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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 11/28/2008

File Folder LEBANON-MAY 1981 (1)

FOIA

M2008-098/16

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3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
56994	REPORT	RE LEBANON PAR 5/29/2001 F99-024/1 #48; PAR 7/17/2012 M098/16 #56994	4	5/15/1981	B1 B3
56995	REPORT	STATUS REPORT D 10/17/2000 F99-024/1 #50; UPHELD 7/17/2012 M098/16 #56695	3	ND	B1 B3
56996	PAPER	RE US POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL D 6/21/2013 M098/16	5	ND	B1
56997	PAPER	WORKING PAPER RE LEBANON PAR 5/19/2006 F99-024/1 #53; PART. 9/28/2010 M098/16 #56997	4	ND	
56998	CABLE	151400Z MAY 81 R 9/28/2010 M098/16	2	5/15/1981	B1
56999	PAPER	WORKING PAPER PAR 5/19/2006 F99-024/1 #67; R 5/18/2011 M098/16 #56999	2	ND	B1
57000	CHART	CHART D 5/19/2006 F99-024/1 #69; R 5/18/2011 M098/16 #57000	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
57001	PAPER	WORKING PAPER ISRAEL-LEBANON BORDER PAR 5/19/2006	2	ND	B1
		F99/024/1 #70; R 5/18/2011 M098/16 #57001			
57002	CHART	CHART D 5/19/2006	1	ND	B1
		F99/024/1 #70; R 5/18/2011 M098/16 #57001			
57003	CHART	CHART PAR 5/19/2006	1	ND	B1
		F99-024/1 #72; R 5/18/2011 M098/16 #57003			
57004	REPORT	USSR AND LEBANON PAR 5/29/2001	4	2/9/1982	B1 B3
		F99-024/1 #75; PAR 7/17/2012 M098/16 # 57004			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Collection: Kemp, Geoffrey: Files
 OA # -90219 90493
 File Folder: Lebanon - May, 1981 (1 of 2)

Archivist: gcc/bcb
 FOIA ID: F99-024/1
 Date: 6/2/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	re Lebanon, 4p. P. 3/30/01 NLSF99-024/1 #48	5/15/81	P1, F1, B3
2. map	Map, 1p. R 3/30/01 NLSF99-024/1 #49	5/81	P1, F1
3. memo	Bremer to Clark, 1p. R 11/16/01 F99-024/1 #50	2/12/81	P1, F1
4. report	Status Report, 3p. D 10/17/00 NLSF99-024/1 #51	n.d.	P1, F1
5. report	re Israel, 5p.	n.d.	P1, F1
6. paper	Working Paper, 4p. PART 5/19/06 F99-024/1 #53; part. 9/28/10 MD8-098/16 #56997	n.d.	P1, F1
7. cable	151400Z, 2p. R 9/28/10 MD8-098/16 #56998	5/15/81	P1, F1
8. map	Map, 1p. R 5/19/06 F99-024/1 #55	n.d.	P1, F1
9. chart	re Response Times. 1p. R " " " #56	n.d.	P1, F1
10. map	Map, 1p. R " " " #57	n.d.	P1, F1
11. map	Map, 1p. R " " " #58	n.d.	P1, F1
12. chart	re Schedule, 1p. R " " " #59	n.d.	P1, F1
13. chart	re Organization, 1p. R " " " #60	n.d.	P1, F1
14. chart	Chart, 1p. R " " " #61	12/15/79	P1, F1
15. chart	re Equipment, 1p. R " " " #62	12/15/79	P1, F1
16. chart	Chart, 1p. R " " " #63	12/15/79	P1, F1
17. chart	re Equipment, 1p. R " " " #64	12/15/79	P1, F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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Collection: Kemp, Geoffrey: Files
 OA # 90219 90493
 File Folder: Lebanon - May, 1981 (1 of 2)

Archivist: gcc/bcb
 FOIA ID: F99-024/1
 Date: 6/2/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
18. chart	Chart, 1p. R 5/19/06 F99-024/1 #65	12/15/79	P1, F1
19. chart	re Equipment, 1p. R " " #66	12/15/79	P1, F1
20. paper	Working Paper, 2p. PART " " #67; R 5/18/11 MO8-098/16 #56979	n.d.	P1, F1
21. chart	Chart, 1p. R " " #68	2/9/82	P1, F1
22. chart	re US Equipment, 2p. D " " #69; R 5/18/11 MO8-098/16 #57000	n.d.	P1, F1, B2, B3
23. paper	Working Paper, 2p. PART " " #70; R " " #57001	n.d.	P1, F1, B2, B3
24. chart	Chart, 1p. D " " #71; R " " #57002	n.d.	P1, F1, B2, B3
25. chart	Chart, 1p. PART " " #72; R " " #57003	n.d.	P1, F1
26. map	Map, 1p. R " " #73	n.d.	P1, F1
27. chart	Chart, 1p. R " " #74	n.d.	P1, F1
28. report	Summary, 4p. P. 3/30/01 NLSF99-024/1 #75	2/9/82	P1, F1, B3
29. report	US Policy in Lebanon, 6p. R 11/16/01 F99-024/1 #76	5/29/81	P1, F1

RESTRICTIONS

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Geoffrey Kemp ✓ ~~RT~~
National Security Council
Room 351, Executive Office Bldg.

We were asked for a brief description of the Phalange and thought you might like to have a copy. It was drafted by Bruce Riedel of OPA/NESA Division.

~~RT~~
↑
Gary R. Field
Gary R. Field
Chief, Near East
South Asia Division
Office of Political Analysis

File

01429

Date 15 May 1981

13524
E.O. 12958

Sec. 3.3 (b)(1), (6)
3.5(c)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

56994

15 May 1981

MEMORANDUM

LEBANON'S PHALANGE PARTY (U)

The Phalange party is the largest Maronite Christian political organization in Lebanon. Supported by an armed militia of 20,000 men, the Phalange is virtually a state within a state. The party and its various smaller Christian allies control a substantial portion of central Lebanon encompassing the area from East Beirut north along the coast to Batrun and extending inland to the Sannin ridge line.

(c)

Within this area--the traditional Maronite heartland known as Mount Lebanon--the Phalange collects taxes, enforces the law, and dispenses justice. The party runs the port of Juniyah, its supply-line to Israel and the outside world, and controls its own radio station, the Voice of Lebanon.

(c)

Origins and History

The Lebanese Phalange Organization (Munazzamat al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniyya in Arabic) is largely the creation of one influential Lebanese family, the Jumayyils. Politics in Lebanon is very much a family or clan business. The Jumayyils are a major Maronite clan of long standing who dominate the politics of their ancestral home at Bikfayya.

(c)

The Phalange was founded as a youth organization on 21 November 1936 by Pierre Jumayyil, who is still the party leader. Pierre, born in 1905, studied pharmacy in Beirut and Paris in the 1930s. In 1936, while attending the Olympics in Berlin, Pierre was very impressed by the Hitler Youth Organization and the other fascist parties of Europe; he created the Phalange to serve as the defender of Maronite interests in Lebanon. The Phalange's membership soon grew to over 20,000.

(c)

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] of the Near East South Asia Division of the Office of Political Analysis at the request of the National Intelligence Officer for Near East South Asia. Information as of 15 May 1981 was used in preparation of this paper. Questions and comments should be addressed to Chief, Near East South Asia Division, OPA on

(c)

PA M 81-10196

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NLRR M08-098/16 #36994

BY RW NARA DATE 7/1/02

The Phalange became a political party after France gave Lebanon its independence in 1945. It has always controlled several seats in Lebanon's parliament, and Pierre has often served in the cabinet. (C)

The Phalange played a key role in the 1958 civil war, supporting President Camille Shamun against a Muslim leftist coalition backed by Egypt and Syria. The party provided the bulk of the Christian militiamen in the 1975-76 civil war as well. (C)

The Phalange enjoys the sympathy of many Maronite members of the Lebanese army--traditionally led mostly by Christians. Units of the army have often fought alongside the Phalange since 1976, most recently during recent clashes in Beirut. (C)

Ideology and Program

The Phalange is dedicated to the ideal of a separate Lebanese nation and to preventing Lebanon's absorption into a greater Syria or a unified Arab state. The party is dedicated, in particular, to preserving Maronite Christian hegemony in Lebanon. (C)

The Maronites are a Uniate Christian Church affiliated with the Vatican. They comprise about 30 percent of the total Lebanese population and slightly more than half of its Christians. There are no exact statistics on Lebanon's population. There has been no official census since 1932 when the Christian were slightly in the majority; most observers now believe the Muslims are in the majority. (C)

The Phalange acknowledges that Lebanon is an Arab country, but believes its confessionally divided population makes it a bridge between the West and the Arab world. The party has always argued that Lebanon should remain neutral in Arab politics and oppose any effort to unite Lebanon with other Arab states. (C)

The party also supports the traditional Christian dominance of Lebanese politics, which was created by the French colonial government and enshrined in the 1943 National Pact, which mandates a Maronite President, a Muslim Prime Minister, and a slight Christian majority in parliament. (C)

Faced with the realities of today's Lebanon with its Muslim majority, some in the Phalange favor creation of a Swiss-style canton system for Lebanon in which the Maronites would control one area, the Druze another, Sunni Muslims a third, and the Shia Muslims a fourth. A weak central

government would head the confederation. This program was endorsed by the Phalange in a document entitled "The Lebanon We Want to Build Up" published last December. (C)

The Phalange sees the Palestinians in Lebanon--most of whom are Muslims who left Israel in 1948--as a threat to the Maronite community. The Phalange believes the 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon should return to their homes in Israel. This view--sharply disputed by Israel--has been played down in recent years but is a potential friction point between the Phalange and its Israeli ally. (C)

The Phalange initially welcomed the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976 that saved the Christian militias from defeat by the Palestinians and Muslim leftists. Since late 1977, however, the Phalange has argued that Syria is protecting the Palestinians and trying to annihilate the Christians, and that it should leave. (C)

Organization, Leadership, and Membership

The Phalange has always been a well organized and disciplined party. It is led by its president, Pierre Jumayyil, and his sons Bashir and Amin. Bashir's control over most of the Phalange militia gives him the dominant voice in party affairs. Bashir is the leading advocate of an aggressive anti-Syrian, pro-Israel policy. He generally has the backing of his father. (C)

Bashir has also led the Phalange drive to dominate Lebanon's other Christian parties. He ordered the June 1978 attack on the pro-Syrian Franjiyah clan in northern Lebanon. He also planned the Phalange attack on Shamun's National Liberal Party militia last year which led to the NLP's forced merger with the Phalange. The Phalange dominates the Lebanese Front, a loose coalition of Maronite groups. (C)

Amin represents the Phalange in the Lebanese parliament. Amin--who has lost influence in recent years--generally favors a more conciliatory policy toward the Syrians and often urges negotiations. He symbolizes a minority view in the Phalange that fears Bashir's pro-Israel policies will isolate the Maronites from the Arab world, ultimately creating a weak Maronite ministate cut off from the economically powerful Persian Gulf oil producers and dependent on Israeli military protection. (C)

In the 1960s the Phalange sought Muslim members--especially Shia Muslims--but never attracted many. Lebanon's Greek Catholics are well represented in the party, but the Phalange has never gained much support from the Greek Orthodox Christians, the second largest Christian community. (C)

The Israeli Connection

The Phalange has had occasional discreet ties with Israel since the 1940s, but it generally supported the Arab opposition to Israel until the 1970s. In need of an ally against the Palestinians in the civil war, the Phalange established secret contacts with Tel Aviv in early 1976. Israel has since become its key outside military ally. (C)

Tel Aviv has provided arms and ammunition, including some Sherman tanks, through Juniyah; it has also trained Phalange fighters in Israel. [REDACTED] regularly visit the Maronite heartland to advise and consult with the party leadership. Senior officials like Bashir have visited Israel. (C)

Israel also serves as a link between the Phalange and Major Haddad's Christian enclave in south Lebanon. Phalange fighters have traveled through Israel to reinforce Haddad in the past. (C)

The Phalange also buys weapons from private arms dealers. To finance these purchases the party depends in part on funds raised in the large Maronite communities in South America and the US. The party has some 40 offices outside Lebanon for fund-raising and information purposes. (C)



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NLS F99-024/1 # 49

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 5/29/01

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TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 12 FEB 82

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 5/17/00

*File w/
Lebanon
options paper
from MAY-JUN
1982*

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

ISRAEL

USSR

INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: STATUS REPORT ON LEBANON CONTINGENCY PLANNING

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

PIPES

TANTER

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DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

(14)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~SECRET~~ /SENSITIVE

February 12, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Status Report on Lebanon Contingency Planning

Attached is the State Department's summary of the OJCS and CIA material provided in response to Deputy Secretary Stoessel's request at the February 8 meeting on Lebanon.

At Tabs 1 and 2 are the OJCS and CIA contributions.

L. Paul Bremer III
L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab 1 - JCS Submission: US Policy Toward Israel

Tab 2 - CIA Submission: The USSR and Lebanon

cc: CIA - John McMahon
OSD - Noel Koch
JCS - Paul Gorman
NSC - Geoff Kemp
OVP - Nancy Bearg Dyke

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NLS F99-0247, #50
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 4/16/09

~~SECRET~~ /SENSITIVEwith ~~TOP SECRET~~ Attachment

RDS-3 2/12/02

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56990

~~TOP SECRET~~

I. (S) SUBJECT: Evacuation and Deterrent Options for Lebanon

II. (TS) PURPOSE: To provide information and recommendations in response to Israeli intervention in Lebanon, and evacuation of AMCITS.

III. (U) MAJOR POINTS:

A. (TS) Reliable information points to a possible Israeli invasion of Lebanon in response to a PLO or PLO-inspired terrorist attack on Israeli citizens or territory.

B. (S) In May 81, USCINCEUR prepared a Commander's Estimate which included five Courses of Action for the evacuation of AMCITS and other nationals who might desire evacuation (TAB A). As of 9 Feb 82, USCINCEUR (at staff level) confirms that the Commander's Estimate is still valid.

- (S) Considered permissive, semi permissive, non-permissive and general war situations.

- (S) Could involve up to 8,000 US evacuees, plus an undetermined number of other nationals.

C. (TS) Evacuation operations commenced before hostilities,

- (TS) Would indicate that US was aware of Israeli plan. Would imply tacit US approval.

- (TS) Would remove a consideration which could tend to deter Israelis from action, or at least limit their response.

D. (TS) Delaying an evacuation until after an Israeli attack.

- (TS) Could force Israelis to limit their response.

- (TS) Could hazard AMCITS.

- (TS) Tends to indicate that US knew nothing of Israeli plans.

E.O. 12958
As Amended
SEC. 3.3(b)(5)(g)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLR 008-19816 #56997
BY FWS NARA DATE 9/28/15

TOP SECRET

- (TS) Will not prevent the evacuation because the EUCOM plan considers operations in such an environment.

- (TS) Would, in all likelihood, prevent use of air (commercial or MAC) as means of evacuation.

E. (S) To effect a seaborne evacuation, Amphibious Ready Group 1-82, with 34th MAU embarked, could be used.

- (S) Available in Med from 9 Feb - 16 Mar 82.

- (S) 15-22 Feb involved in PHIBLEX 2-82 in Garrucha, Spain.

- (S) Pvst Palma, Majorca, 24-27 Feb 82.

- (C) 1-8 Mar 82, involved in PHIBLEX 3-82, Capo Teulada, Italy.

- (S) Pvst Alexandria, Egypt, 13 Mar 82.

- (S) Departs for IO deployment 16 Mar 82, returning to Med 17 Apr 82.

- (C) ARG 1-82 shipping and embarked capability are at TAB B.

- (S) ARG itinerary and response times in Med are at TAB C.

- (S) ARG 1-82 is scheduled to take part in exercise VALIANT USHER in Kenya 28 Mar - 3 Apr 82.

- (S) Lebanon crises requiring retention of ARG 1-82 in Med will require schedule changes by CINCPAC.

- (S) To accommodate evacuees, a significant portion of the MAU would have to be off loaded.

F. (TS) Increased US military presence or support for evacuation forces in a non-permissive environment could be provided by a CVBG.

- (S) In the near term (until 3 Jun), only USS EISENHOWER (CVN-69) will be in the Med. Med itinerary is at TAB D.

- (TS) consideration should be given to cancelling scheduled pvst to Haifa, 15-18 Mar 82, [REDACTED]

- (TS) CVBG could be employed as "over-the-horizon" presence to deter Soviet interference or intervention.

- (TS) Close in, or visible presence, could imply US support for Israeli actions.

- (TS) In the event a more significant US presence were required, USS KENNEDY could be redeployed from IO to Med.

-- (S) Requires 4-6 days for transit.

-- (TS) Would reduce US presence or capability in IO, and could impair response to crises in WESTPAC or SWA.



E. (TS) Should the decision be made to support Israeli actions,

- (TS) Primary support will be in the form of military materiel to replace losses.

-- (TS) MAC will provide airlift for logistic support.

-- (S) CV or MSC shipping and SAC tankers provide ferry support for replacement aircraft destined for Israel.



- (TS) Should direct US military intervention be required,

-- (TS) Initial support would be CV TACAIR.

-- (S) Should ground forces be required, the 34th MAU currently in the Med would become part of a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) (TAB E) that would be deployed to the area. The MAU would not be committed to combat by itself.

--- (S) Arrival of MAB in 15 days.

- (S) The 82d or 101st Abn Division could be deployed from CONUS (TAB F).
 - (S) Closure for combat elements of one division in 15 days.
 - (S) The 24th Inf Div (Mech) could also be employed if a heavier force were required (TAB G).
 - (S) Could close within 30 days with 10-15 day warning.
 - (TS) Use of US forces in NATO would result in significant reduction of US capability in Europe, and involve attendant political sensitivities.
- I. (TS) Should the Soviets actively support Syria through the introduction of forces,

- 
- (TS) With a determination as to the extent of Soviet military support part or all of the RDJTF could be placed on alert.
- 

Prepared by: Lt Col D.J. Kiely, USMC
J-3/JOD (RQMTS & EUCOM Br)
X52532

~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

TSZYU RUSNSW0718 131507
ASH/TMEDIATE
O 151400Z MAY 81

USCINCPAC VAININGEN GERMANY //EFCO//

JCS WASHDC //CJCS//

FO SECDEF WASH DC	CSA WASH DC
CNO WASH DC	CDR WASH DC
CVC WASH DC	USCINCPAC MACDILL AFB FL
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA	COMUSMACV COMDT AFB FL
COMUSMACV OFFUTT AFB NE	CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASH DC	DMX WASH DC
JCA MACDILL AFB FL	KSA WASH DC
CDR MTRC WASH DC	COMSEC WASH DC
COMUSAREUR WEIZELBERG GE//AEAGC//	
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK	NO USAF RAMSTEIN AFB GE//CO//
322 AID RAMSTEIN AF GE//CO//	USNMR SHAPE EE
COMSIXTH FLT	CTF 81/02
CTF 82	USCINCSOUTH NAPLES ITALY

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 002 OF 003

OPERATION CONDUCTED IN A SEMI-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT. NAVAL FORCES MAINTAIN A VISIBLE PRESENCE OFF-SHORE. EVACUATION HELICOPTERS ARE ARMED. FORCE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF).

83C. (S) COURSE OF ACTION NUMBER SIX. EMPLOY NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF A MAU IN AN AMPHIBIOUS SURFACE LANDING TO SECURE SELECTED BEACH(ES) TO CONDUCT EVACUATION OPERATIONS. NAVAL FORCES OF THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE VISIBLE IN DIRECT SUPPORT. FORCE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF). OPERATION CONDUCTED IN A NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT.

83D. (S) COURSE OF ACTION NUMBER SEVEN. EMPLOY NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF A MAU IN COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS HELICOPTERBORNE AND SURFACE LANDINGS TO SECURE DESIGNATED MLZ'S AND BEACH(ES) TO CONDUCT EVACUATION OPERATIONS. NAVAL FORCES OF THE ATF VISIBLE IN DIRECT SUPPORT. FORCE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF). OPERATION CONDUCTED IN NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT.

83E. (S) COURSE OF ACTION NUMBER EIGHT. EMPLOY NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF A MAU IN AMPHIBIOUS HELICOPTERBORNE LANDINGS TO SECURE SELECTED MLZ'S IN BEIRUT TO CONDUCT EVACUATION OPERATIONS. NAVAL FORCES OF THE ATF VISIBLE IN DIRECT SUPPORT. FORCE UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF). OPERATION CONDUCTED IN A NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT.

84. (U) ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION. /
84A. (C) PERMISSIVE. COURSES OF ACTION 1 AND 3 CAN BE PREVENTED BY MINIMAL OPPO SITION WITHOUT RESORT TO HOSTILE ACTION.

84B. (C) SEMI-PERMISSIVE. COURSE OF ACTION 3 IS THE MOST VULNERABLE TO HOSTILE ACTION.

84C. (C) NON PERMISSIVE. COURSES OF ACTION 7 AND 8 PROPOSE RECOVERY FORCE AND EVACUEES TO MULTIPLE THREATS AND ARE THE MOST VULNERABLE TO HOSTILE ACTION.

84D. (U) COMPARISON OF OUR COURSES OF ACTION

84E. (S) COURSE OF ACTION ONE FAIR FROM BEIRUT A/P: PERMITS RAPID EVACUATION IN NON-PROVOCATIVE, LOW- KEY MANNER. REQUIRES EXTENSIVE

IN-COUNTRY COORDINATION TO EXECUTE. REQUIRES POSITIVE COMM LINK BETWEEN OVER THE HORIZON NAVAL FORCES AND BEIRUT. NONCOMBATANTS EXPOSED TO POSSIBLE THREAT WHILE ENROUTE TO AIRPORT. AIRPORT MAY BE SUBJECT TO CLOSURE; THEREFORE, SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION COULD EASILY BE PREVENTED.

84F. (S) COURSE OF ACTION TWO (SEA FROM BEIRUT):

REQUIRES POSITIVE COMM LINK BETWEEN BEIRUT, OVER THE HORIZON ALERT FORCE, AND EVACUATION SHIP/LANDING CRAFT. IF MILITARY SHIPPING IS USED, AN ARMED FORCE COULD BE KEPT "BELOW DECKS" TO BE USED AS AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FORCE IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY. SEA STATE MAY BE A FACTOR IF LANDING CRAFT ARE UTILIZED.

84G. (S) COURSE OF ACTION THREE (CONVOY TO CAMAROUS): WILL REQUIRE POSITIVE COMM LINK BETWEEN OVER THE HORIZON FORCE AND CONVOYS. GREATEST EXPOSURE OF NONCOMBATANTS TO POSSIBLE THREAT. SLOWEST COURSE OF ACTION TO EXECUTE RESULTING IN LOWEST ON ALERT TIME FOR OVER THE HORIZON FORCE. REACTION TIME EXTENDED FOR OVER THE HORIZON FORCE AS CONVOYS GET FURTHER FROM BEIRUT. THIS COA IS CONSIDERED INFEASIBLE IN LIGHT OF THE POTENTIAL NUMBER OF EVACUEES AND OF THE HOSTILITY POTENTIAL IN THE VICINITY OF THE ROUTE BETWEEN BEIRUT AND CAMAROUS.

84H. (S) COURSE OF ACTION FOUR (LANDING CRAFT/SHIP FROM BEIRUT) REQUIRES POSITIVE COMM LINK BETWEEN BEIRUT, OFF-SHORE FORCE, AND LANDING PARTY. LEAST PROVOCATIVE OF SEMI-PERMISSIVE COURSES OF ACTION. FASTER TO EXECUTE WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF EVACUEES.

84I. (S) COURSE OF ACTION FIVE (HELICOPTERS FROM BEIRUT) REQUIRES POSITIVE COMM LINKS BETWEEN BEIRUT, OFF SHORE FORCE, EVACUATION HELICOPTERS, AND LANDING FORCE. USE OF HELICOPTERS MAY BE PROVOCATIVE TO LOCAL FACTIONS. SOME THREAT MAY EXIST TO HELICOPTERS DUE TO UNDISCIPLINED MEMBERS OF LOCAL FACTIONS. FASTER TO EXECUTE WITH SMALL NUMBER OF EVACUEES.

84J. (S) COURSE OF ACTION SIX (LANDING CRAFT FROM BEIRUT). SLOWEST EXECUTION TIME OF COURSES OF ACTION UNDER A NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT. REQUIRES POSITIVE COMM LINK BETWEEN CATF, BEIRUT AND FORCES ASHORE. REQUIRES LARGE U.S. PRESENCE ASHORE IN A NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT. MOST SIMPLE TO EXECUTE IN A NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT.

84K. (S) COURSE OF ACTION SEVEN (HELICOPTERS/LANDING CRAFT FROM BEIRUT). MOST FLEXIBLE FOR THE CATF OF OPTIONS IN A NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT ALTHOUGH EXECUTION TIME IS EXTENDED DUE TO SURFACE LANDINGS. REQUIRES POSITIVE COMM LINK BETWEEN CATF, BEIRUT, AND FORCES ASHORE. MOST COMPLEX OF NON-PERMISSIVE COURSES OF ACTION TO EXECUTE. REQUIRES LARGEST U.S. PRESENCE ASHORE.

84L. (S) COURSE OF ACTION EIGHT (HELICOPTERS FROM BEIRUT). FASTEST OF COURSES OF ACTION FOR EVACUATION OF A SMALL NUMBER OF EVACUEES IN A NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT. REQUIRES POSITIVE COMM LINK BETWEEN CATF, BEIRUT, AND FORCES ASHORE.

85. (U) DECISION. RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION.
85A. (U) PERMISSIVE. OPTION TWO USING COMMERCIAL SHIPPING.

85B. (U) SEMI-PERMISSIVE. OPTION FOUR.

85C. (U) NON-PERMISSIVE. OPTION SIX.

86. (C) OBJECTIVE. THIS REPORT FORMS THE USCINCPAC COMMANDERS ESTIMATE FOR THE CONDUCT OF NONCONSTANT OPERATIONS FROM LESANON.

87. (U) REMARKS.

87A. (C) COORDINATION BETWEEN GOV AND FACTIONS IN-COUNTRY WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR.

87B. (S) OPERATIONS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL SECURITY FORCES WOULD BE CONDUCTED UNDER USCINCPAC COMPLAN 1000.

87C. (C) MOVEMENT AND SECURITY OF NONCOMBATANTS TO EVACUATION OR LOAD POINTS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR.

87D. (C) NONCOMBATANTS OUTSIDE THE CITY OF BEIRUT WILL STANDFAST OR PROCEED TO BEIRUT UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR.

87E. (C) POTENTIAL EVACUEES ARE ESTIMATED AT 1000-1500.

87F. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS (C3).

87F1. (C) GENERAL. EXISTING EMBASSY COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE USED TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE IN THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THIS MISSION. IN-PLACE COMMUNICATIONS INCLUDE:


AUTODIN AND SECURE VOICE USING DOS SKYLINK.

BT

NO DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED
ISTR BY AGENCY PER NR 0000 0000/000

J3(5)
INFO C003:(*) C003(3) DJS(*)
EXTRAD(2)


(M.C)



DECLASSIFIED/KE/05/05
 NLS
 F99-02411-SS

NAIPA DATE 5/19/04

CV AND MARG RESPONSE TIMES TO EIMED CRISIS




DECLASSIFIED (RE 109507)
NLS FC99-024/1 #50

at CU NARA, DATE 5/19/06

HOURS FROM BEIRUT AT 16 KTS

The Mediterranean Basin




REPRESENTS APPROXIMATE STEAMING TIMES

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS F99-0241 #57

CW NARA, DATE 5/19/06



USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER OPERATIONS

PORT VISIT TANGENS 22-27 FEB

OPS WMKD 13-21 FEB

OPS WMKD 28 FEB - 9 MAR

UPKEEP NAPLES 30 JAN - 12 FEB

PORT VISIT PIRAEUS 23-31 MAR

OPS EMEQ 8-14 MAR

OPS EMEQ 19-24 MAR BANJA

PORT VISIT BANJA 13-18 MAR

300NM LAUNCH DISTANCE TO LIBYA

0 100 200 300 400 500 Nautical Miles

10° 20° 30°

MEDITERRANEAN SEA XMOO 0000

CLS NARA DATE 5/19/06
 NLS F99-0241, KSB
 DECLASSIFIED BY

CARRIER DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

CARRIER	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DE
1. MIDWAY (CV-41)			8		21 2		17 10					
2. CORAL SEA (CV-43)			11			18		2			26 5	
3. FORRESTAL (CV-59)												
4. SARATOGA (CV-60)												
5. RANGER (CV-61)			8				31	14	11 23			
6. INDEPENDENCE (CV-62)						10 4						2
7. KITTY HAWK (CV-63)												
8. CONSTELLATION (CV-64)				7 8	8							
9. ENTERPRISE (CVN-65)									23 11			
10. AMERICA (CV-66)											22 4	
11. KENNEDY (CV-67)						3 5	3 1					
12. NIMITZ (CVN-68)												
13. EISENHOWER (CVN-69)												

WESTPAC
 MEDITERRANEAN
 INDIAN OCEAN
 OVERHAUL

MAINTENANCE
 WORKUP
 TRAINING
 REPAIRS

~~SECRET~~

MARINE CORPS COMMAND CENTER OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
FMFPAC TASK ORGANIZATION
SEVENTH MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE

<u>1. Task Organization</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
7TH MAR MC (RGEN J. B. KNOTTS)		
NUCLEUS	17*	26*
AUGMENTED	86	650
27TH MAR (REIN) (COL L. B. MCHEVRY)	139	5833
MAG-7C (COL D. J. MCCARTHY)	135	2683
BSSG-7 (LTCOL J. T. GIPSON)	140	2199
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>900</u>
NAVCSAFGRU		230
	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	<u>12495</u>

* NUCLEUS STAFF FIGURES INCLUDED IN AUGMENTED FIGURES.

2. Aircraft

12/F-4
10/A-6E
10/CH-53
12/CH-46
9/AH-1T
6/CH-1N

3. Arms and Equipment

24/81MM MORTAR	12/155 HOW SP
48/M-47 DRAGON	18/HAWK LAUNCHERS
72/M220E1 TOW	90/REDEYE MISSILES
18/105 HOW TD	95/LVT7/LVTC
6/155 HOW TD	53/M60A1 TANK

4. HTPS Shipping

LOCATION

MERCURY (RO/RO)	DIEGO GARCIA
LYRA (RO/RO)	NAHA, JAPAN
JUPITER (RO/RO)	DIEGO GARCIA
AMERICAN CHAMPION (BREAK BULK)	SUBIC BAY, RP
AMERICAN COURIER (BREAK BULK)	DIEGO GARCIA
ZAPATA PATRIOT (WATER TANKER)	DIEGO GARCIA
RANGER (POL TANKER)	DIEGO GARCIA
MV ROVER (POL TANKER)	DIEGO GARCIA
MV COURIER (POL TANKER)	DIEGO GARCIA
SEALIFT INDIAN OCEAN (POL TANKER)	DIEGO GARCIA
AMERICAN SPITFIRE (AMMO)	DIEGO GARCIA
AUSTRAL LIGHTNING (AMMO)	DIEGO GARCIA
AUSTRAL RAINBOW (AMMO)	DIEGO GARCIA

5. Remarks

THE ANTICIPATED NUMBER OF STRATEGIC LIFT SORTIES FOR 7TH MAB IS 150 (C-5A 12; B-747 24; C-141 114).

ALERT STATUS (NO NOTICE).

- HTPS SHIPS UNDERWAY IN 12 HRS.

- 7TH MAB. FIRST DEPARTURE IN 96 HRS; CINCPAC CALLS FOR MAB CLOSURE IN 11-12 DAY PERIOD TO COMMENCE ABOUT 3 DAYS AFTER ALERT.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 799-0241 H40
CIA
NARA DATE 5/19/01

DAMPL 20851
ALL UNITS ALO 1

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82d ABN DIV
ORGANIC BATTALIONS

15 DEC 79
STRENGTH

	O'ALL	PER	EOH	ES	TNG	TNG WKS	AUTH	OP STR. %	DEPL/%
82 DIV	2	2	1	1	2	3	16224	17080/105	16763/103

UNIT	OVER ALL				EOH		ES		TNG		AUTH	OP STR %		STRENGTH	
	ALL	STR	MOS	SGD	EOH	PI	ES	PI	TNG	WKS		STR	%	DEPL/%	DIV TOTAL
MANEUVER															
1 325 INF	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	3	727	746/103	730/100		
2 325 INF	2X	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	727	725/100	720/99	AUTH	
3 325 INF	2(2X)	1	1	2(3)	1	1	1	1	2	3	727	720/100	710/98	OFF 1059	
1 504 INF	1X	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	0	727	743/102	736/101	WO 397	
2 504 INF	1X	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1(2)	2(3)	727	734/101	729/100	EM 14768	
1 505 INF	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	727	724/100	701/96	AGG 16224	
2 505 INF	2(2X)	1	1	2(3)	1	1	1	1	1	2	727	730/100	721/99		
1 508 INF	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	727	741/102	730/100		
2 508 INF	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	727	746/103	735/101	OP STR	
4 68 AR	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2(1)	3	447	476/106	461/103	OFF 1119	
1-17 AIR CAV	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	767	706/102	776/101	WO 354	
FIRE SPT															
1 319 FA	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	409	522/107	512/105	EJA 15607	
1 320 FA	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	489	494/101	482/99	AGG 17080	
2 321 FA	3	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	2(1)	409	496/101	482/99		
3 4 ADA	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	694	746/107	720/104	DEPL	
SUPPORT															
82 AVN	2X	1	1	1	4	1	1(2)	1(2)	2	3	1072	1044/97	1033/96	OFF 1114	
307 ENG	2	2	1	1	1		2(1)		1	2	572	533/93	520/91	WO 353	
82 SIG	1	1	1	1	1		1		1	1	540	537/99	521/96	EM 15296	
782 MAINT	1	1	1	1	1		1		1	2	597	656/110	644/108	AGG 16763	
407 S&S	1	1	1	1	1		1		1	1	606	649/107	627/103		
307 MED	1(2)	1	1	1(2)	1		1		1	0	347	404/116	395/114		
313 CEWI	3X	2	3	1(2)	4		1		1	1	526	521/99	514/98		

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NLS F99-024/1 #61

5- CH NARA DATE 5/19/06

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STATUS OF GROUND PACING ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

82D ABN DIV
15 DEC 79

ITEM	AUTH	ON HAND	DA OR % AVG	(%) OR	(%)	
					NORS	NORM
CHIAPARRAL						
TOW	162	162	90	97	1	2
DRAGON	294	294	99	98	1	1
105mm HOW (T)	54	54	80	94	3	3
155mm HOW (T) M114A1						
VULCAN M167	48	48	90	90	7	3
M60 A1 TANK						
M60 A2 TANK						
8 IN HOW (SP) M110						
155mm HOW (SP) M109						
VULCAN M163						
PERS CARRIER M113						
M551 ARAAV	54	53	82	94	1	5

DECLASSIFIED
E99-02411
NLS
NARA DATE 5/19/06

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NLS FA9-024/1 #63CN NARA DATE 5/19/06

CONFIDENTIAL
101st ABN DIV (AASLT)
ORGANIC BATTALIONS

DAMPL 32503
 ALL UNITS ALO 1

15 DEC 79
 STRENGTH

	O'ALL	PER	EOH	ES	TNG	TNG WKS	AUTH	OP STR, %	DEPL/%		
101 ABN DIV	4	4	1	2	3(4)	6(7)	17441	14454/83	13945/80		
UNIT	OVER ALL	STR	MOS	SGD	EOH	ES	TNG	OP STR, %	STRENGTH DEPL/%	DIV TOTAL	
										AUTH	
MANEUVER											
3 187 INF	4	4	3(4)	4	1	1	3	741	514/69	496/67	
1 327 INF	4	4	3(4)	4	1	1	3	741	520/71	516/70	OFF _____ 1194
2 327 INF	4	4	3(4)	4	1	1	3	741	507/68	497/67	WO _____ 677
1 501 INF	4	4	3(4)	4	1	1	2	741	530/72	524/71	EM _____ 15570
1 502 INF	4	4	3	4	1	1	3	741	516/70	494/67	AGG _____ 17441
2 502 INF	4	4	3(4)	4	1	1	3	741	511/69	502/68	
1 503 INF	4	4	3(4)	4	1	1	3	741	511/69	499/67	
2 503 INF	4	4	4	4	1	1	3	741	510/69	486/66	
1 506 INF	4	4	3(4)	4	1	1	3	741	506/68	476/64	OP STR
2 17 CAV	2	2	1	1(2)	1(2)	1	2	890	811/91	801/90	OFF _____ 1115
229 AVN BN	3	2	2	3	1	1	3	793	692/87	679/86	WO _____ 586
										DEPL	
FIRE SPT											
2 320 FA (105 T)	3	3	2	3	1	1	3	470	370/79	341/73	EM _____ 12253
1 321 FA (105 T)	3	3	2	3	1	1	4	470	381/81	372/79	AGG _____ 14454
3 319 FA (105 T)	3	3	2(3)	3	1	1	3(4)	470	369/79	365/78	
1 3 ADA (VUL)	3	3	2	2	1	2(3)	3	522	426/82	423/81	
SUPPORT											
101 AVN BN	3	3	2	3	1	1	4	373	418/112	409/110	OFF _____ 1109
158 AVN BN	2	2	2	2	1	1	4	373	414/111	377/85	WO _____ 503
159 AVN BN	3	3	2	3	1	1	2	630	531/84	518/82	EM _____ 12253
326 ENG BN	3	2	2	3	1	3	4	722	622/86	597/83	AGG _____ 13945
501 SIG BN	3	3	2	1	1	3	4	528	420/80	408/77	
801 MILI BN	2(3)	2(3)	1(2)	2	1	1	3	619	533/86	509/82	
426 S&S BN	2	1(2)	1	1(2)	1	2	3	408	469/96	456/93	
326 MID BN	2	2	2	2(1)	1	2	4	372	340/91	327/86	
5 IC BN	4(3)	2	1	4(3)	1	2	4	576	525/91	512/89	

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STATUS OF GROUND PACING ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

101ST ABN DIV
15 DEC 79

ITEM	AUTH	ON HAND	DA OR %	(%) OR	(%)	
			AVG		NORS	NORM
CHAPARRAL						
TOW	168	168	90	86	8	6
DRAGON	354	330	99	99	0	1
105mm HOW (T)	54	54	80	98	0	2
155mm HOW (T) M114A1						
VULCAN M167						
M60 A1 TANK						
M60 A2 TANK						
8 IN HOW (SP) M110						
155mm HOW (SP) M109						
VULCAN M163						
PERS CARRIER M113						
M551 ARAAV						

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NLS 199-024/1 #64

BY 01 NARA DATE 5/19/06

DAMPL 30102
ALL UNITS ALO 1

CONFIDENTIAL
24th INF DIV (M) (-)
ORGANIC UNITS

15 DEC 79
STRENGTH

	O'ALL	PER	EOH	ES	TNG	TNG WKS	AUTH	OP STR %	DEPL/%
24 DIV M (1)	4	4	4	3(2)	3	6	12303	11063/90	10643/87

UNIT	OVER				EOH		ES		TNG		STRENGTH			DIV TOTAL
	ALL	STR	MOS	SGD	EOH	PI	ES	PI	TNG	WKS	AUTH	OP STR %	DEPL/%	

MANEUVER

219 INF (M)	4	3	2	4	4	4	2(1)	2(1)	4	7	817	644/79	620/77
319 INF (M)	3X(4)	3(4)	2(3)	4	4	1	4(1)	4(1)	3(4)	6(7)	817	641/78	609/75
221 INF (M)	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	2(1)	3(2)	817	644/76	599/73
234 INF (M)	4	3	2(3)	4	4(3)	4	4	4	2(1)	3(2)	817	644/79	619/76
532 AR	4	2(3)	1(2)	3(4)	4	1	2	2	3	5(6)	532	495/93	480/90
270 AR	3(4)	2	1	3	2(4)	1	2(1)	2(1)	2	3	532	497/93	494/93
29 AR CAV	3	2	1(2)	3	1	1	1(2)	1(2)	3	5	707	665/94	649/92

AUTH

OFF	783
WO	209
EM	11311
AGG	12303

FIRE SPT

135 FA 155 SP1	4	3	2	3	4	3	2	1	3	6	584	483/83	451/77
235 FA 155 SP1	4	2(3)	2	4	4	3	1	1	4	7(8)	584	494/85	474/81
113 FA H IN SP1	4	2	1	3	4	1	3(4)	3(4)	4	7	510	462/91	457/90
552 ADA (C/V)	4	2	1	2	4	1	2	2	3(2)	5(4)	494	453/92	434/80

OP STR

OFF	772
WO	169
EM	10122
AGG	11063

SUPPORT

24 AVN	4	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	2	3	542	629/116	610/113
3 ENG	3	2	1(2)	3(2)	3		2		3	6	812	765/94	717/88
24 SIG	3	3	2	2(3)	2		2(3)		2	4	578	404/84	457/79
124 MAINT	2	2	1(2)	1	1		2(1)		2	4	787	735/93	720/91
24 S&I	4	1(2)	1	1(2)	4		1		2	3	342	342/100	323/94
24 MED	2	2	2	1	1		1		2	3	295	292/99	269/91

DEPL

OFF	766
WO	166
EM	9711
AGG	10641

RESERVE COMPONENT ROUNDOUT UNITS - ALO 1 AS OF 15 OCT 79

38 INF BN (M) (GA)	3	1	1	1	2(1)		4		3	6	3670	3401/93	90%
1121 INF BN (M)	3(2)	1(2)	1	1	1	1	3(2)	3(2)	2	4	831	815/98	91%
2121 INF BN (M)	3(2)	1	1	1	1	1	3(2)	3(2)	2	4	831	840/102	91%
1108 AP BN	3X(3)	1	1(2)	1	1	1	4(3)	4(3)	2	4	545	543/100	91%
1200 FA BN 155 SP1	3(3)	2	2	1	2(1)	1	3(4)	3(4)	3	6	590	521/101	88%

DECLASSIFIED

NLS #99-024/1 #65

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATUS OF GROUND PACING ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

24TH INF DIV

15 DEC 79

ITEM	AUTH	ON HAND	DA OR % AVG	(%) OR	(%)	
					NOHS	NORM
CHAPARRAL	24	24	88	81	11	8
TOW	84	84	90	78	14	8
DRAGON	122	122	99	100	0	0
105mm HOW (T)						
155mm HOW (T) M114A1						
VULCAN M167	12	11	90	85	12	3
M60 A1 TANK	132	132	86	87	6	7
M50 A2 TANK						
8 IN HOW (SP) M110	12	12	77	79	0	21
155mm HOW (SP) M109	36	26	82	98	0	2
VULCAN M163						
PERS CARRIER M113	396	256	89	79	16	5
M551 ARAAV						

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NARA DATE 5/19/01

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WORKING PAPER
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I. SUBJECT: Anticipated Resupply Needs

II. PURPOSE: To assess potential requirements for resupply of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the event Israel initiates a major incursion into Lebanon.

III. MAIN POINTS:

A. Israel has sufficient war reserve stocks of equipment, spares, munitions, and POL to sustain three to four weeks of combat operations at 1973 war level of intensity.

- No urgent request for resupply was received, acted upon, or generated by the US during or following the March 1978 Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon.
- If the conflict expands beyond an Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, urgent resupply requests for perceived critical items can be expected.

B. Resupply requirements: The most likely urgent resupply requests will be for Air Force items, since in our view ground action against Syria will be deferred as long as possible. Remaining requests would probably be prioritized air defense followed by ground force items. The attached table (TAB A) depicts major equipment and supplies in the pipeline.

- Air Force items:
 - High usage spares for F-4E, F-15, and F-16 aircraft
 - Additional precision-guided munitions
 - Conventional bombs
 - Expedited delivery of items in the pipeline
 - AIM-9L missiles (173)

INTERNAL STAFF PAPER
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- AIM-7F missiles (11)
- AGM-65 Maverick (300)
- F-15 aircraft (6, incl. 3 scheduled for 24 Feb)
- Air Defense items:
 - I-Chaparral missiles (161 in pipeline)
 - I-HAWK missiles (93 in pipeline)
 - REDEYE
- Ground force items:
 - Selected spares/components for combat vehicles (tank engines, tank transmissions, armored vehicle optics).
 - Selected antitank and artillery ammunition (TOW, 155mm HE projectile, 175mm HE projectile, DRAGON).
 - Expedited deliveries of armored vehicles and artillery can be expected if losses are high.
- Navy items: The IDF-Navy is supplied with non-US items, principally Israeli-produced. If a major sea battle developed requests for additional HARPOON missiles and release of high technology items which have not been approved due to technology concerns, such as MK-48 torpedoes, ETC-1 acoustic decoys, and towed array sensors, would be forthcoming.

C. Expedited deliveries. Any expedited delivery would require diversion from US stocks, causing potentially serious adverse impact on US forces readiness. The high usage spare parts for F-15 and F-16 aircraft, AIM-9L missiles, and armored vehicles are cases in point.

D. The attached table (TAB B) lists US equipment and ordnance items in the IDF inventory, the number on order, and assesses whether resupply would be required/requested in each of three different level of intensity conflicts.

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9 February 1962

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
ISRAEL
Major Items in the Pipeline
and Estimated Delivery Dates

Items	Jan-Mar 62	Apr-Jun 62	Jul-Sep 62	Oct-Dec 62	CY 63 and Beyond
50A3 Tanks	30 - Feb 30 - Mar	30 - Apr 35 - May 16 - Jun			
113A2 Armored Personnel Carrier	68 - Feb 77 - Mar	137	100	27	
577A2 Command Post Carrier	15 - Feb 11 - Mar	38	23		
546A2 Cargo Carrier	17 - Feb 8 - Mar				
2W Missiles	951*				
Dragon Missiles	3465 - Mar				
Thunderbolt Missiles					180
Armored Vehicle Launch Bridge					30
Armored Vehicle Launcher and Chassis				2	23
M109A1B 155mm SP Howitzer	16 - Feb 24 - Mar	23 - Apr 27 - May 28 - Jun	12 - Jul 35 - Sep	19 - Oct 11 - Nov 5 - Dec	
Dragon Night Sights	2 - Feb		83		
Dragon Night Sights	2 - Feb		48		
M374A2 81mm Cartridge	30,006 - Mar				
M483A1 155mm Projectile	8,000 - Feb 4,000 - Mar	4,000 Apr 4,000 Jun	4,000 - Jul 1,000 - Aug	10,000	
M437A2 175mm Projectile	23,358 - Feb				
Air Force					
F-16 Aircraft			1**		
F-15 Aircraft	3 - 24 Feb	3 - Apr			
Stinger Missiles			181	119	
F-4U-15	11 - Feb 22 - Mar				
Navv					
Sidewinder Missiles	45 - Feb 50 - Mar	78			
Phalanx Close-in Weapon System			1	6	
AIM-7F		11 - Jun			
WALLEYE					100

* Shipments suspended pending resolution of pallet damage.
** Remaining in the U.S. to perform Israeli peculiar modification tests.

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US EQUIPMENT IN ISRAELI INVENTORY (U)

ITEM	ON HAND	SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY	RESUPPLY REQUIRED		
			LOW*	MODERATE*	HIGH*
<u>AIR:</u>					
F-16 Aircraft	72	1	-	-	X
F-15 Aircraft	34	6	-	-	X
F-4 Aircraft	135	-	-	-	X
A-4 Aircraft	205	-	-	-	-
Air-to-Air Missiles:					
AIM-7E/F	694	11 (F)	-	X	X
AIM-9D/J/L	2907	173 (L)	-	X	X
Air-to-Surface Missiles:					
TOW	3000	951**	-	X	X
AGM-45 Shrike	1000	-	-	-	X
AGM-62 Walleye	400	100	-	X	X
AGM-78 Standard Arm	150	-	-	-	X
AGM-65A Maverick	650	300	-	X	X
Bombs					
Mk 82	UNK	UNK	-	X	X
Mk 83	UNK	UNK	-	X	X
Mk 84	UNK	UNK	-	X	X
<u>GROUND:</u>					
M60A3 tank	1320	121	-	-	X
M88 Recovery Vehicle	42	-	-	-	X
AV13 M60A1	0	25	-	-	-
M113 APC	5462	521	-	-	X
M109 155mm HOW	310	200	-	-	X
M107 175mm Gun	141	-	-	-	X
M110 203mm (8 inch) HOW	36	-	-	-	-
M-125A2 81mm mortar carrier	82	-	-	-	-
M-16 rifles	UNK	UNK	-	-	-
M-60 machine gun	UNK	UNK	-	-	-
50 CAL machine gun	UNK	UNK	-	-	-
Ordnance:					
155mm HE projectiles	UNK	35,000	-	X	X
175mm HE projectiles	UNK	23,358	-	X	X
DRAGON missiles	13,000	3465	-	X	X
TOW missiles	13,000	951**	-	X	X
Helicopters:					
AH-1 Cobra	12	-	-	-	-
Hughes 500MD	29	-	-	-	-
Agusta Bell 212 (ECM)	24	-	-	-	-
CH-53A	35	-	-	-	-
UH-1H/Agusta Bell 212	38	-	-	-	-

+

* Level of intensity of conflict: Low - Israel vs PLO; Moderate - Israel vs PLO and Syria in Lebanon; High - Israel vs PLO and Syria in Lebanon and vs Syria on Golan Heights.

** May be used with either air or ground mounted launchers.

BY AVJ NARA DATE 5/18/11
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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY</u>	<u>RESUPPLY REQUIRED</u>		
			<u>LOW*</u>	<u>MODERATE*</u>	<u>HIGH*</u>
<u>AIR DEFENSE:</u>					
M-163A1 Vulcan Gun	48	-	-	-	-
HAWK (missiles/launchers)	305/66	-	-	-	-
I-HAWK (missiles/launchers)	274/36	0/93	-	-	X
REDEYE launchers	1100	-	-	-	X
I-Chaparral (missiles/launchers)	864/48	0/161	-	-	X
<u>NAVAL OPERANCE:</u>					
HARPOON	100	-	-	-	X

* Level of intensity of conflict: Low - Israel vs PLO; Moderate - Israel vs PLO and Syria in Lebanon; High - Israel vs PLO and Syria in Lebanon and vs Syria on Golan Heights

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Background Paper

I. SUBJECT: Situation along the Israel-Lebanon Border

II. PURPOSE: To assess the effects of an Israeli attack into Lebanon.

III. MAJOR POINTS:

A. STOCKAGE LEVELS ON US SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT:

- The stockage levels of spare parts and ammunition maintained by the Israel Defense Forces is estimated to be at least 90 days. The Israeli Air Force maintains a six month stockage level for recoverable items and eight months for consumables. A 30 day supply of consumables is maintained at squadron level. Air munitions are estimated to be stocked at the 90 day level with a 30 day level maintained at most major operating bases. These levels were computed on the basis of requirements for a general Arab/Israeli conflict. Conflicts below the level of mid intensity would not severely tax the stockage levels of the IDF. Reliable data on utilization rates during the 1978 Litani Operation are not available. Utilization rates for a general Arab/Israeli conflict would be the same or greater than those experienced during the 1973 War.

B. SOVIET SUPPORT TO SYRIA:

- The Soviet Union has not given either Syria or the PLO a security guarantee in Lebanon. It is therefore unlikely that the Soviets would provide direct support, i.e., troops, to Syrian forces in Lebanon. If the conflict spreads to a ground war on Syrian territory and the Syrians are being badly defeated, the Soviets could send in ground forces. These forces would be Soviet airborne units, which would not have the mission of halting an Israeli advance, militarily. Use of Soviet forces would be geared toward forcing the Israelis to halt their advance, in order to avoid the consequences of engaging a Soviet force. Therefore, these Soviet units would be positioned in such a manner as to block the Israeli advance, while avoiding contact with Israeli forces.

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- Soviet military transports could airlift a regiment, minus artillery and other support units to Syria within six hours. This assumes the pre-positioning of the required aircraft. We may see as much as 3 days warning of such pre-positioning. An airborne division could be deployed in approximately 24 hours, again minus artillery and other heavy equipment. There are no pre-positioned Soviet stocks in Syria. Soviet pilots and air defense crews could be rapidly deployed to Syria.
- In either eventuality, i.e., hostilities confined to Lebanon or hostilities spreading to Syria, the Soviets can be expected to supply Syria with equipment. Initial supply can begin by air shortly *before* the outset of hostilities.
- The SOVMEDRON could be expected to deploy closer to the Lebanese coast. The SOVMEDRON presently has an ASW helicopter cruiser, one guided missile destroyer, two regular destroyers and one mine sweeper in the eastern Mediterranean.
- It would take two to three days for the Soviets to deploy naval infantry to the area off the Lebanese coast. However, their numbers would be very limited.

Prepared by: LTC Larry Chambers/Maj Harry Klein
DB-3C1/695-5904/4553
CAPT Ron Bragger
DB-1E2/692-9397/4651

ENCLOSURES

- ENCL 1 - Selected Israeli Troop & Equipment Strengths (S/NF)
- ENCL 2 - Naval Order of Battle (S/NF)
- ENCL 3 - Map of Lebanon (S/NF)
- ENCL 4 - Palestinian and Lebanese Christian Troop & Equipment Strengths (S/NF)

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SELECTED ISRAELI TROOP & EQUIPMENT STRENGTHS

	*	**	***	****	*****
TROOPS	68,000	12,000	17,000	1,500-2,000	2,000
TANKS	1,257	272	401	44	33
APCS	4,800	675	800	200	100
ARTILLERY	228	48	42	28	12
COMBAT MANEUVER BRIGADES	21	4	6	-1	1

*-----Operationally assigned to Northern Command during full mobilization occur.

**-----Normally deployed in Northern Command.

***-----Currently deployed on Golan Heights

****-----Currently deployed in Finger Area of Israel.

*****-----Currently deployed in Western Border Area of Israel.

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
SELECTED ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE

	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
<u>ISRAEL:</u>				
HAIFA:	1	Romat	PGG	8 Harpoon, 6 Gabriel, 1-76mm and 1-40mm gun.
	2	Aliya	PGG	4 Harpoon, 4 Gabriel, 1-40mm gun.
	5	Reshef	PGG	2-4 Harpoon, 6 Gabriel, 1-76mm and 1-40mm (1 unit w/o missiles)
	2	Saar-III	PTG	2 Harpoon, 3 Gabriel, 1-76mm gun.
	6	Saar-II	PTG	2-5 Gabriel, 1-40mm gun. (5 with VDS, 1 w/o missiles).
	1	Bat Sheva	LST	850 ton cargo capacity (15 tanks and 15 M-113s).
	2	Ashdod	LSM	300 t or 13 AMX-13 or 4 M-48s (1 in repair facility).
	3	Gal	SS	10 torpedoes (1 in overhaul).
	11	Dabur	PB	1-20mm, 2-12.7mm
<u>LEBANON:</u>				
PALESTINIAN:	2	Hamelin 37m	PB	1-30 or 40mm gun. (Located in Syria).
	Unk	Various speed boats		
	Unk	Inflatable dinghies		

NOTE: All naval weapons except Harpoon are either produced in Israel or procured from Western European sources. Current Harpoon inventory of 100 allows all available fleet launchers to be loaded.

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 BY ROV NARA DATE 5/18/11

PALESTINIAN AND LEBANESE CHRISTIAN MILITIA FORCE DEPLOYMENTS



Esse 504159 6-78-544600

XX = 30,000 troops
X = 5,000 troops
• = 500 troops

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Palestinian & Lebanese Christian Estimated Troop & Equipment Totals:

	TROOPS	ARTILLERY	MORTARS	APCS	TANKS
<u>PALESTINIANS:</u>					
Beirut--	2,000 (+500 militia)	Unknown	50	10	Unknc
Ad Damur South	6-8,000(+1,000)	150	250	20	78
North Lebanon (Tripoli)	900	Unknown	20	Unknown	Unknc
Bekaa Valley	1,500	40	50	20	Unknc

CHRISTIAN FORCES:

Lebanese Forces:

East Beirut	1,500-2,000	20	Unknown	20	30
North Lebanon	800	15	Unknown	10	20
Eastern Metn Region	1,200-1,500	25	Unknown	23	30

Haddad's Forces:

Western Area	250	4-6	6-8	6	2-4
Central Area	250	4-6	8-10	6-8	6-8
Eastern Area	500	10	8-10	8-10	6-8

NOTE: The Lebanese Forces (LF) move men and equipment from one region to another as required. Figures given represent estimates based on general threat level for each front. Haddad's militia can expand quickly to an estimated 3,000 troops while the Lebanese front can expand to about 30,000.

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NLRR 108-098/16 #57004

BY RW NARA DATE 7/17/12

FORM NO. 104

57004

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

9 February 1982

THE USSR AND LEBANON

Summary

The Soviets will try to exploit tensions or even limited hostilities in Lebanon to improve the USSR's position in the Middle East, particularly with the Syrians and Palestinians. But they have also opposed a major Syrian-Israeli clash which could lead to a US-Soviet confrontation. The contradictions involved in pursuing such a course means Soviet policy is not always clearly defined and can lead to miscalculation. (S)

In the event of hostilities, the level of Soviet military support to Syria would depend on the scope and scale of the fighting. The USSR has indicated to Syria that it would provide only limited military support--such as arms resupply--if the fighting was confined to Lebanon. If the Israelis made substantial attacks into Syria, however, we believe Moscow could place some of its airborne units on alert, step up weapons deliveries, or possibly send Soviet SAM crews or fighter pilots to Syria. Moscow would be more likely to introduce airborne or ground troops in the event of a full-scale war that threatened the fall of Damascus or the destruction of the Syrian military. (S)

Soviet policy toward Lebanon is determined by the impact of developments there on the USSR's broader position in the Middle

SOVM 82-10024

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East. Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to Chief, [redacted] Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis, [redacted]

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East, particularly its ties to Syria and the Palestinians. The Soviets especially want to strengthen their close ties with Syria and to reinforce the USSR's image as a protector of Palestinian rights. The Soviets would also like to have a role in any settlement that might be arranged. Tensions--or even limited hostilities--in Lebanon enable the USSR to increase Syrian and Palestinian dependence on Soviet support while portraying the US as the sole supporter of Israeli intransigence. (S)

Ties and Influence with Syria and the PLO

One aspect of the USSR's close relationship with Syria--since conclusion of the friendship treaty in October 1980--has been stronger Soviet support of Syrian policy in Lebanon. In the past, Lebanon had often been an irritant in Soviet-Syrian relations and Moscow's opposition to Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976 had severely strained bilateral ties. The USSR's objection reflected its interests in keeping the Palestinians in Lebanon free from Syrian political domination and susceptible to Soviet influence. While this concern probably continues to color Soviet attitudes toward Syria's presence there, Syria's enhanced importance to the USSR is pushing the Soviets to lend more support to Damascus. During last year's missile crisis in Lebanon, for example, the Soviets, for the first time, characterized the Syrian presence in Lebanon as legitimate. The Soviets may calculate that Syrian President Assad's increasing dependence on Soviet support will lead Syria to pursue policies in Lebanon that are more compatible with Soviet interests. (S)

The Soviets also have important equities with the Palestinians and have consistently supported their presence in Lebanon. They think that close ties with the Palestinians help enhance the USSR's image as a supporter of the Arabs and pressure other Arabs to oppose US diplomacy that ignores the PLO and excludes the USSR. Moscow's decision to upgrade the PLO office in Moscow last October was aimed at underscoring Soviet support to the Palestinian cause. The USSR is providing more and better arms to the Palestinians. [REDACTED] the two sides recently finalized an arms deal that includes SA-9 surface-to-air missiles--a missile the Soviets have not previously delivered--and anti-aircraft weapons. (S) (U) (C)

Leverage on Syria and the PLO

Moscow's ability to influence events in Lebanon is constrained by the need to protect its relationship with Syria. The Soviets have only limited leverage on Damascus' actions in Lebanon without damaging their close ties to Assad. He has long kept the Soviets at arms length regarding Lebanon because he considers Syrian interests there vital and separate from the Soviet-Syrian relationship. (S)

The divisions within the PLO offer the USSR the opportunity to play one Palestinian faction off against the other, thereby

enhancing Moscow's leverage over the PLO. The Soviets have long been suspicious of Fatah leader Arafat and have occasionally sought to strengthen the more radical Palestinian groups to restrict Arafat's policy options. Moscow especially wants to ensure that Arafat remains opposed to any Arab-Israeli settlement process that excludes the USSR. Soviet influence with the PLO, however, is diluted by the ability of Syria and Libya to serve as alternative arms suppliers to the PLO and by Fatah's intense suspicions of the USSR. (S)

Attitude Toward Tensions and Hostilities

The Soviets are not opposed to tensions per se in Lebanon as long as they remain at a manageable level and do not escalate into a crisis serious enough to draw them into a confrontation with Israel or the US. Indeed, insofar as chronic instability in Lebanon reinforces Palestinian and Syrian dependence on Moscow's good will and military support, the Soviets favor and encourage it. They probably hope that the tensions in Lebanon will unite the Arabs behind Syria and the USSR while isolating the US with Israel. They also may anticipate that such tensions will put more pressure on Egyptian President Mubarak to distance himself both from Israel and the US. Moscow would also use the problems in Lebanon to seek a broader role in Middle Eastern diplomacy. They already cite the situation in Lebanon as evidence of the need to replace the US-sponsored Camp David process with an international approach in which the USSR would have a role equal to that of the US. (S)

At the same time, the Soviets remain concerned that any crisis in Lebanon might escalate into a broad Israeli-Syrian conflict. They have a keen appreciation of Syria's military shortcomings and realize such a conflict might lead to a Soviet-US confrontation if the USSR tries to prevent a Syrian defeat. From Moscow's view, other possible negative ramifications of a large war include Assad's possible fall from power, the establishment of an Israeli-dominated Christian state, and the possible ouster of the PLO from Lebanon. These concerns have led the Soviets to caution the Syrians about undertaking any major hostilities in southern Lebanon. During the Syrian-Israeli face-off in Lebanon last year, for example, the Soviets gave Syria full political and diplomatic support but indicated Soviet military support would be limited in the event of a conflict in Lebanon. The Soviets have continued to assure Damascus of the USSR's support in the event of an Israeli attack on Syria but have also cautioned the Syrians against escalating the Lebanese conflict. (S)

Soviet Military Responses to Hostilities in Lebanon

An Israeli attack on Syria's SAM sites in Lebanon or a large-scale ground incursion into Lebanon would probably prompt the Soviets to resupply the Syrian military and position ships from the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron off Syria's coast. These

actions would be intended to demonstrate to Assad and other Arab states the value of close ties and alliance with the USSR. The Soviets also would seek to deter further Israeli military action and to position the USSR to take credit for halting Israeli aggression. (S)

Moscow's immediate response would likely be to caution Israel and influence the US to restrain Tel Aviv. The Soviets would hope that Assad's unwillingness to take on Israel in a major war and US pressures on Tel Aviv to avoid a major conflict would limit the fighting while offering the USSR the opportunity to project itself as Syria's protector, enhance its position with other Arab states, and gain a major role in the settlement of the crisis. (S)

An expansion of hostilities to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights would present the Soviets with a major decision, especially if Assad's intention was to escalate the fighting with the aim of obtaining direct Soviet and US involvement. The Soviets would want to avoid leaving Assad in the breach. But they might simply decide to refrain from any immediate military moves that could embroil the USSR in the hostilities in hopes the conflict would be short-lived and a compromise reached that would enable Damascus to claim a victory. More protracted fighting would lead the Soviets to step up the resupply effort, provide more sophisticated arms, and step up the USSR's naval activity off Syria's coast. (S)

If the Israelis carried their attacks into Syria the Soviets would consider further military actions designed to deter Israel and induce Washington to pressure Israel to desist. These could include placing some Soviet airborne units on alert, providing more sophisticated arms to Syria, or introducing Soviet SAM crews and fighter pilots into Syria. (S)

The Soviets would be more likely to introduce their own airborne or ground units in the event of a full-scale war between Israel and Syria in which Israel sought either to take Damascus or destroy the Syrian military. The evidence available indicates the Soviets have promised the Syrians in general terms that the USSR would take military action in the event of a major Israeli attack. Furthermore, a significant Syrian defeat or Damascus' acceptance of clearly unpalatable conditions at Israeli's hands would adversely affect Moscow's standing with the Arab states. The value of an alliance with the USSR would be weakened and Arab confidence in Soviet political and military support undermined. (S)

5/29/1981

United States Policy in Lebanon

The current "missile crisis" in Lebanon poses grave risks -- but it might also provide opportunities both for advancing American interests and for helping to extend Lebanon's control over its own country.

The Setting

For the United States, there are several key objectives to be secured during the current crisis -- objectives which can be summarized as a return more-or-less to the status quo ante (even though details of that "status" might be different):

-- helping Israel and Syria both to save face, politically, while effectively disengaging from current confrontation;

-- reestablishing implicit "rules of engagement" to minimize the risks of a repetition of such confrontations over Israeli and Syrian activities in Lebanon; and

-- limiting the capacity of the Soviet Union to manipulate the situation ("no war, no peace"), and to claim a right to involvement in broader Arab-Israeli diplomacy and peace efforts.

These are minimum requirements for the United States. While they would not represent steps either towards 1) a fundamental redefinition of Israeli-Syrian relations; 2) limitation of conflict between the PLO and Israel (or Haddad's Christian militias); or 3) a reduction in the use of Lebanon as a passive and "victimized" battlefield, they would create a situation which, historically, has proved to be acceptable within the context of U.S. needs, both to limit conflict and to seek implementation of the Camp David Accords. This assessment is underlined by Sadat's declared neutrality in the current confrontation.

However, there are three main reasons for looking at current diplomacy in a different light:

-- This crisis did occur, indicating that the status quo ante does not any longer necessarily provide a basis for containing similar confrontations in the future. The principle difference from years of relative stability conferred by post-1978 arrangements has been the role of the Christian militias -- and particularly the Phalangists -- which has, in Syria's eyes, challenged Damascus' position within Lebanon. More than before, as well, Syria's response to developments affecting its position in Lebanon both is a partial product of its isolation (since 1980) in the Arab world, and is tied up with its relations with the Soviet Union.

-- It may be possible for the United States to plant seeds

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BY CAS NARA, DATE 11/16/01

leading to a reduction of violence within Lebanon itself, and to a strengthening of the authority of the Lebanese central government. This has, of course, been a longstanding (and oft-stated) objective of U.S. policy towards Lebanon; but one that has had to take a back seat to more important U.S. strategic objectives. In effect, a Lebanon solution has been seen to be dependent on a solution to overall Arab-Israeli relations, and particularly to the Palestinian problem. However, the current crisis indicates that overall U.S. interests could be advanced by beginning a parallel process of working towards a resolution of Lebanese problems -- i.e. with Lebanon as subject rather than object of policy.

-- It is also desirable to use diplomacy in a crisis like this one (if at all possible) to set the scene for constructive developments in the overall Arab-Israeli peace process (or at least not to set that process back).

Additional Objectives of U.S. Policy

A broadened set of objectives for the United States in current diplomacy, therefore, might include the following (as well as the minimum objectives, above):

1. Syria: to help Assad find an alternative to his current stance in order to achieve basic goals.

Discussion: Syria's key incentives for being in Lebanon are the following, in descending order of immediacy: a) to contain conflict on its western border (i.e. inter-communal strife in Lebanon which could affect Syria); b) to demonstrate to other Arab states both that it can deal adequately with a problem in its "sphere of influence" (vis-a-vis both Israel and Lebanese domestic strife), and to enhance its stature, generally, in the Arab world; and c) to establish permanent influence over Lebanon. Provided the first incentive were realized, Syria might abandon (or postpone) the other two, if it could secure a further objective -- which also provides a reason for demonstrating a presence and influence in Lebanon: namely, a sufficient guarantee that it would not be left dangling, at the conclusion of a peace process in which the Palestinian problem is "resolved", but the Golan Heights remain in Israeli hands. If such a guarantee could be provided -- i.e. that peace must truly be "comprehensive" -- then Syria would have less of an objective need either to be in Lebanon, to support the PLO as a blocking force against any further progress in the peace process, or to seek diplomatic (as opposed to military-supply) support from the Soviet Union. Ideally, the United States, over time, should seek to offer a diplomatic alternative similar to that envisioned by Sadat in the early 1970s (though for obvious reasons it cannot be identical -- e.g. no future U.S.-Syrian military-supply relationship).

With the collapse of the Geneva approach in 1977 (i.e. a comprehensive peace settlement including the Golan Heights), plus the initiation of Camp David which excludes practical steps of interest to Syria, Syrian and Soviet interests became identical: to disrupt U.S. peace efforts. Assad has now "lucked out" in this crisis -- he

has found that he can "get our attention" (in part because of the threat of Soviet involvement in Middle East diplomacy). The key for us, therefore, is to ensure that Assad learns the right "lesson" -- not that a close relationship with Moscow confers benefits for him, but that a renewal of ties with us offers the best hope (however distant) of a peace process that ultimately could benefit Syria (on the Golan Heights). Otherwise, he will only be confirmed in the wisdom of his relationship to Moscow.

2. Lebanon: to help the central government extend its authority over increasing areas of Lebanon within its democratic framework.

Discussion: This objective has been limited by several factors, including: a) continuing (but reduced) confessional competition for domination of the central government -- which, among other things, has affected the Lebanese Armed Forces; b) increasing efforts by Christian militias (especially the Phalangists) to extend their reach and control within Lebanon; c) Syrian desires to be able to dominate the strategic and political situation in Lebanon wherever possible (as above) -- for example, its refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon, considering Lebanon as an extension of "greater" Syria; d) PLO use of southern Lebanon as its principal base against Israel; and e) Israel's pre-emptive strike policy against the PLO in Lebanon, plus its support for Haddad's buffer zone (and for activities of other Christian groups).

Where any of these factors can be reduced, however, Lebanese authority can be extended, thus helping to limit individual "flashpoints". Indeed, in terms of managing its own internal affairs, the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces have acquitted themselves better in recent weeks.

3. The Palestinians: to hold out some promise of redress.

Discussion: Clearly, there is no simple way to do this -- as steadfast and vocal opposition to the Camp David process has made clear. But at the very least, anything that can increase incentives for a diplomatic rather than terrorist approach would be beneficial (and would strengthen the hand of "moderates" like Arafat over the radicals) -- e.g. if Syrian incentives to support PLO activities were diminished.

4. Israel: to reduce risks of conflict with Syria (and Syria's efforts to dominate Lebanon), to work towards a reduction of the use of Lebanon as a staging area for PLO attacks on Israel, and to decrease Israeli incentives to promote Christian aggrandizement.

Discussion: From the Israeli perspective, the first objective could be facilitated if Syria were to withdraw from Lebanon, though that would require fulfillment of conditions noted above (there could be a half-way house if Syrian activities in Lebanon changed). For the second, Israel is unlikely to accept as real even a diminishing of PLO activity mounted

from Lebanon (as demonstrated in the past), and thus will continue to insist on the right of both aerial surveillance and pre-emptive attack. It might begin to constrain the policy of pre-emption if a) the Lebanese Armed Forces showed real gumption in key areas; b) Syria limited its own activities in Lebanon and actively sought to restrain the PLO; c) UNIFIL acted effectively against PLO infiltration (as it has failed to do); d) the Haddad buffer zone were secured and legitimated, at least on an interim basis; and e) the PLO showed a willingness to give diplomacy a chance -- an unlikely development, given both PLO politics and Israel's own ambivalence about resolving the Palestinian problem. Any movement here, therefore, could only be tentative and long-range.

5. Saudi Arabia: to begin to engage Riyadh in a practical sharing of responsibility for the overall peace process.

Discussion: Realistic prospects for moving that process forward probably require some form of Saudi involvement (as opposed to the Chimera of a "Jordanian option" based on an initiative by Hussein). Its negative attitudes on Camp David, etc., are all too clear; yet as the U.S. strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia develops, there will be an increasing need to "square the circle" of its strategic relationship with us, on the one hand, and resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict on the other. Saudi Arabia could be instrumental, with its relations with both Syria and the PLO.

6. The Soviet Union: to limit its capacity to influence the course of events in Lebanon (through Syria), to begin reduction of its relationship with the PLO, and to keep it from claiming admission to the broader peace process (the first and third are also minimum U.S. objectives in the current crisis).

Discussion: The Soviet role will be most effectively constrained to the extent that other objectives, above, are realized -- and particularly Syria's attitudes towards the best way of playing the course of the peace process.

Specific Steps

Most of the added objectives listed above are modest; some are not, and should be viewed more as long-range goals, but where the conduct of current diplomacy can begin to move events in beneficial directions. The following are some practical steps (some of which are already in train), divided into two contexts: steps directly affecting the current crisis, and steps to be taken now that could affect the overall peace process.

1. The Current Crisis:

-- keep President Sarkis actively involved in current diplomacy (even if to little practical effect), in order to demonstrate that Lebanon is not just the object of diplomacy;

— try to get the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) into as many areas as possible as part of a resolution of the crisis (Zahle, Mt. Sannin, Chouf, downtown Beirut and airport);

-- announce increased U.S. support for the development and equipping of the LAF (but in an arms-length relationship — i.e. no direct involvement in new deployments);

-- begin efforts to strengthen UNIFIL, both with added components (e.g. France) and a widened mandate (preferably informal, so that the U.N. Security Council does not become engaged, without at least tacit Syrian and Israeli backing); raise it in NATO;

— secure Phalangist acquiescence for the deployment of LAF troops in Zahle while keeping them at arms length; make this clear both directly and in representations to Israel, indicating the importance of confessional compromise;

-- encourage (in regular diplomacy) a dialogue within Lebanon on a new working bargain for sharing power, and a free expression of its people through the electoral process and a parliament (in this context, consider the possibilities for encouraging formation of a national reconciliation cabinet);

-- include discussions with Israel on practical alternatives to an unrestrained pre-emption policy, while ratifying limited "open skies" and providing strategic (but not tactical) intelligence on Syria; intensify efforts to gain Israeli restraint of Haddad, and reiterate U.S. opposition to a Lebanon divided on confessional lines;

-- avoid contacts with the Soviet Union on this issue;

-- (more speculative) begin thinking about the hitherto unacceptable idea of soliciting buffer-zone troops from NATO states, on a bilateral basis, to separate (and contain) the PLO and the Haddad militia; use this as a challenge to deflect support away from the so-called "European initiative". ✓

2. Overall Peace Process:

-- use current communications with Syria to underline the U.S. policy of "comprehensive settlement" (under 242) — at least in the future; use these communications to set up broader exchanges in the future; engage in a modest foreign aid program;

-- begin thinking now (not after the Israeli elections) about alternative approaches to peace, and begin low-level consultations with relevant parties;

-- stress to Saudi Arabia the relationship of the current crisis to broader peacemaking efforts and the U.S.-Saudi strategic relationship, and begin educating Saudi leaders in the responsibilities (and potential benefits) involved;

-- begin devising diplomacy on Lebanon to parallel the Arab-Israeli peace process (e.g. revival of the abortive efforts of 1979, as a declared follow-on to current crisis diplomacy).

Conclusion

The steps outlined above, while modest in scope, could help the United States use the current crisis to advance two objectives which hitherto have been seen to be incompatible: to meet our overall strategic needs in the region (by stabilizing both Israeli-Syrian relations and the situation in southern Lebanon), and to do something concrete about the human tragedy in Lebanon itself. Any efforts which could help do both would have an added benefit for the United States and for the Administration: to demonstrate the depth of human concerns -- a stance which is particularly important in the overall contest for allegiances with the Soviet Union, whose own lack of concern for human suffering is obvious.

Furthermore, a healthy, independent and sovereign Lebanon would offer specific advantages: including a revival of its role as a center for regional diplomacy, intelligence gathering, and business and banking activity. In addition, restoration of balance in Lebanese politics -- demonstrating that non-Arab Moslem groups can take part effectively in broader Middle East society -- would be reassuring to Israel in the conduct of peace diplomacy, because of the negative "lessons" it has drawn from the experience of Iran, the Kurds, and the Lebanese Christians -- i.e. can the Middle East be made safe for any non-Arab Moslem community?

In sum, therefore, there are real advantages for the United States in seeing current crisis diplomacy in a wider context, and in attempting to exploit it for broader gain.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1981

Lebanon RT
~~TOPIK FILE~~

Dear Dr. Saadi:


Thank you for your letter of April 7, 1981. It is kind of you to express joy at the President's speedy recovery. His strength sets an example for all of us to emulate.

Your thoughts on Lebanon are most interesting. That Lebanon is worth saving is beyond a doubt. Although the best approach for helping Lebanon is not yet clear, our diplomacy is very active regarding Lebanon.

A primary goal of American policy for Lebanon is to avoid a clash between Israel and Syria. As we pursue this goal, however, we acknowledge the need to find a long term answer to Lebanon's problems. Indeed, it may be the case that averting hostilities could be a first step in the process of finding a political solution to the ills that afflict Lebanon.

We appreciate your taking time to share your thoughts with us.

Sincerely,



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Elias T. Saadi, M.D.
President
American Lebanese League
2025 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 19, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Letter from President of American Lebanese League Forwarding Statement re Recent Trip

Dr. Elias Saadi, President of the American Lebanese League, which is an organization of Americans of Lebanese descent, wrote to you on April 7, 1981, expressing his joy at the President's speedy recovery. He also wrote about the organization's objections to the involvement of Syria and the armed PLO presence in Lebanon.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Dr. Saadi at Tab I.

Approve *We* Disapprove _____

Thanks
RT

SIGNED

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Dr. Saadi

A Incoming letter from Dr. Saadi



American Lebanese League

2025 I Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

7 MAY 1981

April 7, 1981

National Security Advisor Richard Allen
State Capitol Building
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Allen,

May I wish you well on behalf of 2½ million Americans of Lebanese descent and express our joy at the President's speedy recovery.

I have recently returned from a trip to Lebanon and desire to share my feelings with you with the enclosed statement.

Essentially it states the following:

1. that Lebanon is worthy of saving;
2. that the Syrians must leave Lebanon;
3. and that the Palestinians must be controlled while their problem seeks a solution.

I hope and pray that President Reagan's renewed strength will be the beginning of a new life for the Lebanese people.

Sincerely,

Elias T. Saadi, M.D.
President

ETS/tlm
Enclosure



American Lebanese League

April 7, 1981

Having recently returned from the second factfinding mission to Lebanon in the last year I want to update and share my thoughts with you.

Lebanon today is an occupied land. The three main participants are the Syrians, the Palestinians and the Israelis. Only a small part of Lebanon, the mountain itself and East Beirut are controlled by the Lebanese. In this drama, the government still exists in outward signs only and for all practical purposes has no control over any country. The major factor in the government's weakness is the lack of a strong internal security force and an inadequately equipped army. This paralysis continues because of Syrian hegemony.

The single most dominant Lebanese power, unquestionably, are the Lebanese Forces commanded by Bachir Gemayel. Any solution to the Lebanese problem must necessarily include them as a major factor.

Lebanon is engaged in an intermittent shooting war and a continuous war of attrition. This unnatural state of human existence has taken its toll after five years and cannot continue much longer.

It is not necessary to wax eloquent as to why Lebanon is important to the United States. Suffice to make the following points:

1. The majority of Americans of Middle East origin are of Lebanese descent, approximately 2½ million. This successful and assimilated portion of American society is vitally concerned about Lebanon.

2. Lebanon represents, in microcosm, the American dream. Seventeen sects, Muslim, Christian and Druze have lived together as a free nation. The system worked and it must be given the opportunity to evolve as an example to the politically and socially backward Middle East.

3. Lebanon needs to survive since it is the only place in the Middle East where there is free Christian presence. A free Christian presence will help evolve freedom for all. Politically it appears that this is what most of the Arab World fears most.



American Lebanese League

4. Lebanon presents to the United States a dimension of its Middle East foreign policy that is apart from the standard two traditional points of petro-politics and Arab-Israeli conflict (Palestinian problem included). Lebanon, with its rootedness in history and its historic ties to the U.S., represents a moral dimension to us as Americans. Its contribution to past and recent history surely cannot be ignored.

5. Lebanon today is exporting terrorism to the world but not by the Lebanese themselves. Terrorism by those elements who have come to Lebanon to use it as a base of operations and training is well known. We must now realize that these parties are surrogates for world revolution and the Soviet Union.

6. Finally, the Palestinian and overall Middle East problem will not be solved as long as Lebanon is boiling. I believe it naive to think that the Lebanese problem must wait until the Palestinian problem is solved. When will that be and can Lebanon wait? An unstable Lebanon guarantees an unstable Middle East. The U.S. must address the Lebanese question as a priority whose solution will begin to ease the overall Middle East problem.

Since 1975 the Lebanese have been fighting for their survival, independence and the integrity of their territories. The Lebanese man fights against the Palestinian army, the Syrian army and against the infiltration of diverse Arab nationalities who, for many reasons, have chosen to make Lebanon their battleground. These armies have taken advantage of the prevailing disorganization to make Lebanon a field of battle to settle (or keep inflaming) most of the Middle East conflicts.

While all of this terrorism and prostitution of the land is going on, the astonishing thing is that these groups with their propoganda machines have convinced most of the western media that this is a "civil war" principally between Christians and Muslims. This criminal abomination is still going on today. This surely is the blackest mark and the darkest hour of western journalism. Surely, our government intelligence knows better and this is where we plead our case.

Today there is a strong sense of nationhood by most Lebanese, although many cannot express it openly. The fragmented Lebanese society is being artificially kept apart by armed foreigners. The Lebanese society contains the cohesive elements to bring itself back together if left alone. It is essential that this begin to take place before what is left of constitutional government and institutions completely evaporates.



American Lebanese League

What are needed now are the following two steps:

1. The Syrians must leave Lebanon. A withdrawal must begin immediately and they should be replaced by an international force made up predominantly of Western troops.
2. The Palestinians must respect the Lebanese authority and refrain from being a state within a state. Armed conflict with Lebanese must end and provocation of Israel to the detriment of civilians must stop.

To achieve the above the U.S. must deploy its strongest efforts and initiatives in a serious, sustained and persistent way. We must act with the conviction that the saving of Lebanon is most important to us as leaders of the Western World.

The democratic West cannot, without losing its very nature, stay impartial in the face of the present evident destiny of a democratic country such as Lebanon. Lebanon, an independent state and member of the United Nations, has throughout its long history represented the highest spiritual and moral values.

A lack of solution to the problem will lead to partition which will reduce Lebanon to a series of armed religious enclaves which does not serve our interest as Americans. Action is required now before the Lebanese presidential election which will be a turning point in Lebanon's history.

Elias T. Saadi
President
American Lebanese League



Lebanese Information and Research Center

National Press Building, Suite 968, Washington, D.C. 20045 • Telephone: (202) 347-5810 • Telex: 64427

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 3, 1981

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:

Mr. Alfred Mady

PRESS RELEASE

Syrian and PLO forces are subjecting the innocent Christian population of Ashrafieh (East Beirut) and Zahle, the largest Christian city in the Middle East, to a massive shelling of barbaric proportions.

The inhabitants of Zahle and Ashrafieh are suffering not only from the intensity of the bombings but also from the lack of food, water, electricity and medical care.

Within the past two days, 110 persons have been killed, 400 wounded and 100 buildings destroyed. The bombing has reached such an intensity that the wounded are dying because of the lack of medical care and the dead cannot be buried. Six schools in the two areas have been destroyed. The shelling of the only hospital in Zahle has left 300 persons (the sick, wounded, doctors and nurses) helpless and trapped.

All contacts with the Syrians to stop their aggression have been fruitless. Even the order of President Sarkis, supposedly the commander of the Syrian forces in Lebanon, to bring about a cease-fire in all areas went unheeded.

Taking advantage of the assassination attempt made on the life of President Reagan and the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State Haig on a peace initiative to the Middle East, the Syrian occupation forces and the PLO are attempting to force the population of Zahle to leave their homes and settle elsewhere. As they have done in the past with other U.S. peace initiatives, they are again showing their displeasure. Zahle and Ashrafieh appear to be the victims.

It is hard to believe that these brutal attacks are happening under President Reagan, who stated in 1976 that if he were President, the tragedy in Lebanon would not have happened. The statement issued by the State Department regarding the killing of Lebanese Christians by the Syrians and the PLO is only a continuation of the Carter policy. This statement not only misrepresents the truth, it also provides a political cover for Soviet surrogates in the Middle East to expand their terrorist activities against friendly countries in the region.

We appeal to the United States, to the United Nations, to the world churches, to the people and governments of the Free World to use all the necessary means to:

- 1) Stop the shelling of, and attacks against, Zahle and Ashrafieh.
- 2) Compel the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and the PLO from both cities and to deploy the Lebanese Army in their place.
- 3) Urge the Syrian authorities to allow the International Red Cross to evacuate the wounded from the zone of conflict and provide them with medical assistance.