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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Kemp, Geoffrey: Files

OA # ~~90249~~ 90443

File Folder: Lebanon: August - December, 1981 (3 of 3)

Archivist: gcc/bcb

FOIA ID: F99-024/1

Date: 6/2/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTIONS
1. memo	Vehiotes to The Secretary, 2p. R 11/16/01 F99-0241, #139	n.d.	P1, F1
2. memo	Tanter to Allen, 1p. R 5/19/06 " #140	8/5/81	P1, F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

LEISAPON

OK ✓

Relayed
to Blair
9.4.81

PROPOSED CABLE FOR TRANSMISSION
TO EMBASSY PARIS FOR DELIVERY
TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

Dear President Mitterrand:

I was shocked and saddened to learn just now of the murder
of Ambassador Delamare in Beirut. The senseless and brutal
terrorism which afflicts the world and endangers our societies
has claimed another victim. Please convey my deepest sympathy
to the Ambassador's family and friends.

Ronald Reagan

PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE OR GUIDANCE

The President was shocked and saddened by the news this morning that France's ambassador to Lebanon was killed as the result of an attack in Beirut. The President feels strongly that the scourge of violence and terror which is growing in many areas of the world is a grave danger to the fabric of society. He would like to extend his deepest sympathies to the family, colleagues and friends of Ambassador Delamare.

~~Kemp~~
R

R071F I6391CZCZSAZOT

FM-AMBASSADOR-LEAD "*****"SNAP (R-070 NO PICKUP)

BEIRUT, SEPT 4, REUTER -- THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON WAS SHOT AND KILLED TODAY BY UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN, POLICE REPORTED.

AMBASSADOR LOUIS DELAMARE DIED IN A HOSPITAL SHORTLY AFTER HIS CAR WAS STOPPED AND GUNMEN PUMPED SIX BULLETS INTO HIM AT CLOSE RANGE. AT LEAST TWO BULLETS STRUCK HIM IN THE HEAD, POLICE SAID.

MORE 0947 RB

TANTER

N025

UI

AMBASSADOR LEAD

EDS: COMBINES BULLETIN SERIES AND ADDS DETAIL THROUGHOUT

URGENT

BEIRUT, LEBANON (AP) -- FRENCH AMBASSADOR LOUIS DELAMARE WAS AMBUSHED BY UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN TODAY AND A DOCTOR AT BARBIR HOSPITAL SAID THE AMBASSADOR DIED OF HIS WOUNDS WHILE UNDERGOING SURGERY.

NO ONE MADE ANY IMMEDIATE CLAIM OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AMBUSH.

LEBANESE POLICE AND THE FRENCH EMBASSY SAID THE AMBASSADOR WAS SHOT IN THE HEAD, CHEST AND STOMACH.

A POLICE STATEMENT BROADCAST BY LEBANON'S STATE RADIO SAID UNKNOWN GUNMEN OPENED FIRE AT THE AMBASSADOR AS HE WAS BEING DRIVEN BACK TO HIS OFFICIAL RESIDENCE CLOSE TO THE GREEN LINE THAT DIVIDES BEIRUT INTO MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN SECTORS.

THE STATEMENT SAID THE 59-YEAR-OLD DELAMARE, A CAREER DIPLOMAT AND FATHER OF FIVE CHILDREN, WAS SHOT AT 2:10 P.M. -- 8:10 A.M. EDT. THE DOCTOR, WHO DID NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED BY NAME, SAID THE AMBASSADOR WAS PRONOUNCED DEAD ABOUT 15 MINUTES AFTER HE WAS BROUGHT INTO THE HOSPITAL OF "MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS IN THE HEAD, CHEST AND ABDOMEN."

"HE WAS NEARLY DEAD WHEN HE WAS BROUGHT IN. DOCTORS TRIED TO RESUSCITATE HIM, BUT VERY LITTLE COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. HIS HEART HAD STOPPED AND HE HAD SEVERAL INJURIES IN THE HEAD," THE DOCTOR SAID. "ATTEMPTS TO RESUSCITATE HIM FAILED AND HE WAS THEN PRONOUNCED DEAD."

THE PRIVATELY OWNED "VOICE OF LEBANON" RADIO STATION SAID FOUR GUNMEN RIDING IN A WHITE GERMAN-MADE BMW CAR SHOT THE AMBASSADOR AFTER TRAILING HIS METALLIC BLUE PEUGEOT 604 FOUR-DOOR SEDAN AND THEN SPED AWAY. THE POLICE STATEMENT SAID DELAMARE'S DRIVER IMMEDIATELY TURNED THE CAR AROUND AND RACED TO THE EMERGENCY WARD OF BARBIR HOSPITAL, A FEW DOZEN YARDS FROM THE SCENE OF THE SHOOTING IN MOSTLY MOSLEM WEST BEIRUT.

THE POLICE STATEMENT DID NOT GIVE ANY DETAILS OF THE ASSAILANTS BUT SAID A TEAM OF SENIOR LEBANESE OFFICERS MOVED TO THE SCENE AND BEGAN AN INVESTIGATION.

DELAMARE'S RESIDENCE, A MID-CITY MANSION KNOWN AS "RESIDENCE DES PINS," WAS IN THE MOSTLY MOSLEM WESTERN SECTOR OF BEIRUT.

THE AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO BEIRUT IN THAT POST SINCE AUG. 28, 1979.

AP-WX-09-04-81 1036EDT

→ ~~TANTER~~

RT LIB
File

WEEKLY MEDIA ABSTRACT

to:

date:

August 10, 1981.

Focal Points

REPORT # 100

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON

(Lebanese organizations, the Central Government, and the P.L.O.)

LEBANON - A REFLECTION OF INTRA-ARAB AND INTRA-MOSLEM RIVALRY

A most recent example of Lebanon serving as an arena for intra-Arab conflicts is pointed at by the Lebanese AMAL. The media organ of the Phalangists claims on July 29, 1981 that a by-product of the "silent" conflict between Syria and Libya has been the former's initiative to cause a split within the increasingly pro-Libyan Murabitun; thus, establishing the 104th. organization militarily and/or politically active in Lebanon - "The Saviours".

The Kuwaiti AL-KABBAS provides on June 11, 1981 some background information concerning that "silent" conflict between the officially almost-united countries. The paper indicates that it has been Libya's intra-Arab interest which motivates that country to supply weaponry (including Sam-9 missiles and a gun-boat) to various radical leftist organisations in Lebanon. Such a move, continues AL-KABBAS, contradicts Syria's interest which has been to consolidate its hold over Lebanon by neutralizing the various organizations (in 1975-76 it fought the Moslem organizations and the P.L.O. which assumed too much power for Assad's taste; and since 1977 it has been fighting the Phalangists for the same reason - ed. note).

Media
Analysis

REPORT # 100

The Kuwaiti paper adds that recent visits to Libya by leaders of the "Murabitun", the "Arab Socialist Union" the "Socialist Progressive Party" and the "Fatah" - which centered around further arms supply - only accentuated the conflict, and set Assad's mind on backing "The Saviours". On Dec. 23, 1980 the Phalangist Radio reports on military battles between the "Syrian Nationalists" militia and the Murabitun .

The Phalangist Radio, also, contributes on June 4, 1981 another dimension to Libya's involvement in regional conflicts through one of its Lebanese proxies, the Murabitun. According to the radio, Ibrahim Klilat, leader of Murabitun, is carrying Gadhafi's campaign against Saudi Arabia by condemning Riad's role in Lebanese internal affairs. In addition, the Independent Nasserites (Murabitun), who are ideologically closer to Gadhafi, fight his wars against Arafat. Thus, on July 9, 1980 the Lebanese AL-ANWAR reports about increased tension between the Murabitun - which is closely linked to Arafat's rivals within the P.L.O - and the Fatah.

The most striking evidence substantiating the notion that Mideast wars-by-proxies are being fought in Lebanon is provided by A.P.'s Tatro, who claims on Oct. 10, 1980 that "over 200 people were killed in Lebanon during street battles between the supporters of the warring Gulf nations over the 4 months prior to the start of the Persian Gulf war. The spill over began (continues Tatro) with the rocketing of both the Iranian and Iraqi Embassies. The Iranian Embassy blamed the pro-Iraqi Lebanese Ba'athists and the Palestinian pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation Front, while the pro-Iranian Mujahedeen claimed responsibility for the Iraqi attack. All of these hostilities represent the proxy war being fought here by allies of the Persian Gulf combatants. Since 1976, Lebanon and the streets of Beirut have become the Mideast's favourite battlegrounds for confrontations elsewhere in the region."

Further indication on the extent of the Gulf war-by-proxy being fought in Beirut, Tripoli, Nabatiye, and in Baalbeck is provided, among others, by the Phalangist Radio (August 8, 1981), Monte Carlo Radio (March 28, 1981), A.P. (March 23, Jan. 23, 1981), MENA (August 15, 1980), and Monte Carlo Radio (July 26, 1980).

Another major regional conflict which takes its toll on the Lebanese arena is the inherent Syria-Iraq rivalry as reported by the A-THA'IR AL-ARABI, April 10, 1981 (on pro-Syrian Ba'ath vs. pro-Iraqi Ba'ath battles), and the ARAB PRESS

REPORT # 100

SERVICE, Sept. 10, 1980 (on fierce clashes in Tripoli between the warring Ba'ath groups, with the involvement of warring P.L.O. groups - the pro-Syrian A-Saiqa vs. the pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation Front).

In addition, the Syrian-Jordanian conflict finds its expression in Lebanon with the relative prominence awarded by Damascus to the most recent political military organization established in Lebanon (105th.) and headquartered in West Beirut - the "Arab Cavalry". According to the Lebanese AL-WATTAN AL-ARABI that organization was associated with the kidnapping of the Jordanian attaché in Beirut. In its Aug. 2, 1981 edition, the pro-Iraqi newspaper, claims that the "Cavalry" is also involved in Syria's attempts to neutralize Fatah activities in Beirut.

Actually, the above-mentioned developments constitute only a few examples characterizing the internal upheaval in Lebanon - an upheaval which has its roots in the inherent ferment of the Lebanese society, as well as in the fact that the 105 organizations operating in the Lebanese political-military scene represent the ideological-political-cultural-religious fragmentation in the "Arab World".

U.S.S.R. INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANESE AFFAIRS

It has been a traditional characteristic of the U.S.S.R. to seize upon any opportunity in international relations in order to advance its global position; and it has been that characteristic which caused Moscow to view the regional ramifications of the internal Lebanese upheaval as an opportunity to be exploited.

Although the importance of Lebanon to Soviet interests in the Mideast should not be exaggerated (the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Gulf far exceed it), still it does serve as a springboard for Soviet aspirations concerning other Arab countries in the region - a springboard which requires minor investments and relatively negligible risks.

As strange as it may sound to some observers, the Soviets invest a great deal of time attempting to cultivate their relations with the Phalangists and other Christian forces (as well as some effort in maintaining contacts with Haddad's southern enclave, as indicated by the two Soviet journalists - driven by a Soviet Embassy car - who visited Haddad - reported by the Kuwait's AL-ANBA on June 22, 1980). Consequently, there has been a surge - since mid 1980 - in the intensity of contacts between the two sides. These contacts include, among others,

REPORT # 100

1981, AL-MUSTAQBAL Feb. 7); B. Jumayel and Camil Shamoun (head of the Christian Liberal National Party) with the Soviet Ambassador (AL-HUADETH, Aug. 1, 1980), B. Jumayel, Amin Jumayel, and C. Shamoun with the Soviet Ambassador, and Samir Franjeh (who sides with Syria and opposes the Phalangists and Shamoun) with high Soviet officials in Moscow (AL-MUSTAQBAL, July 12, 1980), Bashir and Shamoun with Ambassador Soldatov (AL-WATTAN AL-ARABI, June 28, 1980), two meetings between Bashir and Soldatov (AL-MUSTAQBAL, April 26, 1980; AL-ASBOUA AL-ARABI, May 12, 1980), and between Amin Jumayel and Soldatov (Qatar News Agency, Feb. 10, 1980).

Among the Soviet reasons for these contacts, assessed by the above newspapers, is its natural interest to increase its influence in the area - constituting an option for the Phalangists who wish to moderate Syrian pressure, to neutralize the P.L.O. and the leftist Moslem organizations, and to pressure the U.S.A. into a more decisive action. Other reasons (and interests) involved are the development of more complex relations with various regional leaders; gaining the ability to pressure and/or to assist these leaders through the Lebanese arena; attempting to alleviate Syria's pressure over the P.L.O.; neutralizing Syria's ability to generate tension which may cause untimely (from Moscow's point of view) regional or global conflicts; halting Syria's ambitions - simultaneously with massive assistance to Damascus - in order to "tame" Assad into a more "convenient" ally; gaining access to strategic locations inside Lebanon (for intelligence purposes) and along its coast.

One of the means to become further entrenched in Lebanon is the support given to the Lebanese Communist Party. According to AL-MUSTAQBAL (April 18, 1981) it is the intention of Moscow - behind its contacts with the various local leaders - to legitimize the Communist Party, and turn it into an integral element within any future government in Lebanon. For that purpose, continues the paper, Soldatov went out of his way to court former premier, Saib Slam, the traditional Moslem leader, who is known in his anti-Communist feelings. It was for the same purpose that the leader of the C.P., George Khawi, visited Moscow (NOVOSTI, May 29 1981, AL-MUSTAQBAL, July 12, 1980).

The Murabitun, with its fruitful relations with Libya and So. Yemen, has become a major target for Soviet attention. Hence, the reports on the Korean and Cuban arms supplied to the Independent Nasserites (AL BYRAK, June 12 1981, A.P. May 21 1981, AMAL April 16 1981); and hence, the visit of Ibrahim Klilat to the U.S.S.R. and to Afghanistan (A-SAFIR, August 1, 1981).

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capitals - include Walid Junbalat, leader of the influential "Social Progressive Nationalist Party" (Libya News Agency, July 29, 1981; Moscow Radio in Arabic, March 15 1981; AL-MUSTAQBAL, July 26 1980; PRAVDA, June 19, 1981; AL-NAHAR, June 2 1980); other leaders of leftist Moslem organizations (P.L.O. radio May 14 1981 and Libyan News Agency March 15 1981), and even the Shi'ite pro-Iranian (and militarily anti-P.L.O.) Al-Amal which is gaining strength by the day (Al-Nahar, Jan. 21, 1981).

Simultaneously, Moscow has not neglected its official contacts with the Central Government, as may be surmised from the following Lebanese media sources: Beirut Radio, May 14, 1981 (Sarkis-Soldatov); Phalangist Radio, March 18 1981 (Sarkis - head of the Soviet Mideast Institute); the Gulf News Agency, March 15 (Foreign Minister, Fuad Butrus - Cuban F.M.); AL-BYRAK, Feb. 23, 1981 (Rumanian F.M. in Beirut); AL AMAL, Jan. 15, 1981 (head of Mideast Dept. in the Soviet F.M.); Beirut Radio, Nov. 13 1980 (Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Soviet Communist Party).

THE P.L.O.-SOVIET "CONNECTION" (a 4th. chronological list of contacts, May-Aug. 1981)

While the various political-military organizations in Lebanon have earned the attention of Moscow in their capacity as proxies of the major Mideast actors, the same attitude is directed towards the P.L.O. with its some 20 different terrorist organizations which identify with various conflicting leaders and ideologies. While the Moslem proxy-organizations receive negligible assistance from Moscow (since the meaningful contacts do take place in Syria, Iraq, Libya, So. Yemen, etc.), the relatively small assistance (military and economic) offered to the P.L.O. represents the Soviet order of priority which is based on the assumption that the road to the heart of the Mideast goes through the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Gulf, rather than through Judea and Samaria, and that the Arab leaders do follow a similar order of priorities. On the other hand, due to its substance and to its fragile intra-Arab position, the P.L.O. regards Moscow as the major global power on which to rely for the implementation of its aspirations.

August 8, 1981	Libya News Agency	Talal Nadji participated in a Soviet-Palestinian solidarity rally in Moscow.
7	P.L.O. Radio	Arafat met Soldatov, the Soviet Ambassador to Beirut.
6	Baghdad Radio	P.L.O. observer to the U.N. Zehdi Al-Terzi,

REPORT # 100

August 4, 1981	Monte Carlo Radio	Khaled Al-Fahoum, chairman of the Palestinian National Council, in Moscow to prepare Arafat's visit next week.
July 30, 1981	P.L.O. Radio	Arafat met yesterday the Soviet Ambassador to Beirut, Soldatov.
29	Iraq News Agency	Moscow has decided to upgrade the status of the P.L.O. Office to an Embassy level. Further arms supply to be discussed during Arafat's visit.
24	Lebanese A-LIWA'A	P.L.O. has requested from Moscow Frog and Sam-6 missiles.
18	P.L.O. Radio	Arafat met yesterday with Soldatov.
10	P.L.O. Radio	George Habash met, in Beirut, a member of the E. German leadership.
9	P.L.O. Radio	Arafat and Kaddoumi arrived in Belgrade.
3	TASS & P.L.O. Radio	Kaddoumi sums up his visit to Moscow which included - according to June 26 A-LIWA'A and June 29 TASS-discussion on arms supply and a meeting with Gromyko.
3	P.L.O. Radio	Arafat, the E. German Ambassador to Beirut, and two E. German propaganda experts attended the concluding session of a propaganda seminar for journalists.
2	P.L.O. Radio	Arafat met the Polish Ambassador in Beirut.
June 30, 1981	Damascus Radio	Naif Hawatmeh ends his visit to Bulgaria.
19	P.L.O. Radio	Arafat met the Yugoslav Ambassador to Beirut.
16	P.L.O. Radio	Nabil Ramlawi, P.L.O. representative in London, met the Soviet Ambassador in London.
10	P.L.O. Radio	Arafat met the Soviet Ambassador to Beirut.
10	Monte Carlo Radio	Habash visits E. Berlin.
6	The Saudi AL-MAJALA	A P.L.O. leader secretly visits Moscow, due to P.L.O.'s concern regarding U.S.S.R.-Jordan relations, and further arms supply.
1	The Lebanese AL-KHURIAH	Hawatmeh and Abd Rabeh visited Moscow (May 18-22).
May 25, 1981	WELT	P.L.O. has increased its legation in E.Berlin to 35 persons.
25	P.L.O. Radio	Arafat and Abu Maizer met Ceaucescu in

REPORT NO. 100

May 13, 1981	Damascus Radio	Abu Maizer, P.L.O. spokesman, met in Damascus a Soviet Solidarity Committee.
9	A.P.	Arafat met, in Damascus, First Deputy Foreign Minister, Korniyenko.
8, 11	P.L.O.'s FALASTIN A-THAWRA	P.L.O. hosts a Vietnamese delegation of authors and journalists.
April 30, 1981	AL-KHURIAH	The University of Hanoi celebrates the 12th. anniversary of Hawatmeh's Popular Democratic Front.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit of Sarkis
to See the President

PARTICIPANTS: Raymond Tanter *RT*
Beth Jones, Lebanon Desk, Department of
State

DATE: Wednesday, August 19, 1981

Raymond Tanter told Beth Jones that we had a problem clearing a memo from Veliotos to Haig, that the President's scheduling people are discouraging any additional visits to see the President, and that we stand informed by, but have not cleared off on, the attached LDX.

Attachment:

LDX

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1981 AUG 17 PM 4 21

SITE

B

S/S #

RECEIVED

UG 17 P 4: 40

SITUATION ROOM

[Handwritten signature]

LDX MESSAGE NO. 000863 CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NODIS No. Pages 2
FROM: Beth Jones NEA/ARN 21018 6250
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Action Memo

LDX TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
OEGB	Ray Tanter	395-5697	351
	JP		
	NAN		
	COL		
	NSC		

REMARKS: FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

S/S Officer: *[Handwritten signature]*

[Handwritten initials]

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By *[Handwritten]* NARA, Date 5/22/00

17 PM: 5



Action Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 1999 024/1 #139
BY CS NARA, DATE 11/14/01

SECRET/NODIS

TO: The Secretary
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotas
SUBJECT: Possible Unofficial Visit by President Sarkis

In his discussions with you after returning from the Middle East, Ambassador Habib recommended that we find a way for Lebanese President Sarkis to make an unofficial visit to the U.S. As you know, a Sarkis visit under these circumstances in late November/early December was one of the practical steps of our plan of action for the Lebanese-Israeli situation which you and the President approved in mid-August. We would ~~not~~ like to proceed to arrange an opportunity for a meeting between President Reagan and President Sarkis before the end of the year. In keeping with the unofficial nature of the visit, we have in mind a meeting between the two Presidents followed by a lunch hosted by the President at the White House.

In order to provide a framework for President Sarkis's visit, the Council on Foreign Relations in New York has accepted our suggestion of inviting the Lebanese President to speak at a luncheon meeting sometime between November 30 and December 10. There are no state visits on the President's schedule during this period. Much as heads of state do when they visit the UN, Sarkis would make his speech in New York first and then come down to Washington for his meeting with the President. If it can be arranged, Sarkis could spend the night before his

White House meeting at Blair House, a gesture that would contribute significantly to his stature in Lebanon.

The remainder of President Sarkis's stay in the U.S. could be fleshed out with a meeting with you and possibly Cap Weinberger, a few sessions on the Hill and meetings in Washington and elsewhere (Detroit, Chicago) with the Lebanese community.

We must move ahead quickly to broach these ideas with President Sarkis and to get his commitment to specific dates before the President's and the Council's schedules fill up.

Recommendation:

That you approve our plans to provide President Sarkis an opportunity to make an official visit to the U.S. to meet with the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Drafted: NEA/ARN:AEJones;jjvw
8/17/81 x21018

Cleared: NEA/ARN:WNHowell
NEA:
NSC:RTanter

LT 158,000,1

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER

JLH

SUBJECT: Former Presidents' Briefing

Habib Mission

Ambassador Philip Habib made three trips to the Middle East. The first (May 6-28) avoided war between Israel and Syria over its missiles in Central Lebanon. The second (June 9-25) brought about the lifting of Syria's siege of Zahle, Lebanon. The third (July 9-26) affected a cessation of hostilities along the border of Lebanon and Israel.

Fears were growing that, if Israel initiated airstrikes against the Syrian missiles in Central Lebanon, a major Middle Eastern war could ensue. The President, through a personal message, asked Prime Minister Begin for time to ease the situation back from the flashpoint, so as to allow for diplomacy to restore the status quo ante regarding the Sannin ridges, Zahle, and the missiles.

Meanwhile, Israel conducted preventive military operations during June against the PLO. Israel feared the PLO efforts to acquire a conventional warfare military infrastructure and heavy weapons. These efforts were intense during the period in which Habib was in the area. During the spring and summer of 1981, the PLO acquired substantial reinforcements to their military capability from Libya, Syria, and the Communist bloc. Habib's first mission succeeded in averting a war between Israel and Syria over the missiles. Habib, however, had not addressed the PLO's arms buildup or the escalation in the fighting between the PLO and Israel. The second mission succeeded in helping the Arab League committee to effect a lifting of the siege of Zahle. The success of Habib's second mission occurred even though Israel struck Iraq's nuclear facility and there was violence between Israel and the PLO in Lebanon.

A dogfight between Israel and Syria and the escalating violence between Israel and the Palestinians resulted in intensive diplomatic activity led by Habib. This activity culminated in a cessation of hostilities on July 24. The third Habib mission succeeded in capping the violence between Israel and the PLO. A by-product of the cease-fire is an implicit understanding that Israel would refrain from attacking the Syrian missiles.

Ray Tanter Talking Points

- U.S. goals in Lebanon:
 - Maintain ceasefire
 - Promote National reconciliation
 - Expand authority of Central Government
 - Reduce foreign presence
 - Encourage regional states to carry out these goals rather than for the U.S. to be the initiator itself.
 - To see that Lebanon is a thriving free and pro-Western democracy as it once was.

- The Administration is for peace for all of Lebanon not just the South and the Administration is proud to be a party to the cessation of hostilities in the South and has not lost sight of the need for a political settlement for all of Lebanon.
 - has
- U.S./historical relationship with the democratic and pro-Western Lebanon.
 - is
- U.S. commitment/to the freedom, sovereignty and integrity of Lebanon (including the preservation of a free and secure Christian community.

- U.S. supports free and open national elections -- free from outside interference (Syria).

- Lebanese authority should be strong so that it can control terrorism and violence by outside parties.

LEB (K' N) (1) 2

~~Kemp~~
~~KT~~
2120

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1981

Dear Mr. Khan:


Thank you for your letter of July 23, 1981. I share your concern with the well-being of Lebanon. As you point out so well, it is a simplification to describe Lebanon's ills as deriving from religious differences only. On the other hand, perhaps the situation there is more complicated than your economic explanation suggests.

American policy towards Lebanon assumes that there are many reasons for its instability, and thus there may not be single solutions. An overall goal of U.S. policy is for an expansion of the central authority of the Lebanese government and a reduction in the armed presence of foreign elements in Lebanon.

Your thoughts are greatly appreciated.

With regards,

Cordially,



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. J. Khan
2040 Lake Avenue
Wilmette, Illinois 60091

ajr

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 31, 1981

ACTION

RVA HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Letter from J. Khan, Lebanese Student,
Concerning Lebanon-Muslim Christian War

Transmitted at Tab I is a letter from you to Mr. Khan, a Lebanese student, who wrote you a letter July 23 (Tab A), about his concern for the well-being of Lebanon and his thoughts on the problems in Lebanon.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Mr. Khan at Tab I.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

RT
SIGNED

Attachments

- Tab I - Letter to Mr. Khan for your signature
- A - Incoming letter from Mr. Khan dated July 23

27 JUL 1981

4596

2040 Lake Avenue
Wilmette, Il. 60091

July 23, 1981

Mr. Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Allen:

When one speaks of civil war in Lebanon, the half-truth initiated by Mr. Begin of a Muslim-Christian war is perpetuated. A few simple facts are in order:

1. The Syrians entered Lebanon, with the support of the Arab world, to assist a predominantly Christian faction.
2. A prominent Christian leader Mr. Franjeh, lost his son to assassins from the Phalange, another Christian group.
3. The Palestinian representative at the UN, Mr. Zehdi Terzi, is a Christian.
4. The orthodox Archbishop of Jerusalem, a Christian-Palestinian, was imprisoned by the Israelis for a substantial period of time.
5. Kamal Nasser, killed in Beirut in 1973 by Israelis was a Christian.

The Lebanese problem appears rooted in horrendous economic disparity between the ruling families comprising a very small minority and the remainder of the people. A sad and ravaged country, it needs help to heal its wounds, not myths designed to mold public opinion in the U.S. into supporting a ruling elite.

Sincerely,



J. Khan

Lebanon. A name which always passes through your ears, especially since April 1975 when the civil war erupted there.

It breaks my heart to hear the American news agencies calling it a war between Christians on the one side and the Moslems with their Palestinian allies on the other side. It is completely unlogical, as if calling the Palestinian people all fanatic Moslems or calling the Lebanese people religious fanatics.

Palestinians are mostly Christians and Moslems. A lot of Americans know that a lot of the PLO leaders are Christians. In fact, martyr Kamal Nasser, who was assassinated in Beirut in 1973 by the Zionists, was a Christian and one of the top three leaders of the PLO.

The Lebanese people are open-minded in general with big hearts, and Lebanon itself was a symbol of peaceful interaction between all religions.

So, what is going on? Four percent of the people in Lebanon were rich and 96-percent were completely poor. The government was corrupted. And, as a fact, the President of Lebanon was searched in 1974 in the New York Airport for heroin. The parliament was inherited by the same old families since the 1940's. Theft everywhere was in the government. The Constitution was not that bad but it was old, and it needed to be amended.

The Constitution did not state that the President must be a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem, while the Speaker of the House must be a She-ite Moslem. This is the way it was. Does your religion or sect make good citizens?

The intellectual Lebanese and all Lebanon lovers felt this corruption in government and the hashish dealers who used to run the government were unbearable. This is why the war is going on.

The Lebanese isolationist phalangists who only trust Maronite Christians do not even like protestants, orthodox or otherwise. Now the United States takes sides and maybe helped plan the civil war. They take the side of the phalangists because they are against the Palestinians which is in the interests of Israel.

So, how does the American government, which is supposed to defend freedom and democracy in the world, stand beside such a party? I know for sure that most of the American people will not because America had a glorious chapter in the Second World War.

A Lebanese student

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

LE 111
[Signature]
RT 4637
[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

August 5, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

NEED

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Bashir Jumayyil

The commander of the Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia will be in the States and hopes to meet with you between August 7 and 12.

Nick Veliotes prefers that Bashir meet no one higher than his level and is recommending this to Secretary Haig. Nick plans a session with Bashir at State on August 11 and may invite someone to attend from the NSC staff. Haig, however, has not yet ruled out meeting with Bashir or to have Judge Clark or Under Secretary Stoessel meet Bashir.

My view is that it would be a good idea for you to meet with Bashir if Secretary Haig does, but that both meetings should be discouraged. Jumayyil is basically trying to recoup the prestige he and the Phalange have lost recently due to their poor showing against the Syrians.

The USG should not be perceived as favoring one Lebanese leader or faction over the others. We should be encouraging Prime Minister al-Wazzan's attempt to get together a group of Moslem and Christian leaders to come over and talk to us, preferably with a concrete proposal to reunify and demilitarize the country.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you meet with Bashir in your office, if Sec. Haig also meets Bashir, but neither meeting should be encouraged.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

That I meet with Bashir in my office Friday morning, August 7.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

*Ray: There is
has no reg
for
matter
9/1
5/1*

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on August 5, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 899-024/1 #140
CIA NARA, DATE 5/19/06

MEMORANDUM

4478
(S/S 8122407)


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR DODIE LIVINGSTON

SUBJECT: Request for Presidential Message for
Visiting Lebanese Performing Artist

The National Security Council and the State Department see no reason for the President to send a message to the Arab American Cultural Foundation for inclusion in the program commemorating the tour of Fayrouz.


Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

Attachment
Tab A - Incoming correspondence



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Message for Visiting Lebanese Performing Artist

The Department has no reason to recommend that the President send a message to the Arab American Cultural Foundation for inclusion in the program commemorating the tour of Fayrouz. We therefore concur with the recommendation of Ms. Livingston that no message be sent.

for 

L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN LENZ, NSC

SUBJECT: Message for Visiting Lebanese Performing Artist

We received the attached draft material for a Presidential message for a souvenir program being published for the U.S. and Western Hemisphere tour of FAYROUZ, the noted Lebanese singer, which is sponsored by an organization called "Forum for International Art & Culture."

A Miss Yacoub (I'm not sure of spelling) called us several times about this and said that doing the message had already been approved by a Mr. Fletcher and Mr. Essim of the WH Staff and that it was only necessary for us to get this signed so they could print it ASAP. She also said that President Sarkis had provided a message.

I would think it is obvious that the President would not provide messages for visiting performing artists - just as he doesn't send messages to U.S. artists performing abroad - but could you please check with appropriate NSC and State staff to see if any exception should be made in this case. Thank you very much.

DL

FORUM FOR INTERNATIONAL ART & CULTURE

Message from the President

I am happy to hear of the coming American tour of Lebanon's great singer, Fayrouz, along with her dancers and musicians. The artistry and music of the Arab world's most acclaimed performer will be a source of pleasure and enjoyment to everyone. I welcome her to this country on behalf of the American people and wish her a most successful tour.

My congratulations to the Forum for International Art and Culture and the Arab American Cultural Foundation for their part as sponsors of this worthy endeavor.

Ronald Reagan
President
United States of America

FAYROUZ

IN CONCERT



1947

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 4, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN LENZ

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *R.T.*SUBJECT: Request for Presidential Message for
Visiting Lebanese Performing Artist

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Dodie Livingston, for you to sign, advising that the NSC staff and the State Department see no reason for the President to send a message to the Arab American Cultural Foundation for inclusion in the program commemorating the tour of Fayrouz.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Livingston declining request for a Presidential message.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments

- Tab I - Memo to Dodie Livingston to be signed
- A - Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 3, 1981


Dear John:

Thank you for your letter of July 23, 1981 and the enclosures. I strongly share your deep aversion to the violence that occurred in Lebanon during mid-July. As you are aware, Ambassador Philip Habib was able to obtain agreement among the various parties for a cessation of hostilities.

During this period of respite from violence, we intend to work on the basic problems that provoked the outbreak of fighting during July.

With regards,

Cordially,



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. John N. Parker
Mobil Oil Corporation
Suite 620
1100 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Lanter ~~GK~~
Lebanon ~~DF~~
FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 29, 1981

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Mobil Corporation Letter Re Bombing in Lebanon

John N. Parker, Mobil Oil Corporation wrote you a letter dated July 23, 1981, at Tab A, transmitting a copy of a letter and summary to Secretary Haig from Rawleigh Warner, Jr., Chairman of the Board, Mobil Oil Corporation at Tab B. The letter and summary concern the bombings in southern Lebanon and especially of the Medreco Oil Refinery.

A response from you to John Parker is at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to John Parker at Tab I.

Approve *RVA 8/3* Disapprove _____

Concurrences: Kemp, Feith, Bailey, Nau, Poats

Attachments

- Tab I - Letter to Parker to be signed
- A - Parker ltr. dated July 23 to Richard Allen
- B - Copy of ltr. and summary to Sec. Haig

James - done
Why do we need six people to sign off on a simple response? Make it an official item for Staff info. Two ought to be enough

JUL 23 1981

4537

Mobil Oil Corporation

SUITE 620
1100 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

July 23, 1981



Dear Dick:


The enclosed letter of July 22 from Rawleigh Warner, Jr., Chairman of the Board, Mobil Corporation, along with a background summary was hand delivered to the State Department last evening.

I am advised that Caltex Petroleum Corporation has also delivered a letter to Secretary Haig today on this subject.

We felt you should be aware of our position concerning these belligerent and senseless acts of unrestrained vandalism and aggression resulting in injury and death to innocent people and destruction of property.

Thanking you for your interest and concern and with best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,



John N. Parker

JNP:al
Attachments

The Honorable Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Mobil Corporation

150 EAST 42ND STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

RAWLEIGH WARNER, JR.
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

July 22, 1981

The Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Secretary of State
of the United States
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The air raids, naval bombardment, and shelling of southern Lebanon by the Israeli armed forces from July 16 through 19 resulted in the Medreco oil refinery at Zahrani being hit on at least two occasions. One Medreco employee, a Lebanese citizen, was killed. Another employee was seriously injured and is presently hospitalized.

The 17,000 barrel per day refinery, which supplies petroleum products to commercial marketers in southern Lebanon, has been heavily damaged and is inoperable. The spur pipeline which transports crude to the refinery from Tapline's crude terminal at Sidon has also been damaged or destroyed. The refinery is valued at approximately \$15 million.

Medreco and Tapline are wholly owned by U. S. companies. The Mediterranean Refining Company (Medreco) is jointly owned 50% each by Mobil International Petroleum Corporation (a wholly owned subsidiary of Mobil Oil Corporation) and by Caltex Petroleum Corporation (a subsidiary of Texaco and Standard Oil of California). The Trans Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Aramco, which is owned 15% by Mobil and 28 1/3% each by Exxon, Texaco, and Standard Oil of California.

We are distressed by the unprovoked attack on the refinery which has resulted in the loss of innocent life and substantial damage to property owned by American interests. Our foremost concern is for the lives and safety of Medreco's employees and we strongly urge that you take every action possible to prevent further attack on the refinery. In addition we request the Department's views as to an appropriate course of action for us to seek compensation for the death and injury of the Medreco employees and the extensive damages to the refinery and related facilities.


Mobil

The Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Secretary of State
of the United States

July 22, 1981
Page 2

The loss of life and destruction of American property at Zahrani by the Israelis is a part of the greater tragedy which besets Lebanon today. We also urge you to use all the means at your disposal to bring an end to the violence which threatens not only American interests but the lives and well-being of thousands of innocent people.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Rawleigh Warner, Jr." The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Rawleigh Warner, Jr.

MEDRECO REFINERY
SUMMARY

Mediterranean Refining Company (Medreco) is a U.S. Company, incorporated in the state of Delaware, which is jointly owned 50% each by Mobil International Petroleum Corporation (a wholly owned subsidiary of Mobil Oil Corporation), and Caltex Petroleum Corporation (a wholly owned subsidiary of Texaco and Standard Oil of California).

Medreco owns and operates a petroleum refinery located at Zahrani near the Mediterranean seaport of Sidon in Lebanon. The refinery has supplied petroleum products to commercial marketers in the southern part of Lebanon since 1955. It currently refines 17,000 barrels per day of crude oil into 3,400 barrels of gasoline, 1,700 barrels of jet fuel and kerosine, 2,800 barrels of diesel oil, 7,650 barrels of fuel oil, and 510 barrels of liquified petroleum gas.

The assets of the refinery on a replacement cost basis are estimated to be worth \$15 million excluding the value of products in storage.

The refinery is located on approximately 77 acres of waterfront property at Zahrani. Processing equipment includes a 17,500 barrel per stream day crude topping unit, three catalytic reformers (two at 650 BSD and one at 1700 BSD), a naphtha hydrodesulfurizer (3100 BSD), a gasoline treater (2000 BSD) and a kerosine treater (2500 BSD). There are 43 tanks with capacity of 491,000 barrels for storage of refined products. There are no crude storage facilities in the refinery. Other facilities consist of an administrative

building, shops, storehouse, steam and power generation facilities, product loading racks, and effluent cleanup and disposal facilities.

Presently there are approximately 200 employees involved in the operation of the refinery. All of these employees are Lebanese citizens. There are no shareholder personnel physically involved in the operation of the refinery.

Since 1973, Medreco has been operating the refinery under a processing arrangement with the Lebanese Government. Saudi Arabian crude is delivered to the refinery from Tapline storage at Sidon. (Tapline is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Aramco which in turn is owned 15% by Mobil and 28-1/3% each by Exxon, Texaco, and Standard Oil of California). Products manufactured by Medreco are delivered to local commercial marketing companies in southern Lebanon.

During the period July 16 to July 19, 1981, Medreco^o sustained casualties and damages from air raids, shellings, and naval bombardment in the area.

Efforts were undertaken immediately on July 16 to evacuate plant personnel. Five senior managers and eight operators remained full time to close down the plant. On July 19, one operator was killed and another injured. The plant is presently inoperable.

The American Ambassador in Lebanon has been kept fully informed about the attack on Medreco and the resulting casualties and damages. An assessment of the physical damages to Medreco as of July 20 is summarized in the attachment.

The recent attacks have not damaged Tapline's Sidon facilities. However, in view of the proximity of the attacks, Tapline has had to suspend operations and Tapline is extremely concerned at the danger both its facilities and its personnel are facing. Although the Sidon terminal has not, as yet, been damaged, transfer pipelines from the Sidon terminal to the Medreco refinery has been destroyed by fire which will prevent Tapline from making deliveries to Medreco until it is repaired.

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES
TO MEDRECO REFINERY AS OF JULY 20, 1981

1. SHIPPING AND CUSTOMS OFFICES BADLY DAMAGED.
2. LOADING RACK AREA BADLY DAMAGED.
3. TANK FARM:
 - A. TWO GASOLINE TANKS (40,000 BARRELS EACH) SEVERELY PERFORATED. APPROXIMATELY 50 TO 60 THOUSAND BARRELS LOST.
 - B. ONE (90,000 BARRELS) FUEL OIL TANK PERFORATED AT THREE LEVELS. APPROXIMATELY 10,000 BARRELS LOST.
 - C. ONE (23,000 BARRELS) GAS OIL TANK PERFORATED AT 3 LEVELS.
 - D. ONE (3,000 BARRELS) LSR TANK PERFORATED AT 2 LEVELS.
4. TETRA ETHYL LEAD (TEL) PLANT COMPLETELY DESTROYED. ALL TEL DRUMS EXPLODED AND BURNED (182 DRUMS OF 149.8 LITERS EACH).
5. UTILITIES: -
NO. 1 (ELECTRICAL) AND NO. 2 (DIESEL) WATER WELLS DAMAGED AND OUT OF SERVICE.

SERVICE AND COOLING WATER LINES IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS DAMAGED.
6. THE SIX INCH CRUDE LINE FEEDING THE REFINERY FROM TAPLINE HIT AND BURNED.
7. THE 10 INCH GASOLINE/GAS OIL LINE INTER CONNECTING TAPLINE WITH MEDRECO HIT AND BURNED.

RECEIVED

81 JUL 30 AID: 37

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEAVER

CY TO BRADY

J

X
Wal

3/0835

J

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