

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Kemp, Geoffrey: Files
Folder Title: Israel/Lebanon (Phase II) 1982 (6)
Box: 90493

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: KEMP, GEOFFREY: Files
OA/Box: Box 9049 ~~3~~
File Folder: Israel/Lebanon (Phase II) 1982 (6)

Archivist: smf/smf
FOIA ID: F97-106 - Wills
Date: 11/27/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Kemp, et al to Clark re Strategy 3p <i>Part 4/7/06 M08-098/15 #56976</i>	10/11/82	P1/B1
2. memo	duplicate of document 1 3p <i>Part " " #161; R 10/7/10 M08-098/15 #161</i>	10/11/82	P1/B1
3. paper	re Lebanon Phase II 5p R " " #162	n.d.	P1/B1
4. cable	162004Z Oct 82 8p P 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #163 A 11/28/08 M2008-098/15 #56977	10/16/82	P1/B1
5. cable	181732Z Oct 82 4p P 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #164 <i>UPHELD P 11/28/08 M2008-098/15 #56978</i>	10/18/82	P1/B1
6. cable	190247Z Oct 82 2p R 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #165	10/19/82	P1/B1
7. Washfax	1p P 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #166 R 6/29/10 M08-098/15 #56979	10/26/82	P1/B1 B3
8. memo	To Dur and Kemp 1p P 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #167 <i>P 6/29/10 M08-098/15 #56980</i>	10/26/82	P1/B1 B3
9. paper	re Lebanon 3p P 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #168 <i>P UPHELD 6/29/10 M08-098/15 #56981</i>	10/18/82	P1/B1, B3
10. Washfax	2p P 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #169 <i>P 6/29/10 M08-098/15 #56982</i>	10/27/82	P1/B1 B3
11. paper	re PLO 2p D 11/25/02 F97-106/2 #170 <i>D upheld 6/29/10 M08-098/15 #56983</i>	10/27/82	P1/B1, B3

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 4/25/2007

File Folder ISRAEL/LEBANON (PHASE II) 1982 (6)

FOIA

F97-106/1

Box Number 90493

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
1	MEMO	KEMP, ET AL TO CLARK RE STRATEGY	3	10/11/1982
			<i>mvh 3/11/08</i>	
2	MEMO	SAME AS #2	3	10/11/1982
			<i>mvh 3/11/08</i>	

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Inf 11/22/00

~~SECRET~~

Teacher

CLASSIFICATION

90818

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # -

PRIORITY

DEX #

ROUTINE

TTY #

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Oct 12

Judge Clark's
comments
passed to
Geoff Kemp

FROM/LOCATION/

1. KEMP/TEICHER/DUR/ 1

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

JACQUE Hill for JUDGE CLARK - DALLAS

111908Z OCT 82

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

Teicher

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 11, 1982

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*
HOWARD TEICHER *HTE*
PHILIP DUR *PD*

SUBJECT: Strategy for the Withdrawal of Foreign Forces
from Lebanon

State's draft memorandum on Lebanon withdrawal scenarios and the back-up papers on the technical dimensions of the problem present an imaginative and realistic set of options for the President to consider. However, we believe that further discussion of the political consequences of the proposed strategy is necessary before the President decides on the options listed at the end of the summary paper.

We are most concerned that the summary paper underestimates the practical difficulties we face, the potential political problems we will have to consider in the Congress, and the realistic time frame for implementing the strategy. For what is being proposed is a very significant escalation in the degree of American involvement in the physical security of Lebanon including the possible commitment of about 4,000 additional American forces together with their support requirements. Even if Israeli, PLO and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon occurs quickly (e.g., before Christmas), a residual, ongoing American presence of upwards of 4,000 men may be necessary to assure a secure buffer zone in Southern Lebanon.

Our more specific comments and recommendations are as follows:

A. Political

- The Arab Dimension. The memo does not provide adequate specifics for dealing with the PLO and the Syrians. It is assumed that Saudi Arabia can and will negotiate successfully on our behalf without an assessment of the costs to the Saudis (vis-à-vis Syria and the PLO in the peace process) and to US-Saudi relations. Furthermore, while a separate paper deals with the complexities of PLO dispersal, a summary of the difficulties, and a proposal for key destinations (perhaps to include a focus on Jordan consistent with the peace initiative) should be part of the memo.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MDS-09B/15 #56970

BY RWD NARA DATE 10/7/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- The Israeli Dimension. While the memo has been improved to take account of Israeli rejection of UNIFIL (by suggesting that it be our initial position with a quick fallback to the MNF), it does not address how to overcome Israel's insistence that the PLO withdraw first. This may only be an opening Israeli negotiating posture, but the problem, and possible solutions, needs to be more fully explained. Additionally, Sam Lewis has advised that preliminary consultations with the GOI would probably go a long way to increase Israeli flexibility. This could be undertaken when Shamir meets with Shultz on Thursday, October 14. Gemayel is likely to agree to whatever we propose, as long as we can deliver the GOI. Thus, we should do all we can with Israel, in advance, to ensure that they view the basic plan as meeting their security requirements.
- The US Dimension. The political consequences for the President must also be spelled out in more detail, primarily Congressional considerations. We also have to be careful not to present a proposal which Begin and Sharon will cast as insensitive to Israeli security. They would exploit such a US mistake to divert attention from their own problems and to erode support for the President's peace initiative.

B. Military

- Practical difficulties with the timetable and the expanded MNF. In discussing the peacekeeping options for Step One, the memorandum does not address the real and practical difficulties which attend the deployment of an expanded MNF.
 - The deadline established for Step One (25 October) will be difficult if not impossible to meet in terms of force deployments and providing the requisite in-country support for a three brigade-size force.
 - If a force of this size were deployed, and especially if it were used for both steps, the basic memorandum should at least mention the extensive and costly logistics effort necessary to sustain a multinational force through the end of November and, quite possibly, well beyond.

-- Options Not Addressed in the State Memo

The options for Step One and Step Two discussed in the basic memorandum are too limited. Specifically, we should consider UNIFIL for the interposition role along the highway in Step One. Moreover, if the UNIFIL options in both Steps One and Two prove unworkable, we might want to preserve a role for UNIFIL in such things as dissolving Haddad's militia and providing security for the Palestinian refugees in the South.

~~SECRET~~

-- The mission of military forces in Step Two. The military options for Step Two ignore the CIA assessment regarding the high probability of Palestinian reinfiltration into Lebanon across the northern and eastern borders following Syrian withdrawal. Until such time as the IAF is able to patrol and secure these frontiers, we should consider using a portion of the expanded MNF (or the PKF) to undertake a deterrent presence / patrol in the Bekaa.

Recommendation

That if you approve these comments, we forward a blank copy of this memo to State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Per WC:

*Discussed with the President
& Shultz.*

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 11, 1982

ACTION

file

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*
 HOWARD TEICHER *HT*
 PHILIP DUR *td*

SUBJECT: Strategy for the Withdrawal of Foreign Forces
 from Lebanon

State's draft memorandum on Lebanon withdrawal scenarios and the back-up papers on the technical dimensions of the problem present an imaginative and realistic set of options for the President to consider. However, we believe that further discussion of the political consequences of the proposed strategy is necessary before the President decides on the options listed at the end of the summary paper.

We are most concerned that the summary paper underestimates the practical difficulties we face, the potential political problems we will have to consider in the Congress, and the realistic time frame for implementing the strategy. For what is being proposed is a very significant escalation in the degree of American involvement in the physical security of Lebanon including the possible commitment of about 4,000 additional American forces together with their support requirements. Even if Israeli, PLO and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon occurs quickly (e.g., before Christmas), a residual, ongoing American presence of upwards of 4,000 men may be necessary to assure a secure buffer zone in Southern Lebanon.

Our more specific comments and recommendations are as follows:

A. Political

- The Arab Dimension. The memo does not provide adequate specifics for dealing with the PLO and the Syrians. It is assumed that Saudi Arabia can and will negotiate successfully on our behalf without an assessment of the costs to the Saudis (vis-à-vis Syria and the PLO in the peace process) and to US-Saudi relations. Furthermore, while a separate paper deals with the complexities of PLO dispersal, a summary of the difficulties, and a proposal for key destinations (perhaps to include a focus on Jordan consistent with the peace initiative) should be part of the memo.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
 NLRR MO8-098/15 #161 #56970
 BY RW NARA DATE 10/7/10

- The Israeli Dimension. While the memo has been improved to take account of Israeli rejection of UNIFIL (by suggesting that it be our initial position with a quick fallback to the MNF), it does not address how to overcome Israel's insistence that the PLO withdraw first. This may only be an opening Israeli negotiating posture, but the problem, and possible solutions, needs to be more fully explained. Additionally, Sam Lewis has advised that preliminary consultations with the GOI would probably go a long way to increase Israeli flexibility. This could be undertaken when Shamir meets with Shultz on Thursday, October 14. Gemayel is likely to agree to whatever we propose, as long as we can deliver the GOI. Thus, we should do all we can with Israel, in advance, to ensure that they view the basic plan as meeting their security requirements.
- The US Dimension. The political consequences for the President must also be spelled out in more detail, primarily Congressional considerations. We also have to be careful not to present a proposal which Begin and Sharon will cast as insensitive to Israeli security. They would exploit such a US mistake to divert attention from their own problems and to erode support for the President's peace initiative.

B. Military

- Practical difficulties with the timetable and the expanded MNF. In discussing the peacekeeping options for Step One, the memorandum does not address the real and practical difficulties which attend the deployment of an expanded MNF.
 - The deadline established for Step One (25 October) will be difficult if not impossible to meet in terms of force deployments and providing the requisite in-country support for a three brigade-size force.
 - If a force of this size were deployed, and especially if it were used for both steps, the basic memorandum should at least mention the extensive and costly logistics effort necessary to sustain a multinational force through the end of November and, quite possibly, well beyond.
- Options Not Addressed in the State Memo

The options for Step One and Step Two discussed in the basic memorandum are too limited. Specifically, we should consider UNIFIL for the interposition role along the highway in Step One. Moreover, if the UNIFIL options in both Steps One and Two prove unworkable, we might want to preserve a role for UNIFIL in such things as dissolving Haddad's militia and providing security for the Palestinian refugees in the South.

-- The mission of military forces in Step Two. The military options for Step Two ignore the CIA assessment regarding the high probability of Palestinian reinfiltration into Lebanon across the northern and eastern borders following Syrian withdrawal. Until such time as the LAF is able to patrol and secure these frontiers, we should consider using a portion of the expanded MNF (or the PKF) to undertake a deterrent presence / patrol in the Bekaa.

Recommendation

That if you approve these comments, we forward a blank copy of this memo to State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

RECEIVED 12 OCT 82 13

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SEMERAD, K

DOCDATE 08 OCT 82

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

SUBJECT: US PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVES FOR LEBANON

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 13 OCT 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

NAJ

BAILEY

NORTH

TEICHER

KIMMITT

File

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8205063

8205701

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # _____

32 007 9 P:2: 42

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>KEMP</u>	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

7114

October 8, 1982
52 5 11:41

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: KATE SEMERAD *KS*

Before Peter McPherson left for Lebanon he indicated he had discussed the attached with you.

It is his suggestion that the event be staged the day before President Gemayel arrives in Washington, if possible.

If you have further questions I can be reached at 632-7364.

All logistics will be handled by Rich Miller, Director of Public Affairs, AID. His office number is 632-4200 and home number is (301) 262-0983.

cc: M. Peter McPherson, A/AID
Rich Miller, D/OPA
Mort Allin, Deputy Press Secretary
White House
Mike Baroody

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE WILLIAM P. CLARK
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
The White House

SUBJECT: U.S. Private Sector Initiatives for Lebanon

DISCUSSION: Diverse private sector individuals and organizations have become involved in helping with the U.S. efforts for relief and rehabilitation in Lebanon. Considerable money, supplies, technical services, etc., have already been raised by these groups and reached Lebanon. With the formation of two new groups, it is anticipated that further significant U.S. resources will be leveraged for Lebanon.

THE GROUP'S PURPOSES:

Voluntary Agencies: The private and voluntary groups, such as Save the Children, Catholic Relief Service, etc., which were already on the ground when fighting broke out, have substantially contributed to the relief effort in their dispersement of food, medical supplies, etc. At the request of AID these groups have formed a clearinghouse of information in the U.S. to funnel donations to those voluntary agencies in Lebanon.

American/Lebanon Private Sector Cooperation, Inc. (ALPSCI): A newly formed organization composed of U.S. businessmen who plan to provide a rapid dispersal system for U.S. companies that want to give financial or in-kind contributions to rebuild Lebanon. It is ALPSCI's intent to form a counter-part group in Lebanon composed of Lebanese private businesses. All resources, including office space, are donated. John M. Nugent, Vice President, Timmons & Company, is the Chairman of the Board.

U.S. Business Commission on Lebanon: Formed at the suggestion of AID, this group will be composed of approximately 20 CEO's of major U.S. companies. The group would determine potential for U.S. private sector participation in Lebanon. Also, this group will act as the Honorary Board of Directors of ALPSCI. Lew Preston, CEO of J. P. Morgan and Company, is chairing this group.

Ralph Davidson, President of Time, Inc. orchestrated the raising of over \$1M from 27 U.S. companies for relief in Lebanon. Much of that money has already been dispersed through voluntary agencies and to the University of Beirut. No further involvement is planned.

OPERATIONS: All of the above named groups are cooperating with each other. All will receive active support by the U.S. Government but are expected to determine their own agenda, terms of reference, and much, if not all, of their own funding.

U.S. Business Commission on Lebanon
and Honorary Board of Directors of ALPSCI

Lewis Preston
Morgan Guarantee Trust

Hans Angermueller
Citicorp

Donald Rumsfeld
G.D. Searle Company

Dick Debs
Morgan Stanley

W. Clement Stone
Combined International

Robert Fomon
E.F. Hutton

James Robinson
American Express

Max Fischer

J.P. Sticht
R.J. Reynolds

Irving Shapiro
Shapiro, Inc.

William Marriott
Marriott Corporation

Bob Basil
Robert Basil International, Inc.

Rand Araskog (CEO)
ITT

Edward Telling
Sears

George M. Keller
SOCAL

Roy A Anderson
Lockheed Corporation

Lee Morgan
Catepillar

Frank Borman
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.

Bill Ruckelshaus
Weyerhauser

Thomas Joseph Feehan
Brown and Root Company

Ralph Parsons (Owner)
Parsons Construction

James Roche
General Motors (former CEO)

Board of Directors of ALPSCI

Chairman of the Board

John Nugent
Timmons and Company
Washington, D.C.

1-1765

Board Member & Treasurer

Joseph D. Baroody
Wagner & Baroody
Washington, D.C.

Board Members

James M. Roberts
Lockheed Corporation
Washington, D.C.

Edward Forgotson
Shea & Gould
Washington, D.C.

Ralph J. Perk
Perk & Associates
Cleveland, Ohio

President

Bradley Palmer
c/o Brown & Root, Inc.
Washington, D.C.

Vice President

John C. Archer
Halliburton, Inc.
Washington, D.C.

Secretary

Edward L. Weidenfeld
McKenna, Conner, Cuneo
Washington, D.C.

Private Voluntary Agencies Representatives

The following seven voluntary organizations, presently active in Lebanon, will be sending representatives. Their names will be provided under separate cover.

Cooperative League of the U.S.A.
International Committee for the Red Cross
Catholic Relief Services
America Mid-East Educational and Training Services, Inc.
Save the Children Federation
World Vision Relief Organization
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee

REQUEST: The positive aspects of these ventures are numerous. It is consistent with the President's initiative in private volunteerism. It will complement A.I.D. efforts.

We propose that President Reagan hold a Rose Garden ceremony to congratulate and encourage the groups. No more than 10 minutes of the President's time should be involved.

SCENARIO: The Rose Garden would be preset with a large set of risers, enough to accommodate 40 people. All private sector representatives will be seated behind the podium. Standing will be M. Peter McPherson, AID Administrator, Lewis Preston, John Nugent, Ralph Davidson, and one representative from the voluntary agencies.

The President would come to the podium and make brief remarks (suggested remarks attached). He introduces McPherson, Preston, Nugent, Davidson, and one representative from the voluntary agencies to answer questions from the media. The President would leave the podium after his remarks.

McPherson would give a brief explanation of the Private Sector efforts and their relationship to the U.S. Government. The media would then be allowed questions of McPherson, Preston, Nugent, Davidson, and one representative from the voluntary agencies.

Good morning (afternoon). I am happy to welcome here today these fine people who have assembled non-profit private business organizations to help in the difficult task of rebuilding war-torn Lebanon.

As the people of Lebanon begin to rebuild their nation, the United States stands behind their efforts. These people represent organizations created out of the selfless American principles of helping our friends in a time of need. They also exhibit confidence in the resiliency of the Lebanese private sector and its ability to restore a strong Lebanese economy.

I am pleased that we could bring you all here today as evidence that Americans are caring and compassionate people. Certainly the spirit of volunteerism that your organizations reflect is a remarkable tribute to the altruism found in America.

I wish you every success - GOD SPEED!!

REQUEST/RECEIPT FOR TRANSMISSION

WASHFAX

15 OCT 1982 14 2
NMCC-CWO

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

encl 11/22/00

SITE

D

12 OCT 15 P 2: 25

DATE AND TIME TRANSMITTED

372
SSN NBR

DATE AND TIME RECEIVED

TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER

FROM MAYHEW OFFICE/DESK DOD/OSD/ISA/NESA PHONE NBR 695-3890

SUBJECT JCS REWRITE OF LEBANON PHASE II STEP I CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS TAB

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 5

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS
 XXXX IMMEDIATELY

HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS

IMMEDIATELY

NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR EACH ADDEE REQUIRING AFTER HOUR DELIVERY.

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUALS NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
NSC	PHIL DURR	OE08	389	395-7353

REMARKS:

2E 15 OCT 1982 13 31

DRAFT

DRAFT WORKING PAPER

SECRET

3157-3156
Series

DECLASSIFIED

NLS E97-106/2 #167

LEBANON PHASE II

CS NARA DATE 4/7/06

MILITARY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. OBJECTIVE. Disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces in Lebanon. The objective is to be accomplished in two steps: 1) disengagement and an initial substantial withdrawal to agreed positions, followed by 2) complete withdrawal from Lebanon.

2. MISSION OF MNF.* To occupy key selected positions in the areas from which forces have been withdrawn such that, by the presence of the MNF on these key selected positions, neither of the opposing forces will have an opportunity to occupy that terrain and thereby gain a tactical advantage over the other side.

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. Following a negotiated agreement and the beginning of withdrawal to positions specified in the agreement, the expanded MNF will occupy selected key terrain features such that neither of the opposing forces will have an opportunity to occupy that terrain and thereby gain a tactical advantage over the other side. MNF elements will be positioned at the selected key terrain features with due consideration for the security of the force and in such a manner that these positions can be defended. The GOL will exercise control in the areas vacated by opposing forces; international observers will monitor and confirm the withdrawal; and surveillance, intelligence and warning systems will be used to cover gaps and provide reassurance to opposing forces of the status of withdrawal.

a. In addition, the MNF will, from their occupied positions, observe and report any violations of the withdrawal agreement. In the event violations of the withdrawal agreement are noted, the MNF will promptly inform the LAF, who will then inform the Syrians and the Israelis.

b. The MNF will not be responsible for internal security or anti-infiltration measures in areas vacated by the withdrawing forces. The MNF will not be responsible for reconstruction. These tasks will be the responsibility of the Lebanese security forces.

c. The MNF will be assisted by appropriate detection and surveillance systems and by appropriate intelligence information.

* The MNF discussed in this paper is in addition to the MNF now in Beirut.

DRAFT

CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-5

~~SECRET~~

d. The rules of engagement for Phase II are the same as those for Phase I.

e. If hostilities occur between Israeli and Syrian/PLO forces or if either attacks MNF, the ROE will apply. The NCA will address the issue of withdrawal of MNF elements.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL. Because of increased size and scope of envisioned operations, single commander of MNF is recommended. MNF should be composed of national components with commanders, thereof subordinate to the Commander of the MNF.

5. DISPOSITION OF FORCES

a. Positions to which opposing forces should be withdrawn in connection with initial disengagement:

(1) IDF: South of the Awalli River east to a point northwest of Jazzin; direct to Jazzin; following the road south to the Qir awn Dam, thence along the road east to Rashayya, and then directly east to the Syrian border. (Note: this proposal essentially conforms to the 40 KM line north of Israeli northern border).

(2) SYRIAN: From the Syrian-Lebanon border along the southside of the Beirut-Damascus highway to a point south of Zahlah, then north along the Sannin Ridge line and continuing north along the Lebanon Mountains to a point east of Al Batrun then west to Al Batrun on the coast.

b. Potential positions/placement of the MNF (Note: key terrain features/locations are grouped by GOL administrative sectors). (Note: See Appendix 1 for the basis for selection of key terrain features/location).

(1) SECTOR 1: Metn Region

(2) SECTOR 2: Southern Bekaa Valley

~~SECRET~~

6. USE OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS FORCE (IOF) (UNTSO or newly constituted international observer group.)

- a. The IOF must be agreed to, organized and in place prior to commencement of Phase II.
- b. IOF would monitor Syrian and Israeli movements and activities through the use of mobile patrols and check points to insure compliance with the negotiated agreement.
- c. IOF would also operate in close cooperation with the LAF in the areas vacated by the opposing forces to monitor and report any activities of significance.
- d. The use of an IOF in Step 1 of the withdrawal would facilitate the transition to Step 2 (complete withdrawal) since the force would be in place and could extend their function to cover the areas vacated by the withdrawing Israeli and Syrian forces.

7. OTHER CONSIDERATION.

- a. If an MNF is used in Step 1 and U. S. ground forces participate in this MNF, U. S. forces external to the MNF will be required in a support role. Similarly, contingency air support may be required for period MNF is ashore, and demands for airlift support will result in increased requirements for both inter-theater and intra-theater airlift missions.
- b. The use of the MNF in Step 1 of Phase II involves inherently higher risks of sustaining casualties.

8. FORCE SIZE AND COMPOSITION.

a. Total MNF force size for Step 1 of Phase II is estimated to be 5,000 - 15,000.

(1) The lower figure is based on an austere force manning the minimum number of selected key positions. Support considerations were minimized.

(2) The larger number was based on theater commander estimates which involved a larger number of positions to be manned by the MNF and a more thorough examination of support requirements.

b. Force composition will be light infantry with helicopter and vehicular support and other requisite CS/CSS units.

9. US CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF. The US prefers to limit its contribution to the MNF to the use of technical means; i. e., detection and surveillance and providing intelligence information. Such support could cover gaps in MNF presence and provide reassurance to opposing forces of the status of withdrawal.

APPENDIX 1 - SELECTION OF KEY TERRAIN FEATURES/LOCATIONS

1. Long range monitoring posts were selected based on:
 - a. Available line of sight.
 - b. View of likely routes or avenues of approach into vacated areas such that early warning of movement into the area is likely.
2. Close range monitoring posts were selected based on:
 - a. Location adjacent to known roads/highways/routes used by either IDF or Syrian forces in the past.
 - b. Used by Syrians or IDF to control/monitor access into a region, or on routes used by the IDF during invasion.
 - c. Use of the monitoring post would demonstrate a visible presence and provide early indication of any movement through the area.
3. Other considerations:
 - a. It would be advantageous for purposes of liaison with the LAF for the selected terrain features/locations to correspond to the three GOL administrative districts in which the monitoring posts are located.
 - b. The MNF headquarters should be collocated with the LAF at MOD Yarze.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PHASE II

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 08 SECSTATE WASHDC 1608 DTG: 162004Z OCT 82 PSN: 020153
SIT355 AN006082 TOR: 29070146Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB KEMP /008

PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #1608 2892016
P 162004Z OCT 82 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 291608

EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, PINT, MILI, SY, XF, LE, US
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON LEBANON AND THE PEACE PROCESS

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN FYI: AMBASSADOR HABIB RETURNED TO THE U. S. ON
OCTOBER 5 FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS IN LEBANON, ISRAEL,
SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. MORRIS DRAPER ALSO RETURNED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REF M2008-078/15

u 56977

BY Am NARA DATE 11/23/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 08 SECSTATE WASHDC 1608 DTG: 162004Z OCT 82 PSN: 020153

FOR CONSULTATIONS HERE ON OCTOBER 12. SUBSEQUENTLY, ISRAELI FONMIN SHAMIR VISITED WASHINGTON FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY ON OCTOBER 14; HE WILL MEET AGAIN WITH THE SECRETARY ON OCTOBER 16. THE ISRAELIS PRESENTED TO US A PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON THAT FOCUSES HEAVILY ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, WITH A VIEW TO MOVING TOWARDS NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS AND AN EVENTUAL PEACE TREATY. A PEACE TREATY, HOWEVER, IS NOT A PRECONDITION FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL WILL BE VISITING WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 19 AND THESE ISSUES WILL FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN THE DISCUSSIONS. THE LEBANESE WILL BE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED TO AVOID CONCESSIONS THAT WOULD THREATEN LEBANON'S INTERNAL CONSENSUS OR ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD. MEANWHILE, THERE CONTINUES TO BE

CONSIDERABLE MEDIA ATTENTION ON THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING OF PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAS ASSURED US THAT THE IDF WILL TAKE INCREASED SECURITY PRECAUTIONS AROUND THE CAMPS IN THE AREAS STILL UNDER THEIR CONTROL. UNRWA BEGAN CLEARING OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN CAMPS ON OCTOBER 4 TO SET UP TENTS. AMIN GEMAYEL HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE TO OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE WAY THE LEBANESE POLICE ARE CONDUCTING THEIR SWEEPS THROUGH BEIRUT; THOSE BEING ARRESTED SEEM TO BE LARGELY ILLEGAL ALIENS AND CRIMINALS. END FYI.

3. WE DO NOT WISH TO INITIATE BRIEFINGS ON LEBANON. IF ASKED, HOWEVER, YOU MAY DRAW UPON THE POINTS IN PARA 4 FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS ON LEBANON.

4. TALKING POINTS:

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO EARLY

EXD
DIS
EXD
DIS
EXD
DIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 08 SECSTATE WASHDC 1608 DTG: 162004Z OCT 82 PSN: 020153

PROGRESS TO SOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE U.S. ON SEPTEMBER 1.

-- IT IS WITHIN THIS BROAD FRAMEWORK OF INTEREST AND RESPONSIBILITY THAT THE U.S. ROLE IN LEBANON FITS. OUR OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON REMAIN:

- -- RESTORATION OF STRONG, STABLE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

- -- WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

- -- EXPANSION OF LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT ALL ITS TERRITORY.

- -- ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER.

- -- RESUMPTION OF EFFORTS TO END THE WIDER CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS WHILE ACCOMMODATING LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS.

-- THE TRAGEDY OF THE PALESTINIAN MASSACRES UNDERLINES LEBANON'S NEED FOR THE CONTINUING SUPPORT OF ITS FRIENDS.

-- AT LEBANESE REQUEST, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO BOLSTER LEBANESE EFFORTS TO RESTORE AUTHORITY AND CONTROL IN BEIRUT AND PROVIDE SAFETY TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE CITY BY JOINING FRANCE AND ITALY IN CREATING A MULTINATIONAL PRESENCE IN BEIRUT. THE MNF IN BEIRUT HAS BEEN CARRYING OUT ITS DUTIES, WHILE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FORCES HAVE

BEEN REASSERTING THEIR AUTHORITY IN BEIRUT.

-- PARTICIPATION OF AMERICAN FORCES IN THIS EFFORT WILL BE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD BUT REPRESENTS OUR CONTINUING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXD
DIS

EXD
DIS

EXD
DIS

EXD
DIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 08 SECSTATE WASHDC 1608 DTG: 162004Z OCT 82 PSN: 020153

COMMITMENT TO LEBANON'S SECURE AND PROPEROUS FUTURE.

-- AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO THE AREA, WHERE HE CONDUCTED PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN, ISRAELI AND REMAINING PLO FORCES FROM LEBANON. AMBASSADOR MORRIS DRAPER ALSO HAS RETURNED TO THE U.S. FOR CONSULTATIONS ON NEXT STEPS IN OUR POLICY. DRAPER WILL BE RETURNING TO THE AREA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WEEK.

-- WE ARE CONSULTING WITH ISRAEL AND LEBANON TO SEEK THEIR VIEWS ON THE APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS. WITH A VIEW TOWARD ENSURING THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO.

-- ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR HAD TALKS WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ ON OCTOBER 14. WE EXPECT ALSO TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ON OCTOBER

19. THESE TALKS WILL GIVE US A BETTER APPRECIATION OF ALL PARTIES' POSITIONS.

-- ISRAEL INSISTS THAT PALESTINIAN FORCES MUST BE THE FIRST TO LEAVE. ISRAELI CABINET STATEMENTS INDICATE THAT A PEACE TREATY WITH LEBANON IS NO LONGER A PRECONDITION FOR WITHDRAWAL. ALTHOUGH CLEARLY ISRAEL HOPES EVENTUALLY FOR A TREATY. ADDITIONALLY, FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, IT IS CLEAR THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES TO ISRAEL OF PROTECTION FOR THEIR NORTHERN BORDER.

-- UNIFIL CONTINUES TO PLAY A ROLE OF POTENTIALLY GREAT IMPORTANCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT WILL COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE EXPANDED UN OBSERVER FORCE ESTABLISHED BY UNSC RESOLUTION 521.

EXD
DIS

EXD
DIS

EXD
DIS

EXD
DIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 08 SECSTATE WASHDC 1608 DTG: 162004Z OCT 82 PSN: 020153

-- SYRIA INSISTS THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON MUST PRECEDE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. SYRIA STRESSES THAT ITS PRESENCE IN LEBANON IS LEGAL, BASED ON AN ARAB LEAGUE MANDATE AND LEBANESE INVITATION.

-- DESPITE THESE DIFFERENCES, WE BELIEVE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE RIGHT FOR US TO MOVE RAPIDLY FOR A FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. WE WILL BE CONSULTING ON THE APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS WITH PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL ON OCTOBER 19.

-- WITH REGARD TO THE PALESTINIANS, THE U.S. IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH UNRWA, AS WELL AS THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS. TO ENSURE THAT PALESTINIANS IN THE SOUTHERN CAMPS HAVE SHELTER FROM WINTER WEATHER.

-- IN BEIRUT, WE ARE WORKING WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, IN PARTNERSHIP WITH OUR MNF PARTNERS, TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF ALL CIVILIANS, INCLUDING PALESTINIANS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE LEBANESE POLICE ARE ARRESTING AND DEPORTING MOSTLY ILLEGAL ALIENS AND LONG SOUGHT AFTER CRIMINALS. WE HAVE MADE KNOWN OUR VIEW THAT ALL THOSE ARRESTED SHOULD RECEIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH LEBANESE PROCEDURES.

-- WHILE LEBANON HAS GRAVE INTERNAL PROBLEMS, WE BELIEVE THERE IS A DEEP DESIRE AMONG THE LEBANESE FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION STRENGTHENED BY THE CONFIDENCE GENERATED BY THE COMMITMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN TO AN ACTIVE AMERICAN ROLE. WE WILL WORK TO GIVE AMIN GEMAYEL ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT AS HE BEGINS THE DIFFICULT TASKS ENTRUSTED TO HIM BY THE LEBANESE PEOPLE.

-- WE WILL ALSO HELP THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE REBUILDING OF

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 08 SECSTATE WASHDC 1608 DTG: 162004Z OCT 82 PSN: 020153

CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING THE ARMY.

5. PEACE PROCESS: THE DOMESTIC REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 1 INITIATIVE REMAINS VERY SUPPORTIVE. FURTHERMORE, OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE MORE INCLINED TO FOLLOW OUR LEAD THAN HAS BEEN THE CASE FOR MANY YEARS. THE BRITISH, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE BEEN HELPFULLY ACTIVE IN TRYING TO CONVINCE THE ARABS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AFFORDS THEM AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH THEY SHOULD NOT LOSE. OF PERHAPS GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE, THERE IS WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR THE INITIATIVE ON THE WEST BANK AND AMONG PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN.

6. BEGIN FYI. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FEZ SUMMIT, THE MODERATE ARABS CONTINUE TO HAVE A TYPICALLY DIFFICULT TIME FORMING THE KIND OF CONSENSUS THAT HUSSEIN NEEDS IN ORDER TO MAKE AN OVERT MOVE TOWARD THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. HUSSEIN HIMSELF SEEMS WILLING--ALMOST ANXIOUS--TO MAKE SUCH A MOVE BUT UNDERSTANDS THE NEED FOR A MODERATE CONSENSUS BEHIND HIM. HIS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS, HOWEVER, IS TO ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT AN ARRANGEMENT WITH ARAFAT WHEREBY JORDAN CAN TAKE THE LEAD IN NEGOTIATING FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WITHOUT EXPLICITLY OVERTURNING THE 1974 RABAT DECISION CONFERRING THAT MANDATE ON THE

PLO. TO THAT END, ARAFAT WAS IN AMMAN LAST WEEK FOR TALKS.

7. WE WERE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH A MEETING OF THE MINDS DURING THESE INITIAL TALKS, AND THEY DID NOT. THERE IS GREAT CONFUSION WITHIN THE PLO LEADERSHIP AS TO HOW BEST TO PROCEED, WITH ARAFAT OBVIOUSLY TORN BETWEEN THE TEMPTATION TO MAKE DECISION ON HIS OWN AND THE NEED TO

EXD
I
S

EXD
I
S

EXD
I
S

EXD
I
S

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 08 SECSTATE WASHDC 1608 DTG: 162004Z OCT 82 PSN: 020153

GET HIS ORGANIZATIONAL HOUSE IN ORDER. IN ADDITION, THE SAUDIS HAVE NOT BEEN AS FORCEFUL AS WE MIGHT HAVE LIKED IN ENCOURAGING ARAFAT TO ACQUIESCE IN HUSSEIN'S STEPPING FORWARD. PART OF THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN THE AGONIZINGLY SLOW REALIZATION BY THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ARE NOT REPEAT NOT SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION IN ADVANCE OF OR AS A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

8. THE NEXT MAJOR EVENT ON THE ARAB SIDE WILL BE A VISIT TO WASHINGTON OCTOBER 22 BY A FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE FROM THE FEZ SUMMIT, LED BY KING HASSAN, AND INCLUDING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF TUNISIA, SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA. WE SEE THAT AS A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY, BOTH TO CLARIFY OUR INITIATIVE TO THEM AND TO HAVE THEM CLARIFY FOR US THE IMPLICATIONS OF FEZ AND WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED SINCE THE SUMMIT. WE DO NOT INTEND, HOWEVER, TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM, BUT RATHER TO TRY TO CONVINCE THEM THAT NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE WITH ISRAEL. WE DO NOT EXPECT A BREAKTHROUGH AT THAT TIME, HOWEVER, THEY AND WE WILL NEED TO DIGEST THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING, AS WELL AS ON-GOING JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN DISCUSSIONS, BEFORE DECIDING HOW TO PROCEED.

9. THE OFFICIAL ISRAELI POSTURE TOWARDS THE PRESIDENT'S INTITATIVE REMAINS COMPLETELY AND OUTSPOKENLY NEGATIVE. BEGIN. FOR EXAMPLE, REFUSED TO EVEN DISCUSS THE

INITIATIVE WHEN JOE SISCO SAW HIM SEVERAL DAYS AGO. SHARON HAS TAKEN THE SAME TACK WITH OTHER VISITORS. AT THE SAME TIME. MIDDLE-LEVEL ISRAELI OFFICIALS--PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH WHOM WE HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR--ARE DEMONSTRATING GREAT INTEREST IN DISCUSSING WITH US THE INITIATIVE AND HOW IT RELATES TO NEXT STEPS IN THE PEACE

EXD
I
S

EXD
I
S

EXD
I
S

EXD
I
S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 08 OF 08 SECSTATE WASHDC 1608 DTG: 162004Z OCT 82 PSN: 020153

EXD
DIS

PROCESS. THEY ARE QUITE ANXIOUS TO FIND A WAY TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AND, WHILE THEY SHARE THE LEADERSHIPS MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS, THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THE SEPTEMBER 1 INITIATIVE IS ON THE PUBLIC RECORD AND MUST BE DEALT WITH. OUR BASIC POSTURE TOWARD THE ISRAELIS ON THE PEACE PROCESS IS TO AVOID

EXD
DIS

STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE TARGETS TO FOCUS ISRAELI ATTENTION ON THE U. S., THEREBY DIVERTING IT FROM THE SOUL-SEARCHING CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN ISRAEL AS A RESULT OF THE BEIRUT MASSACRES. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF OUR IMPACTING SIGNIFICANTLY ON OFFICIAL GOI THINKING IN THE ABSENCE OF ANOTHER CREDIBLE ARAB NEGOTIATOR WILLING TO SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS PEACE. WHILE THE PEACE PROCESS WAS NOT THE CENTERPIECE OF THIS WEEK'S MEETINGS WITH ISRAELI FONMIN SHAMIR, THE SECRETARY REVIEWED FOR SHAMIR OUR FIRM INTENTION NOT TO NEGOTIATE SEPARATELY WITH THE ARABS BUT TO BRING JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS TO THE TABLE. END FYI. SHULTZ
BT

EXD
DIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1821 DTG: 181732Z OCT 82 PSN: 022058
EOB447 AN006199 TOR: 291/2058Z CSN: HCE878

DISTRIBUTION: GUHN-01 KEMP-01 NORT-01 DUR-01 TEIS-01
/005 A3

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:

OP IMMED /PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #1821 2911840
O P 181732Z OCT 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0000
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 291821

EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, IS, LE, US, XF
SUBJECT: ARENS MEETING WITH DAM ON PEACE TREATY
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPSEC DAM MET WITH AMBASSADOR ARENS FOR MORE THAN ONE HOUR EARLY AFTERNOON OCTOBER 15 TO DISCUSS NORMALIZATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, SPECIFICALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A PEACE TREATY. WITH ARENS WERE MFA DEPDIRGEN BAR-ON AND DCM NETANYAHU. SABEL AND MEROM OF ISRAELI EMBASSY. ON THE U.S. SIDE WERE VELIOTES, KOZAK (L), WALKER (D), KIRBY (NEA/IAI) AND TEISCHER (NSC).

3. ARENS BEGAN BY EXPRESSING HIS GRATITUDE TO DAM FOR TAKING THE TIME TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE PEACE TREATY. HE SAID HE WAS ANXIOUS TO ESTABLISH THE MERITS OF A TREATY AND THE ROLE THE U.S. MIGHT PLAY IN BRINGING IT ABOUT. IN MANY WAYS, THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL THE PROBLEMS BEING DISCUSSED, SINCE IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A TREATY IT MIGHT HELP US ATTAIN OUR OTHER GOALS IN LEBANON AND BEYOND IN THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS. THE REVERSE IS ALSO TRUE, THAT FAILURE TO CONCLUDE A TREATY MIGHT FRUSTRATE OUR ACHIEVEMENT OF OTHER GOALS.



EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

Gk
File

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M2008-078/15
* 5678

BY smf NARA DATE 11/28/08

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-106/2 #164

By smf, NARA. Date 11/25/02

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 04 OF 04

SECSTATE WASHDC 1821

DTG: 181732Z OCT 82

PSN: 022058

E
X
D
I
S

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

E
X
D
I
S

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

E
X
D
I
S

~~REDACTED~~

E
X
D
I
S

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~
~~CTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~
~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~

EMPHASIZED WE MUST NOT BE DIVERTED FROM OUR GOAL OF
ACHIEVING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN
FORCES. IT MIGHT BE BEST, THEREFORE, TO CONSIDER
DEFERRING OTHER ISSUES IF THIS WOULD MEAN LONG,
COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS. SHULTZ
BT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2811 DTG: 190247Z OCT 82 PSN: 022907
EOB775 AN006402 TOR: 292/0925Z CSN: HCE024

DISTRIBUTION: KEMP-01 NORT-01 DUR-01 /003 A3

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHC =2811 2920507
P 190247Z OCT 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0000
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 292811

EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, LEUS, IS, SY
SUBJECT: WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS--GEMAYEL'S
REACTION TO ISRAELI POSITION

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

REF: STATE 289780

NLS F97-106/2 #165

1. - ENTIRE TEXT)

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/25/02

2. SUMMARY: GEMAYEL REJECTS THE ISRAELI CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL BUT IS WILLING TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON HIS OWN TERMS. NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE AT MILITARY LEVEL, AND GEMAYEL WANTS AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE TO BE PRESENT. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR DRAPER, ACCOMPANIED BY NEA/ARN DIRECTOR MACK, CALLED ON PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AT HIS HOTEL SUITE IN NEW YORK ON OCT. 17. GEMAYEL WAS JOINED BY FOREIGN MINISTER SALIM AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORS HADDAD AND MADI.

4. DRAPER PROVIDED GEMAYEL WITH ISRAELI PLAN FOR WITHDRAWAL WHICH SHAMIR HAD PROVIDED AND EXPLAINED U. S. RESERVATIONS ALONG LINES OF SECRETARY'S RESPONSE (REFTEL). DRAPER STRESSED THAT WE HAD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH ISRAELIS BUT DID NOT OURSELVES TAKE POSITIONS.

DRAPER ALSO DESCRIBED ISRAEL'S PROPOSED FIRST STAGE DISENGAGEMENT LINES AND ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT CONTINUED UNIFIL PRESENCE AT NORTHERN EDGE OF SECURITY ZONE. REGARDING ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, DRAPER NOTED THAT THE MILITARY CHANNEL FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS ALREADY EXISTS.

5. GEMAYEL SAID THAT ISRAELIS HAD ALREADY COMMUNICATED THEIR POSITIONS THROUGH CHANNEL OF LEBANESE FORCES. THE ISRAELIS ARE BEHAVING AS OCCUPIER TO OCCUPIED. THEY ARE TRYING TO PROVOKE SPLITS IN LEBANESE SOCIETY AND WANT TO

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2811 DTG: 190247Z OCT 82 PSN: 022907

SET UP A PUPPET GOVERNMENT. GOI USES SAAD HADDAD AS ITS AGENT AND IS FLOODING LEBANESE MARKET WITH ISRAELI EXPORTS WHICH PAY NO CUSTOMS FEES. IF HE WERE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WHICH ISRAELIS DEMAND, GOL WOULD LOSE INTERNAL CONSENSUS AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES.

EXDIS

6. THE BIG QUESTION, SAID GEMAYEL, IS THE LEVEL OF USG BACKING FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. GOL HAS ONLY ONE POSITION--WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. WHAT PRESSURE IS THE USG PREPARED TO BRING TO BEAR ON OCCUPIERS, ESPECIALLY THE ISRAELIS? IF U. S. PRESSURE IS INADEQUATE, IT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR GOL TO REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAELIS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PROPOSALS. IF ISRAEL WANTS TO USE AMIN GEMAYEL TO CREATE NEW RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND TO GAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD, HE IS READY TO COOPERATE.

EXDIS

7. DRAPER SAID THAT GEMAYEL SHOULD BE OPEN TO NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAELIS HAVE STRESSED THAT THEIR POSITIONS WERE NEGOTIABLE, AND THEY ALWAYS TAKE OUT A HARD FIRST POSITION. THAT DOES NOT MEAN GOL MUST ACCEPT ANY CONDITIONS HARMFUL TO LEBANON. GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO USE ISRAELI-LEBANESE MILITARYCOORDTNATTN - COMMITTEE WITH ADDITION OF FOREIGN MINISTRY PARTICIPATION. BUT HE WAS NOT READY FOR FACE-TO-FACE OR TETE-A-TETE TALKS. HE WOULD WANT U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO BE PRESENT. GEMAYEL FURTHER THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF ISRAELIS MADE AN INITIAL MOVE, SUCH AS WITHDRAWAL TO THE 40 KM ZONE. TO HELP GOL ENTER TALKS WITHOUT LOSING INTERNAL CONSENSUS. USG ROLE WOULD BE CENTRAL TO OBTAINING SUCH A MOVE BY ISRAEL.

EXDIS

8. DRAPER SUGGESTED THAT IF GOL FELT AN ISRAELI PULLBACK TO 40 KM ZONE WAS FIRST STEP IT MUST HAVE, THEN GOL COULD START NEGOTIATIONS BY SEEKING THIS CONCESSION. GEMAYEL SAID GOL WOULD FIRST NEED TO KNOW IT HAD AMERICAN BACKING. BUT HE WAS PREPARED TO USE MILITARY COMMITTEE HE ALSO INTENDS TO APPOINT A HIGH-LEVEL PRESIDENTIAL

COORDINATOR FOR THE WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS.

EXDIS

9. GEMAYEL WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT HIS PROSPECTS WITH SYRIA AND PLO. PLO HAD ALREADY TOLD HIM THEY WERE READY TO WITHDRAW, AND HE WAS EXPECTING A VISIT THAT NIGHT FROM A TRUSTED EMISSARY. THE SYRIANS SAY THEY ARE READY TO COOPERATE AND HAVE SHOWN DESIRE FOR NEW RELATIONS BY RETURNING PHALANGE PRISONERS

10. DRAPER AND GEMAYEL ALSO DISCUSSED THE POSSIBLE ROLE FOR UNIFIL, GEMAYEL MAKING CLEAR THAT GOL WANTS AND NEEDS BOTH UNIFIL AND AN EXPANDED MNF. DRAPER SAID WE AGREED WITH ISRAELIS THAT SOME KIND OF SECURITY ZONE IS NECESSARY IN THE SOUTH AND GEMAYEL FELT THAT LAF PLUS UNIFIL COULD DO THE JOB.

11. GEMAYEL SAID THAT GOL VERY MUCH PREFERS U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THAT FROM OTHER SOURCES. HE EXPECTS THAT LEBANESE FORCES MILITIA WILL COOPERATE WITH GOL IN REBUILDING THE LAF.
SHULTZ
BT

DATE/TIME TRANSMITTED

WASHFAX MESSAGE NUMBER

DATE/TIME RECEIVED

REF ID: A56979

939

RECEIVED

OCT 26 4 43 PM '82

OPERATIONS CENTER

82 OCT 26 P 5: 38

SITE A

Central Intelligence Agency



SITUATION ROOM

FROM

Waterman

FILE

SUBJECT

Study

CLASSIFICATION

Secret

PAGES

4

SENT TO:

DELIVER TO:

EXTENSION

ROOM

C

see 1st pg

KPIMP

DIT

NSC/S

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-098/15 #56979

BY KML NARA DATE 6/29/10

26 October 1952

56980

(Handwritten initials)

Please LDX the attached to:

Philip A. Dur
NSC
Room 389
01d EOB
TEL: 395-7353

C

Geoffrey Kemp
NSC/ME
Room 351
01d EOB
TEL: 395-3491

C

Please call for hand pick-up.

1. Attached is a study of peacekeeping options in northern Lebanon which was sent to PM, NEA, ISA, and JCS on 19 October. It is germane to your current deliberations.

2. Per discussions with Cdr. Dur this morning, I am separately LDXing our comments on other pertinent issues under discussion.

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.5(c)

[Redacted signature area]

Charles E. Waterman
NIO/NESA

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M08-098/15 #56980

BY KMI NARA DATE 6/29/10

18 October 1982

SUBJECT: Peacekeeping Options in Northern Lebanon

1. The Setting: The only PLO-controlled Palestinian refugee camps remaining in Lebanon are in two situated in Tripoli (Lebanon's second largest city and a traditional Muslim/leftist stronghold) and one outside Baalbek in the northern Bija' Valley. Approximately [REDACTED] hardcore PLO fighters and an equal number of militiamen are in these areas and the central Bija. Most are Fatah members but a sizable amount are PLFP and DFLP. Syrian forces number around 7,000 and the area is a traditional Syrian zone of influence (the Akkar plain north of Tripoli is populated by many Alawites).

2. Syrian Withdrawal and the PLO: Should Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon a majority of the hardcore PLO forces probably would initially leave as well.

[REDACTED]

Many local militia groups are pro-PLO or pro-Syrian and would assist reinfiltration.

A key factor will be the status of Syrian-PLO/Fatah relations which have been badly strained. Damascus will be hesitant to take all the Palestinians and may demand another US-negotiated dispersal arrangement to other Arab states. Such talks would likely be very time consuming. Should

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-106/2 #168

By smf, NARA, Date 11/25/02

[REDACTED]

moreover,

Fatah may seek to keep its forces in the north and Damascus might seek to reinfiltate its own Palestinian allies (Saiqa/PLA) into the area to rein in Fatah. Assad might also try to stir up trouble in Lebanon using his Palestinian proxies to derail PLO-Jordanian involvement in the peace process, and keep the Lebanese crisis alive.

3. Options

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

RE

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

RE

REDACTED

~~SECRET~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

RE

~~REDACTED~~

~~CTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

LEB II
Time Stamp
RECEIVED

STAFF	C/O
Clark	
McFarlane	C
Poindexter	C
Kemp	C
Duf	C
Merchant	
NSC S/S	

82 OCT 27 P 4:19

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

FILE

C : Copy

O : Original

DATE/TIME TRANSMITTED

WASHFAX MESSAGE NUMBER

DATE/TIME RECEIVED

RECEIVED

002

82 OCT 27 P 4: 19

OCT 27 4 12 PM '82

OPERATIONS CENTER

SITE A

Central Intelligence Agency



WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM

WATERMAN

E. O. 12958

As Amended

Sec 3.3(b)(1), 3.5(c)

SUBJECT

IMPACT OF COMPLETENS

CLASSIFICATION

SNF

PAGES

3

SENT TO:

DELIVER TO:

EXTENSION

ROOM

B

C

D

G

SEE PAGE #1

MARKS:

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRRM08-098/16 #56982

BY KML NARA DATE 6/29/10

27 October 1982

Please LDX the attached to:

Francis J. West, Jr.
Asst. Sec. (DOD/ISA)
Room 4E806
PENTAGON
TEL: 695-4351

D

B. Bigley
Defense J5
Room 2E996
PENTAGON
TEL: 695-5618

G

Jonathan T. Howe
Director, PM
Room 7317
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TEL: 632-9022

B

Geoffrey Kemp
NSC/ME
Room 351
Old EOB
TEL: 395-3491

C

Phillip A. Dur
NSC
Room 389
Old EOB
TEL: 395-7353

C

Please call for hand pick-up.

Originator: Charles E. Waterman, NIO/NESA, [REDACTED]

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec 3.3 (b) (1),
3.5 (c)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 40-4 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.