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Withdrawer

SMF 11/28/2008

File Folder LEBANON-JUNE-JULY 1981 (1)

FOIA

M2008-098/16

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STOCKER

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
57018	REPORT	RE RADICAL PALESTINIAN TERRORISM PAR 5/31/2002 F99-024/1 #96; UPHELD 7/17/2012 M098/16 #57018	2	7/22/1981	B1 B3
57020	MEMO	BAILEY TO ALLEN RE LEBANESE CRISIS P 11/28/2008 UPHELD M2008-098/16	3	7/23/1981	B1
57026	CABLE	USUN NEW YORK 02429 R 11/28/2008 M2008-098/16	4	7/22/1981	B1
57030	CABLE	DAMASCUS 4590 PAR 12/6/2002 F99-024/1 #99; PAR 7/17/2012 M098/16 #57030	2	7/23/1981	B1 B3
57032	CABLE	BEIRUT 4923 R 11/28/2008 M2008-098/16	2	7/23/1981	B1
57033	CABLE	RE SYRIA D 3/30/2001 F99-024/1 #101; UPHELD 7/17/2012 M098/16 #57033	4	7/22/1981	B1 B3
57034	MEMO	HAIG TO RR RE ORIGINS OF RECENT VIOLENCE IN LEBANON R 11/28/2008 M2008-098/16	2	7/18/1981	B1
57038	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 57034 R 11/28/2008 M2008-098/16	2	7/18/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Collection: Kemp, Geoffrey: Files
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 File Folder: Lebanon - June - July, 1981 (1 of 2)

Archivist: gcc/bcb
 FOIA ID: F99-024/1
 Date: 6/2/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	re Israel, 3p. R 5/19/06 F99-024/1 #92	7/24/81	P1, F1
2. report	re Lebanon, 1p. R u u #93	7/21/81	P1, F1
3. report	re Habib Mission, 6p. R " u #94	7/28/81	P1, F1
4. memo	Bailey to Schweitzer, Shoemaker, 2p. R u u #95	7/24/81	P1, F1
5. paper	re Palestinians, 2p. PART. 5/31/02 F99-024/1 #96; upheld 7/17/12 M08-098/16 #57018	7/22/81	P1, F1 ³³
6. memo	Bailey to Allen, 3p. PART 5/19/06 u #97	7/23/81	P1, F1
7. cable	222234Z, 4p. D 11/16/01 F99-024/1 #98	7/22/81	P1, F1
8. cable	230804Z, 2p. P 12/6/02 F99-024/1 #99; Par. 7/17/12 M08-098/16 #57030	7/23/81	P1, F1
9. cable	230754Z, 2p. PART 11/16/01 F99-024/1 #100	7/23/81	P1, F1
10. cable	re Syria, 4p. D 3/30/01 NLSF99-024/1 #101; upheld 7/17/12 M08-098/16 #57033	7/22/81	P1, F1, ³³
11. memo	Kemp/Tanter to Allen, 1p. R 5/19/06 u #102	7/20/81	P1, F1
12. memo	Allen to RR, 1p. R u u #103	n.d.	P1, F1
13. memo	Haig to RR, 2p. PART u #104	7/18/81	P1, F1
14. memo	Duplicate of Item # 13, 2p. PART u #105	7/18/81	P1, F1
15. memo	Tanter/Feith to Allen, 1p. R u u #106	7/14/81	P1, F1

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8. cable	230804Z, 2p. P 12/6/02 F99-024/1 #99	7/23/81	P1, F1
9. cable	230754Z, 2p. PART. 11/16/01 F99-024/1 #100	7/23/81	P1, F1
10. cable	re Syria, 4p. D 3/30/01 NLSF99-024/1 #101	7/22/81	P1, F1, B3
11. memo	Kemp/Tanter to Allen, 1p. R 5/19/06 " #102	7/20/81	P1, F1
12. memo	Allen to RR, 1p. R " " #103	n.d.	P1, F1
13. memo	Haig to RR, 2p. PART " #104	7/18/81	P1, F1
14. memo	Duplicate of Item # 13, 2p. PART " #105	7/18/81	P1, F1
15. memo	Tanter/Feith to Allen, 1p. R " " #106	7/14/81	P1, F1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 31, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Letter from J. Khan, Lebanese Student,
Concerning Lebanon-Muslim Christian War

Transmitted at Tab I is a letter from you to Mr. Khan, a Lebanese student, who wrote you a letter July 23 (Tab A), about his concern for the well-being of Lebanon and his thoughts on the problems in Lebanon.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Mr. Khan at Tab I.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments

- Tab I - Letter to Mr. Khan for your signature
- A - Incoming letter from Mr. Khan dated July 23

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Khan:

Thank you for your letter of July 23, 1981. I share your concern with the well-being of Lebanon. As you point out so well, it is a simplification to describe Lebanon's ills as deriving from religious differences only. On the other hand, perhaps the situation there is more complicated than your economic explanation suggests.

American policy towards Lebanon assumes that there are many reasons for its instability, and thus there may not be single solutions. An overall goal of U.S. policy is for an expansion of the central authority of the Lebanese government and a reduction in the armed presence of foreign elements in Lebanon.

Your thoughts are greatly appreciated.

With regards,

Cordially,

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. J. Khan
2040 Lake Avenue
Wilmette, Illinois 60091

27 JUL 1981

4596

2040 Lake Avenue
Wilmette, Il. 60091

July 23, 1981

Mr. Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Allen:

When one speaks of civil war in Lebanon, the half-truth initiated by Mr. Begin of a Muslim-Christian war is perpetuated. A few simple facts are in order:

1. The Syrians entered Lebanon, with the support of the Arab world, to assist a predominantly Christian faction.
2. A prominent Christian leader Mr. Franjeh, lost his son to assassins from the Phalange, another Christian group.
3. The Palestinian representative at the UN, Mr. Zehdi Terzi, is a Christian.
4. The orthodox Archbishop of Jerusalem, a Christian-Palestinian, was imprisoned by the Israelis for a substantial period of time.
5. Kamal Nasser, killed in Beirut in 1973 by Israelis was a Christian.

The Lebanese problem appears rooted in horrendous economic disparity between the ruling families comprising a very small minority and the remainder of the people. A sad and ravaged country, it needs help to heal its wounds, not myths designed to mold public opinion in the U.S. into supporting a ruling elite.

Sincerely,



J. Khan

Lebanon. A name which always passes through your ears, especially since April 1975 when the civil war erupted there.

It breaks my heart to hear the American news agencies calling it a war between Christians on the one side and the Moslems with their Palestinian allies on the other side. It is completely unlogical, as if calling the Palestinian people all fanatic Moslems or calling the Lebanese people religious fanatics.

Palestinians are mostly Christians and Moslems. A lot of Americans know that a lot of the PLO leaders are Christians. In fact, martyr Kamal Nasser, who was assassinated in Beirut in 1973 by the Zionists, was a Christian and one of the top three leaders of the PLO.

The Lebanese people are open-minded in general with big hearts, and Lebanon itself was a symbol of peaceful interaction between all religions.

So, what is going on? Four percent of the people in Lebanon were rich and 96-percent were completely poor. The government was corrupted. And, as a fact, the President of Lebanon was searched in 1974 in the New York Airport for heroin. The parliament was inherited by the same old families since the 1940's. Theft everywhere was in the government. The Constitution was not that bad but it was old, and it needed to be amended.

The Constitution did not state that the President must be a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem, while the Speaker of the House must be a She-ite Moslem. This is the way it was. Does your religion or sect make good citizens?

The intellectual Lebanese and all Lebanon lovers felt this corruption in government and the hashish dealers who used to run the government were unbearable. This is why the war is going on.

The Lebanese isolationist phalangists who only trust Maronite Christians do not even like protestants, orthodox or otherwise. Now the United States takes sides and maybe helped plan the civil war. They take the side of the phalangists because they are against the Palestinians which is in the interests of Israel.

So, how does the American government, which is supposed to defend freedom and democracy in the world, stand beside such a party? I know for sure that most of the American people will not because America had a glorious chapter in the Second World War.

A Lebanese student

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET
ATTACHMENT

July 29, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Authorization for Sending Two Documents on
 Lebanon: to Fred C. Ikle

Fred and I discussed the situation in Lebanon. He requested any documents I had prepared that would give him an overview of Israel's motivations in Lebanon and of Phil Habib's accomplishments.

At Tab A is my paper of July 24, 1981 on "Israel's Main Goal in Lebanon..." At Tab B is a paper I prepared on the "Habib Mission and the Lebanon Crisis." Neither paper is identified with the NSC.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to send Fred the Israel paper dated July 24.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you authorize me to send Fred the Habib Mission paper dated July 28.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A - Paper on Israel's Main Goal in Lebanon... dated July 24, 1981
- B - Paper on Habib Mission and the Lebanon Crisis dated July 28, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET
ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

July 24, 1981

Israel's Main Goal in Lebanon During the De Facto
Ceasefire: Restrict the PLO's Emerging Conventional
Warfare Infrastructure

Israel's military doctrine anticipates two types of threats:

- 1) Terrorism (threat of shelling, infiltration, and bombings within Israel); and
- 2) Warfare (threat from conventional armies).

Israel's defense planners originally devised a strategy of reprisal raids to compel Arab regimes to crackdown on terrorist operations launched from their territory.

The original terrorist threat from the South declined when Israel seized control of Gaza from Egypt in 1967. Terrorist activity against Israel from the East, however, increased upon Israel's seizure of the West Bank, an area that had been controlled by Jordan before 1967.

Reprisal raids against Jordan impelled King Hussein to suppress the armed Palestinian presence in Jordan. The crackdown culminated in the Jordanian Civil War of 1970, which led to the movement of Palestinian forces from Jordan to Lebanon. The reprisal strategy was effective against Jordan.

The reprisal strategy, however, did not have the same effect in Lebanon because the Government of Lebanon could not compel the armed Palestinians to cease their hostile actions against Israel. Instead of reprisals, Israel adopted a "preventive attack" strategy to keep the terrorists off balance. The aim also was to prevent the Palestinians from acquiring supplies of heavy military hardware.

~~SECRET~~

Review on July 24, 1987

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NARA, DATE 5/19/02

The preventive strategy worked until the Palestinians began to receive large quantities of more sophisticated equipment from Libya, Syria, and the Communist bloc during this year, but especially in the last few months during a ceasefire. The threat to the northern border towns had been mainly from shelling and infiltration. With the new weapons, the terrorist threat is gradually evolving into a conventional warfare threat.

Prior to Israel's land, sea, and air operations during July, the PLO was about to turn South Lebanon into a mini confrontation state. In this regard, see attachment at Tab A from Lebanon: An Evolving Conventional Palestinian Force, DIA, 21 July 1981, p.5.

The emerging conventional warfare capability of the Palestinians coincided with the introduction of Syrian missiles into Central Lebanon. The Syrian missile umbrella in Lebanon complements the emerging Palestinian infrastructure and creates a conventional warfare threat to Israel from Lebanon that is now small but could grow at an accelerated pace in the future with little advance warning.

Israel's strategy for dealing with conventional armies depends upon the territorial depth and amount of warning time available to Israel. A preemptive war strategy was devised because of lack of depth for absorbing a first strike. Depth is important for Israel because it has a small standing army and requires time for mobilization of its reserves upon receiving intelligence warning of actual enemy capability and possible intent of attacking.

The de facto buffer zone in South Lebanon commanded by Israel's Christian ally Major Haddad is more important in light of the growing threat to Israel's security from the PLO/Syrian armed presence in Lebanon. The buffer is viewed by Israel's planners as necessary to provide warning of enemy capability to attack. The emerging conventional warfare capability of the PLO in Lebanon is more a threat to Israel's Christian ally of the South than to Israel proper.

Israel's military operations in Lebanon during mid-July were designed to prevent the conventional warfare threat from getting out of hand. Attacks on bridges, roads, and other line of communication are intended to destroy Palestinian/Syrian military infrastructure. On the other hand, the airstrike on Beirut seems to be an isolated event motivated by the old reprisal strategy rather than the new preventive attack doctrine.

CONCLUSIONS

- 1) As the armed Palestinian presence evolves from terrorist threat to a conventional warfare threat, U.S. leverage on Israel decreases.

- 2) Ceasefires allow for the Palestinian/Syrian conventional warfare infrastructure to grow with little fear of it being destroyed by Israel. A ceasefire may lead to a wider war later, especially if the Syrian missile umbrella expands from Central Lebanon to the East into South Lebanon and/or to the Beirut area.
- 3) The spread of Syria's missile defense to Beirut and/or to South Lebanon combined with the emerging PLO conventional warfare capability constitute a serious threat to Israel and its Christian ally in South Lebanon. Such a prospect increases the chances of a major ground operation by Israel to push the PLO North, e.g., of the Damascus/Beirut Highway, before the threat becomes full-blown.
- 4) Israel's minimum objective during the de facto ceasefire remains the elimination of heavy weapons in the hands of Palestinians in South Lebanon, e.g., long range artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks.
- 5) The PLO's minimum objectives during the de facto ceasefire remain the termination of Israel's preventive attacks, cessation of Israel's overflights of PLO positions, and the end of Major Haddad's shelling of PLO dominated towns and military positions.
- 6) A ceasefire without restrictions on the conventional warfare threat of the PLO will break down, leading to a major ground operation by Israel to destroy the emerging threat to its basic security.
- 7) Although our policy of working for a ceasefire seems to be having an effect, we should be aware that this may be a short-lived phenomenon. In fact, a case can be made that the ceasefire itself will allow both the PLO and Israel more time for further military preparations that, in turn, would lead to a new and more extensive escalation of violence.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In addition, al Fatah has developed several alliances with Lebanese groups that cooperate with the Palestinian forces. Some of these elements, such as Walid Jumblatt's predominantly Druze Progressive Socialist Party, focus their attention in the Druze homeland area east and southeast of Beirut. Others, such as the Arab Lebanese Army, Lebanese Communist Party, and Communist Action Organization, have forces deployed in southern Lebanon along with al Fatah's units.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Al Fatah's second mission -- operations against Israel -- is handled by the Western Sector Office. It is chiefly concerned with offensive activities and the development of a resistance movement within the occupied territories. The Abu Yusuf al Najjar Battalion, Ajnadin Brigade, which is stationed in Tyre, appears to work closely with the Western Sector Office.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Al Fatah/PLO also coordinates or at least gives tacit approval to many of the operations conducted by other Palestinian fedayeen units. This increases al Fatah's unconventional warfare/terrorist capability and sometimes enables it to support activities Arafat might not want attributed to al Fatah or the PLO. Arafat's efforts to control all operations against Israel, however, have not always been successful, since some of the smaller groups reject his leadership without challenging him directly.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Syria has played a key role in the gradual conversion of al Fatah's units from fedayeen/guerrilla elements into regular units. Since last year, the Syrians have been supplying al Fatah with T-34 tanks, 130-mm field artillery, 122-mm BM-11/21 multiple rocket launchers, and other weapons, some of which were furnished by Libya. The intent is to upgrade al Fatah's military capability and continue to convert its forces into a regular army. At the same time, however, Syria has been upgrading the PLA and al Saiqa forces. Syrian officers command these units, and Damascus has moved to increase its control by adding Syrians to the enlisted ranks. Two tank battalions, elements of the Hittin and Qadasiyah brigades, are equipped with T-54/55 tanks. Nevertheless, in the future, Syria would probably be reluctant to commit these Syrian-controlled Palestinian forces against al Fatah, since many of the Palestinians would probably desert as they did in 1976.

Outlook

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Yasir Arafat realizes that al Fatah is dependent on Syria, since Damascus controls the land supply routes to the Palestinians and many of its training bases and supply depots in Syria. Syria's pan-Arab Baath ideology and its skillful linkage of the Golan Heights to a solution of the Palestinian issue make Damascus a sympathetic supporter of the Palestinians. This support will probably continue as long as the Palestinian issue is not addressed before that of the Golan Heights. Nonetheless, Arafat does not trust the Syrians and has no intention of subordinating his organization to Damascus.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Subsidies from the conservative Arab States of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are vital to al Fatah's survival if it is to avoid Syrian domination. Since freedom of action in those areas controlled by the Palestinians in Lebanon is an essential prerequisite for al Fatah to function effectively in the Arab political

The Habib Mission and the Lebanon Crisis

Overview

Ambassador Philip Habib made three trips to the Middle East between May 5 and July 26. The first trip avoided war between Israel and Syria over its missiles in Central Lebanon. The second brought about the lifting of Syria's siege of Zahlah Lebanon. The third effected a cessation of hostilities along the border of Lebanon and Israel.

Future goals regarding Lebanon include: 1) maintaining the ceasefire; 2) expanding the United Nations Interim Force Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the south; 3) keeping the Saudis actively involved in the process of national reconciliation among the various groups in Lebanon; 4) restricting the movement of new heavy weapons into the south for the Palestinians while working to reduce the level of the heavy weapons already present; and 5) reducing the influence of such outside forces as the Syrians, Palestinians, and Israelis as the central government of Lebanon's authority expands throughout the country.

DECLASSIFIED 12/10/87
NLS F99-0241 #94

BY CU NARA DATE 5/9/06

Background

In December 1980, Syria designated the entire Bekaa Valley of Lebanon and the main Beirut-Damascus Highway vital to Syria's national security. Accordingly, Syria made clear its intention to control the area (including roads) around the city of Zahlah. In March-April 1981, Syrian forces in Lebanon (Arab Deterrent Force) announced that Christian Phalange efforts to link Zahlah by roadways with the Christian heartland to the northwest represented

a threat to the ADF. Meanwhile, fighting broke out between Syrian troops and Christian militias in and around Zahlah. In late April, as Syrian ADF troops were clearing Phalange forces from the Sannin mountain ridges around Zahlah, Israel's aircraft shot down two Syrian helicopters that were supplying the Syrians on the ridges. Syria then moved surface-to-air missiles into the Bekaa Valley around Zahlah, and Israel threatened to destroy the missiles, if the Syrians refused to withdraw them.

Habib Mission: May 6-28

Former Under Secretary Philip Habib was named Special Presidential Emissary on May 5. Fears were growing that, if Israel initiated airstrikes against the Syrian missiles in Central Lebanon, a major Middle Eastern war could ensue. The President through a personal message, asked Prime Minister Begin for time to ease the situation back from the flashpoint, so as to allow for diplomacy to restore the status quo ante regarding the Sannin ridges, Zahlah, and the missiles.

Habib's strategy was to initiate a diplomatic process to be led by the Saudis that: 1) would effect a Syrian pullback from the Sannin and place Lebanese internal security forces there; 2) would lift the Syrian siege of Zahlah; and thus 3) would deprive the Syrians of any need for their missiles in the Bekaa Valley. Israel then could revert back to the relatively low rate of reconnaissance flights that antedated the crisis. Habib

sought no formal agreements as such. Habib succeeded in averting a major military confrontation between Israel and Syria over the missiles.

In late May, Israel, in response to the firing of Libyan-manned SA-9 surface-to-air missiles at Israel's reconnaissance aircraft, launched airstrikes and seaborne commando raids against Palestinian targets south of Damur Lebanon (on the Mediterranean coast south of Beirut). These were the first strikes since late April. Begin had told Habib that the missile crisis with Syria would not constrain Israel's moves against the PLO.

One of the reasons for Israel to conduct such "preventive" military operations was that it feared the PLO's efforts to acquire a conventional warfare military infrastructure and heavy weapons. These efforts were especially intense during the period in which Habib was in the area. During the spring and summer of 1981, the PLO acquired substantial reinforcements to their military capability from Libya, Syria, and the Communist bloc. For example, new tanks arrived from Communist nations for a brigade of the Palestine Liberation Army under the command of Fatah.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) acquired armored personnel carriers and tanks. Libya and Syria supplied Fatah, the PFLP-GC, and the DFLP with artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers mounted on trucks. The most

important PLO acquisitions were the mobile rocket launchers, which improved the volume and rate of fire for shelling Israel's border villages.

Habib's first mission succeeded in averting a war between Israel and Syria over the missiles. Habib, however, had not addressed the PLO's arms buildup or the escalation in the fighting between the PLO and Israel.

Early June saw the reconstitution of the Arab League's reconciliation committee, for Lebanon, consisting of foreign ministers from Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Arab League secretary. This development had been initiated by Habib. The committee met at Bayt ad-Din, Lebanon to discuss Lebanese national reconciliation. Notwithstanding Israel's bombing of Iraq's nuclear facility in early June, Arab League diplomacy ended the Syrian siege of Zahlah, and brought about the withdrawal of non-resident Christian Phalange militiamen from the city during late June. Meanwhile, Habib travelled back and forth between Beirut, Riyadh, Damascus, and Jerusalem, facilitating the Saudi-led Arab League diplomacy. Habib returned to the States, partly in order to avoid being in the area during Israel's elections on June 30.

Where Habib's first trip succeeded in averting war, the second mission succeeded in helping the Arab League committee to effect a lifting of the siege of Zahlah. Although a decision was made

for the U.S. to credit the Saudis with this breakthrough, Habib's efforts were an integral part of Saudi diplomacy. The success of Habib's second mission occurred even though Israel struck Iraq's nuclear facility and there was violence between Israel and the PLO in Lebanon.

Habib Mission: July 9-26

During July 10-14, Israel's aircraft struck at PLO positions in Lebanon. The attacks aimed at destroying Libyan-supplied and manned SA-9 missile batteries and Palestinian artillery positions near Damur. Israel last struck Libyan SA-9 sites in May and had expressed concern since then over the continuing shipments of weapons to Palestinian groups. Israel's operations also served as retaliation for Palestinian rocket attacks against one of Israel's northern towns.

On July 15, the PLO attacked two of Israel's northern villages and Israel retaliated by attacking Palestinian targets in southern Lebanon. During this attack, Israel downed a Syrian MIG-23 aircraft, the fourteenth lost by Syria to Israel since mid-1979. On July 17, Israel hit Beirut and bridges over the Zahrani and Litani rivers.

The dogfight between Israel and Syria and the escalating violence between Israel and the Palestinians resulted in intensive diplomatic activity led by Habib. This activity culminated in a

cessation of hostilities on July 24. The third Habib mission succeeded in capping the violence between Israel and the PLO. A by-product of the ceasefire is an implicit understanding that Israel would refrain from attacking the Syrian missiles. Habib returned to the States on July 26 and the ceasefire generally has held through July. Although the Syrian missiles are still present in Central Lebanon, they are not now the issue they were prior to the escalation and cessation of hostilities between Israel and the PLO. Similarly, the issue of Syrian troops on the Sannin ridges is not as explosive an element of the conflict between the Phalange and the Syrians in light of the lifting of the siege of Zahlah by the Syrian troops.



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LEBANON

July 23, 1981

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Israel's Position On Lebanon

The attached material is sent to you in order to explain Israel's position on the terrorist operations from Lebanon and her counter-measures.

The recent escalation stems directly from the fact that the terrorists had amassed huge quantities of Soviet weapons and were planning a major assault on the civilian population in northern Israel. Therefore, in accordance with its policy of pre-emptive defense, Israel struck at the terrorist headquarters and bases in Beirut and other parts of Lebanon.

Civilian casualties were the direct result of the fact that the terrorists had set up their headquarters in the midst of the civilian population.

It is necessary to understand the background, to have the facts and perspective which, we hope, these documents will provide.

We stress that Israel has no quarrel with the people of Lebanon but with those terrorists who have violated Lebanese territory by using it as the launching pad for their murder campaign against Israel. If the Lebanese Government is able to assert its sovereignty and reestablish its authority in order to stop the terrorists operating from their country -- as Jordan and Syria have done before them -- Israel will gladly cooperate with Lebanon to establish peaceful relations and tranquility on the border.

Information Department



23 July 1981

Information Background

PLO AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL AND LEBANON

In recent weeks the citizens of Israel have been the victims of an escalating wave of PLO violence from across the northern border. Faced with mounting difficulty in penetrating Israeli territory from their bases in southern Lebanon, the PLO terrorists have resorted to massive artillery and rocket attacks against the civilian population of the Galilee panhandle (mainly the town of Qiryat Shemona) and the western Galilee (mainly the city of Nahariya).

Between 15 and 20 July, these attacks have claimed numerous victims: five civilians have been killed (among them a 14-year-old boy) and 44 wounded. Altogether, the terrorists have attacked some 19 Israeli towns and villages, extending across the entire northern frontier, and have inflicted heavy damage.

Until 1970, the principal base of PLO activity against Israel was Jordan and the Lebanese border was quiet. But when in the summer of 1970, it became clear that the PLO was attempting to subvert the Jordanian regime as well, King Hussein took military action in September against the terrorists, and finally drove them from Jordanian soil. During the fighting, some 5,000 Palestinian Arabs were killed and another 8,000 wounded, according to the representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Amman.

PLO SUBVERSION OF LEBANON

The terrorists sought and found new bases in Lebanon. Taking advantage of the weakness of the Lebanese system of government and with the help and complicity of the other Arab governments, they gradually forced their control on the Palestinian Arab refugee camps and established a comprehensive network of organizational training and logistical facilities. Terrorist attacks against Israel became more frequent and grew in intensity. To list but a few -- the attack on the school bus near Kibbutz Baram in May 1970, in which 9 pupils and 3 teachers were killed and other 19 pupils wounded, the attack on a school on Ma'alot in May 1974 in which 24 civilians were killed and 62 wounded, and the attack on the nursery of Kibbutz Misgav Am in April 1980 in which a two-and-a-half-year-old child and one kibbutz member were killed, and another adult and 4 children wounded.

This same principle applied to Beirut. The terrorists chose to locate their headquarters in 7 to 8 storey buildings, using the intermediate floors for their offices, whilst those beneath and above were inhabited by civilians -- who shielded them.

Israel was thus faced with the difficult dilemma of having to choose between the security of its own citizens -- whose protection would have necessitated more extensive attacks on the PLO facilities -- and that of those who wielded the PLO terrorists. At great risk and cost to its own citizens, Israel, until recently, painstakingly adhered to the latter option. But recent developments, however, forced Israel to re-evaluate this policy.

ESCALATION DANGER

For some time now, the PLO has been seeking to organize itself into larger and larger terrorist frameworks with enhanced fire power. This transformation has been spurred by a massive influx of heavy arms -- including long-range 130 mm artillery, some 70-80 T-54 T-55 tanks, mobile BM 21 rocket launchers capable of firing rapid salvos of up to 40 katyusha rockets at targets over 13 miles distance, and SAM-9 anti-aircraft missiles -- supplied primarily by Libya, Syria and the USSR.

On 15 May, the PLO launched a massive shelling of Israel villages and towns -- extending all along Israel's northern frontier, which caused large numbers of casualties and unprecedented damage. This left Israel with little choice but to take urgent measures to counter this PLO escalation.

Thus, Israel decided to strike at the PLO logistic and organizational infrastructure in Lebanon. The PLO is fully responsible for any civilian casualties caused by this action, because of its deliberate policy of placing its installations in the midst of civilian concentration.

The Israeli action does not represent any policy of harming civilians, despite their deliberate use by the PLO as human shields. On the contrary, every possible precaution was adopted to minimize civilian casualties and damage, and Israel will continue to do so in the future.

SYRIAN PROVOCATION

There is no doubt as to the Syrian role in this latest round of escalation. Historically, Syria has considered Lebanon to be an integral part of its territory, and it has proven its readiness to go to great lengths to further its goal of annexing Lebanon as part of its plan to create a "greater Syria". Thus, the destabilizing PLO presence in Lebanon serves its purposes admirably, and hostile PLO activity against the "common enemy" is constantly encouraged by Syria. Moreover, having reached a stalemate in the missile crisis, it is likely that Syria has encouraged the PLO to draw as much Israeli fire as possible to divert Israel's attention away from the Syrian missiles.

ONE WEEK OF P.L.O. TERROR

- 15.7.1981 Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory at Upper Galilee
Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory at Western Galilee
In these barrages, three civilians were killed in Nahariya;
16 others were wounded.
- 16.7.1981 Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory at Upper Galilee
In the afternoon, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory
at Western Galilee
At about 19:00 hours, shelling from Lebanese territory of Western
Galilee
- 17.7.1981 At 08:30 hours, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory
at the Galilee Panhandle. Two civilians were wounded.
At about 10:00 hours, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese
territory at the Galilee Panhandle
At 11:30 hours, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory
at Western Galilee. A maternity hospital was hit, and two
young mothers, as well as three other civilians, were wounded.
At 20:00 hours, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory
at the Galilee Panhandle.
At 23:10 hours, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory
at the Galilee Panhandle.
- 18.7.1981 At 00:25, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory at
the Galilee Panhandle.
At 02:05 hours, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory
at the Galilee Panhandle. Five civilians were wounded in Kiryat
Shmonah.
At 02:30 hours, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory at
the Galilee Panhandle. One civilian was wounded in Kiryat Shmonah.
At 04:25 hours, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory
at the Galilee Panhandle.
At 06:10 hours, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory
at the Galilee Panhandle. One civilian was wounded.
At 09:55 hours, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory
at Western Galilee.
At 10:10 hours, Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanese territory
at the Galilee Panhandle.

Israelis' Goal: Crush P.L.O.

Drive Designed to End Pressure by Guerrillas

By DREW MIDDLETON

Israel's air, sea and ground drive against the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon is not a reaction to increased guerrilla activity but a carefully orchestrated campaign that has as its objective the freeing of northern Israel from pressure by the guerrillas.

Military Analysis

Military analysts in the United States and in London and Paris, who take a dispassionate view of the operations, say that the Israelis consider the guerrillas to be at war with them and cite a publication of the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University that says that the guerrillas are employed "to wage a war of terror and attrition against Israel on their own initiative."

The object of this war, the publication continues, is to "inflict losses and undermine morale in Israel and to keep the 'Palestinian issue' as an unsolvable problem in the eyes of the world thereby discrediting the Israeli-Egyptian peace process."

More worrying to the Israelis was the buildup of guerrillas in southern Lebanon and the renewal of artillery and rocket attacks against Israeli settlements in the northern panhandle.

Arms From Libya

At the same time Israeli intelligence knew that new stocks of arms were reaching the guerrillas from Libya.

The Palestinians and their Syrian supporters believed that the Israelis were becoming increasingly aggressive in the north. Maj. Saad Haddad's Israeli-supported Lebanese Christian militia force in a zone just north of the Israeli frontier is regarded by the guerrillas as practically "an arm of the Israeli Army," according to an American analyst.

For several sound military reasons, a British source said, this is the most opportune time for the Israeli operations.

The possibility that the attacks will provoke counterattacks by an Arab coalition is remote. Egypt, while critical, is locked into the Camp David accords, which are President Anwar el-Sadat's guarantee of United States help in rearming his forces.

Iraq is involved in an indecisive and costly war with Iran. Jordan is resolutely neutral. The oil states of the Persian Gulf can be counted on for financial help but little else.

Syria Unlikely to Act Alone

M. E.

Syria, whose forces are the best armed and best trained of any in the Arab world, is unlikely to take on Israel, whose forces are stronger, especially in the air, and whose military leadership is superior to that of Syria.

The Syrian high command, however, bears some responsibility for the increase in Israeli operations. In the years since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war the victors and the vanquished have developed military understandings about the deployment of weapons and forces in the areas close to Israel's frontiers.

For example, a British source said, it was understood by both sides that long-range surface-to-air missiles would not be deployed by Syria in Lebanon. When the Syrians deployed a battery of SAM-6's, the Israelis felt that their military positions was being challenged.

The Syrians believed, according to an American source, that their growing military strength gave them the right to put their missiles where they wished.

Gen. Aharon Yariv, who is head of the Center for Strategic Studies, said in a recent discussion that the Israeli high command ascribed importance to the forward stationing of Syrian guns and missiles. Such deployment, he said, gives Syria the option of bringing much of northern Israel under fire.

Complete Security Is Doubted

Some American analysts doubt that northern Israel can ever be completely secure. Even if Israeli troops take and raze Beaufort Castle, an observation point for the guerrillas, and the guerrillas retire to the Beirut-Damascus highway as demanded by the Israelis, groups of two or three guerrillas will be able to infiltrate south.

The expectation among analysts is that the weight of Israeli operations in the next week will be exerted by the army, most probably in further clearing operations near the Khardali Bridge across the Litani River. Air strikes will be directed in support of the ground forces and against any guerrilla transport moving by day.

Israeli military planning insures that the operations will be carried out with the maximum forces available, according to American officers.

One source reported that Lieut. Gen. Rafael Eytan, Israel's Chief of Staff, sees the guerrillas as part of a long-term danger. He believes apparently that, as long as these forces can operate freely against northern Israel, major Arab states such as Syria will support them.

Most analysts consulted believe that the Israelis, if operations continue at their present level, will be able to clear the areas north of their frontier. But they doubt, in view of the financial backing for the guerrillas, that a permanent peace can be achieved unless the Israeli high command takes the step most dangerous to a Middle East settlement and occupies the area.

ARTICLES

This article was prepared by the National Foreign Assessment Center.

Radical Palestinian Terrorism Likely to Resume

~~_____~~ radical Palestinian groups are anxious to begin a new terrorist campaign against Israeli and U.S. targets and the pressure is mounting on Arafat to condone, at least unofficially, such attacks. The Israeli attack on the Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility in Iraq and the recent Israeli bombing of Palestinian offices in Beirut have given the radicals added ammunition in their opposition to Arafat and his moderate policies. These groups are likely to attempt terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets even if they do not get Arafat's acquiescence.
~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~

Arafat ~~_____~~ has been considering allowing some international terrorist attacks. The incidence of such attacks by Palestinians has fallen in the past few years because of Arafat's orders to cease international terrorist attacks in order to give the Palestinian cause a more legitimate and moderate image. Arafat has been under increasing pressure, however, by radical elements to resume terrorist attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets abroad because his diplomatic efforts have been unsuccessful.
~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~

Arafat made a strong showing at the Palestine National Council meeting in April and thwarted moves by more radical elements to weaken his position. Nevertheless, there were reports even at that time that Arafat, in order to stave off radical criticism, had given the green light to planning for the resumption of international terrorist attacks in the event that no progress was made this year on a Palestinian solution. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~

Recent events may force Arafat to concede to radical demands soon, even if it is only to privately permit selected attacks against Israeli targets abroad. U.S. targets, already included in operational planning by the radicals, could also be included. It would be hard for Arafat to defuse the momentum that has been gathering. Arafat may be persuaded to agree in the hope that such attacks would goad the West into speeding up their attempts to find a solution to the Palestinian question. He may also hope that by allowing attacks, he can retain some control over the radical groups and thwart attempts by several Arab states to gain more control of radical elements. Syria and Libya have been trying to buy influence with the more radical Palestinian groups and have been encouraging these groups to carry out more international terrorist attacks, especially against Israeli targets, in the hope that such attacks would embarrass Arafat and discredit the moderate Palestinian position.
~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

REF. #99-024/1 #96
By CAS NARA, Date 5/21/02

22 July 1981

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON~~

Even if Arafat does not condone terrorist attacks by the radicals, he may not intervene if these attacks occur on a limited basis. There [REDACTED] is support even among certain leftist elements within Fatah, the moderate Palestinian organization headed by Arafat, for attacks against U.S. targets. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON~~

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DE RUEHEG #7317/01 2041607
O 231600Z JUL 81
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA 0075
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 9706
AMEMBASSY BIRUT 9710
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2145
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 6617
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2673
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 5646
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4343
AMEMBASSY LONDON 6629
AMEMBASSY PARIS 6393
USMISSION SINAI 3529
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6947
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7196
USINFO WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 31 OF 02 CAIRO 17317

F.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, EG, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: CAIRO PRESS REVIEW FOR JULY 23: SADAT AND

~~NUMAYRI DEMONSTRATE ISRAELI ATTACKS IN LEBANON~~

HIGHLIGHTS: CAIRO PRESS JULY 23 LEADS WITH JOINT COMMUNI-
QUE ISSUED ON JULY 22 BY PRESIDENT SADAT AND VISITING
SUDANESE PRESIDENT NUMAYRI WHICH STRONGLY CONDEMNS CON-
TRIBUTING ISRAELI ATTACKS IN LEBANON. PAPERS ALSO GIVE
PROMINENCE TO FORMER KAMAL HUSAIN ALI'S JULY 22 STATEMENT
CALLING FOR NON-INTERVENTION AND CONSOLIDATION OF CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN LEBANON. ANOTHER LEAD STORY WAS
SADAT'S SPEECH; READ BY VP MUBARAK, ON THE OCCASION OF THE
29TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1952 REVOLUTION. SPEECH FOCUSED
ON DOMESTIC THEMES BUT REITERATED EGYPT'S DETERMINATION TO
CONTINUE THE "BATTLE OF PEACE." PAPERS ALSO REPORT A
DRAFT LAW THAT WOULD ABOLISH THE CONTROVERSIAL BAR ASSOCI-
ATION COUNCIL AND ESTABLISH A NEW PROVISIONAL 32-MEMBER
BODY IN ITS STEAD. END HIGHLIGHTS.

1. LEBANON: SADAT/NUMAYRI COMMUNIQUE. ALL MAJOR PAPERS

SIT: PUBS
EOB: KEMP, KAMINSKY
WHSR COMMENTS:

HIGHLIGHTED THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED JULY 22 BY PRESIDENTS SADAT AND NUMAYRI CONDEMNING ISRAELI RAIDS IN LEBANON. THE COMMUNIQUE:

- STRESSED THAT ISRAELI AGGRESSION ON LEBANON CLOUDS THE ATMOSPHERE OF PEACE IN THE AREA;
- DENOUNCED ISRAELI BEHAVIOR AS BEING INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SPIRIT OF PEACE, AS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, AS A THREAT TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE AREA, AND AS AN INVITATION FOR FURTHER FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS;
- CALLED FOR ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC'S JULY 21 RESOLUTIONS;
- OBSERVED THAT ARAB COOPERATION REMAINS THE SOLE MEANS OF ATTAINING THE GOALS OF THE ARAB NATION, WHOSE POTENTIAL SHOULD NOT BE WASTED IN SIDE DISPUTES.

2. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT. PROMINENT COVERAGE ALSO GIVEN TO FORMIN ALI'S REMARKS ON LEBANON, DELIVERED TO THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY JULY 22. ACCORDING TO AKHBAR, ALI SAID EGYPT CONDEMNES THE "GENOCIDAL" OPERATIONS PERPETRATED BY ISRAEL AND CALLED ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE GREAT POWERS TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY TO END THESE ACTIONS. ALI ADDED THERE SHOULD BE A FIRM ARAB STAND AGAINST THE DUBIOUS ROLE PLAYED BY THE SYRIAN DETERRMENT FORCE WHICH PLAYS NO POSITIVE ROLE IN LEBANESE AFFAIRS. IN ADDITION, HE REITERATED THAT:

- ALL FOREIGN POWERS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM INTERFERING IN LEBANON'S AFFAIRS;
- SERIOUS CONCERTED ARAB EFFORTS SHOULD BE EXERTED TO REACH PROMPT AGREEMENT ON MEANS TO CONSOLIDATE LEGITIMATE LEBANESE AUTHORITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH RIYADH SUMMIT DECISIONS OF 1976;
- MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS IS NECESSARY FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND FOR SECURING A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION.

3. EDITORIALS. AHRAM CHARACTERIZED THE RECENT ISRAELI RAIDS AS "AN ANTI-PEACE APPROACH." IT NOTED THAT DESPITE ALL EFFORTS TO CALM THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, PRIMIN BEGIN PREFERS DEALING WITH THE PALESTINIANS MILITARILY. HOW, AHRAM ASKED, IF ISRAEL INTENDS TO RESPOND IN SUCH FASHION TO "CASUAL INCIDENTS", WILL ISRAEL DEAL WITH THE PALESTINIANS IN THE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH LIE AHEAD? AKHBAR WARNED THAT BEGIN'S OBJECTIVE SEEMS TO BE THE OCCUPATION OF LARGE AREAS OF LEBANESE TERRITORY. IT NOTED THAT DESPITE THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION, SYRIA'S PRESIDENT SAD SEEMS PREOCCUPIED WITH MASS EXECUTIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND OTHER INTERNAL

OP IMMED
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DE RUEHEG #7317/02 2041614
O 231600Z JUL 01
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4437

INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA 0076
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 9707
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 9711
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 8146
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 6618
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2674
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 5647
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4344
AMEMBASSY LONDON 6610
AMEMBASSY PARIS 6304
USMISSION SINAI 3530
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6948
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7197
USINFO WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 17317

4. SADAT'S REVOLUTION DAY SPEECH. ALL PAPERS REPORTED IN
DETAIL SADAT'S JULY 22 SPEECH, READ BY VP MUBARAK ON THE
OCCASION OF THE 29TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1952 REVOLUTION.
MUBARAK NOTED THERE WOULD BE NO RETREAT FROM THE GOALS
OF THAT "MOTHER-REVOLUTION", WHICH HAD BEEN "CORRECTED"
BY THE MAY 1977 REVOLUTION TO GUARANTEE LIBERTY AND THE
RULE OF LAW. DWELLING ON "THE BATTLE OF PEACE", MUBARAK
DESCRIBED IT AS CONSISTENT WITH EGYPT'S CULTURE, VALUES,
AND IDEALS. WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED THUS FAR, HE
ADDED, IS BUT A FIRST STEP WHICH MUST BE SUPPORTED AND
COMPLEMENTED BY OTHERS. "WE FIRMLY BELIEVE IT IS NECESS-
ARY FOR ALL PARTIES THAT THE NEXT STEP MUST BE TOWARD
SOLVING THE PALESTINE QUESTION, WHICH IS THE CORE OF THE
CONFLICT. THIS FACT CANNOT BE IGNORED OR DISREGARDED."

5. BAR ASSOCIATION. ALL PAPERS REPORT A DECISION BY THE
LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY TO ABOLISH
THE CURRENT BAR ASSOCIATION COUNCIL. THEY NOTE IT WILL
BE REPLACED BY A TEMPORARY BODY OF 30 MEMBERS WHOSE TASK

SIT:
TOB:
WHR COMMENTS:

***** UNCLASSIFIED *****

WILL BE TO DRAFT PROPOSED NEW LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN EGYPT.

6. OTHER NEWS:

--ALL PAPERS REPORTED THE JULY 22 MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR ATHERTON AND MEA UNDERSECRETARY AL-BAZ, AT WHICH ARRANGEMENTS FOR SADAT'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE U.S. REPORTEDLY WERE DISCUSSED;

--ALL PAPERS ALSO REPORTED THAT A STATE INFORMATION SERVICE DELEGATION HEADED BY THE ORGANIZATION'S DIRECTOR, AMBASSADOR SHAFI' ABD AL-HAMID, WILL LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON ON JULY 29. GROUP WILL SET UP AN EGYPTIAN PRESS CENTER AND HANDLE PRESS ARRANGEMENTS DURING SADAT'S VISIT.

ATHERTON

BT

~~SECRET~~

16K

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 24, 1981

file

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT SCHWEITZER
CHRIS SHOEMAKER

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F99-0241, #95

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY

CH NARA, DATE 5/19/06

SUBJECT: The Lebanese Crisis

Thank you for your memo of 24 July in response to mine of 23 July. *(U)*

I agree with most of the points you make in your comments, and if you authorize it I will send your memo along with this one, to RVA. *(U)*

I would only make the following points: *(U)*

- 1) My memo was not an action memo and therefore I did not ask for concurrence from anyone. It also did not mention any US military action of any kind and therefore was not sent through you. *(U)*
- 2) The purpose of the memo was to deplore the lack of strategic thinking by this government on this and many other issues and to demonstrate how such a thought framework could be applied to the Lebanese crisis, especially since we will perhaps be faced with a delegation of Lebanese political leaders in the not distant future. *(S)*
- 3) Perhaps the Israelis cannot militarily crush the PLO. I am not qualified to judge. Nevertheless, if they cannot, then achievement of the objectives you agree with is impossible. Lebanon certainly can't do it and we're not going to. *(S)*
- 4) A manpower pool without weapons is not a military threat, and it is an armed PLO that prevents a Lebanese solution, not the existence of 400,000 Palestinians. *(S)*
- 5) I do not suggest overthrowing Assad. I suggest ways of inducing him to withdraw his troops from Lebanon. The Saudis has already withdrawn their financial support of Assad, we convinced them to review it and did not thereby cause Syria to withdraw its missiles. *(S)*

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

- 6) Sadat would object to being left out and he has some influence in Lebanon. Why not use our allies? That's what we have them for. ~~(S)~~
- 7) The Lebanese problem has a "Palestinian perspective" because of the armed PLO. The West Bank has nothing to do with it. ~~(S)~~
- 8) I am opposed to a mutual defense treaty with Israel. It would further reduce our already severely limited flexibility in dealing with that country. ~~(S)~~
- 9) I believe we should station troops in Israel (if they will have them) only if we simultaneously station troops in at least one Arab country. ~~(S)~~

Finally, I completely agree that our internal debate on Middle East policy must be kept internal and that it must not be allowed to take on a pro - or anti-Israeli or a pro - or anti-Arab coloration. It must be presumed that every member of the NSC Staff is pro-American only that that our dialogue must be conducted on that basis. ~~(S)~~

Attachments

Tab I Middle East Cables and Articles

cc: Geoffrey Kemp
Richard Pipes
Carnes Lord
Raymond Tanter
Doug Feith
Allen Lenz

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4366

~~SECRET~~

July 23, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY

SUBJECT: The Lebanese Crisis *(U) file*

I have been informed that Premier Al-Wazzan of Lebanon is trying to put together a delegation of Lebanese Christian and Moslem leaders to come to Washington and ask for our support for a "Government of National Salvation," evacuation of Lebanese territory by all "foreign" troops (presumably the Syrians, the UN, the Israelis and the PLO), integration of all private militias, including Haddad's, in the Lebanese army and elections in 1982 either for a constituent Assembly or a parliament under the present structure. *(S)*

In this connection it is interesting that the Israeli government authorized Habib to "establish peaceful relations between Israel and Lebanon," a rather broad mandate. *(U)*

There are openings and opportunities here that could well be exploited if this government were oriented towards strategic thinking rather than dichotomous thinking. Unfortunately, I have seen very little indication of that during the time I have been here. However, I have also noted that where such thinking is applied to an issue (by us, by Enders at State, by Dornan at Energy, etc.) it often carries the day because it is so compelling and exotic. *(S)*

In the light of the above I can suggest something along the following lines: *(U)*

Objectives

- 1) A strengthening of the position of our principal allies in the area: Israel and Egypt;
- 2) A unified, non-violent, friendly and disoccupied Lebanon;
- 3) A disarmed and militarily impotent PLO. *(S)*

~~SECRET~~

Review on July 23, 1987

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
 NLRR 142008-098/16 457020
 BY Amf NARA DATE 11/28/08
 NLS 299-0241, #97
 By CU, NARA, Date 5/19/06

Policies

- 1) Eliminate the military capability of the PLO. Please note that this is a precondition for all the rest, since Lebanon was destroyed as a country in order to provide a home for the PLO, which no Arab country wants on its territory.
- 2) Get all foreign troops out of Lebanon.
- 3) Support integration of private Lebanese militias into a reconstituted Lebanese army.
- 4) Support a government of "National Salvation" in Lebanon and elections in 1982. (S)

Strategies

- 1) Let the Israelis smash the PLO militarily while making the appropriate tut-tutting noises and maintaining the F-16 embargo (They don't need them now anyway.). Get them to stop bombing civilian targets.
- 2) Pressure the Saudis into withdrawing financial support of Syria unless the Syrians withdraw from Lebanon and into calling an Arab Summit to support the reunification and pacification of Lebanon with our, EC, Japanese, etc. support.
- 3) If necessary engage in [redacted] support of anti-Assad forces in Syria to help convince him he should withdraw his troops. B1
- 4) Get Sadat's support for the Lebanese part of all this while he's in Washington. (S)

Incidentally, Egypt and Israel will have a much better chance of agreeing on West Bank autonomy once the inhabitants of that territory are no longer under the PLO gun. (S)

I'm sorry that this memo is more than one page. (U)

- cc: Geoffrey Kemp
- Robert Schweitzer
- Richard Pipes
- Carnes Lord
- Raymond Tanter
- Doug Feith

~~SECRET~~

Postscript: The attached cables and others which have come in indicate the correctness of this analysis. I am fully aware that this approach will be overtaken by events. The opportunity will, however, occur again precisely because of how it is being handled now.

Attachments

Tab I Middle East Cables

~~SECRET~~

OP IMMED
STUR911
DE RUEHDT #2429/01 2032337
O 222234Z JUL 81 Z 44
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7161
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE 3619

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9429
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 2161
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5587

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 02429

NODIS
FOR HART/DRAPER
E.O. 12958: RDS-4 7/22/01 (KIRKPATRICK, J.) OR-M
TAGS: UNSC, LE, MOPS
SUBJECT: LEBANON; TUENI TO TUNIS

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. LEBANESE AMB TUENI ASKED TO CALL BRIEFLY ON AMB KIRKPATRICK JULY 22. ALTHOUGH KIRKPATRICK MADE ROOM IN HER SCHEDULE FOR HIM, TUENI WAS UNABLE TAKE UP ALL HIS POINTS IN 45 MINUTES, AND THEREFORE CONTINUED HIS CONVERSATION SUBSEQUENTLY WITH MISOFF. WHAT FOLLOWS IS SUMMARY OF HIS REMARKS IN BOTH MEETINGS.
3. SARKIS HAS ORDERED TUENI TO GO TO TUNIS FOR THE ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING JULY 23. THIS WILL GIVE LEBANON OPPORTUNITY BOTH OF HAVING SERIOUS TALKS WITH ARAFAT (SAUD WILL ALSO BE PRESENT) AND WILL ALSO PERMIT LEBANON TO SPEAK TO MANAGE THE TONE AND OUTCOME OF THE ADC. TUENI HAS ALREADY INSCRIBED HIMSELF AS FIRST SPEAKER SO AS TO SET THE RHETORICAL LEVEL AT A LOW PITCH AND, HOPEFULLY, CHANNEL CONFERENCE IN DIRECTION LEBANON WANTS.
4. FOLLOWING THE ADC, TUENI WILL RETURN TO BEIRUT TO BE PRESENT AT THE JULY 25 QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL. HIS CHIEF OPERATIONAL CONCERN VIS A VIS THE UNSC IS, THEREFORE, TO MAKE SURE THAT THERE IS NO VOTE

BY smf NARA DATE 11/28/08
NLR 192008-07814 # 57026

DECLASSIFIED

SIT: RVA NAM COL JP VP
EOB: KEMP, GUBIN
WHSR COMMENTS: CHECKLIST

PAGE 01 USMISSION USUN NEW 2429 DTG: 222234Z JUL 81 PSN: 037256
TOP: 004/0106Z CSN: 003775

WHILE HE IS NOT HERE TO MANAGE THE ARAB GROUP. YESTERDAY, HE TOLD US, HE FOUND OUT AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR THAT SYRIAN AMB HAD PREPARED DRAFT RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE USG REPEAT USG FOR CONNIVANCE WITH ISRAELI AGGRESSION. TUENI AND PLO DEPUTY ABDAL RAHMAN (FATAH) LITERALLY TORE IT UP - A CLOSE CALL. THIS STORY RINGS TRUE, SINCE TUENI IS WELL KNOWN AS PRACTICALLY THE ONLY ARAB DIPLOMAT HERE (OTHER THAN THE EGYPTIANS) COURAGEOUS ENOUGH TO FACE DOWN THE RADICALS.

5. GIVEN HIS KEEN CONCERN THAT NO COUNCIL ACTION BE TAKEN DURING HIS ABSENCE, TUENI HAS EXPLAINED TO THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR THE IMPORTANCE OF STALLING ANY COUNCIL ACTION, SHOULD A CEASEFIRE NOT EVENTUATE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. EGYPT, HE TOLD US, LIKE THE PLO, HAS HAD THE IDEA OF FORMING A COMMISSION OF UNSC MEMBERS TO STUDY THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, (A NOTION WHICH PRESUMABLY APPEALS TO THE PLO BECAUSE OF THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION THAT MIGHT BE AFFORDED BY THE PRESENCE OF SUCH A COMMISSION IN SOUTH LEBANON); FOR TUENI, A COMMISSION IS A POSSIBLE STALLING DEVICE. HE HAS ASKED THE EGYPTIAN AMB TO RAISE THE IDEA WITH US BEFORE GOING TO THE AMBASSADORS WHOM THE EGYPTIANS HOPE MIGHT FORM SUCH A COMMISSION, I.E. THE PERM REPS OF SPAIN, IRELAND AND JAPAN, THE CO-SPONSORS OF YESTERDAY'S CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION.

6. IN TUNIS, TUENI SAID, HE WILL HAVE A TRY AT A MAJOR DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE, I.E. BRINGING FORWARD THE OCTOBER ARAB SUMMIT TO MEET IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE TO DISCUSS AN OVERALL "MIDDLE EAST PEACE PLAN." ALSO, OF COURSE, TUENI WANTS THE ADC TO WORK ON THE BUSINESS OF HOW TO POLICE LEBANON ITSELF.

7. GIVEN TUENI'S POSITION, IN EMBASSY BEIRUT'S PHRASE, AS DE FACTO FOREIGN MINISTER, MISOFF BRIEFED HIM ON HABIB CONVERSATION WITH SARKIS (SARKIS HAS NO SECURE WAY OF COMMUNICATING WITH TUENI). TUENI SAID THAT WHATEVER HABIB'S IMPRESSION MIGHT HAVE BEEN, SARKIS HIMSELF WAS "CHEERFUL" WHEN HE HIMSELF BRIEFED TUENI BY PHONE JUST AFTER HABIB HAD DEPARTED. GIVEN USUAL FAVESDROPPERS, SARKIS HAD NOT PROVIDED ANY SENSITIVE INFORMATION TO TUENI OVER THE PHONE. TUENI ASKED THAT WE TELL AMB HABIB "DON'T BE DISCOURAGED", AND OFFERED THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS. SARKIS NO LONGER TRUSTS THE PALESTINIANS; HE BELIEVES THAT ANYTHING HE MAY SAY OR DO IS LIKELY TO COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SYRIANS, AND, QUITE LITERALLY, LEAD TO HIS IMMEDIATE POLITICAL DEMISE.

no reply Lebanon

~~SECRET~~

***** COPY

B. "ALMOST NONE OF US" ARE EVEN ON SPEAKING TERMS WITH PLO LEADERS ANY MORE, TUENI INSISTED. ACCORDINGLY, IF THE GOL IS TO EXERT POLITICAL CONTROL OVER THE COURSE OF EVENTS, IT IS VITAL THAT SARKIS CONSTANTLY MANEUVER PRE-EMPTIVELY. THAT IS WHY THE SATURDAY CABINET MEETING DECIDED TO CALL PUBLICALLY FOR SANCTIONS. NOT ONLY DID THIS TACTIC LEAVE THE SYRIANS AND THE PIC WITH NOTHING TO PROPOSE, BUT IT HAD THE EXCELLENT EFFECT OF DRIVING ARAFAT TO ASK TO PAY COURTESY CALL ON THE FM, THE FIRST SUCH REQUEST SINCE WAZZAN WAS APPOINTED. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT OF RETAINING POLITICAL CONTROL FOR GOL THAT TUENI ABOVE ALL WANTS TO AVOID FACING THE SYRIANS ON BT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7102
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INFO AMEMBASSY BHIRUT IMMEDIATE 8430
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0162
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5683

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 02429

NODIS
FOR HABIB/DRAPER
JULY 25 FOLLOWING A US VETO. THE SYRIAN REACTION WOULD
BE PREDICTABLE - SO MUCH FOR YOUR AMERICAN "FRIENDS".

9. THROUGHOUT HER CONVERSATION WITH TUENI, AMB KIRKPATRICK
REITERATED THE PROFOUND USG CONCERN ABOUT THE LEBANESE
SITUATION AND THE VIGOR WITH WHICH WE ARE SEEKING TO
ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE.
KIRKPATRICK
BT

SIT:
FOR:
WESR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01 OF 01 USMISSION USUN NEW 2429 DTG:222234Z JUL 81 PSN:037757
TOR: 204/0100Z GSN:HCE776

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NLRR M08-098/16 #57030
BY RW NARA DATE 7/17/12

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2005

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0507
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0120
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0010
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 3025
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3044
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 2440
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3340
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5200
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2026

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 04500

EXDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 07/23/01 (SEELYE, TALCOTT W.) OR-M
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, IS, LE, SY, PLO
SUBJECT: SYRIAN RESTRAINT IN AIDING THE PLO

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING THE JULY 17 ISRAELI AIR RAID AGAINST BEIRUT, A COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE SYRIAN-SUPPORTED LEBANESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT MADE REFERENCE TO RECENT SYRIAN STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE ADFS RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF WITH WHATEVER WEAPONS IT DEEMS NECESSARY AND CALLED FOR THE STATIONING OF SA-6S IN THE BEIRUT AREA TO DEFEND AGAINST FUTURE ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS. IMPLICIT IN THE NATIONAL FRONT COMMUNIQUE WAS AN APPEAL FOR SYRIA TO DEPLOY SA-6S TO BEIRUT. IN THIS REGARD, SEVERAL REPORTS THIS WEEK HAVE QUOTED PLO OFFICIALS, INCLUDING ARAFAT, AS STATING THAT SYRIA HAS PROMISED TO SEND SA-6S TO BEIRUT. ONE SUCH REPORT INDICATED THAT THE MISSILES WOULD BE DEPLOYED BY JULY 25.

3. WE WOULD BE FRANKLY SURPRISED IF THE SARG WAS CONTAM-

SIT:
FOR:
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01 DAMASCUS 4500 DTG: 230904Z JUL 01 PSN: 438323
TOR: 204/1202Z OSN: HCEB00

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E.O. 12958
APPROPRIATE
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)
RW 3/5/01

PLATING SUCH A PROVOCATIVE ACTION, EVEN IN THE FACE OF LAST WEEKS AIR RAIDS AGAINST PEIRUT. AS NOTED REFTTEL, SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR THE PLO UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES HAS THUS FAR BEEN RESTRICTED TO PROPAGANDA CHARGES AGAINST THE US AND ISRAEL. THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT APPEAL REFERRED TO ABOVE HAS ELICITED NO DISCERNIBLE REACTION ON THE PART OF THE SARG THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN CONTACTS, THE GENERAL CONSENSUS IS THAT SYRIA WILL REFRAIN FROM DEPLOYING SAMS TO THE PEIRUT AREA UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS BECAUSE OF THE CERTAINTY THAT ISRAEL WOULD TAKE THEM OUT. THE ONLY PROVISION IN THIS JUDGEMENT IS THAT IF ISRAEL WERE TO CARRY OUT AIR RAIDS AGAINST ADF POSITIONS, THEN ASSAD MIGHT CONCEIVABLY ORDER THE DEPLOYMENT OF SAMS, JUST AS HE DID FOLLOWING THE APRIL 28 DOWNING OF TWO SYRIAN HELICOPTERS. ISRAEL, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO BE CAREFULLY AVOIDING HITTING ADF TARGETS.

4. ONE SYRIAN CONTACT, A WELL-CONNECTED JOURNALIST, COMPARED SYRIA'S REACTION TO THE PRESENT CLASHES BETWEEN THE PLO AND ISRAEL TO SYRIA'S LACK OF REACTION TO THE 1978 LITANI OPERATION. SYRIA, HE SAID, WOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE PLO WITH ARMS AND AMMUNITION, BUT THE PLO WAS ON ITS OWN IN CONFRONTING ISRAEL. SYRIA REALIZED ITS MILITARY INFERIORITY VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL AND WAS UNWILLING TO ENGAGE IN MILITARY ACTIONS IN DEFENSE OF THE PLO WHICH COULD LEAD TO A WIDER CONFLICT. IT WAS UNLIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT SYRIA WOULD HEED THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT APPEAL.

5. IN ADDITION TO CONSTRAINTS PLACED ON SYRIA BY ISRAEL'S MILITARY SUPERIORITY, SEVERAL SYRIAN CONTACTS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE SARG IS NOT AT ALL UNHAPPY TO SEE THE PLO UNDER PRESSURE FROM ISRAEL. SUCH PRESSURE REDUCES ARAFAT'S FREEDOM OF MANEUVER AND INCREASES HIS DEPENDENCE ON SYRIA, AN IMPORTANT POLICY GOAL FOR ASSAD. THE ISRAELI CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PLO, ACCORDING TO THIS REASONING, UNDERCUTS ARAFAT AND THE MODERATE FATAH ELEMENTS POSITION, THEREBY PUSHING THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A MORE REJECTIONIST POLICY.

6. COMMENT: BY ALL INDICATIONS, SYRIA WILL CONTINUE TO BE RESTRAINED IN ITS SUPPORT OF THE PLO. SEELEY
 CC/T NOTE: RAISED TO EXDIS PER S/S-O TOM WHITE
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 2517
AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 434
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 284
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Bailey

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EXDIS
P.O. 12065: SAS-2 7/22/81 (DILLON, ROBERT S.) 02-0
TAGS: MILI, EXPR, INT, SA, SY, KU, LE, XF
SUBJECT: JULY 25 PARSON MEETING: CONVERSATION WITH JOHNNY ABDU

1. (S-PTIME TEXT)

2. JOHNNY ABDU TOLD ME LAST NIGHT, JULY 21, THAT MEETING
OF ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE, SCHEDULED FOR JULY 25 AT DAAJIA,
WOULD GET UNDERWAY EARLY IN THE MORNING. HE EXHIBITED
MILD OPTIMISM ABOUT THE MEETING, STATING THAT HE THOUGHT
THE PROBLEM OF REBALANCE-ISRAELI RELATIONS HAD BEEN SOLVED
AND THE THE SYRIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE BASHIR STATEMENT.
THAT MEANT THE MEETING COULD FOCUS ON THE NEXT STEP IN THE
PROCESS-- THE BEGINNINGS OF A POLITICAL CONSensus WITHIN
LEBANON AND DISCUSSION OF THE EXTENSION OF GOL
AUTHORITY TO THE SOUTH. HE COMMENTED THAT HE WAS
FEELING EASIER ABOUT BASHIR GEMAYEL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD
ISRAEL BECAUSE RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS HAD DEMONSTRATED
TO BASHIR THE UNRELIABILITY AS AN ALLY OF ISRAEL UNDER
BEGIN'S LEADERSHIP. ABDU DESCRIBED BASHIR AS
WONDERING IF BEGIN HAD LOST HIS MIND.


3. ABDU BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW
DAYS HAD INCREASED THE ABILITY OF THE BARKIS/WARIDAN
GOVERNMENT TO ATTRACT THE COOPERATION OF LEBANON'S

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BY *Amk* NARA DATE *11/28/08*
NRR *M92008-028114 # 57032*

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
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 4923 DTG: 230554Z JUL 81 PSN: 030338
FOY: 230/10 2P CGN: 030302

VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPINGS. WHILE THE PHALANX WAS FEELING CHASTENED ABOUT ITS ISRAELI TIES (ALTHOUGH SOME PHALANX MEMBERS WERE OPENLY PLEASED AT SEEING PALESTINAIAN AND LEBANESE MUSLIMS UNDERGO BOMBING AND ROCKETING SIMILAR TO THE SWELLING THAT SOME CHRISTIAN AREAS HAD UNDERGONE), THE SYRIANS WERE ALSO IN A WEAKER POSITION BECAUSE OF THEIR INABILITY TO COUNTER ISRAELI ACTIONS. THIS LESSON HAD NOT BEEN LOST ON THOSE OF WHO DEPENDENT ON SYRIAN SUPPORT AND, THEREFORE, THEY TOO WERE IN A MOOD TO COOPERATE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.



4. ALL OF THIS IS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE, AS JOHNNY ABED HIMSELF WOULD BE THE FIRST TO ADMIT, BUT IT DOES SUGGEST THAT MORALE AT BAARDA IS HIGHER THAN ONE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED FOLLOWING THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS AND THAT SARKIS WOULD BE HEADING INTO THE JULY 25 MEETING IN A FAIRLY POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND.

5. SARKIS CONFIRMED THIS TO AMBASSADOR HARTZ DURING THEIR CONVERSATION ON JULY 22. HE ASSERTED THAT CONTINUING STABILITY IN THE ZAHLEH AREA AND THE STEPS TAKEN ON THE ISSUE OF PHALANX-ISRAELI RELATIONS ENHANCED THE CHANCES FOR PROGRESS OF THE JULY 25 MEETING. HE ADDED THAT THE HAYT AD-DIN PROCESS PARTICIPANTS WERE ALSO GETTING USED TO WORKING TOGETHER AND DEVELOPING MUTUAL TRUST AND A WILLINGNESS TO GIVE-AND-TAKE, WHICH MADE THEIR MEETINGS MORE LIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE.



DILLON
BT

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 10 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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July 20, 1981

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file

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*
RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Origins of Recent Violence in Lebanon

A memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President on Origins of Recent Violence in Lebanon is at Tab A.

The Secretary's memorandum states that Israel precipitated the current fighting, credits the PLO with observing a ceasefire prior to the recent escalation, and discounts the conventional military threat to Israel posed by the PLO's military buildup during the ceasefire.

The memorandum argues that the major threat to Israel is the increasing PLO capability to shell Israeli northern villages. It points out that Israel will not be able to prevent these strikes unless it physically occupies South Lebanon.

Although we believe the Secretary's memorandum is factually correct, we believe your cover memorandum to the President should balance Israel's airstrikes with the PLO's provocative military buildup. Furthermore, the PLO took advantage of the ceasefire to pursue unprecedented military reinforcements. We therefore believe there is a connection between the PLO buildup and the threat to Israel's border towns.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President transmitting the Secretary's memorandum.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I - Memo to the President to be signed
- A - Memo from the Secretary of State

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 899-0241 #102

CIS NARA DATE 5/19/02

~~SECRET~~

Cl. by State Dept.
Rvw. on 7/18/01

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Origins of Recent Violence in Lebanon

A memorandum from the Secretary of State about the origins of the recent violence in Lebanon is at Tab A. It contends that the latest round of fighting was precipitated by Israeli airstrikes between July 10 and 14, and that these airstrikes resulted in exceptionally heavy PLO rocketing of Israel's border towns.

The memorandum credits the PLO with observing a ceasefire by avoiding military operations against Israel. It acknowledges the PLO military buildup but discounts the conventional military threat to Israel posed by the new weapons. It argues that the major threat to Israel is the increasing PLO capability to shell Israeli northern villages. It also points out that Israel will not be able to prevent these strikes unless it physically occupies South Lebanon.

While I believe it is correct to say that the latest round of fighting was precipitated by Israeli airstrikes, we cannot ignore the provocative buildup of PLO military capabilities over the past year. Furthermore, the PLO used the recent ceasefire with Israel to add sophisticated weapons to its inventory.

It may be true the PLO buildup poses no conventional war military threat to Israel, but the connection between the growing arsenal of artillery and rocket launchers, the PLO's heavy bombardment of Israel's border towns and the intense nature of the Israeli response is clearly very dangerous.

~~SECRET~~

Rvw. on 7/18/01

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NLS F99-024/1 #143


2 - CAF NARA DATE 5/9/06

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

5/02.

July 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
Subject: Origins of Recent Violence in Lebanon

The latest round of violence in Lebanon was precipitated by Israeli airstrikes between July 10 and 14. It represents Begin's continuing strategy of keeping the PLO off balance. In a break with past tactics, however, Palestinian forces replied with exceptionally heavy rocket attacks against northern Israeli towns killing the first Israeli civilians to die in border incidents since April 1980. Previous PLO rocket attacks have been of a more limited character.

Until these recent Israeli raids, Arafat had apparently kept his earlier pledge to Secretary General Waldheim and avoided launching military actions against Israel for more than two months -- a development which had contributed to diplomatic efforts to defuse tensions in Lebanon. The Katyusha attacks, which surprised the Israelis in their intensity, resulted in the most extensive airstrikes in Lebanon since 1978.

The violence also stems from Israel's growing concern about the improvement over the last year in the PLO's capability for shelling northern Israel. The PLO now has long-range artillery (27 km range 130mm cannon) and improved launching platforms for the 22 km range 122 Katyusha rockets that have been in the PLO inventory for some time. These weapons give the PLO a technological sophistication and capability not previously available to them.

These shipments, primarily from Libya, Syria, Iraq, and eastern bloc countries, have been taking place for more than a year and include about 100 T-34 medium tanks, armored personnel carriers, and anti-tank vehicles, about 16 SA-9 Gaskin surface-to-air missile systems; 23mm and 57mm anti-aircraft guns, and

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BY SN NARA DATE 11/28/08

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NOFORN/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON/EXDIS

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- 2 -

long range 130mm artillery, as well as additional 122mm rockets in the more effective multiple launcher configuration. Much of this equipment is deployed along the coast between Sidon and Beirut. However, some artillery and a few tanks have been deployed in areas north of the Litani and in the Nabatiyah area where they can threaten Israeli settlements.

Despite this buildup, the conventional military threat it presents to Israel remains negligible. Although the Israelis have expressed concern about the growing arsenal of weapons in PLO hands, it is the bombardment of the northern settlements by long range artillery that is the major threat and focus of their concern. In addition, of course, the PLO also retains the capability to mount cross-border terrorist operations.

The current Israeli strikes have already made it more difficult for Palestinians to move additional weapons into south Lebanon and to resupply the positions already there. A continuation of Israeli air strikes, perhaps accompanied by ground incursions, could suppress the PLO artillery threat to a considerable degree in the short run. Nevertheless, the relative mobility of certain weapons, particularly the Katyushas, will enable the PLO to continue some attacks on Israeli settlements unless the Israelis establish continuing ground control.


Even an Israeli ground incursion into south Lebanon of the same or larger scale as the Litani operation would only solve the security problem for a while. We do not believe that Haddad has the manpower or capability to extend the enclave beyond the Litani in order to push Palestinian Katyushas beyond the range of Israeli towns. In any event we doubt that Israel would be prepared to take additional territory and remain as an occupying power.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
Subject: Origins of Recent Violence in Lebanon

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NLRR M7C08-098/16
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BY JW NARA DATE 11/28/08

RDS-2 7/18/01
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- 2 -

long range 130mm artillery, as well as additional 122mm rockets in the more effective multiple launcher configuration. Much of this equipment is deployed along the coast between Sidon and Beirut. However, some artillery and a few tanks have been deployed in areas north of the Litani and in the Nabatiyah area where they can threaten Israeli settlements.

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RECEIVED 20 JUL 81 09

TO PRES

FROM HAIG, A

DDCDATE 18 JUL 81

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By Greg *Conroy* NARA, Date *5/19/00*

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

LEBANON

PALESTINE

CM

URGENT

SUBJECT: ORIGINS OF RECENT VIOLENCE IN LEBANON

ACTION: · PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 20 JUL 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

KEMP

TANTER

BAILEY

COLSON *

LENZ

COMMENTS **CABINET LEVEL CORRESPONDENCE -- 3 HR TURNAROUND REQUIRED**

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Janet - original
copy to RVA, Name
Pamela + IL

To
Department
of State

4195 4241 *Tanter*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EVA HAS SEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

July 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*
DOUGLAS J. FEITH *DJF*

SUBJECT: Downing of Syrian MIG-23 by Israel:
The Use of U.S.-Supplied Military
Equipment in Lebanon

According to confirmed reports, Israeli aircraft shot down over Lebanon today a Syrian MIG-23 that had challenged an Israeli raid against PLO bases in Lebanon. Since 1975, when the Syrians moved into Lebanon in force, the Syrian Air Force at times has unsuccessfully challenged both anti-PLO bombing raids and reconnaissance missions conducted by Israeli aircraft. *(c)*

Throughout the Habib mission, Begin has advised that Israel will continue to bomb PLO bases in Lebanon and conduct air reconnaissance missions over Lebanon as Israel's national security concerns mandate. *(c)*

The Reagan Administration has thus far refrained from either condoning or condemning Israel's anti-PLO raids in Lebanon. Following your explanation of the "hot pursuit" principle as it applies to PLO operations out of Lebanon, the White House issued (on April 3, 1981) a "Notice to the Press," which stated in part:

...This Administration has made absolutely clear its opposition to terrorist activities and its support of the right of any nation to protect itself against terrorists....We condemn the terrorist attacks into Israel from camps in southern Lebanon, and we have repeatedly urged the Government of Israel to exercise maximum restraint in their actions in southern Lebanon.... *(u)*

In dealing with today's reports on the downing of the Syrian MIG-23, we may want to reissue the above condemnation of PLO terrorist activities against Israel, while calling for restraint on the part of Israel. *(c)*

RECOMMENDATION:

That appropriate White House Staff be authorized to propose to the State Department that the latter's spokesman acknowledge that Israel's anti-PLO strikes in Lebanon are "defensive" within the meaning of U.S.-Israeli agreements governing the use of U.S.-supplied arms.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

CONFIDENTIAL

Review July 14, 1987

Notes
HR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 899-0241 #16K
at: CES NARA, DATE 5/19/01

#4245

4241

ED

91 JUL 14 P 6: 38

JANET COLSON

Jc 14/1844

BUD NANCE

VR

DICK ALLEN

Rob 15/1415

IRENE DERUS

Ljd 15/1416

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

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CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3935

non
inter

July 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM:

ALLEN J. LENZ *ajl*

SUBJECT:

State Proposed Report on SJR-144 Offering
Strong Support for Diplomatic Efforts to
Resolve Current Crisis in Lebanon

The NSC staff has no objection to the State proposed Report on SJR-144 offering strong support for diplomatic efforts to resolve current crisis in Lebanon.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

3935
NSC/S

June 26, 1981

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
National Security Council ←

SUBJECT: State proposed report on S.J. Res. 144, offering strong support for diplomatic efforts to resolve the current crisis in Lebanon.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than July 23, 1981.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4610), the legislative analyst in this office, or to ().

RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of June 1 inviting the Administration's comments on S. Res. 144, submitted by Senator Kennedy. We have reviewed the resolution, and the Executive Branch can accept it in modified form. Attached is a revised text of the resolution, which has been discussed and agreed upon with Senator Kennedy's staff.

Yours sincerely,

Richard Fairbanks
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

- 1) Correspondence returned
- 2) Revised draft of S. Res. 144

The Honorable
Charles H. Percy,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

RESOLUTION

To offer strong support for diplomatic efforts to resolve the current crisis in Lebanon, including the issue of the Syrian missiles, and to protect the right of all Lebanese communities to live in freedom and security.

Whereas the current situation in Lebanon has caused great human suffering and disruption of the economy of that country;

Whereas the present crisis, including violence and PLO terrorism, threatens to further undermine the sovereignty of Lebanon and stability in the Middle East;

Whereas the strengthening of the Lebanese Government's authority throughout the country would significantly enhance the prospects of Lebanon once again becoming a peaceful, viable democracy;

Whereas a strong, independent, democratic Lebanon--with its traditional ties to the West--would help promote stability in the region and serve the national interest of the United States;

Whereas the Senate commends and supports the will of the Lebanese people to live in freedom, security and peace and

Whereas the Senate hopes for the success of diplomatic efforts currently being carried out by special envoy Philip C. Habib.

Resolved that the Senate of the United States of America strongly supports diplomatic efforts to resolve the current crisis in Lebanon, and that the Government of the United States should continue to pursue a comprehensive and coordinated policy in Lebanon guided by the following principles:

1. Establishment of an immediate and effective cease-fire throughout Lebanon.

2. Resolution of the issue of the Syrian missiles deployed in Lebanon.

3. Freedom, security, and opportunity for the Christian and all other Lebanese communities, including the Muslim, Druze, and Jewish communities in Lebanon.

4. Reaffirmation of the historic U.S.-Lebanon relationship and strengthening the long-standing commitment of the United States to the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon without partition, free from terrorism and violence, and free to determine its future without Soviet or other outside interference.

5. Generous international support for relief, rehabilitation and humanitarian assistance for Lebanon, particularly for those Lebanese citizens who have suffered from the terrorism and violence of recent events.

6. Respect for and strengthening of the authority of a Lebanese government based on open national elections free from external interference, which will be able to preserve security through its national army and its security forces without an outside military presence.

97TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 144

To offer strong support for diplomatic efforts to resolve the current crisis in Lebanon, and to protect the right of Lebanese Christian and other communities to live in freedom and security.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21 (legislative day, APRIL 27), 1981

Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. TSONGAS, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. CRANSTON, and Mr. BIDEN) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

RESOLUTION

To offer strong support for diplomatic efforts to resolve the current crisis in Lebanon, and to protect the right of Lebanese Christian and other communities to live in freedom and security.

Whereas the current situation in Lebanon has caused great human suffering and disruption of the economy of that country;

Whereas the presence of Syrian missiles threatens to further undermine the sovereignty of Lebanon and stability in the Middle East;

Whereas the removal of Syrian forces in Lebanon would significantly enhance the prospects of Lebanon once again becoming a peaceful, viable democracy;

Whereas a strong, pro-Western, democratic Lebanon would help promote stability in the region and serve the national interest of the United States; and

Whereas the Senate hopes for the success of diplomatic efforts currently being carried out by special envoy Philip C. Habib.

1 *Resolved*, That the Senate of the United States of
2 America strongly supports diplomatic efforts to resolve the
3 current crisis in Lebanon, and that the Government of the
4 United States should continue to pursue a comprehensive and
5 coordinated policy in Lebanon guided by the following
6 principles:

7 1. Establishment of an immediate and effective
8 cease-fire throughout Lebanon.

9 2. Removal of all Syrian missiles deployed in
10 Lebanon.

11 3. Preservation of a free and secure Christian
12 community as well as the Moslem, Druze, Armenian,
13 and Jewish communities in Lebanon.

14 4. Reaffirmation of the historic United States-
15 Lebanon relationship and strengthening the longstand-
16 ing commitment of the United States to the independ-
17 ence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon,
18 free from terrorism, from outside military occupation,

1 and from the influence of the Soviet Union or its surro-
2 gates.

3 5. Generous international support for relief, reha-
4 bilitation, and humanitarian assistance for Lebanon,
5 particularly for the residents of Zahle and East Beirut.

6 6. Restoration and respect for the authority of a
7 Lebanese Government based on free and open national
8 elections, now scheduled for mid-1982.

○

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 7, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: State Proposed Report on SJR-144 Offering
Strong Support for Diplomatic Efforts to
Resolve Current Crisis in Lebanon

The memorandum for your signature to Ronald Peterson relays NSC staff concurrence to the State proposed Report on SJR-144 offering strong support for diplomatic efforts to resolve current crisis in Lebanon.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Ronald Peterson.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

- Tab I - Memo for signature to Ronald Peterson
- A - Incoming correspondence

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

July 1, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER RT

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Decision to Regret
Request of Maronite Patriarch of Lebanon
to Meet with the President

In response to a letter from Bishop Francis Zayek (Tab C), Senator James Abdnor wrote to Max Friedersdorf (Tab B) asking for a reconsideration of the decision to deny the request for a courtesy call of the Lebanese Maronite (Roman Catholic) Patriarch with the President. Max Friedersdorf's response to Senator Abdnor is at Tab A.

The offices of Max Friedersdorf and Elizabeth Dole would have no problem with a visit of the President with the Maronite Patriarch of Lebanon if the request came from the State Department. At Tab D is State's incoming memorandum expressing the interest of the Department as well as the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you request a reconsideration of the decision to regret.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments

- Tab A - Friedersdorf's response to Senator Abdnor
- Tab B - Senator Abdnor's letter to Friedersdorf
- Tab C - Bishop Zayek's letter to Senator Abdnor
- Tab D - Memorandum for the Department of State

3764

June 22, 1981

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter of June 11 regarding the Maronite Patriarch and his request to visit with President Reagan, which was regretted by Mr. Greg Newell on June 1.

I appreciate knowing of your feelings on the foreign policy implications of this matter, and I will be sure to bring your assessment of the situation to the immediate attention of the State Department. Please know that I will see that your concerns receive prompt and thorough consideration.

With cordial regard, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President

The Honorable James Abdnor
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

MLF:CMP:MDB

cc: w/copy of incoming to Richard Allen - for appropriate action

sent cc: w/copy of incoming to Greg Newell - FYI

KHORAICHE, ANTHONY P

JAMES ABDNOR
SOUTH DAKOTA

4239 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 224-2321

VERNON C. LOEN
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

3769
COMMITTEES:
APPROPRIATIONS
ENVIRONMENT AND
PUBLIC WORKS
JOINT ECONOMIC

June 11, 1981

The Honorable Max Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President for
Legislative Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

028513

Dear Max:


Enclosed is a copy of a letter I have received from Bishop Francis M. Zayek in regard to the rejection of our efforts to set up a courtesy visit of the Maronite Patriarch with the President.

The Bishop expresses my feelings in this matter exactly: the United States appears ready to sacrifice Lebanon in favor of Syria in a Palestinian settlement.

It is particularly dismaying to know that the State Department was in favor of the courtesy call of the Patriarch. The idea of not receiving religious leaders just doesn't hold water, Max.

Any reconsideration which can be given our request will be appreciated.


Sincerely,


JAMES ABDNOR
United States Senator

JA/jbr

Enclosure

Handwritten note:
cc: [unclear]



CHANCERY OFFICE
P.O. Box 333 - Ft. Hamilton Station
Brooklyn, New York 11209

205 82nd Street
Brooklyn, New York 11209
(212) 680-6270

DIOCESE OF ST. MARON - U.S.A.

June 8, 1981

Prot. #548/81

Senator James Abdnor
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Sanator Abdnor:

I wish to thank you for all your interest and efforts in trying to set up a courtesy visit of Our Maronite Patriarch, when he comes to the United States, with our President. I just received your letter dated June 1, 1981 and the letter of Mr. Gregory J. Newell addressed to you and truly I am disappointed with the response. I pray that other means and approaches would be possible to reverse this present answer because of the deteriorating situation in Lebanon and the desire of our Lebanese descent Americans that the President confers with His Beatitude when he comes to the United States.

This refusal has not been made public but those who have come to know about it began to talk already of a conspiracy by the United States to sacrifice Lebanon in favor of Syria and the settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon, regardless of what the State Department keeps telling us that the United States is committed to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

I renew my thanks for all your past efforts and anything you may yet be able to do to reverse this present refusal of the President.

Sincerely yours,

+FRANCIS M. ZAYEK
BISHOP OF SAINT MARON

FMZ/fe



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8113972

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment for Maronite Patriarch with
President Reagan

Senator John Danforth has requested that the Maronite Patriarch, His Beatitude Anthony Peter Khoraiche, meet with President Reagan some time in the month of May. The Department of State and Ambassador Dean recommend that the President see the Patriarch.

His Beatitude is a long-time friend of the United States. He was elected Maronite Patriarch in 1975. He represents the largest and most influential group of Christians in Lebanon and in the Middle East. The Maronites as well comprise the vast majority of the large Lebanese-American community here.

Particularly in light of the present crisis in Lebanon, a meeting would provide an important opportunity for the President to reaffirm the United States' commitment to the preservation of Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and pluralistic democracy, our concern for the well-being of Lebanon's Christian community, and our support for the central government of President Sarkis.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

7/1

Ray Lantis

- ① We are drowning in paper!
- ② Glass combine into 1 memo.

Thanks
Jent