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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 11/28/2008

**File Folder** LEBANON JANUARY-APRIL 1981 (2)

**FOIA**

M2008-098/16

**Box Number** 90493

STOCKER

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
56993	REPORT	LEBANON UPDATE (PARTIAL) <b>PAR 12/6/2002 F99-024/1 #42; UPHELD 7/17/2012 M098/16 #56993</b>	5	ND	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Kemp, Geoffrey: Files  
 OA # ~~90240~~ 90493  
 File Folder: Lebanon - January - April, 1981 (2 of 2)

Archivist: gcc/bcb  
 FOIA ID: F99-024/1  
 Date: 6/2/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	re Lebanon Update, 5p. P 12/6/02 F99-024/1 # 42; upheld 7/17/2012 M09-098/16 #56993	n.d.	P1, F1 B1, B3
<del>2. map</del>	<del>Map, 1p. R 3/30/01 NLS F99-024/1 # 43</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1, F1</del>
3. memo	Sick to Allen, 2p. R 5/19/00 " #44	4/6/81	P1, F1
3. memo	Sick to Allen, 1p. R " " #45	4/7/81	P1, F1
4. memo	Same Text as Item #3, 2p. R " " #46	4/6/81	P1, F1
<del>5. paper</del>	<del>Briefing Paper, 2p. R 11/16/01 F99-024/1 # 47</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1, F1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Kemp, Geoffrey: Files  
 OA # ~~90249~~ 90493  
 File Folder: Lebanon – January – April, 1981 (2 of 2)

Archivist: gcc/bcb  
 FOIA ID: F99-024/1  
 Date: 6/2/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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<del>2. map</del>	<del>Map, 1p.</del> <i>R 3/30/01 NLS F99-024/1 # 43</i>	n.d.	<del>P1, F1</del>
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<del>5. paper</del>	<del>Briefing Paper, 2p.</del> <i>R 11/26/01 F99-024/1 # 47</i>	n.d.	<del>P1, F1</del>

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: ROBERT SCHWEITZER *RS*  
CHRIS SHOEMAKER  
SUBJECT: Presidential Statement on Lebanon

With the high level of violence in Lebanon continuing and the potential for escalation into a major regional crisis growing at a most unfavorable time, the President may wish to make a statement on the situation in the near future (Tab A).

The attached draft, agreed to by State (Stoessel) and cleared by the speechwriters, is an effort to help get the fighting stopped without ascribing blame for the violence to any of the parties. Such a message from the President could be helpful in effecting a cease-fire, and it is a gesture which would be especially welcomed in light of the President's own experience with unreasoned violence.

Timing is particularly important in maximizing the efficacy of the statement. To ensure that we make the most of the statement, we should do the following:

- Have the President approve the attached statement as an on-the-shelf strawman.
- Consult closely with the State Department if Lebanon continues to heat up.
- When we agree that the time is ripe for the statement, give State one last chance to introduce additional language geared to the specifics of the fighting.

Recommendation

That you approve the draft statement and sign the memo at Tab I.

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

*HOLD MEMO TO MOOSE UNTIL WE HAVE STATE FULLY ABOARD.  
• THIS IS A "THINKING AHEAD" ACTION*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: ED MEESE

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Presidential Message on Lebanon

The level of violence in Lebanon remains high, and the prognosis for near-term stability is not good. Moreover, the situation presents very real dangers for escalation into direct conflict between Israel and Syria, a crisis which would be most unwelcomed, especially at this time.

A statement from you might help defuse the problem or at least control the potential for escalation. We have already made strong demarches with the governments of Syria, Israel, and Lebanon, as well as with the Soviet Union, but we have not issued a general appeal for restraint from the White House. Such a statement from you could be helpful should the level of violence continue to grow.

We should carefully time the issuance of the statement to maximize its effectiveness. If you approve the idea in principle and the general thrust of the statement, I will work with Al Haig to determine the optimal moment for release. It may be necessary to make some minor modifications to the statement, depending upon the circumstances of the moment.

Recommendation

That you approve the statement at Tab A and the release procedure outlined above.

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve                      \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN  
'THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Statement  
on Lebanon

1. Attached is our revision of the contingency Presidential statement on the situation in Lebanon which your staff has proposed for release in the event that the situation there deteriorates significantly. The text has thus far been approved by Ambassador Stoessel. Please note that we are also sending the text to Secretary Haig's party for further review and that the attached should not be considered as authorized by the Department until we have further word from the Secretary's party.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "L. Paul Bremer, III".

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Statement on Lebanon

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT  
ON LEBANON

I have noted with grave concern the violence and bloodshed which has erupted in Lebanon during the past week. The United States deplores the senseless use of force to resolve political disputes, particularly when innocent civilians are involved.

I call upon all involved parties to adopt an immediate and unconditional cease-fire, to cooperate with the Government of Lebanon, and to refrain from actions and provocations which can lead to further violence. (Everyone must exercise the utmost restraint and patience in dealing with this explosive situation. I have directed representatives of the United States to convey this message to all concerned parties.)

The United States supports restoration of the Government of Lebanon's authority throughout the country and efforts to resolve disputes in Lebanon through peaceful negotiations. Only through such negotiations can an equitable and durable peace be obtained. (Further violence will lead only to more needless suffering and loss of life.)



A

MEMORANDUM

1843  
4/8/81 via Sit Room  
Lebanon  
Kemp  
1730

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED with  
SECRET Attachment

April 8, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *per*  
SUBJECT: The Situation in Lebanon

Attached is an information memorandum prepared by the Department of State.

UNCLASSIFIED with  
SECRET Attachment

LEBANON UPDATE

The Current Status

The situation in Lebanon remains tense, though none of the parties appear to be ready for a major assault. In Beirut, firing is again taking place along the confrontation line. And in Zahlah, artillery exchanges continue between the Phalange and Syrian troops in the hills to the northwest and east of the city.

Immediate Syrian objectives remain unchanged:

They are -- to control vital checkpoints among the Beirut-Damascus highway and

-- to prevent the Phalange from establishing a strong military presence in the Zahlah area.

The Phalange is prepared to resist and its forces have managed to reinforce themselves to a level to be able to sustain a long seige. The Phalange supply route to Zahlah is subject to Syrian fire but it has been usable at night.

National Movement and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was quoted on April 5 as saying "we have no choice but confrontation," but there is no sign he wants to jump into the fray.

The Shiite leadership still is hoping to avoid involvement in the conflict, but some Shiite factions receive Syrian support and may be drawn into the fighting.

Arafat and Fatah have refused to take part in the shooting so far. They would be drawn in, however, if the Syrians were seen to be on the point of being forced to withdraw.

Talks to end the crisis are continuing between Syria and Lebanon. But no immediate results have been noted.

The one positive note comes from Israel, where an Israeli Defense Force official told us April 7 that Israel is encouraging Phalange leader Bashir Gemayil to compromise with Syria on the question of control of Zahlah by allowing the Lebanese Armed Forces to replace the Phalange militia in the city. The Israeli official warned, however, that the Israeli government would insist on some form of direct support to the Christians should their political life be placed in jeopardy.

The Key Players

Phalange militia leader Bashir Gemayil and Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad are the major figures in the test of power. Bashir has been expanding his military base for several months. He is young, determined and unafraid to inflict and accept casualties in his goal of an unquestionably Christian-read Phalange-dominated Lebanon free of Palestinian and Syrian influence and presence.

[REDACTED] It is not clear whether Bashir intended to provoke a major clash. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We cannot yet judge if Bashir actually believed he could induce the Israelis to jump in or if his intention in starting the fight was simply to focus Secretary Haig's attention on the Christian plight in Lebanon during his Middle East visit. The vigor of the Syrian response may also have been motivated by a desire to show the Secretary Damascus' importance in the Middle East equation.

Hafiz al-Assad is also a bloodied and determined adversary. For more than a year he has been directing a harsh repression against Muslim Brother opponents in Syria. [REDACTED]

The Syrians are determined not to be pushed by the Phalange from their strategic position near Zahlah on the edge of the Bekaa valley. This is a key defensive position against a potential Israeli strike against Syria from southern Lebanon, and it is also seen as essential to maintaining Syrian influence in Lebanon in general. The importance of Zahlah and Assad's resoluteness most probably account for the intensity of the Syrian response to the Phalange provocation, including in Beirut.

The other players have minor roles. President Sarkis has been struggling for the bulk of his six-year term - up next year - to reestablish central government credibility and some form of control in civil war-ravaged Lebanon. He is the principal negotiator with the Syrians and the Phalange. His asset is his office and his control of the weak but increasingly important Lebanese Armed Forces.

PLO leader Yasir Arafat has insisted he and his forces are innocent bystanders. He has denounced reports that the PLO has joined the Syrian side and said he is taking many casualties. He insists (correctly) that the Palestine Liberation Army, which has been fighting with the Syrians in Beirut, is controlled entirely by the Syrians.

Menachem Begin and Israeli Chief of Staff Eitan round out the cast. Begin is publicly committed to saving the Lebanese Christians from destruction. But he and Eitan see Israel's defense sphere as southern Lebanon. They are very

reluctant to engage Syria, for the Phalange's account, in what Syria believes is a point key to its basic defense.

#### Intentions and Outcomes

If the Phalange hoped to involve the Israelis in a major battle for control of the Bekaa Valley, they miscalculated. News April 7 that the Israelis were urging Bashir Gemayil to work for a face-saving compromise with the Syrians reflects a sober assessment in Jerusalem that the Phalange cannot win this one. And if the Israelis recognize that Syria cannot accept a defeat in Zahlah, the Phalange has no other persuasive support. The Israeli decision should considerably strengthen President Sarkis' hand in negotiations with Damascus.

We see no further Syrian interests to be served by massive retaliation against Phalange targets, if the Phalange cools down its attacks on Syrian targets. The question now is whether and how long it will take the Phalange to agree to have its militia in Zahlah replaced by the Lebanese Armed Forces and whether or not the Syrians want the Phalange to pay a greater political price for its original attack.

#### U.S. Diplomatic Initiatives

We have mounted an all-out effort to try to stop the fighting before it spreads and to recreate a stable situation in Beirut and in Zahlah. Ambassador Dean has maintained continuous close contact with President Sarkis, other Lebanese government leaders, and leaders of key factions including the Phalange. He has made clear our full support for the government's efforts to try to end the fighting and to assume government control over the town of Zahlah to calm the situation there. Dean met with Secretary Haig in Amman on Monday and has returned to Beirut with a letter from the Secretary to President Sarkis underscoring our full support for his efforts. With the Phalange, Dean has consistently urged restraint and avoidance of further action which could lead to greater violence.

Ambassador Seelye has made three demarches to the Syrians in Damascus and Acting Assistant Secretary Constable has followed up with the Syrian Charge here. He has urged them to cease all shelling of the civilian population in Beirut and Zahlah and forcefully made the point that such action is totally unacceptable. The Syrians have listened but have so far provided us with no direct indication of their willingness to ease the situation. They have also insisted that Syria is responding to Phalange "provocations." Seelye also met with Haig on Monday and has returned to Damascus with instructions to make a new demarche.

From the outset of the crisis we have been concerned that Israel may intervene in defense of the Christians. Our Embassy in Tel Aviv and Secretary Haig during his talks with Begin and others strongly urged restraint and asked that Israel not take action which would complicate our efforts to resolve this crisis through diplomatic means. We have also urged the Israelis to use their influence with the Phalange to contribute to a reduction of tension. During Secretary Haig's visit Begin agreed to let our efforts have a chance.

As this crisis has developed, it has seemed to us that leading Arab states may hold the key to inducing Assad to moderate Syria's position. We have made demarches broadly here and in selected Arab capitals (e.g., Amman, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Algeria, Tunis, Morocco) expressing our deep concern at the situation in Lebanon and asking Arab leaders to get involved to end the fighting in ways that will enhance the position of the Lebanese Government. Our demarches have included an instruction to our Ambassador in Tunis to encourage the Arab League headquartered there to play a helpful role.

The key to Arab League involvement probably lies in Saudi activity. In the aftermath of demarches by our Charge, the Saudi Royal Court issued a statement calling for a resolution of the crisis. Secretary Haig has strongly urged the Saudis during his visit to use their influence with Syria and with the Arab League to work out a means to end the confrontation in Zahlah. We do not yet have a full report on Saudi reaction, but Crown Prince Fahd is reportedly sympathetic to trying to work to ease the situation, including a possible revival of active Arab League involvement in Lebanon.

We have also undertaken contacts with major Western European governments to express our concern at the situation in Lebanon and to explain the diplomatic measures we have been undertaking to support the Lebanese Government. France and the United Kingdom, countries with long association with Lebanon, have been quite active in sharing their thoughts with us and exchanging information about the steps they are undertaking. The EC 10 Political Committee met April 7 to discuss Lebanon originally in the context of the deployment of additional Lebanese Army troops to southern Lebanon. In preparation for that meeting, we have expanded our consultations with European Governments from Athens to Luxembourg to focus attention on the gravity of the current situation for Lebanon's future and regional stability and seek concerted diplomatic action to support our initiatives in the region.

Our Embassy in Moscow made a demarche to the Soviets on April 5 about Lebanon, particularly pointing out Syrian overreaction. We impressed upon the Soviets the potential threat to regional security and urged Moscow to use its influence in

Damascus to caution restraint. This approach was reinforced April 6 in Washington. UN Secretary General Waldheim has also talked with the Soviet permanent representative in New York, who promised to report Waldheim's concern to Moscow.

Waldheim and other senior officials of the UN have been active in contacts designed to calm the situation in Lebanon. He has sent a personal message to President Assad of Syria through former French Minister De Guirangaud, who was incidentally visiting Damascus on other business. Our mission at the UN has been in continuing contact with UN officials and representatives of other concerned governments, but there is no consensus at this time that action in the UN context would be helpful. A senior UN official is in the region on a previously scheduled trip but without a formal mandate. He is experienced and widely respected and shares our perspective that the short-term goals are 1) to obtain a cease-fire in order to end the bloodshed and to diminish the likelihood of regional conflict; and 2) do so in a manner which bolsters, or at least does not undercut, Sarkis' authority.

6





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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-024/i # 43

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 5/29/01

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED with  
~~SECRET Attachment~~

April 8, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GARY SICK *GS*  
SUBJECT: The Situation in Lebanon

The Vice President's office requested the attached memo (Tab A) on Lebanon on Monday. The information is perishable and its delivery to the Vice President should be expedited.

You might wish to consider including the memorandum I did for you Monday on the question of possible Israeli intervention. I have attached a copy of that memo at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the Vice President at Tab I, forwarding Tab A and (if you wish) Tab B.

UNCLASSIFIED with  
~~SECRET Attachment~~

1843



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 7, 1981

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By Carly NARA, Date 5/17/00

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Situation in Lebanon

Attached is a memorandum requested by the Vice President's office by phone yesterday. It contains a status report and analysis of the Lebanese fighting plus a summary of U.S. diplomatic activity to end the crisis.

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
As stated.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

(Unclassified upon removal of attachments)

81 APR 8 P 1: 20

*gr 81 1326*

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

*Bud -  
Maybe you  
can sign for  
RVA*

*ACTION  
TAKEN*

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC \_\_\_\_\_

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*Lebanon*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1911

~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GARY SICK *js*  
SUBJECT: Lebanon

I have checked around with the intelligence community about the situation in Zahleh. The following are my own conclusions about the fighting and the likelihood of escalation.

Neither the Phalange nor the Syrians is in full command of the high ground. The terrain around Zahleh is jumbled, and each side holds some positions around the city. Although there has certainly been some shelling of the city itself, it appears that a lot of the fighting has been artillery exchanges between these various strong points outside the city proper. It is fair to assume that the Phalange is getting the worst of the exchange, but we cannot confirm just how bad their situation may be.

The Israelis have four basic options:

1. Diplomatic. They are exercising this now, with public statements of concern and indications that they will not tolerate a massacre of the Christian forces.

2. Reconnaissance. They have probably already taken steps to enhance their intelligence coverage. There was evidence today of Israeli overflights of Zahleh, which would not have been overlooked by the Syrians.

3. Demonstrations. The next escalation by Israel, if it chooses, could be to mobilize some forces in the north to put forces in the Northern Command/Golan on alert, to conduct some ostentatious overflights of the Zahleh area, and/or to move some combat forces into the Haddad zone in southern Lebanon. Any or all of these could be undertaken to persuade Syria that Israel was deadly serious and to raise the risks of a direct military confrontation.

~~SECRET~~

Review on April 6, 1987

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F99-029/1 #44  
CIA NARA DATE 5/19/01

4. Intervention. Israel could carry out some airstrikes on Syrian positions around Zahleh, or, with much greater risk, could conduct a raid or even commit ground forces. Even if these actions did not in themselves resolve the military situation, they would directly pose the question to Syria of whether or not they wish to risk fighting Israel directly.

The Israeli calculus of decision will probably be based on the following indicators:

-- Continuation of fighting at the same level for a period of time without improvement will probably lead the Israelis to take more drastic action. This would probably involve a slow escalation over a period of several days. If the situation simply continues as is, there is some chance that the Israelis will hold back until Haig and his party get clear of the region. At least that will act as a constraint.

-- However, if the Syrians should move to take the town of Zahleh with ground forces, or if the Syrians should begin using airpower in a direct strike role against the Phalange positions or if the Syrians should begin moving air defense missiles into the Zahleh area, then Israel would probably feel that they had to move more forcibly. This could happen very quickly.

At the moment, it is very probable that neither Syria nor Israel wants a direct military clash. We have had serious clashes in the past when both sides pulled back from the brink.

However, the risk of escalation is definitely there. The Israeli commitment to the Phalange and their nearness to the scene keeps them on a hair-trigger. If the Israelis get a piece of intelligence which makes them think the Syrians are beginning to move on Zahleh, they may act first and ask questions later.

The Syrians clearly wish to humiliate the Phalange and "teach them a lesson" about extending their control into the Beqaa Valley. In the past, the Syrians have tended to be brutal in their reactions to turf challenges, but then to stop short of a prolonged military clash which could escalate to Syria's disadvantage. I suspect that is what they have in mind this time, but there is always the chance that they will lose control or that signals will be misunderstood. Similarly, the Israelis are not anxious to be drawn into a military clash with Syria by the Phalange; but they also wish to insure their reputation as a reliable ally.

In short, this situation could well be another in the long series of examples of an escalation which stops short of the brink. If the Israelis and Syrians maintain their sang froid, we can expect some angry rhetoric and military posturing but no major military clash. Keep watching this space...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Kemp

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1841

April 7, 1981

AK

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GARY SICK

SUBJECT: Lebanese Contacts

I was contacted today by Micheline Abi-Samra, of the Lebanese Embassy, and by Ambassador Eitani of Lebanon. Both, of course, are extremely concerned about the situation in Zahleh and the implications for a widening conflict.

Just as the nation of Lebanon is divided into various factions and rival groups, so is the Embassy here in Washington. Miss Abi-Samra is Catholic and reflects the views of the Christian community. The Ambassador is a Sunni Moslem and tends to reflect a somewhat different viewpoint.

I wanted you to be aware that I had talked with these two (each without the knowledge of the other). In each case, I reiterated strong U.S. support for the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon. I expressed our deep concern about the situation and attempted to make them understand that we cannot simply order all the parties to stop fighting.

After each conversation, I reported the substance of the conversation to State. The Lebanese are blanketing the town right now, and this is part of the process. I intend to continue coordinating closely with State to insure there is no disconnect or contrary signals. || ✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Rvw. 4/7/83

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-024/1 #45

CN NARA, DATE 8/19/06

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→ sick ←

RVA HAS SEEN

1911

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JANET COLSON	_____		
BUD NANCE	_____		
DICK ALLEN	_____		
IRENE DERUS	_____		
JANET COLSON	_____		
BUD NANCE	_____		
KAY	_____		
CY TO VP	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO MEESE	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO BAKER	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO DEEVER	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO BRADY	_____	SHOW CC	_____



RVA 1163 5853

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1911

~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1981

*QJF*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GARY SICK *JS*

SUBJECT: Lebanon

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1. Diplomatic. They are exercising this now, with public statements of concern and indications that they will not tolerate a massacre of the Christian forces.
2. Reconnaissance. They have probably already taken steps to enhance their intelligence coverage. There was evidence today of Israeli overflights of Zahleh, which would not have been overlooked by the Syrians.
3. Demonstrations. The next escalation by Israel, if it chooses, could be to mobilize some forces in the north to put forces in the Northern Command/Golan on alert, to conduct some ostentatious overflights of the Zahleh area, and/or to move some combat forces into the Haddad zone in southern Lebanon. Any or all of these could be undertaken to persuade Syria that Israel was deadly serious and to raise the risks of a direct military confrontation.

~~SECRET~~

Review on April 6, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLS E99-024/1 #46

27 CH NARA, DATE 5/19/06

4. Intervention. Israel could carry out some airstrikes on Syrian positions around Zahleh, or, with much greater risk, could conduct a raid or even commit ground forces. Even if these actions did not in themselves resolve the military situation, they would directly pose the question to Syria of whether or not they wish to risk fighting Israel directly.

The Israeli calculus of decision will probably be based on the following indicators:

-- Continuation of fighting at the same level for a period of time without improvement will probably lead the Israelis to take more drastic action. This would probably involve a slow escalation over a period of several days. If the situation simply continues as is, there is some chance that the Israelis will hold back until Haig and his party get clear of the region. At least that will act as a constraint.

-- However, if the Syrians should move to take the town of Zahleh with ground forces, or if the Syrians should begin using airpower in a direct strike role against the Phalange positions or if the Syrians should begin moving air defense missiles into the Zahleh area, then Israel would probably feel that they had to move more forcibly. This could happen very quickly.

At the moment, it is very probable that neither Syria nor Israel wants a direct military clash. We have had serious clashes in the past when both sides pulled back from the brink.

However, the risk of escalation is definitely there. The Israeli commitment to the Phalange and their nearness to the scene keeps them on a hair-trigger. If the Israelis get a piece of intelligence which makes them think the Syrians are beginning to move on Zahleh, they may act first and ask questions later.

The Syrians clearly wish to humiliate the Phalange and "teach them a lesson" about extending their control into the Beqaa Valley. In the past, the Syrians have tended to be brutal in their reactions to turf challenges, but then to stop short of a prolonged military clash which could escalate to Syria's disadvantage. I suspect that is what they have in mind this time, but there is always the chance that they will lose control or that signals will be misunderstood. Similarly, the Israelis are not anxious to be drawn into a military clash with Syria by the Phalange; but they also wish to insure their reputation as a reliable ally.

In short, this situation could well be another in the long series of examples of an escalation which stops short of the brink. If the Israelis and Syrians maintain their sang froid, we can expect some angry rhetoric and military posturing but no major military clash. Keep watching this space...

MEMORANDUM

RVA HAS SEEN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1983

April 6, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GARY SICK *GS*

SUBJECT: Colorado Senator Zakhem

→ SICK  
FR

At your request, I called Colorado State Senator Zakhem. Senator Zakhem is of Lebanese descent and wished to register his serious concern about the situation in Zahleh. I told him we were fully aware of the dangers of the situation and that we were doing everything in our power to keep it under control.

He was very appreciative. I promised to relay his concerns to you personally.

Thanks  
RVA 4-10-81

**MEMORANDUM  
OF CALL**

Lebanon

TO:

Geoff

YOU WERE CALLED BY—

YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Phyllis

OF (Organization)

PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  FTS  
CODE/EXT. \_\_\_\_\_

WILL CALL AGAIN  IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL  WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

More on Lebanon for you to look  
at.

RECEIVED BY

DATE

TIME

63-109  
★ U. S. GPO: 1980-311-156/2

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #42

THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 1981, 12:38 p.m.  
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. DYESS: Good afternoon. I have one announcement. This is a statement on Lebanon.

As regards the South Lebanon situation, we have been deeply concerned and appalled by the threats coming from Sa'ad Haddad's militia along the border; that they will shell the City of Sidon if the Lebanese Government does not pay approximately \$5 million to his force.

This action we consider to be criminal. We know that in recent days Haddad's militia has shelled several Lebanese towns and villages, leaving an estimated three persons dead and 21 wounded. One of the shells from the militia hit a school, injuring nine children.

That's the end of the announcement. I'll be glad to take your questions.

Q On that, beyond this statement, is the United States prepared to do anything beyond issuing this statement?

A In regard to Haddad particularly?

Q Yes.

A In regard to the difficulties in the region, I think I told you yesterday that we are discussing the problem with the Governments of Israel and Lebanon.

Q Do you feel that the Government of Israel has any influence over Haddad's actions?

A I did not mean to suggest or to imply that.

Q Do you think that the Government of Israel does have any influence?

A I did not mean to suggest or imply that. I would not suggest or imply that the Government of Israel had anything to do with Mr. Haddad's threat or the shelling of Sidon.

Q Bill, could you bring us up to date on Mozambique, the status?

Q (Interposing) Wait a minute. This information, Bill, that you just gave out about Haddad, can you tell us the sources of that information?

A I think we probably got it from press reports as well as from embassy reporting.

We had a question about Mozambique?

Q Right.

A What is the question particularly on Mozambique?

Q You gave a rather incomplete account of what happened concerning the Cuban role yesterday, and I was wondering if you could flesh it out on the record today.

A I can flesh it out to some extent ON BACKGROUND.

By way of further amplification of the Mozambique incident, 12 officials of the Cuban Government, led by two senior intelligence officers -- Armando Fernandez and Manuel Martinez Galan -- aided by Mozambican officials, forcibly detained the embassy officer for more than four hours while they attempted to recruit him as a spy for Cuba.

In addition to offering a sizable sum of money, the officer and his family were threatened.

That's the END OF BACKGROUND.

Q Bill, just a technical point: That precise statement that you just read was put out last night by the Press Office on the record.

MR. PASSAGE: No, it was not.

MR. DYESS: I have it here underlined in blue and marked in red that it's on background.

MR. ANDERSON: I misunderstood. I moved it on the record.

A It doesn't push them forward.

Q Bill, could I go back to your opening statement? Did I gather correctly that you were doing nothing about Major Haddad's threat except to issue this statement saying you're appalled?

A That's all that I am stating at this time from this platform, yes.

Q Are you prepared to conclude that on the basis of a threat like this Major Haddad has become a terrorist?

A I would say it's awfully close, yes. I don't know whether I should or properly could use that term to apply to him or not, but I think it's awfully close, particularly if he carries out the threat to shell the city for ransom.

Q Are you concerned about where he's getting his military equipment from?

A Naturally we're concerned about where any terrorists, or someone who is in that activity, would get equipment, yes.

Q Bill, you're familiar with the basic assumption that it's coming -- it's American equipment from Israel.

A No, I'm not making a statement with any such assumption in mind. I do not know that for a fact.

Q Did you raise it with the Israelis?

A If we have, I would not be able to share that information with you. Anything of that nature would be done through diplomatic channels, and it would not be something that I would be able to talk about publicly.

Q What is the normal diplomatic channel to get to Haddad?

A He didn't ask us about conversations with Haddad. He asked us about conversations in regard to Haddad with the Government of Israel.

A It doesn't push them forward.

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A He didn't ask us about conversations with Haddad. He asked us about conversations in regard to Haddad with the Government of Israel.



Q Have you had diplomatic conversations with Haddad or attempted to?

A No. It's awfully difficult to have conversations with someone of that persuasion.

Q But have you tried?

A Diplomatic discussions? No, we could not. He's not a government; he doesn't represent a government. It would be impossible.

Q Bill, the previous administration, as I recall, actually did state that the source of weapons for which -- you just called them criminal activities by Haddad -- were from Israel. Do you have information to negate that now?

A I have no information that would enlighten you, at least from our standpoint, about the source of his weapons, or his weapons supply.

Q Would it be of your concern to find out really if the American Embassy --

A I'm sure, obviously, it's a matter that concerns us, but I'm not sure that I would be able to get anything more specific for you about what we plan to do in regard to his activities.

Q On the same subject. So we cannot really expect that you could provide us with information as to the source of these weapons that Haddad is using for which you call criminal and terrorist activities?

A No, I'm not sure that I would have anything specifically for you on it. We would have to have pretty good evidence, and we would want to be very certain. And, even if we were, we might decide that the best way to deal with the supplies is through other means.

Q What would prevent you from talking directly to Haddad and get his version of what you describe as criminal acts?

A What would prevent us from talking directly to him? I don't know that there would be any point in our talking directly to him. He's not under our jurisdiction. I don't know that we have any grounds to do so.

Q Bill, the point here, I think, is that there are implications by the same people who would do this repeatedly, putting a smear on Israel, that somehow Israel is behind this or involved. And you have repudiated that. But what I'm getting to is we have this information from our embassy in Beirut that is guarded by PLO terrorists.

We don't know where the information came to them except from press reports and from our embassy which may be anti-Israel in sentiment, so why can't we get something a little more clear on this to make sure that there was such a threat, that there is such blackmail. This is what I'm getting at.

A We might be able to get more information for you. I'll see if I can.

Q Bill, can you confirm whether the Soviet Union plans maneuvers in and around Poland later this month? And, if that's the case, do you have any greater sense of concern about the Polish situation?

A It's clear to us now that maneuvers are to be held this month in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact members. I think I said to you on March 3 that major exercises are usually held at this time of year by the Warsaw Pact countries. So we find that not surprising, and we are closely monitoring the situation this year.

I would go on to say that with regard to possible intervention in Poland, I would repeat our frequently stated position that Poland should be free to solve its own problems without any outside interference; and, in our view, outside intervention, whatever its form, would have grave consequences.

Q Bill, on this, can you tell us what the allies are doing in assisting to monitor this? Are they working with us or doing it separately?

A You're asking me now for specific information that would reveal sources and methods of intelligence, which I can't possibly do.

A I think that we could tell the difference, yes.

Q How much in advance possibly?

A I don't want to get into that because, one, I'm not sure of my ground, but I will not even pledge to get you an answer because I'm not sure I could not get one that I could give you.

Q Just a technical point, Bill. Do you still want to leave the proposition, that an invasion is not imminent, in your construction?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any estimate on when the maneuvers might begin?

A No. I have nothing I can give you on that.

Q Bill, if I may, I would like to change the subject. Why have you delayed the announcement on the F-15 deal with Saudi Arabia, and when are you going to announce it?

A Wait. Excuse me. On the Haddad statement -- let's go back to that just a moment -- the information was carried in the Lebanese press and its accuracy confirmed to us by the Lebanese Government.

I'm sorry, I interrupted you.

Q Yes. I asked about the F-15 deal with Saudi Arabia. You were about to announce today the announcement, and you delayed it. The question is why, and when are you going to announce it?

A I said I thought we probably would have an announcement by the end of this week. We still may well have one, but I would not say it is for certain. It could be that it will come early next week, but it's possible it could come tomorrow. In any case, I will let you know the moment I get the word.

Q Are you still consulting with the Saudis about this?

A We are consulting with interested parties. I don't want to be more specific than that.

Q What is the problem that delays the announcement?

A I'm not sure that "delay" is the right word, because there was never a deadline, there was no specific date. It's just that we've suggested to you that we felt we were ending, coming close to a period in which the consultations would all be completed, and a final decision would be taken, and we would be able to announce it. We are not yet quite at that point.

Q One more on this: There are reports of increased opposition from the Saudis and from Congress. Are they affecting your announcement?

A No, I wouldn't want to pinpoint any specific area on which we're consulting now.

Q Have you gone back to the Israelis for consultation?

A No, I'm not going to say that. We are just consulting with interested parties -- I'll leave it at that. And I know of no difficulty that has arisen. It is not a question of some obstacle suddenly occurring; it's simply carrying through the negotiation process.

Q A question on Lebanon?

A Yes.

Q If Haddad wants to visit the United States, will the State Department prevent issuing him a visa?

A I don't know. That's a matter we'd have to take up with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and with our lawyers, and I wouldn't want to speculate.

Q Bill, about Lebanon again, how does the Embassy report Haddad's justification for this ransom demand?

A He demanded --

Q -- \$5 million.

A -- \$5 million to pay his forces. It's extortion. You mean, why does he think that they should give it to him? I don't know why Mr. Haddad thinks that. He needs money, I guess. (Laughter) Yes, he thinks that Lebanon has some, or at least they are a close victim.

Q If you labeled Mr. Haddad, or General Haddad, a terrorist -- that's what I thought -- doesn't that by itself actually say that he cannot enter the United States?

A That's a term that I use, and I think the lawyers would have to settle on the same term before --

Q That's not the policy, that he is; it's your own definition?

A It's the way I characterize his activities, based upon what I know about his activities. But if a person applies for a visa, and there is a question of exclusion on some grounds of ineligibility, then that is reviewed by lawyers.

Q Bill, did you actually say Haddad was a terrorist? I thought you said it was awfully close. Can we get a --

A Yes, I got very close to it, and I may have slipped over the line there. His actions, we'll say, are criminal. Maybe that's a better word than "terrorist."

Q El Salvador?

A Yes, El Salvador.

Q On this thing on the Hill tomorrow, advance information says one of the prime focuses will be on the private sector, business interests in El Salvador, and they will be discussing the possibility of the rollback of the land and other reforms and possible changes in the structure of the government and the personnel.

I'm wondering if you were invited to participate, and if you'll have somebody there or you'll have an observer.

A Who is doing this on the Hill?

Q Senator Helms' top aid -- I forget his name --  
John --

Q Carbaugh.

A We may have been invited. I don't know. I'll have to check to see. I know nothing of this. This is the first I've heard about it. That doesn't mean the Department doesn't know about it. It may well have been invited to participate. I don't know.

Q Bill, am I wrong to assume that there was a slight evolution in the statements made here yesterday in the briefing and later by Secretary Haig?

A -- and that information has been provided to the Government of El Salvador.

Q Right. So it kind of suggests that this implied warning about cutting off the programs of economic and military aid, diplomatic support, and what-have-you --

A No. He didn't say anything about cutting off things. He just said it would be more difficult for us to implement and to carry on our policies in that region --

Q If you had a coup.

A That's right. He was addressing the question of the difficulties this would cause us.

Q Yes, I understand that. But in passing this on to the Government of El Salvador, which indeed would be the victim of a coup, what is the purpose of that? What does he hope to achieve by saying that? That's why I get back to the first question: Is it a warning to the right not to have a coup?

A He said it first of all because he was asked the question. He was responding to a question.

Q He volunteered that, as I understand it, as part of a long answer -- it was the bottom end of it.

A No, no. The question was: Would you oppose a military coup in El Salvador? And the question was asked by Diane Sawyer, I believe. It was a direct answer to her question.

Q There is a report in the Christian Science Monitor yesterday that Vernon Walters, on his way back from South America, stopped in Panama and talked with the former President of Venezuela and said that the United States supported a negotiated settlement in El Salvador. Are those remarks accurate? Does that represent the position of the United States?

A I don't know whether they are accurate or not, but I would not, in any case, comment on what General Walters is saying to the leaders he is meeting.

Q Going back to this Haddad thing one more time, has there been any attempt to send any kind of a message -- you didn't want to characterize it as a diplomatic message -- to Haddad through any channel warning him about pursuing this ransom course?

A I will take the question, not being sure that I can get you an answer. But I will take that question.

Q Bill, you did say something about press reports and confirmation by the Lebanese Government. Has the Lebanese Government, in fact, made an announcement, a statement, publicly that Haddad had made this ransom demand?

A I don't know whether or not they have made it an announcement, but it said that the accuracy of the press report was confirmed to us by the Lebanese Government, so it may have been done directly to the United States Government.

Q But, as far as you know, the Lebanese Government itself has not made a statement to this effect?

A I do not know. I'm not saying yes or no, because I don't know.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you.

(The conference concluded at 1:16 p.m.)

A I will take the question, not being sure that I can get you an answer. But I will take that question.

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A I don't know whether or not they have made it an announcement, but it said that the accuracy of the press report was confirmed to us by the Lebanese Government, so it may have been done directly to the United States Government.

Q But, as far as you know, the Lebanese Government itself has not made a statement to this effect?

A I do not know. I'm not saying yes or no, because I don't know.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you.

(The conference concluded at 1:16 p.m.)



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

410 add-on

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

*J Kemp*

ACTION

February 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*

SUBJECT:

Vice President's Meeting with  
Ambassador Ghorra of Lebanon,  
February 20, 1981

The memorandum for your signature at Tab I to the Vice President forwards briefing material for his use in his meeting with Ambassador Edward Ghorra (former Lebanese Ambassador to the UN).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the Vice President.

APPROVE

*lv*  
22-17-81

DISAPPROVE

\_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES TYSON

FROM: Nancy Bearg Dyke *ND*

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with Ambassador Ghorra

The Vice President will meet with Ambassador Edward Ghorra (former Lebanese Ambassador to the UN) on February 20, 1981, at 4:30 p.m. May we please have any relevant background papers and recommended talking points for the Vice President's use by opening of business, February 18.

REFERRAL

DATE: 10 FEB 81

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: TYSON  
FROM: DYKE,  
DATE: 10 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: LEBANON UN GHORRA, EDWARD

AVP

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR TALKER FOR VP MTG W/ AMB GHORRA

---

REQUIRED ACTION: PREPARE TALKER & BACKGROUND PAPER

DUE DATE: 16 FEB 81

COMMENTS:



FOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

---

FOR NSC USE ONLY

FOR INFO FARRAR

SICK

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O JF C



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


February 17, 1981

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By Gryll NARA, Date 5/17/00

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Vice President's Meeting with Ambassador  
Ghorra of Lebanon

Attached is the briefing material requested in connection with the Vice President's meeting with Ambassador Edward Ghorra (former Lebanese Ambassador to the UN).

  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 2/17/87

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

LEBANON

Your meeting with Ambassador Ghorra will be the first contact by a senior representative of the Reagan Administration with a prominent Lebanese. We know that Lebanon's leaders are intensely interested in the approach of the Administration toward Lebanon and its problems. Accordingly, your discussion with Ambassador Ghorra will be intensely scrutinized to determine the bedrock of the Administration's policy toward Lebanon and its problems.

OBJECTIVES:

1. Assure Ambassador Ghorra that the Reagan Administration stands behind the constitutional Government; the U.S. fully supports efforts to promote national reconciliation and political unity, and the US opposes efforts at partition.

2. Assure the Ambassador that U.S. policy in the coming four years will be guided by the objective of seeking universal respect for Lebanon's territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty, and independence, as well as freedom for Lebanon's citizens to determine their future without the interference of outsiders. The U.S. will continue to support the development of a national army which will be able -- gradually -- to take over security duties, including those now undertaken by the Syrian forces.

3. Assure the Ambassador that the Reagan Administration will do what it can to encourage all involved factions and governments to avoid actions which can provoke further violence and fighting.

DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES:

1. In the aftermath of Lebanon's 1975-76 civil war, the U.S. has consistently supported the Central Government of President Sarkis as the one institution in the country

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Declassify 2/18/87~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 799-024/1 #47  
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 11/16/01

which stands for the preservation of Lebanon's unity and independence. Over this period the Central Government has been challenged by groups (ranging from Palestinian fedayeen to private Maronite militias) whose independent actions tend to undermine its authority. Any indication that U.S. support for the Sarkis Government is eroding will have a serious negative effect on its ability to function. Furthermore, should the Government's detractors sense a weakening of our resolve to support Sarkis, it could spark moves which would upset the fragile political balance and risk a renewed outbreak of fighting with potential for igniting wider Middle East hostilities. The country will face a major test in 1982, when presidential elections are due to be held.

2. Syria presently has a military force of some 20,000-25,000 men in Lebanon. The force was introduced into the country in 1976 during the civil war and has remained under a fraying mandate from the Arab League and with the acquiescence of the Lebanese Government. In addition, the large majority of the PLO's armed fedayeen units are based in Lebanon. Any precipitate pullout by Syria would risk a breakdown of order and renewed fighting among the Palestinian and various Lebanese armed groups, since the Lebanese army is not yet prepared to act as a buffer. Since 1976, we have made it clear that we hope the Syrian forces can be withdrawn -- stage by stage -- as the Lebanese army takes over security duties. We have also made clear that a resolution of the Palestinian problem should not be at the expense of Lebanon's national interests.

3. Since 1978 the southern portion of the country has increasingly become a battleground between Palestinian guerrilla elements, the Israeli-backed Christian militia led by former Lebanese army Major Haddad, and the Israeli armed forces. A measure of stability has been provided in the area by the UN force (UNIFIL), which was introduced into the south during Israel's military withdrawal in 1978. The continuing battles between the Palestinian and Christian forces in the south, and between Israel and Palestinians there, have caused regional tension and instability. We have made clear our support for UNIFIL (which the U.S. helped create in 1978), and we used the influence we have over the parties involved to keep the fighting to a minimum. In particular, we have made clear our opposition to cross-border actions by the Palestinians and preemptive military action by the Israelis. Unequivocal backing for the principle of territorial integrity has been an important element in our support for the Government of President Sarkis, which is weakened by its inability to control the territory in the south and prevent incursions across its borders.