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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 11/28/2008

File Folder LEBANON-MAY 1981 (2)

FOIA

M2008-098/16

Box Number 90493

STOCKER

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
57005	MEMO	KEMP/TANTER TO ALLEN RE LEBANESE POLITICAL FIGURE (PARTIAL) PAR 5/19/2006 F99-024/1 #82; PAR 7/17/2012 M098/16 #57005	2	5/14/1981	B1
57006	MEMO	SIT ROOM TO ALLEN RE NOON NOTES PAR 5/19/2006 F99-024/1 #83; UPHELD 7/17/2012 M098/16 #57005	1	5/13/1981	B1 B3
57009	CABLE	122206Z MAY 81 D 5/22/2010 F99-024/1 #84; UPHELD 6/2/2010 M08-098/16 #57009	2	5/12/1981	B1 B3
57011	CABLE	162059Z MAY 81 D 5/22/2010 F99-024/1 #85; UPHELD 6/2/2010 M08-098/16 #57011	1	5/16/1981	B1
57014	REPORT	SITUATION REPORT RE LEBANON PAR 5/19/2006 F99-024/1 #89; UPHELD 7/15/2010 M098/16 #57014	2	5/10/1981	B1
57016	REPORT	ARAB-ISRAELI HIGHLIGHTS (PARTIAL) P 11/28/2008 UPHELD M2008-098/16	2	5/22/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Kemp, Geoffrey: Files
 OA # ~~90219~~ 90473
 File Folder: Lebanon – May, 1981 (2 of 2)

Archivist: gcc/bcb
 FOIA ID: F99-024/1
 Date: 6/2/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Tanter to Allen, 2p. R 5/19/06 NLSF99-024/1 #77	5/22/81	P1, F1
2. memo	Feith to Allen, 2p. R " " #78	5/20/81	P1, F1
3. memo	Kemp thru Nance to Allen, 1p. R " " #79	5/15/81	P1, F1
4. memo	Feith thru Nance to Allen, 3p. R " " #80	5/14/81	P1, F1
5. report	re Objectives, 10p. R " " #81	n.d.	P1, F1
6. memo	Kemp/Tanter to Allen, 2p. PART " " #82; Part. 7/17/12 M08-098/16 #57005	5/14/81	P1, F1
7. memo	Situation Room to Allen, 1p. PART " " #83; upheld 7/17/12 M08-098/16 #57006	5/13/81	P1, F1
8. cable	122206Z, 2p. D 5/22/01 NLSF99-024/1 #84, upheld 6/2/2010 M08-098/16 #57009	5/12/81	P1, F1
9. cable	162059Z, 1p. D " " #85, upheld 6/2/2010 M08-098/16 #57011	5/16/81	P1, F1
10. memo	Tanter to Bailey, 1p. R 5/19/06 " " #86	5/27/81	P1, F1
11. report	Same Text as Item # 5, 10p. R " " #87	n.d.	P1, F1
12. report	Situation Report, 2p. R F99-024/1 #88 11/16/01	5/9/81	P1, F1
13. report	Situation Report, 2p. PART 5/19/06 F99-024/1 #89; upheld M08-098/16 #57014	5/10/81	P1, F1
14. memo	Draft – Memo for Record, 2p. R " " #90	5/4/81	P1, F1
15. report	Highlights, 2p. P 12/6/02 F99-024/1 #91 P 11/28/08 M2008-098/16 #57016	5/22/81	P1, F1 B1, B3

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
 F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
 F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
 F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
 F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
 F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
 F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
 F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

MEMORANDUM

2952

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 22, 1981

→ ~~TANTER~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER RT

SUBJECT: Lebanon Working Group

The State Department chaired an informal Working Group meeting on Lebanon, May 17, which I attended. At the meeting we talked about emergency evacuation of Beirut for USG personnel and American citizens, deployment of U.S. Navy and Soviet naval assets in the Eastern MED, a State White Paper on the current crisis, our NSC options paper, programmed movement of military equipment into the area of tension, Israel's need for reconnaissance in Central Lebanon, and its fear of a 1975-like reassessment of US relations with Israel. (S)

The State White Paper was to be distributed to a few of us, but Secretary Haig put a hold on circulation outside of State. If this paper coincides with the dates of the Presidential mission, perhaps we should see it at some point. (S)

The NSC options paper caused a stir for presenting the alternative of issuing an ultimatum to Israel. Some attendees e.g., State's PM and S/P Bureaus, were surprised that this option was being seriously considered in the event the Habib mission fails. Others such as OSD/ISA and JCS representatives expressed considerable support for an ultimatum to Israel to deter military action. (S)

Pentagon staffers also favored moving the INDY out of the area of confrontation and even bringing it back to the US east coast as planned. Again, State's PM and S/P Bureaus took exception. State NEA was inclined to favor the Pentagon interpretations about Soviet naval movements. Under the dubious assumption that the Soviet fleet was merely reacting to the presence of two US carrier battle groups, NEA favored a reduction in the US presence. My own personal view was that

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Review on May 22, 1987

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NLS EQ9-024/1 #77

at CN NARA DATE 5/19/06

the Soviets pursue U.S. vessels when they enter an area as an exercise and then break contact when the exercise is over; as a way of inducing the INDY to withdraw from the MED, the Soviet ships also were inclined to pull back from the area around Lebanon. ~~(S)~~

As the INDY entered the MED, there were shortages of aircraft. NEA expressed some apprehension about the replacement but reluctantly agreed that routine replacement should be continued. ~~(S)~~

Scheduled delivery to Israel of some F-16s has been cleared by Portugal via the Azores. NEA again was fearful of the signal that such planned deliveries would send. S/P, however, made the persuasive argument that normal delivery schedules should be met, especially since the Soviets have not interrupted their routine shipments. NEA suggested that someone pull together all planned deliveries of military equipment so that our principals would be alert to the possibilities that such deliveries could be misinterpreted. ~~(S)~~

There was intense discussion of Israel's intelligence requirements as they involved overflights of Central Lebanon. NEA agreed to do a paper on the prior frequency of and location of overflights as a base line to compare with a possible reduction of such flights. ~~(S)~~

There was a report about Israel's fears of a Pentagon led reassessment of US-Israel relations similar to what Kissinger initiated to pressure the Rabin Government into accepting U.S. terms in the Sinai I negotiations of 1975. Israelis have heard rumors of Pentagon reluctance to favor a 1978-like resupply, in the event of a war about the missiles in Lebanon. ~~(S)~~

LEIS...
2878
Kemp
RT

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

May 20, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DOUGLAS J. FEITH *JD*

SUBJECT: Lebanese Crisis

While it is our policy to deter military confrontation between Israel and Syria, there is a possibility such a confrontation will occur. Although the consequences thereof are generally assumed to be bad for us, there is an alternative point of view. ~~(S)~~

o A decisive military victory by Israel would bring the Syrians and the PLO public sympathy from fellow Arabs as well as some money. But such a defeat could weaken Syrian and PLO influence in the Arab world and diminish their ability to intimidate King Hussein and the West Bank/Gaza Arabs. Arafat's awareness of this is evidenced by his frenetic diplomacy to urge caution on Assad and by his redeployment of PLO forces out of the Bekaa and Southern Lebanon. What is bad for Arafat cannot be too bad for the US. ~~(S)~~

o Though the Saudis may hate to see Israel triumph, they would not mourn Syria's loss of prestige (or that of the PLO). ~~(S)~~

o The USG wants the Saudis' strategic cooperation. It could impress the Saudis if the USG stood behind a Middle Eastern military action that was forceful and successful. US support for Israel in the crisis might displease the Saudis, but we are likelier to win their cooperation by impressing them than by pleasing them. ~~(S)~~

o A demonstration that the Soviets cannot "save" the Syrians or the PLO would harm Moscow, which is why the Soviets urged restraint on Assad when an Israeli strike appeared imminent. The Soviet Union stands to gain most if the Syrians can claim that with Soviet backing they unilaterally enhanced their offensive military capabilities in Lebanon. ~~(S)~~

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Review May 20, 1987

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NLS EC99-0241 778

at CIS NARA, DATE 5/19/01

o Were Assad convinced that his continued intransigence would certainly lead to a major Israeli military strike supported by the USG, he would be much more inclined to bend. (S)

Geoffrey Kemp and Raymond Tanter concur and add: While these observations should not be taken as a "green light" for Israeli military action -- for indeed the short run political costs for the US would be very high -- they represent a point of view that at least deserves a hearing. ~~(S)~~

*I agree, but
hope it does not
come to deployment
this scenario*

#2878

JANET COLSON	<u> </u>		
BUD NANCE	<u> </u>		
DICK ALLEN	<u> </u>		
IRENE DERUS	<u> </u>		
JANET COLSON	<u> </u>		
BUD NANCE	<u> </u>		
KAY	<u> </u>		
CY TO VP	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO MEESE	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO BAKER	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO DEEVER	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO BRADY	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>

 22/1048

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 26/0857

 26/0941

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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May 15, 1981

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af
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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: ADMIRAL NANCE

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*

SUBJECT: Douglas Feith's Addendum to Lebanon Crisis Paper

I think it would be useful for you to have in the Lebanon contingency files the attached memorandum by Doug Feith on some of the considerations regarding the oil weapon in the event of an escalation of the crisis in Lebanon. Doug has prepared a very thoughtful and provocative paper which deserves careful study. Norm Bailey has read it and approves of the line of reasoning.

Attachment

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Review on May 15, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FA99-024/ #79
BY CU NARA, DATE 5/19/06

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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May 14, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: ADMIRAL NANCE

FROM: DOUGLAS FEITH

SUBJECT: Addendum to Lebanon Crisis Paper

CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING "THE OIL WEAPON" AND AN ESCALATION OF
THE CRISIS IN LEBANON

The term "oil weapon" encompasses two types of threats: (1) a punitive production cut (as opposed to a cut compelled by economic circumstances like the current glut) and (2) a selective embargo.

I. Punitive Production Cut

The likelihood is very small that the Saudis would cut their oil production as a sign of displeasure over U.S. support of Israel. This is true even if major hostilities break out between Israel and Syria in the Lebanese crisis. Note that Libya, despite mighty provocation by USG (which just expelled Libya's diplomats), has not rushed to "punish" US by foregoing oil revenues. Oil states realize that power lies in taking in lots of revenue, which can be spent to advance one's causes, not in foregoing revenue.

For a punitive production cut to hurt the industrialized nations, it would have to amount to at least three million barrels a day. (As in the past, other oil exporters can be counted on to increase their production to the maximum to grab any markets slighted by the Saudis.) Note that during the 1973-74 Arab "embargo," Iraq took advantage of the Saudis' production cuts to increase Iraq's market share.

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Review on May 14, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-024 #80CU NADA DATE 5/19/06

By conservative estimation, the Saudis would, as a result of a 3 million barrel a day cut, lose \$70-90 million a day in current revenues on the reasonable assumption that oil prices would not rise more than 12%. To put this in perspective: Saudi aid to the PLO totals around \$70 million a year and Saudi aid to Syria is less than \$500 million a year.

Other economic consequences to Saudi Arabia of a punitive production cut would be: (a) Harm to foreign investments. (b) Loss of value of Saudi foreign currency reserves. (c) Disruption of domestic development plans. (d) Increase in the cost of goods the Saudis import. (e) Harm to the value of Saudi oil in the ground resulting from enhanced incentives for the development of non-Saudi sources of oil and non-oil sources of energy. This last item is of deep concern to the Saudi government, as evinced dramatically by Sheikh Yamani's recent major address at the University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. (Yamani warned of a "violent shake-up" if Saudi Arabia does not diversify its economy before demand for Saudi oil dwindles substantially.)

Political consequences of a punitive production cut would include risk of strife between Saudi dynastic and tribal factions, some of whom will favor, and some undoubtedly oppose, the political decision to forego so much current revenue.

Furthermore, the Saudis appreciate that the likelihood of the USG's granting the Saudis' demands once their threat has been executed is virtually nil. Recall how Washington behaved in 1973-'74 once the Arab "embargo" was announced: Saudi political demands were not satisfied before the "embargo" was lifted. Indeed, once it became clear that the December 1973 price increases would stick, the Saudis raised their production each month throughout the first quarter of 1974, despite their threat to cut production each month until Israel withdrew from "occupied territories," and despite the fact that Arab sanctions remained in effect officially until March 1974.

In short, the costs to the Saudis of executing such a threat are certainly high. The benefits are unknown and unlikely to be attained in any event. And the Saudis have never actually executed a punitive production cut before, not even in 1973. (The 1973 production cut was justified amply by business and technical considerations.)

II. Embargo

The simple threat of embargo has no teeth. As the 1973-74 Arab embargo illustrated, no producer (or set of producers) can impose a supply shortfall on a single importing nation. (Remember

also how easily world oil markets adjusted to Iran's 1979-80 oil embargo against the United States.) Moreover, sharing schemes devised by industrialized nations through the International Energy Agency afford participants extra production against embargo threats. To hurt an importing nation, a producer must do more than declare an embargo: it must cut its own production, which, as discussed above, it is altogether unlikely to do.

Additional Comment Regarding Gasoline Lines

The gasoline lines in 1973-74 and 1979 arose from a variety of circumstances including oil prices controls, a bizarre government petroleum allocation scheme, and panic by industry and consumers encouraged by hysterical (and erroneous) warnings about severe oil supply reductions. The gasoline lines, as innumerable economists have noted, did not result from a substantial diminution in the amount of oil the United States imported during the embargo periods; no such diminution ever occurred. No gasoline lines developed in the wake of the Iran-Iraq fighting, which began in September 1980, even though that fighting substantially reduced world oil supplies for a time. This was so, in large part, because inventories in the fall of 1980 were high and no panic occurred. Such inventories are still very high.

Conclusion

USG's policy in the Lebanese crisis should not be constrained by excessive fear of the oil weapon.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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May 13, 1981

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By Greg Curran NARA, Date 5/19/00

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: ADMIRAL NANCE

FROM: GEOFF KEMP *8/14*
BOB SCHWEITZER *AB with pleasure*
RAY TANTER *RT*
CHRIS SHOEMAKER *CS*
DOUG FEITH *DF*

SUBJECT: Lebanon Crisis

An options paper on the Lebanon crisis is at Tab A in accordance with Admiral Nance's memorandum request of May 11, 1981.

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Rvw. on May 13, 1987

SUBJECT: USG Options in Lebanon Crisis

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 199-024/1, #81

U.S. Objectives

by CI NARA, DATE 5/19/06

Short Term

- To prevent outbreak of fighting between Israel and Syria;
- In the event of hostilities, to limit the scope and duration of fighting.

Mid Term

- To insulate the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty and ongoing Sinai negotiations from the effects of the Lebanese crisis;
- To retain the confidence of moderate Arab states and preserve our ability to pursue the Administration's Southwest Asian security strategy;
- To retain Israel's confidence in our support for its fundamental security;
- To deny the Soviets political benefits and focus blame for the failure of diplomatic efforts on the Soviets.
- If fighting begins, to bring it to an early halt in ways that reinforce the unique position of the U.S. to resolve regional problems.
- To strengthen the Government of Lebanon's hand throughout the country.

Note: The options listed below are not mutually exclusive.

DIPLOMATIC CONTINGENCIES

- I. HABIB MISSION SUCCEEDS: No immediate action necessary.
- II. HABIB MISSION AT IMPASSE: HOSTILITIES APPEAR IMMINENT

U.S. Options

- A. Dispatch Habib to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait to state on behalf of the President the U.S. position and demonstrate the extraordinary steps we have taken to avoid a conflict.

1. Pros:

- Gratifies moderate Arab states.
- May insulate USG's Southwest Asian security strategy from ill effects of Lebanese crisis.

2. Cons:

- Expanding Habib's itinerary would drag out a failed Presidential diplomatic initiative.
- May increase chances that moderate Arab states will link Lebanese crisis with USG's Southwest Asian security strategy.

B. Instruct Habib to issue ultimatum to Israel not to use force. Inform Israel that USG reaffirms its commitment to security of Israel but will not support in any way Israel's use of force in Lebanon or Syria.

Specific actions under this option include:

- Announcement that USG will not replace the equipment the Israelis lose in Lebanon.
- Announcement that USG will not increase its level of security assistance to compensate for the Israeli expenditures in Lebanon.
- Announcement that USG will not support Israeli efforts in the United Nations to engage a peace-keeping force in the Bekka until Israel has withdrawn from Lebanon.
- Abstention in the inevitable UN Security Council vote condemning Israel.

1. Pros:

- Such an ultimatum to Israel could:
- Demonstrate to key Arab states that US is distancing itself from Israel.
 - Strengthen our case for restrictions on end-uses of US weapons.

-- Repudiate Soviet propaganda.

-- Reduce chances that Israel will use military force: an ultimatum from the USG to Israel may be the most likely of the alternatives that would avert a clash between Israel and Syria.

2. Cons:

-- Could be portrayed as lack of US support for close friend (Israel).

-- Fail to assuage Arab outrage if Israel should use U.S. arms in Lebanon in face of an American ultimatum.

-- Embarrass the President when Israel decided to take military action anyway. If Israel abides by the ultimatum and the Syrian SAMs remain in place, the ultimatum changes the regional military balance in Lebanon in favor of Syria.

-- Weaken independence of Lebanese Government.

-- Create domestic reaction against the Administration from the Israel lobby.

C. Instruct Habib to tell Begin that while we will publicly oppose any Israeli use of force, we will tailor our private actions dependent upon level of force Israel uses.

1. Pros:

-- Public opposition and private assurance provide a green light for air strikes with limits we can specify, e.g., total opposition to Israeli ground operations.

-- Public opposition and private assurance allow USG to avoid having to choose between Israel and the Arab states lined up with Syria.

2. Cons

-- The option is dishonest.

-- The gap between the public and private view of the USG could be exploited by Israel in the form of leaks to the press.

-- If Israel violates U.S. restrictions, administering the "punishment" (i.e., imposing sanctions on Israel) may damage US strategic goals in the region.

D. Remain neutral in crisis. Urge restraint on all sides. No private warnings to either side.

1. Pros:

Such a neutral stand could:

- Demonstrate to Arabs US disapproval of Israel's policies.
- Afford Israel relative freedom of action.
- Keep US options open.

2. Cons:

- Antagonize Israelis who see themselves entitled to affirmative US support in the crisis.
- Antagonize Arabs who view US aloofness as tacit consent to Israeli military action.

E. Issue ultimatum to Syria to return to status quo ante

of April 1981. Inform Syrians that US recognizes Israel's claim to the right to secure its borders, which are threatened unacceptably by the recent Syrian moves to change the status quo in Lebanon.

Specific actions we would take include:

- Explanation of abandonment of the Habib mission as a result of Syrian intransigence.
- Prepositioning and preparation of US equipment to replace Israeli losses.
- Movement of two US carrier battle groups and a Sixth Fleet Marine Amphibious Unit to the western coast of Lebanon.
- Beginning of efforts in European capitals to line up Western support for Israeli action.

-- Issuance of stiff warnings to the Soviet Union as to the unacceptability of Soviet intervention.

1. Pros:

Such as ultimatum to Syria could:

- Reduce military threat to Israel represented by Syrian missiles and troops in Lebanon.
- Diminish Syrian/Soviet influence in Lebanon.
- Demonstrate USG's fidelity to its friends.
- Ensure continued influence of the pro-Western Christian militia in Lebanon.
- Communicate to Soviet Union USG's commitment to maintain regional power balance.

2. Cons:

Such an ultimatum to Syria could:

- Allow Syria to rally Arab support.
- Lead to a costly Israeli military operation (a la Israel's 1978 Litani incursion) in which Israel could become bogged down.
- Lead to a broader Middle East war.
- Increase chances Israel will not withdraw from Sinai in accordance with Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
- Increase risk of escalation in region and elsewhere, since Soviets may not acquiesce.
- Divide NATO.

F. Evacuation of US Embassy personnel and other US citizens from Beirut.

1. Pro:

Enhance safety of Americans.

2. Con:

May be taken as signal for war and lack of confidence in Lebanese Government.

MILITARY CONTINGENCIES

Once fighting begins, US actions will be constrained by prior American diplomacy. Current choices will be limited by prior decisions. For example, if a US ultimatum were issued to Syria in the pre-fighting stage, the USG could hardly oppose limited military actions by Israel.

I. LIMITED CONFRONTATION: Israel launches air and ground strikes in Lebanon but makes no moves on the Golan against Syrian forces.

Under this situation, the primary US objectives should focus on a rapid termination of the fighting and on minimization of Soviet propaganda gains and a loss of American status in the Arab world.

Option A US tries to constrain Israeli military moves.

Specific actions which the US could take in this regard include:

Refusal to resupply Israel until Israelis agree to terminate hostilities.

Diplomatic dissociation with Israeli action in the UN and on a bilateral basis.

Public opposition to the Israeli invasion while maintaining commitment to the security of the recognized Israeli state.

Stiff warnings to the Soviet Union not to involve itself in the fighting.

1. Pros:

-- Could stop the fighting before it has a chance to expand.

-- Would demonstrate US commitment to even-handed approach.

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2. Cons:

-- If successful, may result in Israel not achieving its military objectives while still incurring political costs.

-- Soviets would derive prestige among the Arab states from having backed a successful Syrian push.

-- Could call into question US commitment to Israel's security.

-- Could waste US political capital since Israel may not acquiesce to US demands.

Option B No US attempt to constrain Israel's military moves.

Under this option we would:

Not attempt to threaten Israel into accepting an early cease-fire.

Allow Israel to achieve its limited military objectives in the Bekka Valley and in southern Lebanon.

Publicly proclaim US opposition to use of force in Lebanon.

Objectively present arguments of both sides, stressing Israel's perceived legitimate security requirements.

Begin a vigorous lobbying effort with moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Urge movement toward a general political solution which would strengthen Lebanese government.

Present the conflict as a regional fight and issue a stiff warning to the Soviet Union not to involve itself in the conflict.

Be prepared to move limited quantities of ammunition and major end items to Israelis to replace battle losses after the conflict is over.

Expand Israel's line of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits accordingly.

Veto UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel.

1. Pros:

-- Would probably allow Israel to achieve its military objectives and would reduce Syrian influence in Lebanon.

-- Would demonstrate Soviet inability to protect its client in Lebanon.

-- Would protect pro-Western orientation of Lebanese government and strengthen the Maronite militias.

-- Would demonstrate US commitment to Israel's security.

2. Cons:

-- Increases chances for expanded war.

-- Would be seen by Arab states as US collusion with Israel in Israeli aggression.

-- Would isolate the US in world, regional and NATO opinion.

-- Could lead to oil threats by Arab nations.

-- Could help Begin's re-election chances.

II. EXPANDED HOSTILITIES

The war expands to a major Israel-Syria conflict on the Golan Heights (into Syria proper).

Option A US opposes Israeli attacks into Syria. Under this option the US would:

Demand publicly and privately a halt in Israeli land attacks in Syria and an immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the 1973 disengagement line.

Declare an immediate embargo on military resupply to Israel until Israeli forces withdraw from the 1973 disengagement line.

Condemn Israeli attacks into Syria in international arenas.

Abstain in the UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel.

Issue a stiff note to the Soviet Union demanding that it not involve itself in the fighting.

Publicly reduce US security assistance to Israel by the amount that it is estimated Israel expends in attacking Syria.

Draw a clear diplomatic distinction between Israeli actions in Lebanon and Israeli attacks on Syria.

1. Pros:

- Would probably limit scope of the war and bring about Israel's withdrawal from Syria.
- Would demonstrate the limits of US support for Israel's action.
- Could help mitigate damage to US-Arab relations.
- Would be consistent with US opposition in principle to Soviet invasions of Afghanistan and Poland.

2. Cons:

- Could result in uncertain military outcome with the renewal of conflict likely in the future.
- Could be ignored at least initially by Israel and thereby demonstrate US impotence in controlling Israel's actions.
- Could be seen as dishonest and/or ineffective by Arab states.
- An oil embargo would probably result anyway.
- Could be parlayed by the Soviet Union into a propaganda and diplomatic victory as occurred in 1956.

Option B US does not restrain Israel's action against Syria proper. Under this option the US would:

Urge restraint on all belligerents but actively support Israel militarily.

Begin an immediate air and sea lift to Israel in response to inevitable Soviet resupply of Syria.

Move carrier battle groups to the Syrian coast.

Issue an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding that it not involve its military forces.

Dispatch immediately highest level emissaries to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to urge patience and moderation in their response.

Increase US real-time intelligence collection in the region in order to discern Soviet, Iraqi or Jordanian moves of forces.

Veto the UN resolutions condemning Israel.

1. Pros:

-- Would probably result in a substantial Israeli victory, undermining Syrian and PLO military strength for years to come.

-- Would demonstrate limits of Soviet support and the emptiness of Soviet rhetoric because the Soviets would probably not be willing to challenge the US in Syria.

-- Would enhance Israel's geographic security over the long term.

-- Would demonstrate the depth of US support for Israel.

2. Cons:

-- Could result in an oil embargo.

-- Could halt the peace process.

-- Could result in Egypt's abrogation of the peace treaty.

-- Could result in unified Arab world rallying around Syrian cause.

-- Could result in Omani and Somali abrogation of access agreements.

-- Would greatly damage US diplomatic position in the region.

MEMORANDUM

Kemp file

TOP SECRET

2817

CF 57005

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD~~

May 14, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *JK*
RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Roger Edde, Lebanese Political Figure

1352-2
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)(6)

At Tab A is a copy of your annotated version 

What you should know is that Roger Edde met with Geoff Kemp on Thursday, May 7 at 2:00. He was accompanied by Simon Serfaty of SAIS. Geoff had been approached on the telephone and by letter by Robert Tucker of SAIS to see Edde. We gather that Edde is a close friend of Tucker's (see letter at Tab B).

At the meeting on Thursday, May 7, Edde gave a presentation with a briefing book on his interpretation of the situation in Lebanon and Ray Tanter attended part of that and retained the manuscript. We did very little talking and certainly had no discussions with him about the partition of the country. Our feeling is that this is just the sort of misinformed gossip which the Iraqis are more than eager to exploit. Incidentally, they state in their cable that he was the son of Raymond Edde when in fact he is the nephew.

A concept paper was written at the CIA as a preliminary to a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Lebanon. Secretary Haig requested a SNIE on Lebanon, and it should be on the street next Friday, the 22nd. The concept paper does mention partition when it poses the following questions:

How likely is a move toward complete partition?

What would be the disposition of the larger ethnic and religious groupings in a partitioned state?

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD~~

Review on May 13, 2011
Classified by Multiple Sources

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR *MD8-098/16 #57005*
BY *RW* NARA DATE *7/17/07*

How would Israel, Syria and the Palestinians react to serious efforts by one or several groups to formalize partition?

Are there arrangements short of formal partition that would place a cap on the current violence?

[REDACTED]

We told the analyst that to our knowledge the NSC had not commissioned a study on the partition of Lebanon. Jim Lilley and Norm Bailey are also unaware of any NSC study on the partition of Lebanon.

Attachments

- Tab A - Annotated [REDACTED]
- Tab B - Tucker's letter

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

May 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Noon Notes

Where did you get this? This is crazy stuff it needs

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Damascus-Amman Air Corridor Closed: Embassy Amman has learned that Syrian airspace along the corridor from Damascus to Amman has been closed and flights have been rerouted. The Jordanian government views this Syrian move as a form of harassment. The embassy feels the principal objective is probably to keep civilian aircraft well away from military installations. (C)

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F99-024/1 #83
By CH, NARA, Date 5/19/06

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 8 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 9 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

May 7



THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21218

DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE

A handwritten signature, likely of Robert W. Tucker, is written in ink.

April 29, 1981

Mr. Geoffrey Kemp
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Jeff:

A note to remind you of the appointment with Roger Edde at 2 p.m. on Thursday, May 7.

As I told you over the phone, I will be in Greece that week, else I would love to come. However, Edde will be attended by Simon Serfaty whom you know.

I appreciate your seeing Edde. You will find him very interesting and perhaps even useful!

Warm regards,

A handwritten signature that reads 'Bob' with a diagonal slash through it.

Robert W. Tucker

#2817

JANET COLSON

Jan 19/8910

BUD NANCE

Jan 12/1016

DICK ALLEN

WA 2-1-49

IRENE DERUS

igd 27/1430

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

Ch

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEAVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC



DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21218

May 7

April 29, 1981

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National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

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I appreciate your seeing Edde. You will find him very interesting and perhaps even useful!

Warm regards,

Bob

Robert W. Tucker

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CORRESPONDENCE REFERRAL

Liberal
2395
Transfer:

May 19, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR LESLIE SORG

FROM: ALLEN J. LENZ *LS*

The NSC staff has reviewed and approved the attached draft reply:

✓ as is.

 as amended.

RT Staff initial

Attachments: Incoming and draft reply.

Dear Mr. Boohaker:

The President has asked me to respond to your letter and petition to him of April 24 expressing concern over the situation in Lebanon and urging that the United States do all in its power to end the violence.

The continuing eruption of heavy violence in Lebanon--which has killed and injured many innocent people--is deeply troubling to us. Our concerns are made even sharper by our long-standing, close historic ties to Lebanon and to the people of Lebanon. We have made major and vigorous efforts through appropriate direct and indirect channels--with all governments and with all quarters having influence over the situation--to bring the fighting and violence to an end as soon as possible. Our efforts will continue. These are consistent with all our major efforts since 1975 to end the violence throughout Lebanon and to help create conditions so that all of Lebanon's communities can live in security and find social and economic opportunity.

The United States is strongly committed to assisting Lebanon in the achievement of its basic national goals, and will continue firmly to support the institutions of the Lebanese government. The United States will, as well, continue to work to assure Lebanon's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and lasting independence.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH A. BOOHAKER, P.C.

Certified Public Accountant

SUITE 106 2937 SOUTH 7TH AVENUE - BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35233 - TELEPHONE (205) 322-4003

8114102

MEMBER
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
ALABAMA SOCIETY OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

April 24, 1981

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


Your speedy and complete recovery is the prayer of all⁴ Lebanese Americans and, indeed, all freedom-loving peoples.

Mr. Bill Harris, Chairman of the Republican Party of Alabama, arranged for me to meet Mr. James Baker who I hope will deliver this plea and its enclosures to you, personally. Mr. Harris knows how hard my family and I worked in our county for your election. We wanted a change and got it, thank God. 78% of all Lebanese Americans who voted in the U. S. presidential election cast their votes for you, according to a survey conducted by the American Lebanese League.

We are impressed that a high priority of yours is to stop terrorism both at home and abroad. Terrorism must be stopped NOW, at its primary source—the PLO training camps in Lebanon. The Lebanese almost achieved this singlehandedly for the world community. Then, the Syrian communists rushed to rescue the terrorists —under the pretense of a "peacekeeping force". Our Country must enforce its many and frequent condemnations of the barbarous Syrian and PLO terrorists with substantial ACTION NOW to retain whatever trust, respect and credibility it still has among the friendly nations, as well as among its adversaries. Withholding the sale of grain to the Soviets, withholding the sale of offensive weaponry to Saudi Arabia, cancelling all aid to Syria and strengthening the Lebanese Army would EVENTUALLY weaken the Syrian and the PLO terrorists. But to stop the torture and slaughter of the Lebanese people NOW, we urge you to turn the Israelis loose on the terrorists for just a day or two. We are convinced the security and commercial interests of our Country are so vital in that area that we should even intervene militarily to remove the cancerous non-Lebanese from within Lebanon's borders.

Mr. President, the free world is looking to YOU for the implementation of the answers. Please save Lebanon NOW before it becomes listed among the many conquests of the communists.

Sincerely,


Joseph A. Boohaker, CPA
Member, American Lebanese League



S/S 8114102

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President on Lebanon

Attached is a suggested draft response to a letter on Lebanon from Mr. Joseph A. Bohaker to President Reagan. The draft text is that used in our response to similar letters on Lebanon from members of Congress.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Draft response

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Tanter
3077
af

May 28, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NAB*

SUBJECT: Your Indication that You Would Be Amenable to Meeting with Raymond Edde of Lebanon

In my weekly report of May 22, I indicated that I had had a meeting with Roger Edde of Lebanon, nephew of Raymond Edde, candidate for next President, and that Roger had indicated that Raymond would like a meeting with you. This was not a recommendation. I was simply informing you of the fact that Mr. Edde would like to meet with you. You indicated marginally that you were favorable to this idea. I then checked with Ray Tanter who, as you will see from the attached (Tab I), is opposed to it. If you still wish to have a meeting with Mr. Edde, I will pass that information on. If not, I will do nothing further.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you indicate whether you wish to meet with Raymond Edde.

 I wish to meet with Raymond Edde

 ✓ I do not wish to meet with Raymond Edde

I guess there's an angle — best not to step into a bog. —

cc: Geoffrey Kemp
Ray Tanter

Tab I Memo from Ray Tanter

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN BAILEY

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER RT
SUBJECT: Raymond Edde of Lebanon

In reference to your Weekly Report of May 22, 1981,
I recommend against RVA meeting with Raymond Edde.

Geoff Kemp concurs.

We greatly appreciate your keeping us informed on
contacts with Lebanese political figures.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on May 27, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F99-024/1 #86
CW NARA DATE 5/19/06

#3077

JANET COLSON

Jan 29 / 1141

BUD NANCE

Jan 29 / 1600

DICK ALLEN

Nov 30 / 1547

IRENE DERUS

Jan 30 / 1653

JANET COLSON

Jan 1 / 0930

BUD NANCE

Jan

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

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CY TO DEAVER

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CY TO BRADY

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 13, 1981

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By Greg Lewis NARA, Date 5/10/00

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: ADMIRAL NANCE

FROM GEOFF KEMP *GK*
BOB SCHWEITZER *NS with pleasure*
RAY TANTER *RT*
CHRIS SHOEMAKER *CS*
DOUG FEITH *DF*

SUBJECT: Lebanon Crisis

An options paper on the Lebanon crisis is at Tab A in accordance with Admiral Nance's memorandum request of May 11, 1981.

SECRET

Rvw. on May 13, 1987

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: USG Options in Lebanon Crisis

U.S. Objectives

Short Term

- To prevent outbreak of fighting between Israel and Syria;
- In the event of hostilities, to limit the scope and duration of fighting.

Mid Term

- To insulate the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty and ongoing Sinai negotiations from the effects of the Lebanese crisis;
- To retain the confidence of moderate Arab states and preserve our ability to pursue the Administration's Southwest Asian security strategy;
- To retain Israel's confidence in our support for its fundamental security;
- To deny the Soviets political benefits and focus blame for the failure of diplomatic efforts on the Soviets.
- If fighting begins, to bring it to an early halt in ways that reinforce the unique position of the U.S. to resolve regional problems.
- To strengthen the Government of Lebanon's hand throughout the country.

Note: The options listed below are not mutually exclusive.

DIPLOMATIC CONTINGENCIES

- I. HABIB MISSION SUCCEEDS: No immediate action necessary.
- II. HABIB MISSION AT IMPASSE: HOSTILITIES APPEAR IMMINENT

U.S. Options

- A. Dispatch Habib to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait
to state on behalf of the President the U.S. position
and demonstrate the extraordinary steps we have taken
to avoid a conflict.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-0246 #87

NARA, DATE 5/19/06

~~SECRET~~

1. Pros:

- Gratifies moderate Arab states.
- May insulate USG's Southwest Asian security strategy from ill effects of Lebanese crisis.

2. Cons:

- Expanding Habib's itinerary would drag out a failed Presidential diplomatic initiative.
- May increase chances that moderate Arab states will link Lebanese crisis with USG's Southwest Asian security strategy.

B. Instruct Habib to issue ultimatum to Israel not to use force. Inform Israel that USG reaffirms its commitment to security of Israel but will not support in any way Israel's use of force in Lebanon or Syria.

Specific actions under this option include:

- Announcement that USG will not replace the equipment the Israelis lose in Lebanon.
- Announcement that USG will not increase its level of security assistance to compensate for the Israeli expenditures in Lebanon.
- Announcement that USG will not support Israeli efforts in the United Nations to engage a peace-keeping force in the Bekka until Israel has withdrawn from Lebanon.
- Abstention in the inevitable UN Security Council vote condemning Israel.

1. Pros:

Such an ultimatum to Israel could:

- Demonstrate to key Arab states that US is distancing itself from Israel.
- Strengthen our case for restrictions on end-uses of US weapons.

-- Repudiate Soviet propaganda.

-- Reduce chances that Israel will use military force; an ultimatum from the USG to Israel may be the most likely of the alternatives that would avert a clash between Israel and Syria.

2. Cons:

-- Could be portrayed as lack of US support for close friend (Israel).

-- Fail to assuage Arab outrage if Israel should use U.S. arms in Lebanon in face of an American ultimatum.

-- Embarrass the President when Israel decided to take military action anyway. If Israel abides by the ultimatum and the Syrian SAMs remain in place, the ultimatum changes the regional military balance in Lebanon in favor of Syria.

-- Weaken independence of Lebanese Government.

-- Create domestic reaction against the Administration from the Israel lobby.

C. Instruct Habib to tell Begin that while we will publicly oppose any Israeli use of force, we will tailor our private actions dependent upon level of force Israel uses.

1. Pros:

-- Public opposition and private assurance provide a green light for air strikes with limits we can specify, e.g., total opposition to Israeli ground operations.

-- Public opposition and private assurance allow USG to avoid having to choose between Israel and the Arab states lined up with Syria.

2. Cons

-- The option is dishonest.

-- The gap between the public and private view of the USG could be exploited by Israel in the form of leaks to the press.

-- If Israel violates U.S. restrictions, administering the "punishment" (i.e., imposing sanctions on Israel) may damage US strategic goals in the region.

D. Remain neutral in crisis. Urge restraint on all sides. No private warnings to either side.

1. Pros:

Such a neutral stand could:

-- Demonstrate to Arabs US disapproval of Israel's policies.

-- Afford Israel relative freedom of action.

-- Keep US options open.

2. Cons:

-- Antagonize Israelis who see themselves entitled to affirmative US support in the crisis.

-- Antagonize Arabs who view US aloofness as tacit consent to Israeli military action.

E. Issue ultimatum to Syria to return to status quo ante

of April 1981. Inform Syrians that US recognizes Israel's claim to the right to secure its borders, which are threatened unacceptably by the recent Syrian moves to change the status quo in Lebanon.

Specific actions we would take include:

-- Explanation of abandonment of the Habib mission as a result of Syrian intransigence.

-- Prepositioning and preparation of US equipment to replace Israeli losses.

-- Movement of two US carrier battle groups and a Sixth Fleet Marine Amphibious Unit to the western coast of Lebanon.

-- Beginning of efforts in European capitals to line up Western support for Israeli action.

-- Issuance of stiff warnings to the Soviet Union as to the unacceptability of Soviet intervention.

1. Pros:

Such as ultimatum to Syria could:

- Reduce military threat to Israel represented by Syrian missiles and troops in Lebanon.
- Diminish Syrian/Soviet influence in Lebanon.
- Demonstrate USG's fidelity to its friends.
- Ensure continued influence of the pro-Western Christian militia in Lebanon.
- Communicate to Soviet Union USG's commitment to maintain regional power balance.

2. Cons:

Such an ultimatum to Syria could:

- Allow Syria to rally Arab support.
- Lead to a costly Israeli military operation (a la Israel's 1978 Litani incursion) in which Israel could become bogged down.
- Lead to a broader Middle East war.
- Increase chances Israel will not withdraw from Sinai in accordance with Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
- Increase risk of escalation in region and elsewhere, since Soviets may not acquiesce.
- Divide NATO.

F. Evacuation of US Embassy personnel and other US citizens from Beirut.

1. Pro:

Enhance safety of Americans.

2. Con:

May be taken as signal for war and lack of confidence in Lebanese Government.

MILITARY CONTINGENCIES

Once fighting begins, US actions will be constrained by prior American diplomacy. Current choices will be limited by prior decisions. For example, if a US ultimatum were issued to Syria in the pre-fighting stage, the USG could hardly oppose limited military actions by Israel.

I. LIMITED CONFRONTATION: Israel launches air and ground strikes in Lebanon but makes no moves on the Golan against Syrian forces.

Under this situation, the primary US objectives should focus on a rapid termination of the fighting and on minimization of Soviet propaganda gains and a loss of American status in the Arab world.

Option A US tries to constrain Israeli military moves.

Specific actions which the US could take in this regard include:

Refusal to resupply Israel until Israelis agree to terminate hostilities.

Diplomatic dissociation with Israeli action in the UN and on a bilateral basis.

Public opposition to the Israeli invasion while maintaining commitment to the security of the recognized Israeli state.

Stiff warnings to the Soviet Union not to involve itself in the fighting.

1. Pros:

-- Could stop the fighting before it has a chance to expand.

-- Would demonstrate US commitment to even-handed approach.

2. Cons:

- If successful, may result in Israel not achieving its military objectives while still incurring political costs.
- Soviets would derive prestige among the Arab states from having backed a successful Syrian push.
- Could call into question US commitment to Israel's security.
- Could waste US political capital since Israel may not acquiesce to US demands.

Option B No US attempt to constrain Israel's military moves.

Under this option we would:

Not attempt to threaten Israel into accepting an early cease-fire.

Allow Israel to achieve its limited military objectives in the Bekka Valley and in southern Lebanon.

Publicly proclaim US opposition to use of force in Lebanon.

Objectively present arguments of both sides, stressing Israel's perceived legitimate security requirements.

Begin a vigorous lobbying effort with moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Urge movement toward a general political solution which would strengthen Lebanese government.

Present the conflict as a regional fight and issue a stiff warning to the Soviet Union not to involve itself in the conflict.

Be prepared to move limited quantities of ammunition and major end items to Israelis to replace battle losses after the conflict is over.

Expand Israel's line of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits accordingly.

Veto UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel.

1. Pros:

-- Would probably allow Israel to achieve its military objectives and would reduce Syrian influence in Lebanon.

-- Would demonstrate Soviet inability to protect its client in Lebanon.

-- Would protect pro-Western orientation of Lebanese government and strengthen the Maronite militias.

-- Would demonstrate US commitment to Israel's security.

2. Cons:

-- Increases chances for expanded war.

-- Would be seen by Arab states as US collusion with Israel in Israeli aggression.

-- Would isolate the US in world, regional and NATO opinion.

-- Could lead to oil threats by Arab nations.

-- Could help Begin's re-election chances.

II. EXPANDED HOSTILITIES

The war expands to a major Israel-Syria conflict on the Golan Heights (into Syria proper).

Option A US opposes Israeli attacks into Syria. Under this option the US would:

Demand publicly and privately a halt in Israeli land attacks in Syria and an immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the 1973 disengagement line.

Declare an immediate embargo on military resupply to Israel until Israeli forces withdraw from the 1973 disengagement line.

Condemn Israeli attacks into Syria in international arenas.

Abstain in the UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel.

Issue a stiff note to the Soviet Union demanding that it not involve itself in the fighting.

Publicly reduce US security assistance to Israel by the amount that it is estimated Israel expends in attacking Syria.

Draw a clear diplomatic distinction between Israeli actions in Lebanon and Israeli attacks on Syria.

1. Pros:

-- Would probably limit scope of the war and bring about Israel's withdrawal from Syria.

-- Would demonstrate the limits of US support for Israel's action.

-- Could help mitigate damage to US-Arab relations.

-- Would be consistent with US opposition in principle to Soviet invasions of Afghanistan and Poland.

2. Cons:

-- Could result in uncertain military outcome with the renewal of conflict likely in the future.

-- Could be ignored at least initially by Israel and thereby demonstrate US impotence in controlling Israel's actions.

-- Could be seen as dishonest and/or ineffective by Arab states.

-- An oil embargo would probably result anyway.

-- Could be parlayed by the Soviet Union into a propaganda and diplomatic victory as occurred in 1956.

Option B US does not restrain Israel's action against Syria proper. Under this option the US would:

Urge restraint on all belligerents but actively support Israel militarily.

Begin an immediate air and sea lift to Israel in response to inevitable Soviet resupply of Syria.

Move carrier battle groups to the Syrian coast.

Issue an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding that it not involve its military forces.

Dispatch immediately highest level emissaries to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to urge patience and moderation in their response.

Increase US real-time intelligence collection in the region in order to discern Soviet, Iraqi or Jordanian moves of forces.

Veto the UN resolutions condemning Israel.

1. Pros:

-- Would probably result in a substantial Israeli victory, undermining Syrian and PLO military strength for years to come.

-- Would demonstrate limits of Soviet support and the emptiness of Soviet rhetoric because the Soviets would probably not be willing to challenge the US in Syria.

-- Would enhance Israel's geographic security over the long term.

-- Would demonstrate the depth of US support for Israel.

2. Cons:

-- Could result in an oil embargo.

-- Could halt the peace process.

-- Could result in Egypt's abrogation of the peace treaty.

-- Could result in unified Arab world rallying around Syrian cause.

-- Could result in Omani and Somali abrogation of access agreements.

-- Would greatly damage US diplomatic position in the region.

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

LEBANON WORKING GROUP

Situation Report No. 22

Situation in Lebanon as of 1700 Hours EDT May 9, 1981

1. Habib Mission. In two days in Beirut, Ambassador Habib held an extensive series of meetings:

Friday Morning, May 8th:

- President Ilyas Sarkis
- Prime Minister Shafiq Al-Wazzan
- National Assembly President Kamal Al-Assad

Friday Afternoon, May 8th:

- Phalange Party Leaders (And GOL Deputies) Pierre and Amin Gemayel
- Lebanese Front President (And NLP Leader) Camille Chamoun
- Sunni Islamic Grouping Members and Former Prime Ministers Saeb Salam and Taqi-Ad-Din Al-Sulh and Islamic Grouping Member Nassib Barbir
- Rightist Lebanese Forces Commander Bashir Gemayel

Saturday Morning, May 9th:

- The Zahle Ministers (Defense Minister Joseph Skaff, Public Works and Transportation Minister Ilyas Hizawi
- National Movement Head (And PSP Leader) Walid Jumblatt, Accompanied by National Movement Executive Committee Member Albert Mandout
- A Delegation from the Shi' A Front For The Preservation of the South, comprised of former Minister Muhammad Safi-Ad-Din, Deputies Rafic Chahine and Abdul Latif Al-Zein From Nabatiyah, and Deputy Husayn Al-Husayni from Ba'Labakk.

While they generally welcomed U.S. efforts to reduce the threat of renewed and expanded conflicts, each of the interlocutors had a somewhat different view of what should/could be done to accomplish the objective. Given

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

(RDS-4 5/9/81 --- Edward L. Peck)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F99-024/1 #885

BY CAJ NARA, DATE 11/16/01

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

- 2 -

the diversity of the participants, press reports of the conversations may vary considerably.

Ambassador Habib left Beirut for Damascus just before noon and was scheduled to meet with Foreign Minister Khaddan at 1 p.m. Washington time.

2. Security Situation: Both the Zahle area and Southern Lebanon appear to have been quiet. There have been no further developments relating to the UNIFIL protest over the presence of Israeli self-propelled 155 mm howitzers within the enclave.

3. Beirut Area: There have been no reports of any significant gunfire or artillery during the period since the last sitrep. The city evidently remains relatively quiet but tense.



Edward L. Peck
Lebanon Working Group



Thomas R. Reynders
Senior Watch Officer

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

LEBANON
GK B1
RT
plb

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

LEBANON WORKING GROUP

Situation Report No. 23

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Working Group
CIA (LDX)
PM

Situation in Lebanon as of 0500 Hours EDT, May 10, 1981

1. Habib Mission: Ambassador Habib is in Damascus and meeting with Syrian leaders. He arrived at 1400 hours local time (0800 hrs. EDT) May 9 and met with Foreign Minister Khaddam for two hours and forty minutes that evening. The Ambassador reports the talk was full of give-and-take. He developed his themes so as to engage the Syrians "in examining and devising pragmatic solutions to specific and discrete elements of the immediate problem in the Biqa' and Sannin instead of resorting to standard rhetoric on global problems." Khaddam "responded with qualified interest to these themes. While he took a hard, critical line regarding Israeli attitudes, he began to listen closely to our efforts to break down the issues into their component parts." A "guaranteed" meeting with President Assad was scheduled for 1100 hours local time (0500 hrs. EDT) May 10. Ambassador Habib is scheduled to depart Damascus for Larnaca at 1200 hours local (0600 hrs. EDT) May 11.

2. Troop Movements: The Working Group has received no reports of any changes in Syrian deployments in the Biqa' Valley or along the Sannin Ridge. [REDACTED] reports that, during the night of May 9-10, a Syrian SA-2 missile battalion headed for the border area passed through an MP checkpoint on the Damascus-Beirut highway approximately 10 miles inside Syria. Report commented that, while Syria is continuing to reinforce its missile capability from the border area, it did not anticipate these SA-2's being deployed in Lebanon proper. Rather, it surmised, Syria is pursuing its preparations for possible hostilities by emplacing this equipment in the border zone to defend against low-level attacks against its SA-6's already in Lebanon. In the enclave, UNIFIL advises it can not confirm that any IDF units have moved in, but it does have information that two IDF artillery batteries (not US-equipped, it thinks) are in the Kelea Khorbe area.

3. Security Situation: At this hour we have no reports of military actions underway.

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

RDS-4 5/10/01 (Lumsden, Q.)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS #99-0241, #89
By 01, NARA, Date 5/19/06

4. Beirut Area: Sporadic firing and shelling followed Habib's departure, but no incidents are being reported at this time.

Quincey Lumsden

Quincey Lumsden
Lebanon Working Group

Kathleen Daly

Kathleen Daly
Senior Watch Officer

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 8, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*SUBJECT: Response from the President to the
Maronite Patriarch

The Maronite Patriarch of Lebanon has sent two messages to President Reagan. One expresses condolences on the President's recent injury; the other addresses the current crisis in Lebanon.

I concur in State's draft of a single response from the President which is at Tab A. The incoming is at Tab B.

Also, you should see Log No. 2409 which deals with a request by the Patriarch to see President Reagan.

RECOMMENDATION

That a single response to the two messages be sent.

Agree _____ Disagree _____

Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED

| 2

2. FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO ABOVE CABLE, AND TO REF B,
FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO PATRIARCH:

QUOTE: YOUR BEATITUDE:

MY WIFE AND I WERE DEEPLY TOUCHED BY YOUR KIND EXPRESSIONS
OF CONCERN OVER MY RECENT INJURY, AND YOUR THANKS FOR
OUR EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. WE
VERY MUCH APPRECIATE KNOWING THAT YOU ARE THINKING OF
US AND THAT I HAVE YOUR PRAYERS FOR A SPEEDY RECOVERY.

DURING MY CONVALESCENCE, MY ADMINISTRATION HAS CONTINUED
TO ADVANCE THE POLICIES AND GOALS WHICH BOTH OF US SHARE.
THROUGHOUT THE RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON, THE UNITED STATES
HAS REMAINED DETERMINED TO SUPPORT THE LEGITIMATE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. WE HAVE SOUGHT THROUGH
ALL MEANS POSSIBLE TO BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE END TO
THE FIGHTING, TO SOLIDIFY A CEASE-FIRE, AND TO HELP
RESTORE THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THROUGH-
OUT THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THE SOUTH. OUR DEEP CONCERN
FOR THE WELFARE OF LEBANON'S CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, AND
OUR SADNESS FOR THE SUFFERING OF ALL LEBANESE, HAS
REMAINED CONSTANT.

THANK YOU FOR SHARING YOUR THOUGHTS WITH ME.

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN

3. NO RELEASE INTENDED, BUT NO OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT
WISHES TO DO SO.

44

UNCLASSIFIED

+

+

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02300 141405Z
ACTION NEA-11

6889

BEIRUT 02300 141405Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 CIAE-00 10-14
NSC-05 NSAE-00 L-03 PH-09 SP-02 /082 W
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P R 141301Z APR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

Message
101-6-2
[Signature]
White House

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 2300

ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE

E.O. 12065 N/A
TAGS: SCUL, LE, US
SUBJECT: (U) MESSAGE FROM MARONITE PATRIARCH

1. ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 14 I CALLED ON ANTOINE-PIERRE KHORAICHE, MARONITE PATRIARCH, IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT I HAD VISITED THE GRAND MUFTI OF LEBANON LAST WEEK (BEIRUT 2157). THE PURPOSE OF THE CALL WAS TO EXPRESS AND DEONSTRATE THE DEEP CONCERN FELT BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE SUFFERING OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE.

2. THE PATRIARCH AVAILED HIMSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE ME THE TEXT OF A TELEGRAM HE ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE:

BEGIN TEXT

HIS EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT ROBALD REAGAN, WASHINGTON, D.C. WE CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR RECOVERY AND ASSURE YOU OF OUR CONTINUED PRAYERS. WE THANK YOU SINCERELY FOR YOUR EFFORTS AND THOSE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE TO BRING THE LEBANESE CRISIS TO AN END. THE STATEMENTS OF YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE, GENERAL ALEXANDER HAIG, GIVE US HOPE. IMMEDIATE INTERNATIONAL ACTION IS INDEED NECESSARY. THE DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL CONFERENCES AND ORGANIZATIONS HAVE NOT YIELDED ANY POSITIVE RESULTS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THIS COUNTRY. ON THE CONTRARY, THE SITUATION HAS WORSENEO AND IS NOW VERY CRITICAL. UNITED NATIONS FORCES, OR, AT LEAST, FORCES UNDER U.N. SUPERVISION, DEPLOYED ALL OVER LEBANON, ARE THE ONLY HOPE TO SAVE THE COUNTRY'S UNITY AND INTEGRITY, THEREBY RESTORING THE PEACE AND SECURITY IN WHICH THE LEBANESE PEOPLE WILL BE ABLE TO MEET, FREELY, AND SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE, DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE. (SIGNED) ANTOINE-PIERRE KHORAICHE, MARONITE PATRIARCH AND PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY OF CATHOLIC PATRIARCHS AND BISHOPS IN LEBANON. END TEXT.

4. I SAID I WOULD BE PLEASED TO TRANSMIT THE MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON. I COULD ASSURE THE MARONITE PATRIARCH THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS FOLLOWING EVENTS CLOSELY IN LEBANON. I ALSO SAID THAT THE MANY DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES WE HAVE TAKEN, WHOULD HAVE MADE IT EVIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO SUPPORT THE LEGITIMATE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND THAT WE WISH TO BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE END TO ALL FIGHTING. I NOTED THAT THE "INTERNATIONALIZATION" OF THE PROBLEMS OF LEBANON IS OPPOSED BH PART OF THE LEBANESE POPULATION AS WELL AS BY

SOME ARAB GOVERNMENTS. HENCE THE PRESENT GOALS ARE TO SOLIDIFY THE CURRENT CEASE-FIRE, PREVENT FUTURE OUT-BREAKS OF VIOLENCE AND HELP RESTORE THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

5. THE PATRIARCH WAS VERY PLEASED TO RECEIVE MY VISIT. FROM HIS RESIOENCE I PROCEEDED TO CALL ON THE PAPAL NUNCIO WHO IS ONLY FIVE MINUTES AWAY.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: I SUGGEST THAT A REPLY BE MADE TO THE PATRIARCH'S MESSAGE, WHICH I CAN CONVEY TO HIM. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY TO KNOW HOW DEEPLY CONCERNED WE ARE ABOUT THE SUFFERING OF THE LEBANESE--REGARDLESS OF WHERE IT OCCURS--AND THAT WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF LEBANON IN THE FUTURE. FURTHERMORE, THE PATRIARCH INTENDS TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES LATER IN THE SPRING ON THE INVITATION OF CARDINAL COOKE OF NEW YORK. OUR REPLY TO HIS CABLE IS A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS ONCE AGAIN THE INTEREST OF THE HIGHEST U.S. AUTHORITIES IN LEBANON'S FUTURE.

DECONTROL APRIL 15, 1982.
DEAN

S/S 8114344

UNCLASSIFIED

NEA/ARN:DWINN
4/27/81 X21018
NEA:NVELIOTES

NEA/ARN:JCOLLINS
S/S-S:JROSENBLATT

NSC:
NEA:MDRAPER

PRIORITY BEIRUT

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PDIP, SCUL, LE, US

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM
- MARONITE PATRIARCH {S/S 8111176}

REF: BEIRUT 2300

1. FYI: FOLLOWING CABLE, DATED MARCH 31 AND ADDRESSED
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, WAS RECEIVED BY WHITE HOUSE:

QUOTE:

THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

DISTRESSED BY THE CRIMINAL ATTEMPT TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN
EXPOSED CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR SAFETY MY FERVENT PRAYERS
AND THOSE OF THE MARONITE CHURCH TO ALMIGHTY GOD TO KEEP
YOU FOR THE PROSPERITY OF YOUR GREAT PEOPLE AND THE
SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE WHOLE WORLD.

ANTOINE PIERRE KHORAICHE MARONITE PATRIARCH

END QUOTE.

NV

DW

JC

JR

MD

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 6, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: CHARLES TYSON

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Anthony P. Khoraiiche, Maronite Rite Patriarch of Lebanon, with the President after May 3, 1981

The Department of State and Ambassador Dean recommend that the President meet with the Maronite Patriarch, His Beatitude Anthony Peter Khoraiiche, some time in May, when he will be visiting the United States.

A meeting with the President would provide an important opportunity to reaffirm US policy and support for the central government of President Sarkis, particularly in light of the present crisis in Lebanon.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Gregory J. Newell.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR GREGORY J. NEWELL

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Anthony P. Khoraiiche, Maronite Rite Patriarch of Lebanon, with the President after May 3, 1981

The Department of State and the NSC staff recommend that the President meet with the Maronite Patriarch, His Beatitude Anthony Peter Khoraiiche, some time in May, when he will be visiting the United States.

His Beatitude is a long-time friend of the United States. He was elected Maronite Patriarch in 1975. He represents the largest and most influential group of Christians in Lebanon and in the Middle East. The Maronites as well comprise the vast majority of the large Lebanese-American community here.

A meeting would provide an important opportunity for the President to reaffirm US policy and our support for the central government of President Sarkis.

cc: Michael P. Castine

2409

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

27 APRIL 1981

TO: RED CAVANEY, RICHARD ALLEN ✓

VIA: GREGORY J. NEWELL

FROM: MICHAEL P. CASTINE MPC

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: ANTHONY P. KHORAICHE, MARONITE RITE PATRIARCH OF LEBANON
WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT.

DATE: AFTER 3 MAY 1981.

LOCATION: THE WHITE HOUSE.

BACKGROUND: REQUESTED BY SENATOR JOHN DANFORTH. KHORAICHE PRE-
DECESSOR WAS RECEIVED BY PRESIDENTS JOHNSON AND KENNEDY.

HIS BEATITUDE REPRESENTS THE LARGEST GROUP OF LEBANESE
CHRISTIANS AND ALSO THE LARGEST SINGLE GROUP OF CATHOLICS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

RESPONSE DUE: 30 MAY 1981. THANK YOU.

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept ___ Regret ___ Surrogate ___ Message ___ Other ___

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE GIVE REASONS:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 22, 1981

MPC
to NSC/P

Dear Senator Danforth:

Thank you for your letter requesting a meeting between the President and Anthony Peter Khoraiiche, Maronite Rite Patriarch of Lebanon, some time after May 3.

I have forwarded your request to the Office of Scheduling in the event the President's schedule enables such a visit.

With cordial regards,

Sincerely,



Powell A. Moore
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs (Senate)

The Honorable John Danforth
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

PAM:NKW:nkw

cc: ✓ ~~Scheduling~~ (through Max Friedersdorf)
Central Files

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

April 1, 1981

Honorable Powell A. Moore
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Powell:

Constituents and friends of mine associated with St. Raymond's Maronite Catholic Church in St. Louis, Missouri, have requested my assistance in securing an appointment with the President for Anthony Peter Khoraiiche, Maronite Rite (Roman Catholic) Patriarch of Lebanon. He will be visiting the United States during the month of May. It is my understanding he is the Patriarch for Antioch and the whole Middle East. In the past when he was in Washington, he was received by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He would be available any time after May 3.

For your information, a short biographical sheet is enclosed.

It would be appreciated if this request could be given favorable consideration.

Sincerely,



John C. Danforth

Enclosure



St. Raymond's Catholic Church

Maronite Rite

March 13, 1981

Honorable Senator John C. Danforth
United States Senate Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

ATTENTION: Judy Hollis

RE: INFORMATION REQUESTED CONCERNING PATRIARCH

NAME: His Beatitude, Anthony Peter Khoraiiche

BORN: Ain Ebel (Lebanon) September 20, 1907

ELECTED PATRIARCH 1975

He is the Maronite Rite (Roman Catholic) Patriarch of Lebanon.

He represents the largest group of Lebanese Christians.

He represents the largest single group of Catholics in the Middle East.

His title is "Patriarch of Antioch and the whole East".

His residence is at a place called Bkerke.

Throughout history, Bkerke, through her patriarchs, not only takes care of her people spiritually but also plays a very important role in the preservation of Lebanon's independence and territorial integrity. Bkerke's patriarchs continue to work for and help all of the Lebanese, regardless of race, religion or political affiliation. The Maronite patriarchal See of Bkerke will always be a symbol and a guarantee of an independent, sovereign Lebanon.

His predecessor, His Beatitude, Paul Peter Meouchi was the guest of the State Department in 1962 and was received by President Kennedy at the White House.... was also received by Johnson at this Texas Ranch in 1962.

Francis R. Slay



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8113972

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment for Maronite Patriarch with
President Reagan

Senator John Danforth has requested that the Maronite Patriarch, His Beatitude Anthony Peter Khoraiiche, meet with President Reagan some time in the month of May. The Department of State and Ambassador Dean recommend that the President see the Patriarch.

His Beatitude is a long-time friend of the United States. He was elected Maronite Patriarch in 1975. He represents the largest and most influential group of Christians in Lebanon and in the Middle East. The Maronites as well comprise the vast majority of the large Lebanese-American community here.

Particularly in light of the present crisis in Lebanon, a meeting would provide an important opportunity for the President to reaffirm the United States' commitment to the preservation of Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and pluralistic democracy, our concern for the well-being of Lebanon's Christian community, and our support for the central government of President Sarkis.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Lebanon Situation

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F99-0241, #90BY CH NARA DATE 5/19/06

Chris Shoemaker asked me to review a draft Presidential Statement on Lebanon. Because of the limited time for revision, I concurred on the Presidential Statement on Lebanon even though I had reservations. Geoff agreed with my reservations, and we redrafted that statement. Since the statement was not discussed at the NSC meeting, we have an opportunity to submit our revised version. Janet Colson, however, said to me that no statement may be made so hold on to it for now.

Meanwhile the Lebanese Ambassador called me and said the following: Beirut called him about wire service reporting that an NSC meeting on Lebanon had been held. Respectfully told the Ambassador that I had no comment on the agenda of NSC meetings.

Spoke with Mort Allen of ~~Meese's~~ ^{Speakes'} office at 4:00 p.m.; Mort told me what Speakes had said: the bottom line is that no reference was made to an NSC meeting in Speakes' statement to the press.

Called Janet Colson and she said that each participant in the NSC meeting had been instructed by Meese to say "no comment". Explained to her that the Lebanon Ambassador thinks an NSC meeting on Lebanon was held. Janet said she would give Dick Allen a summary of her conversation with me and call back. Janet called after consulting with RVA and said that he reiterated what Ed Meese had said that the agenda of NSC meetings is not

to be discussed. Though we can neither confirm nor deny a meeting on Lebanon was held, if I wanted to I could call the Ambassador back and neither confirm nor deny the meeting. I chose to call the Ambassador and did exactly that. The Ambassador called again at the end of the day, pressed for elaboration, and I repeated the "no comment" phrase. He asked for RVA's telephone number, and I gave it to him.

Revised April 30, 1981
by Ray Tanter

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON LEBANON

I have noted with grave concern the escalation of conflict in Lebanon. The United States deplores the senseless use of force to resolve political disputes, particularly when innocent civilians are involved.


I call upon all involved parties to refrain from actions and provocations which can lead to further violence. Everyone must exercise the utmost restraint and patience in dealing with this explosive situation. I have directed representatives of the United States to convey this message to all concerned parties.

The United States supports restoration of the Government of Lebanon's authority throughout the country and efforts to resolve disputes in Lebanon through peaceful negotiations. Only through such negotiations can an equitable and durable peace be obtained. Further escalation will lead only to more needless suffering and loss of life.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RAY
~~Geoff~~

Here is the draft
Lelan. Velister
has cleared. Can
you meet it by
1100?



Thanks
Chi.

Concur
R. Tarter

30 APR 14 89
1040A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: ROBERT SCHWEITZER *RS*
CHRIS SWOEMAKER

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement on Lebanon

With the high level of violence in Lebanon continuing and the potential for escalation into a major regional crisis growing at a most unfavorable time, the President may wish to make a statement on the situation in the near future (Tab A).

The attached draft, agreed to by State (Stoessel) and cleared by the speechwriters, is an effort to help get the fighting stopped without ascribing blame for the violence to any of the parties. Such a message from the President could be helpful in effecting a cease-fire, and it is a gesture which would be especially welcomed in light of the President's own experience with unreasoned violence.

Timing is particularly important in maximizing the efficacy of the statement. To ensure that we make the most of the statement, we should do the following:

- Have the President approve the attached statement as an on-the-shelf strawman.
- Consult closely with the State Department if Lebanon continues to heat up.
- When we agree that the time is ripe for the statement, give State one last chance to introduce additional language geared to the specifics of the fighting.

Recommendation

That you approve the draft statement and sign the memo at Tab I.

_____ Approve _____ Disapprove

— HOLD MEMO TO MOVE UNTIL WE HAVE STATE FULLY ABOARD.
• THIS IS A "THINKING AHEAD" ACTION.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: ED MEESE.
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT: Presidential Message on Lebanon

The level of violence in Lebanon remains high, and the prognosis for near-term stability is not good. Moreover, the situation presents very real dangers for escalation into direct conflict between Israel and Syria, a crisis which would be most unwelcomed, especially at this time.

A statement from you might help defuse the problem or at least control the potential for escalation. We have already made strong demarches with the governments of Syria, Israel, and Lebanon, as well as with the Soviet Union, but we have not issued a general appeal for restraint from the White House. Such a statement from you could be helpful should the level of violence continue to grow.

We should carefully time the issuance of the statement to maximize its effectiveness. If you approve the idea in principle and the general thrust of the statement, I will work with Al Haig to determine the optimal moment for release. It may be necessary to make some minor modifications to the statement, depending upon the circumstances of the moment.

Recommendation

That you approve the statement at Tab A and the release procedure outlined above.

_____ Approve _____ Disapprove



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
'THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Statement
on Lebanon

1. Attached is our revision of the contingency Presidential statement on the situation in Lebanon which your staff has proposed for release in the event that the situation there deteriorates significantly. The text has thus far been approved by Ambassador Stoessel. Please note that we are also sending the text to Secretary Haig's party for further review and that the attached should not be considered as authorized by the Department until we have further word from the Secretary's party.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "L. Paul Bremer, III".

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Statement on Lebanon

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON LEBANON

I have noted with grave concern the ^{escalation of conflict} ~~violence and blood~~ shed which has erupted in Lebanon during the past week. The United States deplores the senseless use of force to resolve political disputes, particularly when innocent civilians are involved.

*in many bits
not much
being now*


I call upon all involved parties to ~~adopt an immediate and unconditional cease fire, to cooperate with the Government of Lebanon, and~~ to refrain from actions and provocations which can lead to further violence. Everyone must exercise the utmost restraint and patience in dealing with this explosive situation. I have directed representatives of the United States to convey this message to all concerned parties.

The United States supports restoration of the Government of Lebanon's authority throughout the country and efforts to resolve disputes in Lebanon through peaceful negotiations. Only through such negotiations can an equitable and durable peace be obtained. ~~Further~~ ^{escalation} ~~violence~~ will lead only to more needless suffering and loss of life.



Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Current Analysis Series

Lebanon IL
OK
RT
DF



May 22, 1981 *GS*

ARAB-ISRAELI HIGHLIGHTS

file

Lebanon: Special National Intelligence Estimate (Entire Text: S/NF/NC)

A Special National Intelligence Estimate on Lebanon has been approved by the intelligence community and is scheduled for distribution later today. Key judgments are summarized below.

The bitter rivalry and divergent ambitions of Christian and Muslim militants coupled with Israeli and Syrian involvement practically guarantee continued high tensions in Lebanon. Even without the involvement of outside powers, Lebanon's central government does not have the strength to engineer a compromise that would accommodate the seemingly irreconcilable interests of the Phalange, the militant Lebanese Muslims, and the Palestinians.

Israel and Syria are using their respective clients and presence in Lebanon to serve their own security interests in the struggle against one another. Neither sees its interests served by a strengthened, unified, and independent Lebanon.

It is doubtful an enduring settlement of Lebanon's problems can be reached outside the context of a broader Arab-Israeli settlement. Without a wider solution:

- The Christians will feel threatened by the presence of Syrian forces and militant Palestinians, and remain determined to keep the option of a separate Christian state open;
- The Palestinians will resist any attempt to curb their freedom to act against Israel from their Lebanese bases and will enlist the support of militant Lebanese leftists;
- Neither Israel nor Syria will willingly relinquish the leverage each has developed in Lebanon.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F79-024/1 #9

By Amf, NARA, Date 12/6/02

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR 112008-098/16 #57016

BY Amf NARA DATE 11/28/08

The greatest near term dangers for the US are the strong possibilities for a direct, broad conflict between Israel and Syria, and partition of Lebanon.

--A major Syrian-Israeli confrontation could irreparably harm US credentials for managing the peace process if--as inevitable--the Arab world blamed the US for Israeli "aggression." Moreover, US efforts to build a regional security framework would suffer a serious setback. A humiliating Syrian defeat by Israel would put President Sadat in an extraordinarily difficult situation and could undermine the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and damage US-Egyptian ties.

--Partition of the country--particularly the declaration of a Maronite state allied with Israel--would dangerously complicate US efforts to preserve the 1974 Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, erode US standing among moderate Arabs, hinder Egypt's reentry into the Arab mainstream, and retard a strategy to advance the peace negotiations.

The Soviet Union sees benefits from continued tensions between Syria and Israel over Lebanon as long as this posture does not result in a full scale Syrian-Israeli war which would lead to a humiliating defeat for Syria and which would risk direct US-Soviet confrontation. In Soviet calculations, strong support for Syria and, more important, the perception that the US supports Israel can only redound to Moscow's benefit. The USSR would hope to gain renewed recognition as an indispensable party to crisis management, end its exclusion from mainstream Arab affairs, and blunt US influence in the region.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Drafted by GDietrich/PO'Neill x23236
Approved by GSHarris x28397

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

May 2, 1980

I send warmest greetings to the National Convention of the American Lebanese League, and I express pride and admiration for the constructive contributions of Americans of Lebanese origin in this country.

You are also to be commended for your continued support of our mutual efforts to ease the burdens imposed by years of tension in the Middle East and to achieve a truly comprehensive peace in the area. My Administration has no greater priority than a commitment to peace, a goal I know you share. We also are determined to seek an end to the continuing strife in Lebanon, which has led to untold human suffering. Lebanon has been a good and trusted friend of the United States. I want to assure you that I will work as closely as before with the Government of President Sarkis to ensure the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Lebanon.

I wish you well at your convention, and I join with you and all of Lebanon's friends in looking toward the day when that country is blessed with lasting peace.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is centered below the text of the letter.



Dear Friends,

During the last five years it has been my privilege to work with many dedicated people on the great cause which is so dear to all of us. To all, I extend my deep appreciation for everything.

A special word for special people...to those who have persevered. You are special to me and the American Lebanese League. You are a group which founded the American Lebanese League whose extraordinary generosity has made possible the continued well-being of this great organization.

This a very special year for A.L.L. when people like you will have the opportunity to help accomplish something that has never been achieved in the history of Lebanese in America. That is, the securing of the permanence of an activist Lebanese organization.

A.L.L. is entering its third phase of existence. The first being the founding years when we operated from an Ohio base; the second is the Washington experience with its concentration on the government. A lot has been learned from these two phases. This is why we should be excited about the future of our organization which we now are certain represents the position of the greater number of American Lebanese.

We believe the third phase to be the long-term character of A.L.L.; i.e., truly representative and reflecting the deepest yearnings of the American Lebanese community. But it will take your continued support, and many others like you, if we are to reach a goal that others have said is unattainable. With your help we can prove them wrong and at long last proudly claim that we have paid proper tribute to the memory of our courageous fathers and mothers.

This is your time to be proud of being Lebanese.

Sincerely,

Elias T. Saadi

Elias T. Saadi
Chairman
National Board of Directors

LEBANESE FORCES



A LETTER FROM BASHIR GEMAYEL TO ALL

Dear Friends:

I would like to thank you on the occasion of your fifth annual convention for all the efforts which you have undertaken to promote the interests of Lebanon in the United States of America.

Lebanon still has many problems but its enemies have not prevailed. Despite being occupied in large part by the Syrians; assailed in the South by the Palestinians; its army being limited to areas controlled by the Lebanese Front; and the superpowers' intent on keeping the internal situation tied to the overall problem of the Middle East, Lebanon lives. She lives with a resolve and fortitude that has been her hallmark throughout her history.

Dear supporters of Lebanon, I can assure you that the Lebanese Forces will continue its resistance until the last Syrian and armed Palestinian leave Lebanon. A revolt against the Syrian-Palestinian presence in the areas controlled by these powers has already begun, and we have no doubt that our war of liberation will succeed.

I am certain that the efforts of the American Lebanese League have been effective in telling the world, in general, and the American people, in particular, of the thoughts and actions of the resistance. The visit of the League's leadership to the mother country in December 1979 was a great occasion for the Lebanese leaders to exchange views with the American Lebanese. This visit is probably one of the most important and successful the Lebanese abroad have ever made to Lebanon. We trust that such visits will continue and hope that the American Lebanese League's example will be followed in every country in which persons of Lebanese descent reside.

Because a great deal depends on America, a great deal depends on you. We are confident that you will fulfill history's expectations of you. Your efforts to help in saving Lebanon, when successful, will redound to your glory and will cause the supreme sacrifice of our martyrs not to have been in vain.

Again, I promise you that the Lebanese Forces will fight until the last foreign soldier and terrorist leaves Lebanon. History will always record that it was our sacrifices, buttressed by your understanding and help, that Lebanon was preserved, and the tragic experience of the seventies was laid to rest forever.

Long live Lebanon. Long live the United States.

Bashir Gemayel
Chief of the Commandment Council
of the Lebanese Forces
Chief Commander of the Lebanese Forces