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**Collection:** Kemp, Geoffrey: Files  
**Folder Title:** Israel/Lebanon (Phase II) 1982 (7)  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: KEMP, GEOFFREY: Files  
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 File Folder: Israel/Lebanon (Phase II) 1982 (7)

Archivist: smf/smf  
 FOIA ID: F97-106 - Wills  
 Date: 11/27/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. cable</del>	<del>101551Z Nov 82 3p</del> R 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #171	<del>11/10/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>2. cable</del>	<del>121550Z Nov 82 6p</del> R 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #172	<del>11/12/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>3. cable</del>	<del>131204Z Nov 82 5p</del> D 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #173 A 11/28/08 M2008-098/15 # 56984	<del>11/13/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>4. cable</del>	<del>150918Z Nov 82 12p</del> D 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #174 A 11/28/08 M2008-098/15 # 56985	<del>11/15/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>5. cable</del>	<del>260831Z Nov 82 2p</del> R 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #175	<del>11/26/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
6. cable	021905Z Dec 82 3p P 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #176 P upheld 11/28/08 M2008-098/15 # 56986	12/2/82	P1/B1
<del>7. cable</del>	<del>071709Z Dec 82 9p</del> R 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #177	<del>12/7/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>8. memo</del>	<del>Kemp/Teicher to Clark re Lebanon Withdrawal 1p</del> R 4/7/06 DLS F96-106/2 #178	<del>12/8/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>9. cable</del>	<del>101249Z Dec 82 7p</del> P 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #179 R 11/28/08 M2008-098/15 # 56987	<del>12/10/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>10. cable</del>	<del>181929Z Dec 82 1p</del> R 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #180	<del>12/18/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>11. cable</del>	<del>182146Z Dec 82 2p</del> R 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #181	<del>12/18/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>12. cable</del>	<del>190538Z Dec 82 1p</del> A 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #182	<del>12/19/82</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
13. cable	190143Z Dec 82 2p D 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #183 upheld D 11/28/08 M2008-098/15 # 56988	12/19/82	P1/B1

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
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 B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
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 B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].  
 B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 4/25/2007

**File Folder** ISRAEL/LEBANON (PHASE II) 1982 (7)

**FOIA**

F97-106/1

**Box Number** 90493

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
<del>6</del>	<del>CABLE</del>	<del>021905Z DEC 82</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>12/2/1982</del>
<del>11</del>	<del>CABLE</del>	<del>182146Z DEC 82</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>12/18/1982</del>
<del>12</del>	<del>CABLE</del>	<del>190538Z DEC 82</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>12/19/1982</del>

SECRET

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PAGE 01 OF 02 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3454 DTG: 101551Z NOV 82 PSN: 000112  
EOB906 AN007967 TOR: 314/1630Z CSN: HCE668

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03454

NODIS  
ALSO FOR CONSUL GENERAL GROVE (C/O NEA)  
E. O. 12356: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, IS, JO, US  
SUBJECT: WEST BANKERS TO URGE PLO TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS  
REF: JERUSALEM (A) JERUSALEM 3428, (B) STATE  
312771

*Handwritten notes:*  
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NLS F97-106/2 #171

BY Inf, NARA, DATE 11/25/02

1.  - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY: BETHLEHEM MAYOR FREIJ AND A HANDFUL OF OTHER NOTABLES ARE NOW CIRCULATING A DRAFT STATEMENT ENDORSING THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND CALLING FOR RECIPROCAL ISRAELI/PLO RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. FREIJ IS INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT HE CAN ELICIT A WIDE RANGE OF WEST BANK/GAZA SUPPORT FOR THE STATEMENT, THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH IS TRANSMITTED BELOW. END SUMMARY.
3. FREIJ HAD A STORMY MEETING WITH CODEL HAMILTON LAST NIGHT AND LEFT THE DISCUSSION FEELING THAT THE CDEL EITHER DID NOT UNDERSTAND OR DID NOT CARE ABOUT THE RISKS HE AND OTHER MODERATES WERE TAKING. AT NOON TODAY, HAVING CALMED DOWN A BIT, HE ADMITTED HAVING OVER-REACTED SOMEWHAT. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN "NERVOUS," HOWEVER, BECAUSE HE AND HIS CO-SPEAKERS (FORMER MAYOR SHAWWA AND HIKMAT AL MASRI) HAD JUST FINISHED DRAFTING THE MAJOR STATEMENT THEY HOPED WOULD FORM THE BASIS OF A BROAD-BASED WEST BANK PEACE INITIATIVE.
4. AFTER LEAVING THE CONGRESSMAN, THE THREE WENT ON TO ANOTHER TURBULENT SESSION, THIS TIME WITH A DOZEN OF THE WEST BANK'S MOST SENIOR NOTABLES WHOSE SUPPORT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE STATEMENT. IN THE END, FREIJ SAID, THE STATEMENT WAS APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY. THE SOLE OBJECTION CAME FROM EX-JERUSALEM GOVERNOR ANWAR EL KHATIB, WHO SAW NO NEED FOR EXPLICIT MENTION OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. FREIJ SAID ALL OF THE OTHERS AGREED WITH FREIJ THAT WERE IT NOT FOR THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO REASON FOR THE STATEMENT IN THE FIRST PLACE.
5. NOW, FREIJ SAID, COURIERS WERE FANNING OUT ALL OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO DISTRIBUTE THE STATEMENT AND

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GATHER SIGNATURES. HE WAS NOT NECESSARILY LOOKING FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF SIGNATURES, HE SAID, BUT AIMED FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE WHO REALLY COUNTED. WHEN PRESSED, HE SAID HE FELT HE COULD BE SURE OF THE SUPPORT OF AT LEAST TEN WEST BANK MAYORS (INCLUDING TWO WHO HAD RECENTLY BEEN DEPOSED) AND OF ALL NINE OF THE WEST BANK'S CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE. BEYOND THAT, HE FELT HE AND SHAWWA BETWEEN THEM COULD GET THE SUPPORT OF A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER WEST BANK AND GAZA NOTABLES. IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, HE SAID, TO GET FORMER MAYOR KHALAF (REMOVED FROM HIS OFFICE IN RAMALLAH LAST SPRING AND NOW IN EXILE IN JERICHO) ON BOARD, SO AS TO ISOLATE BASSAM SHAKA' OF NABLUS. TO DO SO, FREIJ INTENDS TO MAKE THE TRIP TO JERICHO HIMSELF.

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6. FREIJ IS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS THAT THE ISRAELIS NOT UNDERSTAND HOW MUCH PROGRESS HE HAS MADE IN THIS EFFORT, PARTLY SO THAT THEY CAN'T TRY TO BLOCK IT, AND PARTLY, SO AS NOT TO REVEAL FOR NOW THE EXTENT OF HIS OWN ROLE. YOU HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE BEEN GIVEN A RESPONSIBILITY, HE SAID. ARAFAT SENT HIS OWN BROTHER TO BRIEF ME, AND TO TELL ME THAT "THE PLO IS VERY CLOSE TO DESIGNATING CERTAIN WEST BANKERS, INCLUDING ME, TO OPEN DIRECT CONTACTS." I WAS ASKED TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS, AND I WAS GIVEN FULL SUPPORT FOR THIS INITIATIVE.

7. THE FULL TEXT OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

--  
--

A PALESTINIAN PEACE STATEMENT  
ARISING FROM OUR CONVICTION OF THE INEVITABLE NECESSITY OF A COMPREHENSIVE, LASTING AND JUST PEACE AND FROM OUR ASPIRATIONS, WE, THE UNDERSIGNED RESIDENTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP (RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR) OUR CONTINUOUS WORK TOWARDS THIS NOBLE GOAL, ANNOUNCE OUR POLITICAL POSITION TO THE WHOLE WORLD. WE EMPHASIZE OUR CONVICTION THAT WE ARE A BASIC PART OF THE PROCESS OF CREATING PEACE AND THE PATH  
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PAGE 01 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3454 DTG: 101551Z NOV 82 PSN: 000113  
EOB908 AN007969 TOR: 314/1631Z CSN: HCE669

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2334  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9084

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03454

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OF PEACE DEMANDS COURAGE, PREPARATION, STRENGTH OF WILL  
AND FOREBEARANCE FAR MORE THAN THE PATH OF WAR. ON THIS  
BASIS, OUR POSITION IS REPRESENTED IN THE POINTS WHICH  
FOLLOW:

- (1) THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO DETER-  
MINE THEIR DWN POLITICAL DESTINY.
  - (2) WE APPROVE OF AND WE SUPPORT THE RAPPROCHEMENT  
AND THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT  
AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, CALLING ON  
THE PLO TO ACCEPT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY COUNCIL, INCLUDING 242 AND 338.
  - (3) WE CONFIRM DUR COMPLETE SUPPORT FOR THE DECI-  
SIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT AND THE FIRST POSITIVE SIGNS  
WHICH WERE INCLUDED IN THE PROPOSALS OF AMERICAN PRESI-  
DENT REAGAN FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
  - (4) THE IMPERATIVE NEED OF STOPPING ISRAELI SETTLE-  
MENT ACTIVITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BECAUSE THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THESE SETTLEMENTS CONSTITUTES AN OB-  
STACLE ON THE ROAD TO PEACE AND BECAUSE THEY LEAD TO  
CHANGING THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES  
HISTORICALLY, DEMOGRAPHICALLY, SOCIALLY AND ECONOMIC-  
ALLY.
  - (5) WE CALL FOR AND WE SUPPORT MUTUAL, SIMULTANEOUS  
RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZA-  
TION, OUR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND ISRAEL, TAKING INTO  
CONSIDERATION THAT BOTH SIDES ARE INSEPARABLE PARTS OF  
THE PROCESS OF CREATING PEACE JUST AS THEY WERE IN  
WAGING WAR.
  - (6) THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINE PROB-  
LEM IS THE OBVIOUS MEANS TO OVERCOMING THE SITUATION  
FROM WHICH OUR PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ARE SUFFERING AND  
FOR THEIR ASPIRATION TO LIVE IN MUTUAL PEACE WITH THEIR  
NEIGHBORS.
- SO AS TO MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR TO THE WHOLE WORLD, WE  
THUS PLACE OUR SIGNATURES ON THIS STATEMENT AND ALL OF  
THE POINTS CONTAINED WITHIN IT.

8. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT THIS CABLE TO CAIRO AND  
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DTG: 121550Z NOV 82  
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NLS F97-106/2 #172

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 8215

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/25/02

EXDIS  
FROM DRAPER  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, MARR, PLO, LE, IS, SY, US  
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH GEMAYEL NOVEMBER 11  
REF: A) JERUSALEM 3466 (NOTAL), B) BEIRUT 8185 (NOTAL)  
C) BEIRUT 8192

1. ~~1.~~ ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY: IN TWO-HOUR MEETING NOVEMBER 11, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AGREED TO LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSAL FOR INFORMAL MEETING BETWEEN LEBANESE AND ISRAELI CIVILIAN REPS TO PREPARE FOR "IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS" AT DELEGATION LEVEL, EVEN THOUGH ISRAELIS HAVE NOT AGREED TO DATE CERTAIN FOR DELEGATION MEETINGS. I URGED GEMAYEL TO GIVE LEBANESE REP INSTRUCTIONS ON SUCH ASPECTS OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS AS VENUE, DATE, COMPOSITION AND CHAIRMANSHIP OF LEBANESE DELEGATION, AND AGENDAS FOR FORMAL MEETINGS. HE DID NOT REJECT MY URGINGS FOR TALKS IN BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL. GEMAYEL'S PREFERRED TARGET DATE FOR FIRST FORMAL MEETING IS NOVEMBER 17. AGENDA APPEARS TO BE NO PROBLEM. CHAIRMANSHIP ISSUE MAY BE FINESSED BY APPOINTING NO CHAIRMAN, OR POLITICAL AND MILITARY CO-CHAIRMAN, BUT I WANT LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS TO WORK THIS OUT FACE-TO-FACE, AND DID NO MORE THAN SUGGEST THESE OPTIONS. GEMAYEL REVEALED CABINET DECISION TO AVOID UNHELPFUL OFFICIAL COMMENT ON LEBANESE-ISRAELI ISSUES AND AGAIN SHOWED VERY POSITIVE AND FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE TOWARD LONG-TERM LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS. HE WAS ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANY FALSE STEP WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE HIS "HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITIES" TO BUILD THE STRUCTURE OF A NEW LEBANON, WHICH WOULD LAST FIFTY YEARS. IN DISCUSSION OF NORMALIZATION PROCESS, GEMAYEL REPEATED LEBANESE POSITION THAT NEW AGREEMENT PREFERABLY SHOULD BE AN ADDITION OR ANNEX

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TO EXISTING ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, THUS MAKING IT EASIER TO SELL DOMESTICALLY AND IN ARAB WORLD. HE WAS, HOWEVER, PREPARED FOR A NEW "SIGNED" DOCUMENT. ON SPECIFIC ISSUE OF MOVEMENT ACROSS BORDERS, GEMAYEL IS READY FOR SOME PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. AT SEVERAL POINTS IN MEETING, GEMAYEL EXPRESSED FEAR THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DRAG ON AND THAT FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES WOULD BE DELAYED. EVEN IF INITIAL PULLBACKS WERE ACCOMPLISHED, I REITERATED US COMMITMENT TO MOST RAPID POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL. END SUMMARY

3. COMMENT: I HAVE HAD THREE LONG SESSIONS WITH GEMAYEL OVER THE PAST FOUR DAYS. WHILE IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO REPORT ANYTHING BEYOND HIGH POINTS, HIS WORDS SHOW HOW FAR HE HAS MOVED SINCE RETURNING FROM WASHINGTON AND HOW MUCH HE HAS CONDITIONED HIS PEOPLE FOR "POLITICAL" TALKS. WHEN HE TALKS ABOUT DOING WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO REGAIN LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH A SIGNED AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, DESPITE HIS EXPECTATION OF OPPOSITION FROM THE ARAB WORLD AND HIS ERSTWHILE SUPPORTERS HERE, I DETECT REAL QUALITY IN THE MAN. HIS PRESENT DETERMINATION TO PUT TOGETHER A PACKAGE PLAN WITH ALL INGREDIENTS AGREED TO, INCLUDING NORMALIZATION, ETC., BEFORE EVEN AN INITIAL IDF/SYRIAN PULLBACK, MAY REQUIRE MAJOR ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR OWN APPROACH AND THAT OF ISRAEL. END COMMENT.

4. ACCOMPANIED BY ROSS AND DCM PUGH, I MET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL FOR TWO HOURS LATE NOVEMBER 11. NO OTHER LEBANESE WERE PRESENT.

5. AGREEMENT ON INFORMAL LEBANESE-ISRAELI MEETING: --GEMAYEL FINALLY ACCEPTED THE ISRAELI COUNTER PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR AFTTAL AND AN ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE TO PREPARE FOR "IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS" ALONG THE LINES OF THE FORMULATION DISCUSSED WITH

SHARON AND SHAMIR ON NOVEMBER 10 (JERUSALEM 3466). IN PERSUADING GEMAYEL, I DESCRIBED BRIEFLY MY DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL, NOTING THE TOUGH POSITION SHARON HAD TAKEN REJECTING A CLEAR PRIOR COMMITMENT TO FORMAL TALKS, AS WELL AS SHAMIR'S HELPFUL DEFINITION OF "IMMEDIATE" AS MEANING WITH "A FEW DAYS." GEMAYEL IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISRAELI EMPHASIS ON PROCEDURES AND FEARS PROLONGED DISCUSSIONS. HE WILL CALL ON US FOR HELP IF THE ISRAELIS ENGAGE IN STALLING TACTICS.

-- GEMAYEL TOLD US THAT PARTIAL WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO MEET AN ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE BEGINNING SATURDAY AFTERNOON (NOVEMBER 13). WE AGREED ON A TENTATIVE TIME OF 1900, WHICH I UNDERTOOK TO PROPOSE TO THE ISRAELIS. WE ALSO AGREED THAT THE EXISTING LAF-IDF LIAISON CENTER IN B'ABDA (NOT REPEAT NOT THE ISRAELI MFA LIAISON CENTER) "COULD" BE THE BEST VENUE FOR THIS INFORMAL MEETING. SINCE THE FACT THAT IT IS USED DAILY BY ISRAELI AND LEBANESE LIAISON OFFICERS AND IS FULLY

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BEIRUT 8215

EXDIS  
FROM DRAPER  
GUARDED BY LAF TROOPS WILL ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF  
KEEPING THE MEETING SECRET. GEMAYEL AGAIN SAID HE  
DID NOT EXPECT THE MEETING TO BE KEPT SECRET. HE WILL  
NOT BEFOREHAND VOLUNTEER ANYTHING PUBLICLY, BUT IS  
PREPARED TO DEAL WITH ANY CRITICISM THAT EMERGES.  
-- GEMAYEL PRESSED HARD FOR THE MOST RAPID POSSIBLE  
CONVENING OF THE FIRST FORMAL MEETING. I EXPLAINED  
THAT THE RESULTS OF THE INFORMAL SO-CALLED "SECRET"  
MEETING WOULD HAVE TO BE REVIEWED BY THE ISRAELIS  
BEFORE THEY WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A DATE, BUT WE  
AGREED INFORMALLY THAT A GOOD TARGET DATE WOULD BE  
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 17. GEMAYEL WILL BE AWAY IN SAUDI  
ARABIA NOVEMBER 14 AND 15, AND HE WANTS TO BE HERE  
WHEN THE FORMAL TALKS OPEN, IN ORDER TO HEAD OFF TROUBLE  
IF IT DEVELOPS IN THE COUNTRY.

6. ISSUES FOR INFORMAL LEBANESE ISRAELI MEETING:  
-- I URGED GEMAYEL TO GIVE FATTAL NEGOTIATING IN-  
STRUCTIONS ON ALL THE OBVIOUS ISSUES. GEMAYEL  
CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING FATTAL NOVEMBER 12  
TO DO SO, AND HE REVIEWED WITH PRIDE THE COMPOSITION  
OF HIS FULL TEAM, WHICH HAS BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE  
COL. RUHAYYIM, AN OFFICER WHO IS VERY HIGHLY REGARDED.  
-- VENUE. I TOLD GEMAYEL IT IS INEVITABLE THAT ISRAEL  
WOULD PROPOSE HOLDING FORMAL MEETINGS IN BOTH LEBANON  
AND ISRAEL. GEMAYEL SWALLOWED HARD AT THIS POINT,  
BUT DID NOT OBJECT OPENLY WHEN IS SUGGESTED THAT THE  
LEBANESE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GO TO AN ISRAELI TOWN  
(SUCH AS TIBERIAS, FOR EXAMPLE), IN EXCHANGE FOR  
MEETINGS IN KHALDAH, WHICH I ASSUMED THE LEBANESE WOULD  
WANT TO PROPOSE. GEMAYEL CONFIRMED THIS WOULD BE THE  
CASE. FURTHERMORE, HE NOTED, THE PERMANENT LEBANESE  
SECRETARIAT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE INSTALLED AT

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KHALDAH.

-- CHAIRMANSHIP. I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT SHAMIR HAD LIKED THE FACT THAT THERE WOULD BE AS MANY CIVILIANS AS MILITARY MEN ON THE EBANESE DELEGATION (GEMAYEL INTERJECTED THAT THERE MIGHT WELL BE MORE CIVILIANS THAN MILITARY). SHAMIR HAD ALSO APPRECIATED THE LEBANESE READINESS TO FORM SUBCOMMITTEES, INCLUDING A POLITICAL SUB-COMMITTEE. WHILE THE US CERTAINLY SUPPORTED LEBANON'S RIGHT TO NAME ITS OWN DELEGATION, IT MIGHT. I CAUTIONED, BE BETTER NOT TO NAME A FORMAL CHAIRMAN. NO CHAIRMAN OR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CO-CHAIRMAN MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. GEMAYEL AGREED THAT THIS COULD BE FINESSED. LEBANON, HE SAID, DID NOT WANT TO DRAMATIZE THIS ISSUE, AND FORMALITIES SHOULD NOT GET IN THE WAY.

-- DATE OF FORMAL MEETINGS, I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT, WHILE THERE WOULD BE A CERTAIN DELAY WHILE THE ISRAELIS REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF THE INFORMAL MEETING, IT WOULD BE IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST TO BEGIN THE FORMAL MEETINGS BEFORE BEGIN'S NOVEMBER 19 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. OTHERWISE, THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WULD BECOME A HOT ISSUE FOR THAT MEETING. GEMAYEL SAID LEBANON WOULD PRESS FOR AN EARLY MEETING.

-- AGENDA. I TOLD GEMAYEL I FORESAW NO REAL PROBLEM ON AGENDA. THE OBVIOUS MILITARY AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED. AS I EXPECTED, GEMAYEL DID NOT DEMUR.

7. LEBANESE STATEMENTS ON ISRAEL:

-- GEMAYEL CONFIDED THAT, TO HELP BUILD THE PROPER ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, THE CABINET HAD TAKEN A DECISION NOVEMBER 10 THAT MINISTERS SHOULD, UNTIL THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN COMPLETED, REMAIN SILENT ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND ISRAELI-LEBANESE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES. I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT SHAMIR HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY GEMAYEL'S EARLIER EFFORTS TO QUIET HIS MINISTERS, AND THAT THE FORMAL CABINET

DECISION WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE VERY WELL RECEIVED.

8. ATTITUDE TOWARD PEACE PROCESS:

-- GEMAYEL WAS AGAIN EXPLICIT IN HIS CONVICTION THAT, ONCE THE PEACE PROCESS HAD BEGUN, MORE SENIOR CONTACTS ON A BROADER RANGE OF ISSUES COULD BEGIN "WITHIN A MONTH." HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD NO COMPLEX IN THIS REGARD, SAYING HE WAS READY FOR AN "AGGRESSIVE APPROACH." HE REVEALED THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD BEEN THE "OFFICIAL SOURCE" FOR THE POSITIVE TRENDS BACKGROUND PUBLISHED NOVEMBER 11 (BEIRUT 8185).

-- HIS ONLY FEAR, HE SAID, WAS THAT HE REMAINED UNSURE OF ISRAEL'S REAL INTENTIONS (SEE BELOW). HE WAS WORRIED THAT WITHOUT REAL PRESSURE ON ISRAEL FROM THE US, THERE WOULD BE NO POSITIVE RESULTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. I RESPONDED THAT THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS TO GET INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT WE WOULD THEN PLAY OUR ROLE IN THE CONTEXT OF SPECIFIC ISSUES. WE WERE DETERMINED TO AVOID A STALEMATE AND WOULD WORK HARD TO CONVINCE THE ISRAELIS THAT A STRONG LEBANON WAS BETTER FOR THEIR INTERESTS THAN A PROLONGED OCCUPATION.

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EXDIS  
FROM DRAPER

--GEMAYEL REITERATED HIS PAPPENSION, GIVEN HIS  
"HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITIES" IN BUILDING A NEW STRUCTURE  
FOR A NEW LEBANON WHICH HE WANTED TO LAST FOR THE NEXT  
50 YEARS, AND SAID HE ALSO WANTED TO ENSURE THAT NO FALSE STEPS  
COMPLICATED HIS TASK.

9. NORMALIZATION:

- I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT ACCEPT THE  
LEBANESE VIEW THAT THE 1948 ARMISTICE ACCORD HAD ENDED  
THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.  
HE PLEADED FOR ISRAELI UNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT,  
ARGUING THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR LEBANON BOTH DOM-  
ESTICALLY AND IN THE ARAB WORLD TO SPEAK OF REBUILDING  
THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD IN FACT  
BE GIVEN A NEW SUBSTANCE AND APPEARANCE TO TAKE THE  
NEW SITUATION INTO ACCOUNT. THE 1948 ARMISTICE AGREE-  
MENT WOULD SERVE AS A BASE, AND NEW DOCUMENTS OR ARTICLES  
COULD BE ADDED.

--LATER, MOST IMPORTANT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION  
OF LIKELY LEBANESE MUSLIM AND ARAB OPPOSITION TO WHAT  
HE MIGHT HAVE TO DO, GEMAYEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS  
PREPARED TO HAVE WHATEVER DOCUMENT THAT EMERGED FROM  
THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS SIGNED BY THE APPROPRIATE  
LEBANESE. HE IS PREPARED FOR RULY STRONG OPPOSITION,  
HE SAID.

--ONE ELEMENT GEMEYAL TOLD US HE WAS KEEN ON PRE-  
SERVING WAS INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE NEW  
ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH UNIFIL AND UN OBSERVERS. "IF WE  
ARE TO HAVE OPEN BORDERS," HE SAID, "IT IS BETTER TO  
HAVE THEM UNDER INTERNATIONAL, NOT LEBANESE-, RESPONSIBILITY."

(COMMENT: AS MENTIONED EARLIER, THIS IS OBVIOUSLY GOING  
TO REQUIRE FURTHER DISCUSSION AFTER IT IS SURFACED WITH  
ISRAEL. WHAT IS SIGNIFICANT HERE IS GEMAYEL'S ACCEPTANCE

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OF THE IDEA FO OPEN BORDERS OF SOME KIND.)

10. PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS:

--GEMAYEL CAME BACK REPEATEDLY TO HIS FEAR THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME AND THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD THEREFORE KEEP THEIR FORCES IN LEBANON INDEFINITELY. HE POINTED TO ISRAELI PREPARATIONS FOR THE WINTER, AS WELL AS THE INSTALLATION OF SOPHISTICATED ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT ON THE PEAK OF JABAL BARUK, AS DISTURBING EVIDENCE OF THIS POSSIBILITY.

--I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO TRY NEGOTIATIONS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THE US WAS IMPATIENT, I SAID, AND WANTED ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT BY THE END OF THE YEAR. I HAD CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS STILL OUR POLICY OBJECTIVE IN A RECENT TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB. A TWO-STEP WITHDRAWAL MIGHT BE THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED, I SUGGESTED.

--AS HE AND OTHERS HAVE SAID BEFORE, GEMAYEL PROFESSED HIMSELF TO BE VERY WARY OF SUCH AN APPROACH, BECAUSE HE FEARED THAT A FIRST-PHASE PULLBACK WOULD LEAVE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES IN "COMFORTABLE POSITIONS" FROM WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE LITTLE INCENTIVE TO WITHDRAWAL. HE STRESSED THAT LEBANON NEEDS A GUARANTEED TIMETABLE FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL IN A PACKAGE DEAL, A BEFORE MOVING ON INITIAL "PULLBACKS."

-- I REPEATED THAT THE US WOULD FIND IT INTOLERABLE TO HAVE FOREIGN FORCES STAYING FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME ONCE THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS HAD BEGUN. FOR ONE THING, THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE WOULD BE GREATLY COMPLICATED. WHILE IN SOME WAYS A PACKAGE DEAL COULD BE EASIER TO NEGOTIATE, THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS TO GET THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. THEN, THE US COULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION AT CRITICAL POINTS.

--GEMAYEL FINALLY ASKED THAT WE OBTAIN THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES BY THE END OF THE YEAR EVEN IF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED. I COUNTERED

THAT NO ONE COULD PROVIDE AN IRONCLAD GUARANTEE, AND SOME ISSUES SUCH AS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND A DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION WOULD HAVE TO HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATED.

11. FURTHER COMMENT: GEMAYEL WAS VERY RELAXED AND INFORMAL, SHARING JOKES AND EVEN SHARPENING HIS OWN PENCILS AND TAKING HIS OWN NOTES! HE WENT FURTHER THAN EVER

BEFORE IN DEMONSTRATING AN OPEN-MINDED ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL AND A GREAT DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE ISSUES OF FORM AND SUBSTANCE FACING HIM AS WE APPROACH NEGOTIATIONS. I AM THEREFORE OPTIMISTIC THAT, IF WE CAN GET THE ISRAELIS FINALLY ON BOARD, WE ARE ABOUT TO START THE LONG-WAITED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL.

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EXDIS  
FROM DRAPER  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, PINS, LE, IS  
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: ISRAELI VIEWS ON AN ISRAEL/LEBANON  
AGREEMENT

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY. ISRAELIS HAVE A VERY CLEAR IDEA OF THE TYPE OF DOCUMENT WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO EMERGE FROM THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE. IT IS CLOSELY MODELED ON THE 1975 EGYPTIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, BUT WITH SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS ADDED CONCERNING NORMALIZATION. END SUMMARY.
3. ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER KRECZKO MET WITH MFA LEGAL ADVISER ELLIE RUBINSTEIN FOR THREE HOURS ON THURSDAY MORNING (NOV 11), WITH GENERAL TAMIR FOR TWO HOURS IN THE AFTERNOON, AND THEN AGAIN WITH RUBINSTEIN IN THE EVENING, TO EXPLORE ISRAELI VIEWS ON THE LEBANON/ISRAEL TALKS. RUBINSTEIN AND TAMIR PRESENTED SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME VIEWS, ALTHOUGH TAMIR WAS MUCH MORE SPECIFIC.
3. KRECZKO BEGAN EACH MEETING BY STRESSING THE NEED TO INITIATE THE DELEGATION TALKS IMMEDIATELY, DRAWING ON THE POINTS WHICH AMB DRAPER HAD MADE TO FONMIN SHAMIR THE NIGHT BEFORE AND EMPHASIZING THE DESIRABILITY OF BEGINNING BEFORE THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. TAMIR REACTED STRONGLY AT FIRST, SAYING THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT GOING TO CONDUCT THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATION WITH A "US AXE" AT ITS NECK, SINCE ISRAEL HAD PAID DEARLY FOR THE LEBANON OPERATION. KRECZKO RESPONDED THAT WASHINGTON WAS ANXIOUS FOR PROGRESS AND THAT WHILE WASHINGTON MIGHT TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW IF SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE OBSTACLES AROSE, THEY WERE VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT "SHAPE OF THE TABLE" ARGUMENTS WERE PREVENTING US FROM MOVING TO WHAT MIGHT BE A PROMISING SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION.
4. AS TO THE PROCEDURAL MATTERS, TAMIR AND RUBINSTEIN BOTH FELT THAT THE COMPOSITION OF DELEGATIONS WAS FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE VENUE ISSUE. BOTH SAID THAT ALTHOUGH ISRAEL WOULD NOT INSIST ON MINISTERS, THEY WOULD INSIST THAT THE TALKS HAVE A "POLITICAL CHARACTER". WHICH MEANT A SENIOR, CIVILIAN CHAIRMAN.

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5. RUBINSTEIN AND TAMIR TOOK OPPOSITE VIEWS ON HOW THE VENUE ISSUE MIGHT BE RESOLVED. RUBINSTEIN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT TALKS IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WOULD BE NECESSARY, EVEN IF JERUSALEM WAS IMPOSSIBLE. TAMIR SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE MINISTERS WOULD INSIST ON JERUSALEM IF TALKS WERE HELD IN ISRAEL. TAMIR'S PREFERENCE WAS FOR TALKS IN ONE PLACE, HTO SIMPLIFY LOGISTICS. TAMIR DID NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC SUGGESTION FOR A PLACE, PROVIDED IT WAS NOT IN AN UN AREA. (TAMIR COULD NOT EXPLAIN SHARON'S REJECTION OF THE KHALDE HOTEL, EXCEPT TO NOTE THAT SHARON WAS AGITATED OVER THE CHAIRMANSHIP ISSUE.)

EXDIS

6. TAMIR STRESSED THAT THE ONE LOCATION IDEA WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW, WHICH HE WOULD PRESS IN ISRAELI CIRCLES, BUT THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW KIMCHE WOULD FEEL ABOUT IT. HE SAID THAT KIMCHE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PUT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT POSITION (BEIRUT-JERUSALEM) TO FATTAL AT THEIR FIRST MEETING AND WOULD NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT A FALL-BACK WITHOUT REFERRING IT TO THE CABINET. TAMIR SUGGESTED THAT KIMCHE MIGHT BE RECEPTIVE TO A PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL MEETING SOMEWHERE IN LEBANON TO GET THE TALKS MOVING. WITH THE SITE OF SUBSEQUENT TALKS TO BE DETERMINED BY THE DELEGATIONS THEMSELVES. (KRECKO SAID THAT THIS INITIAL PLACE PROBABLY COULD NOT BE BEIRUT, SINCE THE LEBANESE WOULD SUSPECT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY INSIST ON JERUSALEM AS THE EQUIVALENT.)

EXDIS

7. REGARDING THE ISRAELI SUBSTANTIVE POSITION, TAMIR GAVE A DETAILED BRIEFING WHICH WAS CONSISTENT WITH RUBINSTEIN'S SEPARATE PRESENTATION IN NEARLY EVERY RESPECT. THE ISRAELIS ARE LEANING HEAVILY ON THE 1975 EGYPTIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT (SINAI II) AS A PRECEDENT, AND CONTEMPLATE AT LEAST FOUR DOCUMENTS:

EXDIS

8. COVER DOCUMENT: . THE COVERING AGREEMENT WILL BE TITLED ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT, AND WILL CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS, EACH OF WHICH WOULD BE RECIPROCAL UNDERTAKINGS.

A. "STATE OF SECURITY RELATIONS". THIS SHOULD INCLUDE A DECLARATION THAT THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAS BEEN TERMINATED. (RUBINSTEIN SAID THAT IT SHOULD ALSO STATE THAT THE AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD A PEACE AGREEMENT AND SHOULD INCLUDE SOME PROVISION CONCERNING THE FUTURE, AS SINAI II DID.)

B. PROCEDURES FOR DELINEATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY, "SO THAT ISRAEL WILL KNOW WHERE TO WITHDRAW TO".

C. NO FOREIGN FORCES WITHOUT MUTUAL CONSENT. TAMIR DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN THE SOUTHERN 45KMS, WHERE ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT ANY FOREIGN FORCES, AND THE REST OF LEBANON, WHERE ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT "HOSTILE" FOREIGN FORCES.

D. NEITHER PARTY WILL ALLOW THE OPERATION OF TERRORIST GROUPS FROM ITS TERRITORY. RUBINSTEIN SAID THAT THIS PROVISION WILL NEED TO CLEARLY REPUDIATE THE CAIRO AND MELKOURT ACCORDS.

E. NEITHER WILL PARTICIPATE IN HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE OTHER FROM THE TERRITORY OF A THIRD STATE.

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--PRINCIPLE OF PHASED WITHDRAWAL (SEE BELOW).

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F. THERE WILL BE A SECURITY ZONE AS INDICATED IN AN ANNEX (SEE BELOW).

G. NORMALIZATION. THIS PARAGRAPH SHOULD STIPULATE BASIC PRINCIPLES ON NORMALIZATION, INCLUDING:

- OPEN BORDERS FOR PEOPLE AND GOODS;
- FORMATION OF COMMITTEES TO DISCUSS AGRICULTURE, TOURISM, COMMERCE, ETC
- REPRESENTATION (TAMIR AND RUBINSTEIN BOTH SAID ISRAEL DID NOT HAVE A SUGGESTION AT THIS TIME ON HOW THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED);
- PROCEDURES FOR ACHIEVING A PEACE TREATY;
- NO HOSTILE PROPAGANDA.

H. CREATION OF A JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THE WITHDRAWAL (SEE BELOW) AND OF AN AD NOC COMMISSION ON NORMALIZATION.

I. CONCLUDING PARAGRAPHS CONCERNING THE MAINTENANCE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE; REGISTRATION OF THE TREATY WITH THE UN; AND PROVISIONS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES.

9. ANNEX: THE SECOND DOCUMENT WOULD BE A MILITARY ANNEX WHICH WOULD DESCRIBE THE SECURITY ZONE, AND LIMITATIONS THEREIN. THIS ANNEX WOULD BE "PERMANENT" (THAT IS, UNTIL A PEACE TREATY), AND WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

- DEFINITION OF THE ZONE, INCLUDING DELINEATION OF THE ISRAELI/LEBANON BORDER.
- LIMITATIONS ON THE LAF, INCLUDING NO MISSILES, ROCKETS OR ARTILLERY.
- INTEGRATION OF LOCAL FORCES INTO THE LAF.
- ONLY THE LAF IN THE SECURITY ZONE (TAMIR SAID ISRAEL WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL NORTH OF THE ZONE).
- TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.
- (TAMIR SAID THAT THIS WOULD BETTER BE CONCLUDED IN A SEPARATE DOCUMENT, SINCE IT WOULD INVOLVE UNDERTAKINGS CONCERNING SYRIA AND THE PLO, AS WELL AS ISRAEL. TAMIR REPEATED THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THE SEQUENCE OF WITHDRAWALS, WHICH HE EMPHASIZED WAS AN OPENING, NEGOTIATING POSITION)
- EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS (THREE, INCLUDING ONE AT MOUNT BARUK, MANNED BY THE IDF).
- ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE BY NAVAL AND AIR UNITS.
- A JOINT COMMISSION TO SUPERVISE THE ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING JOINT SUBCOMMITTEES OR PATROLS TO ENSURE THAT VIOLATIONS ARE RECTIFIED.

10. APPENDIX. THE THIRD DOCUMENT WOULD BE AN APPENDIX, WHICH WOULD DETAIL SUB-PHASES FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SECURITY ZONE. THIS APPENDIX WOULD ONLY BE OPERATIVE UNTIL ISRAEL HAD COMPLETED ITS WITHDRAWAL. IT WOULD DEFINE EACH SUB-PHASE, INCLUDING TIMING AND THE MECHANISM FOR TURNING TERRITORY OVER TO THE LAF. THIS APPENDIX COULD BE NEGOTIATED BY MILITARY EXPERTS SOMETIME AFTER THE MAIN DOCUMENTS, AS WAS DONE IN THE SINAI II NEGOTIATIONS.

11. THE FOURTH DOCUMENT IS A MAP, WITH THE SECURITY ZONE AND SUB-PHASES INDICATED.

12. RUBINSTEIN SUGGESTED THAT A SECOND ANNEX MIGHT BE NEEDED WHICH WOULD DEAL WITH NORMALIZATION MATTERS (DEFMIN SHARON ALSO SUGGESTED AN ANNEX ON NORMALIZATION IN AN ADDRESS TO A HERUT MEETING ON NOV 12).

13. DURING THE MEETINGS, KRECZKO MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE ISRAELI PRESENTATIONS.

14. KRECZKO SAID THAT BASED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE, NORMALIZATION WAS LIKELY TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE, AND THAT WE NEEDED TO BE CREATIVE IN DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE. RUBINSTEIN AND TAMIR BOTH SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT A SITUATION WORSE THAN BEFORE THE GALILEE OPERATION (TAMIR WAS PARTICULARLY FIRM--"ISRAEL WILL NOT WITHDRAW BEHIND A CLOSED BORDER... LEBANON IS NOT AN ORGANIC COUNTRY, AND AMIN IS NOT PRESIDENT OF THE ENTIRE COUNTRY... WE HAVE AND WILL RETAIN OUR INFLUENCE... THE PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH WILL NOT ACCEPT A CLOSED BORDER WITH ISRAEL).

15. DESPITE TAMIR'S FIRMNESS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF NORMALIZATION HE WAS MUCH MORE FLEXIBLE THAN RUBINSTEIN IN THINKING ABOUT HOW

TO ACCOMPLISH NORMALIZATION. HE DID NOT SUGGEST AN ANNEX FOR NORMALIZATION MATTERS AND BROUGHT UP THE EXAMPLE OF IRAN, WITH WHOM ISRAEL HAD EXTENSIVE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITHOUT ANY FORMAL AGREEMENTS. HE SAID THE ARABS HAVE AN ABILITY TO DO NE THING, AND ESPOUSE A COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT PRINCIPLE. RUBINSTEIN ALSO BROUGHT UP THE IRAN EXAMPLE, BUT IN ORDER TO SAY THAT THIS SITUATION WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE, SINCE IT WAS SO EASILY REVERSIBLE. KRECZKO STRESSED THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO THINK OF THINGS AND FORMATS WHICH LEBANON MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO WITHOUT SACRIFICING ITS ARAB RELATIONS. TAMIR AND RUBINSTEIN ACCEPTED THIS, BUT TAMIR SAID THAT "AMIN HAS GOT TO STOP PLAYING HIS CURRENT GAME, WHERE HE THINKS HE WILL GIVE ISRAEL THE MINIMUM IN ORDER TO GIVE THE ARABS THE MAXIMUM".

16. SECOND KRECZKO SAID THAT WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD LEBANON WAS PREPARED FOR A SECURITY ZONE AND REASONABLE LIMITATIONS THERE, THEY WOULD BE VERY SENSITIVE TO PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD BE GENERALLY PERCEIVED AS DEROGATIONS OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. KRECZKO GAVE THE EXAMPLES OF ISRAELI-MANNED EARLY WARNING STATIONS (EWS) AND JOINT PATROLS, WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE IDEA OF COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND OF AIR AND NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE. KRECZKO PRESSED TAMIR ON WHY EWS WERE NECESSARY, SINCE ISRAEL COULD DETECT SYRIAN MILITARY MOVES FROM AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND WOULD HAVE INFORMATION CONCERNING PLO INTILGRATION FROM ITS GOOD CONTACTS IN THE SOUTH.

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17. TAMIR WAS SOMEWHAT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE POINTS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE MIGHT BE HANDLED IN A SECRET OR SEPARATE AGREEMENT. THEY COULD DISCUSS WHETHER NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE WOULD BE WITHIN LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS, OR IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS ALONG THE LEBANESE COAST. WHILE HE WAS ADAMANT THAT EWS WERE NECESSARY TO DETECT INFILTRATION, HE SAID THAT PERHAPS THERE WERE ALTERNATIVES TO ISRAELI MILITARY CONTROL, SUCH AS A CIVILIAN EWS. (TAMIR DID NOT SAY AMERICAN CIVILIANS, BUT THIS WOULD FLOW LOGICALLY FROM THE SINAI II PRECEDENT).

18. THIRD, KRECZKO TOLD TAMIR THAT THE IDEA OF SUB-PHASES FOR WITHDRAWAL WAS NEW AND HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE WASHINGTON PAPER. KRECZKO SAID THAT THE CHAIN OF DOCUMENTS TAMIR WAS SUGGESTING NOT ONLY WOULD APPEAR VERY IMPOSING FROM A POLITICAL/LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, BUT ALSO SUGGESTS A LONG PERIOD FOR WITHDRAWAL.

19. TAMIR SAID THAT HE WANTED TO PREFACE HIS RESPONSE BY EMPHASIZING THAT ISRAEL WANTED TO WITHDRAW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT, HE SAID THAT THE TIMING OF WITHDRAWAL DEPENDED ON TWO FACTORS: (1) PLO AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL; AND (2) THE CAPABILITY OF THE LAF TO TAKE OVER RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SOUTH. THE SECOND FACTOR DEPENDED ON HOW THE LAF CHOSE TO RE-INTEGRATE THE LOCAL FORCES, ON WHICH ISRAEL WOULD INXIST (EXCLUDING HADDAD HIMSELF). IF THE LAF CHOOSES ONLY TO INTRODUCE NEW LEBANESE OFFICERS TO THE CURRENT FORCES, THIS WOULD NOT TAKE "TOO LONG". IF, HOWEVER, THE LAF WANTED TO RETRAIN INDIVIDUALS AND INTEGRATE AT THE COMPANY LEVEL, THEN MORE TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED.

19. WHEN ASKED WHAT "NOT TOO LONG" MEANT, TAMIR SAID 4-6 MONTHS AFTER THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED. KRECZKO SAID THAT THIS WAS FAR LONGER THAN WE OR THE LEBANESE HAD CONTEMPLATED, AND AGAIN ASKED WHY WUB-PHASES WERE NEEDED.

20. TAMIR SAID SUB-PHASES WERE NOT NECESSARY, BUT 4-6 MONTHS WAS. ISRAELI SECURITY WAS DEPENDENT ON WHAT WENT ON IN THE SOUTHERN 45KMS. AND ISRAEL WAS NOT GOING TO TURN IT OVER UNTIL IT WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE LAF COULD EFFECTIVELY CONTROL THE AREA. THE SUB-PHASES WERE HIS IDEA. HE WAS

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AWARE THAT US AND LEBANESE WOULD HAVE POLITICAL DIFFI-  
CULTIES WITH A 4-6 MONTH WITHDRAWAL PERIOD (ALTHOUGH HE SAID  
HE THOUGHT GEMAYEL WAS MORE REALISTIC AND DID NOT WANT  
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO CREATE A VACUUM). SUB-PHASES  
WERE INTENDED TO SHOW CONTINUOUS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID  
THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD INSISTED ON SUB-PHASES IN SINAI II AND  
IN THE PEACE TREATY, AND HE ASSUMED THEY WOULD BE HELPFUL  
HERE AS WELL. HE ALSO SAID THAT ISRAELI PLANNING FOR SUB-  
PHASES WOULD HAVE ISRAEL WITHDRAW LAST FROM THE POPULATED,  
COASTAL AREA. THPS WOULD ALLOW THE LAF TO ENTER THE EASIEST  
AREAS FIRST, AND GRADUALLY BUILD UP ITS SELF-CONFIDENCE.

21. KRECZKO ALSO ALERTED RUBINSTEIN TO THE FACT THAT THE  
LEBANESE WOULD PRESS FOR ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THE  
NORMALIZATION ITEMS AND THE CLARIFICATION ON THE STATE OF  
BELLIGERENCY, TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE  
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. RUBINSTEIN SAID THAT THPS WOULD NEVER  
BE ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL. KRECZKO SAID THAT THE LEBANESE ARE  
AWARE OF ISRAELI SENSITIVITIES ON THIS. ISRAEL SHOULD UNDER-  
STAND THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD NOT ACCEPT A PEACE TREATY, AND  
THAT THIS APPLIED AS WELL TO AN EQUIVALENT SUBSTANTIVE AGREE-  
MENT UNDER A DIFFERENT NAME.

22. RUBINSTEIN ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY IDEAS ON HOW THE  
NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE HANDLED WHEN THEY STARTED. KRECZKO  
SAID THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THIS WITH AMB DRAPER, BUT  
THAT HIS OWN VIEW WAS THAT IT WAS BETTER NOT TO START WITH  
A DISCUSSION OF THE FORMAT OR CHARACTER OF THE AGREEMENT,  
SINCE THIS WOULD PRODUCE A LONG DEBATE ON THE ARMISTICE  
AGREEMENT, WHETHER IT REMAINED IN FORCE, AND THE PEACE  
TREATY (RUBINSTEIN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT ISRAEL WOULD BE  
REQUIRED TO START WITH THE CABINET POSITION IN FAVOR OF A  
PEACE TREATY). INSTEAD, IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO HAVE A  
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE MAJOR ISSUES THAT WOULD NEED TO  
BE ADDRESSED. KRECZKO SAID THAT THE ISRAELI LIST OF ITEMS  
PRESENTED IN WASHINGTON MIGHT BE A GOOD STARTING POINT,

PARTICULARLY SINCE WE KNEW THAT THE LEBANESE DID NOT HAVE  
MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THE FIRST SEVERAL POINTS.

23. RUBINSTEIN ASKED WHETHER ISRAEL SHOULD PREPARE AND  
PRESENT A PAPER. KRECZKO SAID THAT HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS  
THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE AN INITIAL DISCUSSION  
OF THE GENERAL ISSUES, AND THEN DECIDE HOW TO GET DOWN  
TO DRAFTING. DILLON  
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DE RUQMBE #8242/01 3190950  
D 150918Z NOV 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9901

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1108  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1094  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1344  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1353  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 1082  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 199  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 393  
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 406  
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 401  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1564  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 246

*File*  
*Lebanon Phase II*

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 8242

EXDIS  
FROM DRAPER  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, MCP, MAPR, LE, IS, SY, PLU, US  
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: FIRSTLEBANESE-ISRAELI MEETING

1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DAVID KIMCHE AND ANTOINE FATTAL MET FOR TWO HOURS OF PRELIMINARY "SECRET" TALKS IN MY APARTMENT NOVEMBER 13. THEY MADE A GOOD BEGINNING TOWARD DEVELOPING FRIENDLY PERSONAL RELATIONS THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WAS CORDIAL BUT BUSINESSLIKE. KIMCHE AND FATTAL DISCUSSED A WIDE RANGE OF PROCEDURAL ISSUES, INCLUDING DELEGATION CHAIRMEN, VENUE, TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, THE DATE OF THE FIRST SESSION, THE PACE OF THE TALKS, THE SIZE OF THE DELEGATIONS, THE CREATION OF SUBCOMMITTEES, THE LANGUAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, PRESS RELATIONS, AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE ISSUES OF DELEGATION CHAIRMEN, VENUE, AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS COULD NOT BE SETTLED ON THE SPOT. KIMCHE PROPOSED A COMPROMISE ON THE FIRST

BY *AK* NARA DATE *11/28/08*  
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SIT: ROTG KEMP  
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TWO WHICH FATTAL IS TO DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL NOVEMBER 15: ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT KHALDAH AS THE VENUE IN A FIRST PHASE IF LEBANON APPOINTED A "POLITICAL" CHAIRMAN TO HEAD ITS DELEGATION. KIMCHE ALSO REQUESTED LEBANESE PERMISSION ON FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT OPERATING THROUGH BEIRUT AIRPORT AND REQUESTED LEBANESE HELP IN ASSURING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR THE ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICERS IN B'ABDA, WHO WILL SERVE AS THE SECRETARIAT FOR THE ISRAELI DELEGATION. IT WAS AGREED THAT FORMAL TALKS MIGHT START NOVEMBER 17 IF AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES WERE REACHED. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT, AT LEAST INITIALLY, TALKS WOULD BE HELD EACH MONDAY AND WEDNESDAY, THIS ALLOWING FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH POLITICAL LEVELS (WE WILL PUSH FOR A FASTER PACE). DELEGATIONS WOULD HAVE ABOUT FIVE OR SIX MEMBERS. SPECIALIZED SUBCOMMITTEES COULD BE FORMED. PROCEEDINGS WOULD BE IN ENGLISH. THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY AT THE MEETING SITE, WITH THE IDF POLICING THE HINTERLAND.

3. KIMCHE PRESENTED THE MAIN LINES OF ISRAEL'S SUBSTANTIVE POSITION IN FAMILIAR TERMS, AND FATTAL RESPONDED WITH UNDERSTANDING ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND RESERVATIONS ON THE PACE OF NORMALIZATION. KIMCHE REPEATED ISRAEL'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A PEACE TREATY RIGHT AWAY, BUT SAID IT REMAINED A GOAL. IN THE MEANTIME, ISRAEL REJECTED ANY RETURN TO THE 1948 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IT SOUGHT A NEW FORMAL, SIGNED AGREEMENT OF SOME KIND. KIMCHE SAID "LEBANON AND ISRAEL MUST WORK TOGETHER TO FIND THE MEANS TO DO THE MAXIMUM WITH THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF DAMAGE TO LEBANON". FATTAL AGREED WITH THIS FORMULATION, BUT THE ENSUING DISCUSSION DEMONSTRATED THAT THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS HAVE VERY DIFFERENT VIEWS ON WHAT IS LIKELY TO CAUSE DAMAGE. ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, KIMCHE SAID ISRAEL WANTED NO INTERNATIONAL FORCES OF ANY KIND IN THE SECURITY ZONE. FATTAL SAID LEBANON WOULD SURELY DISAGREE. COMMENT: WHILE THIS FIRST MEETING WAS HELD IN A POSITIVE AND FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE, IT WAS INCONCLUSIVE IN MOST RESPECTS. HOWEVER, FATTAL SHUT NO DOORS. WE BELIEVE THAT A "LEBANESE SOLUTION" CAN BE FOUND ON THE PROBLEM OF CHAIRMANSHIP. END SUMMARY.

4. ISRAELI MFA DIRECTOR-GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE (ACCOMPANIED BY MFA B'ABDA LIAISON OFFICER YITZHAK LEUR AS NOTETAKER) MET FOR TWO HOURS OF PRELIMINARY "SECRET" TALKS WITH LEBANESE AMBASSADOR ANTOINE FATTAL (ACCOMPANIED BY LAF COLONEL FAWZI ABU FARHAT AS NOTETAKER) AT MY WEST BEIRUT APARTMENT LATE NOVEMBER 13. ROSS AND I WERE PRESENT FOR THE US.

5. ATMOSPHER OF MEETING: POSITIVE AND FRIENDLY  
--AN INITIAL HALF-HOUR OF INFORMAL CONVERSATION OVER COFFEE AND SWEETS ENABLED KIMCHE AND FATTAL TO DISCOVER EACH OTHER AS MEN. EXPLORATION OF ACADEMIC TRAINING, PREVIOUS POSTINGS, 8,531)3:57-) 074785, AND MUTUAL FRIENDS (INCLUDING SHARTAI ROSENNE) RAPIDLY MADE IT CLAR THAT KIMCHE AND FATTAL WOULD BE ABLE TO WORK WELL TOGETHER. KIMCHE WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED THAT FATTAL HAD STUDIED JUDAIC LAW AND SPOKE HEBREW AND THAT GEMAYEL HAD CLEARLY BRIEFED FATTAL ON HIS OWN PREVIOUS FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH KIMCHE. KIMCHE HIMSELF STRESSED HIS WARM RELATIONS WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF LEBANESE. IN SHORT, FATTAL AND KIMCHE MADE A GOOD BEGINNING TOWARD DEVELOPING FRIENDLY AND OPEN PERSONAL RELATIONS THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.  
--IN THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED, THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL BUT BUSINESSLIKE. EACH PRESENTED HIS POSITIONS IN A COURTEOUS, LOW-KEY MANNER, AND EACH WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO EXPRESS RESPECT FOR THE POSITIONS OF THE OTHER, EVEN WHEN THERE WAS EVIDENT DISAGREEMENT.  
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1109  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1095  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1345  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1354  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 1083  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 200  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 394  
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 407  
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 402  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1565  
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EXDIS  
FROM DRAPER

6. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF TALKS: COMPROMISE PROPOSED  
--KIMCHE OPENED THE DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURE FOR THE  
FORMAL TALKS AND BY THE END OF THE MEETING HE AND  
FATTAL HAD ENGAGED IN CONSIDERABLE GIVE-AND-TAKE ON  
THE DELEGATION CHAIRMEN (I.E., THE NATURE OF THE TALKS),  
VENUE, TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, THE DATE OF THE FIRST  
SESSION, THE PACE OF THE TALKS, THE ZIE OF THE  
DELEGATIONS, THE CREATION OF SUBCOMMITTEES, THE LANGUAGE  
OF THE PROCEEDINGS, PRESS RELATIONS, AND SECURITY  
ARRANGEMENTS. THE ISSUES OF DELEGATION CHAIRMEN AND  
VENUE, AS WELL AS TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, COULD NOT BE  
RESOLVED ON THE SPOT. ON THE FIRST TWO, KIMCHE FINALLY  
PROPOSED A COMPROMISE UNDER WHICH ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT  
KHALDAH AS THE VENUE IN A FIRST PHASE IF LEBANON APPOINTED  
A "POLITICAL" CIVILIAN CHAIRMAN TO HEAD ITS DELEGATION,  
INSTEAD OF THE GENERAL ALREADY NAMED. FATTAL IS TO  
DISCUSS THIS COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, AS WELL AS AN ISRAELI  
REQUEST TO BRING THEIR DELEGATION INTO BEIRUT AIRPORT  
BY FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT, WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL UPON THE

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SIT: RDTG KEMP  
EDR:  
WHSR COMMENT:

LATTER'S RETURN FROM SAUDI ARABIA LATE NOVEMBER 15.

#### 7. NATURE OF THE TALKS AND VENUE

--KIMCHE AND FATTAL HAD LENGTHY EXCHANGES ON THESE SUBJECTS. KIMCHE, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF GIVING THE NEGOTIATIONS A POLITICAL CAST, WAS SEEKING TO HAVE A CIVILIAN NAMED TO HEAD THE LEBANESE DELEGATION DURING A "PREPARATORY PHASE" AND TO HAVE A MINISTER NAMED DURING A SECOND PHASE. FATTAL REJECTED BOTH THE NOTION OF TWO PHASES AND THE NOTION OF A CHAIRMAN OF MINISTERIAL RANK. HE SOUGHT A WAY OUT OF NAMING A CIVILIAN OF ANY RANK BY PROPOSING INSTEAD EITHER THAT THERE BE NO CHAIRMAN OR THAT A CIVILIAN HEAD BE NAMED IN ONE OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES. LATER, HE WENT EVEN FURTHER, PROPOSING CIVILIAN-MILITARY CO-CHAIRMEN OR ALTERNATING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY CHAIRMEN. KIMCHE WOULD NOT YIELD. WITHOUT RESOLVING THIS ISSUE, HE ASKED FATTAL FOR LEBANON'S VIEWS ON VENUE, POINTING OUT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED NEGOTIATIONS IN THE TWO CAPITALS.

--FATTAL SAID HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON VENUE WAS CLEAR: IT WOULD INSIST ON KHALDAH. THIS GAVE KIMCHE AN OPENING FOR A COMPROMISE FORMULA. "LET US DECIDE", HE SAID, " THAT A PREPARATORY PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN AT KHALDAH AND THAT THE CHAIRMEN OF THE TWO DELEGATIONS BE CIVILIAN OFFICIALS". HE RESERVED ISRAEL'S FUTURE POSITION, REPEATING THAT IT WOULD SEEK MINISTERIAL-LEVEL MEETINGS IN THE TWO CAPITALS AT A LATER PHASE. HE ADMITTED HIMSELF UNABLE TO STATE, HOWEVER, WHEN SUCH A LATER PHASE MIGHT BEGIN. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY ONLY WHEN IT CAME TIME TO SIGN.

--FINALLY FATTAL AGREED TO CONSULT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ON THE ISSUE OF A CIVILIAN CHAIRMAN. HE REJECTED FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF A TWO-PHASE NEGOTIATION, SAYING ARAB AND LEBANESE PUBLIC OPINION WOULD SEE THIS AS THE BEGINNING OF A CAMP DAVID-STYLE PROCESS. KIMCHE RESPONDED THAT HE AND FATTAL WERE OBVIOUSLY IN DISAGREEMENT ON THIS POINT, AND THE ISSUE WAS DROPPED.

--FATTAL, IN A TELEPHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AT THIS POINT IN THE MEETING, ASCERTAINED THAT HE COULD NOT GET A REPLY UNTIL GEMAYEL'S RETURN FROM SAUDI ARABIA LATE MONDAY, NOVEMBER 15.

#### 8. TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS

--KIMCHE RAISED THE ISSUE OF TRAVEL NOW THAT BAD WEATHER WAS ABOUT TO BEGIN. BECAUSE OF THE RESULTING UNCERTAINTIES OF HELICOPTER TRAVEL, HE SAID, ISRAEL WANTED LEBANON'S PERMISSION TO BRING ITS DELEGATION INTO BEIRUT AIRPORT BY FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT WHENEVER TALKS WERE HELD.

FATTAL UNDERTOOK TO REFER THIS QUESTION TO GEMAYEL AS WELL.

--KIMCHE ALSO TOLD FATTAL THAT THE ISRAELI MFA LIAISON OFFICE IN B'ABDA WOULD BE ACTING AS THE SECRETARIAT OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION. TO HELP IT IN ITS TASK, IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ITS OFFICERS TO HAVE SOME FORM OF DOCUMENTATION ALLOWING THEM FREE MOVEMENT AROUND THE CITY. FATTAL DID NOT COMMIT HIMSELF ON THIS POINT.

#### 9. DATE OF FIRST SESSION

--KIMCHE ASKED WHEN THE LEBANESE PROPOSED TO START THE FORMAL TALKS. FATTAL REPLIED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT WAS AGREED INFORMALLY THAT WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, MIGHT BE FEASIBLE IF AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES WAS REACHED.

#### 10. PACE OF TALKS

--FATTAL AND KIMCHE AGREED THAT THE TALKS SHOULD BE INTENSIVE, BUT WITH INTERVALS FOR CONSULTATIONS. MONDAYS AND WEDNESDAYS WERE CHOSEN AS NEGOTIATING DAYS, AT LEAST INITIALLY, WITH SESSIONS TO BEGIN AT 0930 AND CONTINUE THROUGH THE DAY WITH A SHORT BREAK FOR LUNCH. (WE WILL PUSH LATER FOR AN ACCELERATED SCHEDULE).

#### 11. SIZE OF DELEGATIONS

--FATTAL AND KIMCHE AGREED THAT EACH DELEGATION WOULD NUMBER ABOUT FIVE OR SIX. KIMCHE TOLD FATTAL THE ISRAELI DELEGATION WOULD CONSIST OF KIMCHE HIMSELF, MFA LEGAL ADVISER RUBINSTEIN, GENERAL TAMIR, GENERAL BROUK (IDF CHIEF OF PLANNING), PLUS ONE OR TWO OTHERS FROM THE MFA.

#### 12. SUBCOMMITTEES

--FATTAL AND KIMCHE AGREED THAT THE PLENARY WOULD CREATE SUBCOMMITTEES TO DEAL WITH SPECIALIZED ISSUES ONCE THE APPROPRIATE POLITICAL DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN.

#### 13. LANGUAGE OF PROCEEDINGS

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1110  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1096  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1346  
AMCONSUL JERUSALFM IMMEDIATE 1355  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 1084  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 201  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 395  
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 408  
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 403  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1566  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 BEIRUT 8242

-- TATTAL AND KIMCHE AGREED THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WOULD BE IN ENGLISH. FATTAL SAID THE LEBANESE WOULD PROVIDE FRENCH-ENGLISH INTERPRETATION TO TAKE CARE OF THOSE LEBANESE WHO FOUND FRENCH EASIER.

14. PRESS RELATIONS

-- KIMCHE AND FATTAL HAD AN INCONCLUSIVE EXCHANGE ON HOW TO HANDLE THE PRESS. BOTH RECOGNIZED THAT THE PRESS WAS IMPORTANT IN THEIR COUNTRIES, BUT, BEYOND AGREEING THAT THEY NEEDED TO COORDINATE THEIR APPROACHES, THEY SET NO GUIDELINES. FATTAL TOLD KIMCHE THE LEBANESE WOULD PLAN TO PUT OUT A COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING EACH SESSION BUT WOULD NOT HAVE AN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN. KIMCHE GAVE NO INDICATION OF HOW THE ISRAELIS PLANNED TO DEAL WITH THE PRESS.

15. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

-- COLONEL ABU FARHAT PROPOSED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY CONTROL THE MEETING SITE AND ITS IMMEDIATE ENVIRONS AND THAT THE IDF, WHICH IN A FORMAL SENSE STILL OCCUPIES THE AREA, CONTROL THE HEIGHTS OVERLOOKING THE HOTEL. ABU FARHAT IS TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE IDF LIAISON OFFICER

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SIT: RDTG KEM  
EOR:  
WHSR COMMENT:



ON THIS ISSUE. IT WAS AGREED, MEANWHILE, THAT KIMCHE AND LEOR WOULD VISIT THE LEBANON BEACH HOTEL, THE MEETING PLACE PROPOSED BY THE LEBANESE. (THEY DID SO NOV. 14 IN ROSS'S COMPANY.)

16 GENERAL STATEMENTS OF POSITION: OPENING ROUND  
KIMCHE PRESENTED THE MAIN LINES OF ISRAELI'S POSITION AS IT MOVES TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS:

-- ISRAEL SEEKS A STRONG LEBANON. IT HAS NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS OF ANY KIND. SINCE LEBANON IS IN FACT TRYING TO STRENGTHEN ITSELF, THERE IS A SOLID BASE OF MUTUAL INTEREST THAT WILL FAVOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- ISRAEL IS SENSITIVE TO THE PROBLEMS LEBANON FACES AND HAS NO WISH TO EXACERBATE THEM. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT TOO HAS PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY WITH A PUBLIC THAT WANTS TO SEE CONCRETE RESULTS -- BEYOND THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT -- FROM THE COSTLY ACTION UNDERTAKEN IN LEBANON.

-- ISRAEL IS CONVINCED THE PLO WILL TRY TO RETURN TO LEBANON AND WANTS TO WORK WITH LEBANON TO PREVENT THIS. IT WILL THEREFORE GIVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO THE CREATION OF ARRANGEMENTS TO BAR THE RETURN OF HOSTILE ELEMENTS TO SOUTHERN LEBANON.

-- TO GUARANTEE THESE ARRANGEMENTS, ISRAEL WILL ALSO SEEK A CERTAIN NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. IT OF COURSE WANTS A PEACE TREATY, BUT KNOWS THAT LEBANON WOULD HAVE PROBLEMS SIGNING ONE AT THIS TIME. THIS WILL REMAIN A GOAL TO BE ACHIEVED "SOME DAY," NOT AT THE POINT OF A GUN, BUT WHEN LEBANON IS FREE TO SIGN.

17. FATTAL RESPONDED DIRECTLY TO KIMCHE'S POINTS:

-- A PEACE TREATY IS FOR THE MOMENT IMPOSSIBLE. LEBANON'S IDEAL IS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A TREATY, BUT IT CANNOT DO SO AT PRESENT FOR REASONS BOTH OF INTERNAL SECURITY (THE DIVERSITY OF REACTIONS WITHIN THE LEBANESE BODY POLITIC, NOT TO MENTION THE RESIDUAL PLO PRESENCE) AND EXTERNAL SECURITY (SYRIA IS A NEIGHBOR IN FERMENT, AND COULD BE TROUBLESOME). LEBANON WANTS TO BECOME ISRAEL'S "MEDIATOR" IN THE ARAB WORLD, AS IT HAS BEEN FOR OTHERS, BUT A PEACE TREATY SHOULD NOT BE RUSHED.

-- ON NORMALIZATION, EVERYTHING WILL DEPEND ON THE CONTENT ISRAEL GIVES THAT TERM. HERE, TOO, PRUDENCE AND A DELIBERATE PACE ARE REQUIRED. PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT ACCEPT A HIGHLY VISIBLE, "FLASHY," NORMALIZATION. THIS CAN BE EXAMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT LEBANON WILL BE ABLE TO GO VERY FAR AT THE BEGINNING.

-- ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, ISRAEL HAS EVERY RIGHT TO WANT AND DEMAND THESE. LEBANON WILL PROVIDE ALL POS-

SIBLE ASSURANCES. WITH US HELP, IT WILL RESTRUCTURE ITS ARMY RAPIDLY TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND ON ALL OF LEBANON'S BORDERS. IN ADDITION, IT IS CONSIDERING THE CREATIN OF A COAST GUARD AND FRONTIER GUARD ON THE ECUPTIAN MODEL. LEBANON WILL MAKE CONSIDERABLE EFFECTS IN THIS DOMAIN.

18. GENERAL STATEMENTS ON POSITION: ROUND TWO  
KIMCHE RETURNED BRIEFLY TO THE THEME OF NORMALIZATION:

-- HAVING FOUGHT IN LEBANON SINCE JUNE 6 AND INCURRED NUMBEROUS DEATHS, ISRAFL DOES NOT WANT TO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUD ANTE. IT WILL RETURN NEITHER TO THE FORMULA OF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION NOR TO THE REGIME OF THE "IRON CURTAIN" ON THE BORDER. TOO MUCH HAS HAPPENED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SINCE 1976. WHILE ISRAEL DOES NOT INSIST ON A PEACHE TREATY, IT WANTS THE KINDS OF CONTACTS AND LINKS THAT TAKE THE NEW SITUATION AND MUTUAL INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT.

-- LEBANON SHOULD BE ABLE TO TELL THE ARABS AND LEBANESE MUSLIMS THAT A NEW SITUATION EXISTS AND MUST BE RECOGNIZED. IN EGYPT, AN EMBASSY EXISTS. WITH JURDAN, MANY FORMS OF PRAGMATIC COOPERATION OCCUR. IF LEBANON CAN OVERCOME THE EVIDENCE OF ANEW SITUATION, THERE MIGHT BE SOME INITIAL PROTESTS, BUT THE ARAB WORLD WOULD IN THE END COME AROUND.

-- IN SHURT, Z LEBANON AND ISRAEL MUST WORK TOGETHER TO FIND THE MEANS TO DO THE MAXIMUM WITH THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF DAMAGE."

19. FATTAL, IN A BRIEF REJDINDER, AGREED THAT KIMCHE'S FORMULA WAS A GOOD ONE. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT THE "DAMAGE" TO LEBANON COULD BE SUBSTANTIAL IF, FOR EXAMPLE, IT SUFFERED AN ARAB BOYCOTT AS EGYPT HAD. LEBANON DEPENDED ON THE ARAB ECONOMY, ANT IT COULD MAKE NO SACKRIFICFS IN THIS REGARD.

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1111  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1097  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1347  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1356  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 1085  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 202  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 396  
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 409  
AMEMBASSYROME PRIORITY 404  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1567  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 249

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 BEIRUT 8242

EXDIS  
FROM DRAPER

20. KIMCHE, UNCONVINCED, ARGUED THAT THE ARAB WORLD NEEDED LEBANON AS WELL. THE PRESENCE OF 300,000 LEBANESE WORKERS WAS IMPORTANT, AND THE ARAB STATES "WON'T DO ANYTHING TO DAMAGE THEIR INTERESTS" (SIC). SINCE THE ARAB WORLD WOULD NOT EASILY BOYCOTT LEBANON, MUCH COULD BE DONE IN THE WAY OF NORMALIZATION. KIMCHE HIGHLIGHTED WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE LATE BASHIR GEMAYEL'S PLANS FOR A PEACE TREATY WITHIN SIX TO NINE MONTHS AND FURTHER BUTTRESSED HIS ARGUMENTS BY ASSERTING THAT "A VERY GREAT FRACTION OF THE LEBANESE POPULATION WANTS CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL. THEY TELL US, "BE FIRM. DON'T WITHDRAW UNTIL YOU ACHIEVE THIS".

21. AT A DIFFERENT POINT IN THE MEETING, FATTAL URGED KIMCHE TO SEE THE ARMISTICE FRAMEWORK IN A POSITIVE LIGHT. FOR LEBANON, HE SAID, THE ARMISTICE HAD IN FACT ENDED THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW FORESAW DEFINITIVE ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS, NOT THE TRANSITIONAL ONES OF CLASSIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. HE

\* \* \* \* \*

SIT: RDTG KEMP  
EDR:  
WHSR COMMENT:

SAID LEBANON COULD EASILY REAFFIRM THAT NO STATE OF WAR EXISTED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS. HE HAD BEEN LOOKING AT THESE TO FIND WAYS TO INTEGRATE ISRAELI DESIRES INTO THEM. THIS WOULD MAKE THEM EASIER TO ACCEPT. FOR INSTANCE, A MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION ENLARGED TO INCLUDE CIVILIANS WAS TANTAMOUNT TO THE JOINT COMMISSION THE ISRAELIS WERE SEEKING. FURTHERMORE CERTAIN MEASURES OF NORMALIZATION COULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE ARMISTICE FRAMEWORK, SINCE THE 1948 AGREEMENT FORESAW A TRANSITION TO PERMANENT PEACE. THE IDEAL, FATTAL SAID, WAS A NEUTRAL LEBANON.

22. WHILE KIMCHE AGREED THAT A NEUTRAL LEBANON WOULD BE A GOOD THING, HE WARNED THAT ANY SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO INJECT THE OLD ARMISTICE FRAMEWORK INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BRING THEM TO IMMEDIATE CRISIS. ANY TALK OF THE ARMISTICE FRAMEWORK WOULD, HE EXCLAIMED, BE A RED FLAG. IT HAD TO BE REPLACED BY SOMETHING ELSE.

23. GENERAL STATEMENTS OF POSITION: FINAL POINTS IN A CLOSING STATEMENT, KIMCHE HAD SEVERAL POINTS, OLD AND NEW, TO MAKE.

--THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SOUTH. THESE ARE TO BE CONTAINED IN A FORMAL AGREEMENT ON SECURITY AND NORMALIZATION SIGNED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AT THE END OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS. (FATTAL DID NOT DEMUR.)

--THE BALL IS IN THE LEBANESE COURT ON THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN FORCES. ONCE THE PLD HAS DEPARTED, ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES CAN EFFECT A FIRST-PHASE PULLBACK, THE ISRAELIS TO THE 45-50 KM. SECURITY ZONE, THE SYRIANS TO THE BEKAA. (FATTAL INTERJECTED THAT SUCH A PULLBACK WOULD BE VERY USEFUL, SINCE IT WOULD ALLOW THE LEBANESE TO GO FURTHER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.)

--ISRAEL DID NOT ATTACK LEBANON, BUT LAUNCHED AN OPERATION AGAINST THE PLD AND SYRIA. IT HAS NOTHING AGAINST LEBANON, AND DOES NOT WANT THE PLD TO RETURN TO ITS TERRITORY. (FATTAL AGREED ENTIRELY.)

--ISRAEL WILL NOT WANT TO SEE ANY INTERNATIONAL FORCES (EITHER UNIFIL OR MNF) IN THE SECURITY ZONE OF SOUTHERN LEBANON. (FATTAL INTERJECTED THAT ON THIS POINT LEBANON WOULD SURELY BE IN DISAGREEMENT.)

24. COMMENT: WHILE THIS LONG-AWAITED FIRST MEETING WAS HELD IN A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE, ITS RESULTS WERE LIMITED. ON THE MAJOR ISSUE OF CHAIRMANSHIP/LEVEL, FATTAL WAS UNABLE TO MAKE A DECISION, FORCING AT LEAST TWO DAYS' DELAY IN THE PROCESS OF GETTING THE NEGOTIATIONS GOING. THE ISRAELIS, WHO FELT THEY HAD MADE A

REAL CONCESSION IN AGREEING TO KHALDAH, WERE SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED, BUT WE FOUND THE LEBANESE DELAY PREDICTABLE AT THIS EARLY STAGE IN THE DISCUSSIONS. GEMAYEL WILL CLEARLY WANT TO DEAL WITH ALL CONTENTIOUS DECISIONS, AND CHAIRMANSHIP AND VENUE ARE CERTAINLY CONTENTIOUS. IT IS EVEN CONCEIVABLE THAT HE PLANS TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED ISRAELI COMPROMISE WITH THE SAUDIS DURING HIS NOVEMBER 14-15 TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA.

25. WE CONTINUE TO BE OPTIMISTIC, PROVIDED THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE NOT FRIGHTENED GEMAYEL INTO A HARDER POSITION THAN HE HAS UP TO NOW BEEN READY TO ASSUME. FATTAL SHUT NO DOORS, BUT CONTINUED THE LEBANESE EMPHASIS ON THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS. HIS MANS OF AGREEMENT AND BODY LANGUAGE INDICATED A SYMPATHY FOR MUCH OF WHAT KIMCHE WAS SAYING. FROM OUR EARLIER DISCUSSIONS WITH GEMAYEL AND OTHERS, WE BELIEVE THAT A "LEBANESE" SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND ON THE PROBLEM OF CHAIRMANSHIP. THEN, FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS CAN BEGIN.

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~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 03608

EXDIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. I HAVE NOW BEEN TO LEBANON, SYRIA AND ISRAEL PURSUING AN ELUSIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE SUBSEQUENT RESTORATION OF LEBANESE INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY. I STARTED OUT HAVING IN MIND GETTING AT LEAST SOME SORT OF VIABLE AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL BY THE END OF THE YEAR.
3. IT IS CLEAR THAT A STARTING POINT IS GETTING ISRAEL AND LEBANON TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. AT THE SAME TIME LEBANON MUST OPEN A SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO ABOUT THEIR WITHDRAWAL. THE LEBANESE PRESIDENT RESPONDED QUITE FAVORABLY TO OUR URGING ON THESE POINTS, POINTING OUT THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GO A LONG WAY TO SATISFY ISRAELI DEMANDS, AND WAS PREPARED TO OPEN TALKS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO WITHOUT DELAY. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WERE CLEAR LIMITS ON HIS FREEDOM OF ACTION BY VIRTUE OF HIS INTERNAL POLITICAL NEEDS AND THE EXTERNAL PRESSURES FROM ARAB NATIONS WHOM HE CANNOT AFFORD TO ALIENATE. NEVERTHELESS, I LEFT LEBANON FEELING THAT AS FAR AS GEMAYEL AND HIS GOVERNMENT WERE CONCERNED THE OBSTACLES TO MEETING VALID ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO CONCERNS WERE NOT SO GREAT AS TO BE UNSURMOUNTABLE IN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME.
4. IN SYRIA THE PROGRESS BEGAN TO CHANGE. THE SYRIANS ARE PREPARED TO LEAVE LEBANON, BUT THEY ARE EXTREMELY WARY OF WHAT THEY SEE AS ISRAELI DEMANDS WHICH WILL THREATEN SYRIAN SECURITY AND LEAD TO WHAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER AS UNACCEPTABLE ISRAELI INFLUENCE IN LEBANON. THUS MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE TERMS OF ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT AND THE NATURE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD BRING ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THIS PLACED CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF AT LEAST BEGINNING ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS SO THAT THE OUTCOME WOULD BECOME MORE CLEAR.
5. IN ISRAEL, DESPITE A STRONG ARGUMENT FOR A COMMON

*File  
Lebanon  
Phase II*

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F92-106/2#175

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/25/02

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PAGE 02 OF 02 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3608 DTG: 260831Z NOV 82 PSN: 024579

SENSE APPROACH TO OVERCOME THE PROCEDURAL IMPASSE, WE WERE NOT ABLE TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITHOUT DELAY. THE ISRAELIS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE IN ANY HURRY AT ALL TO GET OUT OF LEBANON, AND MAY WAIT OUT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL UNTIL HE MEETS THEIR PROCEDURAL CLAIM TO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS AND JERUSALEM AS A PARTIAL VENUE. I ALSO BELIEVE THIS POINTS TO THE PROBABILITY THAT ISRAELI SUBSTANTIVE DEMANDS WILL NOT BE EASILY MODERATED TO MEET WHAT GEMAYEL HAS DESCRIBED AS HIS ABSOLUTE NEEDS. SHARON SEEMS DETERMINED TO EXTRACT THE FULL BENEFIT OF ISRAEL'S INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON AND THUS JUSTIFY THE COSTS. SO FAR HE HAS CARRIED THE DAY WITH BEGIN.

6. WE NOW MUST AWAIT THE ISRAELI CABINET MEETING DUE ON SUNDAY, TO GET THEIR RESPONSE TO GEMAYEL'S LATEST POSITION WHICH WE OUTLINED TO THEM YESTERDAY. I DO NOT EXPECT ANY SUBSTANTIAL GIVE AS A RESULT. DRAPER WILL INFORM GEMAYEL OF THE STATUS AND SEEK HIS REACTION. HOW FAR THE LEBANESE CAN GO TO MEET THE ISRAELI PROCEDURAL DEMANDS, AND TO WHAT EXTENT THAT WILL LEAD TO SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT, IS GOING TO DEPEND ON GEMAYEL'S ESTIMATE OF HOW MUCH LEEWAY HE CAN EXTRACT FROM HIS PRECARIOUS POLITICAL CONSENSUS AND NOT THREATEN HIS RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB NATIONS, ESPECIALLY SYRIA. SO FAR HE HAS SHOWN A FAIR DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY BUT HE DOES HAVE REAL LIMITS ON HIM. WE WILL HAVE A BETTER IDEA IN A FEW DAYS WHEN WE SHALL CONSIDER WHAT WE CAN DO TO MOVE THINGS ALONG. GROVE  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 17952

EXDIS  
FROM AMBASSADOR LEWIS; ROME FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB, BEIRUT  
FOR AMBASSADOR DRAPER  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, PLO, LE, SY, US, IS  
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: STEPS TO BREAK THE IMPASSE  
IN ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS  
REFS: A. BEIRUT 8860, B. TEL AVIV 17920

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.  
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2. MORRIE DRAPER'S PERCEPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISRAELI POSITION (REF A) DOVETAILS REASONABLY WELL WITH OUR OWN (REF B). I AGREE THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE VIRTUALLY NO ROOM FOR GIVE ON THE ISRAELI SIDE--PARTICULARLY ON THE ISSUE OF TALKS IN JERUSALEM--FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS INCLUDING IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND THE IMPETUS (UNWANTED) AN IDF WITHDRAWAL WOULD GIVE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE.

3. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL IS REVERTING "TO AN EARLIER THESIS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SMALL CHRISTIAN STATE. . . AND THE DIVISION OF THE REST OF THE COUNTRY INTO ISRAELI AND SYRIAN PROTECTORATES." TO THE CONTRARY, THE EVIDENCE HERE IS THAT THIS IDEA HAS VERY LITTLE SUPPORT.



*C/k*  
*File Leb. Phase II*

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BY *SM* NARA DATE 11/28/08

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
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BY *SM*

11/25/08



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4. I AGREE THAT OUR OPTIONS AT THIS POINT ARE LIMITED AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STARTING NEGOTIATIONS SOON ARE BLEAK, UNLESS AMIN COMES BACK WITH ANOTHER COUNTERPROPOSAL. (KIMCHE TOLD ME THAT THEY HEAR VIA THEIR "PARALLEL CHANNEL" THAT SUCH A FURTHER LEBANESE PROPOSAL IS BEING WORKED ON IN BEIRUT.) I CAN HOLD OUT LITTLE HOPE FOR SHIFTING THE VENUE TO EUROPE, AND NONE FOR MOVING TO A SIXTH FLEET VESSEL. NOW THAT THE JERUSALEM ISSUE IS IN THE SPOTLIGHT, IT MUST BE FACTORED IN AT SOME POINT, EITHER "IN PRINCIPLE" OR THROUGH A LEBANESE COMMITMENT TO MEET THERE LATER, PERHAPS FOR A FINAL WRAP-UP SESSION.

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5. DIRECT INTERVENTION BY THE PRESIDENT IS AN OBVIOUS POSSIBLE NEXT STEP TO NUDGE BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE LEBANESE. TIME IS SHORT AND THE ATTEMPT ON WALID JUMBLATT'S LIFE YESTERDAY ONLY UNDERSCORES THE DANGER OF THE LEBANESE INTERNAL SITUATION. HOWEVER, THE TIMING HERE IS TRICKY. TO BRING UP OUR HEAVIEST ARTILLERY PREMATURELY CAN PRODUCE AN UNNECESSARY FAILURE, EMBARRASSMENT, FURTHER HARDENING OF THE ISRAELI POSITION, AND FRUITLESS CONFRONTATION. BEFORE THE PRESIDENT INTERVENES, IT WOULD BE BEST TO LET THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS IMPASSE SINK IN HERE A BIT MORE, REINFORCED BY THE OMINOUS HINTS ALREADY COMING THROUGH FROM KEN DAM'S SFRC TESTIMONY AND OTHER MORE ANONYMOUS WASHINGTON VOICES. IF THE LEBANESE WERE TO OFFER ANOTHER COUNTERPROPOSAL IN THE MEANTIME IT WOULD GREATLY HELP.

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6. THE MOST PROMISING APPROACH FOR A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE WOULD, IN MY VIEW, BE AN APPEAL TO BOTH BEGIN AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO GET THE TALKS GOING FORTHWITH, STRESSING  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 17952

EXDIS

THE PRESIDENT'S DISAPPOINTMENT AND DEEP PERSONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPASSE. ALTHOUGH BEGIN HAS NOW STAKED OUT HIS POSITION IN PUBLIC ON A JERUSALEM VENUE, ECHOING SHARON, I RECOMMEND THAT WE EXTEND AN INVITATION TO THE CIVILIAN CHAIRMEN OF THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE NEGOTIATING GROUPS TO GO TO WASHINGTON TO GET THE "PRELIMINARY" TALKS GOING, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF HABIE OR DRAPER. (THE CHAIRMEN WOULD, OF COURSE, BE FATTAL AND PROBABLY KIMCHE BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED BY NAME IN THE INVITATION TO AVOID INTERJECTING OURSELVES INTO THE SHARON-MFA TUG OF WAR.) IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD INFORMALLY, IF NOT SPECIFICALLY STATED, THAT THESE TALKS WOULD BEGIN TO ADDRESS SUBSTANCE AS WELL AS FORM, AND COULD ALSO DEAL WITH WAYS IN WHICH THE JERUSALEM ISSUE MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE HANDLED IN A LATER PHASE.

7. IN SHORT, WE NEED A POINTED BUT SUBTLE APPEAL TO BOTH BEGIN AND GEMAYEL. WE HAVE ALREADY EXERTED CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC PRESSURE IN RECENT DAYS ON THE ISRAELIS, WHO ARE BEGINNING TO BRISTLE OVER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TO THWART CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE ISRAEL'S ASSISTANCE PACKAGE. OVERT REFERENCES TO PRESSURE IN A HIGH-LEVEL MESSAGE AT THIS POINT WILL FORCE BEGIN AND SHARON TO DIG IN THEIR HEELS FURTHER. THEY ARE ACUTELY AWARE OF THE MOOD IN WASHINGTON AND WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT, THOUGH UNFORTUNATELY NOT IMPROBABLE, TO RESIST A SUGGESTION FROM THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY THAT ISRAELI OFFICIALS TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON FOR TALKS WITH US AS WELL AS WITH THE LEBANESE. THIS IS NOT AN IDEAL APPROACH, BUT IT IS, I BELIEVE, THE WISEST AND MOST PROMISING AT THIS JUNCTURE. LEWIS

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 09083

NLS F97-106/2 #177

EXDIS  
MILAD HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
DEPARTMENT PASS AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER; CINCEUR FOR POLAD  
FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, MARR, LE, SY, IS, PLO, US  
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: LEBANESE POSITION ON EVE OF  
- US CONSULTATIONS

BY *Amj* NARA, DATE 11/25/02

1. (~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: BEFORE DEPARTING FOR WASHINGTON, AMBASSADOR DRAPER MET INTENSIVELY WITH LEBANESE LEADERSHIP TO GAIN FULLEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING OF LEBANESE POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. DECEMBER 6 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, AND PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR TUENI HIGHLIGHTED LEBANESE INSISTENCE ON RAPID PROGRESS ON BASIS OF DECISIVE US ACTION. GEMAYEL AND WAZZAN IN PARTICULAR WARNED OF DANGER OF FURTHER DELAY FOR BOTH LEBANON AND US. WHILE LEBANESE FURTHER REFINED THEIR POSITION ON VENUE DURING MEETINGS, THEY DREW LINE AT ACCEPTING JERUSALEM. THEY ALSO ARGUED FOR SIGNIFICANT WORK ON SUBSTANCE BEFORE MEETINGS EVER TOOK PLACE, EITHER THROUGH SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY OR THROUGH SOME KIND OF COMPREHENSIVE PLAN. THEY SHOWED INTENSE INTEREST IN PRECISE FORM OF ANY NEW SIGNED DOCUMENT THAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS, AND FINALLY EVEN WAZZAN APPEARED TO ACQUIESCE IN INEVITABILITY OF SUCH A DOCUMENT. LEBANESE POSITIONS ON SEVERAL SPECIFIC ISSUES -- BORDER ARRANGEMENTS AND SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT OF ISRAELI-LEBANESE RELATIONS IN FUTURE, OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION, HADDAD'S FORCES, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE STATIONS, AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA AND PLO -- WERE FURTHER

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PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 9083

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3. IN PREPARATION FOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON, AMBASSADOR DRAPER HELD AN INTENSIVE ROUND OF TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP DEC. 3-6. ON DEC. 2, HE AND ROSS MET WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER TUENI. ON DEC. 3, HE AND ROSS MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, TUENI, AND AMBASSADOR FATTAL. ON DEC. 6, JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ROSS, HE MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, SALEM AND TUENI. WAZZAN'S PRESENCE AT THE LAST MEETING WAS ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT IN THAT IT PERMITTED GEMAYEL AND DRAPER TO BRING WAZZAN ALONG ON SEVERAL ISSUES, PARTICULARLY THE NEED FOR A NEW SIGNED DOCUMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AT THE END OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THESE THREE MEETINGS ARE OUTLINED BELOW.

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4. LEBANESE MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AT THE DEC. 6 MEETING, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM PRESENTED WHAT HE CALLED "OUR MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN" ON THE OCCASION OF DRAPER'S DEPARTURE:  
-- DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON MUST START NOW. THEY CANNOT WAIT FOR BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. US PRESTIGE IS AT STAKE.  
-- LET THE US, IF IT WISHES, CALL FOR LEBANESE-ISRAELI TALKS TO BE HELD ANYWHERE BUT IN JERUSALEM.  
-- LET THE US SUGGEST, IF IT WISHES, THAT ALL DELEGATIONS BE HALF MILITARY, HALF CIVILIAN, WITH ONE US CHAIRMAN.  
-- THE LEBANESE PROBLEM CANNOT BE LINKED TO THAT OF THE MIDDLE EAST.  
-- THE US SHOULD COMMIT ITSELF TO DISCUSS SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL WITH SYRIA AND THE OTHER ARAB STATES.  
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USLO RIYADH PRIORITY 0494  
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0498  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0287  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 BEIRUT 09083

EXDIS

-- THE US SHOULD GUARANTEE LEBANON'S COMMITMENT TO MAKE LEBANON SAFE FOR ALL OF ITS NEIGHBORS.  
-- IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE PRESIDENT TO REAFFIRM THAT THE US WILL NOT PERMIT ANY PROLONGED OCCUPATION, SETTLEMENTS, ZONE OF INFLUENCE, OR PROTECTORATE BY ISRAEL OR SYRIA.  
-- LIKewise, IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE PRESIDENT TO REAFFIRM THAT LEBANON IS A FRIEND, THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS A GOOD FRIEND, AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS BECOMING STRONGER AND PROCEEDING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.  
-- FROM A HUMANITARIAN POINT OF VIEW, LEBANON SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE ALLOWED TO SUFFER ANY OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.  
-- (ADDED BY TUENI AT THE END OF THE MEETING) THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S STAND ON THE PROPOSED INCREASE IN AID TO ISRAEL.

5. NEED FOR FIRM AND RAPID US ACTION  
THE MAJOR COMMON THEME OF DRAPER'S THREE MEETINGS WAS THE NEED FOR RAPID RESULTS THROUGH FIRM US ACTION. GEMAYEL EXPRESSED THIS MOST ELOQUENTLY AT THE DECEMBER 6 MEETING:  
-- THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE SITUATION HAS BECOME VERY DANGEROUS. IT WAS READY TO GO A LONG WAY AND HAD PRESENTED VERY POSITIVE PROPOSALS, BUT EVERY TIME IT MADE A CONCESSION, ISRAEL PRESENTED A NEW CONDITION. IT HAS THEREFORE DECIDED TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT POSITION (AGAINST TALKS IN BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM), ESPECIALLY SINCE THE US HAD SHOWN UNDERSTANDING.  
-- LEBANON NOW EXPECTS THE US EITHER TO APPLY REAL PRESSURE TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO AGREE TO A COMPROMISE

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PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 9083

DTG: 071709Z DEC 82 PSN: 027235

ON VENUE OR TO PRESENT NEW US IDEAS.  
-- NO TIME SHOULD BE WASTED, SINCE TIME IS NOT ON  
LEBANON'S SIDE. THE SITUATION IN THE 'ALAYH AND  
SHUF DISTRICTS IS VERY DANGEROUS. IN THE SOUTH,  
THERE IS A TOTAL ABSENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL; FOR  
THE FIRST TIME, EVEN THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ITSELF  
HAS BEEN REPLACED BY DIRECT ISRAELI CONTROL. IN  
THE ECONOMIC FIELD, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ILLEGAL  
PORTS ARE BECOMING VERY HARMFUL. LEBANON WANTS TO  
WORK CLOSELY WITH THE US TO QUICKEN THE PACE OF THE  
NEGOTIATING EFFORT.

6. WAZZAN VOICED THE SAME CONCERNS, ADDING THAT IT  
WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWALS  
IF ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WERE NOT ARRANGED. THE US, HE  
EMPHASIZED, IS THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION. FURTHERMORE,  
ITS ATTITUDE ON LEBANON WILL BE THE TOUCHSTONE NOT  
ONLY FOR THE FUTURE OF THAT COUNTRY, BUT ALSO FOR THE  
MIDDLE EAST QUESTION. ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN  
WORDS, AND HOW COULD IT SUCCEED IN DEALING WITH THE  
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS IF IT DID NOT SUCCEED IN LEBANON?

7. IN ALL THREE MEETINGS, THE LEBANESE STRESSED  
THAT THEY WERE WAITING FOR THE US TO COME FORWARD  
WITH USEFUL PROPOSALS. IF IT PROVED UNABLE TO DO  
SO, LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO MOVE FORWARD ON ITS OWN  
BY EXPLORING VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES, SUCH AS RECOURSE  
TO THE UN OR UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS OF VARIOUS  
SORTS. IF IT CAME TO THAT, LEBANON WOULD STILL WEL-  
COME CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US.

8. DRAPER EMPHASIZED AT ALL THREE MEETINGS THAT THE  
LEBANESE CONCERNS WERE AT THE HEART OF THE WASHINGTON  
CONSULTATIONS THAT HE AND AMBASSADOR HABIB WERE  
ABOUT TO UNDERTAKE. THE NEED FOR RAPID MOVEMENT AND

LEBANON'S EXPECTATION THAT THE US WOULD MOVE DECISIVELY  
WOULD FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH  
THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.  
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PAGE 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 9083  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0394

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1236  
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1724  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1249  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1203  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 1203  
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9. FURTHER REFINEMENT ON LEBANESE POSITION ON VENUE AT THE DECEMBER 2 AND 3 MEETINGS, THE LEBANESE FURTHER REFINED THEIR POSITION ON VENUE. THEY COULD ACCEPT GENEVA, PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, AND EVEN CAIRO (IF MUBARAK TOOK THE INITIATIVE), BUT NOT ATHENS OR CYPRUS. THEY COULD ALSO ACCEPT KHALDAH AND A SUBURB OF ISRAELI JERUSALEM, BUT ONLY IF THE ISRAELIS COMMITTED THEMSELVES NOT TO ADVERTISE THAT THE MEETINGS WERE IN FACT BEING HELD INSIDE THE JERUSALEM CITY LIMITS. THEY COULD, OF COURSE, ACCEPT KHALDAH AND ANY OTHER SIMILAR TOWN IN ISRAEL.

10. WHEN, AT THE DECEMBER 3 MEETING, DRAPER AGAIN RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT, IF PRIOR NEGOTIATIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL, THE FINAL TWO SESSIONS BE HELD IN BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM, AS GEMAYEL HAD ONCE INTIMATED. TUENI QUICKLY PULLED THAT OPENING OFF THE TABLE, CLARIFYING THAT GEMAYEL HAD MEANT THAT MEETINGS IN JERUSALEM WOULD BE ALL RIGHT ONCE THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD WAS RIGHT. SALEM INDICATED THE LEBANESE COULD GO NO FURTHER THAN TO SAY THEY WOULD GIVE SUCH A PROPOSAL "SERIOUS CONSIDERATION" IN THE LIGHT OF ARAB ATTITUDES. HE WAS CAREFUL TO HIGHLIGHT THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF KING HASSAN, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JERUSALEM COMMITTEE. ON THIS POINT, TUENI FOLLOWED SUIT, CITING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SYRIANS, THE PLO, AND EVEN THE VATICAN ON THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM.

11. NEED FOR PRELIMINARY WORK ON SUBSTANCE AT ALL THREE MEETINGS, THE LEBANESE WARNED THAT, EVEN IF THE IMPASSE ON VENUE COULD BE BROKEN, A LOT OF GROUND WOULD HAVE TO HAVE BEEN COVERED BEFORE THE

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MEETINGS STARTED. OTHERWISE, THEY RAN THE RISK OF BREAKING DOWN. TUENI STRESSED DEC. 2 THAT THE LEBANESE COULD EVEN REVIEW THE SPECIFIC WORDING OF COMMITMENTS IN ADVANCE TO MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS. ON DEC. 3, SALEM RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY TO DO THIS, AND ON DEC. 6 THE LEBANESE SEIZED ON DRAPER'S PASSING MENTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME KIND OF "PLAN" AKIN TO THE AUGUST PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO AND SYRIANS FROM WEST BEIRUT AS BEING, IN TUENI'S WORDS, "VERY REASONABLE." IN SPITE OF LEBANESE PRODDING, DRAPER AVOIDED ANY DETAILED DISCUSSION OF ANY "PLAN," DESCRIBING IT SIMPLY AS ONE WAY OF MELDING POSITIONS ON WHICH AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED, PERHAPS IN WRITING. TO FORM THE BASIS OF NEW UNDERTAKINGS. THE LEBANESE, TUENI IN PARTICULAR, PRESSED HARD ON THE TIMING AND "MECHANISM OF IMPLEMENTATION" (I.E., GUARANTEES AND ASSURANCES) OF ANY SUCH PLAN. AGAIN, DRAPER AVOIDED DETAILED DISCUSSION, INDICATING MERELY THAT ANY PLAN COULD HAVE PORTIONS THAT WOULD BE SELF-EXECUTING AND OTHERS THAT WOULD REQUIRE THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO ACT. SALEM EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT DISCUSSION OF A PLAN COULD PROCEED MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS AND OFFERED TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE FOR PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

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12. FORM OF FINAL AGREEMENT  
MUCH OF THE DECEMBER 6 MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO EXAMINING THE POLITICAL "PRICE" THAT LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO PAY TO OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. GEMAYEL, SPECIFICALLY, WANTED TO KNOW WHERE ON THE SPECTRUM BETWEEN AN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND A PEACE TREATY THE FINAL AGREEMENT WOULD STAND. DRAPER INDICATED THAT THE MOST OBVIOUS SIGNED AGREEMENT WOULD BE AN UNDERTAKING TO END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY AND FORMALIZING OTHER AGREED ARRANGEMENTS. GEMAYEL EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD BE LIMITED MERELY TO NON-BELLIGERENCY AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS; THE ISRAELIS WOULD WANT A PEACE TREATY IN ALL BUT NAME. WAZZAN ARGUED THAT ANY AGREEMENT BE MERELY AN EXPANSION OF THE EXISTING ARMISTICE ACCORD, AT LEAST UNTIL THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION HAD BEEN SOLVED AND THE ARMISTICE ACCORDS SUPERSEDED. TUENI BRUIED THE IDEA OF BRINGING THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS INTO EFFECT THROUGH EXCHANGES OF LETTERS WITH THE US. DRAPER MADE IT  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 BEIRUT 09083

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CLEAR IN THE GIVE AND TAKE THAT, WHATEVER THE PRECISE FORM, A NEW DOCUMENT SIGNED BY BOTH THE LEBANESE AND THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO EMERGE. EVEN WAZZAN -- TO WHOM GEMAYEL SAID AT ONE POINT, "SPARE ME ANY MORE TALK ABOUT THE ARMISTICE ACCORD" -- SEEMED BY THE END OF THE MEETING TO HAVE ACQUIESCED IN THE NEED FOR A NEW SIGNED DOCUMENT.

13. EXAMINATION OF SPECIFIC ISSUES  
THE THREE MEETINGS GAVE DRAPER A CHANCE TO DEEPEN HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEBANESE POSITION ON A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ISSUES. AT THE DECEMBER 6 MEETING, HE COUPLED EXAMINATION OF THE SPECIFIC ISSUES WITH A REMINDER THAT LEBANON SHOULD REVIEW THE FEZ SUMMIT DECLARATION CAREFULLY, SINCE ONE CLAUSE GAVE THE ARAB STATES THE RIGHT TO DEFINE THEIR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. THIS, HE SAID, COULD BE USED TO COVER WHATEVER LEBANON DID WITH ISRAEL. SALEM IMMEDIATELY CAUTIONED THAT THERE WERE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THIS CLAUSE, AND THE SYRIAN REACTION MIGHT BE A PROBLEM. -- BORDER ARRANGEMENTS AND SECURITY: AT THE DEC. 3 MEETING, DRAPER PRESSED SALEM AND TUENI FOR A FULLER PRESENTATION OF THE LEBANESE POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN "INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE" ALONG THE BORDER. TUENI REPLIED THAT AT A MINIMUM LEBANON WANTED INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS. MORE DESIRABLE WERE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF A SYSTEM OF DETECTION. MOST DESIRABLE WOULD BE THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL OR MNF FORCES. SALEM ADDED THAT, IF THE ISRAELIS WANTED ANY DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION, THE LEBANESE WOULD WANT AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE. BASICALLY, HE SAID, THE LEBANESE WANTED AN INDEPENDENT BODY OF SOME KIND TO ADJUDICATE ANY DISPUTES OR ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS SO THAT THE

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1205  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 1205  
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AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0481  
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY 0497  
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0501  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0290  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 BEIRUT 09083

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TRANSFORMATION OF ANY PALESTINIAN INSTITUTIONS INTO  
MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WHILE THEY WOULD ALLOW HUMANI-  
TARIAN ACTIVITIES, THEY WOULD SUBORDINATE THE EXISTENCE  
AND LOCATIONS OF PALESTINIAN CAMPS TO LEBANESE SECURITY  
CONCERNS.

-- TALKS WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO: AT THE DEC. 6  
MEETING, DRAPER ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF TALKS  
WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO. TUENI SAID SOME TALKS HAD  
BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITH THE SYRIANS, BUT A VERY LOW  
PROFILE HAD BEEN MAINTAINED. GEMAYEL ADDED THAT  
LEBANON HAD BEGUN DOING WHAT IT MUST WITH BOTH THE  
SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS, BUT THE LACK OF PROGRESS  
ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL HAD DEADLOCKED THE  
OTHER TALKS.

14. COMMENT: AS A RESULT OF THIS ROUND OF TALKS,  
DRAPER IS RETURNING TO WASHINGTON WITH ALL THE MAJOR  
ELEMENTS OF THE LEBANESE POSITION AS IT NOW STANDS.  
WHILE THE LEBANESE ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF DISCOURAGEMENT,  
AS THE TONE AND SUBSTANCE OF SALEM'S "MESSAGE" FOR THE  
PRESIDENT SHOW, THEY REMAIN COMMITTED TO US SPONSOR-  
SHIP OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND ARE AWAITING ANY  
NEW IDEAS THAT THE US MAY PUT FORWARD IN A VERY  
POSITIVE AND EAGER SPIRIT. THEY DO REMAIN AFRAID,  
HOWEVER, OF ANY SIGNIFICANT DELAY IN GETTING THE NEGO-  
TIATING PROCESS STARTED. AT THE DEC. 3 MEETING,  
SALEM SPOKE CMINOUSLY OF THE RISK THAT SOUTH LEBANON  
WOULD BECOME ANOTHER "TERRITORY OF SETTLEMENT" AKIN  
TO THE WEST BANK IF MATTERS DRAGGED ON TOO LONG.  
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ISRAELIS WOULD NO LONGER BE BOTH JUDGE AND JURY, AS THEY HAD BEEN DURING "THE NIGHTMARE OF THE PAST." SALEM ALSO EMPHASIZED THE LEBANESE DESIRE THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS APPLY TO ALL OF LEBANON, ON BOTH THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN BORDERS.

-- MECHANISM FOR DEVELOPING ISRAELI-LEBANESE RELATIONS: AT BOTH THE DEC. 3 AND 6 MEETINGS, DRAPER UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR A PROCESS BY WHICH ISRAELI-LEBANESE RELATIONS COULD EVOLVE. GEMAYEL ASKED FOR A WRITTEN PROPOSAL ON THIS ISSUE.

-- OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION: AT THE DEC. 6 MEETING, DRAPER OFFERED THE US LIAISON OFFICE IN PEKING AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS MIGHT AGREE TO. GEMAYEL CONFIRMED THAT A LIAISON OFFICE COULD OPERATE IN LEBANON, ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT VERY WELL BE NO COUNTERPART OFFICE IN ISRAEL. THE MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE ALREADY EXISTED. HE NOTED, AND IT WOULD BE OBLIGED TO FOLLOW THE STATE OF RELATIONS. THERE WAS NO REASON WHY IT COULD NOT HAVE A FORMAL OFFICE.

-- HADDAD'S FORCES: AT THE DECEMBER 3 MEETING, SALEM DESCRIBED THE ARRANGEMENTS BEING CONTEMPLATED FOR SA'D HADDAD AND HIS FORCES -- THE FORMER LAF SOLDIERS WOULD BE REINTERGRATED; A "LEBANESE SOLUTION" WOULD BE FOUND FOR HADDAD AND THE OTHER LAF OFFICERS; THE NON-LAF PORTION OF HADDAD'S MILITIA WOULD BE DISSOLVED AND ABSORBED INTO LEBANESE SOCIETY. SOME MIGHT BE CONSCRIPTED UNDER THE NEW MILITARY SERVICE LAW.

-- ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE STATIONS: AT THE DECEMBER 3 MEETING, SALEM SAID THE PRESENCE OF ANY ISRAELI MILITARY PERSONNEL AT SUCH STATIONS WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. AT THE DEC. 6 MEETING, GEMAYEL SAID ANY SUCH STATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.

-- RESIDUAL PALESTINIAN ACTIVITIES: AT THE DEC. 3

MEETING, DRAPER ASKED WHAT THE LEBANESE INTENDED TO DO WITH RESIDUAL PALESTINIAN ACTIVITIES SUCH AS HOSPITALS. SALEM, IN AN IMPASSIONED RESPONSE, SAID THE LEBANESE HAD LEARNED TO BE VERY ALERT FOR THE  
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

December 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

WPC HAS SEEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP <sup>NGT FOR</sup>  
HOWARD J. TEICHER <sup>NGT</sup>

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F97-106/2-4178  
BY CLS NARA, DATE 4/7/06

SUBJECT: Lebanon Withdrawal

Secretary Dam is sending the President a memorandum tonight outlining proposed next steps for withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. We worked with State, OSD and JCS today and are in basic agreement with the approach. The memo calls for Phil and Morris to return to the Middle East next week, and, in a somewhat contrived fashion, present the proposals to Begin and then Gemayel. (Draper would first visit Beirut to stress the need for Lebanese talks with the Syrians and PLO.)

However, we are concerned about State's lack of a public affairs strategy, though Secretary Dam clearly appreciates the domestic considerations. Following Habib's meeting with the President, some of the ideas are likely to leak out causing political as well as diplomatic problems. (Alan Romberg thinks it is only a matter of days before the details will be out.)

If we want to take the initiative publicly, i.e., a Presidential statement or even a radio talk, we need to alert Begin and Gemayel (and possibly others) of our intentions in advance. This would have to be done before next Thursday when Phil first plans to meet with Begin, and probably before the President goes public.

We therefore recommend that you discuss with the President tomorrow the public dimensions of his initiatives, bearing in mind the growing criticism we face over lack of progress and the intense speculation that will be aroused as Phil exits the White House tomorrow.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you use the talking points at Tab I when you discuss the Dam memo with the President tomorrow.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Attachment:  
Tab I - Talking Points

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 8339  
SIT483 AN005800

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*Howard Teicher*

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 18339

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STATE PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE  
FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY, HABIB, VELIOTES AND DRAPER  
FROM LEWIS  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, PINT, LE, IS, US  
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN  
- MINISTER SHAMIR OVER LEBANON NEGOTIATING IMPASSE  
REF: A. TEL AVIV 18070 (NOTAL), B. HABIB/LEWIS SECURE  
TELCON 12/9/82

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.  
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2. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION. SHAMIR HOPES  
THAT THE U. S. WILL PROPOSE A NEUTRAL VENUE FOR  
THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, PREFERABLY IN EUROPE,  
AND SAYS THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT THERE IS A "BIG

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CHANCE OF SUCCESS" IF WE WILL DO SO. HE IS CLEARLY APPREHENSIVE ABOUT IMPENDING CONFRONTATION WITH WASHINGTON OVER LEBANON AND INSISTS IT IS NEEDLESS, SINCE HE IS "VERY OPTIMISTIC" THAT AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON CAN BE REACHED ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN A FAIRLY SHORT TIME IF ONLY WE PROPOSE A WAY AROUND THE VENUE IMPASSE. BECAUSE OF THE "ABSOLUTE JERUSALEM TABOO," IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ISRAELI CABINET TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE ITSELF TO GET OUT OF ITS SELF-CONSTRUCTED JERUSALEM BOX. SHAMIR'S OPTIMISM ABOUT POTENTIAL AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES STEMS FROM WHAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN HEARING IN VERY RECENT DAYS FROM THEIR LEBANESE CHRISTIAN FRIENDS ABOUT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S POSITIONS. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT HABIB PROPOSE CONVENING TRI-LATERAL NEGOTIATIONS PROMPTLY AT A NEUTRAL VENUE IN EUROPE, IN ADDITION TO PRESENTING OTHER ELEMENTS OF HIS PACKAGE TO BEGIN. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DIRECT FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR THE ISRAELIS, AND ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH VENUE FOR DIRECT TALKS WILL MAKE HABIB'S NEGOTIATING TASK HERE A GREAT DEAL HARDER.

END SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION.

--

3. I SPENT AN HOUR AND A HALF ALONE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR THURSDAY AFTERNOON, DECEMBER 9, REVIEWING THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING IMPASSE, THE WORSENING STATE OF U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS, AND ASSOCIATED TOPICS, INCLUDING THE DETERIORATING CHARACTER OF ISRAELI EGYPTIAN RELATIONS (SEPTEL). SHAMIR WAS FRIENDLY AND RELAXED, AS ALWAYS. BUT UNDOUBTEDLY VERY TROUBLED BY THE DIRECTION EVENTS ARE TAKING. I TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT THE FRUSTRATED, IMPATIENT AND INCREASINGLY ANGRY MOOD

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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IN WASHINGTON TOWARD ISRAEL, FOCUSED ON OUR INABILITY TO GET THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS OFF THE GROUND BECAUSE OF PROCEDURAL ROAD BLOCKS AND HEIGHTENED BY A GROWING SUSPICION IN CERTAIN QUARTERS THAT ISRAEL IS STALLING IN ORDER TO PUT OFF TO THE FARTHER DISTANT FUTURE THE DAY IN WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED. I ALSO STRESSED TO SHAMIR THE RISING DOMESTIC PRESSURES ON THE PRESIDENT FOR DECISIVE U.S. ACTION TO CUT THROUGH THE LEBANESE GORDIAN KNOT.

--

4. SHAMIR DID NOT ARGUE WITH MY CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION; INDEED, HE WAS OBVIOUSLY WELL AWARE OF IT FROM OTHER CHANNELS AND FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS WHICH HAS BEEN FULL OF THESE SAME THEMES IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, STIMULATED IN PART BY MY BACKGROUNDING OF KEY ISRAELI CORRESPONDENTS TO PREPARE THE GROUND WITH BEGIN AND THE CABINET FOR HABIB'S MISSION NEXT WEEK. HE INSISTED THAT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO NEED FOR ANY CONFRONTATION OVER LEBANON IN HIS VIEW BECAUSE HE WAS "VERY OPTIMISTIC" THAT THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE COULD REACH A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT IN A SHORT TIME OVER THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES CONCERNING SECURITY AND NORMALIZATION. THIS OPTIMISM STEMS FROM CONTACTS IN RECENT DAYS WITH LEBANESE CHRISTIAN ELEMENTS.

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5. HOWEVER, IT WAS CLEAR THAT WE WERE HUNG-UP OVER THE JERUSALEM ISSUE AS CONCERNS THE VENUE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. SADLY, SHAMIR ADMITTED,  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 8339  
SIT484 AN005801

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1620

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 18339

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STATE PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE  
JERUSALEM IS A "TABOO" FOR ISRAEL'S LEADERS AND,  
ONCE INTRODUCED INTO THE CABINET'S DECISIONS,  
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM OR ANY OTHER MEMBER OF  
THE ISRAELI CABINET TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE TO  
PROPOSE HOLDING TALKS ANYWHERE OTHER THAN IN  
JERUSALEM AND BEIRUT. THOUGH I PRESSED HIM TO  
TAKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE, HE INSISTED THAT IT IS  
POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. ON THE OTHER HAND,  
SHAMIR MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT HE ALMOST  
DESPERATELY HOPES THAT THE U.S. WILL NOW PROPOSE  
A "NEUTRAL VENUE," PREFERABLY IN EUROPE. (FROM  
A LATER CONVERSATION WITH DAVID KIMCHE, I GATHER  
THAT SWITZERLAND WOULD PROBABLY BE PREFERRED BUT  
THAT THERE IS NO STRONG ISRAELI PREFERENCE AS  
AMONG VARIOUS EUROPEAN CITIES.) SHAMIR SAID  
REPEATEDLY THAT IF WE COULD GET OVER THIS VENUE  
ISSUE TO A NEUTRAL SITE OUTSIDE THE AREA HE WAS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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OPTIMISTIC THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED IN SHORT ORDER ON THE KEY ISSUES.

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6. I PRESSED HIM VERY HARD, RECALLING ALL TOO VIVIDLY HIS OVER-OPTIMISM ABOUT WHAT WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE CABINET DURING PHIL HABIB'S LAST ROUND HERE IN JERUSALEM. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY STRONGLY SUPPORT ACCEPTING A U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A NEUTRAL VENUE, THOUGH HE ASKED ME NOT TO QUOTE HIM, OBVIOUSLY FEARING A LEAK THAT WOULD PLAY INTO SHARON'S HANDS. HE PROMISED TO TALK AS PERSUASIVELY AS POSSIBLE TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, BEFORE HE (SHAMIR) LEAVES ON SUNDAY FOR A TWELVE DAY TRIP TO ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY, AND HE AUTHORIZED ME TO REPORT TO WASHINGTON HIS CONVICTION THAT THERE IS A "BIG CHANCE OF SUCCESS" IN GETTING ISRAELI APPROVAL FOR SUCH A VENUE. HE SAID HE KNEW THERE WOULD BE MANY CABINET MEMBERS EAGER TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE. HOWEVER, HE WAS CAREFUL TO SAY HE COULD GIVE NO GUARANTEES BECAUSE THE ISSUE WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK TO THE CABINET AND UNDOUBTEDLY THERE WOULD BE A GOOD DEAL OF DISCUSSION. (WHAT WAS LEFT UNSAID BUT TACITLY ACKNOWLEDGED WAS OUR MUTUAL ASSUMPTION THAT SHARON WOULD CONTINUE TO STRONGLY OPPOSE SUCH A SHIFT.)

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7. IN RESPONSE TO MY PROBING ABOUT HOW LONG NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE IF A NEUTRAL VENUE WERE FOUND, REINFORCED BY MY REPEATED STATEMENTS ABOUT THE SENSE OF URGENCY PREVAILING IN WASHINGTON FOR RAPID ACTION, SHAMIR WOULD NOT GIVE ANY PRECISE TIME FRAME. HE DID, HOWEVER, SAY SEVERAL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TIMES THAT HE BELIEVED THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT "TAKE VERY LONG," AND THAT HE WAS VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THEIR OUTCOME. WE CONCLUDED THIS SECTION OF THE CONVERSATION BY MY SAYING I WOULD RECOMMEND TO WASHINGTON THAT WE PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL FOR A NEUTRAL EUROPEAN VENUE, BUT THAT I WAS VERY FAR FROM BEING ABLE TO KNOW WHETHER MY RECOMMENDATION WOULD FALL ON FERTILE GROUND IN LIGHT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON CONCERNING NEXT STEPS AND IN LIGHT OF THE GENUINE SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AND DISILLUSIONMENT ABOUT THE TORTUOUS TRACK WE HAD BEEN FOLLOWING DURING THE LAST EIGHT WEEKS.

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8. WE TALKED FOR SOME TIME ABOUT THE GENERAL STATE OF U.S. - ISRAELI RELATIONU. SHAMIR DID HIS BEST TO DISPEL ANY IMPRESSION I MIGHT HAVE THAT THERE WAS ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT AND THE PACE OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, OR ANY DESIRE IN JERUSALEM FOR A CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. FOR POTENTIAL ELECTORAL ADVANTAGE, BOTH THEMES WHICH HAVE APPEARED PROMINENTLY HERE IN THE PRESS THIS WEEK, ATTRIBUTED TO WASHINGTON SOURCES. HE INSISTED THAT THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY WAS NOW OF RELATIVELY LITTLE INTEREST TO THE ISRAELI PUBLIC, MIGHT NOT FINISH ITS REPORT BEFORE MARCH IN LIGHT OF THE NUMEROUS ADDITIONAL WITNESSES NOW BEING CALLED, AND WAS UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE ANY POLITICAL UPHEAVAL WHICH WOULD AFFECT OUR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP. SHAMIR DID NOT BELABOR THE SUBJECT BUT HE WAS DELICATELY IF UNMISTAKABLY TRYING TO REBUT WELL PUBLICIZED U.S. SUSPICIONS ABOUT ISRAELI MOTIVES.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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9. OTHER TOPICS DISCUSSED BEING REPORTED BY  
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TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 5726

INFO ZEN/SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 351865

NODIS  
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB  
E. O. 12356; DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, OVIP  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT RECEIVED FOR AMBASSADOR  
HABIB

*File  
Leb Phase II*

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE  
FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB ON SATURDAY, DECEMBER 18

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PHIL,

IN LIGHT OF THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS, IN WHICH I SEE BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS, I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW WHAT I HOPE YOU CAN STILL ACHIEVE. WHEN WE LAST MET, I APPROVED A COURSE OF ACTION TO BE SUBMITTED TO ISRAEL AND LEBANON WHICH I UNDERSTAND YOU HAVE PRESENTED FULLY. WHILE I RECOGNIZE THAT OUR APPROACH MAY HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND GIVEN THAT THERE IS CONTINUING LEBANESE DISAGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL'S PLAN, I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT OUR PROPOSAL OFFERS THE BEST COURSE TO ENSURE THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AND THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OUR OTHER POLITICAL AND SECURITY

OBJECTIVES. I THEREFORE LOOK FORWARD TO THE REACTION OF THE ISRAELI CABINET AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO OUR COURSE OF ACTION.

BASED ON YOUR REPORT FROM BEIRUT, IT APPEARS THAT, ONCE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCE, LEBANON AND ISRAEL SHOULD BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT BY THE END OF THE YEAR. I TRUST YOU WILL HAVE LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO YOUR RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON MONDAY.

GRATEFULLY, SIGNED, RON

END TEXT. DAM  
BT

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BY anf, NARA, DATE 11/25/02

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PAGE 01 OF 02 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3839 DTG: 182146Z DEC 82 PSN: 043353  
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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3951  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC FLASH

~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 03839

NODIS  
FROM HABIB  
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT AS INFO IMMEDIATE  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, OVIP, XF, IS, LE, US  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMB. HABIB  
REF: STATE 351865

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY REPLY TO THE LETTER, DATED  
DECEMBER 18, FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN: BEGIN TEXT:  
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:  
-- I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER CALLING FOR US TO RESUME  
THE EFFORTS TO SETTLE THE LEBANESE PROBLEM ALONG THE  
LINES WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON BEFORE I LEFT.  
-- IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT THE SITUATION I FOUND  
WHEN I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND SUBSEQUENTLY  
WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL REQUIRES US TO MOVE DIFFERENTLY  
BUT WITH THE SAME OBJECTIVE. THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE  
HAVE BEEN HOLDING SECRET, SUBSTANTIVE TALKS FOR THE  
PAST TWO MONTHS AND PRODUCED A WORKING PAPER TO GUIDE  
NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE THEY DISAGREE ON HOW MUCH OF THE  
SUBSTANCE OF THE DOCUMENT IS AGREED, THEY BOTH SEEM  
PREPARED TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THIS  
DOCUMENT.  
-- IN THIS SITUATION, I DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN NOW  
RE-INTRODUCE OUR ORIGINAL COURSE OF ACTION. TO DO SO  
WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY PROVOKE A NEGATIVE ISRAELI RE-  
ACTION, AND A PUBLIC CHARGE THAT WE HAVE INTERFERED WITH  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH LEBANON. THEY  
WILL POINT OUT, CORRECTLY, THAT BOTH SIDES SAY THEY ARE  
READY TO MEET AND NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIC ISSUES; WITH-  
DRAWAL, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND NORMALIZATION OF  
RELATIONS.  
-- I WILL SEE BEGIN AT 8:30 A.M., DECEMBER 19, BEFORE  
HIS CABINET MEETS. I RECOMMEND THAT I URGE HIM AT THAT  
TIME TO SEEK HIS CABINET'S APPROVAL FOR THE INITIATION  
OF NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS ON THE BASIS OF  
THE WORKING PAPER. I WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE EXPECT  
THOSE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN ONE WEEK, AND  
INDICATE THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO RE-INTRODUCE OUR  
PROPOSALS, SHOULD THE NEGOTIATIONS NOT MOVE QUICKLY.  
-- I REALIZE THAT THE APPROACH WHICH I AM RECOMMENDING  
IS NOT AS DIRECT AND IMMEDIATELY DEFINITIVE AS OUR  
ORIGINAL APPROACH. HOWEVER, I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT  
OUR ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE THE ISRAELIS FROM PURSUING WHAT  
THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED DIRECTLY WITH THE  
LEBANESE WILL ONLY LEAD TO A PROTRACTED CONFRONTATION

*Handwritten initials and scribbles*

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BY Smf, NARA, DATE 11/25/02

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PAGE 02 OF 02 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 3839 DTG: 182146Z DEC 82 PSN: 043353

WITH US, DURING WHICH NO PROGRESS WILL BE MADE ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. WE HAVE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE, AS I HAVE INDICATED ABOVE, WHICH CAN BE SUPPLEMENTED THROUGH THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSALS IF THE LEBANESE/ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS PROVE UNSUCCESSFUL. WE WILL BE PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THUS BE IN A POSITION TO MONITOR AND INFLUENCE THE RESULTS.

-- I ASSURE YOU THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL BE IN NO DOUBT AS TO YOUR POSITION THAT WE MUST HAVE A CLEAR AGREEMENT WITHOUT DELAY THAT LEADS TO THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

-- AMBASSADORS LEWIS AND DRAPER AGREE WITH THIS MESSAGE.

-- RESPECTFULLY, PHILIP C. HABIB. GROVE  
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TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS FLASH 5439  
SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3952

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 9350  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0333  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE 3007

~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 03840

NODIS  
DAMASCUS FOR RUGH FROM HABIB  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, US, LE, XF  
SUBJECT: SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON  
REF: (A) STATE 351885 (B) DAMASCUS 09072  
--

1. (~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUGGEST THAT DEMARCHE BE HANDLED AS BANDAR SUGGESTS-- AS MERELY SEEKING VERIFICATION. THE ONE THING I AM CONCERNED ABOUT IS THAT THE SYRIANS WILL SAY THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE REPEAT ANNOUNCE THEIR WITHDRAWAL WHEN WE ASSURE THEM OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TIMING.
3. I WOULD NOT PROPOSE TO USE THE REPORTED SYRIAN POSITION AT THIS TIME WITH THE ISRAELIS. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LEAVE IT UNTIL THE ISRAELI POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL IS FIRM, AND UNTIL WE HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS DETAILS WITH THE LEBANESE, INCLUDING THE TIMING AND MANNER OF A DIRECT LEBANESE REQUEST OF SYRIA TO WITHDRAW.
4. IN SEEKING CONFIRMATION, EMBASSY DAMASCUS SHOULD NOT OVERPLAY THIS MATTER, GIVEN SYRIAN SENSITIVITIES THAT THIS IS A SUBJECT FOR THEM TO DISCUSS WITH THE LEBANESE. WE MIGHT EVEN FIND THAT THE SYRIANS WILL BE RELUCTANT TO GIVE A DIRECT ANSWER. NONETHELESS, I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN AVOID APPROACHING THE SYRIANS, GIVEN THE DIRECTNESS OF THE SAUDI SUGGESTION.
5. WE ALSO ASK WHETHER THE SAUDIS COULD BE ASKED AT SOME POINT TO GIVE US A COPY OF THE ASSAD MESSAGE, OR ITS RELEVANT EXTRACTS.
6. FINAL NOTE: WE MUST AVOID PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE REPORTED SYRIAN POSITION, OR WE RUN THE RISK OF A STRONG SYRIAN DENIAL. GROVE  
BT

*[Handwritten marks: a star and a signature]*

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BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/25/02

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