Lynchburg if the Moral Majority really supported Coleman.

	1980	1976	1981	1977
Colonial Hgts. (sub Rich)	71.0	64.0	63.7	71.4
Lynchburg	62.4	63.9	55.7	71.5
Winchester	64.0	63.5	52.5	69.9

We have looked at some of the Republican areas of the state. Now we should take a look at the Black vote. The next three counties are rural Southside counties with Black majorities. As one can readily see, these Black counties are always bad news. Furthermore, the deterioration in the Republican percentage is

not as great as in the Republican areas. There is just no way to blame the Black vote for the defeat on Tuesday. Black turnout was heavy, but did not exceed presidential years.

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1977</u>
Charles City County	23.7	23.2	20.0	27.0
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Brunswick	39.4	43.7	39.7	53.8

Some Democratic cities with large Black populations. The Black vote was heavy in Richmond and produced a large citywide margin. However, the margin should easily have been offset by Henrico and Chesterfield. In fact, one of those counties alone should have offset the city. Petersburg is another Black city near Richmond. One can see that the Black vote was bad, but not much worse than usual.

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Finally, there are rural Southside counties which were the bastion of the Byrd machine in years past. These counties have been voting Republican in recent years, but are still Democratic in loyalty. The following counties illustrate the fact that Coleman angered or failed to attract many Byrd Democrats. Many Byrd Democrats were more comfortable with Robb.

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1977</u>
Appomattox	60.4	53.6	40.1	64.5
Mecklenburg	54.5	52.0	49.4	65.3

The counties used in the preceding tables were representative examples. Many other counties could have been used to make the same points.

WHY WE LOST VIRGINIA?
Executive Summary

>The main reason Coleman lost the Governorship was his poor showing among Republicans.

*Coleman ran badly in the premier Republican counties in the state. He failed to carry Virginia Beach and Fairfax and turned in poor margins in Henrico and Chesterfield.

*All of these areas are heavily Republican, thus the defection of suburban Republicans is obvious.

*In addition to the suburban areas, Coleman ran badly in traditional Republican counties in the Mountains and Valley, even though both he and Miller were from that part of the state.

*The failure of Coleman and the Republican ticket to build normal margins in GOP areas meant that they were unable to offset the Democratic areas of the state.

>A secondary reason for the defeat was the defection of "Byrd" Democrats back to the Democratic Party.

*Coleman failed to seek their advice or help until the end.

*As a consequence, many rural Southside counties which had been voting Republican in recent years turned in solid Democratic margins.

>The increased turnout did not account for the Democratic victory.

*An additional 200,000 voters participated as compared to the 1977 gubernatorial race.

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>Geography was a major contributor to the defeat of the ticket.

*The Democratic ticket was balanced geographically, with candidates from the Tidewater, Richmond, and northern Virginia.

*The Republicans had two candidates from the upper Shenandoah Valley (Coleman, Miller) and none from the Tidewater or Richmond.

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*But it was no worse than in presidential years.

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>Conclusion:

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WHY WE LOST VIRGINIA?
SUPPORTING TABLES

The following data are in support of the paper on the loss in Virginia. The data covers certain specific categories of counties which illustrate the reason for Coleman's defeat. The 1980 and 1976 presidential returns are compared to the 1981 and 1977 returns for Governor.

Keep in mind that Reagan won Virginia by 240,000 votes. Ford barely carried the state, winning by only 24,000 votes. Thus, Ford's race cannot be considered a good run for a Republican in Virginia by any standard. Coleman lost by 100,000 votes in a much smaller turnout. Dalton won by over 150,000.

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11/3/81 Tue 23:42

VIRGINIA

Democrats scored a major victory in the Old Dominion tonight. With the Attorney General's race still in doubt, but the Democrat leading, the Democrats were victorious throughout the state. Coleman carried only the 7th district so far(Upper Valley). Davis, the Democrat was easily elected Lt. Governor.

The most disappointing aspect of the election is the failure of the GOP to post major gains in the legislature. At Midnight, it appeared the Republicans posted a net gain of only 3 seats, far short of expectations. The reason for this was the defeat of three incumbent Republicans in northern Virginia, two of whom were right-wing extremists.

Thus, there is very little to cheer about in Virginia. If Durette pulls ahead and wins, as well he might, we can point to his election. Also, we should point out Republican gains in the legislature even though they fell short of expectations.

HERE ARE THE POINTS TO REMEMBER:

1. Regardless of the final figures, the race was close. The switch of a few percentage points would have given Coleman the edge. Even the Lt. Governor's race was not a blowout. Thus the Party in losing amassed a large vote.
2. Coleman originally was way behind, 9 points in all of the Richmond Times polls, an as much as 12 in one Washington Post poll. Only a few late polls showed the race close.
3. The national Party's efforts, as well as the President's and Vice-President's turned a Robb runaway into a fairly close contest.
4. The Coleman campaign was poorly run and trailed from the start. They needlessly let Robb build a big lead. The Coleman media campaign was terrible at first.
5. Geography was the most important factor in the race. The Democratic ticket was balanced, while the Republican was not. The Democrats nominated candidates from Richmond, the Tidewater, and northern Virginia, while the GOP had two from the Valley and one from northern Virginia. This in effect wrote off the Tidewater. The GOP convention should have nominated Bateman instead of Miller. The failure to do so cost the Party the Tidewater.
6. Robb capitalized on being from northern Virginia. He is the first Governor from northern Virginia in 60 years.
7. Both Coleman and Robb ran on conservative platforms. Thus the

election was not a repudiation of the Reagan Administration.

8. The Black vote was a factor, but the Black vote is always a factor in a southern state. We can expect the Blacks to show up in large numbers from now on.

9. The split in the Fairfax Party between the far right and the moderates was evident in the delegate races. We must put an end to this infighting.

10. We must not forget, despite congressional and presidential elections, Virginia is still a Democratic state.

NEW JERSEY

New Jersey was a bright spot for the Republicans. As of 12:45, the Republican Tom Kean appeared to be the winner in a virtual dead heat. While the race was close, it was a Republican victory nevertheless. This is the case because of the tremendous inroads the GOP made in the Democratic legislature. Control of both houses is in doubt, although the Democrats look as though they will retain a lead of 1 or 2 seats in each house. This is in sharp contrast to the 27-13 and 44-36 lead the Democrats now enjoy.

THE POINTS TO REMEMBER ABOUT NEW JERSEY:

1. New Jersey, more than Virginia, was a test of the President's economic program. Florio was in opposition to the President, while Robb campaigned in support of much of the President's program.
2. The economy is much more important in New Jersey than Virginia, because of much greater industrialization.
3. The Democrat, Jim Florio, had everything going for him and still lost. He enjoyed a massive Demo registration edge. The Democrats had won every gubernatorial race in the past 30 years except one. He was a Catholic in a 40% Catholic state. He was an Italian, in a state that is 20% Italian. He was from South Jersey and was able to exploit the regionalism of that area.
4. Geography was an important issue in the state. Without its effects, Kean would have won by an even larger margin.
5. Republican victories in legislative races lend support to the argument that the Reagan coalition is not disintegrating.
6. WE MUST NOT EXPEL HARRISON WILLIAMS FROM THE SENATE. Someone must tell Howard Baker to lay off until Kean is inaugurated. The Democrats will try and reapportion the state quickly, as well as have Senator Williams resign right away. We must blow thw whistle on that business.

7. Kean trailed by as much as 6 and 8 points in the race until the very end. Thus, the efforts by the President and Vice-President certainly had a positive effect as in Virginia. The difference is that we did not have as far to go to catch up in New Jersey.

8. If the Press talks about the end of Republican dominance in Virginia, we must remind them of the greater dominance of the Democrats in New Jersey.

WHY WE LOST VIRGINIA?

Contrary to media opinion, the Black vote did not account for Tuesday's Democratic sweep in Virginia. To be sure the Black vote was bad news for the GOP ticket and turnout was heavy, but it could have been offset easily by a normal vote in traditionally Republican areas.

There was a significant Black vote in Richmond, rural Southside, and the Hampton Roads area, but the results bore a close resemblance to the presidential returns. We lost the Richmond district, not because of the Black vote, but because of the poor Republican showing in Henrico and Chesterfield Counties. The same is true with the Norfolk district. Virginia Beach could have offset Norfolk, but it didn't. Instead, Robb carried Virginia Beach.

The main reason Coleman lost the Governorship was his poor showing among Republicans. In other words, it was not because of a strong Democratic trend, but rather his failure to unite all factions of the Party that caused his defeat.

One need only look at the premier Republican counties in the state to see this. It is obvious that thousands of Republicans in Virginia Beach, suburban Richmond, and Fairfax County voted a Democratic ticket. Further proof of this is in the legislative returns. The Party picked up 8 seats in the House of Delegates, with many legislative candidates running ahead of the statewide ticket.

What is most disturbing is the incredibly poor showing by the entire Republican ticket in the Mountains and Valley. Even the northern Shenandoah Valley, home of both Coleman and Miller, was disappointing. Mountain counties with Republican traditions since the Civil War either voted for Robb or turned in an insignificant GOP margin. We couldn't even carry suburban Roanoke.

We cannot help but blame the Coleman campaign for much of the defeat. They should have secured a solid base in the Mountains and Valley before worrying about the rest of the state. It is ironic that the Democratic parts of the state were not so bad that they could not have been offset with a normal Republican vote.

No doubt the Democratic Party in Virginia will consider the election as a rebirth. It is likely they will go all out next year in the Senate and House races. We believe they will misinterpret the vote, not observing that many Republicans voted Democratic.

A secondary factor in the election was the return of many "Byrd" Democrats to the Democratic Party. This is evident in the loss of a number of rural Southside counties which normally vote Republican on the national level. It is clear that Coleman did

nothing to attract these people to the ticket. We hardly carried Lynchburg. Blacks had nothing to do with the ticket's poor showing in these rural White areas.

As stated previously, geography was a major contributor to the defeat of the GOP. Robb was from northern Virginia and thus carried the area. We had no candidate from the Tidewater or Richmond and suffered accordingly.

Still, even with the lack of support from the Tidewater and Richmond, the traditionally Republican areas further west and north should have made the race close. Even though the Democrats swept all three races, statistically the election was close. The switch of 3 1/2 points would have given the race to Coleman. Even Miller lost only 55-45. Durette lost by only 2 points. Again, if the Republican vote would have been even close to normal in our strongholds, we could have won the election.

In the legislature, the number of Republicans rose from 25 to 33, even though 3 incumbent Republicans lost in northern Virginia. Virginia is only the 3rd Confederate state to witness a third of one house of its legislature go Republican. Republicans scored gains in suburban Richmond, Danville, Virginia Beach, and Fredericksburg, as well as northern Virginia. With the House of Delegates forced to run again next year because of racial gerrymandering, the GOP may be in a good position to take control if the national trend is favorable.

The following are potential scenarios for Tuesday's elections along with some possible responses.

OVERALL

1. Loss of both governor's races: The loss of both races will be heralded as a major repudiation of the Reagan Administration. The Press will cite the intrusion of the Administration on a large scale into both contests. We will be unable to refute this even though both GOP state campaigns will say that the election was decided on local issues. If this happens we must look at each state on an individual basis and point to whatever bright spots there may have been (see each state separately).

2. Retention by incumbent parties: If each party retains its respective statehouse, the media will likely say the election was a draw and that each party retained the loyalty of its normal supporters. This may be the case, but we should take a close look at New Jersey to see if it can be demonstrated that the Republican ticket ran better than usual.

This retention scenario is essentially good for the Administration because it means the party in power has not suffered serious erosion as is frequently the case in off-year elections. The retention scenario would also be good from the standpoint of effort expended. The President's effort and appeal was greater in Virginia than New Jersey, thus the results can be said to reflect that fact.

3. The exchange of Governorships: It is quite possible that we will win in New Jersey, but lose in Virginia. This will be a confusing scenario for the Press. It is likely that it will conclude that Kean won on his own, but that the President failed to save Marshall Coleman. We should say that the Virginia race was won by a popular, conservative Democrat who campaign partly on the Reagan program. Whereas the New Jersey race was a clear contest on the Reagan economic program.

This will be a tricky scenario. We must be prepared to offer the correct analysis as soon as possible and not trust the Press will get it straight.

4. Victory in both states: It is obvious that this outcome would be a great victory for the President, but we must make sure the country knows just how great. In both states it means that the Republican candidate will have come from far behind to post a victory. We must not let the media attribute it to local conditions.

We must make sure that this lesson is not lost on the Democrats. It should send them into a state of panic and to quarreling among themselves.

SPECIFIC SCENARIOS

Virginia: If Robb wins easily we must look for bright spots in the election returns. Wyatt Durette should win the Attorney General's race, while the GOP should post some gains in the state legislature. It might even occur that Coleman would be the only Republican to lose (if Nathan Miller wins as well as Durette, although this appears to be more and more remote). We could then say that it was a Republican victory, with Republicans splitting for the "other" conservative at the top of the ticket.

If Robb wins in a tight race, we can say that the President's intervention almost turned the tide after trailing so badly. If the race was close, the rest of the GOP ticket will have run well. Coleman trailed by as much as 11 points only a few weeks ago.

If Coleman and Durette both win, but Nathan Miller loses, we can brush that loss aside because of the hint of scandal. Naturally if all three candidates win, the Democratic Party will have to fold its tent. It should cause Harry Byrd to think things over very carefully.

Regardless of the scenario, we should watch the legislative races closely. We stand an excellent chance of gaining Assembly seats. Currently we have only 25, but we should be able to raise the total to 30 or more, perhaps even 32 or 33. This would be a major accomplishment in a Confederate state.

New Jersey: If Florio wins easily, we must look at the 30 year pattern of Democratic landslides for Governor in the Garden State. William Cahill, a popular South Jersey congressman, was the only Republican to win that office since 1949. Most of the other elections have been landslides with the exception of 1961 when Eisenhower's Secretary of Labor made it close. It is not likely that Florio will be able to come close to any of the previous landslides. Thus we must point out the relative closeness of the vote. We must also point out the overwhelming Democratic registration edge in the state.

If Florio wins by a narrow margin, we must again point out the normal Democratic margin for Governor. Then we must cite the polls which have consistently shown Florio with a commanding lead. Florio's Italian and Catholic heritage should be pointed out in a state that is about 20% Italian and 40% Catholic. Finally, the fact that South Jersey feels like seceding from the rest of the state should not be lost on the media. A narrow defeat for Kean will be the result of this regionalism within the state rather than a repudiation of the Administration.

If Kean wins, then the election was a "test" of the Reagan economic program. We should also point out the tremendous advantages the Democrat enjoyed from the beginning (the

demographics). A Republican victory in the Garden State could touch off a shoddy deal by the Democrats to get Senator Williams to resign before Kean is inaugurated in order that Governor Byrne can make the appointment. If this looks like it may happen, the Jersey GOP must blow the whistle on it. After Kean is inaugurated, we must push the US Senate into expelling Williams. A Kean victory might also save us from a reapportionment disaster in New Jersey.

GUBERNATORIAL RACES

There are three possibilities which may occur in Tuesday's elections. The worst case is losing both the New Jersey and Virginia races. If this happens the press will play it up as a significant repudiation of the Reagan Administration. The media will cite the massive intrusion of the national Administration into the state elections. There will be no denying it.

The second possibility is a split of the two governorships. It could be a retention of the status quo or the parties could switch statehouses. Either way there will be no clear national trend. In this scenario, the media may say that local conditions determined the outcome.

The third situation, winning both governorships, would have to be interpreted as another stunning come-from-behind victory for the President.

THE OUTLOOK

It appears that, while both races are extremely close, the Democrats have the edge in both states. In New Jersey the race is almost too close to call, but we believe that Florio will win by anywhere from 1 to 3 points. This would translate into a margin of between 25,000 to 65,000 votes. We look for a race similar to the 1961 contest between GOP Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell and Democrat Richard J. Hughes win which the Hughes won by 35,000 votes out of over 2 million cast. While we continue to predict a Democratic victory, signs are extremely encouraging.

In Virginia the race has not been as close, but at the end Coleman has practically closed the gap. He still trails and will probably lose by 2 or 3 points, a margin of 25,000 to 40,000 votes. The momentum is clearly with the GOP at this time, with party loyalty now the major factor. We look for a race similar to the John Warner-Andrew Miller contest in 1978, which Warner won 513,000 to 508,000 or the Howell-Godwin contest in 1973, which was nearly as close.

We must emphasize that both races could still be won, and neither should be conceded. There remains a very good chance that at least one of the races will end up in the GOP column.

Despite all of the campaign rhetoric concerning both local and national issues, geography remains the key factor in both races. Let us examine both races in detail.

VIRGINIA

The latest Richmond Times-Dispatch Poll gives the Democrat Charles Robb a whopping 9 point lead: 47-38. However, when the most likely to vote are identified, the result is a little closer with Robb leading Coleman only 48-41. The final Washington Post Poll gives Robb a 51 to 44 lead, down from the previous lead of 11 points. There are reports of a Roanoke TV station poll showing Robb ahead by only 5 statewide, but we have no specifics.

The most significant poll so far is the one done by the University of Virginia for the Norfolk Virginian Pilot. It has the race dead even at 44 apiece. This is the first public poll to indicate a serious chance of Coleman winning. GOP polls in recent days have shown Coleman ahead with the trend running his way. Local polls by the Arundel Newspapers in northern Virginia also seem to indicate that Coleman is closing the gap.

Everything seems to indicate that Coleman has pulled nearly even with Robb. The closeness of the election notwithstanding, however, Robb still appears to have the advantage, due in large part to the better geographic balance on the Democratic ticket. An analysis of the race on a district by district basis also indicates an edge to Robb:

- 1st Dist. (Tidewater): Robb is way ahead here.
- 2nd Dist. (Norfolk-Va. Beach) Robb leading, but GOP strength in Virginia Beach is beginning to show.
- 3rd Dist. (Richmond) Coleman not doing well here but the overwhelming GOP vote in Henrico and Chesterfield counties should prevail on election day. If not, look out. Indications are that Coleman is picking up here.
- 4th Dist. (Southside-Prtsmth.) Robb way ahead, heavy support from Blacks who will probably turn out in large numbers.
- 5th Dist. (Lynchburg-Danville) Coleman ahead in this GOP district. He must do well here as well as in Richmond to offset the big Democratic lead in the Tidewater districts.
- 6th Dist. (Roanoke) Coleman way ahead in his home district. Again the margin is important.
- 7th Dist. (Valley-Staunton) Coleman ahead in this Republican stronghold.
- 8th Dist. (Wash. suburbs-Alex.) Robb ahead here and likely to stay ahead. For Coleman to win he will have to hold Robb to a modest margin in both suburban districts. If Coleman carries either suburban district he could win statewide.
- 9th Dist. (Southwest-Bristol) Close district, not much margin, Robb probably leads here.
- 10th Dist. (Wash. suburbs-Arl.) Same as 8th district, Robb ahead.

While we believe that Robb has the advantage, due especially to geography, we do not concede the race. The endorsements by the President and Governor Godwin, as well as the Richmond paper, makes the race more of a test of party loyalty. Also, the Republican effort to turn out the vote will have a decided impact on the outcome. Thus it may be possible for Coleman to pull it out by election day.

There is also the possibility that Robb will win it by a large margin. If that happens, say by 10 points, that could spell defeat for the entire GOP ticket. The likelihood of this occurring appears less and less likely.

For Coleman to win he will have to come out of the mountains with a large margin. Then he will have to do well in the Richmond suburbs. Finally, he will have to hold Robb's margins in northern Virginia down to insignificant levels. If Coleman fails to achieve any one of these three necessary objectives, he will not win. Undoubtedly the press will say the Black vote cost Coleman the Governorship.

With the governor's race questionable, the Administration should turn its election night focus on the rest of the ticket in the Old Dominion. It now appears that Republican Wyatt Durette will win the attorney general's race, thus retaining that post for the Party.

There is also a possibility that the much-maligned Nathan Miller will win the Lt. Governor's race, although he now appears to be fading. For most of the campaign he appeared to be doing better than Coleman. Much of his strength seems to be coming from partisan Republicans who regard the allegations of scandal against him as a call to arms for Republicans. Thus if the Governor's race is within 3 or 4 points, it is conceivable that Miller could win while Coleman loses. This is less and less likely as Coleman picks up strength and the full implications of Miller's problems sink in with the voters.

In the races for the state legislature, the GOP appears on the verge of making Virginia a two-party state. With only 25 out of 100 in the Assembly currently, the Party is likely to push that total up over 30. Gains are likely to come from Fairfax County, Virginia Beach, Loudon County, and the Richmond suburbs. Of course, a Robb landslide would prevent these gains. It is entirely possible that we could push the number of Republican seats in the Assembly as high as 32 or 33, a third of the total. The only other Confederate states where the GOP has ever elected such a high percentage of the legislature are Florida and Tennessee.

NEW JERSEY

The race in the Garden State is too close to call. It could go either way. We have a much better chance of winning in New Jersey than in Virginia as it stands right now. GOP polls have shown Tom Kean with a narrow, but consistent lead. Public newspaper polls have shown Florio with a comfortable but diminishing lead. The Democratic National Committee is deeply concerned over New Jersey.

The latest New York Times poll gave Florio a 48 to 40 lead among all voters, but among likely voters his lead was a mere 2 points. The Eagleton Poll put Florio's lead at 6 points as of a few days ago, but it is reported that further polling by that organization shows the contest a dead heat because the undecided are breaking heavily for Kean. Another statewide poll has Florio leading by 5 points. It is also reported that one of the networks will release a poll showing Kean up by 1 point.

The problem with New Jersey is that the demographics favor the Democrats. Florio is from South Jersey, which is frequently a swing area. He is way ahead there. Florio also has considerable strength among Italian voters, who make up 20% of the state. Over 40% of New Jersey is Catholic, one of the highest percentages in the nation.

Given the facts, we feel that Florio will win a narrow 1 or 2 point victory over Kean. THERE SHOULD BE CONCERN OVER OBTAINING AN HONEST COUNT. Again the press will attempt to label the election as a repudiation of the Administration. They will cite the fact the President Reagan won the state in a landslide in 1980 and that President Ford carried it in 1976 also.

WE MUST POINT OUT THAT THE DEMOCRATS HAVE DOMINATED THE GOVERNOR'S RACE FOR NEARLY THREE DECADES IN NEW JERSEY. William Cahill, a popular South Jersey congressman, was the only Republican elected governor since Alfred Driscoll was reelected in 1949. Some of the Democratic victories have been by significant landslides:

<u>Year</u>	<u>GOP%</u>	<u>DEM%</u>
1953	44.7	53.2
1957	44.5	54.6
1961	48.7	50.4 (a close election)
1965	41.1	57.4
1969	59.7	38.5 (our only win in the last 32 years)
1973	32.1	66.4
1977	42	56

Thus, if Kean loses by a couple of points we must demonstrate that his showing was quite good for a Republican in a New Jersey Governor's race. You cannot compare the Governor's races to presidential or congressional.

In analyzing the state on a district by district basis, it is clear that the Democratic cities in northern Jersey are key. Such cities as Jersey City, Passaic, Paterson, Elizabeth and Perth Amboy will determine the winner. Florio will run well in South Jersey, while Kean will run well in traditionally Republican suburbs and rural areas. Florio will also carry the previously mentioned cities. The question is by how much.

The district by district breakdown:

- 1st Dist.: (Camden) This is Florio's home district. He may win better than 2 to 1 here.
- 2nd Dist.: (Atlantic City) Not really a Democratic district but Florio is way ahead here because he is from South Jersey.
- 3rd Dist.: (Monmouth Cty) Kean ahead in this Republican stronghold.
- 4th Dist.: (Trenton) Another bad news Democratic city. Florio ahead.
- 5th Dist.: (Morristown) The heartland of Yankee Republicanism. Kean all the way.
- 6th Dist.: (sub. Cam.-Phil) A Republican district but local boy Florio way ahead.
- 7th Dist.: (Bergen County) Heartland of New York suburbs. Kean country.
- 8th Dist.: (Passaic-Ptrsn) An urban swing district with lots of Italian Catholics. Kean must hold Florio to a small margin.
- 9th Dist.: (Bergen County) Another suburban GOP district, lots of Catholics. Kean needs a big margin here to win statewide.
- 10th Dist.: (Newark) Look out!! Heavy Black population. Press will say turnout in Newark cost GOP the Governorship.
- 11th Dist.: (Oranges) Swing district, many working class suburbs plus Italians. Kean's home is in the adjacent district, which could be a positive factor. Kean needs to win here. Too close to call.
- 12th Dist.: (Union County) Leans Republican. Kean should do well here, but needs a good margin.
- 13th Dist.: (rural northwest) Strong GOP district, Kean strong here.
- 14th Dist.: (Jersey City) Heavily Democratic, but the margin is the important thing. Democrats cast more votes in the gubernatorial primary than Carter received for president in 1980. Lots of Italians.
- 15th Dist.: (Perth Amboy) Working class Democratic area which Reagan easily carried. If Florio carries the traditional Democratic vote here, he will win statewide.

It looks like a Democratic victory based on tradition. The one thing Kean has going for him is the fact that voters are tired of the Democratic dominance in Trenton and are on the verge of throwing the rascals out. On the other hand, the economy is not good and President Reagan may get the blame. AWACS might hurt instead of help in New Jersey since there is a very large Jewish population particularly near Kean's home base. The reverse is true

The legislature has been gerrymandered Democratic, but the GOP has staged an all-out effort to win control of at least one of the houses. Traditionally, the legislative races are tied to the Governor's race. A victory of 200,000 votes gives control over both houses. A victory of 100,000 guarantees only one house.

Given the facts of reapportionment and the closeness of the Governor's race, control of the legislature is in doubt. While we expect the Democrats to maintain control, there is a good possibility that the GOP might capture the Assembly. This is crucial to avoiding an expected Democratic gerrymander of the state's congressional districts in 1982. Such a remap could cost the GOP anywhere from 2 to 4 of its 7 congressmen.

To: John Morgan

From: Grayling

New Jersey Senate Vote

Republican 1,051,445

Democrat 1,076,782

Difference 25,337

Advantage: Democrat

New Jersey Assembly Vote

Republican $2,084,318/2 = 1,042,159$

Democrat $2,031,631/2 = 1,015,816$

Difference 26,343

Advantage: Republican

Republican Assembly Advantage 26,343

Democrat Senate Advantage 25,337

Difference 1,006

Overall Advantage: Republican

To: Dr. R. Beal
From: J. Morgan
Subject: Virginia Legislative Gains.
Date: November 4, 1981

Despite a rather poor showing in northern Virginia, the GOP made substantial gains in the House of Delegates. Several incumbent Republicans lost but the Party posted a net gain of 8 seats. This raises the Republican total from 25 to 33 out of 100. It is the highest total number of Republicans in 100 years.

Republicans scored gains in Virginia Beach, the Richmond area, and in scattered constituencies. Had we not lost 3 incumbents in northern Virginia, the gains would have been even greater. The entire House of Delegates will have to face reelection next year in the congressional election instead of the normal off-off-year.

Only two other Confederate states have witnessed a higher percentage of Republicans in the legislature (Tennessee, Florida). We will never be truly competitive in the South until we can establish a two-party presence in the legislatures.